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T
O THE
HONORABLE JOHN MARSHALL , LL . D . ,
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .
SIR ,
I ASK the favor of dedicating this work to you . I know not to whom it
could with so much propriety b
e
dedicated a
s
to one whose youth was
engaged in the arduous enterprises o
f
the Revolution , whose manhood
assisted in framing and supporting the national Constitution , and whose
maturer years have been devoted to the task of unfolding its powers and
illustrating it
s principles . When , indeed , I look back upon your judicial
labors during a period o
f thirty -two years , it is difficult to suppress aston
ishment a
t
their extent and variety , and at the exact learning , the pro
found reasoning , and th
e
solid principles which they everywhere display .
Other judges have attained an elevated reputation b
y
similar labors , in a
single department of jurisprudence . But in one department , it need
scarcely b
e
said that I allude to that of constitutional law , ) the common
consent of your countrymen has admitted you to stand without a rival .
Posterity will assuredly confirm , b
y
it
s deliberate award ,what the present
age has approved a
s
a
n act o
f undisputed justice . Your expositions of
constitutional law enjoy a rare and extraordinary authority . They consti
tute a monument o
f
fame far beyond the ordinary memorials o
f political
and military glory . They are destined to enlighten , instruct , and convince
future generations , and can scarcely perish but with th
e
memory of th
e
Constitution itself . They are the victories of a mind accustomed to grapple
with difficulties , capable of unfolding the most comprehensive truths with
masculine simplicity and severe logic , and prompt to dissipate the illusions
o
f ingenious doubt and subtle argument and impassioned eloquencé .
They remind u
s o
f
some mighty river o
f
our own country ,which , gathering
in it
s
course the contributions of many tributary streams , pours at last its
own current into the ocean , deep , clear , and irresistible .
But I confess that I dwell with even more pleasure upon the entirety
o
f
a life adorned b
y
consistent principles , and filled u
p
in the discharge o
f
virtuous duty ; where there is nothing to regret , and nothing to conceal ;
n
o friendships broken ; no confidence betrayed ; no timid surrenders to
DEDICATION .
popular clamor ; no eager reaches fo
r
popular favor . Who does not listen
with conscious pride to the truth , that the disciple , the friend , the biographer
o
f Washington still lives , th
e
uncompromising advocate o
f
h
is principles ?
I am but too sensible that , to some minds , the time may not seem yet to
have arrived when language like this , however true , should meet the eyes
o
f
the public . May the period be yet far distant when praise shall speak
out with that fulness of utterance which belongs to the sanctity o
f
the
grave .
But I know not that , in the course of Providence , the privilege will be
allowed me .hereafter to declare , in any suitable form ,my deep sense of
the obligations which the jurisprudence o
fmy country owes to your labors ,
o
f
which I have been for twenty -one years a witness , and in some humble
measure a companion . And if any apology should be required fo
r my
present freedom ,may I not say that , at your age , al
l
reserve may well b
e
spared , since all your labors must soon belong exclusively to history ?
Allow me to add , that I have a desire (will it be deemed presump
tuous ? ) to record upon these pages the memory o
f
a friendship which has
for so many years been to me a source of inexpressible satisfaction ; and
which , I indulge the hope ,may continue to accompany and cheer me to
the close of life .
I am ,with the highest respect ,
Affectionately your servant ,
JOSEPH STORY .
CAMBRIDGE , January , 1833 .
EDITOR ' S PREFACE
TO THE FOURTH EDITION .
In preparing for the press a fourth edition of Mr. Jus
tice Story 's Commentaries on the Constitution , it has been
thought proper to preserve the original text without al
teration or interpolation , and to put into notes al
l
discus
sions by the editor , as well as al
l
references to subsequent
adjudications , public papers , and events , tending to illus
trate , support , or qualify th
e
positions assumed in the
text . The new amendments , however , seemed to demand
treatment in the body o
f
the work , and additional chap
ters ar
e
given for that purpose . In preparing them , the
editor has not been ambitious to enter upon original dis
cussions , or to advance peculiar views ; and he has con
tented himself with a brief commentary on the provisions
and purposes of the amendments , aiming , as fa
r
a
s possi
ble , to keep in harmony with the opinions and sentiments
under the inspiration o
f
which they were accepted and
ratified in th
e
several States . So fa
r
a
s
it was possible to
derive assistance from adjudicated cases , he has sought to
d
o
so ,but he has carefully abstained from th
e
expression
o
f partisan views on disputed points , and he has not in
general deemed it necessary to anticipate th
e
judgment of
the country upon any such decisions o
f
inferior federal
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courts as might seem to him chargeable to the disorders
and excitements of the times , and to be unwarranted by
the Constitution . In the main , therefore , such decisions
have been passed over by him without notice .
The liberty has been taken in this edition to retain the
benefit o
f
a portion o
f Judge Bennett ' s labors upon the
last , but credit is in all cases given b
y
adding his initials .
Notes b
y
the editors are distinguished from those o
f
the
author b
y
being included in brackets .
UNIVERSITY O
F
MICHIGAN , ANN ARBOR , 1873 .
              .
I now offer to the public another portion of the labors devolved on me
in th
e
execution o
f
th
e
duties o
f
th
e
Dane Professorship o
f
Law in Har .
vard University . The importance of the subject will hardly be doubted
b
y
any persons who have been accustomed to deep reflection upon the
nature and value of the Constitution of the United States . I can only
regret that it has not fallen into abler hands ,with more leisure to prepare ,
and more various knowledge to bring to such a task .
Imperfect , however , as these Commentaries may seem to those who ar
e
accustomed to demand a perfect finish in a
ll elementary works , they have
been attended with a degree o
f uninviting labor and dry research , of
which it is scarcely possible fo
r
the general reader to form any adequate
estimate . Many of the materials la
y
loose and scattered , and were to be
gathered u
p
among pamphlets an
d
discussions o
f
a temporary charac
ter ; among obscure private and public documents ; and from collections
which required an exhausting diligence to master their contents , or to
select from important masses a fe
w
facts o
r
a solitary argument . Indeed ,
it required n
o
small labor , even after these sources were explored , to
bring together the irregular fragments , and to form them into groups in
which they might illustrate and support each other .
From two great sources , however , I have drawn by fa
r
the greatest
part of my most valuable materials . These are , The Federalist , an in
comparable commentary o
f
three o
f
th
e
greatest statesmen o
f
their age ,
and the extraordinary Judgments o
f Mr . Chief Justice Marshall upon con
stitutional la
w . The former bave discussed th
e
structure and organization
o
f
the national government , in al
l
it
s departments , with admirable fulness
and force . The latter bas expounded the application and limits of its
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powers and functions with unrivalled profoundness and felicity . The
Federalist could do little more than state the objects and general bearing
of these powers and functions. The masterly reasoning of the Chief Jus
tice has followed them out to their ultimate results and boundaries with a
precision and clearness approaching , as near as may be, to mathematical
demonstration . The Federalist , being written to meet the most prevalent
popular objections at the time of the adoption of th
e
Constitution , has not
attempted to pursue any very exact order in it
s reasonings , but has taken
u
p subjects in such a manner a
s
was best adapted a
t
the time to overcome
prejudices and win favor . Topics , therefore , having a natural connection
are sometimes separated ; and illustrations , appropriate to several important
points , ar
e
sometimes presented in a
n incidental discussion . I have trans
ferred into my own pages a
ll
which seemed to be of permanent importance
in that great work , and have thereby endeavored tomake its merits more
generally known .
The reader must not expect to find in these pages any novel views and
novel constructions o
f
the Constitution . I have not the ambition to be the
author o
f any new plan of interpreting th
e
theory of the Constitution , or of
enlarging o
r narrowing its powers b
y
ingenious subtilties and learned
doubts . My object will be sufficiently attained , if I shall have succeeded
in bringing before th
e
reader the true view of its powers ,maintained by
it
s founders and friends , and confirmed and illustrated by the actual prac
tice o
f
the government . The expositions to be found in the work ar
e
less
to b
e regarded a
s my own opinions than a
s
those o
f the great minds which
framed th
e
Constitution , or which have been from time to time called upon
to administer it . Upon subjects of government , it has always appeared to
me that metaphysical refinements are out of place . A constitution of gov
ernment is addressed to th
e
common -sense of th
e
people ; and never was
designed fo
r
trials o
f logical skill or visionary speculation .
The reader will sometimes find th
e
same train o
f
reasoning brought
before hi
m
in different parts of these Commentaries . Itwas indispensable
to d
o
so , unless th
e
discussion was left imperfect , or the reader was referred
back to other pages , to gather up and combine disjointed portions of rea
soning . In cases which have undergone judicial investigation , or which
concern th
e
judicial department , I have felt myself restricted to more
narrow discussions than in the rest o
f
the work ; and have sometimes
PREFACE .
contented myself with a mere transcript from th
e
judgments o
f
th
e
court .
It may readily be understood that this course has been adopted from a
solicitude not to g
o incidentally beyond the line pointed out b
y
the authori
ties .
In dismissing the work , I cannot but solicit the indulgence of the public
for it
s
omissions and deficiencies . With more copious materials , itmight
have been made more exact , as well as more satisfactory . With more
leisure and more learning , it might have been wrought u
p
more in th
e
spirit o
f political philosophy . Such as it is , itmay not be wholly useless
a
s
a means of stimulating abler minds to a more thorough review of the
whole subject , and of impressing upon Americans a reverential attachment
to the Constitution , as in the highest sense the palladium of American lib
erty .
JANUARY , 1833 .
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CONSTITUTION
03
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .
We, the people of the United States , in order to form a more perfect
union , establish justice , insure domestic tranquillity , provide fo
r
th
e
com
mon defence , promote the general welfare , and secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity , do ordain and establish this Consti
tution for the United States o
f
America .
ARTICLE I .
SECTION 1 .
1 . All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States ,which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representa
tives .
SECTION 2 .
1 . The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen
every second year b
y
the people of the several States , and the electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the State legislature . .
2 . No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to
the age o
f
twenty - five years , and been seven years a citizen of the United
States , and who shall not , when elected , be an inhabitant of that State in
which h
e
shall be chosen .
3 . Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may b
e
included within this Union , according to their
respective numbers , which shall be determined b
y
adding to the whole
number o
f
free persons , including those bound to service for a term of
VOL . 1 ,
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years, and excluding Indians not taxed , three fifths of al
l
other persons .
The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first
meeting of the Congress of the United States , and within every subsequent
term o
f
ten years , in such manner as they shall b
y
law direct . The num
ber o
f
representatives shall not exceed one fo
r
every thirty thousand , but
each State shall have a
t
least one representative ; and , until such enumera
tion shall be made , the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose
three ,Massachusetts eight , Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one ,
Connecticut five , New York six , New Jersey four , Pennsylvania eight ,
Delaware one , Maryland six , Virginia ten , North Carolina five , South
Carolina five , and Georgia three .
4 . When vacancies happen in the representation from any State , the
executiye authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fi
ll
such
vacancies .
5 . The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other
officers , and shall have the sole power of impeachment .
SECTION 3 .
1 . The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators
from each State , chosen by the legislature thereof , fo
r
si
x
years ; and each
senator shall have one vote .
2 . Immediately after they shall be assembled , in consequence of the
first election , they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes .
The seats o
f
the senators o
f
the first class shall b
e
vacated a
t
the expiration
o
f
the second year , of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year ,
and o
f
the third class at the expiration o
f
the sixth year , so that one third
may b
e
chosen every second year ; and if vacancies happen , b
y
resignation
o
r
otherwise , during the recess of the legislature of any State , th
e
executive
thereof may make temporary appointments , until the next meeting of the
legislature ,which shall then fil
l
such vacancies .
3 . No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age
o
f
thirty years , and been nine years a citizen of the United States , and
who shall not , when elected , be an inhabitant of that State for which he
shall b
e
chosen .
4 . The Vice -President of the United States shall be president of the Sen
ate , but shall have no vote unless they be equally divided .
5 . The Senate shall choose their other officers , and also a president pro
tempore , in the absence of the Vice -President , or when he shall exercise the
office o
f President of the United States .
6 . The Senate shall have the sole power to tr
y
a
ll impeachments . When
sitting fo
r
that purpose , they shall be on oath or affirmation . When the
President o
f
the United States is tried , the chief justice shall preside ; and
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no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the
members present .
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from office , and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office, of
honor , trust , or profit , under the United States ; but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment , trial, judgment , and
punishment , according to law .
SECTION 4.
1. The times , places, and manner of holding elections for senators and
representatives shall be prescribed in each State b
y
the legislature thereof ;
but th
e
Congress may at any time , by law ,make or alter such regulations ,
except a
s
to the places o
f choosing senators .
2 . The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year , and such
meeting shall be on the first Monday in December , unless they shall by
law appoint a different day .
SECTION 5 .
1 . Each house shall be the judge of th
e
elections , returns , and qualifica
tions of it
s
own members , and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum
to d
o business ; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day , and
may b
e
authorized to compel the attendance o
f
absent members , in such
manner , and under such penalties , as each house may provide .
2 . Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings , punish its
members for disorderly behavior , and , with the concurrence of two thirds ,
expel a member .
3 . Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings , and from time to
time publish the same , excepting such parts as may , in their judgment , re
quire secrecy ; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on
any question shall , at the desire of one fifth of those present , be entered on
the journal .
4 . Neither house , during the session of Congress , shall , without the con
sent of the other , adjourn for more than three days , nor to any other place
than that in which the two houses shall be sitting .
Section 6 .
1 . The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for
their services , to be ascertained by law , and paid out of the treasury of the
United States . They shall , in al
l
cases , except treason , felony , and breach
o
f
the peace , be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the ses
sion o
f
their respective houses , and in going to and returning from the
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same ; and for any speech or debate in either house they shall not be ques
tioned in any other place.
2. No senator or representative shall ,during th
e
time fo
r
which h
e
was
elected , be appointed to any civil office under the authority of th
e
United
States , which shall have been created , or the emoluments whereof shall
have been increased during such time ; and no person holding any office
under the United States shall be a member o
f
either house during his
continuance in office .
Section 7 .
1 . All bills fo
r
raising revenue shall originate in the House o
f Represent
atives ; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments , as on other
bills .
2 . Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate shall , before it become a law , be presented to the President of
the United States ; if he approve he shall sign it , but if not he shall return
it , with hi
s
objections , to that house in which it shall have originated , who
shall enter th
e
objections a
t large on their journal , and proceed to recon
sider it . If , after such reconsideration , two thirds of that house shall agree
to pass the bill , it shall be sent , together with the objections , to th
e
other
house , b
y
which it shall likewise be reconsidered , and , if approved b
y
two
thirds of that house , it shall become a law . But in al
l
such cases the votes
o
f
both houses shall b
e
determined b
y yeas and nays , and the names of the
persons voting fo
r
and against the bill shall be entered on th
e
journal o
f
each house respectively . If any bill shall not be returned b
y
the Presi
dent within te
n
days (Sundays excepted ) after it shall have been presented
to h
im , the same shall be a law , in like manner as if he had signed it , un
less the Congress , by their adjournment , prevent its return , in which case
, it shall not be a law .
3 . Every order , resolution , or vote , to which the concurrence of the Sen
ate and House o
f Representatives may be necessary , (except on a question
o
f adjournment , ) shall be presented to the President of the United States ;
and , before the same shall take effect , shall be approved by him , or , being
disapproved by him , shall be repassed b
y
two thirds o
f
th
e
Senate and House
o
f Representatives , according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the
case o
f
a bill . '
SECTION 8 .
The Congress shall have power , —
1 . To lay and collect taxes , duties , imposts , and excises , to pay the
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States ; but all duties , imposts , and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States :
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2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States :
3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations , and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes :
4 . To establish an uniform rule of naturalization , an
d
uniform laws on
th
e subject of bankruptcies , throughout th
e
United States :
5 . To coin money , regulate th
e
value thereof , and of foreign coin , and
fi
x the standard o
f weights and measures :
6 . To provide fo
r
th
e
punishment o
f counterfeiting the securities and
current coin of the United States :
7 . To establish post offices and post -roads :
8 . To promote the progress of science and useful arts , b
y
securing , for
limited times , to authors and inventors th
e
exclusive right to their respec
tive writings and discoveries :
9 . To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court :
1
0 . To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas , and offences against th
e
la
w
o
f nations :
1
1 . To declare war , grant letters of marque and reprisal , and make rules
concerning captures on land and water :
1
2 . To raise and support armies , but no appropriation of money to that
use shall b
e
for a longer term than two years :
1
3 . To provide and maintain a navy :
1
4 . To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces :
1
5 . To provide fo
r
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union , suppress insurrections , and repel invasions :
1
6 . To provide for organizing , arming , and disciplining the militia , and
fo
r
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service o
f
the
United States , reserying to the States respectively the appointment of the
officers , and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed b
y
Congress :
1
7 . To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever , over such
district , (not exceeding te
n
miles square , ) asmay , b
y
cession o
f particular
States , and the acceptance of Congress , become the seat of the government
o
f
the United States , and to exercise like authority over all places purchased
b
y
the consent of the legislature o
f
the State in which the same shall b
e ,
for the erection o
f
forts ,magazines , arsenals , dock -yards , and other needful
buildings : - And
1
8 . Tomake al
l
laws which shall b
e necessary and proper fo
r
carrying
into execution the foregoing powers , and al
l
other powers vested b
y
this
Constitution in the government o
f
the United States , or in any department
o
r
officer thereof .
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SECTION 9.
1. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by th
e
Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight , but a tax
o
r duty may b
e imposed on such importation , not exceeding ten dollars for
each person .
2 . The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended ,
unless when in cases o
f
rebellion o
r
invasion th
e
public safety may re
quire it .
3 . No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed .
4 . No capitation , or other direct tax shall be laid , unless in proportion
to the census , or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken .
5 . N
o
ta
x
o
r duty shall be la
id
o
n articles exported from any State . N
o
preference shall b
e given , by any regulation of commerce or revenue , to
the ports o
f
one State over those o
f
another ; nor shall vessels bound to or
from one State b
e obliged to enter , clear , or pay duties in another .
6 . No money shall be drawn from the treasury , but in consequence of
appropriations made b
y
law ; and a regular statement and account of the
receipts and expenditures of a
ll public money shall be published from time
to time .
7 . No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States : And no
person holding any office o
f profit o
r
trust under them sball , without the
consent o
f
the Congress , accept of any present , emolument , office , or title of
any kind whatever , from any king , prince , or foreign state .
Section 10 .
1 . N
o
State shall enter into any treaty , alliance , or confederation ; grant
letters of marque and reprisal ; coin money ; emit bills of credit ; make
anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment o
f
debts ; pass any
bill of attainder , ex post facto law , or law impairing th
e
obligation o
f
con
tracts , or grant any title of nobility
2 . No State shall , without the consent of the Congress , la
y
any imposts
o
r
duties on imports o
r exports , except what may be absolutely necessary
fo
r
executing its inspection laws ; and the net produce of al
l
duties and
imposts , laid b
y
any State on imports o
r exports , shall be fo
r
the use o
f
the
treasury of the United States ; and a
ll
such laws shall b
e subject to the
revision and control o
f
the Congress . No State shall ,without th
e
consent
o
f Congress , lay any duty of tonnage , keep troops , or ships of war , in time
o
f peace , enter into any agreement or compact with another State , or with
a foreign power , or engage in war , unless actually invaded , or in such im .
minent danger as will not admit o
f delay .
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ARTICLE II .
SECTION 1.
1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America . He shall hold his office during the term of four years ,
and , together with the Vice - President, chosen for the same term , be elected
as follows:
2. Each State shall appoint , in such manner as the legislature thereof
may direct , a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and
representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress ; but no
senator or representative , or person holding an office of trust or profit under
the United States, shall be appointed an elector .
3. The electors shall meet in their respective States , and vote by ballot
for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the
same State with themselves . And they shall make a list of al
l
the persons
voted fo
r , and of th
e
number of votes fo
r
each ; which lis
t
they shall sign
and certify , and transmit , sealed , to the seat of the government of the
United States , directed to the president of the Senate . The president of the
Senate shall , in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives ,
open a
ll
th
e
certificates , and the votes shall then be counted . The person
having the greatest number o
f
votes shall b
e
the President , if such number
b
e
a majority o
f
the whole number o
f
electors appointed ; and if there b
e
more than one who have such majority , and have an equal number of
votes , then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot
one of them fo
r
President ; and if no person have a majority , then , from
the five highest on the list the said House shall in like manner choose the
President . But in choosing the President the votes shall be taken by States ,
the representation from each State having one vote ; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds o
f
the
States , and a majority of al
l
the States shall b
e necessary to a choice . In
every case , after the choice of the President , the person having the greatest
number o
f
votes o
f
the electors shall b
e
the Vice -President . But if there
should remain two o
rmore who have equal votes , the Senate shall choose
from them b
y
ballot the Vice -President .
4 . The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors , and
th
e
day on which they shall give their votes ; which day shall be the same
throughout the United States .
5 . No person except a natural -born citizen , o
r
a citizen o
f
the United
States a
t
the time o
f
the adoption of this Constitution , shall be eligible to
the office o
f
President ; neither shall any person be eligible to that office
who shall n
o
t
have attained to the age of thirty -five years , and been four
teen years a resident within the United States .
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6. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of hi
s
death ,
resignation , or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said
office , the same shall devolve on the Vice -President , and the Congress may
b
y
la
w provide fo
r
the case o
f removal , death ,resignation , or inability , both
o
f
the President and Vice -President , declaring what officer shall then act
a
s
President , and such offieer shall act accordingly , until the disability be
removed , or a President shall be elected .
7 . The President shall , at stated times , receive fo
r
h
is
services a com
pensation , which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the peri
o
d
fo
r
which h
e
shall have been elected , and he shall not receive within
that period any other emolument from the United States o
r any o
f
them .
8 . Before he enter on the execution of hi
s
office , he shall take the fol
lowing oath or affirmation :
9 . “ I do solemnly swear , ( or affirm , ) that I will faithfully execute the
office o
f
President o
f
the United States , and will , to the best ofmy ability ,
preserve , protect , and defend the Constitution o
f
the United States . ”
SECTION 2 .
1 . The President shall be commander - in -chief of the army and navy of
the United States , and of the militia of the several States , when called into
the actual service of the United States ; he may require the opinion , in
writing , of the principal officer in each of the executive departments , upon
any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices , and he shall
have power to grant reprieves and pardons fo
r
offences against the United
States , except in cases of impeachment .
2 . He shall have power , by and with the advice and consent of the Sen
a
te , to make treaties , provided two thirds of the senators present concur ;
and h
e shall nominate , and by and with the advice and consent of the Sen
a
te shall appoint ambassadors , other public ministers and consuls , judges
o
f
the Supreme Court , and al
l
other officers o
f
the United States , whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided fo
r , and wbich shall be
established b
y
law ; but th
e
Congress may b
y
la
w
vest the appointment
o
f
such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone , in the
courts o
f
law , or in the heads of departments .
3 . The President shall have power to fil
l
u
p
a
ll
vacancies that may hap
pen during the recess of th
e
Senate , by granting commissions , which shall
expire a
t
the end o
f
their next session .
SECTION 3 .
1 . He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the
state o
f
the Union , and recommend to their consideration such measures
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as he shall judge necessary and expedient ; he may , on extraordinary
occasions , convene both houses, or either of them , and in case of disa
greement between them with respect to the time of adjournment , he may
adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper ; he shall receive
ambassadors and other public ministers ; he shall take care that the laws
be faithfully executed , and shall commission all the officers of the United
States .
SECTION 4.
1. The President, Vice -President , and al
l
civil officers of the United
States shall be removed from office on impeachment for , and conviction of ,
treason , bribery , or other high crimes and misdemeanors .
ARTICLE III .
Section 1 .
1 . The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Su
preme Court , and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish . The Judges , both of the supreme and inferior
courts , shall hold their offices during good behavior , and shall , at stated
times , receive fo
r
their services a compensation ,which shall not be dimin
ished during their continuance in office .
SECTION 2 .
1 . The judicial power shall extend to al
l
cases , in law and equity , aris
ing under this Constitution , the laws of the United States , and treaties
made , or which shall be made , under their authority ; to al
l
cases affecting
ambassadors , other public ministers and consuls ; to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction ; to controversies to which the United States
shall be a party ; to controversies between two or more States , between a
State and citizens of another State , between citizens o
f
different States , b
e
tween citizens o
f
the same State claiming lands under grants o
f
different
States , and between a State , or the citizens thereof , and foreign states , citi
zens , or subjects .
2 . In al
l
eases affecting ambassadors , other public ministers and con
suls , and those in which a State shall be a party , the Supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction . In al
l
the other cases before mentioned , the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction , both as to law and fact ,
with such exceptions , and under such regulations , as th
e
Congress shall
make .
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3. The trial of al
l
crimes , except in cases of impeachment , shall be by
jury ; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall
have been committed ; but when not committed within any State , the trial
shall b
e
a
t
such place o
r places as the Congress may b
y
law have directed .
Section 3 .
1 . Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war
against them , or in adhering to their enemies , giving them ai
d
and comfort .
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony o
f
two wit
nesses to the same overt ac
t , or on confession in open court .
2 . The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason ,
but n
o
attainder o
f
treason shall work corruption o
f
blood , or forfeiture ,
except during the life o
f
the person attainted .
ARTICLE IV .
Section 1 .
1 . Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts ,
records , and judicial proceedings of every other State . And the Congress
may b
y
general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts , records , and
proceedings shall be proved , and th
e
effect thereof .
Section 2 .
1 . The citizens of each State shall be entitled to al
l
privileges and im
munities o
f
citizens in the several States .
2 . A person charged in any State with treason , felony , or other crime ,
who shall flee from justice ,and be found in another State , shall , on demand
o
f
the executive authority o
f
the State from which he fled , be delivered u
p ,
to b
e
removed to the State having jurisdiction o
f
the crime .
3 . No person held to service or labor in one State , under the laws there
o
f , escaping into another , shall , in consequence of any law or regulation
therein , be discharged from such service or labor ,but shall be delivered u
p
o
n
claim o
f
the party to whom such service o
r
labor may be due .
Section 3 .
1 . New States may be admitted b
y
the Congress into this Union ; but no
new State shall be formed o
r
erected within the jurisdiction o
f any other
State ; nor any State be formed b
y
the junction o
f
two o
r
more States , or
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parts of States , without th
e
consent o
f
the legislatures o
f
the States con
cerned , as well as of the Congress .
2 . The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make al
l
needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory o
r
other property belonging
to the United States ; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so con
strued as to prejudice any claims o
f
the United States , or of any particular
State .
SECTION 4 .
1 . The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a re
publican form o
f government , and shall protect each of them against inva
sion ; and on application of the legislature , or of the executive , (when the
legislature cannot be convened , ) against domestic violence .
ARTICLE V .
1 . The Congress , whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it
necessary , shall propose amendments to this Constitution , or , on the
application o
f
th
e
legislatures of two thirds of the several States , shall call
a convention fo
r
proposing amendments , which , in either case , shall be
valid to all intents and purposes , as part of this Constitution , when ratified
b
y
the legislatures o
f
three fourths o
f
the several States o
r b
y
conventions
in three fourths thereof , as the one or the other mode of ratification may
b
e proposed b
y
the Congress : Provided , that no amendment ,which may be
made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight , shall in any
manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of th
e
first
article ; and that no State , without its consent , shall be deprived of its
equal suffrage in the Senate .
ARTICLE V
I
.
1 . A
ll
debts contracted and engagements entered into , before the adop
tion o
f
this Constitution , shall be as valid against the United States under
this Constitution as under the confederation .
2 . This Constitution , and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof , and al
l
treaties made , or which shall be made ,
under the authority of the United States , shall be the supreme law of the
land ; and th
e
judges in every State shall b
e
bound thereby , anything in
th
e
constitution o
r
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding .
3 . The senators and representatives before mentioned , and the members
o
f
the several State legislatures ,and al
l
executive and judicial officers , both
o
f the United States and of the several States , shall be bound , b
y
oath o
r
affirmation , to support this Constitution ; but no religious test shall ever be
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required as a qualification to any office or public trust under th
e
United
States .
ARTICLE VII .
1 . The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient
for the establishment o
f
this Constitution between the States so ratifying
the same .
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· AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION .
ARTICLE I.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion , or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ; or abridging the freedom of speech ,
or of the press ; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government fo
r
a redress of grievances .
ARTICLE II .
A well -regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state ,
th
e right o
f
th
e
people to keep and bear arms shall no
t
b
e infringed .
ARTICLE III .
N
o
soldier shall , in time of peace , be quartered in any house without
the consent of the owner ; nor in time of war , but in a manner to be
prescribed b
y
law .
ARTICLE IV .
The right o
f
th
e
people to b
e
secure in their persons , houses , papers ,
and effects , against unreasonable searches and seizures , shall not be vio
lated ; and no warrants shall issue , but upon probable cause , supported by
oath o
r
affirmation , and particularly describing the place to be searched ,
and the persons o
r things to be seized .
ARTICLE V .
No person shall be held to answer fo
r
a capital or otherwise infamous
crime , unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury , except in
cases arising in the land o
r
naval forces , or in the militia , when in actual
service , in time of war or public danger ; nor sball any person be subject
fo
r
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of lif
e
o
r limb ; nor shall
b
e compelled , in any criminal case , to be a witness against himself , nor be
deprived o
f life , liberty , or property , without due process of law ; nor shall
private property be taken fo
r
public use without just compensation .
ARTICLE V
I
.
In a
ll
criminal prosecutions th
e
accused shall enjoy th
e
right to a speedy
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and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed , which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law ; and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him ; to have
compulsory process fo
r
obtaining witnesses in hi
s
favor ; and to have the
assistance o
f
counsel for his defence .
ARTICLE VII .
In suits a
t
common law , where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars , th
e right o
f
trial b
y
jury shall be preserved ; and no fact
tried b
y
a jury shall b
e
otherwise re -examined in any court of th
e
United
States , than according to the rules of the common law .
ARTICLE VIII .
Excessive bail shall not be required , nor excessive fines imposed , no
r
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted .
ARTICLE IX .
The enumeration in the Constitution o
f
certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained b
y
the people .
ARTICLE X .
The powers not delegated to the United States b
y
th
e
Constitution , nor
prohibited b
y
it to the States , are reserved to the States respectively , or to
the people .
ARTICLE XI .
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law o
r equity , commenced or prosecuted against one
o
f
the United States b
y
citizens o
f
another State , or b
y
citizens o
r subjects
o
f any foreign state .
ARTICLE XII .
1 . The electors shall meet in their respective States , and vote by ballot
for President and Vice -President , one of whom , at least , shall not be an
inhabitant of the same State with themselves ; they shall name in the
ballots the person voted fo
r
a
s President , and in distinct ballots the person
voted fo
r
a
s Vice - President ; and they shall make distinct lists of al
l
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persons voted fo
r
a
s
President , and of al
l
persons voted fo
r
a
s Vice -Presi
dent , and of the number of votes for each , which list they shall sign and
certify and transmit sealed to the seat o
f
the government of the United
States , directed to the president of the Senate ; the president of the Senate
shall , in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives , open al
l
the certificates , and the votes shall then be counted : the person having the
greatest number o
f
votes fo
r
President shall be the President , if such
number b
e
a majority of the whole number o
f
electors appointed ; and if
n
o person have such majority , then from the persons having the highest
numbers , not exceeding three , on the list of those voted fo
r , as President ,
the House of Representatives shall choose immediately , b
y
ballot , the Presi
dent . But , in choosing the President , the votes shall be taken by States ,
the representation from each State having one vote ; a quorum for this
purpose sball consist o
f
a member o
r
members from two thirds o
f
the
States , and a majority of al
l
the States shall be necessary to a choice . And
if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the
right o
f
choice shall devolve upon them , before th
e
fourth d
a
y
o
f March
next following , then the Vice -President shall act as President , as in the case
o
f
the death o
r
other constitutional disability o
f
the President .
2 . The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice - President
shall b
e
the Vice - President , if such number be a majority of the whole
number o
f
electors appointed ; and if no person have a majority , then from
the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice - Presi
dent : a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of the whole
number o
f
senators , a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a
choice .
3 . But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President
shall be eligible to that o
f
Vice - President of the United States .
ARTICLE XIII .
1 . Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude , except as a punishment
for crime , whereof the party shall have been duly convicted , shall exist
within the United States , or any place subject to their jurisdiction .
2 . Congress shall have power to enforce this article b
y
appropriate
legislation .
· ARTICLE XIV .
1 . All persons born or naturalized in the United States , and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof , are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside . N
o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge th
e
privileges o
r
immunities o
f
citizens of the United States ; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life , liberty , or property , without
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due process of law , nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection o
f
the laws .
2 . Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord
ing to their respective numbers , counting the whole number of persons in
each State , excluding Indians not taxed . But when the right to vote at
any election for the choice of electors fo
r
President and Vice - President o
f
the United States , representatives in Congress , the executive and judicial
officers o
f
a State , or the members of the legislature thereof , is denied to
any of th
e
male inhabitants of such State , being twenty -one years of age
and citizens o
f
the United States , or in any way abridged , except fo
r
participation in rebellion o
r
other crime , the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number o
f
male citizens twenty -one years of age in
such State .
3 . No person shall be a senator or representative in Congress , or elector
o
f
President and Vice -President , or hold any office , civil or military ,under
the United States o
r
under any State , who , having previously taken an
oath a
s
a member o
f Congress , or as an officer of the Unied States , or as
a member o
f any State legislature , or as an executive or judicial officer
o
f
any State , to support the Constitution of the United States , shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same , or given ai
d
o
r com
fort to the enemies thereof . But Congress may , b
y
a vote o
f
two thirds o
f
each house , remove such disability .
4 . The validity of the public debt of the United States authorized by
la
w , including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties fo
r
services in suppressing insurrection and rebellion , shall not be questioned .
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any
debt o
r obligation incurred in ai
d
o
f
insurrection or rebellion against the
United States , or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave ; but
a
ll
such debts , obligations , o
r
claims shall be held illegal and void .
5 . The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation
the provisions o
f
this article .
ARTICLE XV .
1 . The right o
f
citizens o
f
the United States to vote shall not b
e
denied
o
r
abridged b
y
th
e
United States , or by any State , on account of race ,
color , or previous condition of servitude .
2 . The Congress shall have power to enforce this article b
y
appropriate
legislation .
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COMMENTARIES .
PRELIMINARY CHAPTER .
PLAN OF THE WORK .
The principal object of these Commentaries is to present a full
analysis and exposition of the Constitution of Government of the
United States of America . In order to do this with clearness and
accuracy , it is necessary to understand what was th
e
political posi
tion o
f
the several States composing the Union , in relation to each
other at the time of it
s adoption . This will naturally conduct us
back to the American Revolution , and to the formation o
f
the Con
federation consequent thereon . But ifwe stop here , w
e
shall still
b
e surrounded with many difficulties in regard to our domestic
institutions and policy , which have grown out of transactions of a
much earlier date , connected on one side with the common depend
ence o
f all the colonies upon the British Empire , and on the
other with the particular charters o
f government and internal
legislation which belonged to each colony a
s
a distinct sover
eignty , and which have impressed upon each peculiar habits ,
opinions , attachments , and even prejudices . Traces of these
peculiarities are everywhere discernible in the actual jurispru
dence o
f
each State ; and are silently or openly referred to in sev
eral o
f
the provisions o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United States . In
short ,without a careful review of the origin and constitutional and
juridical history o
f a
ll
the colonies , of the principles common to
all , and of the diversities which were no less remarkable in all , it
would be impossible fully to understand the nature and objects o
f
the Constitution ; the reasons on which several of its most impor
tant provisions are founded ; and the necessity of those conces
sions and compromises which a desire to form a solid and perpet
ual Union has incorporated into its leading features .
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW .
The plan of the work will , therefore , naturally comprehend three
great divisions . The first will embrace a sketch of the charters ,
constitutional history , and ante-revolutionary jurisprudence of the
colonies . The second will embrace a sketch of the constitutional
history of the States during the Revolution , and the rise, progress ,
decline , and fall of the Confederation . The third will embrace
the history of the rise and adoption of the Constitution ; and a
full exposition of all it
s provisions , with the reasons on which they
were respectively founded , the objections b
y
which they were
respectively assailed , and such illustrations drawn from contem
poraneous documents , and the subsequent operations of the gov
ernment , asmay best enable the reader to estimate for himself the
true value o
f
each . In this way ( as it is hoped ) his judgment as
well as hi
s
affections will be enlisted on the side of the Constitu
tion , as the truest security of the Union , and the only solid basis
o
n which to rest the private rights , the public liberties , and the
substantial prosperity o
f
the people composing the American
Republic .
BOOK I .
HISTORY OF THE COLONIES .
CHAPTER I .
ORIGIN OF THE TITLE TO TERRITORY OF THE COLONIES .
§ 1. The discovery of the continent of America by Columbus
in the fifteenth century awakened the attention of a
ll
the maritime
states o
f Europe . Stimulated b
y
the love of glory , and still more
b
y
the hope of gain and dominion ,many of them early embarked in
adventurous enterprises , the object o
f
which was to found colonies ,
o
r
to search fo
r
the precious metals , or to exchange the products
and manufactures of the Old World fo
r
whatever was most val
uable and attractive in the New England was not behind her
continental neighbors in seeking her own aggrandizement , and
nourishing her then infant commerce . The ambition of Henry
the Seventh was roused b
y
th
e
communications o
f
Columbus , and
in 1495 h
e granted a commission to John Cabot , an enterprising
Venetian , then settled in England , to proceed on a voyage of dis
covery , and to subdue and take possession o
f any lands unoccu
pied b
y
any Christian Power , in the name and fo
r
th
e
benefit o
f
the British Crown . In th
e
succeeding year Cabot sailed on his
voyage , and having first discovered the islands of Newfoundland
and S
t
. John ' s , he afterwards sailed along the coast of the conti
nent from the 56th to the 38th degree of north latitude , and
claimed for his sovereign the vast region which stretches from the
Gulf o
f
Mexico to themost northern regions .
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§ 2. Such is the origin of the British title to the territory com
posing these United States . That title was founded on th
e
right
o
f discovery , a right which was held among the European nations
a just and sufficient foundation on which to rest their respective
claims to the American continent . Whatever controversies ex
isted among them (and they were numerous ) respecting the extent
o
f
their own acquisitions abroad , they appealed to this as the ulti
mate fact , b
y
which their various and conflicting claimswere to
b
e adjusted . It may not be easy upon general reasoning to estab
lish the doctrine that priority o
f discovery confers any exclusive
right to territory . It was probably adopted by the European
nations as a convenient and flexible rule by which to regulate
their respective claims . For it was obvious , that in the mutual
contests for dominion in newly discovered lands , there would soon
arise violent and sanguinary struggles fo
r
exclusive possession ,
unless some common principle should be recognized b
y
a
ll mari
time nations for the benefit of all . Nonemore readily suggested
itself than the one now under consideration ; and as it was a
principle o
f
peace and repose , of perfect equality of benefit in pro
portion to th
e
actual or supposed expenditures and hazards attend
ant upon such enterprises , it received a universal acquiescence , if
not a ready approbation . It became the basis of European polity ,
and regulated the exercise of the rights o
f sovereignty and settle
ment in a
ll
the cisatlantic Plantations . In respect to desert and
uninhabited lands , there does not seem any important objection
which can be urged against it . But in respect to countries then
inhabited b
y
the natives , it is not easy to perceive how , in point
o
f justice or humanity , or general conformity to th
e
law o
f
nature ,
it can be successfully vindicated . As a conventional rule it might
properly govern all the nations which recognized it
s obligation ;
but it could have no authority over the aborigines of America ,
whether gathered into civilized communities o
r
scattered in
hunting tribes over the wilderness . Their right , whatever it
was , of occupation or use , stood upon original principles deducible
from the law o
f
nature , and could not be justly narrowed or ex
tinguished without their own free consent .
$ 3 . There is no doubt that the Indian tribes , inhabiting this
continent a
t
the time of it
s discovery , maintained a claim to the
exclusive possession and occupancy of th
e
territory within their
1 Johnson v . M ‘Intosh , 8 Wheat . R . 543 , 572 ,573 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 11
0
.
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durun .
respective limits , as sovereigns and absolute proprietors of the soil .
They acknowledged no obedience or allegiance or subordination
to any foreign sovereign whatsoever ; and as far as they have pos
sessed themeans, they have ever since asserted this plenary right
of dominion , and yielded it up only when lost by the superior force
of conquest , or transferred by a voluntary cession .
$ 4 . This is not the place to enter upon the discussion of the
question of the actual merits of the titles claimed by the respec
tive parties upon principles of natural law . That would involve
the consideration of many nice and delicate topics ,as to the nature
and origin of property in the soil, and the extent to which civ
ilized man may demand it from the savage for uses or cultivation
different from , and perhaps more beneficial to , society than the uses
to which the latter may choose to appropriate it . Such topics
belong more properly to a treatise on natural law than to lectures
professing to treat upon the law of a single nation .
$ 5 . The European nations found little difficulty in reconciling
themselves to the adoption of any principle which gave ample
scope to their ambition , and employed little reasoning to support
it . They were content to take counsel of their interests , their
prejudices , and their passions , and felt no necessity of vindicating
their conduct before cabinets, which were already eager to recog
nize it
s justice and it
s policy . The Indians were a savage race ,
sunk in the depths of ignorance and heathenism . If they might
not b
e extirpated fo
r
their want of religion and just morals , they
might be reclaimed from their errors . They were bound to yield
to the superior genius o
f Europe , and in exchanging their wild and
debasing habits for civilization and Christianity they were deemed
to gain more than an equivalent for every sacrifice and suffering . 1
The Papal authority , too ,was brought in aid of these great designs ;
and for the purpose of overthrowing heathenism , and propagating
the Catholic religion , Alexander the Sixth , b
y
a Bull issued in
1493 , granted to the Crown of Castile the whole of the immense
territory then discovered , or to be discovered , between the poles ,
so fa
r
a
s
it was not then possessed b
y
any Christian prince . 3
18Wheat . R . 543 , 573 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 50 , 51 , 72 , 82 , 103 , 105 ; Vattel , B . 1 , ch . 18 ,
$ 207 , 208 , 209 , and note .
2 “ U
t
fides Catholica , et Christiana Religio nostris præsertim temporibus exaltetur ,
& c . , ac barbaræ nationes deprimantur , et ad fidem ipsam reducantur , " is the language
o
f the Bull . i Haz . Coll . 3 .
3 1 Haz . Collect . 3 ; Marshall , Hist . Col . 13 , 14 .
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$ 6 . The principle , then , that discovery gave title to the govern
ment,by whose subjects or by whose authority it was made , against
all other European governments , being once established , it fol
lowed almost as a matter of course , that every government within
the limits of it
s
discoveries excluded all other persons from any
right to acquire the soil b
y
any grant whatsoever from the natives .
No nation would suffer either its own subjects or those of any
other nation to set u
p
o
r
vindicate any such title . It was deemed
a right exclusively belonging to the government in it
s sovereign
capacity to extinguish the Indian title , and to perfect its own
dominion over the soil ,and dispose of it according to its own good
pleasure .
$ 7 . It may be asked ,what was the effect of this principle of
discovery in respect to the rights o
f
the natives themselves . In
the view o
f
the Europeans it created a peculiar relation between
themselves and the aboriginal inhabitants . The latter were admit
ted to possess a present right of occupancy , or use in the soil ,
which was subordinate to the ultimate dominion o
f
the discoverer .
They were admitted to b
e
the rightful occupants of the soil , with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it , and to use it
according to their own discretion . In a certain sense they were per
mitted to exercise rights of sovereignty over it . They might sell
o
r transfer it to the sovereign , who discovered it ; but they were
denied the authority to dispose of it to any other persons ; and
until such a sale or transfer , they were generally permitted to
occupy it as sovereigns de facto . But notwithstanding this occu
pancy , the European discoverers claimed and exercised the right
to grant the soil , while yet in possession of the natives , subject
however to their right o
f
occupancy ; and the title so granted was
universally admitted to convey a sufficient title in the soil to the
grantees in perfect dominion , or , as it is sometimes expressed
in treatises o
f public law , it was a transfer of plenum et utile
dominium .
$ 8 . This subjectwas discussed at great length in the celebrated
case o
f
Johnson v . M ‘ Intosh ; and one cannot do better than tran
scribe from the pages o
f
that report a summary o
f
the historical
confirmations adduced in support o
f
these principles ,which ismore
clear and exact than has ever been before in print .
$ 9 . “ The history of America , ( says Mr .Chief Justice Marshall ,
i Chalmers , Annals , 67
6
,677 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 213 .
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in delivering the opinion of the Court,) 1 from its discovery to the
present day , proves , we think , the universal recognition o
f
these
principles .
“ Spain did not rest her title solely on the grant o
f
the Pope .
Her discussions respecting boundary , with France , with Great
Britain , and with the United States , al
l
show that she placed it
o
n the rights given b
y
discovery . Portugal sustained her claim to
the Brazils b
y
the same title .
§ 1
0 . “ France ,also , founded her title to the vast territories she
claimed in America on discovery . However conciliatory her con
duct to the natives may have been , she still asserted her right of
dominion over a great extent o
f country not actually settled b
y
Frenchmen , and her exclusive right to acquire and dispose of the
soil , which remained in the occupation of Indians . Hermonarch
claimed all Canada and Acadie , as colonies of France , at a time
when the French population was very inconsiderable , and the In
dians occupied almost th
e
whole country . He also claimed Louis
iana , comprehending the immense territories watered b
y
the
Mississippi , and the rivers which empty into it , b
y
the title o
f
discovery . The letters -patent granted to th
e
Sieur Demonts , in
1603 , constitute him Lieutenant -General , and the representative
o
f the king in Acadie ,which is described as stretching from the
40th to the 46th degree o
f
north latitude , with authority to extend
the power o
f
the French over that country and its inhabitants , to
give laws to the people , to treat with the natives , and enforce the
observance o
f
treaties , and to parcel out and give title to lands ,
according to his own judgment .
$ 1
1 . “ The states of Holland also made acquisitions in America ,
and sustained their right on the common principle adopted b
y
all
Europe . They allege , as we are told b
y
Smith , in hi
s
History o
f
New York , that Henry Hudson , who sailed , as they say , under the
orders o
f
their East India Company , discovered the country from
the Delaware to the Hudson , u
p
which h
e
sailed to the 43d degree
o
f
north latitude ; and this country they claimed under the title
acquired b
y
this voyage . Their first object was commercial , as
18Wheat . 543 . See also Worcester v . Georgia , 6 Peters ’ s R 515 ; 4 Jefferson ' s Cor .
resp . 478 ; Mackintosh ' s History of Ethical Philosophy , ( Phila . 1832 , ) 50 ; Johnson v .
M Intosh , 8 Wheat . R . 574 - 588 . [Wheat . Int . Law , p
t
. 2 , ch . 4 , 85 ; Jackson v .Wood ,
7 Johns . 290 ; Clark v . Williams , 19 Pick . 499 ; Godfrey v . Beardsley , 2 McLean , 412 ;
Coleman v . Doe , 4 S . & M . 40 ; Jones v . Erans , 5 Yerg . 323 ; Rowland v . Ladiga , 9 Port .
488 ; Sparkman v . Porter , 1 Paine , 457 . ]
.
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appears by a grant made to a company of merchants in 1614 ;
but in 1621, the States-General made , as we ar
e
told b
y
Mr .
Smith , a grant of the country to the West India Company , b
y
th
e
name of New Netherlands . The claim of the Dutch was
always contested b
y
the English ; not because they questioned the
title given b
y
discovery , but because they insisted on being them
selves the rightful claimants under that title . Their pretensions
were finally decided b
y
the sword .
$ 1
2 . “ No one of the powers of Europe gave its full assent to
this principle more unequivocally than England . The documents
upon this subject are ample and complete . So early as the year
1496 , her monarch granted a commission to the Cabots , to dis
cover countries then unknown to Christian people ,and to take pos
session o
f
them in the name of the King of England . Two years
afterwards , Cabot proceeded on this voyage , and discovered the
continent o
f
North America , along which he sailed as far south as
Virginia . To this discovery the English trace their title . In this
first effort made b
y
the English government to acquire territory
o
n this continent , w
e
perceive a complete recognition o
f
the prin
ciple which has been mentioned . The right of discovery given b
y
this commission is confined to countries then unknown to Chris
tian people ' ; and of these countries Cabot was empowered to take
possession in the name o
f
the King of England . Thus asserting a
right to take possession , notwithstanding the occupancy of the
natives , who were heathens , and , a
t
the same time , admitting the
prior title of any Christian people , who may havemade a previous
discovery .
§ 1
3 . “ The same principle continued to be recognized . The
charter granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert , in 1578 , authorizes him
to discover and take possession o
f
such remote , heathen , and bar
barous lands , as were not actually possessed b
y
any Christian
prince o
r people . This charter was afterwards renewed to Si
r
Walter Raleigh , in nearly the same terms .
§ 1
4 . “ B
y
the charter o
f
1606 , under which the first perma
nent English settlement on this continent was made , James the
First granted to Sir Thomas Gates and others , those territories in
America lying on the sea - coast between the 34th and 45th degrees
o
f
north latitude , and which either belonged to that monarch , or
were not then possessed b
y
any other Christian prince or people .
The grantees were divided into two companies a
t
their own request .
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The first , or southern colony was directed to settle between the
34th and 41st degrees of north latitude ; and the second, or north
ern colony , between the 38th and 45th degrees .
$ 15 . “ In 1609 , after some expensive and not very successful
attempts at settlement had been made , a new and more enlarged
charter was given by the crown to the first colony , in which the
king granted to the Treasurer and Company of Adventurers of
the city of London for the first colony in Virginia ,' in absolute
property , the lands extending along the sea -coast four hundred
miles , and into the land throughout from sea to sea. This
charter , which is a part of the special verdict in this cause , was
annulled so far as respected the rights of th
e
company , by the
judgment o
f
the Court o
f King ' s Bench on a writ of quo war
ranto ; but the whole effect allowed to this judgment was , to re
vest in the crown the powers o
f government , and the title to the
lands within its limits .
$ 1
6 . “ At the association of those who held under the grant
to the second o
r
northern colony , a new and more enlarged
charter was granted to the Duke o
f
Lenox and others , in 1620 ,
who were denominated the Plymouth Company , conveying to
them in absolute property all the lands between the 40th and
48th degrees o
f
north latitude . Under this patent , New England
has been in a great measure settled . The company conveyed to
Henry Rosewell and others , in 1627 , that territory which is now
Massachusetts ; and in 1628 , a charter of incorporation , compre
hending th
e powers o
f government , was granted to the purchas
ers . A great part of New England was granted b
y
this com
pany , which , a
t length , divided their remaining lands among
themselves ; and , in 1635 , surrendered their charter to the crown .
A patent was granted to Gorges fo
r
Maine , which was allotted
to hi
m
in th
e
division o
f property . All the grants made by the
Plymouth Company , so far as we can learn , have been respected .
$ 1
7 . “ In pursuance o
f
the same principle , the king , in 1664 ,
granted to the Duke of York the country o
f
New England a
s
fa
r
south a
s
the Delaware Bay . His royal highness transferred New
Jersey to Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret .
§ 1
8 . “ In 1663 , the crown granted to Lord Clarendon and
others the country lying between the 36th degree o
f
north lati
tude and the river S
t .Mathes ; and in 1666 , th
e
proprietors ob
tained from the crown a new charter , granting to them that prov
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ince in the king's dominions in North America , which lies from
36 degrees 30 minutes north latitude to the 29th degree , and
from the Atlantic Ocean to the South Sea .
$ 19 . “ Thus has our whole country been granted by th
e
crown while in the occupation of the Indians . These grants pur
port to convey the soil , as well as the right of dominion , to the
grantees . In those governments which were denominated royal ,
where the right to the soil was not vested in individuals , but re
mained in the crown , or was vested in the colonial government ,
the king claimed and exercised the right o
f granting lands , and of
dismembering the government a
t
his will . The grants made out
o
f
the two original colonies , after the resumption of their charters
b
y
the crown , are examples of this . The governments . of New
England , New York , New Jersey , Pennsylvania , Maryland , and
a part o
f
Carolina were thus created . In all of them the soil ,
a
t
the time the grants were made ,was occupied b
y
the Indians .
Yet almost every title within those governments is dependent on
these grants . In some instances , the soil was conveyed b
y
the
crown unaccompanied b
y
the powers o
f government , as in the
case o
f
the northern neck of Virginia . It has never been ob
jected to this , or to any other similar grant , that the title aswell
a
s
possession was in the Indians when it was made , and that it
passed nothing on that account .
§ 2
0 . “ These various patents cannot be considered as nulli
ties ; nor can they be limited to a mere grant o
f
the powers o
f
government . A charter intended to convey political power only
would never contain words expressly granting the land , the soil ,
and the waters . Some of them purport to convey the soil alone ;
and in those cases in which the powers of government as well
a
s
the soil are conveyed to individuals , the crown has always
acknowledged itself to b
e
bound b
y
the grant . Though the
power to dismember regal governments was asserted and exer
eised , the power to dismember proprietary governments was not
claimed . And , in some instances , even after the powers of gor
ernment were revested in the crown , the title of the proprietors
to the soil was respected .
§ 2
1 . “ Charles the Second was extremely anxious to acquire
the property of Maine , but the grantees sold it to Massachusetts ,
and h
e
d
id not venture to contest the right o
f
the colony to the
soil . The Carolinas were originally proprietary governments .
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In 1721 , a revolution was effected by the people , who shook of
f
their obedience to the proprietors , and declared their dependence
immediately on the crown . The king , however , purchased the
· title of those who were disposed to sell . One of them , Lord
Carteret , surrendered his interest in the government , but retained
h
is title to the soil . That title was respected til
l
the Revolution ,
when it was forfeited b
y
the laws o
f
war .
$ 2
2 . 6 Further proofs of the extent to which this principle
has been recognized will be found in the history o
f
th
e
wars , ne
gotiations , and treaties which the different nations claiming ter
ritory in America have carried on , and held with each other .
The contests between the cabinets of Versailles and Madrid re
specting the territory on the northern coast of the Gulf of Mex
ic
o
were fierce and bloody ; and continued until the establish
ment o
f
a Bourbon on the throne o
f Spain produced such ami
cable dispositions in the two crowns as to suspend o
r
terminate
them . Betweeen France and Great Britain , whose discoveries ,
a
s well a
s
settlements , were nearly contemporaneous , contests
fo
r
the country actually covered b
y
the Indians began as soon
a
s their settlements approached each other , and were continued
until finally settled , in the year 1763 , b
y
the treaty o
f
Paris .
$ 2
3 . “ Each nation had granted and partially settled the
country denominated b
y
the French Acadie and b
y
the English
Nova Scotia . B
y
the 12th article o
f
the treaty o
f Utrecht ,made
in 1703 ,his most Christian Majesty ceded to the Queen of Great
Britain a
ll
Nova Scotia , or Acadie , with its ancient boundaries . '
A great part of the ceded territory was in possession of the In
dians , and th
e
extent of the cession could not b
e adjusted by the
commissioners to whom it was to be referred . The treaty of
Aix la Chapelle , which was made on th
e
principle o
f
the status
ante bellum , did not remove this subject of controversy . Com
missioners fo
r
it
s adjustment were appointed , whose very able
and elaborate , though unsuccessful arguments in favor of the
title o
f
their respective sovereigns show how entirely each relied
o
n the title given by discovery to lands remaining in the posses
sion o
f Indians .
$ 2
4 . “ After the termination of this fruitless discussion , the
subject was transferred to Europe , and taken u
p by the cabinets
o
f
Versailles and London . This controversy embraced not only
the boundaries o
f
New England , Nova Scotia , and that part of
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Canada which adjoined those colonies , but embraced our whole
Western country also . France contended , not only that the St.
Lawrence was to be considered as the centre of Canada , but that
the Ohio was within that colony . She founded this claim on
discovery , and on having used that river for the transportation
of troops in a war with some Southern Indians. This river was
comprehended in the chartered limits of Virginia ; but , though
the right of England to a reasonable extent of country , in virtue
of her discovery of the sea -coast , and of the settlements she made
on it, was not to be questioned , her claim of al
l
the lands to the
Pacific Ocean , because she had discovered the country washed
b
y
the Atlantic , might , without derogating from the principle
recognized b
y
all , be deemed extravagant . It interfered , too ,
with the claims of France founded on the same principle . She
therefore sought to strengthen her original title to the lands in
controversy , by insisting that it had been acknowledged by
France in the 15th article of the treaty of Utrecht . The dispute
respecting the construction of that article has no tendency to
impair the principle , that discovery gave a title to lands still re
maining in the possession of the Indians . Whichever title pre
vailed , it was still a title to lands occupied b
y
the Indians , whose
right of occupancy neither controverted , and neither had then
extinguished .
§ 2
5 . “ These conflicting claims produced a long and bloody
war , which was terminated b
y
the conquest o
f
the whole country
east o
f
the Mississippi . In the treaty of 1763 , France ceded and
guaranteed to Great Britain al
l
Nova Scotia , or Acadie , and
Canada , with their dependencies ; and it was agreed , that the
boundaries between the territories o
f
the two nations in America
should be irrevocably fixed b
y
a line drawn from the source o
f
the
Mississippi , through the middle of that river and the lakes Mau
repas and Pontchartrain , to the sea . This treaty expressly cedes ,
and has always been understood to cede , the whole country on
the English side o
f
the dividing line between the two nations ,
although a great and valuable part o
f
it was occupied b
y
the
Indians . Great Britain , on her part , surrendered to France all
her pretensions to the country west o
f
the Mississippi . It has
never been supposed that she surrendered nothing , although she
was not in actual possession of a foot of land . She surrendered
all right to acquire the country ; and any after attempt to pur
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chase it from the Indians would have been considered and treated
as an invasion of the territories of France .
26 . “ By the 20th article of the same treaty, Spain ceded
Florida , with its dependencies , and al
l
the country she claimed
east o
r
southeast o
f
the Mississippi , to Great Britain . Great part
o
f
this territory also was in possession o
f
the Indians .
$ 2
7 . “ By a secret treaty , which was executed about the same
time , France ceded Louisiana to Spain ; and Spain has since retro
ceded the same country to France . At the time both of its ces
sion and retrocession , it was occupied chiefly b
y
the Indians .
§ 2
8 . “ Thus , al
l
the nations of Europe who have acquired ter
ritory on this continent have asserted in themselves , and have
recognized in others , the exclusive right of the discovery to appro
priate the lands occupied b
y
the Indians . Have the American
States rejected o
r adopted this principle ?
§ 2
9 . “ B
y
the treaty which concluded th
e
war o
f
our Revolu
tion ,Great Britain relinquished all claim , not only to the govern
ment , but to the propriety and territorial rights of the United
States , ' whose boundaries were fixed in the second article . By
this treaty , the powers of government , and the right to soil , which
had previously been in Great Britain , passed definitively to these
States . We had before taken possession of them , by declaring
independence ; but neither the declaration of independence , nor
the treaty confirming it , could give us more than that which we
before possessed , or to which Great Britain was before entitled .
It has never been doubted , that either the United States or the
several States had a clear title to all the lands within the boun
dary lines described in the treaty , subject only to the Indian right
o
f
occupancy , and that th
e
exclusive power to extinguish that
right was vested in that government which might constitutionally
exercise it .
§ 30 . “ Virginia ,particularly ,within whose chartered limits the
. land in controversy la
y , passed an act , in the year 1779 , declaring
her " exclusive right of pre -emption from the Indians of all the
lands within the limits o
f her own chartered territory , and that no
persons whatsoever have , or ever had , a right to purchase any
lands within th
e
same from any Indian nation , except only per
sons duly authorized to make such purchase , formerly for the use
and benefit o
f
the colony , and lately fo
r
the Commonwealth . '
The act then proceeds to annul a
ll
deedsmade b
y
Indians to indi
viduals fo
r
the private use o
f
the purchasers .
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$ 31. “ Without ascribing to this act the power of annulling
vested rights , or admitting it to countervail the testimony fur
nished by themarginal note opposite to the title of the law forbid
ding purchases from the Indians, in the revisals of the Virginia
statutes , stating that law to be repealed , it may safely be consid
ered as an unequivocal affirmance , on the part of Virginia , of the
broad principle , which had always been maintained , that th
e
ex
clusive right to purchase from the Indians resided in the govern
ment .
§ 3
2 . “ In pursuance of the same idea , Virginia proceeded , at
the same session , to open her land -office fo
r
the sale o
f
that coun
try which now constitutes Kentucky , a country every acre of
which was then claimed and possessed b
y
Indians , who main
tained their title with a
s
much persevering courage as was ever
manifested b
y any people .
$ 3
3 . “ The States having within their chartered limits different
portions of territory covered b
y
Indians , ceded that territory , gen
erally , to the United States , on conditions expressed in their deeds
o
f
cession ,which demonstrate the opinion , that they ceded the soil
a
swell as jurisdiction , and that in doing so , they granted a pro
ductive fund to the government of the Union . The lands in con
troversy la
y
within the chartered limits of Virginia , and were
ceded with the whole country northwest of the river Ohio . This
grant contained reservations and stipulations ,which could only be
made b
y
the owners o
f
the soil ; and concluded with a stipulation ,
that a
ll
the lands in the ceded territory , not reserved , should be
considered as a common fund , for the use and benefit of such of
the United States a
s
have become , or shall become ,members of
the confederation , ' & c . , 'according to their usual respective pro
portions in the general charge and expenditure , and shall be faith
fully and bonâ fide disposed of for that purpose , and fo
r
n
o
other
use o
r purpose whatsoever . ' The ceded territory was occupied by
numerous and warlike tribes o
f
Indians ; but the exclusive right .
o
f
the United States to extinguish their title , and to grant the soil ,
has never , we believe , been doubted .
§ 3
4 . “ After these States became independent , a controversy
subsisted between them and Spain respecting boundary . B
y
th
e
treaty o
f
1795 , this controversy was adjusted , and Spain ceded to
the United States th
e
territory in question . This territory , though
claimed b
y
both nations ,was chiefly in the actual occupation of
Indians .
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$ 35 . “ The magnificent purchase of Louisiana was the pur
chase from France of a country almost entirely occupied by
numerous tribes of Indians , who are in fact independent . Yet ,
any attempt of others to intrude into that country would be con
sidered as an aggression which would justify war.
§ 36 . “ Our late acquisitions from Spain are of the same char
acter ; and the negotiations which preceded those acquisitions
recognize and elucidate the principle which has been received as
the foundation of a
ll European title in America .
$ 3
7 . “ The United States , then , have unequivocally acceded to
that great and broad rule b
y
which it
s
civilized inhabitants now
hold this country . They hold , and assert in themselves , the title
b
y
which it was acquired . They maintain , as all others have
maintained , that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish
the Indian title o
f occupancy , either b
y
purchase o
r by conquest ;
and gave also a right to such a degree of sovereignty as the cir
cumstances o
f
the people would allow them to exercise .
$ 3
8 . “ The power now possessed b
y
the government o
f
the
United States to grant lands resided ,while w
e
were colonies , in
the crown or it
s grantees . The validity of the titles given b
y
either has never been questioned in our courts . It has been exer
cised uniformly over territory in possession of the Indians . The
existence o
f
this power must negative the existence of any right
which may conflict with and control it . An absolute title to lands
cannot exist , at the same time , in different persons , or in different
governments . An absolute must be an exclusive title , or at least
a title which excludes all others not compatible with it . All our
institutions recognize the absolute title o
f
the crown , subject only
to the Indian right of occupancy , and recognize the absolute title
o
f
the crown to extinguish that right . This is incompatible with
a
n absolute and complete title in th
e
Indians . ”
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CHAPTER II .
ORIGIN AND SETTLEMENT OF VIRGINIA .
$ 39. Having thus traced out the origin of the title to the soil
of America asserted by the European nations , we may now enter
upon a consideration of themanner in which the settlements were
made , and of the political constitutions by which the various col
onies were organized and governed .
$ 40 . For a long time after the discoveries of Cabot were made ,
England from various causes remained in a state of indifference or
inactivity in respect to the territory thus subjected to her sway .1
Nearly a century elapsed before any effectual plan fo
r
planting any
colony was put into operation ; and indeed the ill success , not to
say entire failure , of the first expedition was well calculated to
abate any undue confidence in the value of such enterprises . In
1578 , Sir Humphrey Gilbert , having obtained letters -patent from
Queen Elizabeth , granting him and hi
s
heirs any lands discovered
b
y
h
im , attempted a settlement on th
e
cold and barren shores o
f
Cape Breton and the adjacent regions , and exhausted his fortune
and lost his life in the fruitless labor . The brilliant genius of
Sir Walter Raleigh was captivated b
y
the allurements o
f any
scheme which gave play to his romantic temper ; and unmindful
o
f the disastrous fate o
f
his half -brother , or gathering fresh
courage from the consciousness of difficulties , eagerly followed u
p
the original plan under a new patent from the crown . To him
we are indebted for the first plantations in the South ; 5 and such
was the splendor o
f
the description o
f
the soil and climate and
productions o
f
that region given b
y
the first adventurers , that
Elizabeth was proud to bestow upon it the name of Virginia , and
thus to connect it with the reign o
f
a virgin Queen . . But not
withstanding the bright prospects thus held out , three successive
1 Robertson ' s America , B . 9 ; Doug . Summ . 11
0
, & c .
? i Haz . Coll . 24 .
3 Marshall ' s Colon . 15 , 16 ; Robertson ' s America , B . 9 .
4 1 Haz . Coll . 33 ; Robertson ' s America , B . 9 .
5 i Haz . Coll . 38 - 40 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 385 .
6 Marsh . Colon . 1
7 ; Robertson ' s America , B , 9 .
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attempts under the auspices of Raleigh ended in a ruinous disas- .
te
r , and seemed but a presage of the hard fate and darkened for
tunes o
f
that gallant , but unfortunate gentleman . 1
§ 4
1 . The first permanent settlement made in America under
the auspices o
f England was under a charter granted to Sir
Thomas Gates and his associates b
y
James the First , in the
fourth year after his accession to the throne o
f England ? ( in
1606 ) . That charter granted to them the territories in America ,
then commonly called Virginia , lying on the se
a
-coast between
th
e
34th and the 45th degrees o
f
north latitude and the islands ad
jacent within 10
0
miles ,which were not belonging to or possessed
b
y any Christian prince o
r people . The associates were divided
into two companies , one of which was required to settle between
the 34th and 41st degrees o
f
north latitude , and th
e
other be
tween the 38th and 45th degrees o
f
north latitude , but not within
100 miles of the prior colony . B
y
degrees the name o
f Virginia
was confined to the first o
r
south colony . 3 The second assumed
the name o
f
the Plymouth Company , from the residence of the
original grantees ; and New England was founded under their
auspices . Each colony had exclusive propriety in al
l
the terri
tory within fifty miles from the first seat of their plantation .
§ 4
2 . Some of the provisions of this charter deserve a particu
lar consideration from the light they throw pon the political
and civil condition o
f
the persons who should become inhab
itants o
f
the colonies . The companies were authorized to en
gage as colonists any o
f
the subjects o
f England who should
b
e disposed to emigrate . All persons being English subjects
and inhabiting in the colonies ,and every one of their children born
therein , were declared to have and possess all liberties , franchises ,
and immunities , within any other of the dominions of the crown ,
to a
ll
intents and purposes , as if they had been abiding and born
within the realm o
f England , or any other dominions of the
crown . The patentees were to hold the lands , & c . , in the colony ,
o
f
the king , his heirs and successors , as of the manor of East
Greenwich in the county o
f Kent , in free and common socage
only , and not in capite ; and were authorized to grant the same to
1 Robertson ' s America , B . 9 .
2 Marsh . Colon . 25 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 50 ; Robertson ' s America , B . 9 .
8 1 Haz . Coll . 99 ; Robertson ' s America , B . 9 .
4 Robertson ' s America , B . 9 . 51 Haz . Coll . 50 .
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the inhabitants of the colonies in such manner and form and for
such estates , as the council of the colony should direct .1
§ 43 . In respect to political government , each colony was to
be governed by a local council, appointed and removable at the
pleasure of the crown , according to the royal instructions and
ordinances from time to time promulgated . These councils
were to be under the superior management and direction of an
other council sitting in England . A power was given to expel
all intruders , and to lay a limited duty upon al
l
persons traffick
ing with the colony ; and a prohibition was imposed upon all
the colonists against trafficking with foreign countries under the
pretence o
f
trade from the mother country to the colonies . ?
$ 4
4 . The royal authority soon found a gratifying employment
in drawing u
p
and establishing a code of fundamental regula
tions for these colonies , in pursuance o
f
the power reserved in
the charter . A superintending council was created in England .
The legislative and executive powers were vested in the presi
dent and councils of the colonies ; but their ordinances were not
to touch life nor limb , and were in substance to conform to the
laws o
f England , and were to continue in force only until made
void b
y
the crown , or the council in England . Persons com
mitting high offences were to be sent to England for punish
ment ; and subordinate offences were to be punished a
t
the dis
cretion o
f
the president and council . Allegiance to the crown
was strictly insisted on ; and the Church of England established . 3
The royal authority was in all respects made paramount ; and
the value o
f political liberty was totally overlooked , or deliber
ately disregarded .
§ 4
5 . The charter of th
e
first or Virginia colony was succes
sively altered in 1609 and 1612 , 4 without any important change
in it
s
substantial provisions , as to the civil o
r political rights of
the colonists . It is surprising , indeed , that charters securing such
vast powers to the crown , and such entire dependence on the
part of the emigrants , should have found any favor in the eyes
either o
f
the proprietors or o
f
the people . B
y
placing the whole
legislative and executive powers in a council nominated b
y
the
11 Haz . Coll . 50 ; Marsh . Colon . 25 , 26 ; Robertson ' s Amer . B . 9 .
2 1 Haz . Coll . 50 ; Marsh . Colon . 26 .
8 Marsh . Colon . 27 , 28 .
4 i Haz . Coll . 58 , 72 ; Marsh . Colon . 44 , 45 , 47 ; Robertson ' s America , B . 9 .
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crown , and guided by its instructions , every person settling in
America seems to have been bereaved o
f
th
e
noblest privileges
o
f
a free man . But without hesitation or reluctance , the pro
prietors of both colonies prepared to execute their respective
plans ; and under the authority of a charter , which would now
b
e rejected with disdain as a violent invasion o
f
the sacred and
inalienable rights of liberty , the first permanent settlements o
f
the
English in America were established . From this period the
progress o
f
the two provinces o
f Virginia and New England
forms a regular and connected story . The former in th
e
South ,
and the latter in the North ,may be considered as the original and
parent colonies , in imitation of which , and under whose shelter ,
all the others have been successively planted and reared .
$ 4
6 . The settlements in Virginia were earliest in point of
date , and were fast advancing under a policy , which subdivided
th
e
property among th
e
settlers , instead of retaining it in com
mon , and thus gave vigor to private enterprise . As the colony
increased , the spirit of its members assumed more and more the
tone o
f independence ; and they grew restless and impatient for
the privileges enjoyed under the government o
f
their native coun
try . To quiet this uneasiness , Sir George Yeardley , then the
governor o
f
the colony , in 1619 , called a general assembly , com
posed o
f representatives from the various plantations in the col
ony , and permitted them to assume and exercise the high func
tions o
f legislation . Thus was formed and established th
e
first
representative legislature that ever sat in America . And this
example of a domestic parliament to regulate all the internal
concerns o
f
the country was never lost sight o
f , but was ever
afterwards cherished throughout America , as the dearest birthright
o
f
freemen . So acceptable was it to the people , and so indispen
sable to the real prosperity o
f
the colony , that the council in Eng
land were compelled , in 1621 , to issue an ordinance , which gave
it a complete and permanent sanction . In imitation of the con
stitution o
f
the British Parliament , the legislative power was
lodged partly in the governor ,who held the place of the sover
eign ; partly in a council of state named b
y
the company ; and
1 I quote the very words of D
r
. Robertson throughout this passage fo
r
it
s spirit and
general truth . Robert . Hist . of America , B . 9 .
? Robertson ' s America , B 9 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 2 , p . 5
4 .
Henning , Stat . 111 ; Stith ' s Virg . App . No . 4 , p . 321 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 54 .
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partly in an assembly composed of representatives freely chosen
by the people . Each branch of the legislature might decide by
a majority of voices , and a negative was reserved to the gov
ernor . But no law was to be in force , though approved by all
three of the branches of the legislature , until it was ratified by a
general court of the company , and returned under its seal to the
colony . The ordinance further required the general assembly , as
also the council o
f
state , “ to imitate and follow the policy of the
form o
f government , laws , customs , and manner o
f
trial and other
administration of justice used in the realm of England ; as near as
may b
e . ” The conduct of the colonists , as well as the company ,
soon afterwards gave offence to King James ; and the disasters ,
which accomplished an almost total destruction o
f
the colony b
y
the successful inroads o
f
the Indians , created much discontent
and disappointment among the proprietors a
t
home . The king
found it no difficult matter to satisfy the nation that an inquiry
into their conduct was necessary . It was accordingly ordered ;
and the result o
f
that inquiry , by commissioners appointed b
y
himself , was a demand on th
e
part o
f
the crown o
f
a surrender
o
f
th
e
charters . The demand was resisted by the company ; a
quo warranto was instituted against them , and it terminated , as
in that age it might well be supposed it would , in a judgment ,
pronounced in 1624 b
y
judges holding their offices during his
pleasure , that the franchises were forfeited and the corporation
should be dissolved . 3
$ 4
7 . It does not appear that these proceedings , although they
have met with severe rebuke in later times , attracted any indig
nation o
r sympathy for the sufferers on this occasion . The royal
prerogative was then viewed without jealousy , if not with favor ;
and the rights o
f Englishmen were ill defined and ill protected
under a reign remarkable for n
o great o
r
noble objects . D
r
. Rob
ertson has observed , that the company , like al
l
unprosperous so
cieties , fell unpitied ; 4 and the nation were content to forget the
prostration o
f
private rights , under the false encouragements held
out o
f
aid to the colony from the benignant efforts and future
counsels o
f
the crown .
1 Robertson ' s America , B . 9 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 2 , p . 56 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 131 .
3 In 1623 . See 1 Haz . Coll . 155 .
8 Robertson ' s America , B . 9 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 183 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 2 , p . 60 , 62 ;
Chalmers ' s Annals .
4 Robertson ' s America , B . 9 .
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§ 48. With the fall of the charter the colony came under the
immediate government and control of the crown itself ;, and the
king issued a special commission appointing a governor and twelve
counsellors , to whom the entire direction of its affairs was com
mitted . In this commission no representative assembly was men
tioned ; and there is little reason to suppose that James the First ,
who , besides his arbitrary notions of government , imputed the
recent disasters to the existence of such an assembly , ever
intended to revive it . While he was yetmeditating upon a plan
o
r
code o
f government , his death put an end to his projects ,which
were better calculated to nourish his own pride and conceit , than
to subserve the permanent interests o
f
the province . Henceforth ,
however , Virginia continued to be a royal province until the period
o
f
the American Revolution . 3
§49 . Charles the First adopted th
e
notions and followed ou
t
in
it
s
full extent the colonial system of hi
s
father . 4 He declared the
colony to be a part o
f
the empire annexed to the crown , and im
mediately subordinate to it
s jurisdiction . During the greater part
o
f his reign , Virginia knew no other law than the will of the sov
ereign , or his delegated agents ; and statutes were passed and
taxes imposed without the slightest effort to convene a colonial
assembly . It was not until the murmurs and complaints which
such a course o
f
conduct was calculated to produce had betrayed
the inhabitants into acts o
f
open resistance to the governor , and
into a firm demand o
f
redress from the crown against his oppres
sions , that the king was brought to more considerate measures .
He did not at once yield to their discontents ; but pressed , as he
was , b
y
severe embarrassments a
t
home , he was content to adopt a
policy which would conciliate the colony and remove some of it
s
just complaints . He accordingly soon afterwards appointed Si
r
William Berkeley governor , with powers and instructions which
breathed a fa
r
more benign spirit . Hewas authorized to proclaim ,
that in a
ll
it
s
concerns , civil as well as ecclesiastical , the colony
should be governed according to th
e
laws o
f England . Hewas
directed to issue writs for electing representatives o
f
the people ,
11 Haz . Coll . 189 .
? Marsh . Colon . ch . 2 , p . 63 , 64 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 189 .
8 1 Haz . Coll . 220 , 225 .
4 It seems that a charter was subsequently granted b
y
.Charles the Second on the
10th o
f
October , 1676 , but it contained little more than an acknowledgment of the
colony a
s
a
n
immediate dependency o
f
the crown . 2 Henning , Stat . 531 , 532 .
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who with the governor and council should form a general assem
bly clothed with supreme legislative authority ; and to establish
courts of justice ,whose proceedings should be guided by the forms
of the parent country . The rights of Englishmen were thus in a
great measure secured to the colonists ; and under the government
of this excellent magistrate , with some short intervals of interrup
tion , the colony flourished with a vigorous growth for almost forty
years. The revolution of 1688 found it , if not in the practical
possession of liberty , at least with forms of government well cal
culated silently to cherish it
s spirit .
$ 5
0 . The laws of Virginia , during its colonial state , do not
exhibit a
s many marked deviations , in the general structure of its
institutions and civil polity , from those of the parent country , as
those in the Northern colonies . The common law was recognized
a
s
th
e
general basis o
f
it
s jurisprudence ; and the legislature , with
some appearance o
f
boast , stated , soon after the restoration o
f
Charles the Second , that they had “ endeavored , in all things , as
near a
s
the capacity and constitution of this country would admit ,
to adhere to those excellent and often refined laws o
f England , to
which we profess and acknowledge all due obedience and rever
ence . ” 2 The prevalence of th
e
common law was also expressly
provided fo
r
in a
ll
the charters successively granted , as well as
by the royal declaration , when the colony was annexed as a depen
dency to the crown . Indeed , there is no reason to suppose , that
the common law was not in it
s leading features very acceptable to
the colonists ; and in it
s general policy the colony closely followed
in the steps o
f
the mother country . Among the earliest acts of
the legislature we find the Church o
f England established as the
only true church ; 3 and its doctrines and discipline were strictly
enforced . All non -conformists were at first compelled to leave the
colony , and a spirit of persecution was exemplified not far behind
the rigor o
f
themost zealous of the Puritans . The clergy of the
Established Church were amply provided fo
r
b
y glebes and tithes ,
1 Robertson ' s America , B . 9 ; Marsh . Amer . Col . ch . 2 , p
p
. 6
5 , 6
6 , note . I have not
thought it necessary to advert particularly to the state of things during the disturbed
period o
f
the Commonwealth . Henning , Virg . Stat . Introduction , p . 13 , 14 .
? 2 Henning , Stat . 43 . Si
r
William Berkeley , in his answer to the questions of the
Lords Commissioners , in 1671 . “ Contrary to the laws of England , we never did , nor
dare , to make any [ law ] only this , that no sale o
f
land is good and legal , unless within
threemonths after the conveyance it b
e
recorded . "
8 (Jefferson , Works , I . 38 ; Life of Madison by Rives , I . 42 ; Bancroft , Hist . of
U . S . , I . 206 ; Terrett v . Taylor , 9 Cranch , 43 . ]
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and other aids. Non -residence was prohibited , and a due perform
ance of parochial duties peremptorily required . The laws, indeed ,
respecting the church ,made a very prominent figure during the
first fifty years of the colonial legislation . The first law allowing
toleration to Protestant dissenters was in the year 1699 , and merely
adopts that of the statute of the 1st William and Mary . Subject
to this , the Church of England seems to have maintained an ex
clusive supremacy down to the period o
f
the American Revolution .
Marriages , except in special cases , were required to be celebrated
in the parish church , and according to the rubric in the common
prayer book . The law of inheritance of the parent country was
silently maintained down to the period o
f
the American Revolu
tion ; and the distribution of intestate estates was closely fash
ioned upon the same general model . Devises also were regulated
b
y
the law o
f England ; 1 and no colonial statute appears to have
been made on that subject until 1748 ,when one was enacted which
contains a fe
w
deviations from it , probably arising from local cir
cumstances . One of the most remarkable facts in the juridical
history of the colony is its steady attachment to entails . By an
act passed in 1705 , it was provided , that estates -tail should no
longer be docked b
y
fines o
r
recoveries , but only by an act o
f
the
legislature in each particular case . And though this was after
wards modified , so as to allow entails to be destroyed in another
manner , where the estate di
d
not exceed £200 sterling in value ,
yet the general policy continued down to the American Revolution .
In this respect , the zeal o
f
the colony to secure entails and per
petuate inheritances in the same family outstripped that of the
parent country .
$ 51 . At a very early period the acknowledgment and registry
o
f
deeds and mortgages o
f real estate were provided fo
r , and the
non -registry was deemed a badge of fraud . The trial b
y jury ,
although a privilege resulting from their general rights , was
guarded by special legislation . There was also an early declara
tion , that no taxes could be levied b
y
the governor without the
consent o
f
the general assembly ; and when raised , they were to
1 I refer upon these subjects to Henning , Stat . 12
2
, 123 , 144 , 149 , 155 , 180 , 240 , 268 ,
277 , 434 ; 2 Hen . Stat . 48 , 50 ; 3 Hen . Stat . 150 , 170 , 360 , 441 .
2 5 Henning , Stat . 456 .
8 3 Henning , Stat . 32
0
, 516 ; 4 Hen . Stat . 40
0
; 5 Hen . Stat . 41
4
; 1 Tuck . Black .
Comm . App .
4 1 Henning , Stat . 248 ; 2 Hen . Stat . 98 ; 3 Hen . Stat . 321 .
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be applied according to the appointment of the legislature . The
burgesses , also , during their attendance upon the assembly , were
free from arrest . In respect to domestic trade, a general freedom
was guaranteed to all the inhabitants to buy and sell to the greatest
advantage , and al
l
engrossing was prohibited . The culture of
tobacco seems to have been a constant object o
f
solicitude ; and it
was encouraged b
y
a long succession o
f
acts , sufficiently evincing
the public feeling , and the vast importance of it to the prosperity
o
f
the colony . We learn from Si
r
William Berkeley ' s answers to
the Lords Commissioners , in 1671 , that the population of the
colony was a
t
that time about 40 ,000 ; that the restrictions of the
navigation act , cutting of
f
a
ll
trade with foreign countries ,were
very injurious to them , as they were obedient to the laws . And
“ this , ” says he , “ is the cause why no small or great vessels are
built here ; for we are most obedient to all laws , whilst the New
Englandmen break through ,and men trade to any place that their
interest leads them . ” This language is sufficiently significant of
the restlessness o
f
New England under these restraints upon it
s
commerce . But his answer to the question respecting religious
and other instruction in the colony ,would in our times create uni
versal astonishment . “ I thank God , ” says he , “ there are no
free schools nor printing ; and I hope we shall not have these hun
dred years ; for learning has brought disobedience and heresy and
sects into th
e
world , and printing has divulged them , and libels
against the best government . God keep us from both . ” 3 In 1680
a remarkable change was made in the colonial jurisprudence , b
y
taking all judicial power from th
e
assembly , and allowing an
appeal from the judgments of th
e
General Court to the King in
Council . 4
11 Henning , Stat . 290 .
2 See 1 Hen . Stat . 126 , and Index , tit . Tobacco , in that and the subsequent volumes ;
2 Henning , Stat . 514 .
8 2 Hen . Stat . 511 , 512 , 514 , 517 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 328 ; 3 Hutch . Collect . 496 .
4 Marsh . Colon . ch . 5 , p . 163 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 32
5
.
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ided b
y
men on Lord Chief Justicing . Captain
$ 5
2 . We may now advert in a briefmanner to the history of
the Northern or Plymouth Company . That company pos
sessed fewer resources and less enterprise than the Southern ;
and though ai ed b
y
men o
f
high distinction , and among others ,
b
y
the public spirit and zeal of Chief Justice Popham , its
first efforts fo
r
colonization were feeble and discouraging . Captain
John Smith , so well known in the history of Virginia b
y
his
successful adventures under their authority , lent a transient
lustre to their attempts ; and his warm descriptions of the beauty
and fertility o
f
the country procured fo
r
it from the excited
imagination o
f
the Prince , afterwards King Charles the First , the
flattering name o
f
New England , a name which effaced from it
that o
f Virginia , and which has since become dear beyond
expression to the inhabitants of it
s
harsh but salubrious climate .
$ 5
3 . While the company was yet languishing , an event
occurred which gave a new and unexpected aspect to it
s pros
pects . It is well known that the religious dissensions consequent
upon the Reformation ,while they led to a more bold and free
spirit of discussion , failed a
t
the same time o
f introducing a
corresponding charity fo
r
differences of religious opinion . Each
successive sect entertained not the slightest doubt of it
s
own
infallibility in doctrine and worship , and was eager to obtain
proselytes , and denounce the errors of its opponents . If it had
stopped here ,we might have forgotten , in admiration of th
e
sin
cere zeal for Christian truth , the desire of power , and the pride
o
f
mind , which lurked within the inner folds of their devotion .
But , unfortunately , the spirit of intolerance was abroad , in al
l
it
s
stern and unrelenting severity . To tolerate errors was to
sacrifice Christianity to mere temporal interests . Truth , and
truth alone , was to be followed at the hazard of al
l
consequences ;
and religion allowed no compromises between conscience and
| Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; Marsh . Amer . Col . ch . 3 , p . 77 , 78 ; 1 Haz . Coll .
1
0
3
, 147 ,404 ; 1 Belknap ' s New Hampshire , ch . 1 .
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worldly comforts . Heresy was itself a sin of a deadly nature ,
and to extirpate it was a primary duty o
f
a
ll
who were believers
in sincerity and truth . Persecution , therefore , even when it
seemed most to violate the feelings o
f humanity and the rights
o
f private judgment , never wanted apologists among those of the
purest and most devout lives . It was too often received with
acclamations b
y
th
e
crowd , and found an ample vindication from
the learned and the dogmatists ; from th
e
policy o
f
the civil
magistrate ,and the blind zeal of the ecclesiastic . Each sect , as it
attained power , exhibited the same unrelenting firmness in put
ting down it
s
adversaries . The papist and the prelate , the Puri
tan and the Presbyterian , felt no compunctions in the destruction
o
f
dissentients from their own faith . They uttered , indeed , loud
complaints o
f
the injustice o
f
their enemies , when they were
themselves oppressed ; but it was not from any abhorrence to
persecution itself , but of the infamous errors of the persecutors .
There are not wanting on the records o
f
the history o
f
these
times abundant proofs , how easily sects ,which had borne every
human calamity with unshrinking fortitude fo
r
conscience ' sake ,
could turn upon their inoffensive , but , in their judgment , erring
neighbors with a like infliction o
f suffering . Even adversity
sometimes fails o
f producing it
s
usual salutary effects o
fmodera
tion and compassion , when a blind but honest zeal las usurped
dominion over the mind . If such a picture of human infirmity
may justly add to our humility , it may also serve to admonish us
o
f
the Christian duty o
f
forbearance . And he who can look with
a
n eye o
f
exclusive censure on such scenes ,must have forgotten
how many bright examples they have afforded o
f
the liveliest vir
tue , the most persuasive fidelity , and themost exalted piety .
i Dr . Robertson has justly observed , that not only th
e
idea o
f
toleration , but even
the word itself , in the sensenow affixed to it , was then unknown . * Sir James Mackin
tosh , a name equally glorious in judicial and ethical philosophy , has remarked , that this
giant evil (the suppression of the right of private judgment in matters of religion ) had
received a mortal wound from Luther , who , in his warfare with Rome , had struck a
blow against all human authority , and unconsciously disclosed to mankind that they were
entitled , o
r rather bound , to form and utter their own opinions , and most o
f all , on the
most deeply interesting subjects . Dissertation on th
e
Progress o
f
Ethical Philosophy
( Phila . 1832 ) , p . 3
6
.
2 Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; 1 Belknap ' s New Hampshire , ch . 3 ; 1 Chalm . An
nals , p . 143 , 145 , 169 , 189 , 190 , 191 ; 3 Hutch . Hist . Coll . 42 .
* The whole passagedeservescommendation for it
s
catholic spirit . Robertson ' s Amerita ,
B . 1
0
.
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$ 5
4 . Among others who suffered persecutions from the
haughty zeal o
f
Elizabeth , was a small sect called , from the
name o
f
their leader , Brownists , to whom we owe the founda
tion o
f
the now widespread sect o
f Congregationalists o
r Inde
pendents . After sufferings o
f
a
n aggravated nature , they were
compelled to take refuge in Holland , under the care of their
pastor , Mr . John Robinson , a man distinguished for his piety ,
his benevolence , and his intrepid spirit . After remaining there
some years , they concluded to emigrate to America , in the hope
that they might thus perpetuate their religious discipline , and
preserve the purity o
f
a
n apostolical church . In conjunction
with other friends in England , they embarked on the voyage
with a design of settlement on Hudson ' s River in New York .
But , against their intention , they were compelled to land on the
shores o
f Cape Cod , in the depth of winter , and the place of
their landing was called Plymouth , which has since become so
celebrated as the first permanent settlement in New England . 3
Not having contemplated any plantation at this place , they
had not taken the precaution to obtain any charter from the
Plymouth Company . The original plan of their colony , how
ever , is still preserved ; 4 and it was founded upon the basis of a
community of property , at least fo
r
a given space o
f
time , a
scheme , as the event showed , utterly incompatible with the ex
istence o
f any large and flourishing colony . Before their land
ing , they drew up and signed a voluntary compact of govern .
ment , forming , if not the first , at least the best authenticated
case o
f
a
n original social contract for the establishment o
f
a na
tion which is to be found in the annals of the world . Philoso
phers and jurists have perpetually resorted to the theory o
f
such
a compact , b
y
which to measure the rights and duties o
f gov
ernments and subjects ; but fo
r
the most part it has been treated
a
s
a
n effort o
f imagination , unsustained b
y
the history o
r prac
tice o
f
nations , and furnishing little of solid instruction for the
actual concerns o
f
life . It was little dreamed of , that America
should furnish an example o
f
it in primitive and almost patri
archal simplicity .
1 Belknap ' s New Hampshire , ch . 3 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 369 .
? Morton ' s Mem . 1 to 30 .
3 Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; Marsh . Amer . Col . ch . 3 , p . 79 , 80 ; Morton ' s Mem .
3
1
to 3
5
.
4 | Haz . Coll . 87 , 88 ; Morton ' s Mem . App . 373 .
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$ 55 . On the 11th of November , 1620 , these humble but fear
less adventurers , before their landing , drew up and signed an
original compact , in which , after acknowledging themselves sub
jects of the crown of England , they proceed to declare : “ Hav
ing undertaken , fo
r
the glory of God and the advancement o
f
the
Christian faith and the honor o
f
our king and country , a voyage
to plant the first colony in the northern parts of Virginia , we do
b
y
these presents solemnly and mutually , in the presence of God
and of one another , covenant and combine ourselves together
into a civil body politic , fo
r
our better ordering and preservation
and furtherance o
f
the ends aforesaid . And b
y
virtue hereof do
enact , constitute , and frame such just and equal law ' s , ordinances ,
acts , constitutions , and officers from time to time as shall be
thought most meet and convenient for the general good o
f
the
colony ; unto which we promise all due submission and obe
dience . ” This is the whole of the compact , and itwas signed by
forty -one persons . It is in its very essence a pure democracy ;
and in pursuance of it the colonists proceeded soon afterwards to
organize the colonial government , under the name of the Colony
o
f
New Plymouth , to appoint a governor and other officers , and
to enact laws . The governor was chosen annually by the free
men , and had at first one assistant to aid him in the discharge of
his trust . Four others were soon afterwards added , and finally
the number was increased to seven . The supreme legislative
power resided in , and was exercised b
y , the whole body of the
male inhabitants , every freeman , who was a member of the
church , being admitted to vote in all public affairs . The num
ber o
f
settlements having increased , and being at a considerable
distance from each other , a house of representatives was estab
lished in 1639 ; 5 the members ofwhich , as well as al
l
other offi
cers , were annually chosen . They adopted the common law o
f
England a
s
the general basis o
f
their jurisprudence , varying it
however from time to time b
y
municipal regulations better
adapted to their situation , or conforming more exactly to their
11 Haz . Coll . 119 ; Morton ' s Mem . 37 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 3 , p . 80 ; Robertson ' s
America , B . 1
0 ; 2 Hutch . Hist . 455 .
2 Plymouth Laws ( 1685 ) ; 1 Haz . Coll . 404 , 408 .
3 Morton ' s Mem . 110 ; Prince ' s Annals , 225 ; 2 Hutch . Hist . 463 , 465 ; 1 Haz . Coll .
404 , 408 , 411 , 412 .
4 Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; 2 Hutch . Hist . 467 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 408 ,411 , 41
2
, 41
4
.
5 2 Hutch . Hist . 463 .
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stern notions of the absolute authority and universal obligation
of the Mosaic institutions ."
$ 56 . The Plymouth colonists acted , at first, altogether under
the voluntary compact and association already mentioned . But
they daily felt embarrassments from the want of some general
authority , derived directly or indirectly from the crown , which
should recognize their settlement and confirm their legislation .
After several ineffectual attempts made fo
r
this purpose , they at
length succeeded in obtaining , in January , 1629 , a patent from the
council established a
t Plymouth , in England , under the charter of
King James of 1620 . This patent , besides a grant of the terri
tory upon the terms and tenure o
f
the original patent of 1620 ,
included an authority to the patentee (William Bradford ) and his
associates , “ to incorporate b
y
some usual or fit name and title him
o
r
themselves , or the people there inhabiting under him or them ,
and their successors , from time to time , to frame and make orders ,
ordinances , and constitutions , aswell fo
r
the better government o
f
their affairs here , and the receiving or admitting any into hi
s
o
r
their society , as also fo
r
the better government o
f
his o
r
their peo
p
le , or his or their people at sea in going thither or returning
from thence ; and the same to put or cause to be put in execution ,
b
y
such officers and ministers , as he or they shall authorize and
depute ; provided , that the said laws and orders be not repugnant
to the laws of England or the frame of government by the said
president and council [ o
f Plymouth Company ] hereafter to be
established . ” 3
$ 5
7 . This patent or charter seems never to have been con
firmed b
y
the crown ; 4 and the colonists were never , b
y
any act o
f
the crown , created a body politic and corporate with any legisla
tive powers . They , therefore , remained in legal contemplation a
mere voluntary association ,exercising the highest powers and pre
rogatives o
f sovereignty , and yielding obedience to the laws and
magistrates chosen b
y
themselves .
1 Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; 2 Hutch . Hist .462 , 463 ,464 ; Hubbard ' s Hist . ch . 10 ,
p . 62 ; Chalmers ' s Annals , p . 88 .
? 2 Hutch . Hist . 464 ,479 ; 1 Haz .Coll . 298 , 404 , 468 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 97 , 98 ;
i Holmes ' s Annals , 201 .
SiHaz . Coll . 298 , 404 .
4 Chalmers says ( 1 Chalm . Annals , 97 ) that “ this patent was not confirmed b
y
the
crown , though the contrary has been affirmed by the colonial historians . " See also
Marsh . Hist . Colon . ch . 3 , 82 , 83 .
6 Marsh . Hist . Colon . ch . 3 , p . 82 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 87 , 88 , 97 .
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$ 58 . The charter of 1629 furnished them , however , with the
color of delegated sovereignty , of which they did not fail to avail
themselves. They assumed under it the exercise of themost plen
ary executive , legislative , and judicial powers , with but amomen
tary scruple as to their right to inflict capital punishments . They
were not disturbed in the free exercise of these powers , either
through the ignorance or the connivance of the crown , until after
the restoration of Charles the Second. Their authority under
their charter was then questioned ; and several unsuccessful
attempts were made to procure a confirmation from the crown.
They continued to cling to it , until, in the general shipwreck of
charters in 1684 , theirs was overturned . An arbitrary govern
ment was then established over them in common with the other
New England colonies ; and they were finally incorporated into a
province with Massachusetts , under the charter granted to the lat
te
r
b
y
William and Mary in 1691 . 2
$ 5
9 . It may not be without use to notice a few of the laws
which formed what may properly be deemed the fundamentals o
f
their jurisprudence . After providing fo
r
the manner of choosing
their governor and legislature , as above stated , their first attention
seems to have been directed to the establishment o
f
“ the free lib
erties o
f
the free -born people of England . ” It was therefore
declared , 3 almost in the language of Magna Charta , that justice
should b
e impartially administered unto all , not sold , or denied ;
that no person should suffer “ in respect to life , limb , liberty , good
name , or estate , but b
y
virtue or equity o
f
some express law o
f
the General Court , or the good and equitable laws of our nation
suitable fo
r
u
s , in matters which are of a civil nature , ( as b
y
the
court here hath been accustomed , ) wherein we have no particular
law o
f our own ” ; and none should suffer without being brought
to answer by due course and process of law ; that in criminal and
civil cases there should be a trial b
y
jury a
t all events upon a final
trial on appeal , with the right to challenge for just cause ; and in
capital cases a peremptory right to challenge twenty jurors as in
England ; that no party should be cast or condemned , unless upon
the testimony o
f
two sufficient witnesses , or other sufficient evi
1 2 Hutch .Hist . 464 ,465 , 467 ; Chalm . Annals , 88 . [Palfrey , Hist . of New England ,
I . 542 . )
2 2 Hutch . Hist . 479 , 480 ; Chalm . Annals , 97 , 98 .
8 In 1636 . See 1 Haz . Coll . 404 , 408 ; Id . 17
8
; Plymouth Colony Laws (edit .
1685 ) ; 1 Haz . Coll 411 , 414 , 419 .
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dence o
r
circumstances , unless otherwise specially provided by
la
w ; that al
l
persons of th
e
age o
f twenty -one years , and of sound
memory , should have power to make wills and other lawful aliena
tions o
f
their estate , whether they were condemned or excommuni
cated , or other ; except that in treason their personal estate
should b
e
forfeited , but their real estate was still to be at their dis
posal . All processes were directed to be in the king ' s name . All
trials in respect to land were to be in the county where it lay ; and
a
ll personal actions where one of the parties lived ; and lands
and goods were liable to attachment to answer the judgment ren
dered in any action . All lands were to descend according to the
free tenure of lands of East Greenwich , in the county of Kent ;
and a
ll
entailed lands according to the law o
f England . All the
sons were to inherit equally , except the eldest , who was to have a
double share . If there were no sons , al
l
the daughters were to
inherit alike . Brothers of the whole blood were to inherit ; and
if none , then sisters of the whole blood . All conveyances of land
were to b
e b
y
deed only , acknowledged before some magistrate ,
and recorded in the public records . Among capital offences were
enumerated , without any discrimination , idolatry , blasphemy , trea
son ,murder ,witchcraft , bestiality , sodomy , false witness ,man -steal .
ing , cursing or smiting father or mother , rape , wilful burning of
houses and ships , and piracy ; while certain other offences of a
nature quite a
s immoral and injurious to society , received a far
more moderate punishment . Undoubtedly a reverential regard
for the Scriptures placed the crimes of idolatry , blasphemy , and
false witness , and cursing and smiting father and mother , among
the capital offences . And , as might well be presumed from the
religious sentiments o
f
the people , ample protection was given to
the church ; and the maintenance of a public orthodox ministry
and o
f public schools was carefully provided for . 2
$ 6
0 . Compared with the legislation of some of th
e
colonies
during an equal period , the laws of th
e
Plymouth Colony will be
found few and brief . This resulted in somemeasure from the nar
row limits o
f
the population and business o
f
the colony ; but in a
greater measure from their reliance in their simple proceedings
upon the general principles o
f
the common law .
1 1 Haz . Coll . 47
3
; Plymouth Colony Laws (1688 ) , p . 16 .
· More ample information upon al
l
thesesubjects will be furnished b
y
a
n
examination
o
f
the Plymouth Colony Laws , first printed in 1685 .
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CHAPTER IV .
MASSACHUSETTS .
$ 61 . ABOUT the period when the Plymouth colonists completed
their voyage , ( 1620 ) James the First , with a view to promote
more effectually the interests of the second or northern company ,
granted 1 to the Duke of Lenox and others of the company a new
charter ,by which its territories were extended in breadth from the
40th to the 48th degree o
f
north latitude ; and in length b
y
a
ll
the
breadth aforesaid throughout the mainland from sea to sea , ex
cluding , however , al
l
possession o
f any other Christian prince , and
all lands within the bounds of the southern colony . To the ter
ritory thus bounded h
e
affixed the name of New England , and to
the corporation itself so created the name o
f
“ The Council estab
lished a
t Plymouth in the county o
f
Devon , for the planting ,ruling ,
ordering , and governing of New England in America . ” 8 The
charter contains the names o
f
the persons who were to constitute
the first council , with power to fill vacancies and keep up a per
petual succession o
f
counsellors to the number o
f forty . The
power to purchase , hold , and sell lands , and other usual powers
o
f corporations , are then conferred on them , and special authority
to make laws and ordinances to regulate the admission and trade
o
f all persons with the plantation ; to dispose o
f
their lands ; to
appoint and remove governors and other officers o
f
the plantation ;
to establish a
ll
manner o
f
orders , laws and directions , instructions ,
forms and ceremonies o
f government and magistracy , so that the
same be not contrary to the laws and statutes o
f England ; to cor
rect , punish , pardon , govern , and rule al
l
inhabitants of the colony
b
y
such laws and ordinances , and in defect thereof , in cases of
necessity , according to the good discretions of their governors and
officers respectively , as well in cases capital and criminal as civil ,
both marine and others , so always that the same ordinances and
proceedings be , as near as conveniently may be , agreeable to th
e
laws , statutes , government ,and policy of England ; and finally to
1 Nov . 3 , 1620 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 406 , & c .
2 1 Haz . Coll . 103 , 105 , & c . 8 1 Haz . Coll . 99 , 103 , 10
6
, 110 , 111 .
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regulate trade and traffic to and from the colony , prohibiting the
same to a
ll persons not licensed b
y
the corporation . The charter
further contains some extraordinary powers in cases o
f
rebellion ,
mutiny , misconduct , illicit trade ,and hostile invasions , which it is
not necessary to particularize . The charter also declares that all
the territory shall be holden o
f
the crown , as of the royal manor
o
f East Greenwich , in Kent County , in free and common socage ,
and not in capite , nor by knight service ; ? and that al
l
subjects ,
inhabitants o
f
the plantation , and their children and posterity born
within the limits thereof , shall have and enjoy al
l
liberties and
franchises and immunities o
f
free denizens and natural subjects
within any other o
f
the dominions o
f
the crown , to al
l
intents and
purposes , as if they had been abiding and born within the kingdom
o
f England , or any other dominions of the crown . The charter
also authorized the council to transport to the plantation any sub
jects , or strangers who were willing to become subjects and live
under the king ' s allegiance . But it prohibited papists to be trans
ported , by requiring al
l
persons going there to take the oath o
f
supremacy , and authorizing the president of the council to admin
ister the oath . 4
$62 . Some of the powers granted b
y
this charter were alarm
ing to many persons , and especially those which granted a
monopoly o
f
trade . The efforts to settle a colony within the ter
ritory were again renewed , and again were unsuccessful . The
spirit o
f religion , however , soon effected what the spirit of com
merce had failed to accomplish . The Puritans , persecuted at
home , and groaning under the weight of spiritual bondage , cast a
longing eye towards America a
s
a
n ultimate retreat fo
r
themselves
and their children . They were encouraged by the information
that the colonists a
t Plymouth were allowed to worship their Crea
to
r according to the dictates o
f
their consciences ,without moles
tation . They opened a negotiation , through the instrumentality
o
f
a Mr . White , a distinguished non - conforming minister , with the
council established a
t Plymouth ; and in March , 1627 , procured
from them a grant , to Si
r
Henry Rosewell and others , of al
l
that
part o
f
New England lying three miles south o
f Charles River and
1 1 Haz . Coll . 10
9 , 11
0 , 11
2 , 113 , 14
1
.
? Ibid . 111 . 8 Ibid . 117 .
4 Ibid . 117 .
6 Marsh . Colon . ch . 3 , p . 83 ; Chalm . Annals , p . 81 , 83 .
6 Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; Chalm . Annals , 90 .
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three miles north of Merrimack River,extending from the Atlantic
to the South Sea .?
$ 63 . Other persons were soon induced to unite with them , if a
charter could be procured from the crown which should secure to
the adventurers the usual powers of government . Application was
made fo
r
this purpose to King Charles ,who accordingly , in March ,
1628 , granted to the grantees and their associates the most ample
powers of government . The charter confirmed to them the terri
tory already granted b
y
the council established at Plymouth , to be
holden o
f
the crown , as of the royal manor of East Greenwich ,
“ in free and common socage , and not in capite , nor b
y knight ' s
service , yielding to the crown one fifth part o
f
a
ll
ore o
f
gold and ,
silver , ” & c . , with the exception , however , of any part of the terri
tory actually possessed o
r
inhabited b
y
any other Christian prince
o
r
state , or of any part of it within the bounds of the southern
colony [ o
f Virginia ] granted b
y King James . It also created the
associates a body politic b
y
the name of “ The Governor and Com
pany o
f
the Massachusetts Bay in New England , ” with the usual
powers o
f corporations . It provided that the government should
b
e administered b
y
a governor , a deputy -governor , and eighteen
assistants , from time to time elected out o
f
the freemen o
f
the com
pany , which officers should have the care o
f
the general business
and affairs o
f
the lands and plantations , and the government of
the people there ; and it appointed the first governor , deputy -gov
ernor , and assistants b
y
name . It further provided that a court
o
r
quorum fo
r
the transaction o
f
business should consist o
f
the
governor , or the deputy -governor , and seven or more assistants ,
which should assemble as often a
s
once a month fo
r
that purpose ,
and also that four great general assemblies o
f
the company should
b
e
held in every year . In these great and general assemblies ,
(which were composed o
f
the governor , deputy , assistants , and
freemen present , ) freemen were to be admitted free of the com
pany , officers were to be elected , and laws and ordinances for the
good and welfare o
f
the colony made ; “ so as such laws and ordi
nances be not contrary or repugnant to the laws and statutes o
f
this
our realm o
f England . ” A
t
one o
f
these great and general assem
blies held in Easter Term , the governor , deputy , and assistants ,
1 These are not the descriptive words of the grant , but a statement of the substance
o
f
it . The grant is recited in the charter in Hutchinson ' s Collection , p . 1 , & c . , and in
the Colonial and Province Laws of Massachusetts , printed in 1814 .
CH, Iv.] 37MASSACHUSETTS .
and other officers were to be annually chosen by the company
present . The company were further authorized to transport any
subjects or strangers willing to become subjects of the crown to
the colony , and to carry on trade to and from it,without custom
or subsidy fo
r
seven years , and were to be free of al
l
taxation o
f
imports o
r exports to and from the English dominion fo
r
the space
o
f twenty -one years , with the exception of a five per cent duty .
The charter further provided that a
ll subjects o
f
the crown who
should become inhabitants , and their children born there , or on
the seas going o
r returning , should enjoy all liberties and immuni
ties o
f
free and natural subjects , as if they and every of them were
born within the realm o
f England . Full legislative authority was
also given , subject to the restriction o
f
not being contrary to the
laws o
f England , as also fo
r
the imposition o
f
fines and mulcts
“ according to the course of other corporations in England . ” 1
Many other provisions were added , similar in substance to those
found in the antecedent colonial charters o
f
the crown .
$ 6
4 . Such were the original limits of the colony of Massachu
setts Bay , and such were the powers and privileges conferred on
it . It is observable that the whole structure of the charter pre
supposes the residence o
f
the company in England , and the trans
action o
f all its business there . The experience of the past had
not sufficiently instructed the adventurers that settlements in
America could not be well governed b
y corporations resident
abroad ; ? or if any of them had arrived at such a conclusion , there
were many reasons for presuming that the crown would be jealous
o
f granting powers of so large a nature , which were to be exer
cised a
t
such a distance a
s
would render control or responsibility
over them wholly visionary . They were content , therefore , to get
what they could , hoping that th
e
future might furnish more ample
opportunities for success ; that their usurpations of authority
would not be closely watched ; or that there might be a silent
indulgence , until th
e
policy of the crown might feel it a duty to
yield , what it was now useless to contend fo
r , as a dictate of wis
dom and justice . The charter did not include any clause provid
ing fo
r
the free exercise o
f religion o
r
the rights o
f
conscience ,
( as has been often erroneously supposed . ) 4 It gave authority to
1 Hutch . Coll . p . 1 - 23 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 239 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , p . 137 .
2 Chalm . Annals , 81 ; Robertson ' s Hist . America , B . 10 .
8 Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 141 .
' i Chalmers ' s Annals , 141 ; Robertson ' s America , B . 10 , and note .
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the governor and other officers to administer the oath of suprem
acy, thereby probably intending to discourage the settlement of
papists in the colony . But there is nothing in it which exhibits
on the part of themonarch any disposition to relax in favor of the
Puritans the severe maxims of conformity so characteristic of his
reign . The first emigrants , however , paid no attention to this cir
cumstance ; and the very first church planted by them was inde
pendent in a
ll
it
s
forms , and repudiated every connection with
Episcopacy or a liturgy . 3
$ 6
5 . But a bolder step was soon afterwards taken b
y
the com
pany itself . It was ascertained that little success would attend
the plantation , so long as its affairs were under the control of a
distant government , knowing little of its wants , and insensible to
it
s
difficulties . Many persons , indeed , possessed of fortune and
character , warmed with religious zeal , or suffering under religious
intolerance , were ready to embark in the enterprise , if the corpo
ration should b
e
removed , so that the powers o
f government might
be exercised b
y
the actual settlers . The company had already
become alarmed at the extent of their own expenditures ,and there
were but faint hopes o
f any speedy reimbursement . They enter
tained some doubts of the legality o
f
the course o
f transferring the
charter . But at length it was determined , in August , 1629 , “ by
the general consent of the company , that the government and
patent should b
e
settled in New England . ” This resolution
infused new life into the association ; and the next election of ffi
cers wasmade from among those proprietors who had signified an
intention to remove to America . The government and charter
were accordingly removed ; and henceforth the whole manage
ment o
f all the affairs of the colony was confided to persons and
magistrates resident within it
s
own bosom . The fate o
f
the col
ony was thus decided ; and it grew with a rapidity and strength
that soon gave it a great ascendency among the New England set
tlements ,and awakened the jealousy , distrust , and vigilance of the
parent country .
1 But see 1 Grahame , Hist ch . 1 , p . 245 , note .
2 Robertson ' s America , Book 10 , and note ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 141 .
3 Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; Hutch . Coll . 201 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 143 , 144 , 145 .
41 Chalmers ' s Annals , 94 , 95 .
6 i Hutch . Hist . 12 , 13 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Ann . 150 , 151 .
6 i Hutch . Hist . 13 ; Hutch . Coll . 25 , 26 ; Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; Narsh .
Colonies , ch . 3 , p . 89 ; 1 Holmes ' s Aonals , 197 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 150 .
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$ 66 . It has been justly remarked , that this transaction stands
alone in the history of English colonization . The power of the
corporation to make the transfer has been seriously doubted , and
even denied .? But the boldness of the step is not more striking
than the silent acquiescence of the king in permitting it to take
place . The proceedings of the royal authority a few years after
sufficiently prove that the royal acquiescence was not intended as
any adinission of right. The subsequent struggles between the
crown and the colony,down to the overthrow of the charter , under
the famous quo warranto proceedings , in 1684 ,manifest a disposi
tion on the part of the colonists to yield nothing which could be
retained ; and ,on the part of the crown , to force them into absolute
subjection .
$ 67. The government of the colony , immediately after the
removal of the charter , was changed in many important features ;
but it
s
fundamental grants of territory , powers , and privileges
were eagerly maintained in their original validity . It is true , as
Dr . Robertson has observed , that , as soon as the Massachusetts
emigrants had landed on these shores , they considered themselves ,
for many purposes , as a voluntary association , possessing the
natural rights o
f
men to adopt that mode o
f government which
was most agreeable to themselves , and to enact such laws aswere
conducive to their own welfare . They did not , indeed , surrender
u
p
their charter , or cease to recognize its obligatory force . But
they extended their acts far beyond it
s expression o
f powers ; and ,
while they boldly claimed protection from it against the royal
demands and prerogatives , they nevertheless di
d
not feel that it
furnished any limit upon the freest exercise o
f legislative , execu
tive , or judicial functions . They did not view it as creating an
English corporation , under the narrow construction of the com
mon law , but as affording the means of founding a broad political
government , subject to the crown of England , but ye
t
enjoying
many exclusive privileges .
1 Robertson ' s America , B . 10 .
2 See 1 Hutch . Hist . 410 , 415 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 139 , 141 , 142 , 148 , 151 , 173 .
8 i Hutch . Hist . 25 ; Hutch . Coll , 199 , 200 , 203 , 205 , 207 .
• Robertson ' s America , B . 10 .
5 Hutch . Coll 199 , 203 .
& I Hutch . Hist . 35 , 36 , 37 , 410 , 507 , 529 ; Hutch . Coll . 196 , 199 , 200 , 203 , 205 ,
207 , 329 , 330 , 417 , 418 , 420 , 477 ; 1 Hutch . Hist . 410 , 415 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 151 ,
153, 157 , 161 ; Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; Marsh . Hist . Colon . ch . 5 , 139 .
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§ 68. The General Court, in their address to Parliament , in
1646 , in answer to the remonstrance of certain malecontents , used
the following language : 1 “ For our government itself, it is framed
according to our charter and the fundamental and common laws
of England , and carried on according to the same, ( taking the
words of eternal truth and righteousness along with them ,as that
rule by which a
ll kingdoms and jurisdictions must render account
o
f every act and administration in the last day , ) with as bare
allowance o
f
the disproportion between such an ancient , populous ,
wealthy kingdom , and so poor an infant , thin colony , as common
reason can afford . ” And they then proceeded to show the truth
o
f
their statement b
y drawing a parallel , setting down in one
column the fundamental and common laws and customs o
f Eng
land , beginning with Magna Charta , and in a corresponding
column their own fundamental laws and customs . Among other
parallels , after stating that the supreme authority in England is in
the high court o
f
Parliament ,they stated : “ The highest authority
here is in the General Court , both b
y
our charter and b
y
our own
positive laws . ”
$ 6
9 . For three or four years after the removal of the charter , the
governor and assistants were chosen , and al
l
the business o
f
the
government was transacted , by the freemen assembled at large in a
General Court . But themembers having increased , so as to make
a general assembly inconvenient , an alteration took place , and in
1634 the towns sent representatives to the General Court . They
drew u
p
a general declaration that the General Court alone had
power to make and establish laws and to elect officers , to raise
moneys and taxes , and to sell lands ; and that therefore every
town might choose persons as representatives ,not exceeding two ,
who should have the full power and voices o
f all the freemen ,
except in the choice o
f
officers and magistrates , wherein every
freeman was to give his own vote . The system thus proposed
was immediately established b
y
common consent , 3 although it is
nowhere provided for in the charter ; and thus was formed the
second house of representatives (the first being in Virginia ) in
1 1 Hutch . Hist . 14
5 , 14
6 ; Hatch . Coll . 199 , & c . ( Se
e
Palfrey , Hist . of New
England , II . 174 . )
2 Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; 1 Hatch . Hist . 35 , 36 , 203 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 320 .
8 Col . and Province Laws (1814 ) , ch . 35 , p . 97 ; Hlutch . Coll . 203 , & c . ; I Hutch .
Hist . 449 .
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any of the colonies . At first , the whole of the magistrates (or
assistants ) and the representatives sat together , and acted as one
body in enacting all laws and orders ; but at length , in 1644 , they
separated into two distinct and independent bodies, each ofwhich
possessed a negative upon the acts of th
e
other . This course of
proceeding continued until the final dissolution o
f
the charter .
$ 7
0 . It may bewell to state , in this connection , that the council
established in Plymouth in a very short period after the grant o
f
the Massachusetts charter ( in 1635 ) finally surrendered their own
patent back to the crown . They had made other grants of terri
tory , which we shall hereafter have occasion to notice , which had
greatly diminished the value as well as importance of their char - ·
ter . But the immediate cause of the surrender was the odious
extent o
f
the monopolies granted to them ,which roused the atten
tion o
f
Parliament and o
f
the nation a
t
large , and compelled them
to resign what they could scarcely maintain against the strong
current of public opinion . The surrender , so far from working
any evil , rather infused new life into the colonies which sprung
from it , b
y
freeing them from all restraint and supervision b
y
a su - .
perior power , to which they might perhaps have been held account
able . Immediately after this surrender legal proceedings were
instituted against the proprietors o
f
the Massachusetts charter .
Those who appeared were deprived of their franchises . But for
tunately the measure was not carried into complete execution
against the absent proprietors acting under the charter in
America .
. $ 71 . After the fall of the first colonial charter in 1684 , 5 Mas
sachusetts remained fo
r
some years in a very disturbed state under
the arbitrary power o
f
the crown . At length a new charter was
in 1691 granted to the colony b
y
William and Mary ; and it
henceforth became known as a province , and continued to act
under this last charter until after the Revolution . The charter
comprehended within its territorial limits all the old colony of the
11 Hutch . Hist . 35 , 36 , 37 , 94 , note ,449 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 222 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 320 ,
321 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 157 . [Palfrey , Hist . of New England , I . 371 . )
2 1 Hutch . Hist . 419 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 166 ; Col . and Province Laws (1814 ) ,
ch . 31 , p . 88 ; Hutch . Coll . 205 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 431 .
3 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 227 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 390 , 393 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 9
4 , 95 , 99 .
4 i Holmes ' s Annals , 227 ; Hutch . Coll . 101 , 104 ; 2 Haz . Coll . 423 , 425 ; 3 Chal
mers ' s Annals , 161 .
5 i Holmes ' s Annals , 412 .
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Massachusetts Bay, the colony of New Plymouth , the province of
Maine, the territory called Acadie , or Nova Scotia , and all the
lands lying between Nova Scotia and Maine ; and incorporated
the whole into one province by the name of the Province of the
Massachusetts Bay in New England, to be holden as of the royal
manor of East Greenwich , in the county of Kent. It confirmed
all prior grants made of lands to al
l
persons , corporations , col .
leges , towns , villages , and schools . It reserved to the crown the
appointment o
f
the governor , and lieutenant -governor , and secre
tary o
f
th
e
province , and al
l
the officers o
f
the Court o
f Admi
ralty . It provided for the appointment annually of twenty -eight
counsellors , who were to be chosen b
y
the General Court , and
nominated the first board . The governor and counsellors were
to hold a council for the ordering and directing o
f
the affairs o
f
the province . The governor was invested with authority , with
the advice and consent o
f
the council , to nominate and appoint
“ judges , commissioners of oyer and terminer , sheriffs , provosts ,
marshals , justices of the peace , and other officers to the council
and courts of justice belonging . ” The governor was also invested
with th
e
command o
f
the militia , and with power to appoint any
chief commander o
r
other officer or officers ; to train , instruct ,
exercise , and govern the militia , to lead them in war , and to use
and exercise the law martial in time of actual war , invasion , or
rebellion . He had also the power of calling the General Court ,
and o
f adjourning , proroguing , and dissolving it . He had also
a negative upon a
ll
laws passed b
y
the General Court . The Gen
eral Court was to assemble annually on the last Wednesday o
f
May , and was to consist of the governor and council for the time
being , and of such representatives being freeholders as should be
annually elected b
y
the freeholders in each town , who possessed a
freehold o
f forty shillings ' annual value , or other estate to the
value o
f forty pounds . Each town was entitled to two representa
tives ; but the General Court was from time to time to decide on
the number which each town should send . The General Court
was invested with full authority to erect courts , to levy taxes , and
make a
ll
wholesome laws and ordinances , “ so as the same be not
repugnant or contrary to the laws o
f England ” ; and to settle
annually a
ll
civil officers whose appointment was not otherwise
provided for . All laws , howerer , were to be sent to England for
approbation o
r
disallowance ; and if disallowed , and so signified
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under the sign manual and signet , within three years, the same
thenceforth to cease and become void ; otherwise to continue in
force according to the terms of their original enactment . The
General Court was also invested with authority to grant any lands
in the colonies of Massachusetts , New Plymouth , and province of
Maine , with certain exceptions . The governor and council were
invested with full jurisdiction as to the probate of wills and grant
ing administrations . The governor was also made commander - in
chief of th
e
militia with the usualmartial powers ; but was not to
exercise martial law without the advice of the council . In case
o
f
his death , removal , or absence , his authority was to devolve on
the lieutenant -governor , o
r , if his office was vacant , then on the
council . With a view also to advance the growth of the province
by encouraging new settlements , it was expressly provided that
there should b
e
" a liberty of conscience allowed in the worship
o
f
God to a
ll Christians except Papists " ; and that al
l
subjects
inhabiting in the province and their children born there , or on the
seas going o
r returning , should have al
l
th
e
liberties and immuni
ties o
f
free and natural subjects , as if they were born within the
realm o
f England . And in al
l
cases an appeal was allowed from
the judgments of any courts of the province to the King in the
Privy Council in England ,where the matter in difference exceeded
three hundred pounds sterling . And finally there was a reserva
tion o
f
th
e
whole admiralty jurisdiction to th
e
crown , and of a
right to a
ll
subjects to fish on the coasts . Considering the spirit
o
f
the times , it must be acknowledged that , on the whole , this
charter contains a liberal grant o
f authority to the province , and
a reasonable reservation o
f
the royal prerogative . Itwas hailed
with sincere satisfaction b
y
the colony , after the dangers which
had fo
r
so long a time menaced it
s
liberties and it
s peace . ”
$ 7
2 . In reviewing the laws passed b
y
the Legislature o
f Mas
sachusetts during it
s
colonial state , the first andmost important
consideration is the early care with which the public rights o
f
the inhabitants were declared and established . No man ' s life ,
person , honor , or good name was to be affected ; no man was to
b
e deprived o
f
his wife or children or estate , unless by virtue o
r
1 The charter will be found at large in the Colony and Province Laws o
f
Massachu
setts , printed in 1814 . It
s
substance is well summed u
p
in 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 436 .
Under the first charter the admiralty jurisdiction was exercised b
y
the Colonial Com
mon Law Courts , even in capital cases , i Hutch . 451 .
2 1 Hatch . Hist . 415 , 416 .
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equity of some express law of the General Court , “ or , in case of a
defect of a law in any particular case , by the Word of God ; and
in capital cases , or in cases of dismembering or banishment ac
cording to that Word , to be judged of by the General Court .” 1
No persons but church -members were allowed to become freemen ;
and all persons of twenty -one years of age were allowed to dis
pose of their estate by will or any proper conveyance . All con
veyances were to be by deed acknowledged and recorded in the
public records.3 All lands and hereditaments were declared free
from a
ll
fines and forfeitures . Courts of law were established ,
and local processes provided fo
r
. The trial by jury in civil and
criminal cases was secured . Wager of law was not allowed but
according to la
w ,and according to the precept in Exodus (xxii . 8 ) .
Difficult cases of law were finally determinable in the Court of
Assistants o
r
in the General Court , b
y
appeal o
r petition . In
criminal cases where the law prescribed no penalty , the judges
had power to inflict penalties “ According to the rule o
f
God ' s
Word . ” 6 Treason ,murder , poisoning , arson ,witchcraft , sodomy ,
idolatry , blasphemy , man - stealing , adultery , false witness , con
spiracy and rebellion , cursing or smiting of parents b
y
children ,
being a stubborn o
r
rebellious so
n , burglary , and rape ( in partic
ular circumstances ) were offences punishable with death . For
the severity o
f
some o
f
these punishments the General Court ex
pressly justified themselves b
y
the language of the Scriptures .
But theft was not punished with death , because , as they said ,
" we read otherwise in the Scriptures " ; 8 and many other crimes
o
f
a heinous nature were suffered to pass with a moderate pun
ishment . 9 Hutchinson has well observed , that “ in punishing
offences they professed to be governed b
y
the judicial laws o
f
Moses , but no further than those laws were of a moral nature . ” 10
Marriages were celebrated exclusively b
y
magistrates during the
1 Hutch . Coll . 201 .
? Ant . Col . and Prov . Laws , ch . 4 , p . 44 ; ch . 104 , p . 204 .
8 Ant . Col . and Prov . Laws , ch . 1 , p . 41 ; ch . 28 , p . 85 ; I Hutch . Hist . 455 .
4 Hutch . Coll . 203 , 205 .
6 i Hutch . 450 ; Hutch . Coll . 203 , 205 .
6 Hutch . Coll . 205 .
7 Ant . Col . and Prov . Laws , ch . 18 , p . 58 , 59 , 60 ; 1 Hutch . Hist . 440 , 441 , 442 ; 1
Belk . New Hampshire , ch . 4 , p . 66 .
8 Hutch . Coll . 205 .
9 i Hutch . Hist . 442 , 443 , 444 ; Ant . Col . and Prov . Laws , ch . 17 , p . 56 .
1
0 i Hutch . Hist . 435 , 439 .
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first charter ; though afterwards there was a concurrent power
given to the clergy . Divorces a mensa et thoro seem not to have
been in use during the period of the first charter ; but fo
r
the
same causes fo
r
which such a divorce might be granted b
y
the
spiritual courts , a divorce a vinculo was granted . Female adultery
was a sufficient cause ; butmale adultery not . 2 In tenderness to
th
e marriage state , a man who struck his wife , or a woman her
husband , was liable to a fine . 3
$ 7
3 . In the beginning the county courts had jurisdiction of
the testamentary matters , and real estate was at first treated as
mere bona in the civil law . When a positive rule was made , all
th
e
estate was (apparently with some reference to the Mosaic
law ) made subject to distribution ; the widow had such part of
th
e
estate a
s
th
e
court held just and equal ; and the rest was d
i
vided among th
e
children o
r
other heirs , th
e
eldest son having a
double portion , and th
e
daughters ,where there were no sons ,
inheriting as coparceners , unless the court otherwise should de
termine . If the party died insolvent , his estate was distributed
among a
ll
h
is
creditors , there not being any preference of any
debts b
y
judgment o
r specialty .
The law o
f
inheritance was thus , as we see , altered from that
o
f England from the beginning ; and yet , strangely enough , the
General Court , in their answer in 1646 , considered their canon
o
f descent a
s parallel to the English la
w , and expounded it b
y
the same terms , “ the eldest son is preferred before the younger
in the ancestor ' s inheritance , " ? when in reality he had only a
double portion , and the estate was partible among al
l
the chil
dren . Their land being b
y
th
e
charter held , as of the manor of
East Greenwich , in free and common socage , they attributed to
it the gavelkind quality o
f
not being forfeited for felony o
r
trea
son ; and the convict might , therefore , even after sentence , dispose
o
f it b
y
will . 8 Estates tail were recognized , and in such cases
the heir took per formam doni , according to the common law , and
not al
l
the children a
s
one heir . 9
11 Hutch . Hist . 444 . 2 1 Hutch . Hist . 445 .
Si Hutch . Hist . 445 . 4 i Hutch . Hist . 446 .
5 Ant . Col . and Prov . Laws , ch . 104 , p . 205 .
6 i Hutch . Hist . 446 .
? Hutch . Coll . 20
7
; 1 Hutch . Hist . 447 ; Ant . Col . and Prov . Laws , ch . 10
4
, p .
205 .
SiHutch . Hist . 447 . 9 i Hutch . Hist . 447 .
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$ 74 . In respect to ecclesiastical concerns , they made ample
provision fo
r
their own church , (meaning the Congregational
Church , ) exclusive of al
l
others . In their parallel in 1646 , they
quote the provision o
f Magna Charta , that “ the church shall
enjoy all her liberties , " and , dropping all suggestion of the real
differences o
f
their own church establishment from that of Eng .
land , they quote their own provision , that “ al
l
persons orthodox
in judgment , and not scandalous in life ,may gather into a church
state , according to the rules of the gospel , ” as of similar import . 1
They gave to their own churches , when organized , full power
and authority to inflict ecclesiastical censures , and even to expel
members . But they reserved to the civil authority the further
power to punish offences , and “ the liberty to see the peace , or
dinances , and rules of Christ observed . ” 2 Every church had
liberty to elect it
s
own officers , and “ no injunction was to be
put upon any church , church officer , ormember in point of doc
trine , worship , or discipline , whether fo
r
substance o
r circum
stance , besides the institution of the Lord . ” 3 But the General
Court , with the assistance of the clergy , were in the habit o
f
judging o
f
a
ll
such matters with supreme authority , and of con
demning errors with no sparing hand . They had not the slight
est scruple o
f punishing heresies with fines and banishment , and
even , in obstinate cases , with death . 4 Ministers were maintained
and public worship provided for b
y
taxes assessed upon the in
habitants o
f
each parochial district ; and an attendance upon
public worship was required of a
ll persons , under penalties , as a
solemn duty . So effectual were the colonial laws in respect to
conformity , and so powerful the influence of themagistrates and
the clergy , that Hutchinson informs us that there was not “ any
Episcopal Church in any part o
f
the colony until the charter was
vacated . ” 6
$ 7
5 . But the most striking , as well as the most important part
i Hutch . Collect . 201 ; Ant . Colon . an
d
Prov . Laws , ch . 39 , p . 10
0 ; 1 Haz . Coll .
488 .
? Ant . Col . and Prov . Laws , ch . 39 , p . 100 , 101 .
8 1 Hutch . Hist . 420 , 421 , 422 , 423 ,424 , 434 ; 1 Belk . New Hamp . ch . 4 , p . 70 , 71 .
4 Robertson ' s America , B . 10 ; 1 Belk . New Hamp . ch . 4 , p . 70 to 77 ; Ant . Col . and
Prov . Laws , ch . 57 , p . 120 , & c . ; Hutch . Coll . 215 , 216 ; 1 .Hutch . Hist . 431 ; 2 Hutch .
Hist . 42 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 538 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 163 , 164 , 165 , 167 , 169 , 189 , 190 ,
191 , 194 .
6 i Hutch . Hist . 427 ; Ant . Col . and Prov . Laws , ch . 39 , p . 103 , 104 .
6 i Hutch . Hist . 431 .
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of their legislation , is in respect to education . As early as 1647,
the General Court , “ to th
e
end , ” as the preamble of the act de
clares , “ that learning may not be buried in the graves of our
forefathers in church and commonwealth , " provided , under a
penalty , that every township o
f
fifty householders “ shall appoint
a public school fo
r
the instruction of children in writing and read
ing , " and that every town of one hundred householders “ shall set
u
p
a grammar school , the master thereof being able to instruct
youth so far as may be fitted for the university . " This law has ,
in substance , continued down to the present times ; and it has
contributed more than any other circumstance to give that peculiar
character to the inhabitants and institutions o
f
Massachusetts for
which she , in common with the other New England States , in
dulges an honest and not unreasonable pride .
$ 7
6 . After the grant of the provincial charter , in 1691 , the
legislation o
f
the colony took a wider scope , and became more
liberal as well as more exact . A
t
the very first session an act
passed , declaring the general rights and liberties of the people ,
and embracing the principal provisions o
f Magna Charta on this
subject . Among other things , it was declared that no tax could
b
e levied but b
y
the General Court ; that the trial b
y jury should
b
e
secured to all the inhabitants ; and that all lands shall be free
from escheats and forfeitures , except in cases of high treason . ”
A habeas corpus act was also passed a
t
the same session ; but it
seems to have been disallowed b
y
the crown . 8 Chalmers asserts
that there is n
o
circumstance in the history of colonial jurispru
dence better established than the fact that the habeas corpus act
was not extended to the plantations until the reign of Queen
Anne . 4
$ 7
7 . It does not seem necessary to go into any minute exami
nation o
f
the subsequent provincial legislation . In its general
character it did not materially vary from that antecedently
adopted , except so far as the charter required , or a progressive
spirit o
f improvement invited a change . Lands were made lia
ble to the payment of debts ; the right of choosing their ministers
was , after some struggles , secured in effect to the concurrent vote
o
f
the church and congregation in each parish ; and the spirit of
i Ant . Col .and Prov . Laws , ch . 88 , p . 186 .
2 2 Hutch . Hist . 64 ; Ant . Col . and Prov . Laws , ch . 2 , p . 214 .
8 2 Hutch . Hist . 64 . 4 i Chalm . Annals , 56 , 74 .
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religious intolerance was in somemeasure checked , if not entirely
subdued . Among the earliest acts of the provincial Legislature ,
which were approved , were an act for the prevention of frauds
and perjuries , conformable to that of Charles the Second ; an act
for the observance of the Lord's Day ; an act for solemnizing
marriages by a minister or a justice o
f
peace ; an act fo
r
the
support of ministers and schoolmasters ; an act for regulating
towns and counties ; and an act fo
r
the settlement and distribu
tion o
f
the estates o
f persons dying intestate . These and many
other acts o
f general utility have continued substantially in force
down to our day . Under the act for the distribution of estates ,
the half -blood were permitted to inherit equally with the whole
blood . Entails were preserved and passed according to the
course o
f
descents o
f
the common la
w ; but the general policy of
the State silently reduced the actual creation o
f
such estates to
comparatively narrow limits .
1 2 Hutch . Hist . 65 , 66 . 2 Ibid . 66 .
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CHAPTER V .
NEW HAMPSHIRE .
$ 78 . HAVING gone into a full consideration of the origin and
political organization of the primitive colonies in the South and
North , it remains only to take a rapid view of those which were
subsequently established in both regions . An historical order will
probably be found as convenient fo
r
this purpose a
s any which
could b
e
devised .
$ 7
9 . In November , 1629 , Captain John Mason obtained a grant
from the Council o
f Plymouth of a
ll
that part o
f
the mainland
in New England “ lying upon the sea -coast , beginning from the
middle part o
f
Merrimack River , and from thence to proceed north
wards along the sea -coast to Piscataqua River , and so forwards u
p
within the said river and to the furthest head thereof ; and from
thence northwestwards until threescoremiles be finished from the
first entrance o
f Piscataqua River ; and also from Merrimack
through the said river and to the furthest head thereof , and so
forwards up into the lands westwards , until threescore miles be fin
ished ; and from thence to cross overland to the end of the three
score miles accounted from Piscataqua River , together with all isl
ands and islets within five leagues ' distance of the premises . ” 1
This territory was afterwards called New Hampshire . The land
so granted was expressly subjected to the conditions and limita
tions in the original patent ; and there was a covenant on the part
o
f
Mason , that he would establish such government therein , and
continue the same , “ as shall be agreeable , as near as may be , to
the laws and customs o
f
the realm o
f England ” ; and that if
charged with neglect , he would reform the same according to the
discretion o
f
the president and council ; or in default thereof , that
the aggrieved inhabitants or planters , tenants of the lands ,might
appeal to the chief court o
f justice o
f
the president and council .
A further grant wasmade to Mason b
y
the Council o
f Plymouth
about the time o
f
the surrender o
f
their charter , ( 22 April , 1635 , )
6
6 beginning from themiddle part o
fNaumkeag River [Salem ) and
1 1 Haz . Coll . 28
9
; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 199 ; 1 Belk . N . Hamp . ch . 1 , p . 13 .
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from thence to proceed eastwards along the sea -coast to Cape Ann
and round about the same to Piscataqua harbor ” ; and then cover
ing much of the land in the prior grant , and giving to the whole the
name of New Hampshire . This grant included a power of judi
cature in a
ll
cases , civil and criminal , “ to be exercised and exe
cuted according to the laws of England as near a
s may be , ”
reserving an appeal to the council . No patent of confirmation of
this grant appears to have been made b
y
the crown after th
e
sur
render o
f
the Plymouth patent . 2
$ 8
0 . Various detached settlements were made within this ter
ritory ; and so ill defined were the boundaries , that a controversy
soon arose between Massachusetts and Mason in respect to the
right o
f sovereignty over it . In the exposition of it
s
own charter
Massachusetts contended that it
s
limits included the whole terri
tory o
f
New Hampshire ; and , being at that time comparatively
strong and active , sh
e
succeeded in establishing her jurisdiction over
it , and maintained it with unabated vigilance for forty years . The
controversy was finally brought before the king in council ; and
in 1679 it was solemnly adjudged against the claim of Massachu
setts . And it being admitted that Mason ,under his grant , had no
right to exercise any powers o
f government , a commission was , in
the same year , issued b
y
the crown for the government o
f
New
Hampshire . B
y
the form o
f government described in this com
mission the whole executive power was vested in a president and
council appointed b
y
the crown , to whom also was confided the
judiciary power with an appeal to England . In the administra
tion o
f justice it was directed , that “ the form of proceedings in
such cases , and the judgment thereon to be given , be as consonant
and agreeable to the laws and statutes of this our realm of Eng
land , as the present state and condition of our subjects inhabiting
within the limits aforesaid , and the circumstances of the place will
admit . ” 6 The legislative power was intrusted to the president ,
1 1 Haz . Coll . 38
3
, 38
4
, 385 ; 1 Chalm . Annals ,472 ,473 , 47
7
; 1 Belk . N .Hamp . ch .
1 , p . 27 .
? 1 Hutch . Hist . 313 , 314 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 3 , p . 97 .
81 Hutch . Hist . 101 , 108 , 109 , 311 , 312 to 318 .
11 Chalm . Annals , 477 , 484 , 485 , 504 , 505 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 4 , p . 109 , ch . 6 , p .
167 , 168 ; Hutch . Coll . 422 ; 1 Belk . N . Hamp . ch . 2 , p . 49 , 50 .
61 Chalm . Annals , 489 , 490 ; 1 Hutch . Hist . 319 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 395 ; Marsh .
Colon . ch . 6 , p . 168 ; Rob . America , B . 10 ; 1 Belk . N . Hamp . ch . 6 , p . 137 , 138 ; 1
Doug Summ . 28 ; N . Hamp . Prov . Laws , (edit . 1771 , ) p . 1 , & c .
6 N . Hamp . Prov . Laws , (edit . 1771 , ) p . 1 , 3 .
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council , and burgesses , or representatives chosen by the towns ;
and they were authorized to levy taxes and to make laws for the
interest of the province ; which laws , being approved by the presi
dent and council , were to stand and be in force until the pleasure
of the king should be known , whether th
e
same laws and ordi
nances should receive any change o
r
confirmation , or be totally dis
allowed and discharged . And the president and council were
required to transmit and send over the same b
y
the first ship that
should depart thence for England after their making . Liberty of
conscience was allowed to a
ll
Protestants , those of the Church of
England to b
e particularly encouraged . And a pledge was given
in the commission to continue the privilege o
f
a
n assembly in the
samemanner and form , unless b
y
inconvenience arising therefrom
th
e
crown should see cause to alter th
e
same . A body of laws was ,
enacted in the first year of their legislation , which , upon being
sent to England , was disallowed b
y
the crown . New Hampshire
continued , down to the period of the Revolution , to be governed ' .
b
y
commission a
s
a royal province ; and enjoyed the privilege of
enacting her own laws through the instrumentality of a general
assembly , in the manner provided b
y
the first commission . 3 Some
alterations were made in the successive commissions , but none of
them made any substantive change in the organization o
f
the
province . The judicial power of the governor and council was
subsequently , by law , confined to the exercise of appellate juris
diction from the inferior courts ; and in the later commissions a
clause was inserted , that the colonial statutes should “ not be
repugnant , but as near as may be agreeable , to the laws and
statutes o
f
the realm o
f England . " 4
$ 8
1 . The laws of New Hampshire , during its provincial state ,
partook very much of the character of those of the neighboring
province o
f
Massachusetts . Those regulating the descent and
distribution o
f
estates , the registration of conveyances , the taking
o
f depositions to be used in the civil courts , fo
r
the maintenance
o
f
the ministry , fo
r making lands and tenements liable fo
r
the
payment o
f
debts , fo
r
the settlement and support o
f public gram
11 Chalm . Annals , 489 , 490 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 395 ; 1 Belk . N . Hamp . ch . 6 , p .
138 , 139 ; 2 Belk . N . Hamp . Preface ; N . Hamp . Prov . Laws , (edit . 1771 , ) p . 5 .
2 Ibid .
3 i Chalm . Annals , 491 , 492 , 493 , 50
8
.
* N . Hamp . Prov . Laws , ( edit . 1771 , ) p . 61 , and Id .
5 N . Hamp . Prov . Laws , (edit . 1771 , ) 19 , 22 , 55 , 90 , 104 , 105 , 137 , 143 , 157 , 163 , 166 .
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mar schools , for the suppression of frauds and perjuries , and for
the qualification of voters , involve no important differences , and
were evidently framed upon a common model . New Hampshire
seems also to have had more facility than some other colonies , in
introducing into her domestic code some of the most beneficial
clauses of the acts of Parliament of a general nature , and applica
b
le
to it
s
local jurisprudence . Wealso find upon its statute book ,
without comment or objection , the celebrated Plantation Act of 7
& 8 William 3 , ch . 22 , as well as the acts respecting inland bills
o
f exchange , ( 9 & 10 William 3 , ch . 17 , ) and promissory notes ,
( 4 Ann , ch . 9 , ) and others of a less prominent character .
1 N . Hamp . Prov . Laws , (edit . 1771 , ) p . 209 ; Gov . Wentworth ' s Commission in
1766 .
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CHAPTER VI.
MAINE .
$ 82 . In August, 1622 , the Council of Plymouth (which seems
to have been extremely profuse and inconsiderate in it
s grants ? )
granted to S
ir
Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason all
the land lying between the rivers Merrimack and Sagadahock , ex
tending back to th
e
great lakes and rivers o
f
Canada ; which was
called Laconia . In April , 1639 , Sir Ferdinando obtained from
the crown a confirmatory grant o
f
a
ll
the land from Piscataqua
to Sagadahock and the Kennebec River , and from the coast into
the northern interior one hundred and twenty miles ; and it was
styled “ The Province o
f
Maine . " 3 o
f
this province h
e
was
made Lord Palatine , with all the powers , jurisdiction , and royal
ties belonging to the Bishop of the County Palatine of Durham ;
and the lands were to be holden a
s o
f
the manor o
f
East Green
wich . The charter contains a reservation o
f
faith and allegiance
to the crown , as having the supreme dominion ; and thewill and
pleasure o
f
th
e
crown is signified , that the religion of the Church
o
f England be professed , and its ecclesiastical government estab
lished in the province . It also authorizes the Palatine ,with th
e
assent o
f
the greater part o
f
th
e
freeholders o
f
the province , to
make laws not repugnant or contrary , but as near as conveniently
may b
e
to the laws of England , for the public good of the prov
ince ; and to erect courts of judicature for the determination of
all civil and criminal causes , with an appeal to the Palatine .
But al
l
the powers o
f government so granted were to b
e
subordi
nate to the “ power and regement ” o
f
the lords commissioners
fo
r
foreign plantations fo
r
the time being . The Palatine also
had authority to make ordinances fo
r
the government of the
province , under certain restrictions , and a grant o
f full admi
ralty powers , subject to those of the Lord High Admiral of Eng
land . And the inhabitants , being subjects of the crown , were
i i Hutch . Hist . 6 , 104 ; Rob . America , B . 10 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 366 , 380 , 386 .
? 1 Hutch . Hist . 316 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 180 ; 1 Belk . N . Hamp . ch . 1 , p . 14 .
3 Holmes ' s Annals , 254 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 472 , 473 , 474 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 386 , & c .
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to enjoy a
ll
the rights and privileges of natural -born subjects in
England .
$ 8
3 . Under these ample provisions Gorges soon established a
civil government in the province , and made ordinances . The
government , such as it was , was solely confided to the executive ,
without any powers o
f legislation . The province languished in
imbecility under his care , and began to acquire vigor only when
h
e
ceased to act as proprietary and lawgiver . Massachusetts
soon afterwards set u
p
a
n exclusive right and jurisdiction over
the territory , as within its chartered limits , and was able to en
force obedience and submission to its power . It continued under
the jurisdiction o
f
Massachusetts until 1665 , when the commis
sioners of the crown separated it for a short period ; but the
authority o
f
Massachusetts was soon afterwards re -established . 4
The controversy between Massachusetts and the Palatine , as to
jurisdiction over the province , was brought before the Privy Coun
cil at the same time with that of Mason respecting New Hamp
shire , and the claim of Massachusetts was adjudged void . Before
a final adjudication was had , Massachusetts had the prudence and
sagacity , in 1677 , to purchase th
e
title of Gorges fo
r
a trifling
sum ; and thus , to the great disappointment of the crown , (then
in treaty fo
r
the same object , ) succeeded to it , and held and gov
erned it as a provincial dependency , until the fall of its own char
te
r
; and it afterwards , as w
e
have seen , was incorporated with
Massachusetts in the provincial charter of 1691 . 6
11 Haz . Coll . 442 to 445 .
2 I Chalm . Annals , 474 , 479 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 254 , 258 , 296 .
31 Chalm . Annals , 480 , 481 , 483 ; 1 Hutch . History , 17
6
, 177 , 25
6
; 1 Holmes ' s
Annals , 296 ; 2 Winthrop ' s Journ . 38 , 42 .
4 1 Chalm . Annals , 483 , 484 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 343 , 348 ; Hutch . Coll . 422 .
5 i Chalm . Annals , 485 , 504 , 505 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 388 .
6 i Chalm . Annals , 486 , 487 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 388 ; 1 Hutch . Hist . 326 .
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CHAPTER VII .
CONNECTICUT .
$ 8
4 . CONNECTICUT was originally settled under the protection
o
f
Massachusetts ; but the inhabitants in a few years afterwards
( 1638 ) felt a
t liberty (after the example of Massachusetts ) to
frame a constitution o
f government and laws for themselves . 1
In 1630 , the Earl of Warwick obtained from the Council of
Plymouth a patent o
f
the land upon a straight line near the sea
shore towards the southwest , west and by south , or west from
Narraganset River forty leagues , as the coast lies , towards Vir
ginia , and al
l
within that breadth to the South Sea . In March ,
1631 , the Earl of Warwick conveyed the same to Lord Say and
Seale and others . In April , 1635 , 2 the same council granted the
same territory to the Marquis o
f
Hamilton . Possession under
th
e
title of Lord Say and Seale and others was taken a
t
the
mouth o
f
the Connecticut in 1635 . 3 The settlers there were not ,
however , disturbed ; and finally , in 1644 , they extinguished the
title o
f
the proprietaries , or lords , and continued to act under the
constitution o
f government which they had framed in 1638 . B
y
that constitution , which was framed b
y
the inhabitants o
f
the
three towns o
f
Windsor , Hartford , and Weathersfield , it was pro
vided that there should be two general assemblies annually ; that
there should be annually elected , b
y
the freemen , at the court in
April , a governor and si
x
assistants , who should “ have power to
administer justice according to the law here established , and for
want thereof according to the rule of the Word o
f
God . ” And
that a
s many other officers should be chosen as might be found
1 Huich . Hist . 98 , 99 ; 2 Hutch . Hist . 202 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 321 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals ,
220 , 228 , 231 , 232 , 251 , 269 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 286 , 287 , 289 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 158 ,
& c . ; i Hutch Hist . 100 .
The substance o
f
this frame o
f government is given in 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 251 ; and
a full copy in 1 Haz . Coll . 437 , 441 .
2 2 Hutch . Hist . 203 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 318 ; 1 Holmes ' s Ann . 208 ; 1 Chalm . Ann .
299 .
81 Chalm . Annals , 288 , 289 , 290 , 300 ; 2 Hutch . Hist . 203 ; 1 Haz . Coll . 395 , 396 ;
i Holmes ' s Annals , 229 ; 1 Huich . Hist . 47 ; 1 Winthrop ' s Jour . 170 , 397 ; Hutch .
Coll . 412 , 413 .
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requisite .1 To the General Court each of the above -named towns
was entitled to send four deputies ; and other towns, which should
be afterwards formed , were to send so many deputies as theGen
eral Court should judgemeet, according to the apportionment of
the freemen in the town . All persons, who were inhabitants and
freemen , and who took the oath of fidelity , were entitled to vote
in the elections . Church -membership was not , as in Massachu
setts , an indispensable qualification . The supreme power , legis
lative , executive , and judicial , was vested in the General Court.2
$ 85 . The colony of New Haven had a separate origin , and was
settled by emigrants immediately from England , without any title
derived from the patentees . They began their settlement in 1638 ,
purchasing their lands of the natives , and entered into a solemn
compact of government . By it no person was admitted to any
office , or to have any voice at any election , unless he was a mem
ber of one of the churches allowed in the dominion . There was
an annual election of the governor , the deputy , magistrates , and
other officers, by th
e
freemen . The General Court consisted of
the governor , deputy , magistrates , and two deputies from each
plantation ; 4 and was declared to be “ the supreme power , under
God , of this independent dominion , ” and had authority “ to
declare , publish ,and establish the laws of God , the Supreme Legis
lator , and to make and repeal orders for smaller matters , not par
ticularly determined in Scripture , according to the general rules
o
f righteousness ; to order all affairs of war and peace , and all
matters relative to the defending o
r fortifying the country ; to
receive and determine all appeals , civil or criminal , from any
inferior courts , in which they are to proceed according to Script
ure light , and laws , and orders agreeing therewith . ” 5 Other
courts were provided for ; and Hutchinson observes that their
laws and proceedings varied in very few circumstances from Mas
sachusetts , except that they had no jury , either in civil or criminal
cases . All matters of facts were determined b
y
the court . 6
$ 8
6 . Soon after the restoration of Charles the Second to the
11 Haz . Coll . 437 ; 1 Holmes ' s Ann . 251 .
2 Ibid .
8 i Hutch . Hist . 82 , 83 ; 1 Holmes ' s Ann . 244 , 24
5
; 1 Chalm . Ann . 290 ; Robert
son ' s America , B . 10 ; 3 American Museum , 523 .
4 3 American Museum , 523 .
5 i Hutch . Hist . 83 , note .
6 i Hutch . Hist . 84 , note ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 290 .
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throne , the colony of Connecticut , aware o
f
the doubtful nature o
f
it
s
title to the exercise o
f sovereignty , solicited ,and in April , 1662 ,
obtained from that monarch a charter o
f government and terri
tory . The charter included within its limits the whole colony of
New Haven ; and as this was done without the consent of the lat
te
r , resistance was made to the incorporation until 1665 , when
both were indissolubly united ,and have ever since remained under
one general government . 2
$ 8
7 . The charter of Connecticut , which has been objected to
b
y
Chalmers a
s establishing “ a mere democracy , or rule of the
people , " contained , indeed , a very ample grant o
f privileges . It
incorporated the inhabitants b
y
the name of the Governor and
Company o
f
th
e
Colony o
f
Connecticut in New England in
America . It ordained that two general assemblies shall be annu
ally held ; and that the assembly shall consist of a governor ,
deputy -governor , twelve assistants , and two deputies , from every
town or city , to be chosen b
y
the freemen , (the charter nomi
nating the first governor and assistants ) . The general assembly
had authority to appoint judicatories ,make freemen , elect officers ,
establish laws and ordinances “ not contrary to the laws of this
realm o
f England , ” to punish offences “ according to the course of
other corporations within this our kingdom o
f England , ” to assem
ble the inhabitants in martial array for the common defence , and
to exercise martial law in cases of necessity . The lands were to
b
e
holden a
s o
f
the manor of EastGreenwich , in free and common
socage . The inhabitants and their children born there were to
enjoy and possess a
ll
the liberties and immunities o
f
free , natural
born subjects , in the same manner as if born within the realm .
The right o
f general fishery on the coasts was reserved to a
ll
sub
jects ; and finally the territory bounded on the east b
y
the Narra
ganset River , where it falls into the sea , and on the north b
y
Mas
sachusetts , and on the south b
y
the sea , and in longitude , as the
line o
f
the Massachusetts colony running from east to west , that
from Narraganset Bay to the South Sea , was granted and con
firmed to the colony . 3 The charter is silent in regard to religious
rights and privileges .
11 Haz . Coll . 58
6
; 1 Chalm . Ann . 292 ,293 ; 1 Holmes ' s Ann . 32
0
; 2 Doug . Summ .
164 .
? 1 Holmes ' s Ann . 33
8
; 1 Chalm . Annals , 29
6
; Marsh . Colon . 13
4
; 1 Chalm . Ann .
294 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 164 , 167 .
8 2 Haz . Coll .597 to 605 ; 1 Holmes ' s Ann . 32
0
; 1 Chalm . Annals , 293 , 294 ; Marsh .
Colon . ch . 5 , p . 134 .
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§ 88 . In 1685 , a quo warranto was issued by King James against
the colony for the repeal of the charter . No judgment appears to
have been rendered upon it ; but the colony offered its submission
to the will of the crown ; and Sir Edward Andros , in 1687 , went
to Hartford , and in the name of the crown declared the govern
ment dissolved . They did not , however , surrender the charter ;
but secreted it in an oak , which is still venerated ; and immedi
ately after the revolution o
f
1688 , they resumed the exercise of all
it
s powers . The successors of the Stuarts silently suffered them
to retain it until the American Revolution , without any struggle
o
r
resistance . The charter continued to bemaintained as a fun
damental law o
f
the State , until the year 1818 , when a new con
stitution o
f government was framed and adopted b
y
the people .
$ 8
9 . The laws of Connecticut were , in many respects , similar
to those o
f Massachusetts . At an early period after the charter
they passed an act which may be deemed a bill of rights . By it , it
was declared that “ no man ' s life shall be taken away ; no man ' s
honor or good name shall be stained ; no man ' s person shall be
arrested , restrained , banished , dismembered , nor any ways pun
ished ; no man shall be deprived of his wife or children ; no man ' s
goods o
r
estate shall be taken away from him , nor any way en
dangered under color o
f
la
w , or countenance of authority , unless
it be b
y
virtue o
r equity o
f
some express law o
f
this colony , war
ranting the same , established b
y
the General Court , and suffi
ciently published ; or in case of the defects of a law in any par
ticular case , by some clear and plain rule of the Word of God , in
which the whole court shall concur . " 4 The trial b
y
jury , in civil
and criminal cases , was also secured ; and if the court were dis
satisfied with the verdict , they might send back the jury to con
sider the same a second and third time , but not further . The
governor was to be chosen , as th
e
charter provided , by the free
men . Every town was to send one or two deputies or representa
tives to the General Assembly ; but every freeman was to give his
11 Holmes ' s Ann . 415 , 421 , 429 , 442 ; 1 Chalm Ann . 297 , 298 , 301 , 30
4
, 306 ; 1
Hutch . Hist . 339 , 406 , note .
2 Ibid .
8 2 Doug . Summ . 171 to 176 , 193 to 202 .
* Colony Laws o
f
Connecticut , edition by Greene , 1715 - 1718 , folio , (New London , )
p . 1 .
old , p . 2 . The practice continued down to the establishment of the new consti
tution in 1818 .
CH. VI
I
. ] 59CONNECTICUT .
voice in the election o
f
assistants and other public officers . ) No
person was entitled to b
e
made a freeman , unless he owned lands
in freehold o
f forty shillings ' value per annum , or £ 40 personal
estate .
$ 9
0 . In respect to offences , their criminal code proceeded upon
the same general foundation as that o
f
Massachusetts , declaring
those capital which were so declared in the Holy Scriptures , and
citing them as authority for this purpose . Among the capital
offences were idolatry , blasphemy of Father , Son , or Holy Ghost ,
witchcraft ,murder ,murder through guile by poisoning or other
devilish practices , bestiality , sodomy , rape ,man -stealing , false wit
ness , conspiracy against the colony , arson , children cursing o
r
smiting father ormother , being a stubborn o
r
rebellious son , and
treason . 3
§ 9
1 . In respect to religious concerns , their laws provided that
a
ll persons should attend public worship , and that the towns
should support and pay the ministers of religion . And a
t
first
th
e
choice of the minister was confided to the major part o
f
th
e
householders o
f
th
e
town ; the church , as such , having nothing to
d
o with the choice . But in 1708 , an act was passed , (doubtless
b
y
the influence of the clergy , ) b
y
which the choice o
f
ministers
was vested in the inhabitants o
f
the town who were church -mein
bers ; and the same year the celebrated platform at Saybrook was
approved ,which has continued down to our day to regulate , in dis
cipline and in doctrine , the ecclesiastical concerns of the State . 4
$ 9
2 . The spirit of toleration was not more liberal here than in
most o
f
the other colonies . No persons were allowed to embody
themselves into church estate without the consent o
f
the General
Assembly , and the approbation of the neighboring churches ; and
n
o ministry or church administration was entertained or author
ized separate from , and in opposition to , that openly and publicly
observed and dispensed b
y
the approved minister o
f
the place ,
except with the approbation and consent aforesaid . 5 Quakers ,
Ranters , Adamites , and other notorious heretics , ( as they were
called , ) were to be committed to prison or sent out of the colony ,
i Colony Laws of Connecticut , edition by Greene , 1715 - 1718 , folio , (New Lon
don ) p . 27 , 30 .
? Id . p . 41 . 3 Id . 12 .
* Id . p . 29 , 84 , 85 , 110 , 141 . The Constitution of 1818 has made a great change in
the rights and powers o
f
the ministers and parishes in ecclesiastical affairs .
6 Id . p . 29 .
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by order of the governor and assistants . Nor does the zeal of
persecution appear at a
ll
to have abated until , in pursuance of the
statutes o
f
1 William and Mary , dissenters were allowed th
e
lib
erty o
f
conscience withoutmolestation . 2
$ 9
3 . In respect to real estate , the descent and distribution was
directed to b
e among all the children , giving the eldest so
n
a
double share ; conveyances in fraud of creditors were declared
void ; lands were made liable to be set of
f
to creditors on execu
tions b
y
the appraisement o
f
three appraisers . 3
The process in courts o
f justice was required to b
e
in the name
o
f
the reigning king . Persons having no estate might be relieved
from imprisonment b
y
two assistants ; but if the creditor required
it , he should satisfy the debt b
y
service . Depositions were a
l
lowed a
s
evidence in civil suits . No person was permitted to
plead in behalf o
f
another person on trial for delinquency , except
directly to matter o
f
law , a provision somewhat singular in our
annals , though in entire conformity to the English law in capital
felonies . Bills and bonds were made assignable , and suits allowed
in the name o
f
the assignees .
Magistrates , justices of the peace ,and ministers were author
ized to marry persons ; and divorces a vinculo allowed fo
r
adul
tery , fraudulent contract , or desertion fo
r
three years . Men and
women , having a husband or wife in foreign parts , were not a
l
lowed to abide in the colony , so separated , above two years , with
out liberty from the General Court .
Towns were required to support public schools under regulations
similar , for the most part , to those of Massachusetts ; 9 and an
especial maritime code was enacted , regulating th
e
rights and
duties and authorities of ship -owners , seamen , and others con
cerned in navigation . 10
Such are the principal provisions of the colonial legislation of
Connecticut .
i Colony Laws of Conn . , edition by Greene , 1715 – 1718 , folio , (New London , ) p .
49 .
2 Id . p . 134 .
3 Id . p . 33 , 61 , 164 . 4 Id . p . 41 .
6 Id . p . 6 . 6 Id . p . 116 .
7 Id . p . 26 . 8 Id . p . 7 .
9 Id . p . 84 .
1
0
Id . p . 70 . A similar code existed in Massachusetts , enacted in 1668 .
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CHAPTER VIII .
RHODE ISLAND .
$ 94 . RHODE ISLAND was originally settled by emigrants from
Massachusetts , fleeing thither to escape from religious persecu
tion ; and it still boasts of Roger Williams as its founder , and as
the early defender of religious freedom and the rights of con
science . One body of them purchased the island which has given
the name to the State , and another the territory of the Providence
Plantations from the Indians, and began their settlements in both
places nearly at the same period , viz . in 1636 and 1638 . 1 They
entered into separate voluntary associations of government . But
finding their associations not sufficient to protect them against the
encroachments o
f
Massachusetts , and having no title under any
o
f
the royal patents , they sent Roger Williams to England in 1643
to procure a surer foundation both o
f
title and government . He
succeeded in obtaining from the Earl of Warwick ( in 1643 ) a
charter of incorporation of Providence Plantations ; ? and also , in
1644 , a charter from the two houses of Parliament (Charles the
First being then driven from his capital ) for the incorporation
o
f
the towns o
f
Providence , Newport , and Portsmouth , fo
r
th
e
absolute government o
f
themselves , but according to the laws of
England . 3
§ 95 . Under this charter an assembly was convened in 1647 ,
consisting of the collective freemen o
f
the various plantations .
The legislative power was vested in a court o
f
commissioners o
f
si
x
persons , chosen by each of th
e
four towns then in existence .
1 i Hutch . Hist . 72 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 225 , 233 , 246 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 269 , 270 ;
Hutch . Coll . 413 , 414 , 415 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 3 , p . 99 , 100 ; Robertson ' s America ,
B . 10 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 76 to 90 ; 1 Pitkin ' s Hist . 46 . Mr . Chalmers says , that Prov
idence was settled in the beginning o
f
1635 ; and Dr . Holmes , in 1636 . ( 1 Chalm .
Annals , 270 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 233 . )
2 1 Hutch . Hist . 39 , note ; Walsh ' s Appeal , 429 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 46 , 47 , 48 ; 2 Doug .
Summ . 8
0
.
si Chalm . 271 , 272 ; Hutch . Coll . 415 , 416 ; [ 1 R . I . Hist . Rec . 143 ; Arnold ,
Hist . of Rhode Island , I . 114 , 200 . )
* i Chalm . Annals , 273 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 283 ; Walsh ' s Appeal , 429 ; 2 Doug .
Summ . 80 .
62 [BOOK I.HISTORY OF THE COLONIES .
The whole executive power seems to have been vested in a presi
dent and four assistants , who were chosen from the freemen , and
formed the supreme court fo
r
the administration o
f justice . Every
township , forming within itself a corporation , elected a council of
six fo
r
the management o
f its peculiar affairs , and for the settle
ment o
f
the smallest disputes . The council of state of the Com
monwealth soon afterwards interfered to suspend their government ;
but th
e
distractions a
t
home prevented any serious interference b
y
Parliament in the administration of their affairs ; and they con
tinued to act under their former government until the restoration
o
f
Charles the Second . That event seems to have given great
satisfaction to these plantations . They immediately proclaimed
the king , and sent an agent to England ; and in July , 1663 , after
some opposition , they succeeded in obtaining a charter from the
crown . 3
§ 96 . That charter incorporated the inhabitants b
y
the name o
f
the Governor and Company of the English Colony of Rhode Island
and Providence Plantations in New England in America , confer
ring on them the usual powers of corporations . The executive
power was lodged in a governor , deputy -governor , and ten assist
ants , chosen b
y
the freemen . The supreme legislative authority
was .rested in a General Assembly , consisting of a governor ,deputy
governor , ten assistants , and deputies from the respective towns ,
chosen b
y
the freemen , (six for Newport , four for Providence ,
Portsmouth ,and Warwick , and two for other towns , ) the governor
o
r deputy and si
x
assistants being always present . The General
Assembly were authorized to admit freemen , choose officers , make
laws and ordinances , so as that they were “ not contrary and re
pugnant unto , but asnear as may be agreeable to , the laws of this
our realm o
f England , considering the nature and constitution of
the place and people ; to create and organize courts ; to punish
offences according to the course of other corporations in Eng
land ” ; to array the martial force of the colony fo
r
the common
defence , and enforce martial law ; and to exercise other important
powers and prerogatives . It further provided fo
r
a free fishery on
the coasts ; and that all the inhabitants and children born there
11 Chalm . Annals , 273 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 283 .
? i Chalm . Annals , 274 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 297 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 5 , p . 133 .
31 Chalm . Annals , 274 ; I Holmes ' s Annals , 329 ; ( Arnold , Hist . of Rhode Island ,
I . 29
0
; Palfrey , Hist . of New England , II . 565 . ]
4 2 Haz . Coll .612 to 623 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 81 .
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should enjoy a
ll
the liberties and immunities o
f
free and natural
subjects born within the realm o
f England . It then granted and
confirmed unto them all that part of the king ' s dominions in New
England containing the Narraganset Bay and the countries and
parts adjacent , bounded westerly to the middle of Pawcatuck
River ,and so along the river northward to the head thereof , thence
b
y
a straiglat line due north ,until it meet the south line of Mas
sachusetts , extending casterly three English miles to the most
eastern and northeastern parts o
f Narraganset Bay , as the bay
extendeth southerly unto the mouth o
f
the river running towards
Providence , and thence along the easterly side or bank o
f
the said
river u
p
to the falls , called Patucket Falls , and thence in a straight
line due north till it meets the Massachusetts line . The territory
was to be holden as o
f
the manor of East Greenwich in free and
common socage . It further secured a free trade with al
l
the other
colonies .
$ 9
7 . But the most remarkable circumstance in the charter ,
and that which exhibits the strong feeling and spirit o
f
the colony ,
is the provision respecting religious freedom . The charter , after
reciting the petition of the inhabitants , “ that it is much in their
hearts ( if they be permitted ) to hold forth a lively experiment ,
that a most flourishing civil state may stand , and be best main
tained , and that among our English subjects , with a full liberty in
religious concernments , and that true piety , rightly grounded upon
gospel principles ,will give the best and greatest security to sov
ereignty , ” proceeds to declare : ? “ We being willing to encourage
the hopeful undertaking of our said loyal and loving subjects , and
to secure them in the free exercise and enjoyment o
f all their
civil and religious rights appertaining to them as our loving sub
jects , and to preserve to them that liberty in the true Christian
faith and worship o
f
God , which they have sought with so much
travail , and with peaceful minds and loyal subjection to our royal
progenitors and ourselves to enjoy ; and because some of the peo
ple and inhabitants of the same colony cannot , in their private
opinion , conform to the public exercise of religion according to
th
e
liturgy , form , and ceremonies of the Church of England , or
i This is the substance but not the exact words of the boundaries in the charter ,which
is given a
t large in 2 Haz . Coll .612 to 623 , and in Rhode Island Laws , editions of 1789
and 1822 .
2 2 Haz . Coll . 613 .
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take or subscribe the oaths and articles made and established in
that behalf ; and fo
r
that the same , b
y
reason o
f
the remote dis
tances of these places , will , as we hope , be no breach of the unity
and uniformity established in this nation , have therefore thought
fi
t , and do hereby publish , grant , ordain , and declare that our
royal will and pleasure is , that no person within the said colony , a
t
any time hereafter , shall be anywise molested , punished , disquieted ,
o
r
called in question for any differences in opinion in matters of
religion ; but that al
l
and every person and person8 may , from time
to time and at al
l
time hereafter , freely and fully have and enjoy
his and their own judgment and consciences in matters of religious
concernment throughout the tract of land hereafter mentioned ,
they behaving themselves peaceably and quietly , not using this
liberty to licentiousness and profaneness , nor to the civil injury
o
r
outward disturbance o
f
others . ” ] This is a noble declaration ,
and worthy of any prince who rules over a free people . It is
lamentable to reflect how little it comports with the domestic
persecutions authorized b
y
the samemonarch during his profligate
reign . It is still more lamentable to reflect how little a similar
spirit o
f
toleration was encouraged either b
y
the precepts o
r ex
amples o
f any other o
f
the New England colonies .
$ 9
8 . Rhode Island enjoys the honor of having been , if not the
first , at least one of the earliest of the colonies , and indeed of
modern States , in which the liberty of conscience and freedom of
worship were boldly proclaimed among it
s
fundamental laws . 2
If at any time afterwards the State broke in upon the broad and
rational principles thus established , it was but a momentary devi
ation from the settled course o
f
it
s policy . A
t
the present day ,
acting under this very charter , it continues to maintain religious
freedom with all the sincerity and liberality and zeal which be
longed to its founder . It has been supposed , that in the laws
passed b
y
the General Assembly first convened under this charter ,
( 1644 , ) Roman Catholics were excluded from the privileges of
freemen . But this has been very justly doubted ; and , indeed , if
well founded , the act would deserve all the reproach which has
been heaped upon it . The first laws , however , declared that no
1 2 Haz . Coll .613 ; [Arnold , Hist . of Rhode Island , I . 292 . ]
2 Walsh ' s Appeal ,429 .
3 Hutch . Coll . 413 , 415 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 276 , 284 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 336 .
4 On this subject , se
e
1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 276 , 284 ; and Dr . Holmes ' s valuable note
to his Annals , vol . i . p . 336 , and Id . p . 341 ; Hutch . Coll . 413 , 415 ; Walsh ' s Appeal ,
429 to 435 .
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freeman shall be imprisoned or deprived o
f
his freehold ,but by
the judgment o
f
his peers o
r
the laws o
f
the colony ; and that no
ta
x
should be imposed o
r required o
f
the colonists , but by th
e
a
ct
o
f the General Assembly . 1
$ 9
9 . It is said that th
e
general conduct o
f
Rhode Island seems
to have given entire satisfaction to Charles the Second during the
residue o
f his reign . Upon the accession of James the inhabi
tants were among the first to offer their congratulations , and to
ask protection fo
r
their chartered rights . That monarch ,however ,
disregarded their request . They were accused of a violation of
their charter , and a quo warranto was filed against them . They
immediately resolved , without much hesitation , not to contend
with the crown , but to surrender their charter , and passed an act
for that purpose which was afterwards suppressed . In Decem
ber , 1686 , Sir Edmund Andros , agreeably to his orders , dissolved
their government , and assumed the administration of the colony .
The Revolution o
f
1688 put an end to his power ; and the colony
immediately afterwards resumed it
s
charter ,and , though not with
out some interruptions , continued to maintain and exercise its
powers down to the period o
f
the American Revolution . It still
continues to act under the same charter , as a fundamental law , it
being the only State in the Union which has not formed a new
constitution o
f government . It seems , that until the year 1696 ,
the governor , assistants , and deputies of the towns sat together ;
but b
y
a law then passed they were separated , and the deputies
acted a
s
a lower house , and the governor and assistants as an
upper house , 5
$ 100 . In reviewing the colonial legislation of Rhode Island
some peculiarities are discernible , though the general system is
like that of the other parts of New England . 6 No persons but
those who were admitted freemen o
f
the colony were allowed to
vote a
t elections , and they might do it in person o
r by proxy ;
and none but freemen were eligible to office . Wills of real es
tate were required to have three witnesses . The probate of wills
ii Chalm . Annals , 276 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 336 ; R . Island Colony Laws (1744 ) ,
P . 3 .
? i Chalm . Annals , 27
8
.
si Chalm . Annals , 280 , 281 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 85 .
41 Chalm . Annals , 278 , 279 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 415 , 420 , 428 , 442 ; 2 Doug .
Summ . 8
5 , 377 ; Danmer ' s Defence , 1 American Tracts , 7 .
5 R . Island Colony Laws (174 + ) , 24 . 6 Id . p . 1 , 14
7
.
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and the granting of administrations of personal estate were com
mitted to the jurisdiction of the town councils of each town in
the colony , with an appeal to the governor and council as su
preme ordinary . Every town was a corporate body , entitled to
choose it
s
officers , and to admit persons as freemen . 2 Sports and
labor on Sunday were prohibited . 3 Purchases of land from the
Indians were prohibited . B
y
a formal enactment , in 1700 , it was
declared , that in al
l
actions ,matters , causes , and things whatso
ever , where no particular law of the colony is made to decide and
determine the same , then in all such cases the laws of England
shall b
e put in force to issue , determine , and decide the same , any
usage , custom , or law to the contrary notwithstanding . About
the same period the English navigation laws were required , b
y
a
n
act o
f
the colonial legislature , to be executed . Twenty years '
peaceful possession o
f
lands , under the claim of a title in fee
simple , was declared to give a good and rightful title to the fee ; ?
and thus a just and liberal effect was given to the statute o
f lim
itations , not as a bar of the remedy , but of the right . The
acknowledgment and registration of conveyances of lands in a
public town registry were provided fo
r
. The support of th
e
min
istry was made to depend upon free contributions . Appeals to
the king in council , in cases exceeding £300 in value , were
allowed . A system of redress , in cases of abuses o
f property
devoted to charitable uses , was established ; 9 fines and common
recoveries were regulated ; and the trial b
y jury established . The
criminal code was not sanguinary in its enactments ; and did not
affect to follow th
e
punishments denounced in the Scripture
against particular offences . 10 Witchcraft , however ,was , as in the
common law , punished with death . At a later period , lands of
persons living out o
f
the colony o
r concealing themselves therein
were made liable to the payment o
f
their debts . 11 In respect to
the descent o
f
real estates , the canons of the common law were
adopted , and the eldest son took the whole inheritance by primo
geniture . This system was for a short period repealed b
y
a
n act
( 4 & 5 George I . , 1718 ) which divided the estate among al
l
the
children , giving the eldest son a double share . 12 But the common
1 R . Island Col . Laws (1744 ) , p . 1 , 4 . 2 Id . p . 9 .
3 Id . 18 . 4 Id . 4 . 6 Id . 2
8
. . 6 Id . 28 .
* Id . 46 . 8 Id . 87 , 133 . Id . 108 . 1
0
Id . 115 .
1
1
Id . 192 .
1
2 Colony Laws of Rhode Island (edit . 1719 , printed at Boston ) , pp . 95 , 96 .
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la
w
was soon afterwards ( in 1728 ) reinstated b
y
th
e
public appro
bation , and so remained to regulate descents until a short period
( 1770 ) before the Revolution . Contracts fo
r
things above the
value o
f
te
n pounds were required to be in writing ; and convey
ances in fraud o
f
creditors were declared void . And we may also
trace in it
s legislation provision respecting hue and cry in cases o
f
robbery ; and of forfeiture in cases of accidental death , by way of
deodand . 1
§ 101 . We have now finished our review of all the successive
colonies established in New England . The remark of Chalmers
is in general well founded . " Originally settled , ” says he , 2 “ b
y
th
e
same kind o
f people , a similar policy naturally rooted in all
the colonies o
f
New England . Their forms of government , their
laws , their courts of justice , their manners , and their religious
tenets ,which gave birth to all these ,were nearly the same . ” Still ,
however , the remark is subject to many local qualifications . In
Rhode Island , fo
r
instance , the rigid spirit o
f
Puritanism softened
down ( as we have seen ) into general toleration . On the other
hand , the common -law rules of descents were adhered to in its
policy with singular zeal , down to the year 1770 , as necessary to
prevent the destruction o
f family estates , while the neighboring
colonies adopted a rule dividing the inheritance among all the
children . 3
§ 102 . One of the most memorable circumstances in the history
o
f
New England is th
e
early formation and establishment of a
confederation of the colonies fo
r
amity , offence and defence , and
mutual advice and assistance . The project was agitated as early
a
s 1637 ; but difficulties having occurred , the articles of union
were not finally adopted until 1643 . In the month ofMay of that
year , the colonies of Massachusetts , Connecticut , New Haven , and
Plymouth formed a confederacy b
y
the name o
f
the United Col
onies o
f
New England , and entered into a perpetual league of
friendship and amity , for offence and defence , and mutual advice
and succor . The charges of al
l
wars , offensive and defensive ,were
to be borne in common , and according to an apportionment pro
vided for in th
e
articles ; and in case of invasion of any colony ,
1 Rhode Island Colony Laws (1719 ) , p . 5 , 8 . . ? i Chalm . Annals , 296 .
8 Gardner v . Collins , 2 Peters ' s Sup . Ct . Rep . 58 .
' 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 269 , 270 ; i Winthrop ' s Jour . 237 , 28
4
; ( Palfrey , Hist . of
New England , I . 630 . ]
68 [ BOOK I.HISTORY OF THE COLONIES.
the others were to furnish a certain proportion of armed men for
it
s
assistance . Commissioners , appointed by each colony ,were to
meet and determine all affairs of war and peace , leagues , aids ,
charges , & c . , and to frame and establish agreements and orders
for other general interests . This union , so important and neces
sary for mutual defence and assistance during the troubles which
then agitated the parent country , was not objected to b
y King
Charles the Second , on his restoration ; and with some few alter
ations , it subsisted down to 1686 , when all the charters were pros
trated b
y
the authority o
f King James . ? Rhode Island made ap
plication to be admitted into this union , but was refused ,upon the
ground that the territory was within the limits of Plymouth col
ony . It does not appear that subsequently the colony became a
party to it . 3
1 2 Haz . Coll . 1 to 6 ; 2 Winthrop ' s Jour . 10
1
to 106 ; 1 Hutch . Hist . 124 , 126 .
2 i Holmes ' s Annals , 270 and note ; I Hatch . Hist . 126 , note ; 2 Haz . Coll . 7 , et seq .
3 i Holmes ' s Annals , 287and note ; 1 Hutch . Hist . 124 ; 2 Haz . Coll . 99 , 100 . [The
application o
f
Rhode Island and it
s rejection are given in Hutch . Coll . 226 , 227 ]
CH, Tx.] -69MARYLAND .
CHAPTER IX .
MARYLAND.
§ 103 . The province of Maryland was included originally in the
patent of the Southern or Virginia company ; and upon the disso
lution of that company it reverted to the crown . King Charles
the First , on the 20th June , 1632 , granted it by patent to Cecilius
Calvert Lord Baltimore , the son of George Calvert Lord Balti
more , to whom the patent was intended to have been made, but he
died before it was executed . By the charter the king erected it
into a province , and gave it the name of Maryland , in honor of his
queen , Henrietta Maria , the daughter of Henry the Fourth of
France , to be held of the crown of England , he yearly , forever,
rendering two Indian arrows. The territory was bounded by a
right line drawn from Watkin ' s Point, on Chesapeake Bay, to
the ocean on the east, thence to that part of the estuary of Dela
ware on the north which lieth under the 40th degree , where New
England is terminated ; thence in a right line, by the degree
aforesaid , to the meridian of the fountain of Potomac ; thence fol
lowing it
s
course b
y
the farther bank to it
s
confluence with the
Chesapeake ; and thence to Watkin ' s Point . 2
§ 104 . The territory thus severed from Virginia was made im
mediately subject to the crown , and was granted in full and abso
lute propriety to Lord Baltimore and his heirs , saving the alle
giance and sovereign dominion to the crown , with al
l
the rights ,
regalities , and prerogatives , which the Bishop of Durham enjoyed
in that palatinate , to be held o
f
the crown a
s o
f
Windsor Castle ,
in the county of Berks , in free and common socage , and not in
capite , or by knight ' s service . The charter further provided that
the proprietary should have authority , b
y
and with the consent of
the freemen , or their delegates assembled fo
r
the purpose , to make
all laws for the province , " so that such laws be consonant to
11 Holmes ' s Ann . 213 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 201 , 202 ; Bacon ' s Laws of Maryland
( 1765 ) ; 2 Doug . Summ . 353 , & c .
2 1 Haz . Coll . 32
7
to 337 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 202 ; Charters of N . A . Provinces , 4t
o ,
London , 1766 .
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reason , and not repugnant or contrary , but as far as conveniently
might be , agreeable to the laws , statutes , customs , and rights of
this our realm of England .” ] The proprietary was also vested
with full executive power ; and the establishment of courts of jus
tice was provided for. The proprietary was also authorized to levy
subsidies , with the assent of the people in assembly . The inhabi
tants and their children were to enjoy all the rights , immunities ,
and privileges of subjects born in England . The right of the
advowsons of th
e
churches ,according to the establishment of Eng
land , and the right to create manors and courts baron , to confer
titles o
fdignity , to erect ports and other regalities ,were expressly
given to the proprietary . An exemption of the colonists from all
talliages on their goods and estates , to be imposed b
y
the crown ,
was expressly covenanted for in perpetuity ; an exemption which
had been conferred on other colonies for years only . License was
granted to a
ll subjects to transport themselves to the province ;
and it
s products were to be imported into England and Ireland ,
under such taxes only as were paid b
y
other subjects . And the
usual powers in other charters to repel invasions , to suppress
rebellions , & c . , were also conferred on the proprietary .
$ 105 . Such is the substance of the patent . And Chalmers has
with some pride asserted , that “ Maryland has always enjoyed the
unrivalled honor of being the first colony which was erected into
a province o
f
the English Empire and governed regularly b
y
laws
enacted in a provincial legislature . ” 3 It is also observable that
there is no clause in the patent which required any transmission
o
f the province laws to the king , or providing fo
r
h
is approbation
o
r
assent . Under this charter Maryland continued to be gov
erned , with some short intervals of interruption , down to the
period of the American Revolution , by the successors of the origi
nal proprietary .
$ 106 . The first emigration made under the auspices of Lord
Baltimore was in November , 1632 , and consisted of about two hun
dred gentlemen o
f
considerable fortune and rank ,and their adher
ents , being chiefly Roman Catholics . “ He laid the foundation of
this province , ” says Chalmers , 5 “ upon the broad basis of security to
property and o
f
freedom o
f religion , granting in absolute fee fifty
i i Haz . Coll . 3 ? 7 , & c . ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 202 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 2 , p . 69 .
? i Chalmers ' s Annals , 203 , 204 , 205 . 8 Id . 200 .
4 Id . 203 . 6 Id . 207 , 208 .
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acres of land to every emigrant ; establishing Christianity agree
ably to the old common law , of which it is a part , without allow
ing pre-eminence to any particular sect. The wisdom of his choice
soon converted a dreary wilderness into a prosperous colony .” It
is certainly very honorable to the liberality and public spirit of the
proprietary , that he should have introduced into his fundamental
policy the doctrine of general toleration and equality among Chris
tian sects (for he does not appear to have gone further ) ; and
have thus given the earliest example of a legislator inviting his
subjects to the free indulgence of religious opinion . This was
anterior to the settlement of Rhode Island ; and therefore merits
the enviable rank of being the first recognition among the colo
nists of the glorious and indefeasible rights of conscience . Rhode
Island seems, without any apparent consciousness of co -operation ,
to have gone further , and to have protected an universal freedom
of religious opinion in Jew and Gentile , in Christian and Pagan ,
without any distinction to be found in its legislation .
$ 107 . The first legislative assembly of Maryland , held b
y
the
freemen a
t large , was in 1634 - 1635 ; but little of their proceed
ings is known . No acts appear to have been adopted until 1638
- 1639 , 3 when provision was made , in consequence of an increase
o
f
the colonists , fo
r
a representative assembly , called the House
o
f Assembly , chosen b
y
the freemen ; and the laws passed b
y
the
assembly , and approved b
y
the proprietary o
r
his lieutenant , were
to b
e o
f
full force . The assembly was afterwards divided into an
upper and lower house . At the same session , an act , which may
b
e
considered a
s
in some sort a Magna Charta ,was passed , de
claring , among other things , that “ Holy Church within this prov
ince shall have a
ll
her rights and prerogatives ” ; “ that the inhab
itants shall have a
ll
their rights and liberties according to th
e
great charter o
f England ” ; and that the goods of debtors , if not
sufficient to pay their debts , shall be sold and distributed pro rata ,
saving debts to the proprietary . 4 In 1649 an act was passed , pun
1 ] Chalmers ' s Annals , 21
3
, 218 , 219 , 363 . Walsh ' s Appeal ,429 , Note B .
3 [ That is to say , none were agreed upon by the assembly and the proprietary ; but
acts appear to have been passed by the assembly which were rejected b
y
the proprietary ,
and others were proposed b
y
the proprietary which the assembly refused to adopt . See
Bozman , History of Maryland , 295 , 300 - 318 . This author conjectures , though the
records are silent o
n
the subject , that the difficulty between the proprietary and the
assembly was that each claimed the right to originate the laws . ]
4 Bacon ' s Laws of Maryland , ch . 2 , of 1638 ; 1650 , ch . 1 ; 1 Marsh . Colon . & c . ch .
2 , p . 73 ; 1 Chalm . Ann . 213 , 219 , 220 , 225 .
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ishing blasphemy , or denying the Holy Trinity , with death and
confiscation of goods and lands ; ? and, strangely enough after
such a provision , in the same ac
t
, after a preamble , reciting that
the confining o
f
conscience in matters o
f religion hath frequently
fallen out to be o
f dangerous consequence , it is enacted that no
person “ professing to believe in Jesus Christ , ” shall be molested
for o
r
in respect to his religion , o
r
the free exercise thereof , nor
any way compelled to the belief or exercise o
f any other religion . 2
It seems not to have been even imagined that a belief in the di
vine mission o
f Jesus Christ could , in the eyes of any sect o
f
Christians , be quite consistent with the denial o
f
the Trinity .
This act was confirmed among the perpetual laws in 1676 .
$ 108 . The legislation of Maryland does not , indeed , appear
to have afforded an uniform protection in respect to religion , such
a
s
the original policy of the founder would seem to indicate .
Under the protectorate o
f
Cromwell , Roman Catholics were ex
pressly denied any protection in the province ; and all others ,
“ who profess faith in God by Jesus Christ , though differing in
judgment from the doctrine , worship , or discipline publicly held
forth , ” were not to be restrained from the exercise of their relig
ion . 3 In 1696 the Church of England was established in the
province ; and in 1702 , the liturgy and rites and ceremonies o
f
the Church o
f England were required to b
e pursued in all the
churches , with such toleration fo
r
dissenters , however , as was pro
vided fo
r
in the act o
f
1 William and Mary . And the introduc
tion o
f
the test and abjuration acts , in 1716 , excluded al
l
Roman
Catholics from office . 5
$ 109 . It appears to have been a policy adopted at no great
distance o
f
time after th
e
settlement o
f
the colony to provide for
the public registration o
f conveyances o
f real estates . In the
silence o
f
the statute -book until 1715 , it is to be presumed that the
system o
f
descents o
f intestate estates was that of the parent
country . In that year an act passed , which made the estate part
11 Chalm . Annals , 223 , 365 ; Bacon ' s Laws of Maryland , 1649 .
2 Bacon ' s Laws o
f Maryland , 1649 , ch . 1 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 218 , 219 , 235 .
3 Bacon ' s Laws ofMaryland , 1654 , ch . 4 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 2 , p . 75 ; Chalm . Ann .
218 , 235 .
4 Bacon ' s Laws o
f Maryland , 1702 , ch . 1 .
6 Bacon ' s Laws of Maryland , 1716 , ch . 5 ; Walsh ' s Appeal , 49 , 50 ; 1 Holmes ' s An
nals , 476 , 489 .
6 Bacon ' s Laws ofMaryland , 1674 .
7 Bacon ' s Laws of Maryland , 1715 , ch . 39 .
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ible among all the children ; and the system thus introduced has ,
in it
s
substance , never since been departed from . Maryland , too ,
like the other colonies , was early alive to the importance of pos
sessing the sole power of internal taxation ; and accordingly , in
1650 , it was declared that no taxes should be levied without the
consent o
f
the general assembly .
§ 110 . Upon the Revolution of 1688 , the government of Mary
land was seized into the hands of the crown , and was not again
restored to the proprietary until 1716 . From that period no
interruption occurred until the American Revolution . ?
1 Bacon ' s Laws of Maryland , 1650 , ch . 25 ; 1 Chalm . Ann . 22
0
.
? Bacon ' s Laws of Maryland , 1692 , 1716 .
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CHAPTER X .
NEW YORK .
$ 111. New YORK was originally settled by emigrants from
Holland , at least as early as 1614 .1 Trading -houses were estab
lished on Manhattan Island by them , under the auspices of the
Dutch West India Company , about 1621. But the permanent
establishment of a Dụtch colony there does not appear to have
been fixed until about 1629 , when it seems to have acquired the
name of the New Netherlands . But the English government
seems at a
ll
times to have disputed the right of the Dutch to make
any settlement in America ; and the territory occupied b
y
them
was unquestionably within the chartered limits o
f
New England
granted to the council o
f Plymouth . 4 Charles the Second , soon
after his restoration , instigated as much b
y
personal antipathy a
s
b
y
a regard for the interest of the crown , determined to maintain
his right , and in March , 1664 , granted a patent to his brother , the
Duke o
f York and Albany , b
y
which h
e conveyed to him the
region extending from the western bank of the Connecticut to the
eastern shore o
f
the Delaware , together with Long Island , and
conferred on him the powers of government , civil and military .
Authority was given (among other things ) to correct , punish , par
don , govern ,and rule all subjects that should inhabit the territory ,
according to such laws , ordinances , & c . , as the Duke should estab
lish , so always that the same “ were not contrary , but as near as
might be agreeable to the laws and statutes and government of the
realm o
f England , ” saving to the crown a right to hear and deter
mine all appeals . The usual authority was also given to use and
exercise martial la
w
in cases of rebellion , insurrection , mutiny ,
and invasion . A part of this tract was afterwards conveyed b
y
1 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 567 , 568 . 2 Id . 570 . 8 Ibid .
41 Chalmers ' s Annals , 568 , 569 , 570 , 572 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 5 , p . 143 ; 2 Doug .
Summ . 220 , & c .
6 Smith ’ s New Jersey , 35 , 59 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 573 ; Smith ' s New York , p .
3
1
( 1
0
) ; Smith ' s New Jersey , p . 210 to 215 .
6 I copy from the recital of it in Smith ' s History of New Jersey in the surrender of
1702 , of the provinces of East and West Jersey .
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the Duke, by deed of lease and release , in June of the same year,
to Lord Berkeley and Si
r
George Carteret . By this latter grant
they were entitled to all th
e
tract adjacent to New England , lying
westward o
f Long Island and bounded on the east b
y
the main
sea and partly b
y
Hudson ' s River , and upon the west b
y
Delaware
Bay o
r River , and extending southward to the main ocean as fa
r
a
s Cape May at the mouth o
f
Delaware Bay , and to the northward
a
s far as the northernmost branch of Delaware Bay or River , which
is 4
1 degrees 4
0 minutes latitude ; which tract was to be called
b
y
the name of Nova Cæsarea , or New Jersey . ' So that the terri
tory then claimed b
y
th
e
Dutch a
s
the New Netherlands was d
i
vided into the colonies of New York and New Jersey .
$ 112 . In September , 1664 , the Dutch colony was surprised b
y
a British armament which arrived on the coast ,and was compelled
to surrender to it
s authority . B
y
the terms of the capitulation the
inhabitants were to continue free denizens and to enjoy their prop
erty . The Dutch inhabitants were to enjoy the liberty o
f
their
conscience in divine worship and church discipline , and their own
customs concerning their inheritances . The government was
instantly assumed b
y right of conquest in behalf o
f
the Duke o
f
York , the proprietary , and the territory was called New York .
Liberty o
f
conscience was granted to a
ll
settlers . No laws con
trary to those o
f England were allowed ; and taxes were to be
levied b
y authority of a general assembly . 3 The peace of Breda ,
in 1667 , confirmed the title in the conquerors by the rule of uti
possidetis . In the succeeding Dutch war the colony was recon
quered ; but it was restored to the Duke of York upon the suc
ceeding peace o
f
1674 . 5
$ 113 . As the validity of the original grant to the Duke of
York , while the Dutch were in quiet possession of the country ,
was deemed questionable , he thought it prudent to ask , and he
accordingly obtained a new grant from the crown in June , 1674 . 6
It confirmed the former grant , and empowered him to govern the
inhabitants b
y
such ordinances as h
e
o
r
h
is assigns should estab
1 Smith ’ s New York , 31 , 32 ( 10 , 11 ) ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 613 .
Smith ' s New York , 44 , 45 [ 19 , 20 ) ; 1 Chalm . Ann . 574 ; Smith ' s New Jersey , 36 ,
4
3 , 14 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 223 .
81 Chalmers ' s Annals , 575 , 577 , 579 , 597 ; Smith ' s New Jersey , 44 , 48 .
4 i Chalmers ' s Annals , 578 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 223 .
61 Chalmers ' s Annals , 579 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 364 , 366 .
6 Smith ' s New York , 61 ( 32 ) ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 579 .
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lish . It authorized him to administer justice according to the
laws of England , allowing an appeal to the king in council .1 It
prohibited trade thither without his permission ; and allowed the
colonists to import merchandise upon paying customs according to
th
e
laws o
f
th
e
realm . Under this charter he ruled the province
until his accession to the throne . No general assembly was
called fo
r
several years ; and th
e
people having become clamorous
fo
r
the privileges enjoyed b
y
other colonists , th
e
governor was , in
1682 , authorized to call an assembly , which was empowered to
make laws fo
r
the general regulation o
f
the State ,which ,however ,
were of no force without the ratification of the proprietary . 3
Upon the Revolution o
f
1688 , the people o
f
New York immediately
took side in favor o
f
the Prince of Orange . From this era they
were deemed entitled to a
ll the privileges o
f
British subjects ,
inhabiting a dependent province o
f
the state . No charter was
subsequently granted to them b
y
the crown ; and therefore they
derived no peculiar privileges from that source . 5
$ 114 . The government was henceforth administered b
y gov
ernors appointed b
y
the crown . But no effort was made to con
duct the administration without the aid o
f
the representatives o
f
the people in general assembly . On the contrary , as soon as the
first royal governor arrived in 1691 , an assembly was called which
passed a number o
f important acts . Among others was an act
virtually declaring their right of representation ,and their right to
enjoy the liberties and privileges o
f Englishmen b
y
Magna Charta . 6
It enacted that the supreme legislative power shall forever reside
in a governor and council appointed b
y
the crown , and the people
b
y
their representatives ( chosen in the manner pointed out in the
act ) convened in general assembly . It further declared that al
l
lands should be held in free and common socage according to the
tenure o
f
East Greenwich in England ; that in al
l
criminal cases
there should b
e
a trial b
y
jury ; that estates o
f
femes covert should
b
e conveyed only by deed upon privy examination ; that wills in
11 Chalmers ' s Annals , 579 , 58
0
.
? 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 581 , 583 ; Smith ' s New York , 123 , 125 , 126 ( 72 , 75 ) .
8 i Chalm . Annals , 584 , 585 ; Smith ' s New York , 127 [ 75 ] ; I Holmes ' s Annals , 409 .
In the year 1683 certain fundamental regulations were passed by the legislature , which
will be found in an Appendix to the second volume of the old edition of the New York
Laws .
4 i Holmes ' s Annals , 429 ; Smith ' s New York , 59 .
61 Chalm . Annals , 585 , 590 , 591 , 592 .
8 i Holmes ' s Annals , 435 ; Smith ' s New York , 127 [ 75 , 76 ) ; Acts of 1691 .
CH. S.] NEW YORK .
writing , attested by three or more credible witnesses , should be
sufficient to pass lands ; that there should be no fines upon aliena
tions , or escheats and forfeitures of lands, except in cases of
treason ; that no person should hold any office unless upon his
appointment he would take the oaths of supremacy , and the test
prescribed by the act of Parliament ; 1 that no tax or talliage
should be levied but by the consent of the general assembly ; and
that no person professing faith in Jesus Christ should be disturbed
or questioned for different opinions in religion , with an exception
of Roman Catholics . The act , howerer , was repealed by King
William in 1697 .2 Another act enabling persons who were scru
pulous of taking oaths, to make in lieu thereof a solemn promise to
qualify them as witnesses , jurors, and officers. In the year 1693 ,
an act was passed fo
r
themaintenance o
f
ministers and churches
o
f
the Protestant religion . New York ( like Massachusetts )
seemed a
t
a
ll
times determined to suppress the Romish Church .
In an act passed in the beginning of the last century it was de
clared that every Jesuit and Popish priest who should continue in
the colony after a given day should be condemned to perpetual im
prisonment ; and if he broke prison or escaped and was retaken ,
he was to be put to death . And so little were the spirit of tolera
tion and the rights o
f
conscience understood a
t
a much later
period , that one of her historians 3 a half - century afterwards gave
this exclusion the warm praise o
f
being worthy o
f perpetual dura
tion . And the constitution of New York , of 1777 , 4 required al
l
persons naturalized b
y
the State to take an oath o
f abjuration o
f
a
ll foreign allegiance , and subjection in al
l
matters , ecclesiastical
a
s well a
s
civil . This was doubtless intended to exclude al
l
Catho
lics , who acknowledged the spiritual supremacy of the Pope , from
the benefits o
f
naturalization . In examining the subsequent legis
lation o
f
the province , there do not appear to be any very striking
deviations from the laws of England ; and the common law ,
beyond a
ll
question , was th
e
basis o
f
it
s jurisprudence . The
common - la
w
course o
f
descents appears to have been silently but
1 i Holmes ' s Annals , 435 ; Smith ’ s New York ; 12
7
[ 75 , 76 ] ; Prov . Laws of
1691 .
? i Holmes ' s Annals ,434 ; Province Laws of 1691 ; Smith ' s New York , 127 [ 76 ] ;
2 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 25 , p . 62 , 63 .
8 Mr . Smith .
4 Art . 42 .
6 2 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 25 , p . 62 , 63 .
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exclusively followed ; 1 and perhaps New York was more close in
adoption of the policy and legislation of the parent country before
the Revolution than any other colony .
1 I do not find any act respecting the distribution of intestate estates in th
e
statute
book , except that of 1697 , which seems to have in view only the distribution of per
sonal estate substantially on the basis of the statute of distribution o
f
Charles the
Second .
CE. XI ] 79NEW JERSEY
CHAPTER XI.
NEW JERSEY .
$ 115 . NEW JERSEY , as we have already seen , was a part of the
territory granted to the Duke of York , and was by him granted ,
in June, 1664 , to Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret , with al
l
the rights , royalties , and powers of government which h
e himself
possessed . 1 The proprietors , fo
r
the better settlement o
f
the terri
tory , agreed in February , 1664 - 1665 , upon a constitution or con
cession o
f government , which was so much relished that the
eastern part o
f
the province soon contained a considerable popu
lation . By this constitution it was provided that the executive
government should be administered b
y
a governor and council ,
who should have the appointment o
f
officers ; and that there
should b
e
a legislative o
r general assembly , to be composed of the
governor and council , and deputies chosen by the people . The
general assembly were to have power to make a
ll
laws fo
r
the
government o
f
the province , so that “ the same be consonant to
reason , and as near asmay be conveniently agreeable to the laws
and customs o
f his Majesty ' s realm of England ” ; to constitute
courts , to levy taxes , to erect manors and ports and incorpora
tions . The registry of title -deeds of land and the granting
thereof , as a bounty to planters , were also provided for . Liberty
o
f conscience was allowed , and a freedom from molestation guar
anteed on account of any difference in opinion o
r practice in mat
ters o
f religious concernments , so always that the civil peace was
not disturbed . But the general assembly were to be at liberty to
appoint ministers and establish their maintenance , giving liberty
to others tomaintain what ministers they pleased . Every inhabi
tant was bound to swear o
r
subscribe allegiance to the king ; and
the general assembly might grant naturalization .
$ 116 . This constitution continued until the province was d
i
11 Chalm . Ann . 613 ; Smith ' s New York , p . 31 [ 11 ] ; Smith ' s N . Jersey , 60 ;
Marsh . Colon . 177 to 18
0
; 2 Doug . Summ . 220 , & c . , 231 , 267 , & c .
? Smith ' s New Jersey , 6 Appx . 512 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 614 .
8 Smith ' s New Jersey , 512 , 514 .
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vided , in 1676 , between the proprietors . By that division East
New Jersey was assigned to Carteret , and West New Jersey to
William Penn and others , who had purchased of Lord Berkeley .1
Carteret then explained and confirmed the former concessions for
the territory thus exclusively belonging to himself. The propri
etors also of West Jersey drew up another set of concessions for
the settlers within that territory . They contain very ample privi
leges to the people . It was declared that the common law , or
fundamental rights and privileges of West New Jersey , therein
stated , are to be the foundation of government , not alterable by
the legislature . Among these fundamentals were the following :
“ That no man ,nor number of men upon earth , hath power or
authority to rule over men 's consciences in religious matters " ; 2
that no person shall be anyways called in question or in the least
punished , or either, fo
r
the sake o
f
his opinion , judgment , faith ,
o
r worship towards God in matters of religion ; that there shall
b
e
a trial b
y
jury in civil and criminal cases ; that there shall be
a general assembly o
f representatives o
f
the people , who shall
have power to provide fo
r
the proper administration of the govern
ment , and tomake laws , so that the same be , as near asmay be
conveniently , agreeable to the primitive , ancient , and fundamental
laws of England . " 3
$ 117 . Whether these concessions became the general law of
the province seems involved in some obscurity . There were many
difficulties and contests fo
r
jurisdiction between the governors o
f
the Duke o
f
York and the proprietors o
f
the Jerseys ; and these
were not settled until after the Duke , in 1680 , 4 finally surrendered
a
ll right to both b
y
letters -patent granted to the respective propri
etors . In 1681 , the governor of the proprietors ofWest Jersey ,
with the consent o
f
the general assembly ,made a frame of gov
ernment embracing some o
f
the fundamentals in the former con
cessions . There were to be a governor and council , and a general
assembly o
f representatives o
f
the people . The general assembly
had the power to make laws , to levy taxes , and to appoint officers .
Liberty of conscience was allowed ,and no persons rendered inca
i Smith ' s New Jersey , 61 , 79 , 80 , 87 ; 1 Chalm . Ann . 617 .
2 Smith ' s New Jersey , 80 , App . 521 , & c .
8 Ibid .
4 Chalmers says in 1680 , p . 619 . Smith says in 1678 , p . 111 .
5 Smith ' s New Jersey , 110 , 111 ; 1 Chalm . Ann .619 , 626 .
6 Smith ' s New Jersey , 12
6
.
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pable of office in respect of their faith and worship . West Jer
se
y
continued to be governed in this manner until the surrender
o
f the proprietary government , in 1702 . 1
$ 118 . Carteret died in 1679 , and being the sole proprietor of
East Jersey , by his will he ordered it to be sold for payment of his
debts ; and it was accordingly sold to William Penn and eleven
others , who were called the Twelve Proprietors . They afterwards
took twelve more into th
e
proprietaryship ; and to the twenty -four
thus formed , the Duke of York , in March , 1682 ,made hi
s
third
and last grant o
f
East Jersey . Very serious dissensions soon
arose between the two provinces themselves , as well as between
them and New York ,which banished moderation from their coun
cils , and threatened the most serious calamities . A quo warranto
was ordered b
y
the crown , in 1686 , to be issued against both prov
inces . East Jersey immediately offered to be annexed to West
Jersey , and to submit to a governor appointed b
y
the crown .
Soon afterwards the crown ordered the Jerseys to be annexed to
New England ; and the proprietors of East Jersey made a formal
surrender o
f
it
s patent , praying only fo
r
a new grant , securing
their right of soil . Before this request could be granted , the Revo
lution o
f
1688 took place , and they passed under the allegiance of
a new sovereign . 3
$ 119 . From this period both of the provinces were in a great
state o
f
confusion and distraction , and remained so until the
proprietors o
f
both made a formal surrender o
f a
ll
their powers
o
f government , but not of their lands , to Queen Anne , in April ,
1702 . The queen immediately reunited both provinces into one ;
and b
y
commission appointed a governor over it . He was thereby
authorized to govern with the assistance o
f
a council , and to call
general assemblies of representatives of the people to be chosen
b
y
the freeholders ,who were required to take the oath of allegiance
and supremacy , and the tests provided b
y
the acts o
f Parliament .
The general assembly , with the consent of the governor and coun
ci
l , were authorized to make laws and ordinances for the welfare
o
f
the people “ not repugnant , but , as near as may be , agreeable
unto the laws and statutes o
f
this our kingdom o
f England ” ;
which laws were , however , to be subject to th
e
approbation or dis
1 Smith ' s New Jersey , 154 .
* Smith ' s New Jersey , 157 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 620 , 621 ; Marshall ' s Colon . 180 .
8 i Chalm . Ann . 621 , 622 ; Smith ' s New Jersey , 209 , 210 , 211 , & c .
VOL . I .
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sent of the crown . The governor ,with the consent of the council ,
was to erect courts of justice , to appoint judges and other officers ,
to collate to churches and benefices, and to command the military
force . Liberty of conscience was allowed to al
l
persons but
Papists .
$ 120 . From this time to the American Revolution the province
was governed without any charter under royal commissions , sub
stantially in the manner pointed out in the first . The people
always strenuously contended fo
r
the rights and privileges guar
anteed to them b
y
the former concessions ; and many struggles
occurred from time to time between their representatives and the
royal governors on this subject . 2
1 Smith ' s New Jersey , 220 to 230 , 231 to 261 .
2 Smith ' s New Jersey , ch . 14 , and particularly p . 265 , & c . , p . 269 , & c . , 275 , 292 , 304 .
See Arnold v . , 1 Halsted ' s Rep . 1 , as to the rights of the proprietaries in the soil
after surrender o
f
the government to the crown .
CH. XII . ] PENNSYLVANIA .
CHAPTER XII .
PENNSYLVANIA .
$ 121 . PENNSYLVANIA was originally settled b
y
different detach
ments o
f planters , under various authorities , Dutch , Swedes , and
others ,which at different times occupied portions of land on South
o
r
Delaware River . The ascendency was finally obtained over
these settlements b
y the governors of New York , acting under the
charter o
f
1664 , to the Duke of York . Chalmers , however , does
not scruple to say , that “ it is a singular circumstance in the his
tory o
f
this then ] inconsiderable colony , that it seems to have
been a
t all times governed b
y
usurpers , because their titles were
defective . ” 2 It continued in a feeble state until the celebrated
William Penn , in March , 1681 , obtained a patent from Charles the
Second , b
y
which he became the proprietary o
f
a
n ample territory
which , in honor of hi
s
father , was called Pennsylvania . The
boundaries described in the charter were on the east , b
y
Dela
ware River , from twelvemiles distance northwards of New Castle
town to the 430 degree of north latitude , if the said river doth
extend so far northward ; but if not , then b
y
said river so far a
s
it doth extend ; and from the head of the river th
e
eastern bounds
are to be determined b
y
a meridian line , to be drawn from the
head o
f
said river unto the said 43d degree o
f
north latitude .
The said lands to extend westward five degrees in longitude , to be
computed from the said eastern bounds , and the said lands to be
bounded on the north b
y
the beginning of the 43d degree of north
latitude ; and on the south by a circle drawn a
t
twelve miles ' dis
tance from New Castle ,northward and westward , to the beginning
o
f
the 40th degree o
f
northern latitude ; and then b
y
a straight
line westward to the limits o
f
the longitude above mentioned .
$ 122 . The charter constituted Penn the true and absolute pro
prietary o
f
the territory thus described , ( saving to the crown the
sovereignty o
f
the country , and the allegiance of the proprietary and
11 Chalm . Annals , 630 to 634 ; Smith ' s New York , [ 31 ] 49 ; 1 Proud , Penn . 110 ,
111 , 112 , 113 , 116 , 118 , 119 , 122 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 29
7
, & c .
? i Chalm . Annals , 634 ,635 . 8 1 Proud , Penn . 172 .
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the inhabitants ,) to be holden of the crown , as of the castle of
Windsor , in Berks, in free and common socage , and not in capite, or
by knight service ; and erected it into a province and seignory by
the name of Pennsylvania . It authorized the proprietary and his
heirs and successors to make al
l
laws fo
r
raising money and other
purposes , with the assent o
f
the freemen o
f
the country , or their depu
ties assembled for the purpose . But “ the same laws were to be
consonant to reason , and not repugnant or contrary ,but as near as
conveniently may be , agreeable to law and statutes and rights of
this our kingdom o
f England . ” 2 The laws fo
r
the descent and
enjoyment of lands , and succession to goods , and o
f
ſelonies , to be
according to the course in England until altered b
y
the assembly .
All laws were to be sent to England within five years after the
making of them , and if disapproved of b
y
the crown within six
months , to become null and void . It also authorized the proprie
tary to appoint judges and other officers ; to pardon and reprieve
criminals ; to establish courts of justice , with a right of appeal to
the crown from all judgments ; to create cities and other corpora
tions ; to erect ports and manors , and courts baron in such manors .
Liberty was allowed to subjects to transport themselves and their
goods to the province ; and to import its products into England ;
and to export them from thence within one year , the inhabitants
observing the acts o
f navigation , and all other laws in this behalf
made . It was further stipulated that the crown should lery . no tax ,
custom , o
r imposition upon the inhabitants o
r
their goods , unless
b
y
the consent o
f
the proprietary or assembly , " or b
y
act o
f Par
liament in England . ” Such are the most important clauses of
this charter ,which has been deemed one o
f
the best drawn of the
colonial charters , and which underwent the revision , not merely
o
f
the law -officers o
f
the crown , but o
f
the then Lord Chief Jus
tice (North ) of England . It has been remarked , as a singular
omission in this charter , that there is no provision that the inhab
itants and their children shall be deemed British subjects , and
entitled to a
ll
the liberties and inmunities thereof , such a clause
being found in every other charter . 5 Chalmers 6 has observed that
11 Prond , Penn . 17
6
; Laws of Pennsyl . , ed . of Franklin , 1742 , App . '
2 | Proud , Penn . 17
5
, 176 , 17
7
.
8 i Pruud , Penn . 17
7
, 178 .
4 ] Chalm Annals , 636 , 637 .
61Graham ' s Hist . of Colon . 41 , note ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 639 , 658 .
6 ] Chalın . Annals , 639 , 658 .
CH. XI
I
. ] PENNSYLVANIA .
the clause was wholly unnecessary , as the allegiance to the crown
was reserved ; and the common law thence inferred , that al
l
the
inhabitants were subjects , and of course were entitled to al
l
the
privileges o
f Englishmen .
$ 123 . Penn immediately invited emigration to his province by
holding out concessions o
f
a very liberal nature to a
ll
settlers ; 1
and under his benign and enlightened policy a foundation was
early laid for the establishment o
f
a government and laws which
have been justly celebrated fo
r
their moderation ,wisdom , and pro
tection o
f
the rights and liberties o
f
the people . In the introduc
tion to his first frame of government , he lays down this proposi
tion , which was fa
r
beyond the general spirit o
f
that age , that
“ any government is free to the people under it , whatever be the
frame , where th
e
laws rule , and the people are a party to those
laws ; and more than this is tyranny , oligarchy , or confusion . ” 3
In that frame o
f government , after providing fo
r
the organization
o
f it under the government of a governor , council , and general
assembly , chosen by the people , it was declared that all persons
acknowledging one Almighty God , and living peaceably , shall be
in n
o ways molested fo
r
their religious persuasion or practice in
matters o
f
faith o
r worship , or compelled to frequent or maintain
any religious worship , place , or ministry . Provisions were also
made securing the right o
f trial by jury , and the right to dispose
o
f property b
y
will , attested b
y
two witnesses ; making lands in
certain cases liable to the payment o
f
debts ; giving to seven years '
quiet possession the efficacy of an unquestionable title ; requiring
the registry o
f grants and conveyances , and declaring that no
taxes should be levied but b
y
a law for that purpose made . 5
Among other things truly honorable to the memory of this great
man , is the tender regard ard solicitude which on all occasions he
manifested for the rights o
f
the Indians , and the duties of the
settlers towards them . They are exhibited in his original plan of
concessions , as well as in various other public documents , and
were exemplified in his subsequent conduct . In August , 1682 , in
order to secure his title against adverse claims , he procured a patent
11 Proud , Penn . 192 ; 2 Proud , Penn . App . 1 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 300 , 301 .
3 i Chalm . Annals , 638 , 642 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 6 , p . 182 , 183 .
8 i Proud , Penn . 197 , 198 ; 2 Proud , Penn . App . 7 .
4 1 Proud , Penn . 200 ; 2 Proud , Penn . App . 19 .
5 2 Proud , Penn . App . 15 , 20 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 641 , 642 .
Bi Chalm . Annals , 644 ; 1 Proud , Penn . 194 , 195 , 212 , 429 ; 2 Proud , App . 4 .
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from the Duke of York , releasing al
l
his title derived under any o
f
his patents from the crown . )
$ 124 . Itwas soon found that th
e
original frame o
f government ,
drawn u
p
before any settlements were made ,was ill adapted to the
state of things in an infant colony . Accordingly it was laid aside ,
and a new frame o
f government was , with the consent of the gen
eral assembly , established in 1683 . 2 In 1692 , Penn was deprived
o
f
the government o
f Pennsylvania by William and Mary ; but it
was again restored to him in the succeeding year . 3 A third frame
o
f government was established in 1696 . This again was surren
dered , and a new final charter of government was , in October ,
1701 ,with the consent of the general assembly , established , under
which the province continued to b
e governed down to the period
o
f
the American Revolution . It provided fo
r
full liberty o
f con
science and worship ; and fo
r
the right of all persons professing to
believe in Jesus Christ , to serve the government in any capacity . 5
· An annual assembly was to be chosen of delegates from each
county , and to have the usual legislative authority of other colonial
assemblies , and also power to nominate certain persons fo
r
office
to the governor . The laws were to be subject to the approbation
o
f
the governor ,who had a council of state to assist him in the gov
ernment . Provision was made in the same charter , that if the rep
resentatives o
f
the province and territories (meaning b
y
territories
th
e
three counties o
f
Delaware ) should not agree to join together
in legislation , they should be represented in distinct assemblies . ?
$ 125 . In the legislation of Pennsylvania , early provision was
made ( in 1683 ) for the descent and distribution of intestate estates ,
b
y
which they were to be divided among a
ll
the children , the eldest
son having a double share ; and this provision was never afterwards
departed from . 8 Notwithstanding the liberty of conscience recog
nized in the charters , the legislature seems to have fe
lt
itself a
t
liberty to narrow down it
s protection to persons who believed in
the Trinity , and in the divine inspiration of the Scriptures . 9
1 | Proud , Penn . 20
0
.
2 1 Proud , Penn , 239 ; 2 Proud , Penn . App . 21 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 302 .
8 1 Proud , Penn . 377 , 403 .
4 i Proud , Penn . 415 ; 2 Proud , Penn . App . 30 ; Marshall , Colon . ch . 6 , p . 183 .
5 i Proud , Penn . 443 to 450 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 303 .
6 i Proud , Penn . 450 .
71 Proud , Penn . 454 , 455 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 485 .
8 Laws of Penn . , ed . o
f
Franklin , 1742 , App . 5 ; Id . p . 60 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 649 .
9 Laws o
f
Penn . , ed . of Franklin , 1742 , p . 4 ( 1705 ) .
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CHAPTER XIII .
DELAWARE .
§ 126 . AFTER Penn had become proprietary of Pennsylvania ,
he purchased of the Duke of York , in 1682 ,all his right and inter
est in the territory , afterwards called the Three Lower Counties of
Delaware , extending from the south boundary of the province ,
and situated on the western side of the river and bay of Dela
ware to Cape Henlopen , beyond or south of Lewistown ; and the
three counties took the names of New Castle , Kent , and Sus
sex . At this time they were inhabited principally by Dutch
and Swedes , and seem to have constituted an appendage to the
government of New York . The first settlement by the Swedes
seems to have been earlier than 1638 ; 8 and no permanent
settlements were attempted by the Dutch until a later period
(1651) .4
§ 127 . In the same year , with the consent of the people , an act
of union with the province of Pennsylvania was passed , and an
act of settlement of the frame of government in a general assem
bly , composed of deputies from the counties of Delaware and
Pennsylvania . By this act the three counties were , under the
name of the territories , annexed to the province , and were to be
represented in the general assembly, governed by the same laws,
and to enjoy the same privileges as the inhabitants of Pennsyl
vania . Difficulties soon afterwards arose between the deputies
of the province and those of the territories ; and after various
subordinate arrangements , a final separation took place between
1 1 Proud , Penn . 201, 202 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 643 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 297, &c.
? 1 Chalmers 's Annals, 631, 632 , 633, 634 , 643 ; 1 Holmes 's Annals , 295, 404 ;
i Pitk . Hist. 24, 26, 27 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 221. See 1 Chalm . Annals, 571, 572, 630,
631 .
8 Chalm . Annals , 631.
* Id. 632 , 633, 634.
61 Proud , Penn . 206; 1 Holmes 's Annals , 404 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 645, 646.
61 Chalm . Annals, 646 ; 1 Dall . Penn . Laws, App . 24, 26 ; 2 Colden 's Five Na
tions, App.
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them , with the consent of the proprietary , in 1703 . From that
period down to the American Revolution , the territories were gov
erned by a separate legislature of their own , pursuant to the
liberty reserved to them by a clause in the original charter or
frame of government ."
i i Proud , Penn . 358, 45
4
; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 404 , note ; 2 Doug . Summ . 29
7
,
298 .
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CHAPTER XIV .
NORTH AND SOUTH CAROLINA .
§ 128 . We next come to the consideration of the history of the
political organization of the Carolinas . That level region , which
stretches from the 36th degree of north latitude to Cape Florida,
afforded an ample theatre for the early strugyles of the three great
European powers , Spain , France , and England, to maintain or
acquire an exclusive sovereignty . Various settlements were made
under the auspices of each of the rival powers , and a common
fate seemed fo
r
a while to attend them a
ll . In March , 1662
[April , 1663 ) , Charles th
e
Second made a grant to Lord Claren
don and others o
f
the territory lying on the Atlantic Ocean , and
extending from the north end o
f
the island called Hope Island , in
the South Virginian Seas , and within 36 degrees of north latitude ,
and to the west as fa
r
a
s the South Seas , and so respectively as
far as the river Mathias upon the coast o
f
Florida , and within 31
degrees o
f
north latitude , and so west in a direct line to the South
Seas , and erected it into a province , b
y
the name o
f
Carolina , to
b
e holden as o
f
the manor o
f East Greenwich in Kent , in free and
common socage , and not in capite , or by knight service , subject
immediately to the crown , as a dependency , forever . 2
$ 129 . The grantees were created absolute lords proprietaries ,
saving th
e
faith , allegiance , and supreme dominion of the crown ,
and invested with a
s ample rights and jurisdictions a
s
the Bishop
o
f
Durham possessed in his palatine diocese . The charter seems
to have been copied from that o
f Maryland , and resembles it in
many o
f
it
s provisions . It authorized the proprietaries to enact
laws with the assent o
f
the freemen o
f
the colony , or their dele
gates , to erect courts of judicature , to appoint civil officers , to
grant titles o
f
honor , to erect forts , to make war , and in cases
o
f necessity to exercise martial law , to build harbors , to make
ports , to erect manors , and to enjoy customs and subsidies im
11 Chalmers ' s Annals , 513 , 514 , 515 .
2 i Chalm . Annals ,519 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 327 , 328 ; Marsh .Colon . ch . 5 , p . 152 ;
1 Williamson ' s North Carol . 87 , 230 ; Carolina Charters , London , 4to .
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posed with the consent of the freemen .1 And it further author
ized the proprietaries to grant indulgences and dispensations in
religious affairs , so that persons might not be molested fo
r
differ
*ences in speculative opinion with respect to religion , avowedly
fo
r
the purpose o
f tolerating non - conformity to the Church of Eng
land . It further required that al
l
laws should " be consonant to
reason , and as near as may be conveniently , agreeable to the laws
and customs of this our kingdom of England . ” 3 And it declared
that the inhabitants and their children , born in the province ,
should be denizens o
f England , and entitled to al
l
the privileges
and immunities o
f
British -born subjects .
$ 130 . The proprietaries immediately took measures for the
settlement o
f
the province , and at the desire of the New England
settlers within it (whose disposition to emigration is with Chalmers
a constant theme o
f
reproach ) published proposals , forming a
basis o
f government . It was declared that there should be a
governor chosen b
y
the proprietaries from thirteen persons named
b
y
the colonists , and a general assembly , composed of the gov
ernor , council , and representatives of the people , who should have
authority to make laws not contrary to those o
f England ,which
should remain in force until disapproved o
f
b
y
the proprietaries . 5
Perfect freedom o
f religion was also promised , and a hundred
acres o
f
land offered a
t
a half -penny an acre , to every settler
within five years .
§ 131 . In 1665 , the proprietaries obtained from Charles the
Second a second charter , with an enlargement of boundaries . It
recited the grant o
f
the former charter , and declared the limits to
extend north and eastward as fa
r
a
s
the north end o
f
Currituck
River o
r
Inlet , upon a straight westerly line to Wyonoak Creek ,
which lies within o
r
about 36 degrees 30 minutes o
f
north lati
tude , and so west in a direct line as fa
r
a
s
the South Seas , and
south and westward a
s
far a
s
the degrees o
f
2
9 inclusive of north
ern latitude ,and so west in a direct line as fa
r
a
s
the South Seas .
11 Holmes ' s Annals , 327 , 328 . This charter , and the second charter , and the fun
damental constitutions made b
y
the proprietaries , is to be found in a small quarto
printed in London without date , which is in Harvard College Library .
? i Holmes ' s Annals , 328 ; 1 Hewatt ' s South Car . 42 to 47 .
8 Carolina Charter , 4to , London .
4 1 Chalm . Annals , 515 .
5i Chalm . Annals , 518 , 553 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 5 , p . 152 .
6 1 Chalm . Annals , 521 ; 1 Williams ' s N . Car . 230 , 231 ; i Holmes ' s Annals , 340 ;
Carolina Charters , 4to , London .
CH . XIV .] 91NORTH AND SOUTH CAROLINA .
It then proceeded to constitute the proprietaries absolute owners
and lords of the province , saving the faith , allegiance , and sov
ereign dominion of the crown , to hold the same as of the manor
of East Greenwich in Kent, in free and common socage , and not
in capite , or by knight service , and to possess in the same all the
royalties , jurisdictions , and privileges of the Bishop of Durham in
his diocese . It also gave them power to make laws, with the
assent of the freemen of the province , or their delegates , provided
such laws were consonant with reason , and as near as conveniently
may be, agreeable to the laws and customs of the realm of Eng
land . It also provided that the inhabitants and their children
should be denizens and lieges of the kingdom of England , and
reputed and held as the liege people born within the kingdom , and
might inherit and purchase lands, and sell and bequeath the same,
and should possess all the privileges and immunities of natural
born subjects within the realm . Many other provisions were
added , in substance like those in the former charter. Several
detached settlements were made in Carolina, which were at first
placed under distinct temporary governments ; one was in Albe
marle, another to the south of Cape Fear .3 Thus various inde
pendent and separate colonies were established , each of which had
it
s
own assembly , its own customs , and its own laws ; a policy
which the proprietaries had afterwards occasion to regret , from
it
s tendency to enfeeble and distract the province . 4
§ 132 . In the year 1669 , the proprietaries , dissatisfied with the
systems already established within the province , signed a funda
mental constitution fo
r
the government thereof , the object ofwhich
is declared to be , " that we may establish a government agreeable
to the monarchy , of which Carolina is a part , that we may avoid
making to
o
numerous a democracy . " 5 This constitution was
drawn u
p
b
y
the celebrated John Locke , and hi
s
memory has
often been reproached with the illiberal character of some of the
articles , the oppressive servitude of others , and the general disre
IliWilliams ' s N . Car . 230 , 237 .
2 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 340 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 521 , 522 ; 1Williams ' s N . Car . 230 to
254 ; Iredell ' s Laws o
f
N . Car . Charter , p . 1 to 7 .
Chalm . Annals , 519 , 520 ,524 , 525 ; 1 Williams ' s N . Car . 88 , 91 , 92 , 9
3 , 96 , 97 ,
103 , 114 .
4 1 Chalm . Annals , 521 ,
5i Chalm . Annals , 526 , 52
7
; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 350 , 351 , and note ; Carolina
Charters , 4to , London , p . 3
3 .
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gard of some of those maxims of religious and political liberty
for which he has in his treatises of government and other writings
contended with so much ability and success . Probably there were
many circumstances attending this transaction which are now
unknown , and which might well have moderated the severity of
the reproach , and furnished , if not a justification , at least some
apology for this extraordinary instance of unwise and visionary
legislation .
$ 133. It provided that the oldest proprietary should be the
palatine , and the next oldest should succeed hi
m . Each of the
proprietaries was to hold a high office . The rules of precedency
weremost exactly established . Two orders of hereditary nobility
were instituted , with suitable estates , which were to descend with
the dignity . The provincial legislature , dignified with the name
o
f parliament , was to be biennial , and to consist of the proprieta
ries o
r
their deputies , of the nobility , and of representatives of
the freeholders chosen in districts . They were all to meet in one
apartment ( like the ancient Scottish Parliament ) , and enjoy an
equal vote . No business , however , was to be proposed , until it
had been debated in the grand council (which was to consist o
f
the proprietaries and forty -two counsellors ) , whose duty it was to
prepare bills . No act was of force longer than until the next
biennial meeting o
f the parliament , unless ratified b
y
the palatine
and a quorum of the proprietaries . All the laws were to become
void a
t
the end o
f
a century , without any formal repeal . The
Church o
f England (which was declared to be the only true and
orthodox religion ) was alone to be allowed a public maintenance
b
y parliament . But every congregation might tax its own mem
bers for the support o
f
its own minister . Every man of seventeen
years o
f
age was to declare himself o
f
some church o
r religious
profession , and to be recorded as such ; otherwise he was not to
have any benefit o
f
the laws . And no man was to be permitted
to b
e
a freeman o
f Carolina , or have any estate or habitation , who
did not acknowledge a God , and that God is to be publicly wor
shipped . In other respects there was a guaranty of religious
freedom . There was to be a public registry of all deeds and con
veyances o
f
lands , and of marriages and births . Every freeman
11 Hewatt ' s South Car . 42 to 47 , 321 , & c . ; Carolina Charters , 4t
o , London , p . 33 ,
& c . ; i Chalm . Annals , 526 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 350 , 351 ; 1 Williams ' s N . Car . 104
to 111 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 5 , p . 155 ; 1 Ramsay ' s South Car . 3
1 , 32 .
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was to have “ absolute power and authority over his negro slaves,
of what opinion or religion soever." . No civil or criminal cause
was to be tried but by a jury of the peers of the party ; but the
verdict of a majority was binding . With a view to prevent un
necessary litigation , it was (with a simplicity , which at this time
may excite a smile ) provided that “ it shall be a base and vile
thing to plead fo
r
money or reward ” ; and that “ since multi
plicity o
f
comments , as well as of laws , have great inconveniences ,
and serve only to obscure and perplex , all manner of comments
and expositions on any part o
f
these fundamental constitutions ,
o
r
o
n any part of the common o
r
statute law o
f
Carolina , are
absolutely prohibited . ” 1
$ 134 . Such was the substance o
f
this celebrated constitution .
It is easy to perceive that it was ill adapted to the feelings , the
wants , and the opinions of the colonists . The introduction of it ,
therefore , was resisted b
y
the people , as much as it could be ; and
indeed , in some respects it was found impracticable . Public dis
satisfaction daily increased , and after a few years ' experience of
it
s
ill arrangements , aŋd its mischievous tendency , the proprieta
ries , upon the application of the people ( in 1693 ) , abrogated the
constitution , and restored the ancient form of government . Thus
perished the labors o
f Mr . Locke ; and thus perished a system ,
under the administration of which , it has been remarked , the
Carolinians had not known one day o
f
real enjoyment , and that
introduced evils and disorders ,which ended only with the disso
lution o
f
the proprietary governinent ? Perhaps in the annals o
f
the world there is not to be found amore wholesome lesson of the
utter folly o
f
a
ll
efforts to establish forms o
f government upon
mere theory , and of the dangers of legislation without consulting
the habits , manners , feelings , and opinions of the people upon
which they ar
e
to operate .
$ 135 . After James the Second came to the throne , the same
general course was adopted o
f filing a quo warranto against the
proprietaries , as had been successful in respect to other colonies .
The proprietaries ,with a view to elude the storm , prudently offered
1 Carolina Charters , 4to , p . 45 , $ 70 , p . 47 , $ 80 ; 1 Hewatt ' s South Car . 321 , & c .
2 i Ramsay ' s South Car . 39 , 43 , 88 ; 1 Hewate ' s South Car 45 ; 1 Chalmers ' s An
nals , 527 , 528 , 529 , 530 , 532 , 550 ; Marsh . Colon . c
h . 5 , 156 , 157 , 159 ; 1 Williams ' s N .
Car . 122 , 143 .
8 i Chalmers ' s Annals , 552 .
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to surrender their charter ,and thereby gained time. Before any
thing definitive took place , the Revolution of 1688 occurred ,which
put an end to the hostile proceedings . In April , 1698 , the pro
prietaries made another system of fundamental constitutions ,
which embraced many of those propounded in the first , and in
deed , was manifestly a mere amendment of them .
$ 136 . These constitutions ( fo
r
experience does not seem to
have imparted more wisdom to the proprietaries on this subject )
contained the most objectionable features o
f
the system o
f govern
ment , and hereditary nobility of the former constitutions , and
shared a common fate . They were never generally assented to
by the people of the colony , or b
y
their representatives , as a body
o
f
fundamental laws . Hewatt says , that none of these systems
ever obtained “ the force o
f
fundamental and unalterable laws in
the colony . What regulations the people found applicable , they
adopted a
t
the request o
f
their governors ; but observed these on
account o
f
their own propriety and necessity , rather than as a
system o
f
laws imposed on them b
y
British legislators . " 3
$ 137 . There was at this period a space of three hundred miles
between the southern and northern settlements o
f
Carolina ; 4 and
though the whole province was owned b
y
the same proprietaries ,
the legislation of the two great settlements had been hitherto con
ducted by separate and distinct assemblies , sometimes under the
same governor and sometimes under different governors . The
legislatures continued to remain distinct down to the period when
a final surrender o
f
the proprietary charter was made to the crown
in 1729 . The respective territories were designated by the name
o
f
North Carolina and South Carolina , and the laws of each ob
tained a like appellation . Cape Fear seems to have been com
monly deemed in the commissions o
f
the governor the boundary
between the two colonies .
$ 138 . By the surrender of the charter , the whole government
o
f
the territory was vested in the crown ; ( it had been in fact ex
ii Chalmers ' s Annals ,549 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals ,416 .
2 1 Hewatt ' s South Carol . 45 .
3 Dr . Ramsay treats these successive constitutions as of no authority whatsoever in
the province , a
s
a law o
r
rule o
f government . But in a legal point o
f
view the propo
sition is open to much doubt . 2 Ramsay ' s South Carol . 121 to 124 .
41Williams ' s N . Car . 155 .
5 Marsh . Colon . ch . 9 , p . 246 , 247 ; 1 Hewatt ' s South Carol . 212 , 318 .
81Williams ' s N . Car . 161 , 162 ; 1 Ramsay ' s South Carol . 56 , & c . 88 , 95 ; 1 Hew .
att ' s South Carol . 212 , 318 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 523 , 525 ; Marsh . Colon . ch . 9 , p . 246 .
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ercised by the crown ever since the overthrow of the proprietary
government in 1720 ;) and henceforward it became a royal prov
ince , and was governed by commission under a form of gov
ernment substantially like that established in the other royal
provinces . This change of government was very acceptable to
the people , and gave a new impulse to their industry and enter
prise . At a later period (1732], fo
r
the convenience of th
e
inhabi
tants , the province was divided ; and the divisions were distin
guished by the names of North Carolina and South Carolina . ?
$ 139 . The form of government conferred on Carolina when it
became a royal province was in substance this : It consisted of a
governor and council appointed b
y
the crown , and an assembly
chosen b
y
the people , and these three branches constituted th
e
legislature . The governor convened , prorogued , and dissolved the
legislature , and had a negative upon the laws , and exercised the
executive authority . He possessed also the powers of the court
o
f chancery , of the admiralty , of supreme ordinary , and o
f ap
pointing magistrates and militia officers . All laws were subject to
the royal approbation o
r
dissent ; butwere in the mean time in full
force .
$ 140 . On examining the statutes of South Carolina , a close
adherence to the general policy o
f
the English laws is apparent .
As early as the year 1712 , a large body o
f
the English statutes
was , by express legislation , adopted as part o
f
its own code ; and
all English statutes respecting allegiance , all the test and suprem
acy acts , and al
l
acts declaring the rights and liberties of the sub
jects , or securing the same ,were also declared to be in full force
in the province . All and every part of the common law , not
altered b
y
these acts o
r
inconsistent with the constitutions , cus
toms , and laws of the province , was also adopted as part of its
jurisprudence . An exception was made of ancient abolished ten
ures , and of ecclesiastical matters inconsistent with the then
church establishment in the province . There was also a saving
o
f
the liberty o
f
conscience , which was allowed to be enjoyed b
y
the charter from the crown and the laws of the province . This
liberty o
f
conscience did not amount to a right to deny the Trinity . 5
1 Marsh . Colon . ch . 9 , p . 247 .
2 Marsh . Colon . ch . 9 , p 237 ; 1 Holmes ' s Annals , 544 .
3 2 Hewatt ' s South Car . ch . 7 , p . 1 , et seq . ; 1 Ramsay ' s South Car . ch . 4 , p . 9
5 .
4 Grimke ' s South Carolina Laws ( 1712 ) , p . 81 , 98 , 99 , 100 .
6 Id . Act of 1703 , p . 4 .
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The Church of England had been previously established in the
province [ in 1704 ] and a
ll
members o
f
the assembly were required
to b
e o
f
that persuasion . Fortunately Queen Anne annulled these
obnoxious laws ; and though the Church of England was estab
lished , dissenters obtained a toleration , and the law respecting the
religious qualification o
f assemblymen was shortly afterwards
repealed .
$ 141 . The laws of descents of intestate real estates , of wills ,
and o
f
uses , existing in England , seem to have acquired a perma
nent foundation in the colony , and remained undisturbed , until
after the period of the American Revolution . As in the other
colonies , the registration of conveyances of lands was early pro
vided for , in order to suppress fraudulent grants .
§ 142 . In respect to North Carolina , there was an early declara
tion o
f
the legislature ( 1715 ) conformably to the charter , that the
common law was and should be in force in the colony . All stat
ute laws fo
r
maintaining the royal prerogative and succession to
the crown , and al
l
such laws made for the establishment o
f
the
church , and laws made for the indulgence to Protestant dissent
ers ; and al
l
laws providing for the privileges of the people , and
security o
f
trade ; and al
l
laws fo
r
the limitation o
f
actions and
for preventing vexatious suits , and for preventing immorality and
fraud , and confirming inheritances and titles o
f
land , were de
clared to be in force in the province . The policy thus avowed
was not departed from down to the period o
f
the American Revo
lution ; and the laws of descents and the registration of convey
ances in both th
e
Carolinas were a silent result o
f
their common
origin and government .
11 Holmes ' s Annals , 489 , 49
0
,491 ; 1 Hewatt ' s South Carol . 16
6
to 177 .
2 2 Ramsay ' s South Car . 130 . The descent of estates was not altered until 1791 .
8 Iredell ' s North Car . Laws , 1715 , p . 18 , 19 .
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CHAPTER XV .
GEORGIA .
$ 143. In the same year in which Carolina was divided [1732 ],
a project was formed fo
r
the settlement of a colony upon the unoc
cupied territory between the rivers Savannah and Altamaha . 1
The object o
f
the projectors was to strengthen th
e
province o
f
Carolina , to provide a maintenance fo
r
the suffering poor o
f
the
mother country , and to open an asylum for the persecuted Protes
tants in Europe ; and in common with al
l
the other colonies to
attempt the conversion and civilization o
f
the natives . 2 Upon ap
plication , George the Second granted a charter to the company ,
( consisting o
f
Lord Percival and twenty others , among whom was
the celebrated Oglethorpe , ) and incorporated them b
y
the name
o
f
the Trustees fo
r
establishing the Colony o
f Georgia in America . 3
The charter conferred the usual powers o
f corporations in Eng
land , and authorized the trustees to hold any territories , jurisdic
tions , etc . , in America for the better settling o
f
a colony there .
The affairs o
f
the corporation were to b
e managed b
y
the corpora
tion , and b
y
a common council o
f
fifteen persons , in the first place
nominated b
y
the crown , and afterwards , as vacancies occurred ,
filled b
y
the corporation . The number of common -councilmen
might , with the increase of the corporation , be increased to
twenty -four . The charter further granted to the corporation
seven undivided parts o
f
a
ll
the territories lying in that part
o
f
South Carolina which lies from the northern stream o
f
a river ,
there called the Savannah , al
l
along the sea -coast to the southward
unto the southernmost stream o
f
a certain other great river , called
the Altamaha , and westward from the heads of the said rivers
respectively in direct lines to the South Seas , to be held as of the
manor o
f Hampton Court , in Middlesex , in free and common
socage , and not in capite . It then erected al
l
the territory into an
independent province by the name o
f Georgia . It authorized the
1 i Holmes ' s Annals , 552 ; Marsh . Colonies , ch . 9 , p . 247 ; 2 Hewatt ' s South Car .
1
5 , 16 ; Stokes ' s Hist . Colonies , 113 .
? i Holmes ' s Annals , 552 ; 2 Hewatt ’ s South Car , 15 , 16 , 17 .
3 Charters o
f
N . A . Provinces , 4to , London , 1766 .
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trustees fo
r
the term o
f twenty -one years to make laws fo
r
the
province “ not repugnant to the laws and statutes of England , sub
ject to the approbation o
r
disallowance o
f
the crown , and after
such approbation to b
e
valid . The affairs of the corporation were
ordinarily to be managed b
y
the common council . It was further
declared that all persons born in th
e
province should enjoy a
ll the
privileges and immunities of natural -born subjects in Great Britain .
Liberty of conscience was allowed to a
ll
inhabitants in the worship
o
f
God , and a free exercise of religion to al
l
persons , except Pa
pists . The corporation were also authorized , for the term of twenty
one years , to erect courts of judicature fo
r
a
ll
civil and criminal
causes , and to appoint a governor , judges , and other magistrates .
The registration o
f
a
ll conveyances o
f
the corporation was also
provided fo
r
. The governor was to take an oath to observe al
l
the
acts o
f
Parliament relating to trade and navigation , and to obey
all royal instructions pursuant thereto . The governor of South
Carolina was to have the chief command of the militia o
f
the
province ; and goods were to be imported and exported without
touching a
t any port in South Carolina . A
t
the end o
f
the twenty
one years the crown was to establish such form o
f government in
the province , and such method of making laws therefor , as in its
pleasure should be deemed meet ; and a
ll
officers should be then
appointed by the crown .
$ 144 . Such is the substance of the charter , which was obvi
ously intended fo
r
a temporary duration only ; and the first meas
ures adopted b
y
the trustees , granting lands in tail male , to be
held b
y
a sort o
f military service , and introducing other restric
tions , were not adapted to aid the original design , or foster the
growth o
f
the colony . It continued to languish , until at length
the trustees , wearied with their own labors , and the complaints of
the people , in June , 1751 , surrendered the charter to the crown . 2
Henceforward itwas governed as a royal province , enjoying the
same liberties and immunities as other royal provinces ; and in
process of time it began to flourish , and at the period of the
American Revolution it had attained considerable importance
among the colonies . 3
1 Marshall ' s Colon . ch . 9 , p . 248 , 249 , 250 ; 2 Holmes ' s Annals , 4 - 45 ; 2 Hewatt ' s
South Car . 4
1 , 4
2 , 4
3
.
2 2 Holmes ' s Anpals , 45 .
3 Stokes ' s Hist . of Colonies , 115 , 119 ; 2 Hewatt ’ s South Car . 145 ; 2 Holmes ' s An .
nals , 4
5 , 117 .
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$ 145 . In respect to its ante -revolutionary jurisprudence , a few
remarks may suffice . The British common and statute law lay at
the foundation . The same general system prevailed as in the
Carolinas , from which it sprung . Intestate estates descended
according to the course o
f
the English la
w
. The registration of
conveyances was provided fo
r , at once to secure titles and to sup
press frauds ; and the general interests of religion , the rights of
representation , of personal liberty , and of public justice , were pro
tected b
y ample colonial regulations .
1 Stokes ' s Hist . of Colon . 11
9
, 13
6
.
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CHAPTER XVI.
GENERAL REVIEW OF THE COLONIES .
$ 146 . We have now finished our survey of the origin and
political history of the colonies , and here we may pause fo
r
a short
time for the purpose of some general reflections upon the subject .
§ 147 . Plantations o
r
colonies in distant countries are either
such a
s
a
re acquired by occupying and peopling desert and uncul
tivated regions b
y emigrations from the mother country , or such
a
s , being already cultivated and organized , are acquired b
y
con
quest o
r
cession under treaties . There is , however , a difference
between these two species o
f
colonies in respect to the laws b
y
which they are governed , at least according to the jurisprudence
o
f
the common law . If an uninhabited country is discovered and
planted b
y
British subjects , the English laws are said to be imme
diately in force there ; fo
r
the law is the birthright o
f
every sub
ject . So that wherever they go they carry their laws with them ;
and the new -found country is governed by them .
§ 148 . This proposition , however , though laid down in such
general terms b
y
very high authority , requires many limitations ,
and is to b
e understood with many restrictions . Such colonists
d
o not carry with them the whole body of the English laws , as
they then exist ; fo
r
many o
f
them must , from the nature of the
case , be wholly inapplicable to their situation , and inconsistent
with their comfort and prosperity . There is , therefore , this ne
cessary limitation implied , that they carry with them all the laws
applicable to their situation , and not repugnant to the local and
political circumstances in which they are placed .
§ 149 . Even as thus stated , the proposition is full of vagueness
and perplexity ; fo
r
it must still remain a question of intrinsic
difficulty to sa
y
what laws are or are not applicable to their situa
tion ; and whether they are bound b
y
a present state o
f things , or
are a
t liberty to apply the laws in future b
y adoption , as the growth
1 1 B
l
. Comm . 107 .
2 2 P .Will . 75 ; 1 B
l
. Comm . 107 ; 2 Salk .411 ; Com . Dig . Le
y
. C . ; Rex v . Vaughan ,
4 Burr . R . 2500 ; Chitty on Prerog . ch . 3 , p . 29 , & c .
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or interests of the colony may dictate. The English rules of
inheritance , and of protection from personal injuries , the rights
secured by Magna Charta , and the remedial course in the admin
istration of justice, are examples as clear perhaps as any which
can be stated as presumptively adopted , or applicable . And yet
in th
e
infancy of a colony some o
f
these very rights and privileges
and remedies and rules may be in fact inapplicable , or inconven
ient and impolitic . It is not perhaps easy to settle what parts of
the English laws are or are not in force in any such colony , until
either b
y
usage or judicial determination they have been recog
nized a
s o
f
absolute force .
$ 150 . In respect to conquered and ceded countries ,which have
already laws of their own , a different rule prevails . In such cases
the crown has a right to abrogate the former laws and institute
new ones . But until such new laws are promulgated , the ol
d
laws
and customs o
f
the country remain in full force , unless so far as
they are contrary to our religion , or enact anything that is malum
in se ; fo
r
in all such cases the laws of the conquering or acquiring
country shall prevail . This qualification of the rule arises from the
presumption that the crown could never intend to sanction laws
contrary to religion or sound morals . But although the king has
thus the power to change the laws o
f
ceded and conquered coun
tries , the power is not unlimited . His legislation is subordinate
to the authority o
f parliament . He cannot make any new change
contrary to fundamental principles ; he cannot exempt an inhabi
tant from that particular dominion , as fo
r
instance from the laws
o
f trade , o
r
from the power of parliament ; and he cannot give
him privileges exclusive o
f
other subjects .
§ 151 . Mr . Justice Blackstone , in his Commentaries , insists
that the American colonies are principally to be deemed con
quered , or ceded countries . His language is , “ Our American
plantations are principally o
f
this latter sort , [ i . e . ceded or con
quered countries , ] being obtained in the last century either by
right o
f conquest and driving out the natives , (with what natural
11 B1 . Comm . 107 ; 2 Merivale , R . 143 , 159 .
B
l
. Comm . 107 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . note E , 37
8
, 384 , et se
q
. ; 4 Burr . R . 2500 ;
2 Merivale , R . 143 , 157 , 158 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 49 to 54 .
Blankard v .Galy , 4 Mod . 222 ; 8 . c . 2 Salk . 411 , 412 ; 2 Peere Will . 75 ; 1 Black .
Comm . 107 ; Campbell v . Hall , Cowp . R . 204 , 209 , Calvin ' s case , 7 C
o
. 1 , 17 b ; Com .
Dig . Navigation , G . 1 , 3 ; Id . Ley . C . ; 4 Burr . R . 2500 ; 2 Merivale , R . 143 , 157 , 158 .
* Campbell v . Hall , Cowp . R . 204 , 209 ; Chitty on Prerog . ch . 3 , p . 29 , & c .
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justice I shall not at present inquire ,) or by treaties. And , there
fore, the common law of England, as such , has no allowance or
authority there ; they being no part of the mother country , but
distinct , though dependent dominions .” 1
§ 152. There is great reason to doubt the accuracy of this state
ment in a legal view . We have already seen that the European
nations by whom America was colonized treated the subject in a
very different manner . They claimed an absolute dominion over
the whole territories afterwards occupied by them , not in virtue of
any conquest of, or cession by , the Indian natives , but as a right
acquired by discovery . Some of them , indeed , obtained a sort
of confirmatory grant from the papal authority . But as between
themselves they treated the dominion and title of territory as
resulting from priority of discovery ; 4 and that European power
which had first discovered the country and set up marks of pos
session was deemed to have gained the right, though it had not
yet formed a regular colony there . We have also seen that the
title of the Indians was not treated as a right of propriety and
dominion , but as a mere rightof occupancy . As infidels , heathen ,
and savages , they were not allowed to possess the prerogatives
belonging to absolute , sovereign , and independent nations . The
territory over which they wandered , and which they used for their
temporary and fugitive purposes , was, in respect to Christians ,
deemed as if it were inhabited only by brute animals . There is
not a single grant from the British crown , from the earliest of
Elizabeth down to the latest of George the Second , that affects to
look to any title except that founded on discovery . Conquest or
cession is not once alluded to . And it is impossible that it should
have been ; for at the time when al
l
the leading grants were re
1 i B
l
. Comm . 107 ; Chitty on Prerog . ch . 3 , p . 29 .
* See ante , p . 4 to 22 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 676 ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 234 .
3 Vattel , B . 1 , ch . 18 , $ 205 , 206 , 207 , 208 , 209 .
+ Johnson v . McIntosh , 8 Wheat . R . 543 , 576 , 595 .
5 Penn v . Lord Baltimore , 1 Ves . 444 , 451 .
03 Kent ' s Comm . 308 to 313 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 676 , 677 ; 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp .
478 ; Worcester v . Georgia , 6 Peters ' s R . 515 .
7 T
o
d
o but justice to those times , it is proper to state that this pretension did not
obtain universal approbation . . On the contrary , it was opposed b
y
some o
f
the most
enlightened ecclesiastics and philosophers o
f
those days , as unjust and absurd ; and es
pecially b
y
two Spanish writers o
f
eminent worth , Soto and Victoria . See Si
r
James
McIntosh ' s elegant treatise on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy , Philadelphia edit .
1832 , p
p
. 49 , 50 .
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spectively made , there had not been any conquest or cession from
the natives of the territory comprehended in those grants . Even
in respect to the territory of New York and New Jersey , which
alone afford any pretence for a claim by conquest, they were con
quered from the Dutch , and not from the natives , and were ceded
to England by the treaty of Breda in 1667 . But England claimed
this very territory , not by right of this conquest, but by the prior
right of discovery . The original grant was made to the Duke of
York in 1664 , founded upon this right, and the subsequent con
firmation of his title did not depart from the original foundation .
§ 153 . The Indians could in no just sense be deemed a con
quered people,who had been stripped of their territorial posses
sions by superior force . They were considered as a people not
having any regular laws , or any organized government , but as
mere wandering tribes . They were never reduced into actual
obedience , as dependent communities ; and no scheme of general
legislation over them was ever attempted . For many purposes
they were treated as independent communities , at liberty to gov
ern themselves , so always that they did not interfere with the
paramount rights of the European discoverers .3
$ 154 . For the most part at the time of the first grants of the
colonial charters , there was not any possession or occupation of
the territory by any British emigrants . The main object of these
charters , as stated in the preliminary recitals , was to invite emi
grations , to people the country , to found colonies, and to Christian
ize the natives . Even in case of a conquered country , where there
are no laws at a
ll existing , or none which are adapted to a civil
ized community , or where the laws are silent , or are rejected and
none substituted , the territory must be governed according to the
rules o
f
natural equity and right . And Englishmen removing
thither must be deemed to carry with them those rights and privi
leges which belong to them in their native country . 4
1 4 Wheaton , 575 , 576 , 588 . See also 1 Tuck . Black . Appx . 332 ; 1 Chalm . An
nals , 676 .
? Vattel , B . 1 , ch , 18 , $ 208 , 209 ; 3 Kent ' s Comm . 312 , 313 .
8 4 Wheat . R . 590 , 591 , 596 ; 1 Grahame ' s Hist . of America , 44 ; 2 Kent ' s Comm .
311 ; Worcester v . State of Georgia , 6 Peters ' s Sup . C
t
. Rep . 515 . (Mackey v . Coxe , 18
How . 104 ; Wheat . Int . Law , p
t
. 1 , ch . 2 , 14 . ]
4 2 Salk . 411 , 412 . See also Hall v . Campbell , Cowp . R . 204 , 211 , 212 ; 1 Chalm .
Ann . 14 , 15 ,678 , 679 , 689 , 690 ; 1 Chalm . Opinions , 194 ; 2 Chalm . Opinions , 20
2
;
Chitty on Prerog . ch . 2 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 48 , 49 .
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$ 155 . The very ground , therefore , assumed by England , as the
foundation of it
s
title to America , and the invitations to its own
subjects to people it , carry along with them a necessary implica
tion that the plantations , subsequently formed ,were to be deemed
a part of the ancient dominions ; and the subjects inhabiting them
to belong to a common country , and to retain their former rights
and privileges . The government , in its public policy and arrange
ments , as well as in its charters , proclaimed that the colonies were
established with a view to extend and enlarge the boundaries o
f
the empire . The colonies ,when so formed , became a part of th
e
state equally with it
s
ancient possessions . It is not , therefore ,
without strong reason , that it has been said that “ the colonists ,
continuing a
s
much subjects in the new establishment , where they
had freely placed themselves (with th
e
consent o
f
the crown ] , as
they had been in the old , carried with them their birthright , — the
laws o
f
their country , because the customs of a free people are a
part o
f
their liberty ; ' and that “ the jurisprudence of England
became that o
f
the colonies , so fa
r
a
s
it was applicable to the situ
ation a
t
which they had newly arrived ,because they were Eng
lishmen residing within a distant territory of the empire . ” 2 And
itmay be added , that as there were no other laws to govern them ,
the territory was necessarily treated a
s
a deserted and unoccupied
country , annexed b
y
discovery to the ol
d
empire , and composing
a part o
f
it . Moreover , even if it were possible to consider th
e
case a
s
a case o
f conquest from the Indians , it would not follow ,
if the natives did not remain there , but deserted it and left it a
vacant territory , that the rule as to conquests would continue to
apply to it . On the contrary , as soon as the crown should choose
to found an English colony in such vacant territory , the general
principle o
f
settlements in desert countries would govern it . It
would cease to be a conquest , and become a colony , and as such
be affected b
y
the British laws . This doctrine is laid down with
great clearness and force b
y
Lord Mansfield , in hi
s
celebrated
judgment in Hall y . Campbell . In a still more recent case it
1 Vattel , B . 1 , ch . 18 , $ 209 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 67
6
, 677 , 678 , 679 ; 8 Wheat . R .
595 ; Grotius , B . 2 , ch . 9 , $ 10 .
? i Chalm . Ann . 677 ; Id . 14 , 15 , 658 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 48 , 49 ; 3 Wilson ' s
Law Lect . 234 , 235 .
3 Roberdeau v . Rous , 1 At
k
. R . 543 , 54
4
; Vaughan , R . 30
0
, 40
0
; Show . Parl . Cas .
3
1 ; 8 Wheat . R . 595 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 382 , 383 ; Dummer ' s Defence , 1
American Tracts , 18 . 4 Cowp . R . 204 , 211 , 212 .
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was laid down by Lord Ellenborough that the law of England
might properly be recognized by subjects of England in a place
occupied temporarily by British troops , who would impliedly carry
that law with them .
$ 1
5
6
. The doctrine of Mr . Justice Blackstone , therefore , may
well admit of serious doubt upon general principles . But it is
manifestly erroneous , so far as it is applied to the colonies and
plantations composing our Union . In th
e
charters under which
all these colonies were settled , with a single exception , there is ,
a
s has been already seen , an express declaration that al
l
subjects
and their children inhabiting therein shall be deemed natural
born subjects , and shall enjoy all the privileges and immunities
thereof . There is also in al
l
o
f
them a
n express restriction that
n
o laws shall be made repugnant to those of England , or that as
near a
s may be conveniently , they shall be consonant with and
conformable thereto ; and either expressly or b
y
necessary impli
cation it is provided that th
e
laws o
f England so fa
r
a
s applicable
shall be in force there . Now this declaration , even if the crown
previously possessed a right to establish what laws it pleased
over the territory , as a conquest from the natives , being a funda
mental rule o
f
the original settlement o
f
the colonies , and before
the emigrations thither , was conclusive , and could not afterwards
b
e abrogated b
y
the crown . It was an irrevocable annexation of
the colonies to the mother country , as dependencies governed by
the same laws and entitled to the same rights . 3
$ 157 . And so has been the uniform doctrine in America ever
since the settlement of the colonies . The universal principle (and
the practice has conformed to it ) has been , that the common law
is our birthright and inheritance , and that our ancestors brought
hither with them upon their emigration all of it which was appli
cable to their situation . The whole structure of our present
jurisprudence stands upon the original foundations of the common
la
w . 4
1 R
e
x
v . Brampton , 10 East , R . 282 , 28
8
, 28
9
.
That o
f Pennsylvania , ì Grahame ' s Hist . 41 , note ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 14 , 15 , 639 ,
640 , 658 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 48 , 49 .
8 Stokes ' s Colon . 30 ; Hall v . Campbell , Cowp . R . 204 , 212 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm .
App . 383 , 384 ; Chitty , Prerog . 3
2 , 33 .
4 Notwithstanding the clearness o
f
this doctrine , both from the language o
f
the char
ters , and the whole course of judicial decisions ,Mr . Jefferson has treated it with an ex
traordinary degree o
f
derision if not o
f contempt . " I deride (says he ) with yo
u
the
ordinary doctrine , that we brought with us from England the common - law rights .
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$ 158 . We thus se
e
in a very clear light the mode in which th
e
common law was first introduced into the colonies ; as well as the
This narrow notion was a favorite in the first moment of rallying to ou
r
rights against
Great Britain . But itwas that of men who felt their rights , before they had thought of
their explanation . The truth is , that w
e
brought with u
s
the rights o
f
men , of expatri
atedmen . On our arrival here the question would at once arise , b
y
what law will we
govern ourselves ? The resolution seems to have been , b
y
that system with which we
are familiar ; to be altered b
y
ourselves occasionally , and adapted to our new situation . "
4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 178 .
How differently did the Congress o
f
1774 think . They unanimously resolved , “ That
the respective colonies are entitled to th
e
common la
w
o
f England , and more especially to
the great and inestimable privilege o
f being tried b
y
their peers o
f
the vicinage accord
ing to the course o
f
that law . " They further resolved , " that they were entitled to the
benefit o
f
such o
f
the English statutes a
s
existed a
t
the time o
f
their colonization , and
which they have b
y
experience respectively found to b
e applicable to their several and
local circumstances . ” They also resolved , that their ancestors a
t
the time o
f
their em
igration were “ entitled " (not to the rights o
f
men , o
f
expatriated men , but ) “ to all the
rights , liberties , and immunities of free and natural -born subjects within the realm o
f
England . ” Journal of Congress , Declaration o
f
Rights o
f
the Colonies , Oct . 14 , 1774 ,
p . 2
7
to 3
1
.
, I Chalm . Opinions , 202 , 220 , 295 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 677 , 681 , 682 ; 1 Tuck . Black .
Comm . 385 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 322 ; Journal of Congress , 1774 , p . 28 , 29 ; 2 Wilson ' s
Law Lect . 48 , 49 , 50 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 380 to 384 ; Van Ness v . Packard ,
2 Peters ' s Sup . R . 137 , 144 .
(Mr . Jefferson , as will be seen from the quotation above , did not question , but ex
pressly asserted , that the English common law was in force in the colonies ; but h
e
speaks o
f
it a
s having been accepted by the colonists , who might on the other hand have
chosen to reject it . Further on in the same letter ( to Judge Tyler , Jefferson ' s Works ,
VI . 65 ) he says : “ The state of the English law at the date of our emigration consti
tuted the system adopted here . ” And in his notes on Virginia he says : “ The laws of
England seem to have been adopted b
y
consent o
f
the settlers ,which might easily enough
have beendone whilst they were fe
w
and living all together . Of such adoption , however ,
we have no other proof than their practice till the year 1661 , when they were expressly
adopted b
y
a
n
act o
f
the assembly , except so far a
s ' a difference o
f
condition ’ rendered
them inapplicable . " Jefferson ' s Works , VIII . 374 . See also Ibid . IX . 282 . When , at
the breaking out o
f
the Revolution , the laws were revised by a commission , o
f
which
Mr . Jefferson was a member , the common law of England was made the basis of the
revision . Jefferson ' sWorks , VIII . 379 . The true rule as to the extent to which the
common law prevailed in the colonies is thus stated b
y
Mr . Justice Story , in one of his
judicial decisions . “ The common law of England , ” he says , “ is not to be taken , in
a
ll respects , to be that o
f
America . Our ancestors broughtwith them its general prin
ciples , and claimed it a
s
their birthright ; but they brought with them and adopted only
that portion which was applicable to their condition . " Van Ness v . Packard , 2 Pet .
144 . See also Chisholm v . Georgia , 2 Dall . 435 ; Town of Pawlett v . Clark , 9 Cranch ,
292 ; Wheaton v . Peters , 8 Pet . 541 . The acts o
f
Parliament passed after the settlement
o
f
the American colonies were not in force therein , unless made so b
y
express words
o
r by adoption . Commonwealth v . Lodge , 2 Grat . 579 ; Pemble v . Clifford , 2 McCord ,
3
1
. See also Baker v . Mattocks , Quincy , 7
2 ; Cathcart v . Robinson , 5 Pet . 280 ; Swift v .
Towsey , 5 Ind . 196 . For the different views taken b
y
English and American statesmen
upon the subject o
f
this note prior to the Revolution , seeWorks of Franklin , b
y
Sparks ,
IV . 271 . ]
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true reason of the exceptions to it to be found in our colonial
usages and laws. It was not introduced as of original and uni
versal obligation in its utmost latitude ; but the limitations con
tained in the bosom o
f
the common law itself , and indeed consti
tuting a part o
f
the law o
f
nations , were affirmatively settled and
recognized in the respective charters o
f
settlement . Thus limited
and defined , it has become the guardian of our political and civil
rights ; it has protected our infant liberties , it has watched over
our maturer growth , it has expanded with our wants , it has nur
tured that spirit of independence which checked the first ap
proaches o
f arbitrary power , it has enabled us to triumph in the
midst of difficulties and dangers threatening our political exist
ence ; and , b
y
the goodness o
f
God , we are now enjoying , under
it
s
bold and manly principles , the blessings of a free , independent ,
and united government . 2
1 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 48 to 55 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 380 to 384 ; 1 Chalm .
Opinions , 220 .
? The question , whether the common law is applicable to the United States , in their
national character , relations , and government , has been much discussed at different
periods o
f
the government , principally , however , with reference to the jurisdiction and
punishment o
f
common -law offences b
y
the courts o
f
the United States . It would be a
most extraordinary state o
f
things that the common la
w
should b
e
the basis o
f
the juris
prudence o
f
the States originally composing the Union , and yet a government ingrafted
upon the existing system should have n
o jurisprudence a
t
a
ll . If such be the result ,
there is n
o guide and n
o
rule for the courts o
f
the United States , o
r , indeed , for any
other department o
f
government , in the exercise o
f
any o
f
the powers confided to them ,
except so far a
s Congress has laid , or shall lay , down a rule . In the immense mass o
f
rights and duties , o
f
contracts and claims , growing out o
f
the Constitution and laws o
f
the United States , (upon which positive legislation has hitherto done little or nothing , )
what is the rule o
f
decision , and interpretation , and restriction ? Suppose the simplest
case o
f
contract with the government o
f
the United States , how is it to be construed ?
How is it to be enforced ? What are it
s obligations ? Take a
n
act o
f Congress , how
is it to be interpreted ? Are the rules o
f
the common law to furnish the proper guide ,
o
r
is every court and department to give it any interpretation itmay please , according to
it
s
own arbitrary will ? My design is not here to discuss the subject , (for that would
require a volume , ) but rather to suggest some o
f
the difficulties attendant upon it . Those
readers who are desirous o
f
more ample information are referred to Duponceau o
n
the
Jurisdiction o
f
the Courts o
f
the United States ; to 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App .
note E , p . 372 ; to 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 16 , p . 311 to 322 ; to the report of the Vir
ginia legislature o
f
1799 – 1800 ; to Rawle o
n
the Constitution , ch . 3
0 , p . 258 ; to the
North American Review , July , 1825 ; and to Mr . Bayard ' s Speech in the Debates o
n
the Judiciary , in 1802 , p . 372 , & c . Some other remarks illustrative o
f it will necessa
rily arise in discussing the subject o
f
impeachments .
[ " It is clear , ” says Mr . Justice McLean , in Wheaton v . Peters , 8 Pet . 658 , “ that there
can b
e
n
o
common law o
f the United States . The Federal government is composed o
f
twenty -four sovereign and independent States ; each o
f
which may have it
s
local usages ,
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customs , and common law. There is no principle which pervades the Union , and has
the authority of law , that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the Union .
The common law could be made a part of our Federal system only by legislative adop
tion . When , therefore, a common - law right is asserted, we must look to the State in
which the controversy originated .” See to the same effect, Kendall v. United States, 12
Pet . 524 ; Lorman v. Clarke , 2McLean , 568. Therefore th
e
United States cannot ex
ercise a common -law jurisdiction in criminal cases . Congress must first make an act a
crime , affix a punishment to it , and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction o
f
the
offence , before such court can take cognizance thereof . United States v . Hudson , 7
Cranch , 32 ; Same v . Lancaster , 2 McLean , 433 ; Same v . New Bedford Bridge , 1 Wood .
& M . 435 ; Same v . Wilson , 3 Blatch . 435 . But the national courts , after jurisdiction
is conferred , are to look to the common law , in the absence of statutory provisions , fo
r
rules to guide them in the exercise o
f
their functions , in criminal a
swell as civil cases .
Conklin ' s Treatise , 82 . ]
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CHAPTER XVII.
GENERAL REVIEW OF THE COLONIES .
§ 159 . In respect to their interior polity , the colonies have been
very properly divided by Mr. Justice Blackstone into three sorts ;
namely , provincial, proprietary , and charter governments . First ,
provincial establishments . The constitutions of these depended
on the respective commissions issued by the crown to the govern
ors , and the instructions which usually accompanied those com
missions . These commissions were usually in one form , ap
pointing a governor , as the king 's representative or deputy , who
was to be governed by the royal instructions , and styling him cap - .
tain -general and governor -in - chief over the province , and chancel
lor, vice-admiral, and ordinary of the same . The crown also
appointed a council who, besides their legislative authority , were
to assist the governor in the discharge of his official duties ; and
power was given him to suspend them from office , and in case of
vacancies to appoint others , until the pleasure of the crown should
be known. The commissions also contained authority to convene
a general assembly of representatives of the freeholders and
planters ; 3 and under this authority provincial assemblies com
posed of the governor , the council , and the representatives , were
constituted (the council being a separate branch or upper house ,
and the governor having a negative upon all their proceedings , and
also the right of proroguing and dissolving them ) ; which assem
blies had the power of making local laws and ordinances , not
repugnant to the laws of England , but as near asmay be agree
1 1 Bl. Comm . 10
8
; Stokes ' s Hist . Colon . 20 , 23 , 14
9
, 18
4
, 185 ; Cowper ' s R . 207 ,
212 ; Com . Dig . Navigation , G . 1 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 163 , note ; Id . 251 ; 1 Doug .
Summ . 207 .
2 Stokes ' s Hist . Colon . 14 , 23 , 149 , 150 , 166 , 184 , 185 , 191 , 199 , 202 , 237 , 239 ; 1 B
l
.
Comm . 108 . Stokes has given , in his History of the Colonies , ch . 4 , p . 149 , & c . , a
copy o
f
one o
f
these commissions . A copy is also prefixed to the Provincial Laws of
New Hampshire , edition of 1767 . See 2 Hewatt ' s History of South Carolina and
Georgia , and Account of the l 'rovincial Governments ,
8 Stokes ' s Hist . Colon . 155 , 237 , 240 , 241 , 242 , 251 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 71 ; 1 Chalmers ' s
Annals , 683 . See in Parliamentary Debates , Vol . II . , for 1785 ( old edition ) , in Appen
dix , copies of the Charters of the American Colonies .
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able thereto , subject to the ratification and disapproval of the crown .
The governors also had power ,with the advice of council , to estab
lish courts , and to appoint judges and other magistrates and offi
cers for th
e
province ; to pardon offences , and to remit fines and
forfeitures ; to collate to churches and benefices ; to levy military
forces for defence ; and to execute martial law in time o
f
invasion ,
war , and rebellion . Appeals lay to the king in council , from the
decisions o
f
the highest courts o
f judicature o
f
the province , as ,
indeed , tliey did from all others of the colonies . Under this form
o
f government , the provinces of New Hampshire , New York , New
Jersey , Virginia , the Carolinas , and Georgia were governed ( as
we have seen ) fo
r
a long period , and some of them from an early
period after their settlement .
$ 160 . Secondly , proprietary governments . These ( as w
e
have
seen ) were granted out b
y
the crown to individuals , in the nature
o
f feudatory principalities , with al
l
the inferior royalties and sub
ordinate powers of legislation which formerly belonged to the
owners o
f
counties palatine . Yet still there were these express
conditions , that the ends for which the grant was made should
b
e substantially pursued ; and that nothing should be done or
attempted which might derogate from the sovereignty of the
mother country . In the proprietary government , the governors
were appointed b
y
the proprietaries , and legislative assemblies
were convened under their authority ; and indeed all the usual
prerogatives were exercised which in provincial governments
belonged to the crown . Three only existed at the period o
f
the
American Revolution , namely , the proprietary governments of
Maryland , Pennsylvania , and Delaware . The former had this
peculiarity in it
s
character , that its laws were not subject to the
supervision and control of the crown ; whereas , in both the latter
such a supervision and control were expressly o
r impliedly pro
vided for . 6
§ 161 . Thirdly , charter governments . Mr . Justice Blackstone
describes them as " in the nature of 'civil corporations , with
the power o
f making by -laws for their own internal regulation ,
not contrary to the laws o
f England ; and with such rights and
1 Stokes ' s Hist . of Colonies , 157 , 158 , 184 , 264 . ? 1 Doug . Summ . 207 .
8 i Black . Comm . 108 ; Stokes ' s Hist . Colon . 19 . 4 Stokes ' s Hist . of Colon . 22 .
6 i Ptk . Hist . 55 ; Stokes ' s Hist . of Colon , 19 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 207 .
6 i Chalmers ' s Annals , 203 , 637 . 7 1 B
l
. Comm . 108 .
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authorities as are specially given them in their several charters
of incorporation . They have a governor named by the king ,
(or, in some proprietary colonies , by the proprietor ,) who is his
representative or deputy . They have courts of justice of their
own , from whose decisions an appeal lies to the king and council
here in England . Their general assemblies ,which are their house
of commons , together with their council of state , being their upper
house , with the concurrence of the king, or his representative the
governor ,make laws suited to their own emergencies .” This is
by no means a just or accurate description of the charter govern
ments . They could not properly be considered as mere civil cor
porations of the realm , empowered to pass by-laws ; but rather as
great political establishments or colonies , possessing the general
powers of government and rights of sovereignty , dependent , in
deed , and subject to the realm of England , but still possessing
within their own territorial limits the general powers of legislation
and taxation . The only charter governments existing at the
period of the American Revolution were those of Massachusetts ,
Rhode Island , and Connecticut . The first charter of Massachu
setts might be open to the objection that it provided only fo
r
a
civil corporation within the realm , and did not justify the assump
tion o
f
th
e
extensive executive , legislative , and judicial powers ,
which were afterwards exercised upon the removal o
f
that charter
to America . And a similar objection might be urged against the
charter o
f
the Plymouth colony . But the charter of William and
Mary , in 1691 , was obviously upon a broader foundation , and was
in the strictest sense a charter fo
r
general political government , a
constitution fo
r
a state , with sovereign powers and prerogatives ,
and not fo
r
a mere municipality . By this last charter the organi
zation o
f
the different departments o
f
the government was , in
some respects , similar to that in the provincial governments ; the
governor was appointed b
y
the crown ; the council annually chosen
b
y
the general assembly ; and the house of representatives by the
people . But in Connecticut and Rhode Island , the charter gov
ernments were organized altogether upon popular and democrati
ca
l
principles ; the governor , council , and assembly being annually
chosen b
y
the freemen of the colony , and al
l
other officers ap
11 Chalmers ' s Annals , 274 , 275 , 293 , 687 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 385 ; 1
Pitk . Hist . 10
8
; 1 Hutch . Hist . No . 13 , p . 529 ; Mass . State Papers , 338 , 339 , 358 ,
359 ; Stokes ' s Hist . o
f
Colon . 21 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 207 .
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pointed by their authority .1 By the statutes of 7 & 8 Wil
liam 3 , ( ch . 22 , § 6 ,) it was indeed required that al
l
governors
appointed in charter and proprietary governments should be ap
proved o
f
b
y
the crown , before entering upon the duties of their
office ; but this statute was , if at al
l , ill observed , and seems to
have produced n
o essential change in the colonial policy .
$ 162 . The circumstances in which the colonies were generally
agreed , notwithstanding the diversities of their organization into
provincial , proprietary , and charter governments , were the follow
ing : -
§ 163 . ( 1 . ) They enjoyed the rights and privileges of British
born subjects , and the benefit of the common laws o
f England ;
and a
ll
their laws were required to be not repugnant unto , but as
near asmight be , agreeable to , the laws and statutes of England . 3
This , as we have seen , was a limitation upon the legislative power
contained in an express clause o
f
a
ll
the charters , and could not
be transcended without a clear breach of their fundamental con
ditions . A very liberal exposition of this clause seems , however ,
always to have prevailed , and to have been acquiesced in , if not
adopted , by the crown . Practically speaking , it seems to have
been left to the judicial tribunals in th
e
colonies to ascertain what
part o
f
the common law was applicable to the situation o
f
the
colonies ; 4 and of course , from a difference of interpretation , the
common law , as actually administered , was not in any two of the
colonies exactly th
e
same . The general foundation of the local
jurisprudence was confessedly composed o
f
the same materials ;
but in the actual superstructure they were variously combined and
modified , so as to present neither a general symmetry of design
nor a unity o
f
execution .
$ 164 . In regard to the legislative power , there was a still
greater latitude allowed ; fo
r
notwithstanding the cautious ref
erence in the charters to the laws of England , the assemblies
actually exercised the authority to abrogate every part of the
common law , except that which united the colonies to the parent
state b
y
the general ties o
f allegiance and dependency ; and every
part of th
e
statute law , except those acts of Parliament which
1 i Chalmers ' s Annals , 274 , 293 , 294 ; Stokes ' s Hist . Colon . 21 , 22 , 23 .
2 I Chalmers ' s Annals , 295 ; Stokes ' s Hist . Colon . 20 .
8 Com . Dig . Navigation , G . 1 ; Id . Ley . C . ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 .
41 Chalm . Annals , 677 , 678 , 687 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . 384 ; I Vez . 444 , 449 ;
2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 49 to 54 ; Mass . State Papers ( ed . 1818 , 375 , 390 , 391 ) .
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expressly prescribed rules for the colonies , and necessarily bound
them ,as integral parts of the empire, in a general system , formed
fo
r
a
ll , and fo
r
th
e
interest of a
ll . To guard this superintending
authority with more effect , it was enacted b
y
Parliament in 7 &
8 William 3 , ch . 22 , “ that all laws , b
y
-laws , usages , and cus
toms which should b
e
in practice in any o
f
the plantations , repug
nant to any la
w
made , or to be made in this kingdom relative to
the said plantations , shall be utterly void , and o
f
none effect . " 2
$ 165 . It was under the consciousness of the full possession of
the rights , liberties , and immunities of British subjects , that the
colonists in almost all the early legislation of their respective as
semblies insisted upon a declaratory act , acknowledging and con
firming them . 3 And fo
r
the most part they thus succeeded in
obtaining a real and effective Magna Charta o
f
their liberties .
The trial b
y
jury in a
ll
cases , civil and criminal , was as firmly
and a
s universally established in the colonies a
s
in the mother
country .
$ 166 . ( 2 . ) In al
l
the colonies local legislatures were estab
lished , one branch of which consisted of representatives of the
people freely chosen to represent and defend their interests , and
possessing a negative upon a
ll
laws . We have seen that in the
original structure of the charters of the early colonies no provision
was made fo
r
such a legislative body . But accustomed as the
colonists had been to possess the rights and privileges o
f Eng
lishmen , and valuing as they did above all others the right of
representation in Parliament , as the only real security fo
r
their
political and civil liberties , it was easy to foresee that they would
not long endure the exercise o
f any arbitrary power ; and that
they would insist upon some share in framing the laws b
y
which
they were to b
e
governed . We find accordingly that at an early
period [1619 ] a house of burgesses was forced upon the then pro
prietors o
f Virginia . In Massachusetts , Connecticut , New Hamp
ii Chalmers ' s Annals , 139 , 140 , 671 ,675 ,684 , 687 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . 38 ,
App . ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 49 , 50 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 213 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 108 ; Mass .
State Papers , 345 , 346 , 347 , 351 to 364 , 375 , 390 ; Dummer ' s Defence , 1 American
Tracts , 65 , & c .
2 Stokes ' s Colon .
8 1 Pitk . Hist . 88 , 89 ; Hutch . Coll . 201 , & c . ; 1 Chalmers ' s Annals , 678 ; 2 Doug .
Summ . 193 .
* 1 Doug . Summ . 213 to 215 .
6 Robertson ' s America , B . 9 .
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shire , and Rhode Island the same course ,was pursued .1 And Mr.
Hutchinson has correctly observed that all the colonies before the
reign of Charles the Second (Maryland alone excepted ,whose char
ter contained an express provision on the subject ) settled a model
of government for themselves, in which the people had a voice ,
and representation in framing the laws, and in assenting to bur
dens being imposed upon themselves . After the restoration ,
there was no instance of a colony without a representation of the
people , nor any attempt to deprive the colonies of this privilege ,
except during the brief and arbitrary reign of King James the
Second .?
§ 167 . In the proprietary and charter governments , the right
of the people to be governed by laws established by a local legis
lature , in which they were represented ,was recognized as a funda
i i Tucker 's Black . Comm . App . 386.
2 1 Hutch . Hist . Mass. 94, note ; 1 Doug . Summ . 213. Mr. Hutchinson 's remarks
are entitled to something more than this brief notice , and a quotation is therefore made
of the leading passage. “ It is observable that all the colonies before the reign of King
Charles the Second , Maryland excepted, settled amodel of government for themselves .
Virginia had beenmany years distracted under the government of presidents and gor
ernors , with councils , in whose nomination or removal the people had no voice, until in
the year 1620 ahouse of burgesses broke out in the colony ; the king nor the grand coun
ci
l
a
t
home not having given any powers o
r
directions fo
r
it . The governor and assist
ants o
f
the Massachusetts a
t
first intended to rule the people ; and , a
s
we have observed ,
obtained their consent for it , but this lasted two or three years only ; and although there
is n
o
color fo
r
it in the charter , yet a house of deputies appeared suddenly , in 1634 , to the
surprise o
f
the magistrates , and the disappointment o
f
their schemes for power . Con
necticut soon after followed the plan o
f
theMassachusetts . New Haven , although the
people had the highest reverence for their leaders , and fo
r
near thirty years in judicial
proceedings submitted to the magistracy ( it must , however , be remembered , that it was
annually elected ) without a jury ; yet in matters o
f legislation the people , from the be
ginning , would have their share b
y
their representatives . New Hampshire combined
together under the same form with Massachusetts . Lord Say tempted the principal
men o
f
the Massachusetts , to make them and their heirs nobles and absolute governors
o
f
a new colony ; but , under this plan , they could find no people to follow them . Bar
badoes and the leeward islands , began in 1625 , struggled under governors , and councils ,
and contending proprietors fo
r
about twenty years . Numbers suffered death b
y
the
arbitrary sentences o
f
courts -martial , or other acts of violence , as one side or the other
happened to prevail . At length , in 1645 , the assembly was called , and no reason given
but this , viz . : That , b
y
the grant o
f
the Earl of Carlisle , the inhabitants were to enjoy
all the liberties , privileges , and franchises of English subjects ; and therefore , as it is
also expressly mentioned in the grant , could not legally b
e
bound , o
r charged b
y
any
act without their own consent . This grant , in 1627 , was made b
y
Charles the First , &
prince not the most tender of the subjects ' liberties . After the restoration , there is no
instance o
f
a colony settled without a representation o
f
the people , nor any attempt to
deprive the colonies o
f
this privilege , except in th
e
arbitrary reign o
f King James the
Second . "
CH . XVII.] 115GENERAL REVIEW .
mental principle of the compact. But in the provincial govern
ments it was often a matter of debate whether the people had a
right to be represented in the legislature , or whether it was a
privilege enjoyed by the favor and during th
e
pleasure o
f
th
e
crown . The former was the doctrine of the colonists ; the latter
was maintained b
y
the crown and it
s legal advisers . Struggles
took place from time to time on this subject in some o
f
the pro
vincial assemblies , and declarations of rights were there drawn
up , and rejected b
y
the crown as an invasion o
f
it
s prerogative .
The crown also claimed , aswithin its exclusive competence , the
right to decide what number o
f representatives should be chosen ,
and from what places they should come . The provincial assem
blies insisted upon an adverse claim . The crown also insisted on
the right to continue the legislative assembly for an indefinite
period , at its pleasure , without a new election , and to dissolve it
in like manner . The latter power was admitted , but the former
wasmost stoutly resisted , as in effect a destruction of the popular
right of representation , frequent elections being deemed vital to
their political safety , — “ a right ” ( as the Declaration of Inde
pendence emphatically pronounces ) “ inestimable to them , and
formidable to tyrants only . ” 3 In the colony of New York the
crown succeeded a
t
last (1743 ] 4 in establishing septennial assem
blies , in imitation of the septennial Parliaments of the parent
country ,which was a measure so offensive to th
e
people that it
constituted one o
f
their grievances propounded a
t
the commence
ment o
f
the American Revolution .
$ 168 . For all the purposes of domestic and internal regula
tion , the colonial legislatures deemed themselves possessed of
entire and exclusive authority . One of the earliest forms in
which the spirit of the people exhibited itself on this subject was
the constant denial of all power of taxation , except under laws
passed b
y
themselves . The propriety o
f
their resistance o
f
the
claim o
f
the crown to tax them seems not to have been denied b
y
the most strenuous o
f
their opponents . It was the object of the
11 Pitk . Hist . 85 , 86 , 87 ; 1 Chalm . Opin . 189 ; 2 Doug . Summ .251 , & c .
2 i Pitk . Hist . 88 ; 1 Chalm . Opin . 268 , 272 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 73 ;
Chitty , Prerog . ch . 3 .
8 1 Pitk . Hist . 86 , 87 .
4 i Pitk . Hist . 87 , 88 .
5 In Virginia also the assemblies were septennial . The Federalist , No . 5
2 .
6 Chalm . Annals , 658 , 681 , 683 , 686 , 687 ; Stat . 6 Geo . 3 , ch . 12 .
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latter to subject them only to th
e
undefined and arbitrary power
o
f
taxation b
y
Parliament . The colonists , with a firmness and
public spirit which strikes us with surprise and admiration ,
claimed for themselves and their posterity a total exemption from
all taxation not imposed b
y
their own representatives . A dec
laration to this effect will be found in some of the earliest of
colonial legislation , — in that of Plymouth , of Massachusetts , of
Virginia , of Maryland , of Rhode Island , of New York , and indeed
o
f
most of the other colonies . The general opinion held b
y
them
was , that Parliament had no authority to tax them , because they
were not represented in Parliament .
$ 169 . On the other hand , the statute of 6 Geo . 3 , ch . 12 ,
contained an express declaration b
y
Parliament that “ the colonies
and plantations in America have been , are , and of right ought to
b
e , subordinate unto and dependent upon th
e
imperial crown and
Parliament o
f
Great Britain , " and that the king , with the advice
and consent o
f
Parliament , “ had , hath , and of right ought to
have , full power and authority to make laws and statutes of suffi
cient force and validity to bind the colonies and people o
f
America
in all cases whatsoever . ” 3
$ 170 . It does not appear that this declaratory act of 6 Geo .
3 met with any general opposition among those statesmen in
England who were most friendly to America . Lord Chatham , in
a speech on the 17th o
f December , 1765 , said : “ I assert the
authority o
f
this country over the colonies to b
e sovereign and
supreme in every circumstance o
f government and legislation .
But ( he added ) taxation is no part of the governing or legislative
power ; taxes are the voluntary grant of the people alone . ” 4 Mr .
11 Pitkin ' s Hist . 89 , 90 , 91 ; 2 Holmes ' s Annals , 133 , 13
4
, 13
5
; 2 Doug . Summ .
251 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 213 ; 3 Hutch . Coll , 529 , 530 .
2 1 Pitkin , 89 , & c . , 97 , 127 , 129 ; Marsh . Colon . 352 , 353 ; Appx . 469 , 470 , 472 ;
Chalm . Annals , 658 .
36 Geo . 3 , ch . 12 ; Stokes ' s Colon . 28 , 29 . See also Marshall on Colon . ch . 13 , p .
353 ; Vaughan , R . 300 , 400 ; 1 Pitkin ' s Hist . 123 .
4 Mr . Burke has sketched with a most masterly hand the true origin of this resist
ance to the power o
f
taxation . The passage is so full of his best eloquence , and por
trays with such striking fidelity the character o
f
the colonists , that , notwithstanding it
s
length , I am tempted to lay it before the reader in this note .
“ In this character o
f
the Americans , a love of freedom is the predominating feature ,
which marks and distinguishes the whole ; and as an ardent is always a jealous affec
tion , your colonies become suspicious , restive , and untractable , whenever they see the
least attempt to wrest from them b
y
force , o
r
shuffle from them b
y
chicane , what they
think the only advantage worth living for . This fierce spirit of liberty is stronger in
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Burke ,whomay justly be deemed the leader of the colonial advo
cates , maintained the supremacy of Parliament to the full extent
the English colonies probably than in any other people of the earth : an
d
this from a
great variety o
f powerful causes ; which , to understand the true temper o
f
their minds ,
and the direction which this spirit takes , itwill not be amiss to lay open somewhat more
largely .
" First , the people of the colonies are descendants o
f Englishmen . England , Sir , is
a nation which still , I hope , respects , and formerly adored , her freedom . The colonists
emigrated from you , when this part of your character was most predominant ; and
they took this bias and direction the moment they parted from your hands . They are
therefore not only devoted to liberty , but to liberty according to English ideas , and o
n
English principles . Abstract liberty , like other mere abstractions , is not to be found .
Liberty inheres in some sensible object ; and every nation has formed to itself some
favorite point , which b
y way of eminence becomes the criterion of their happiness . It
happened , you know , Sir , that the great contests for freedom in this country were from
the earliest times chiefly upon the question o
f taxing . Most of the contests in the
ancient commonwealths turned primarily o
n
the right o
f
election o
f magistrates ; or on
the balance among the several orders o
f
the state . The question of money was not
with them so immediate . But in England it was otherwise . On this point o
f
taxes
the ablest pens and most eloquent tongues have been exercised , the greatest spirits
have acted and suffered . In order to give the fullest satisfaction concerning the im
portance o
f
this point , it was not only necessary fo
r
those who in argument defended
the excellence o
f
the English constitution to insist o
n
this privilege o
f
granting money
a
s
a dry point o
f
fact , and to prove that the right had been acknowledged in ancient
parchments and blind usages , to reside in a certain body called the House of Commons .
They wentmuch further ; they attempted to prove , and they succeeded , that in theory
it ought to be so , from the particular nature of a house of commons , as an immediate
representative o
f
the people , whether the old records bad delivered this oracle o
r
not .
They took infinite pains to inculcate , a
s
a fundamental principle , that in all monarchies
the people must in effect themselves mediately or immediately possess the power of
granting their own money , or no shadow o
f liberty could subsist . The colonies draw
from you , a
s
with their life -blood , these ideas and principles . Their love o
f liberty , a
s
with you , fixed and attached on this specific point o
f
taxing . Liberty might be safe ,
o
rmight be endangered in twenty other particulars ,without their being much pleased
o
r
alarmed . Here they felt its pulse ; and a
s they found that beat , they thought them
selves sick o
r
sound . I do not say whether they were right or wrong in applying your
general arguments to their own case . It is not easy indeed to make a monopoly of
theorems and corollaries . The fact is , that they did thus apply those general argu
ments ; and your mode o
f governing them , whether through lenity or indolence ,
through wisdom o
r
mistake , confirmed them in the imagination , that they , a
s
well a
s
you , had a
n
interest in these common principles .
“ They were further confirmed in this pleasing error b
y
the form o
f
their provincial
legislative assemblies . Their governments are popular in an high degree ; some are
merely popular ; in al
l , the popular representative is the most weighty ; and this share
of the people in their ordinary government never fails to inspire them with lofty senti .
ments , and with a strong aversion from whatever tends to deprive them of their chief
importance .
“ If anything were wanting to this necessary operation of the form of government ,
religion would have given it a complete effect . Religion , always a principle of energy ,
in this new people , is no way worn out o
r impaired ; and their mode of professing it is
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of the declaratory act, and as justly including th
e
power o
f
taxa
tion . But he deemed the power of taxation in Parliament as an
also one main cause o
f
this free spirit . The people ar
e
Protestants ; and of that kind
which is the most adverse to a
ll implicit submission of mind and opinion . This is a
persuasion not only favorable to liberty , but built upon it . I do not think , Si
r , that the
reason o
f
this averseness in the dissenting churches from all that looks like absolute
government is so much to b
e sought in their religious tenets , as in their history . Every
one knows that the Roman Catholic religion is a
t
least coeval with most o
f
the govern
ments where it prevails ; that it has generally gone hand in hand with them ; and
received great favor and every kind o
f support from authority . The Church of Eng .
land , too , was formed from her cradle under the nursing care of regular government .
But the dissenting interests have sprung u
p
in direct opposition to all the ordinary
powers o
f the world , and could justify that opposition only o
n
a strong claim to
natural liberty . Their very existence depended on the powerful and unremitted asser
tion o
f
that claim . All Protestantism , even the most cold and passive , is a sort of
dissent . But the religion most prevalent in our Northern colonies is a refinement o
n
the
principle o
f resistance ; it is the diffidence of dissent ; and the Protestantism o
f
the Prot
estant religion . This religion , under a variety o
f
denominations , agreeing in nothing
but in the communion o
f
the spirit o
f liberty , is predominant in most of the Northern
provinces ; where the Church of England , notwithstanding it
s legal rights , is in reality
n
o
more than a sort o
f private sect , not composing most probably the tenth of the
people . The colonists left England when this spirit was high , and in the emigrants
was the highest o
f
a
ll
: and even that stream o
f foreigners , which has been constantly
flowing into these colonies , has , for the greatest part , been composed of dissenters from
the establishments o
f
their several countries , and have brought with them a temper and
character far from alien to that o
f
the people with whom they mixed .
“ Sir , I can perceive b
y
their manner , that some gentlemen object to the latitude of
this description , because in th
e
Southern colonies the Church o
f England forms a large
body , and has a regular establishment . It is certainly true . There is , however , a c
ir
cumstance attending these colonies , which , in my opinion , fully counterbalances this
difference , and makes the spirit of liberty still more high and haughty than in those o
f
the northward . It is that in Virginia and the Carolinas they have a vastmultitude of
slaves . Where this is the case in any part of the world , those who are free are b
y
far
the most proud and jealous o
f
their freedom . Freedom is to them not only an enjoy
ment , but a kind of rank and privilege . Not seeing there that freedom , as in countries
where it is a common blessing , and as broad and general as the air ,may be united
with much abject toil , with great misery , with all the exterior o
f
servitude , liberty looks
amongst them like something that is more noble and liberal . I do not mean , Sir , to
commend the superior morality o
f
this sentiment , which has at least as much pride as
virtue in it ; but I cannot alter the nature of man . The fact is so ; and these people of
the Southern colonies are much more strongly , and with an higher and more stubborn
spirit , attached to liberty , than those to the northward . Such were all the ancient com
monwealths ; such were our Gothic ancestors ; such in our days were the Poles ; and
such will be all masters of slaves , who are not slaves themselves . In such a people the
haughtiness o
f
domination combines with the spirit o
f
freedom , fortifies it , and renders
it invincible .
“ Permit me , Sir , to add another circumstance in our colonies , which contributes no
mean part towards the growth and effect o
f
this untractable spirit . Imean their educa
1 Burke ' s Speech on Taxation of America in 1774 ; Burke ' s Speech on Conciliation
with America , 22 March , 1775 . See also his Letters to the Sheriffs of Bristol , in 1777 .
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instrument of empire , and not as a means of supply ; and there
fore that it should be resorted to only in extreme cases for the
tion. In no country perhaps in th
e
world is the la
w
so general a study . The profes
sion itself is numerous and powerful , and in most provinces it takes the lead . The
greater number o
f
the deputies sent to Congress were lawyers . But al
l
who read — and
most do read — endeavor to obtain some smattering in that science . I have been told b
y
a
n
eminent bookseller , that in no branch o
f
his business , after tracts of popular devo
tion , were so many books a
s
those o
n
the law exported to the plantations . The col
onists have now fallen into the way o
f printing them for their own use . I hear that
they have sold nearly a
s many o
f
Blackstone ' s Commentaries in America as in Eng
land . General Gage marks out this disposition very particularly in a letter on your
table . He states that all the people in his government are lawyers , or smatterers in
law ; and that in Boston they have been enabled , b
y
successful chicane , wholly to
evademany parts of one o
f your capital penal constitutions . The smartness of debate
will say that this knowledge ought to teach them more clearly th
e
rights o
f legislature ,
their obligations to obedience , and the penalties of rebellion . All this ismighty well .
Butmy honorable and learned friend (the Attorney -General ] on the floor ,who conde
scends to mark what I sa
y
for animadversion , will disdain that ground . He has heard ,
a
s well as I , that when great honors and great emoluments do not win over this knowl .
edge to the service o
f
the state , it is a formidable adversary to government . If the spirit
b
e
not tamed and broken b
y
these happy methods , it is stubborn and litigious . Abeunt
studia in mores . This study renders men acute , inquisitive , dexterous , prompt in attack ,
ready in defence , full o
f
resources . In other countries , the people , more simple and o
f
a less mercurial cast , judge o
f
a
n ill principle in government only b
y
a
n
actual griev
ance ; here they anticipate the evil , and judge o
f
the pressure o
f
the grievance b
y
the
badness o
f
the principle . They augur misgovernment at a distance , and snuff theap
proach o
f tyranny in every tainted breeze .
“ The last cause o
f
this disobedient spirit in the colonies is hardly less powerful than
the rest , as it is notmerely moral ,but laid deep in the natural constitution of things .
Three thousand miles o
f
ocean lie between you and them . No contrivance can prevent
the effect o
f
this distance in weakening government . Seas roll , and months pass ,
between the order and the execution ; and the want of a speedy explanation of a single
point is enough to defeat a whole system . You have , indeed , winged ministers of ven
geance ,who carry your bolts in their pounces to the remotest verge of the sea . But
there a power steps in , that limits the arrogance o
f raging passions and furious elements ,
and says , ' So far shalt thou go , and no farther . ' Who are you , that should fret and
rage , and bite th
e
chains o
f
nature ? Nothing worse happens to you than does to all
nations who have extensive empire ; and it happens in all the forms into which empire
can b
e
thrown . In large bodies the circulation o
f power must be less vigorous at the
extremities . Nature has said it . The Turk cannot govern Egypt and Arabia and
Cardistan a
s
h
e governs Thrace ; nor has he the same dominion in Crimea and Algiers
which h
e
has a
t
Brusa and Smyrna . Despotism itself is obliged to truck and huckster .
The Sultan gets such obedience a
s
h
e
can . He governs with a loose rein , that he may
govern a
t all ; and the whole o
f
the force and vigor o
f
his authority in his centre , is
derived from a prudent relaxation in all his borders . Spain , in her provinces , is , per
haps , not so well obeyed as you are in yours . She complies too ; she submits ; she
watches times . This is the immutable condition , the eternal law , of extensive and
detached empire .
“ Then , Sir , from thesesix capital sources , - ofdescent ; of form of government ; of
religion in the Northern provinces ; o
f
manners in the Southern ; of education ; of the
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former purposes . With a view to conciliation , another act was
passed at a late period , ( in 18 Geo . 3, ch . 12,) which declared
that Parliamentwould not impose any duty or tax on the colonies ,
except for the regulation of commerce ; and that the net produce
of such duty, or tax , should be applied to the use of the colony in
which it was levied . But it failed of its object . The spirit of
resistance had then become stubborn and uncontrollable . The
colonists were awake to a full sense o
f
a
ll
their rights , and habit
had made them firm , and common sufferings had made them
acute , as well as indignant in the vindication of their privileges .
And thus the struggle was maintained on each side with unabated
zeal , until the American Revolution . The Declaration of Inde
pendence embodied in a permanent form a denial o
f
such parlia
mentary authority , treating it as a gross and unconstitutional
usurpation .
§ 171 . The colonial legislatures , with the restrictions necessa
rily arising from their dependency on Great Britain , were sover
eign within the limits of their respective territories . But there
was this difference among them , that in Maryland , Connecticut ,
and Rhode Island the laws were not required to be sent to the
king for his approval ; whereas , in al
l
the other colonies the king
possessed the power o
f abrogating them , and they were not final
in their authority until they had passed under his review . 1 In
respect to the mode o
f enacting laws , there were some differences
in the organization o
f
the colonial governments . In Connecticut
and Rhode Island the governor had no negative upon th
e
laws ;
in Pennsylvania th
e
council had n
o negative , but was merely advi
sory to the executive ; in Massachusetts the council was chosen
b
y
the legislature , and not b
y
the crown , but the governor had a
negative on the choice .
$ 172 . ( 3 . ) In al
l
the colonies th
e
lands within their limits
were b
y
the very terms o
f
their original grants and charters to be
holden of the crown in free and common socage , and not in capite ,
remoteness o
f
situation from the first mover o
f government , - from all these causes a
fierce spirit o
f liberty has grown up . It has grown with the growth of the people in
your colonies , and increased with the increase o
f
their wealth ; a spirit , that unhappily
meeting with a
n
exercise o
f power in England ,which , however lawful , is not reconcil
able to any ideas o
f liberty ,much less with theirs , has kindled this flame , that is ready
to consume u
s . ” 2 Burke ' s Works , 38 - 45 .
11 Chambers ' s Anpals , 203 , 295 ; 1 Doug . Summ . 207 , 208 .
2 | Doug . Summ . 215 .
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or by knights ' service . They were al
l
holden either a
s o
f
the
manor o
f
East Greenwich in Kent , or of the manor o
f Hampton
Court in Middlesex , or of the castle of Windsor in Berkshire . 1
All the slavish and military part o
f
the ancient feudal tenures was
thus effectually prevented from taking root in the American soil ;
and the colonists escaped from the oppressive burdens , which fo
r
a long time affected the parent country , and were not abolished
until after the restoration o
f
Charles the Second . 2 Our tenures
thus acquired a universal simplicity ; and it is believed that none
but freehold tenures in socage ever were in use among us . No
traces are to b
e
found o
f
copyhold , or gavelkind , or burgage ten
ures . In short , for most purposes , our lands may be deemed to
b
e perfectly allodial , or held of no superior at al
l
, though many
o
f
the distinctions o
f
the feudal law have necessarily insinuated
themselves into the modes o
f acquiring , transferring , and trans
mitting real estates . One of the most remarkable circumstances
in our colonial history is the almost total absence of leasehold
estates . The erection o
f
manors , with all their attendant privi
leges , was , indeed , provided fo
r
in several of the charters . But it
was so little congenial with the feelings , the wants , or the inter
ests o
f
the people , that after their erection they gradually fell into
desuetude ; and the few remaining in our day are but shadows of
the past , th
e
relics o
f
faded grandeur in the last steps o
f
decay ,
enjoying n
o privileges , and conferring no power .
$ 173 . In fact , partly from the cheapness of land , and partly
from a
n innate love o
f independence , few agricultural estates in
the whole country have a
t
any time been held on lease for a stip
ulated rent . The tenants and occupiers are almost universally
the proprietors o
f
the soil in fe
e
-simple . The estates of a more
limited duration are principally those arising from the acts o
f
the
law , such as estates in dower and in curtesy . Strictly speaking ,
therefore , there has never been in this country a dependent peas
antry . The yeomanry are absolute owners of the soil on which
they tread , and their character has from this circumstance been
marked b
y
a more jealous watchfulness o
f
their rights , and b
y
a
more steady spirit of resistance against every encroachment , than
can be found among any other people , whose habits and pursuits
are less homogeneous and independent , less influenced by personal
choice , and more controlled b
y political circumstances .
11Grahame ' s Hist . 43 , 44 . 2 Stat . 12 Car . 2 , ch . 24 .
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$ 174 . (4.) Connected with this state of things , and , indeed ,
as a natural consequence flowing from it, is the simplicity of the
system of conveyances , by which the titles to estates are passed ,
and the notoriety of the transfers made . From a very early
period of their settlement the colonies adopted an almost uni
form mode of conveyance of land , at once simple and practicable
and safe . The differences are so slight that they became almost
evanescent . All lands were conveyed by a deed , commonly in
the form of a feoffment, or a bargain and sale , or a lease and re
lease , attested by one or more witnesses , acknowledged or proved
before some court or magistrate , and then registered in some pub
lic registry . When so executed , acknowledged , and recorded , it
had full effect to convey the estate without any livery of seisin , or
any other act or ceremony whatsoever . This mode of conveyance
prevailed , if not in all , in nearly al
l
the colonies from a very early
period , and it has now become absolutely universal . It is hardly
possible to measure the beneficial influences upon our titles arising
from this source , in point of security , facility of transfer , and
marketable value .
$ 175 . ( 5 . ) All the colonies considered themselves , not as par
cel of the realm o
f
Great Britain , but as dependencies of the British
crown , and owing allegiance thereto , the king being their supreme
and sovereign lord . In virtue of its general superintendency , the
crown constantly claimed and exercised the right of entertaining
appeals from the courts of the last resort in the colonies ; and
these appeals were heard and finally adjudged b
y
the king in
council . This right of appeal was secured by express reservation
in most of the colonial charters . It was expressly provided fo
r
b
y
a
n early provincial law in New Hampshire , when the matter in
difference exceeded the true value o
r
sum o
f
£ 300 sterling . So ,
a like colonial la
w
o
f
Rhode Island was enacted b
y
it
s
local legis
lature in 1719 . 3 It was treated by the crown as an inherent right
o
f
the subject , independent of any such reservation . And so in
divers cases it was held b
y
the courts o
f England . The reasons
given fo
r
the opinion that writs o
f
error lie to a
ll
the dominions
1 1 Vez .444 ; Vaughan , R . 300 , 400 ; Shower , Parl . Cases , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 ; Mass .
State Papers , 359 .
3 i Black . Comm . 231 , 232 ; Chitty on Prerog . 29 , 31 .
8 New Hampshire Prov . Laws , edit . 1771 , p . 7 , Act o
f
1
1 Will . 3 , ch . 4 ; Rhode Is
l
and Laws , edit . 1744 , p . 78 .
41 P .Will . 329 ; Chitty on Prerog . ch . 3 .
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belonging to England upon the ultimate judgments given there ,
are, ( 1.) That, otherwise , the law appointed or permitted to such
inferior dominion might be considerably changed without the as
sent of the superior dominion ; ( 2 .) Judgments might be given
to the disadvantage or lessening of the superiority , or to make the
superiority of the king only , and not of the crown of England ;
and , (3 .) That the practice has been accordingly .
$ 176 . Notwithstanding the clearness with which this appellate
jurisdiction was asserted , and upheld by the principles of the com
mon law , the exercise of it was not generally assumed until about
1680 ; and it was not then conceded as a matter of right in al
l
the colonies . On the contrary , Massachusetts resisted it under
her first charter (the right of appeal was expressly reserved in
that o
f
1691 ) ; and Rhode Island and Connecticut a
t
first denied
it , as inconsistent with , or rather as not provided fo
r , in theirs . 3
Rhode Island soon after surrendered her opposition . But Con
necticut continued it to a later period . In a practical sense , how
ever , the appellate jurisdiction of the king in council was in full
and undisturbed exercise throughout the colonies a
t
the time o
f
the
American Revolution ; and was deemed rather a protection than a
grievance .
$ 177 . ( 6 . ) Though the colonies had a common origin , and
owed a common allegiance , and the inhabitants of each were
1 Vanghan ' s Rep . 29
0 ,402 ; Show . Parl . Cases , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 ; 1 Vez .444 ; Stokes ' s
Colon . 26 , 222 , 231 ; 2 Ld . Raym . 1447 , 1448 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 139 , 304 , 671 , 678 ,
684 ; Christian v . Corver , 1 P . Will . R . 829 ; Att . Gen . v . Stewart , 2 Merivale , R . 143 ,
156 ; Rex v . Cowle , 2 Barr . 834 , 852 , 854 , 856 ; Fabrigas v .Mostyn , Cowp . 174 ; 1 Doug .
Summ . 216 ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 230 ; 2 Chalm . Opin . 177 , 222 .
? Chitty o
n Prerog . ch . 3 , p . 28 , 29 ; 1 Chalm . Opin . 222 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 121 , 123 ,
124 , 125 , 126 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 139 , 140 , 678 ; 5 Mass . Hist . Coll . 139 .
8 i Chalm . Annals , 277 , 280 , 297 , 304 , 411 , 446 , 462 ; 2 Doug . Summ . 174 ; Hutch .
Coll . 330 , 418 , 529 ; 2 Hutch . Hist . 539 .
• 2 Doug . Summ . 97 ; 3 Hutch . Coll . 412 , 413 .
62 Doug . Summ . 194 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 123 to 125 .
6 I have in my possession a printed case , Thomas Forsley v . Warddel Cunningham ,
brought before the governor and council o
f
New York from the supreme court o
f that
province , by appeal , in 1764 . The great question was ,whether an appeal or writ of error
lay ; and the judges of the supreme court , and the council held , that no appeal lay ,
fo
r
that would b
e
to re -examine facts settled b
y
the verdict o
f
a jury . The lieutenant
governor dissented . It was agreed on all sides , that an appeal in matter of law ( b
y
way o
f
writ o
f
error ) la
y
to th
e
king in council from a
ll judgments in the colonies ; but
not a
s
to matters o
f
fact in suits a
t
common la
w
. It was also held , that in al
l
the
colonies the subjects carry with them the laws o
f England , and therefore as well those
which took place after a
s
those which were in force beforeMagna Charta .
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British subjects, they had no direct political connection with each
other . Each was independent of al
l
th
e
others ; each , in a limited
sense , was sovereign within its own territory . There was neither
alliance nor confederacy between them . The assembly of one
province could not make laws for , another ; nor confer privileges ,
which were to be enjoyed or exercised in another , further than
they could be in any independent foreign state . As colonies ,
they were also excluded from all connections with foreign states .
They were known only as dependencies ; and they followed the
fate o
f the parent country both in peace and war , without having
assigned to them , in the intercourse or diplomacy of nations , any
distinct or independent existence . They did not possess the
power o
f forming any league o
r treaty among themselves which
should acquire an obligatory force without the assent of the parent
state . And though their mutual wants and necessities often in
duced them to associate fo
r
common purposes o
f
defence , these
confederacies were o
f
a casual and temporary nature , and were
allowed a
s
a
n indulgence rather than a right . They made several
efforts to procure the establishment of some general superintend
ing government over them a
ll ; but their own differences of opinion ,
a
s
well as the jealousy of the crown ,made these efforts abortive . ?
These efforts , however , prepared their minds fo
r
the gradual recon
ciliation o
f
their local interests , and for the gradual development
o
f
the principles upon which a union ought to rest , rather than
brought on an immediate sense of the necessity or th
e
blessings
o
f
such a general government .
§ 178 . But although the colonies were independent of each other
in respect to their domestic concerns , they were not wholly alien
to each other . On the contrary , they were fellow -subjects , and for
many purposes one people . Every colonist had a right to inhabit ,
if he pleased , in any other colony ; and as a British subject , he
was capable o
f inheriting lands by descent in every other colony .
The commercial intercourse o
f
the colonies , too , was regulated b
y
the general laws o
f
the British Empire , and could not be re
strained or obstructed b
y
colonial legislation . The remarks of
Mr . Chief Justice Jay on this subject ar
e
equally just and striking .
“ All the people of this country were then subjects of the king of
11 Chalm . Annals , 686 , 689 , 690 .
21 Pitk . Hist . 50 , 141 , 142 , 143 , 144 , 145 , 146 , 429 ; 2 Haz . Coll . ; 1 Marsh . Colon .
ch . 10 , p . 284 ; 3 Hutch . Hist . 21 , 22 , 23 .
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Great Britain , and owed allegiance to him ; and al
l
the civil
authority then existing , or exercised here , flowed from the head of
the British Empire . They were , in a strict sense , fellow -subjects ,
and in a variety o
f respects one people . When the Revolution com
menced , the patriots di
d
not assert that only the sameaffinity and
social connection subsisted between the people o
f
the colonies which
subsisted between the people o
f Gaul , Britain , and Spain , while
Roman provinces , to wit , only that affinity and social connection
which result from the mere circumstance o
f being governed b
y
the
same prince . Different ideas prevailed , and gave occasion to the
Congress o
f
1774 and 1775 . ” 1
Chisholm v . State of Georgia , 2 Dall . 470 . [ It is plain that the several American
States were never fully and in a
ll respects , as regards each other , independent States , as
that term is applied in the law o
f
nations . On the contrary , the learned author takes
pains to point out that our present government is the successor , with modified powers ,
o
f
that which formerly possessed authority over them a
ll . Prior to the Revolution ,
certain powers o
f government were exercised over all the colonies , either as pertaining
to the crown o
f Great Britain or the Parliament ; but the rightful extent of those pow
ers and how fa
r
possessed b
y
th
e
Parliament , and how fa
r
resting in the crown , were the
questions in dispute which le
d
to the Revolution . That the home government possessed
authority over the subjects o
f peace and war , and had the general direction o
f
commer
cial intercourse with other nations , was often formally conceded b
y
the colonies . And
the disputes between them and the home government related principally to other mat
ters which the colonists insisted were within the exclusive control o
f
the local legisla
tures .
The tendency among the colonists to establish a more intimate and voluntary union
among themselves might form the subject of one of the most interesting chapters in
American history . The New England Confederacy of 1643 , the temporary Congress
o
f
1690 , the plan of Union agreed upon in the Convention of 1754 , the Stamp Act
Congress o
f
1765 , and finally the Continental Congress o
f
1774 ,were all the offspring
o
f
a desire among the scattered colonies o
f
Great Britain in America to strengthen and
extend the common ties for their mutual safety and protection . To all this the jealousy
o
f
the home government constituted a serious impediment , but the difficulty in reaching
a
n arrangement a
s
to the proper measure o
f authority to b
e
conceded to any proposed
confederacy o
r congress , was an obstacle stillmore serious . The history o
f
the Convention
o
f
1754 is particularly instructive . See Mr . Everett upon its work , N . A . Rev . , Vol .
XXXVIII . p . 73 , et se
q
. At last the colonies , b
y
formal declaration , threw of
f
allegiance
to the crown ; but even then they did not cease to have a common national head , for it
was through th
e
revolutionary Congress that independence was declared , and that body
had already , b
y
common consent , taken upon itself those powers o
f
external control
which before had been conceded to the crown o
r
the Parliament , together with such
others a
s
the emergency seemed to call for . Those powers being undefined , the Con
gress a
s
a national authority could answer a temporary purpose only , but what was
done thereafter , in establishing the Articles o
f
Confederation , and then in substituting
for these the work o
f
the Convention o
f
1787 , was not for the purpose o
f creating for
the first time a common authority for States before wholly independent o
f
each other ,
butwas done b
y
way o
fmodifying ,defining , strengthening ,and rendering more efficient
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$ 179 . Having considered some of the particulars in which the
political organization and public rights and juridical policy of the
colonies were nearly similar , it remains to notice a few in which
there were important differences .
( 1.) As to the course of descents and distribution of intestate
estates . And here the policy of different colonies was in a great
measure determined by the nature of their original governments
and local positions . All the Southern colonies , including Virginia ,
adhered to the course of descents at the common law (as we have
had occasion to see ) down to the American Revolution . As a nat
ural consequence , real property was in these colonies generally held
in large masses by the families of ancient proprietors ; the younger
branches were in a great measure dependent upon the eldest ; and
the latter assumed and supported somewhat of the pre-eminence
which belonged to baronial possessions in the parent country .
Virginia was so tenacious of entails , that she would not even endure
the barring of them by the common means of fines and recoveries .
New York and New Jersey silently adhered to the English rule of
descents under the government of the crown , as royal provinces .
On the other hand , all New England, with the exception of Rhode
Island , from a very early period of their settlements , adopted the
rule of dividing the inheritance equally among all the children ,
and other next of kin , giving a double share to the eldest son .
Maryland, after 1715 , and Pennsylvania almost from its settlement ,
in like manner distributed the inheritance among all the children
and other next o
f
kin . New Hampshire , although a royal prov
ince , steadily clung to the system of Massachusetts , which she
had received when she formed an integral part of the latter . But
Rhode Island retained ( a
s
we have already seen ) it
s
attachment
to the common -law rule o
f
descents down almost to the era of the
American Revolution . 1
and enduring a
n existing authority , through which alone theywere known in the family
o
f
nations .
" The Union , " it is said in the inaugural address o
f
President Lincoln , “ is much
older than the Constitution . It was formed in fact by the Articles of Association of
1774 . It was matured and continued b
y
the Declaration o
f Independence o
f
1776 . It
was further matured , and the faith ofall th
e
then thirteen States expressly plighted and
engaged that it should be perpetual b
y
the Articles o
f
Confederation in 1778 , and
finally , in 1787 , one o
f
the declared objects in ordaining and establishing the Constitu
tion was ' to form a more perfect Union . ' "
For a brief account o
f
the Colonial Confederacies , the reader is referred to Mr .
Towle ' s Analysis of the Constitution , p . 298 , et seq . ]
1 T
o
1770 , Gardner v . Collins , 2 Peters ' s Sup . Ct . R . 58 .
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$ 180 . In all the colonies , where the rule of partible inheritance
prevailed , estates were soon parcelled out into moderate planta
tions and farms ; and the general equality of property introduced
habits of industry and economy, the effects of which are still
visible in their local customs, institutions , and public policy . The
philosophical mind can scarcely fail to trace the intimate connec
tion which naturally subsists between the general equality of the
apportionment of property among the mass of a nation and the
popular form of it
s government . The former can scarcely fail ,
first or last , to introduce the substance of a republic into the actual
administration o
f
the government , though its forms do not bear
such a
n external impress . Our Revolutionary statesmen were not
insensible to this silent but potent influence ; and the fact , that at
the present time the law of divisible inheritances pervades the
Union , is a strong proof of the general sense , not merely of its
equity , but of its political importance .
§ 181 . A very curious question was a
t
one time 1 agitated before
the king in council , upon an appeal from Connecticut , how fa
r
the
statutes o
f
descents and distributions , dividing the estate among
all the children , was conformable to the charter of that colony ,
which required the laws to be " not contrary to the laws of the
realm o
f England . " It was upon that occasion decided , that the
law o
f
descents , giving the female as well as the male heirs a
part o
f
the real estate , was repugnant to the charter , and therefore
void . This determination created great alarm , not only in Con
necticut , but elsewhere ; since itmight cut deep into the legislation
o
f
the other colonies , and disturb the foundation of many titles .
The decree o
f
th
e
council , annulling the law ,was upon the urgent
application o
f
some of the colonial agents revoked , and the law
reinstated with its obligatory force . At a still later period the
same question seems to have been presented in a somewhat differ
ent shape for the consideration o
f
the law -officers of the crown ;
and itmay now be gathered a
s
the rule of construction , that even
in a colony , to which the benefit of the laws of England is ex
pressly extended , the law of descents of England is not to be
deemed a
s necessarily in force there , if it is inapplicable to their
situation ; or a
t
least , that a change of it is not beyond the general
competency o
f
the colonial legislature . 3
1 In 1727 . ? i Pitk . Hist . 125 , 126 .
8 A
u
. Gen . v . Stewart , 2 Meriv . R . 143 , 157 , 158 , 159 .
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§ 182. (2 .) Connected with this ,wemay notice the strong ten
dency of the colonies to make lands liable to the payment of debts .
In some of them , indeed , the English rule prevailed of making
lands liable only to an extent upon an elegit . But in by far the
greatest number , lands were liable to be set of
f
upon appraisement ,
o
r
sold fo
r
the payment of debts . And lands were also assets , in
cases o
f
a deficiency o
f personal property , to be applied in the
course o
f
administration to discharge the debts o
f
th
e
party de
ceased . This was a natural result of the condition of the people
in a new country , who possessed little moneyed capital , whose
wants were numerous , and whose desire of credit was correspond
ently great . The true policy in such a state of things was to make
land , in some degree , a substitute fo
r
money , by giving it al
l
the
facilities o
f
transfer , and all the prompt applicability of personal
property . It will be found that the growth of the respective col
onies was in n
o
small degree affected b
y
this circumstance . Com
plaints were made , and perhaps justly , that undue priorities in
payment o
f
debts were given to the inhabitants o
f
the colony over
all other creditors ; and that occasional obstructions were thrown
in the way o
f collecting debts . But the evil was not general in
it
s operation ; and the policy , wherever it was pursued , retarded
the growth and stinted the means o
f
the settlements . For the
purpose , however , of giving greater security to creditors , as well
a
s
fo
r
a more easy recovery o
f
debts due in the plantations
and colonies in America , the statute of 5 Geo . 2 , ch . 7 [1732 ] ,
among other things declared , that all houses , lands , negroes , and
other hereditaments and real estates in the plantations should be
liable to , and chargeable with , the debts of the proprietor , and be
assets for the satisfaction thereof , in like manner as real estates
are b
y
the law o
f England liable to the satisfaction of debts due
b
y
bond o
r
other specialty ,and shall be subject to like remedies in
courts o
f
law and equity , for seizing , extending , selling , and dis
posing o
f
the same , toward satisfaction of such debts , in like man
ner a
s personal estates in any o
f
such plantations are seized , ex
tended , sold , or disposed of , fo
r
satisfaction o
f
debts . This act
does not seem to have been resisted on the part o
f any o
f
the col
onies to whom it peculiarly applied . 2
§ 183 . In respect to the political relations o
f
the colonies with
1 1 Chalm . Annals ,692 , 69
3
.
2 Telfair v . Stead , 2 Cranch , 407 .
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the parent country , it is not easy to state the exact limits of the
dependency which was admitted , and the extent of sovereignty
which might be lawfully exercised over them , either by the crown
or by Parliament. In regard to the crown , all of the colonies ad
mitted that they owed allegiance to the king , as their sovereign
liege lord , though the nature of the powers which he might exer
cise , as sovereign ,were still undefined ."
$ 184 . In the silence of express declarations we may resort to
the doctrines maintained by the crown-writers , as furnishing , if :
not an exact , at least a comprehensive view of the claims of the
royal prerogative over the colonial establishments . They consid
ered it not necessary to maintain that all the royal prerogatives
exercisable in England were of course exercisable in the colonies ,
but only such fundamental rights and principles as constituted
the basis of the throne and it
s authority , and without which the
king would cease to be sovereign in all his dominions . Hence the
attributes o
f sovereignty , perfection , perpetuity , and irresponsibil
it
y , which were inherent in the political capacity of the king , be
longed to him in a
ll
the territories subject to the crown , whatever
was the nature o
f
their laws and government in other respects .
Everywhere he was the head o
f
the Church and the fountain o
f jus
tice ; everywhere he was entitled to a share in the legislation (ex
cept where h
e
had expressly renounced it ) ; everywhere he was
generalissimo o
f all forces , and entitled to make peace or war .
Butminor prerogatives might be yielded ,where they were incon
sistent with the laws or usages of th
e
place , or were inapplicable
to the condition o
f
the people . In every question that respected
the royal prerogatives in the colonies , where they were not of a
strictly fundamental nature , the first thing to be considered was ,
whether the charter o
f
the particular colony contained any express
provision on the subject . If it did , that was the guide . If it was
silent , then the royal prerogatives were in the colony precisely the
same a
s
in the parent country ; for in such cases the common law
o
f England was the common law o
f
the colonies fo
r
such purposes .
Hence , if the colonial charter contained no peculiar grant to the
contrary , the king might erect courts of justice and exchequer
therein ; and the colonial judicatories , in point of law , were
deemed to emanate from the crown , under the modifications made
b
y
the colonial assemblies under their charters . The king also
1 Marshall ' s Colon . ch . 13 , p . 353 ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 236 , 237 , 238 , 24
1
, 24
2
, 243 .
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might extend the privilege of sending representatives to new towns
in the colonial assemblies . He might control , and enter a nolle
prosequi in criminal prosecutions , and pardon crimes , and release
forfeitures . He might present to vacant benefices ; and he was
entitled to royal moneys , treasure -trove , escheats , and forfeitures .
No colonial assemblies had a right to enact laws , except with the
assent of the crown by charter , or commission , or otherwise ; and
if they exceeded the authority prescribed by the crown , their acts
were void . The king might alter th
e
constitution and form o
f
the
government o
f
the colony ,where there was no charter or other
confirmatory act b
y
the colonial assembly , with the assent of the
crown ; and it rested merely on the instructions and commissions
given , from time to time , by the crown to its governors . The king
had power also to vest in the royal governors in the colonies , from
time to time , such of his prerogatives as he should please ; such
a
s
the power to prorogue ,adjourn ,and dissolve the colonial assem
blies ; to confirm acts and laws , to pardon offences , to act as cap
tain -general of the public forces , to appoint public officers , to act
a
s chancellor and supreme ordinary , to si
t
in the highest court o
f
appeals and errors , to exercise the duties of vice -admiral , and to
grant commissions to privateers . These last , and some other of
the prerogatives o
f
the king ,were commonly exercised by the royal
governors without objection .
$ 185 . The colonial assemblies were not considered as standing
o
n the same footing a
s Parliament in respect to rights , powers ,
and privileges ; but as deriving all their energies from the crown ,
and limited b
y
the respective charters , or other confirmatory acts
o
f
the crown , in al
l
their proceedings . The king might , in respect
to a colonial assembly , assent to an act of assembly before itmet ,
o
r ratify it , or dissent from it , after the session was closed . He
might accept a surrender of a colonial charter , subject to the rights
o
f third persons previously acquired , and give the colony a new
charter o
r
otherwise institute therein a new form o
f government .
And it has been even contended that the king might , in cases o
f
extraordinary necessity o
r emergency , take away a charter , where
the defence o
r protection of the inhabitants required it , leaving
them in possession o
f
their civil rights .
§ 186 . Such are some of the royal prerogatives which were
supposed to exist b
y
th
e
crown -writers in the colonial establish
ments ,when not restrained by any positive charter or bill of rights .
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Of these ,many were undisputed ; but others were resisted with
pertinacity and effect in the colonial assemblies .?
$ 187 . In regard to the authority of Parliament to enact laws
which should be binding upon them , there was quite as much
obscurity and still more jealousy spreading over the whole subject.2
The government of Great Britain always maintained the doctrine
that the Parliament had authority to bind the colonies in all cases
whatsoever .3 No acts of Parliament , however , were understood
to bind the colonies , unless expressly named therein . But in
America , at different times and in different colonies, different
opinions were entertained on the subject. In fact , it seemed to
be the policy of the colonies as much as possible to withdraw
themselves from any acknowledgment of such authority , except
so fa
r
a
s their necessities , from time to time , compelled them to
acquiesce in the parliamentary measures expressly extending to
them . We have already seen that they resisted the imposition of
taxes upon them without the consent o
f
their local legislatures ,
from a very early period . 6
§ 188 . But it was by no means an uncommon opinion in some
o
f
the colonies , especially in the proprietary and charter govern
ments , that no act of Parliament whatsoever could bind them
without their own consent . An extreme reluctance was shown
b
y
Massachusetts to any parliamentary interference a
s early a
s
1640 ; 8 and the famous Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 were
perpetually evaded , even when their authority was no longer de
nied , throughout the whole of New England . 9 Massachusetts , in
1 The reader will find th
e
subject o
f
th
e
royal prerogative in th
e
colonies discussed a
t
large in Chitty o
n
the Prerogatives o
f
the Crown , ch . 3 , p . 25 to 40 ; in Stokes on the
Constitution o
f
the Colonies , passim ; in Chalmers ' s Annals of the Colonies ; and in
Chalmers ' s Opinions , 2 vols . passim . See also Com . Dig . Prerogative .
? 1 Pitk . Hist . 164 to 169 , 186 , 198 , 199 , 200 to 205 ; App . 448 , No . 9 ; Id . 452 ,
453 ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 238 , 239 , 240 , 241 , 242 , 243 ; 2 Wilson ' s Works , 54 , 55 , 58
Mass . State Papers , 338 , 339 , 344 , 352 to 364 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 255 .
3 3 Wilson ' sWorks , 205 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 140 , 687 , 690 ; Stokes ' s Colon . 146 .
4 1 Black . Comm . 107 , 108 ; Chitty on Prerog . 33 .
5 i Pitk . Hist . 198 , 199 , 200 to 205 , 206 , 209 ; Marshall ' s Colon . ch . 13 , p . 352 ; 1
Chitty o
n Prerog . 29 ; 1 Chalmers ' s Opinions , 196 to 225 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . ch . 6 , p . 162
to 212 .
6 Marshall ' s Colon . ch . 13 , p . 353 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 89 , 90 , & c . , 98 ; Id . 164 , 174 , 179 ,
182 to 212 ; Mass . State Papers , 359 to 364 .
71 Pitk . Hist . 91 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 443 .
$ 2 Winthrop ' s Jour . 25 .
91 Chalm . Annals , 277 , 280 , 407 , 440 , 443 , 448 , 452 , 460 , 462 , 639 , 698 ; Hutch .
Coll . 496 ; Mass . State Papers (1818 ) , Introduction ; Id . 50 ; 2 Wilson ' s Works , 62 .
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1679 , in an address to the crown , declared that she “ apprehended
them to be an invasion of the rights , liberties , and properties of
the subjects of his Majesty in the colony , they not being repre
sented in Parliament ; and , according to the usual sayings of the
learned in the law , the laws of England were bounded within the
four seas , and did not reach America .” i However , Massachusetts ,
as well as the other New England colonies, finally acquiesced in
the authority of Parliament to regulate trade and commerce , but
denied it in regard to taxation and internal regulation of the
colonies . As late as 1757 the General Court of Massachusetts
admitted the constitutional authority of Parliament in the follow
ing words : “ The authority of all acts of Parliament , which con
cern the colonies and extend to them , is ever acknowledged in a
ll
the courts o
f
law , and made the rule of all judicial proceedings
in the province . There is not a member of the General Court ,
and we know no inhabitant within the bounds of the government ,
that ever questioned this authority . " 3 And in another address in
1761 , they declared that “ every act we make , repugnant to an act
o
f
Parliament extending to the plantations , is ipso facto null and
void . And a
t
a later period , in 1768 , in a circular address to the
other colonies , they admitted “ that his Majesty ' s high court of
Parliament is the supreme legislative power over the whole em
pire ” ; contending , however , that as British subjects they could
not be taxed without their own consent .
$ 189 . “ In the Middle and Southern provinces , " (we are in
formed b
y
amost respectable historian , ) “ no question respecting
the supremacy o
f Parliament in matters of general legislation ex
isted . The authority of such acts of internal regulation as were
made for America , as well as those for the regulation of com
11 Chalm . Ann . 407 ; 1 Hutch . Hist . 322 ; 2 Wilson ' s Works , 62 , 63 .
2 1 Pitk . Hist . 92 , 98 , 181 to 212 , 285 , 473 , 475 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 452 , 460 ; 1
Hutch . Hist . 322 ; 3 Hutch . Hist . 23 , 24 ; Dummer ' s Defence , 1 American Tracts , 51 ;
Burke ' s Speech on Taxation in 1774 , and on Conciliation in 1775 .
8 3 Hutch . Hist . 66 ; Mass . State Papers , 337 .
4 3 Hutch . Hist . 92 ; App . 463 ; Marshall ' s Colon . No . 5 , p . 472 .
6 Marshall ' s Colon . ch . 13 , p . 371 ; App . No . 5 , p . 472 , 473 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 186 ; App .
448 , 450 , 453 , 458 . This was the ground asserted in Mr . J . Otis ' s celebrated pamphlet
o
n
the Rights o
f
the Colonies . 1 American Tracts (1766 ) , 48 , 52 , 54 , 56 , 59 , 66 , 73 ,
9
9 ; and also in Dulany ' s Considerations on Taxing th
e
Colonies , 1 Amer . Tracts , 14 ,
1
8 , 36 , 52 . See also 1 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 6 , 7 , 12 .
6 Marshall ' s Colon . ch . 13 , p . 354 . See also 1 Pitk . Hist . 162 to 212 , 255 , 275 , 276 ;
I Jefferson ' s Corresp . 6 , 7 , 104 ; Id . 117 .
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merce , even by the imposition of duties , provided these duties
were imposed fo
r
the purpose o
f regulation , had been at all times
admitted . But these colonies , however they might acknowledge
the supremacy o
f
Parliament in other respects , denied the right
o
f
that body to tax them internally . ” If there were any excep
tions to the general accuracy o
f
this statement , they seem to have
been too few and fugitive to impair the general result . In the
charter of Pennsylvania , an express reservation was made o
f
the
power o
f
taxation b
y
a
n act o
f
Parliament , though this was argued
not to be a sufficient foundation for the exercise o
f
it . 2
$ 190 . Perhaps the best general summary o
f
the rights and
liberties asserted b
y
all the colonies is contained in the celebrated
declaration drawn u
p
b
y
the Congress of the Nine Colonies
assembled a
t
New York , in October , 1765 . 3 That declaration as
serted that th
e
colonists owe the same allegiance to the crown
o
f Great Britain that is owing from his subjects born within the
realm , and all due subordination to that august body , the Parlia
ment o
f
Great Britain . ” That the colonists “ ar
e
entitled to a
ll
the inherent rights and liberties of his [ the king ' s ) natural -born
subjects within the kingdom o
f
Great Britain . ” “ That it is in
separably essential to the freedom o
f
a people , and the undoubted
right of Englishmen that no taxes be imposed on them , but with
their own consent , given personally , or b
y
their representatives . ”
That the people o
f
the “ colonies are not , and from their local cir
cumstances cannot be , represented in the House of Commons of
Great Britain . That the only representatives of these colonies
are persons chosen therein b
y
themselves ; and that no taxes ever
have been , or ca
n
b
e , constitutionally imposed upon them , but by
their respective legislatures . That al
l
supplies o
f
the crown being
free gifts from the people , it is unreasonable and inconsistent with
the principles and spirit of the British Constitution for the people
o
f
Great Britain to grant to his Majesty the property o
f
the colo
nies . And that the trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable
right o
f
every British subject in these colonies . ” 4
$ 191 . We here observe that the superintending authority of
i i Pitk . Hist . 92 , 96 , 98 , 162 to 212 ; App . No . 4 , 448 , 450 , 453 .
? i Chalmers ' s Annals , 638 , 658 ; 2 American Tracts , Rights of Parlia . Vind . 25 , 26 ;
3 Amer . Tracts , App . 51 ; Id . Franklin ' s Exam . 46 .
3 The nine States were Massachusetts , Rhode Island , Connecticut , New York , New
Jersey , Pennsylvania , Delaware , Maryland , and South Carolina .
4 Marsh . Hist . Colonies , ch . 13 , p
p
. 360 , 470 , 471 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 178 , 179 , 180 , 446 .
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Parliament is admitted in general terms ; and that absolute inde
pendence of it is not even suggested , although in subsequent
clauses certain grievances, by the Stamp Act, and by certain acts
levying duties and restraining trade in the colonies, are disap
proved of in very strong language . In the report of th
e
commit
te
e
o
f
the same body , on the subject of colonial rights , drawn u
p
with great ability , itwas stated : “ It is acknowledged that th
e
Par
liament , collectively considered , as consisting of king , lords , and
commons , are the supreme legislature of the whole empire ; and ,
a
s
such , have an undoubted jurisdiction over the whole colonies , 80
far a
s
is consistent with our essential rights , of which also they are
and must b
e
the final judges ; and even the applications and peti
tions to the king and Parliament , to implore relief in our present
difficulties , will be an ample recognition of our subjection to , and
dependence upon , the legislature . ” 2 And they contended that
there is a vast difference between the exercise o
f parliamentary
jurisdiction in general acts for the amendment o
f
the common law ,
o
r
even in general regulations o
f
trade and commerce through the
empire , and the actual exercise of that jurisdiction in levying ex
ternal and internal duties and taxes on the colonists , while they
neither are , nor can be , represented in Parliament . " 3 And in
the petition o
f
the same body to the House o
f
Commons , there is
the following declaration : “ We most sincerely recognize our
allegiance to the crown , and acknowledge al
l
due subordination to
the Parliament o
f
Great Britain , and shall always retain themost
grateful sense of their assistance and protection . ” 4 But it is
added , there is “ a material distinction in reason and sound policy
between the necessary exercise o
f parliamentary jurisdiction in
general acts fo
r
the amendment o
f
the common law , and the regulation
o
f
trade and commerce through the whole empire , and the exercise of
that jurisdiction b
y imposing taxes on the colonies " ; 5 thus admit
ting the former to b
e rightful , while denying the latter .
§ 192 . But after the passage o
f
the Stamp Act , in 1765 ,many
o
f
the colonies began to examine this subject with more care , and
to entertain very different opinions as to parliamentary authority .
1 Marsh . Hist . Colon . p . 471 , note 4 .
2 Pitk . Hist . 448 , 450 . 8 i Pitk . Hist . 453 , 454 .
4 4 Amer .Museum , 89 . 6 4 Amer . Museum , 89 , 90 .
6 The celebrated declaration o
f
th
e
rights o
f
the colonies , by Congress , in 1774
(hereafter cited ) , contains a summary not essentially different . 1 Journ . of Congress ,
2
7
to 31 .
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The doctrines maintained in debate in Parliament , as well as the
alarming extent to which a practical application of those doctrines
might lead , in drying up the resources and prostrating the strength
and prosperity of the colonies , drove them to a more close and
narrow survey of the foundation of parliamentary supremacy .
Doubts were soon infused into their minds, and from doubts they
passed by an easy transition to a denial, first , of the power of tax
ation , and next, of al
l
authority whatever to bind them b
y
its
laws . One of the most distinguished of our writers 2 during the
contest admits that he entered upon the inquiry " with a view and
expectation o
f
being able to trace some constitutional line between
those cases in which w
e
ought , and those in which w
e oughtnot ,
to acknowledge the power o
f Parliament over us . In the prosecu
tion o
f his inquiries , he became fully convinced that such a line
does not exist ; and that there can be no medium between ac
knowledging and denying that power in al
l
cases . "
$ 193 . If other colonies did not immediately arrive at the same
conclusion , itwas easy to foresee that the struggle would ultimately
b
e
maintained upon the general ground ; and that a common inter
est and a common desire o
f security , if not of independence ,
would gradually bring a
ll
the colonies to feel the absolute necessity
o
f adhering to it , as their truest and safest defence . In 1773 ,
Massachusetts found n
o difficulty in contending in the broadest
terms fo
r
a
n unlimited independence of Parliament ; and in a bold
and decided tone denied all its power of legislation over them . A
distinction was taken between subjection to Parliament , and alle
giance to the crown . The latter was admitted ; but the former
was resolutely opposed . It is remarkable that the Declaration
o
f Independence ,which sets forth our grievances in such warm
and glowing colors , does not once mention Parliament , or allude
to our connection with it ; but treats the acts of oppression therein
referred to a
s
acts o
f
the king , in combination “ with others ” fo
r
the overthrow o
f
our liberties . 5
11 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 6 , 7 , 12 , 104 to 116 .
2 3 Wilson ' s Works , 203 ; Mass . State Papers , 339 , 340 .
3 1 Wilson ' s Works , 221 , 222 , 226 , 227 , 229 , 237 , 238 ; 2 Wilson ' s Works , 5
4 , 55 , 58
to 6
3 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 242 , 243 , 246 , 248 , 249 , 250 ; Mass . State Papers , 331 , 333 , 337 ,
339 , 342 to 351 , 352 to 364 ; 4 Debrett ' s Parl . Debates , 251 , & c . , note ; Marsh . Hist .
ch . 14 , p . 412 , 483 ; 1 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 6 , 7 , 12 , 100 , 104 to 116 .
4 Mass . State Papers , edit . 1818 , p . 342 to 365 , 384 to 396 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 250 , 251 ,
453 , 454 .
51 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 6 , 7 , 12 , 100 to 116 .
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$ 194. The colonies generally did not, however, at this period
concur in these doctrines of Massachusetts , and some difficulties
arose among them in the discussions on this subject. Even in the
Declaration of Rights 1 drawn up by the continental congress in
1774 , and presented to the world as their deliberate opinion of
colonial privileges ,while it was asserted , that they were entitled to
a free and exclusive power of legislation in their provincial legis
latures , in al
l
cases o
f
taxation and internal policy , they admitted ,
from the necessity o
f
the case , and a regard to the mutual inter
ests o
f
both countries , that Parliament might pass laws bona fide
fo
r
the regulation o
f
external commerce , though not to raise a
revenue , fo
r
the purpose o
f securing the commercial advantages o
f
the whole empire to themother country ,and the commercial bene
fits o
f
it
s respective members . An utter denial of al
l
parliamen
11 Pitk . Hist . 235 , 286 , 34
0
, 344 ; Journ . of Congress , 1774 , p . 28 , 29 ; Marsh .
Colon . ch . 14 , p . 412 , 483 . [Botta ' s American War , b . 4 . )
2 As this document is very important , and not easily found , the material clauses will
b
e
here extracted . After reciting many acts of grievance , the Declaration proceeds as
follows :
“ The good people o
f
the several colonies o
f
New Hampshire ,Massachusetts Bay ,
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations , Connecticut , New York , New Jersey , Penn
sylvania , Newcastle , Kent and Sussex on Delaware , Maryland , Virginia , North Caro
lina , and South Carolina , justly alarmed a
t
these arbitrary proceedings o
f
Parliament
and administration , have severally elected , constituted , and appointed deputies to meet
and si
t
in general congress , in the city o
f Philadelphia , in order to obtain such estab
lishment , as that their religion , laws , and liberties may not be subverted : Whereapon
the deputies so appointed being now assembled , in a full and free representation of these
colonies , taking into their most serious consideration th
e
best means o
f attaining the
ends aforesaid , d
o
in the first place , a
s Englishmen , their ancestors , in like cases have
usually done , for asserting and vindicating their rights and liberties , DECLARE ,
“ That the inhabitants of the English colonies in North America , b
y
the immutable
laws o
f
nature , the principles of the English constitution , and the several charters or
compacts have the following RIGHTS .
“ Resolved , N . C . D . 1 . That they are entitled to life , liberty , and property ; and
they have never ceded to any sovereign power whatever a right to dispose o
f
either
without their consent .
“ Resolved , N . C . D . 2 . That our ancestors who first settled these colonies were , at
the time o
f
their emigration from th
e
mother country , entitled to al
l
the rights , liberties ,
and immunities o
f
free and natural -born subjects within the realm o
f England .
" Resolved , N . C . D . 3 . That b
y
such emigration they b
y
n
o
means forfeited , sur
rendered , or lost any of those rights , but that they were , and their descendants now
are , entitled to the exercise and enjoyment of al
l
such o
f
them a
s
their local and other
circumstances enable them to exercise and enjoy .
“ Resolved , 4 . That the foundation of English liberty and of al
l
free government is
a right in the people to participate in their legislative council ; and as the English
colonists are not represented , and from their local and other circumstances cannot
properly b
e represented in the British Parliament , they are entitled to a free and ex
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tary authority was not generally maintained until after indepen
dence was in th
e
full contemplation o
f
most o
f
the colonies .
§ 195 . The principal grounds on which Parliament asserted the
right to make laws to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever
were , that the colonies were originally established under charters
from the crown ; that the territories were dependencies of the
realm , and the crown could not b
y
it
s grants exempt them from the
supreme legislative power o
f
Parliament ,which extended wherever
the sovereignty o
f
the crown extended ; that the colonists in their
clusive power o
f legislation in their several provincial legislatures , where their right of
representation can alone b
e preserved , in all cases o
f
taxation and internal polity , sub
ject only to the negative o
f
their sovereign , in such manner as has been heretofore used
and accustomed . But from the necessity of th
e
case , and a regard to themutual in
terests o
f
both countries , we cheerfully consent to the operation o
f
such acts o
f
the
British Parliament a
s
are bona fide restrained to the regulation o
f
our external com
merce , for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empire to
the mother country , and the commercial benefits o
f
it
s respective members ; excluding
every idea o
f
taxation , internal or external , fo
r
raising a revenue o
n
the subjects in
America without their consent .
“ Resolved , N . C . D . 5 . That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law
o
f England , and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried
b
y
their peers o
f
the vicinage , according to th
e
course o
f
that law .
“ Resolved , 6 . That they are entitled to the benefit of such of the English statutes
a
s
existed a
t
the time o
f
their colonization ; and which they have , b
y
experience , re
spectively found to b
e applicable to their several local and other circumstances .
" Resolved , N . C . D . 7 . That these , his Majesty ' s colonies , ar
e
likewise entitled to
a
ll
the immunities and privileges granted and confirmed to them b
y royal charters , or
secured b
y
their several codes o
f provincial laws .
" Resolved , N . C . D . 8 . That they have a right peaceably to assemble , consider of
their grievances , and petition th
e
king ; and that al
l
prosecutions , prohibitory proclama
tions , and commitments o
f
the same , are illegal .
“ Resolved , N . C . D . 9 . That the keeping a standing army in these colonies , in
times o
f
peace , without the consent of the legislature o
f
that colony in which such
army is kept , is against law .
“ Resolved , N . C . D . 10 . It is indispensably necessary to good government , and
rendered essential b
y
the English Constitution , that the constituent branches of th
e
legislature b
e independent o
f
each other ; that , therefore , the exercise o
f legislative
power in several colonies , b
y
a council appointed , during pleasure , b
y
th
e
crown , is
unconstitutional , dangerous , and destructive to the freedom of American legislation .
“ All and each of which the aforesaid deputies , in behalf of themselves and their
constituents , d
o
claim , demand , and insist o
n , a
s
their indubitable rights and liberties ,
which cannot b
e legally taken from them , altered , o
r abridged b
y
any power whatever ,
without their own consent , b
y
their representatives in their several provincial legisla
tures . ”
The plan o
f
conciliation proposed b
y
th
e
provincial convention o
f
New York in 1775
explicitly admits , “ that from the necessity of the caseGreat Britain should regulate the
trade o
f
the whole empire fo
r
the general benefit o
f
the whole , butnot fo
r
the separate
benefit o
f any particular part . ” i Pitk . Hist . ch . 9 , p . 344 .
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new settlements owed the same subjection and allegiance to the
supreme power, as if they resided in England , and that the crown
had no authority to enter into any compact to impair it ; that the
legislative power over the colonies is supreme and sovereign ; that
the supreme power must be entire and complete in taxation as
well as in legislation ; that there is no difference between a grant
of duties on merchandise , and a grant of taxes and subsidies ;
that there is no difference between external and internal taxes ,and ,
though different in name , they are in effect the same; that taxa
tion is a part of the sovereign power , and that it may be rightfully
exercised over those who are not represented .
$ 196. The grounds on which the colonies resisted the right of
taxation by Parliament were , (as we have seen ,) that they were
not represented in Parliament ; that they were entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of British subjects ; that the latter could
not be taxed but by their own representatives ; that representation
and taxation were inseparably connected ; that the principles of
taxation were essentially distinct from those of legislation ; that
there is a wide difference between the power of internal and exter
nal taxation ; that the colonies had always enjoyed the sole right
of imposing taxes upon themselves ; and that it was essential to
their freedom .
$ 197 . The Stamp Act was repealed ; but within a few years
afterwards duties o
f
another sort were laid , the object of which
was to raise a revenue from importations into the colonies . These
o
f
course became as offensive to the colonies a
s
the prior attempt
a
t
internal taxation , and were resisted upon the same grounds of
unconstitutionality . It soon became obvious that the great strug
gle in respect to colonial and parliamentary rights could scarcely
be decided otherwise than b
y
a
n appeal to arms . Great Britain
was resolutely bent upon enforcing her claims b
y
a
n open exercise
o
f military power ; and , on the other hand , America scarcely saw
any other choice left to her but unconditional submission o
r
bold
and unmeasured resistance .
i i Pitk . Hist . 199 , 201 , 202 , 204 , 205 , 206 , 208 , 209 , 457 ; Mass . State Papers , 338 ,
339 ; 1 Chalm . Annals , 15 , 28 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 54 to 63 ; Chitty on Prerog . ch .
3 ; 1 Chalm . Opin . 196 to 225 .
2 i Pitk . Hist . 199 , 200 , 201 , 208 , 209 , 211 , 219 , 285 to 288 , 311 , 443 , 446 , 447 , 448 ,
453 , 458 , 459 , 467 ; Mass . State Papers , 344 , 345 , 346 to 351 ; 4 Debrett ' s Parl . De
bates , 251 , note , & c . ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 54 to 63 .
8 i Pitk . Hist . 217 , 219 , & c . [Botta ' s American War , b . 3 . ]
BOOK II .
HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION AND OF THE
CONFEDERATION .
CHAPTER I .
THE REVOLUTION .
§ 198 . We have now completed our survey of the origin and
political history of the American colonies up to the period of the
Revolution . We have examined the more important coincidences
and differences in their forms of government , in their laws, and in
their political institutions . We have presented a general outline
of their actual relations with the parent country ; of the rights
which they claimed ; of the dependence which they admitted ;
and of the controversies which existed at this period , in respect
to sovereign powers and prerogatives on one side , and colonial
rights and liberties on the other.
$ 199 . We are next to proceed to a historical review of the
origin of that union of the colonies which le
d
to the declaration
o
f independence ; o
f
the effects o
f
that event , and of the subse
quent war upon the political character and rights of the colonies ;
o
f
the formation and adoption o
f
the Articles o
f
Confederation ; of
the sovereign powers antecedently exercised b
y
the continental
congress ; of the powers delegated b
y
the confederation to the
general government ; of the causes of the decline and fall of the
confederation ; and finally , o
f
the establishment o
f
the present
Constitution o
f
the United States . Having disposed of these in
teresting and important topics ,we shall then be prepared to enter
upon the examination o
f
the details o
f
that Constitution , which
has justly been deemed one of the most profound efforts of human
wisdom , and which ( it is believed ) will awaken our admiration ,
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and warm our affections more and more , as its excellences are
unfolded in a minute and careful survey .
$ 200 . No redress of grievances having followed upon the many
appeals made to the king and to Parliament , b
y
and in behalf o
f
the colonies , either conjointly or separately , it became obvious to
them that a closer union and co -operation were necessary to vin
dicate their rights and protect their liberties . If a resort to arms
should be indispensable , it was impossible to hope for success but
in united efforts . If peaceable redress was to be sought , it was as
clear that the voice of th
e
coloniesmust be heard ,and their power
felt in a national organization . In 1774 , Massachusetts recom
mended the assembling o
f
a continental congress to deliberate
upon the state o
f public affairs ; and according to her recommen
dation , delegates were appointed b
y
the colonies fo
r
a congress to
b
e
held in Philadelphia in the autumn o
f
the same year . In some
o
f
the legislatures of the colonies , which were then in session ,
delegates were appointed b
y
the popular o
r representative branch ;
and in other cases they were appointed b
y
conventions o
f
the peo
ple in the colonies . The congress of delegates ( calling themselves
in their more formal acts “ the delegates appointed b
y
the good
people o
f
these colonies " ) assembled on the 4th o
f September ,
1774 ; 2 and having chosen officers , they adopted certain funda
mental rules for their proceedings .
$ 201 . Thus was organized under the auspices and with the
consent of the people , acting directly in their primary , sovereign
capacity , and without the intervention of th
e
functionaries , to
whom the ordinary powers o
f government were delegated in the
colonies , the first general or national government , which has been
very aptly called “ the revolutionary government , ” since in its
origin and progress it was wholly conducted upon revolutionary
principles . The congress thus assembled , exercised de facto and
d
e jure a sovereign authority ; not as the delegated agents of the
governments de facto of the colonies , but in virtue of original
powers derived from the people . The revolutionary government ,
thus formed , terminated only when it was regularly superseded b
y
the confederated government under the articles finally ratified , as
we shall hereafter see , in 1781 . 4
1 1 Journ . of Cong . 2 , 3 , & c . 27 , 45 ; 9 Dane ' s Abridg . App . $ 5 , p . 16 , $ 10 , p . 21 .
? All the States were represented , except Georgia .
8 9 Dane ' s Abridg . App . p . 1 , § 5 , p . 16 , § 13 , p . 23 .
4 Sergeant o
n
Const . Introd . 7 , 8 ( 2d ed . ) .
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$ 202. The first and most important of their acts was a dec
laration that in determining questions in this congress , each
colony or province should have one vote ; and this became the
established course during the Revolution . They proposed a gen
eral congress to be held at the same place in May in the next
year . They appointed committees to take into consideration their
rights and grievances. They passed resolutions that " after the
1st of December , 1774 , there shall be no importation into British
America from Great Britain or Ireland of any goods ,& c., or from
any other place , of any such goods as shall have been exported
from Great Britain or Ireland ” ; that " after the 10th of Septem
ber , 1775 , the exportation of all merchandise , & c ., to Great
Britain , Ireland , and the West Indies ought to cease , unless the
grievances of America are redressed before that time.” 2 They
adopted a declaration of rights , not differing in substance from
that of the congress of 1765 ,3 and affirming that the respective
colonies are entitled to the common law of England , and the ben
efit of such English statutes as existed at the time of their coloni
zation , and which they have by experience respectively found to
be applicable to their local and other circumstances . They also ,
in behalf of themselves and their constituents , adopted and signed
certain articles of association , containing an agreement of non
importation , non -exportation , and non -consumption , in order to
carry into effect the preceding resolves ; and also an agreement to
discontinue the slave -trade . They also adopted addresses to the
people of England , to the neighboring British colonies , and to the
king , explaining their grievances , and requesting aid and redress .
§ 203 . In May , 1775 , a second congress of delegates met from
a
ll
the States . These delegates were chosen , as the preceding
had been , partly by the popular branch of the State legislatures ,
when in session , but principally by conventions of the people in
the various States . In a few instances the choice b
y
the legisla
1 [Equality o
f representation and authority was also insisted upon b
y
the weaker
colonies in the confederacy o
f
1643 , and was the principal source of the controversies
which arose to weaken it
s efficiency . Palfrey , Hist . of New England , II . 243 ; Ban
croft , Hist . of U . S . , I . 420 ; Towle , Analysis o
f
the Constitution , 302 , et s
e
q
. ]
? 1 Jour . of Cong . 21 .
8 See ante , p . 133 .
* Georgia did not send delegates until the 15th o
f July , 1775 , who di
d
not take their
seats until the 13th of September .
6 S
e
e
Penhallow v . Doane , 3 Dall . 54 ,and particularly the opinions of Iredell , J . ,and
Blair , J . , on this point . Journals of 1775 , p . 73 to 79 .
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tive body was confirmed by that of a convention , and e converso. 1
They immediately adopted a resolution prohibiting a
ll exporta
tions to Quebec , Nova Scotia , St . Johns , Newfoundland , Georgia ,
except St . Johns Parish , and East and West Florida . This was
followed u
p
b
y
a resolution that the colonies b
e immediately put
into a state o
f
defence . They prohibited the receipt and nego
tiation o
f any British government bills , and the supply o
f any
provisions o
r
necessaries for the British army and navy in Massa
chusetts , or transports in their service . They recommended to
Massachusetts to consider the offices of governor and lieutenant
governor o
f
that province vacant , and to make choice of a council
by the representatives in assembly , b
y
whom the powers of gor
ernment should be exercised , until a governor of the king ' s ap
pointment should consent to govern the colony according to it
s
charter . They authorized the raising o
f
continental troops , and
appointed General Washington commander - in - chief , to whom they
gave a commission in the name o
f
the delegates o
f
the united
colonies . They had previously authorized certain military meas
ures , and especially the arming of the militia of New York , and
the occupation o
f
Crown Point and Ticonderoga . They author
ized the emission o
f
two millions of dollars in bills o
f
credit ,
pledging the colonies to th
e
redemption thereof . They framed
rules fo
r
the government of the army . They published a solemn
declaration o
f
the causes o
f
their taking u
p
arms , an address to
the king , entreating a change of measures , and an address to the
people o
f
Great Britain , requesting their aid , and admonishing
them o
f the threatening evils o
f
a separation . They erected a
general post -office , and organized the department for a
ll
the colo
nies . They apportioned the quota that each colony should pay of
the bills emitted b
y
Congress .
$ 204 . A
t
a subsequent adjournment , they authorized the equip
ment of armed vessels to intercept supplies to the British , and the
organization o
f
a marine corps . They prohibited all exportations ,
except from colony to colony under the inspection o
f
committees .
They recommended to New Hampshire , Virginia , and South Caro
lina to call conventions o
f
the people to establish a form of gov
1 Journals o
f Congress o
f
1775 , p . 73 to 79 .
2 Journals o
f
Congress o
f
1775 , p . 103 .
8 Journals o
f Congress o
f
1775 , p . 115 .
4 Journals o
f Congress o
f
1775 , p . 177 .
CH. 1.] 143HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION .
ernment. They authorized the grant of commissions to capture
armed vessels and transports in the British service , and recom
mended the creation of prize courts in each colony, reserving a
right of appeal to Congress . They adopted rules for the regula
tion of the navy and fo
r
the division o
f prizes and prize money . 3
They denounced a
s
enemies a
ll
who should obstruct or discourage
the circulation o
f bills of credit . They authorized further emis
sions o
f
bills o
f
credit , and created two military departments fo
r
the Middle and Southern colonies . They authorized general re
prisals and the equipment o
f private armed vessels against British
vessels and property . They organized a general treasury depart
ment . They authorized the exportation and importation of all
goods to and from foreign countries , not subject to Great Britain ,
with certain exceptions , and prohibited the importation of slaves ,
and declared a forfeiture o
f
all prohibited goods . They recom
mended to the respective assemblies and conventions o
f
the colo
nies , where no government sufficient to the exigencies had been
established , to adopt such government as in the opinion of the rep
resentatives should best conduce to the happiness and safety o
f
their
constituents in particular , and America in general , and adopted a
preamble which stated “ that the exercise o
f every kind o
f authority
under the crown o
f
Great Britain should b
e totally suppressed . ” 6
$ 205 . These measures , al
l
o
f
which progressively pointed to a
separation from the mother country , and evinced a determination
to maintain , a
t
every hazard , the liberties of the colonies , were
soon followed b
y
more decisive steps . On the 7th o
f
June , 1776 , .
certain resolutions respecting independency were moved , which
were referred to a committee o
f
the whole . On the 10th of June
it was resolved that a committee be appointed to prepare a dec
laration " that these united colonies are , and of right ought to be ,
free and independent States ; that they are absolved from al
l
allegiance to the British crown ; and that al
l
political connection
between them and the state o
f
Great Britain is , and ought to be ,
dissolved . ” 7 On the 11th of June a committee was appointed to
1 Journals o
f
Congress o
f
1775 , p . 231 , 235 , 279 .
2 Journals o
f
Congress o
f
1775 , p . 259 , 260 , & c .
8 Journals o
f
Congress o
f
1776 , p . 13 .
- Journals o
f
Congress o
f
1776 , p . 106 , 107 , 118 , 119 .
6 Journals o
f Congress o
f
1776 , p . 122 , 123 .
6 Journals o
f Congress o
f
1776 , p . 166 , 174 .
7 Journals o
f Congress o
f
1776 , p . 205 , 206 .
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prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into
between the colonies, and also a committee to prepare a plan of
treaties to be proposed to foreign powers . On the 28th of June
the committee appointed to prepare a declaration of independence
brought in a draft . On the 2d of July Congress adopted the reso
lution fo
r
independence ; and on th
e
4th o
f July they adopted the
Declaration of Independence , and thereby solemnly published and
declared “ That these united colonies are ,and of right ought to be ,
free and independent States ; that they are absolved from al
l
alle
giance to the British crown ; and that all political connection
between them and the state of Great Britain is , and ought to be ,
totally dissolved ; and that as free and independent States they
have full power to levy war , conclude peace , contract alliances ,
establish commerce , and to do all other acts and things which
independent States may o
f right do . ”
§ 206 . These minute details have been given , not merely be
cause they present an historical view of the actual and slow
progress towards independence , but because they give rise to
several very important considerations respecting the political rights
and sovereignty of the several colonies , and of the union which
was thus spontaneously formed b
y
the people o
f
the united colo
nies .
$ 207 . In the first place , antecedent to the Declaration of Inde
pendence none o
f
the colonies were , or pretended to be , sovereign
states , in the sense in which the term “ sovereign ” is sometimes
applied to states . The term “ sovereign ” or “ sovereignty ” is
used in different senses , which often leads to a confusion of ideas ,
and sometimes to very mischievous and unfounded conclusions .
B
y
“ sovereignty ” in it
s largest sense is meant supreme , absolute ,
uncontrollable power , the jus summi imperii , the absolute right to
govern . A state or nation is a body politic , or society of men ,
united together fo
r
the purpose o
f promoting their mutual safety
and advantage b
y
their combined strength . B
y
th
e
very act of
civil and political association , each citizen subjects himself to the
authority o
f
the whole ; and the authority of al
l
over each mem
ber essentially belongs to the body politic . A state which pos
1 Journals o
f Congress o
f
1776 , p . 20
7
.
? 3 Dall . 110 , per Blair , J . ; 9 Dane ' s Abridg . App . $ 2 , p . 10 , 83 , p . 12 , § 5 , p . 16 .
8 1 B
l
. Comm . 49 ; 2 Dall . 471 , per Jay , C . J .
4 Vattel , B . 1 , ch . 1 , $ 1 ; 2 Dall . 455 , per Wilson , J .
5 Vattel , B . 1 , ch . 1 , $ 2 .
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sesses this absolute power , without any dependence upon any
foreign power or state , is in the largest sense a sovereign state.
And it is wholly immaterialwhat is the form of the government ,
or by whose hands this absolute authority is exercised . Itmay be
exercised by the people at large , as in a pure democracy ; or by a
select fe
w , as in an absolute aristocracy ; or by a single person , as
in an absolute monarchy . But “ sovereignty ” is often used in a
fa
r
more limited sense than that of which w
e
have spoken , to
designate such political powers a
s
in the actual organization o
f
the particular state or nation are to be exclusively exercised b
y
certain public functionaries , without the control of any superior
authority . It is in this sense that Blackstone employs it , when he
says that it is of the very essence of a law that it is made b
y
the
supreme power . Sovereignty and legislature are , indeed , converti
ble terms ; one cannot subsist without the other . ” 3 Now , in every
limited government the power o
f legislation is , or at leastmay be ,
limited a
t
the will o
f
the nation ; and therefore the legislature is
not in an absolute sense sovereign . It is in the same sense that
Blackstone says , “ the law ascribes to the king of England the
attribute o
f sovereignty or pre -eminence , ” 4 because , in respect to
the powers confided to him , he is dependent on no man , account
able to n
o
man , and subjected to no superior jurisdiction . Yet
the king of England cannot make a law ; and his acts , beyond the
powers assigned to him b
y
the Constitution , are utterly void .
§ 208 . In like manner the word " state " is used in various
senses . In itsmost enlarged sense itmeans the people composing
a particular nation or community . In this sense the state means
the whole people , united into one body politic ; and the state and
th
e people o
f
the state are equivalent expressions . Mr . Justice
Wilson , in his Law Lectures , uses the word " state " in its broad
est sense . “ In free states , " says he , “ the people form an arti
ficial person , or body politic , the highest and noblest that can
b
e known . They form that moral person , which in one ofmy
1 2 Dall . 456 , 457 , per Wilson , J .
? Vattel , B . 1 , ch . 1 , § 2 , 3 .
31 Bl . Comm . 46 . See also 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . note A . , a commentary
o
n
this clause o
f
the author ' s text .
4 1 B
l
. Comm . 241 .
6 Penhallow v . Doane , 3 Dall . R . 93 , 94 , per Iredell , J . ; Chisholm v . Georgia , 2 Dall .
455 , per Wilson , J . ; 2 Wilson ' s Lect . 120 ; Dane ' s Appx . $ 50 , p . 63 . See Dr . Lie
ber ' s Political Ethics , B . 2 , ch . 4 , p . 163 .
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former lectures ? I described as a complete body of free ,natural
persons , united together fo
r
their common benefit ; as having an
understanding and a will ; as deliberating , and resolving , and
acting ; as possessed of interests which it ought to manage ; as
enjoying rights which it ought to maintain ; and as lying under
obligations which it ought to perform . To this moral person we
assign , by way of eminence , the dignified appellation o
f
STATE . ” 2
But there is a more limited sense in which the word is often used ,
where it expresses merely the positive o
r
actual organization o
f
th
e
legislative , executive , or judicial powers . Thus , th
e
actual
government o
f
a state is frequently designated b
y
th
e
name o
f
the
state . We say , the state has power to do this or that ; the state
has passed a la
w , or prohibited an act ,meaning nomore than that
the proper functionaries , organized fo
r
that purpose , have power
to d
o the act , or have passed the law , or prohibited th
e
particu
la
r
action . The sovereignty of a nation or state , considered with
reference to it
s
association , as a body politic , may be absolute
and uncontrollable in a
ll respects , except the limitations which it
chooses to impose upon itself . But the sovereignty of the gov
ernment organized within the state may be of a very limited
nature . It may extend to few or to many objects . It may be
unlimited a
s
to some , it may be restrained as to others . To the
extent o
f
the power given , the government may be sovereign , and
it
s
acts may be deemed the sovereign acts o
f
the state . Nay , the
state , b
y
which we mean the people composing the state , may
divide it
s sovereign powers among various functionaries , and each
in the limited sense would b
e sovereign in respect to the powers
confided to each , and dependent in al
l
other cases . Strictly
speaking , in our republican forms of government the absolute
sovereignty o
f
the nation is in the people o
f
the nation ; and the
11Wilson ' s Lect . 304 , 305 .
2 2 Wilson ' s Lect . 120 , 121 .
8 Mr .Madison , in hi
s
elaborate report in the Virginia legislature in January , 1800 ,
adverts to the different senses in which th
e
word " state " is used . He says , “ It is in
deed true , that the term ' states ' is sometimes used in a vague sense , and sometimes
in different senses , according to the subject to which it is applied . Thus it sometimes
means the separate sections o
f territory occupied by the political societies within each ;
sometimes the particular governmentsestablished b
y
those societies ; sometimes those
societies , as organized into those particular governments ; and lastly , itmeans thepeople
composing those political societies , in their highest sovereign capacity . ”
4 2 Dall . 433 , Iredell , J . ; Id . 455 , 456 , per Wilson , J .
63 Dall . 93 , per Iredell , J . ; 2 Dall . 455 , 457 , per Wilson , J .
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residuary sovereignty of each State , not granted to any of its pub
lic functionaries , is in the people of the State .
$ 209 . There is another mode in which we speak of a state as
sovereign , and that is in reference to foreign states . Whatever
may be the internal organization o
f
th
e
government of any state ,
if it has the sole power of governing itself and is not dependent
upon any foreign state , it is called a sovereign state ; that is , it is
a state having th
e
same rights , privileges , and powers as other
independent states . It is in this sense that the term is generally
used in treatises and discussions on the la
w
o
f
nations . A full
consideration o
f
this subject will more properly find place in some
future page .
$ 210 . Now it is apparent that none of the colonies before the
Revolution were , in the most large and general sense , independent
o
r sovereign communities . They were al
l
originally settled under ,
and subjected to , the British crown . Their powers and authori
ties were derived from , and limited b
y , their respective charters .
All , or nearly al
l , of these charters controlled their legislation b
y
prohibiting them from making laws repugnant o
r contrary to
those o
f England . The crown , in many o
f
them , possessed a
negative upon their legislation , aswell as the exclusive appoint
1 2 Dall . 471 , 472 , per Jay , C . J .
M
r
. J . Q . Adams , in hi
s
oration o
n
th
e
4
th
o
f July , 1831 , published after the prepa
ration o
f
these Commentaries , uses the following language : “ It is not true that there
must reside in all governments an absolute , uncontrollable , irresistible , and despotic
power ; nor is such power in any manner essential to sovereignty . Uncontrollable
power exists in n
o government o
n
earth . The sternest despotisms in any region and
in every age o
f
the world are and have been under perpetual control . Unlimited
power belongs not to man ; and rotten will be the foundation of every government
leaning upon such a maxim for it
s support . Least of all can it be predicated o
f
a
government professing to b
e
founded upon a
n original compact . The pretence of an
absolute , irresistible , despotic power , existing in every government somewhere , is incom
patible with the first principles o
f
natural right . "
* Dr . Rush , in a political communication , 1786 , uses the term “ sovereignty ” in an
other and somewhat more limited sense . He says , “ The people of America have
mistaken the meaning o
f
the word ' sovereignty . ' Hence each State pretends to be sov
ereign . In Europe it is applied to those states which possess the power of making war
and peace , o
f forming treaties , and the like . As this power belongs only to Congress ,
they are the only sovereign power in the United States . We commit a similar mistake
in our ideas of the word ' independent . ' No individual State , as such , has any claim
to independence . She is independent only in a union with her sister States in Congress . ”
1 Amer . Museum , 8 , 9 . Dr . Barton , on the other hand , in a similar essay , explains the
operation o
f
the system o
f
the confederation in th
e
manner which has been given in the
text . i Amer . Museum , 13 , 14 .
8 2 Dall . 471 , pe
r
Jay , C . J .
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ment of their superior officers ; and a right of revision , by way of
appeal , of the judgments of their courts. In their most solemn
declarations of rights , they admitted themselves bound , as British
subjects, to allegiance to the British crown ; and as such , they
claimed to be entitled to all the rights , liberties , and immunities
of freeborn British subjects . They denied al
l
power o
f
taxation ,
except b
y
their own colonial legislatures ; but at the same time
they admitted themselves bound b
y
acts o
f
the British Parliament
fo
r
the regulation o
f
external commerce , so as to secure the com
mercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother country , and
the commercial benefits o
f
it
s respective members . So far as
respects foreign states , the colonies were not , in the sense of the
laws of nations , sovereign states , butmere dependencies of Great
Britain . They could make no treaty , declare no war , send no
ambassadors , regulate no intercourse or commerce , nor in any
other shape act , as sovereigns , in the negotiations usual between
independent states . In respect to each other , they stood in the
common relation o
f
British subjects ; the legislation of neither
could be controlled b
y
any other ; but there was a common sub
jection to the British crown . If in any sense they might claim
the attributes o
f sovereignty , it was only in that subordinate sense
to which we have alluded a
s exercising within a limited extent
certain usual powers o
f sovereignty . They did not even affect to
claim a local allegiance . 4
$ 211 . In the next place , the colonies did not severally act fo
r
themselves , and proclaim their own independence . It is true , that
some of the States had previously formed incipient governments
for themselves ; but it was done in compliance with the recom
mendations o
f Congress . Virginia , on the 29th of June , 1776 , by
a convention o
f delegates , declared “ the government of this coun
tr
y , as formerly exercised under the crown of Great Britain , totally
dissolved ” ; and proceeded to form a new constitution of govern
1 See Marshall ' s Hist . of Colonies , p . 483 ; Journals of Congress , 1774 , p . 29 .
2 Journal o
f Congress , 1774 , p . 27 , 29 , 38 , 39 ; 1775 , p . 152 , 156 ; Marshall ' s Hist .
o
f
Colonies , ch . 14 , p . 412 , 483 .
81 Chalmers ' s Annals , 686 , 687 ; 2 Dall . 470 , per Jay , C . J .
* Journal o
f Congress , 1776 , p . 282 ; 2 Haz . Col . 591 ; Marsh . Colonies , App . No .
3 , p . 469 .
6 Journal of Congress , 1775 , p . 115 , 231 , 2
3
5
, 279 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 351 , 355 ; Marsh .
Colon . ch . 14 , p . 441 , 447 ; 9 Hening , Stat . 112 , 113 ; 9 Dane ' s Abridg . App . $ 5 , p .
1
6
.
CH . 1. ] 149HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION .
ment. New Hampshire also formed a government in December ,
1775 ,which was manifestly intended to be temporary , “ during ( as
they said ) the unhappy and unnatural contest with Great Britain .” 1
New Jersey , too , established a frame of government on the 2d of
July , 1776 ; but it was expressly declared that it should be void
upon a reconciliation with Great Britain . And South Carolina , in
March , 1776 , adopted a constitution of government ; but this was ,
in like manner , “ established until an accommodation between
Great Britain and America could be obtained .” 3 But the declara
tion of independence of all the colonies was the united act of all.
It was “ a declaration by the representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled ” ; “ by the delegates appointed
by the good people of the colonies," as in a prior declaration of
rights they were called . It was not an act done by the State gov
ernments then organized , nor by persons chosen by them . It was
emphatically the act of the whole people of the united colonies , by
the instrumentality of their representatives , chosen for that among
other purposes . It was not an act competent to the State govern
ments , or any of them , as organized under their charters , to adopt .
Those charters neither contemplated the case nor provided for it.
It was an act of original , inherent sovereignty by the people them
selves , resulting from their right to change the form of govern
ment, and to institute a new one, whenever necessary fo
r
their
safety and happiness . So the Declaration of Independence treats
it . No State had presumed of itself to form a new government ,
o
r
to provide for the exigencies o
f
the times , without consulting
Congress on the subject ; and when any acted , it was in pursu
ance o
f
the recommendation o
f Congress . It was , therefore , the
achievement o
f
the whole fo
r
the benefit o
f
the whole . The
people o
f
the united colonies made the united colonies free and
independent States , and absolved them from al
l
allegiance to the
British crown . The Declaration of Independence has accordingly
always been treated as an act o
f paramount and sovereign author
it
y , complete and perfect per se , and ipso facto working an entire
dissolution o
f
a
ll political connection with ,and allegiance to ,Great
1 2 Belk . N . Hamp . ch . 25 , p . 306 , 308 , 31
8
; 1 Pitk . Hist . 351 , 355 .
2 Stokes ' s Hist . Colon . 51 , 75 .
8 Stokes ' s Hist . Colon . 105 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . 355 .
- Journal , 1776 , p . 241 ; Journal , 1774 , p
p
. 27 , 45 .
5 2 Dall . 470 , 471 , per Jay , C . J . ; 9 Dane ' s Abridg App . $ 12 , 13 , p . 23 , 24 .
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Britain . And this , not merely as a practical fact, but in a legal
and constitutional view of the matter by courts of justice .1
$ 212 . In the debates in the South Carolina legislature , in Jan
uary , 1788 , respecting the propriety of calling a convention of the
people to ratify or reject the Constitution , a distinguished states
man ? used the following language : “ This admirable manifesto
(that is , the Declaration of Independence ) sufficiently refutes the
doctrine of the individual sovereignty and independence of the
several States. In that declaration the several States are not even
enumerated ; but, after reciting in nervous language and with con
vincing arguments our right to independence , and the tyranny
which compelled us to assert it , the declaration is made in the fol
lowing words : “We, therefore , the representatives of the United
States , & c., do , in the name, & c., of the good people of these col
onies , solemnly publish , & c., that these united colonies are , and of
right ought to be , free and independent States .' The separate in
dependence and individual sovereignty of the several States were
never thought of by the enlightened band of patriots who framed
this declaration . The several States are not even mentioned by
name in any part , as if it was intended to impress the maxim on
America that our freedom and independence arose from our union ,
and that without it we could never be free or independent . Let
us then consider all attempts to weaken this union , by maintaining
that each State is separately and individually independent , as a
species of political heresy , which can never benefit us , but may
bring on us the most serious distresses .” 3
1 2 Dallas , R. 470 .
?Mr. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney .
3 Debates in South Carolina , 1788, printed by A. E .Miller , Charleston , 1831, p. 43,
44. Mr. Adams, in his oration on the 4th of July , 1831, which is valuable for its
views o
f
constitutional principles , insists upon the same doctrine at considerable length .
Though it has been published since the original preparation o
f
these lectures , I gladly
avail myself of an opportunity to use his authority in corroboration of the same views .
“ The union o
f
the colonies had preceded this declaration o
f independence ) , and even
the commencement o
f
the war . The declaration was joint , that the united colonies were
free and independent States , but not that any one of them was a free and independent
State , separate from the rest . ” “ The Declaration of Independence was a social com
pact , by which the whole people covenanted with each citizen , and each citizen with the
whole people , that the united colonies were , and of right ought to be , freeand indepen
dent States . To this compact , union was as vital as freedom or independence . The
Declaration o
f Independence announced the severance o
f
the thirteen united colonies
from the rest o
f
the British Empire , and the existence of their people , from that day
forth , as an independent nation . The people of al
l
the colonies , speaking b
y
their rep
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$ 213 . In th
e
next place , we have seen that the power to do
this act was not derived from the State governments , nor was it
done generally with their co -operation . The question then natu
rally presents itself , if it is to be considered as a national act , in
what manner did the colonies become a nation , and in whatman
ner di
d
Congress become possessed o
f
this national power ? The
true answer must be , that as soon as Congress assumed powers and
passed measures which were in their nature national , to that ex
tent the people , from whose acquiescence and consent they took
effect , must be considered as agreeing to form a nation . The
Congress of 1774 , looking a
t
the general terms o
f
the commissions
under which the delegates were appointed , seem to have possessed
the power o
f concerting such measures as they deemed best to
redress the grievances and preserve the rights and liberties o
f all
th
e
colonies . Their duties seem to have been principally of an
advisory nature ; but the exigencies of the times led them rather
to follow out the wishes and objects o
f
their constituents , than
scrupulously to examine the words in which their authority was
communicated . The Congress of 1775 and 1776 were clothed
with more ample powers , and the language of their commissions
generally was sufficiently broad to embrace the right to pass meas
ures of a national character and obligation . The caution necessary
a
t that period of the Revolutionary struggle rendered that language
more guarded than the objects really in view would justify ; but
it was foreseen that the spirit of the people would eagerly second
every measure adopted to further a general union and resistance
against the British claims . The Congress of 1775 accordingly
assumed a
t
once ( a
s
we have seen ) the exercise o
f
some o
f
the
highest functions o
f sovereignty . They took measures for national
defence and resistance ; they followed u
p
the prohibitions upon
trade and intercourse with Great Britain ; they raised a national
army and navy , and authorized limited national hostilities against
Great Britain ; they raised money , emitted bills of credit , and
contracted debts upon national account ; they established a national
resentatives , constituted themselves one moral person before the face of their fellow
men . The Declaration o
f
Independence was not a declaration o
f liberty merely a
c
quired , nor was it a form o
f
government . The people o
f
the colonies were already free ,
and their forms of government were various . They were a
ll
colonies o
f
a monarchy .
The king o
f
Great Britain was their common sovereign . "
13 Dall . R . 80 , 81 , 90 , 91 , 109 , 110 , 111 , 117 .
2 3 Dall . R . 91 .
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post-office ; and finally they authorized captures and condemnation
of prizes in prize courts, with a reserve of appellate jurisdiction
to themselves .
$ 214 . The same body , in 1776 , took bolder steps, and exerted
powers which could in no other manner be justified or accounted
fo
r , than upon the supposition that a national union fo
r
national
purposes already existed , and that th
e
Congress was invested with
sovereign power over a
ll
the colonies fo
r
the purpose o
f preserving
the common rights and liberties o
f
a
ll . They accordingly author
ized general hostilities against the persons and property o
f
British
subjects ; they opened an extensive commerce with foreign coun
tries , regulating the whole subject of imports and exports ; they
authorized the formation o
f
new governments in the colonies ; and
finally they exercised the sovereign , prerogative o
f dissolving the
allegiance of all colonies to the British crown . The validity
o
f
these acts was never doubted o
r
denied b
y
the people . On the
contrary , they became the foundation upon which th
e
superstruct
ure o
f
the liberties and independence of the United States has
been erected . Whatever , then , may be the theories of ingenious
men on the subject , it is historically true that before the declara
tion o
f independence these colonies were not , in any absolute
sense , sovereign states ; that that event did not find them ormake
them such ; but that at themoment of their separation they were
under the dominion of a superior controlling national government
whose powers were vested in and exercised b
y
the general Congress
with the consent of the people of a
ll
the States . 1
· $ 215 . From the moment o
f
the declaration o
f independence , if
not fo
r
most purposes a
t
a
n antecedent period , the united col
onies must be considered as being a nation de facto , having a gen
1 This whole subject is very amply discussed b
y
Mr . Dane in his Appendix to theninth
volume o
f
his Abridgment o
f
the Laws ; and many o
f
his views coincide with those
stated in the text . The whole of that Appendix is worthy of the perusal of every con
stitutional lawyer , even though he might differ from some o
f
the conclusions o
f
the
learned author . He will there find much reasoning from documentary evidence o
f
a
public nature , which has not hitherto been presented in a condensed or accurate shape . "
Some interesting views o
f
this subject are also presented in President Monroe ' sMes
sage o
n
Internal Improvements , on the 4th of May , 1822 , appended to his Message
respecting the Cumberland Road . See , especially , pages 8 and 9 .
When Mr . Chief Justice Marshall , in Ogden v . Gibbons , ( 9 Wheat . R . 187 , ) admits
that the States , before the formation of the Constitution , were sovereign and indepen
dent , and were connected with each other only by a league , it is manifest that h
e
uses
the word “ sovereign " in a very restricted sense . Under the confederation there were
many limitations upon the powers o
f the States .
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eral government over it, created and acting by the general consent
of the people of a
ll
the colonies . The powers of that government
were not , and indeed could not be ,well defined . But still its ex
clusive sovereignty , in many cases ,was firmly established ; and its
controlling power over the States was in most , if not in al
l
, national
measures universally admitted . The Articles of Confederation ,
o
f
which we shall have occasion to speak more hereafter , were not
prepared or adopted b
y Congress until November , 1777 ; 2 they
were not signed or ratified b
y
any o
f
the States until July , 1778 ;
and they were not ratified , so as to become obligatory upon all the
States , until March , 1781 . In the intermediate time , Congress
continued to exercise the powers o
f
a general government , whose
acts were binding on all the States . And though they constantly /
admitted the States to b
e
“ sovereign and independent communi
ties , ” 3 yet it must be obvious that the terms were used in the
subordinate and limited sense already alluded to ; for it was im
possible to use them in any other sense , since a majority o
f
the
States could b
y
their public acts ' in Congress control and bind the
minority . Among the exclusive powers exercised b
y Congress
were the power to declare war and make peace ; to authorize cap
tures ; to institute appellate prize courts ; to direct and control al
l
national , military , and naval operations ; to form alliances and
make treaties ; to contract debts , and issue bills of credit upon
national account . In respect to foreign governments , we were
politically known as the United States only ; and it was in our
national capacity , as such , that w
e
sent and received ambassadors ,
entered into treaties and alliances , and were admitted into the gen
eral community of nations ,who might exercise the right of belliger
ents , and claim an equality of sovereign powers and prerogatives .
§ 216 . In confirmation of these views , it may not be without use
to refer to the opinions of some of our most eminent judges , de
livered on occasions which required an exact examination o
f
the
subject . In Chisholm ' s Executors v . The State of Georgia , Mr .
Chief Justice Jay , who was equally distinguished as a Revolution
1 See Penhallow v . Doane , 3 Dall . R . 54 ; Ware v . Hylton , 3 Dall . 19
0
, pe
r
Chase , J .
See the Circular Letter o
f Congress , 13th Sept . , 1779 ; 5 Jour . Cong . 341 , 348 , 349 .
? Jour . o
f
Cong . 1777 , p . 502 .
8 See Letter o
f
17th Nov . , 1777 , b
y
Congress , recommending the Articles o
f
Confed .
eration ; Journal of 1777 , p . 513 , 514 .
4 1 Amer .Museum , 15 ; 1 Kent , Comm . 197 , 198 , 199 .
6 3 Dall . 419 , 470 .
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ary statesman and a general jurist , expressed himself to the
following effect : “ The Revolution , or rather the declaration of
independence , found the people already united for general purposes ,
and at the same time providing for their more domestic concerns
by State conventions and other temporary arrangements . From
th
e
crown o
f
Great Britain the sovereignty o
f
their country passed
to the people of it ; and it was then not an uncommon opinion ,
that the unappropriated lands which belonged to that crown
passed , not to the people of the colony or States within whose
limits they were situated , but to the whole people . On whatever
principle this opinion rested , it did not give way to the other ; and
thirteen sovereignties were considered a
s emerging from the princi
ples o
f
the Revolution , combined by local convenience and consid
erations . The people , nevertheless , continued to consider them
selves , in a national point of view , as one people ; and they
continued without interruption to manage their national concerns
accordingly . ” In Penhallow v . Doane , Mr . Justice Patterson
(who was also a Revolutionary statesman ) said , speaking o
f
the
period before the ratification of the confederation : “ The powers
o
f Congress were revolutionary in their nature , arising out o
f
events adequate to every national emergency ,and coextensive with
the object to b
e
attained . Congress was the general , supreme ,and
controlling council o
f
th
e
nation , the centre of force , and the sun
o
f
the political system . Congress raised armies , fitted out a navy ,
and prescribed rules for their government , & c . , & c . These high
acts o
f sovereignty were submitted to , acquiesced in , and approved
o
f b
y
the people of America , & c . , & c . The danger being imminent
and common , it became necessary fo
r
the people o
r
colonies to
coalesce and act in concert , in order to divert or break the violence
o
f
the gathering storm . They accordingly grew into union , and
formed one great political body , of which Congress was the direct
ing principle and soul , & c . , & c . The truth is , that th
e
States , indi
vidually , were not known nor recognized as sovereign b
y
foreign
nations ,nor are they now . The States collectively under Congress ,
a
s their connecting point o
r
head , were acknowledged b
y
foreign
powers as sovereign , particularly in that acceptation of the term
which is applicable to a
ll great national concerns , and in the exer
cise o
f
which other sovereigns would b
e
more immediately inter
ested . " In Ware v . Hylton , 2 Mr . Justice Chase (himself also a
1 3 Dall . 54 . 2 3 Dall . 199 .
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Revolutionary statesman ) said : “ It has been inquired , what pow
ers Congress possessed from the first meeting in September , 1774 ,
until the ratification of the confederation on the 1st of March ,
1781. It appears to me that the powers of Congress during that
whole period were derived from the people they represented , ex
pressly given through the medium of their State conventions or
State legislatures ; or that after they were exercised , they were
impliedly ratified by the acquiescence and obedience of the people ,
& c . The powers of Congress originated from necessity , and arose
out of it, and were only limited by events ; or , in other words ,
they were revolutionary in their nature . Their extent depended
on the exigencies and necessities of public affairs . I entertain this
general idea , that the several States retained al
l
internal sover
eignty ; and that Congress properly possessed the rights o
f
external
sovereignty . In deciding on the powers of Congress , and o
f
the
several States before the confederation , I see but one safe rule ,
namely , that all the powers actually exercised b
y
Congress be
fore that period were rightfully exercised on the presumption not
to b
e controverted , that they were so authorized by the people they
represented , by an express or implied grant ; and that al
l
the
powers exercised b
y
the State conventions or State legislatures were
also frightfully exercised on the same presumption o
f authority
from the people . ” 1
$ 217 . In respect to the powers of the Continental Congress
exercised before the adoption of the Articles of Confederation , few
questions were judiciously discussed during the Revolutionary con
test ; for men had not leisure in the heat of war nicely to scrutinize
o
r weigh such subjects ; inter arma silent leges . The people , rely
ing on the wisdom and patriotism o
f Congress , silently acquiesced
in whatever authority they assumed . But soon after the organiza
tion o
f
the present government , the question was most elaborately
discussed before the Supreme Court o
f
the United States , in a case
calling for an exposition o
f
the appellate jurisdiction o
f Congress
in prize causes before the ratification o
f
the confederation . The
1 S
e
e
also 1 Kent , Comm . Lect . 10 , p . 19
6
; President Monroe ' s Exposition and Mes
sage , 4th of May , 1822 , p . 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 .
2 Penhallow v . Doane , 3 Dall . 54 , 80 , 83 , 90 , 91 , 94 , 109 , 110 , 11
1
, 112 , 117 ; Journals
o
f Congress , March , 1779 , p . 86 to 88 ; 1 Kent , Comm . 198 , 199 .
[ An exceedingly interesting account o
f
the controversy with Pennsylvania over the
jurisdiction o
f Congress in prize causes , and of the part taken b
y
that eminent lawyer ,
Mr . A . J . Dallas , in sustaining the Federal authority , will be found in the Life ofMr .
Dallas , by hi
s
son George M . Dallas , page 95 et se
q
. ]
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result of that examination was, as the opinions already cited indi
cate , that Congress , before the confederation , possessed , by the
consent of the people of the United States , sovereign and supreme
powers for national purposes ; and among others the supreme pow
ers of peace and war, and , as an incident , the right of entertaining
appeals in the last resort in prize causes , even in opposition to
State legislation . And that the actual powers exercised by Con
gress , in respect to national objects , furnished the best exposition
of it
s
constitutional authority , since they emanated from the repre
sentatives as the people , and were acquiesced in b
y
the people .
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CHAPTER II .
ORIGIN OF THE CONFEDERATION .
$ 218 . The union , thus formed, grew out of the exigencies of
the times ; and from its nature and objects might be deemed tem
porary , extending only to the maintenance of the common liberties
and independence o
f
the States , and to terminate with the return
o
f peace with Great Britain , and the accomplishment of the ends
o
f
the Revolutionary contest . It was obvious to reflecting minds
that such a future separation of the States into absolute , indepen
dent communities , with nomutual ties or controlling national gov
ernment , would be fraught with the most imminent dangers to
their common safety and peace , and expose them not only to the
chance o
f reconquest b
y
Great Britain , after such separation in
detached contests , but also to all the hazards o
f
internal warfare
and civil dissensions . So that those who had stood side b
y
side in
the common cause against Great Britain might then , b
y
the in
trigues o
f
their enemies and the jealousies always incident to
neighboring nations , become instruments in th
e
hands o
f
the am
bitious abroad o
r
the corrupt a
t
home , to ai
d
in the mutual
destruction o
f
each other ; and thus all successively fall the vic
tims o
f
a foreign o
r
domestic tyranny . Such considerations could
not but have great weight with a
ll
honest and patriotic citizens ,
independent o
f
the real blessings which a permanent union could
not fail to secure throughout all the States .
$ 219 . It is not surprising , therefore , that a project which , even
in their colonial state , had been so often attempted b
y
some of
them to guard themselves against the evils incident to their politi
cal weakness and their distance from the mother country , and
which had been so often defeated b
y
the jealousy o
f
the crown o
r
o
f
the colonies , should at a very early period have occurred to
the great and wise men who assembled in the Continental Con
gress .
$ 220 . It will be an instructive and useful lesson to us to trace
1 2 Haz . Coll . 1 , et
c
. ; Id . 521 ; 2 Holmes ' s Annals , 55 and note ; Marshall , Colon .
284 , 285 , 464 ; 1 Kent , Comm . 190 , 191 .
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historically the steps which led to the formation and final adop
tion of the Articles of Confederation and perpetual union between
the United States . It will be instructive , by disclosing the real
difficulties attendant upon such a plan , even in times when the
necessity of it was forced upon the minds of men not only by
common dangers , but by common protection , by common feelings
of affection , and by common efforts of defence . It will be useful ,
by moderating the ardor of inexperienced minds, which are apt to
imagine that the theory of government is too plain , and the prin
ciples on which it should be formed too obvious , to leave much
doubt fo
r
the exercise of the wisdom o
f
statesmen o
r
the ingenu
it
y
o
f speculatists ; nothing is indeed more difficult to foresee than
the practical operation o
f given powers , unless it be the practical
operation o
f
restrictions intended to control those powers . It is
a mortifying truth , that if the possession of power sometimes leads
to mischievous abuses , the absence o
f
it also sometimes produces
a political debility , quite as ruinous in its consequences to the
great objects o
f civil government .
$ 221 . It is proposed , therefore , to go into a historical review of
the manner o
f
the formation and adoption o
f
the Articles of Con
federation . This will be followed b
y
a
n exposition o
f
the general
provisions and distributions o
f power under it . And this will
naturally lead us to a consideration o
f
the causes o
f
it
s
decline and
fall ; and thus prepare the way to a consideration o
f
the measures
which led to the origin and final adoption o
f
the present Constitu
tion o
f
the United States . 1
§ 222 . On the 11th of June , 1776 , the same day on which the
committee fo
r
preparing the Declaration o
f Independence was ap
pointed , Congress resolved that “ a committee be appointed to pre
pare and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into
between these colonies " ; and on the next day a committee was
accordingly appointed , consisting of a member from each colony . 2
Nearly a year before this period , (viz . on the 21st of July , 1775 , )
Dr . Franklin had submitted to Congress a sketch of articles of
confederation , which does not , however ,appear to have been acted
i The first volume cf the United States Laws , published by Bioren and Duane , con
tains a summary view o
f
the proceedings in Congress fo
r
the establishment o
f
th
e
con
federation , and also of the convention for the establishment of the Constitution of the
United States . And the whole proceedings are given at large in the first volume of the
Secret Journals , published b
y
Congress in 1821 , p . 283 et se
q
.
2 Journals o
f
1776 , p . 207 .
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on . These articles contemplated a union until a reconciliation
with Great Britain , and , on failure thereof , the confederation to be
perpetual .
$ 223 . On the 12th of July , 1776 , the committee appointed to
prepare Articles of Confederation presented a draft, which was in
the handwriting of Mr. Dickenson , one of the committee , and a
delegate from Pennsylvania . The draft , so reported , was debated
from the 22d to the 31st of July , and on several days between the
5th and 20th of August , 1776 . On this last day Congress , in
committee of the whole , reported a new draft, which was ordered
to be printed for the use of the members .?
$ 224 . The subject seems not again to have been touched until
the 8th of April , 1777 , and the articles were debated at several
times between that time and the 15th of November of the same
year. On this last day th
e
articles were reported with sundry
amendments , and finally adopted b
y Congress . A committee was
then appointed to draft , and they accordingly drafted a circular
letter , requesting the States respectively to authorize their dele
gates in Congress to subscribe the same in behalf o
f
the State .
The committee remark in that letter “ that to form a permanent
union , accommodated to the opinions and wishes of the delegates
o
f
so many States , differing in habits , produce , commerce , and in
ternal police , was found to be a work which nothing but time and
reflection , conspiring with a disposition to conciliate , could mature
and accomplish . Hardly is it to be expected that any plan , in the
variety of provisions essential to our union , should exactly corre
spond with th
e
maxims and political views o
f every particular State .
Let it be remarked , that after the most careful inquiry and the
fullest information , this is proposed , as the best which could be
adapted to the circumstances o
f
a
ll , and as that alone which
affords any tolerable prospect of general ratification . Permit us ,
then , (add the committee , ) earnestly to recommend these articles
to the immediate and dispassionate attention o
f
the legislatures of
the respective States . Let them be candidly reviewed under a
sense o
f
the difficulty o
f combining , in one general system , the
various sentiments and interests o
f
a continent , divided into so
i The draft of Dr . Franklin , and this draft , understood to be byMr . Dickenson , were
never printed until the publication o
f
the Secret Journals b
y
order o
f Congress in 1821 ,
where they will be found under pages 283 and 290 .
2 Secret Journals , 1776 , p . 304 .
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many sovereign and independent communities , under a conviction
of the absolute necessity of uniting a
ll
our councils and a
ll
our
strength , tomaintain and defend our common liberties . Let them
b
e
examined with a liberality becoming brethren and fellow -citi
zens , surrounded b
y
the same imminent dangers , contending for
the same illustrious prize , and deeply interested in being forever
bound and connected together b
y
ties the most intimate and indis
soluble . And , finally , let them be adjusted with the temper and the
magnanimity o
f
wise and patriotic legislators , who , while they are
concerned for the prosperity o
f
their own more immediate circle ,
are capable o
f rising superior to local attachments ,when they may
b
e incompatible with the safety , happiness , and glory of the gen
eral confederacy . ”
§ 225 . Such was the strong and eloquent appeal made to the
States . It carried ,however , very slowly , conviction to the minds
o
f
the local legislatures . Many objections were stated , and many
amendments were proposed . All of them , however ,were rejected
b
y
Congress ,not probably because they were al
l
deemed inexpe
dient or improper in themselves , but from the danger of sending
the instrument back again to all the States fo
r
reconsideration .
Accordingly , on the 26th of June , 1778 , a copy , engrossed for
ratification ,was prepared , and the ratification begun on the 9th
day o
f July following . It was ratified b
y
a
ll
the States , except
Delaware and Maryland , in 1778 ; b
y
Delaware in 1779 , and b
y
Maryland on the 1st o
f
March , 1781 , from which last date its
final ratification took effect , and was joyfully announced by Con
gress . 1
$ 2
2
6
. In reviewing the objections taken b
y
the various States
to the adoption of the confederation in the form in which it was
presented to them , at least so far as those objections can be gath
ered from the official acts o
f
those States , or their delegates in
Congress , some of them will appear to be founded upon a desire for
verbal amendments conducing to greater accuracy and certainty ;
and some o
f
them upon considerations o
f
a more large and im
portant bearing upon the interests o
f
the States respectively , or
o
f
the Union . Among the latter were the objections taken and
alterations proposed in respect to the apportionment of taxes ,
and o
f
the quota o
f public forces to be raised among the States ,
1 Secret Journals , 401 , 418 , 423 , 424 , 426 ; 3 Kent ' s Comm . 196 , 197 .
2 2 Pitk . Hist . ch . 11 , p . 19 to 36 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 197 , 198 .
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by Massachusetts , Connecticut , New Jersey , and Pennsylvania .1
There was also an abundance of jealousy of the power to keep
up a standing army in time of peace .2
$ 227 . But that which seemed to be of paramount importance ,
and which , indeed , protracted the ratification of the confederation
to so late a period ,was the alarming controversy in respect to the
boundaries of some of the States and the public lands held by the
crown within those reputed boundaries . On the one hand, the
great States contended that each of them had an exclusive title
to a
ll
the lands of the crown within its boundaries ; and these
boundaries , b
y
the claims under some of the charters , extended to
the South Sea , or to an indefinite extent into the uncultivated
western wilderness . On the other hand , the other States as stren
uously contended that the territory , unsettled a
t
the commence
ment of the war , and claimed b
y
the British crown , which was
ceded to it b
y
the treaty o
f Paris of 1763 , if wrested from the
common enemy b
y
the blood and treasure o
f
the thirteen States ,
ought to be deemed a common property , subject to the disposition
o
f Congress fo
r
the general good . 3 Rhode Island , Delaware , New
Jersey , and Maryland insisted upon some provision for establish
ing the western boundaries o
f
the States , and fo
r
the recognition
o
f
the unsettled western territory as the property o
f
the Union .
§ 228 . The subject was one of a perpetually recurring interest
and irritation , and threatened a dissolution of the confederacy .
New York , at length , in February , 1780 , passed an act author
izing a surrender o
f
a part o
f
the western territory claimed b
y
her . Congress embraced the opportunity , thus afforded , to ad
dress the States on the subject o
f ceding the territory , reminding
them “ how indispensably necessary it is to establish the Federal
Union on a fixed and permanent basis , and on principles accepta
ble to a
ll
it
s respective members ; how essential to public credit
and confidence , to the support of our army , to the vigor of our
councils , and the success of our measures ; to our tranquillity at
home , our reputation abroad ; to our very existence as a free ,
sovereign , and independent people . ” They recommended , with
earnestness , a cession o
f
the western territory ; and a
t
the same
time they a
s earnestly recommended to Maryland to subscribe the
1 Secret Journals , 371 , 373 , 376 , 378 , 381 ; 2 Pitk .Hist . ch . 11 , p . 19 to 32 .
? Secret Journals , 373 , 376 , 383 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . ch . 11 , p . 19 to 32 .
8 2 Dall . R . 470 , per Jay , C . J . ; 2 Pitk . Hist . ch . 11 , p . 19 to 36 .
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Articles of Confederation . A cession was accordingly made by
th
e
delegates of New York on the 1s
t
o
f
March , 1781 , the very
day on which Maryland acceded to the confederation . Virginia
had previously acted upon the recommendation o
f Congress ; and
b
y
subsequent cessions from her , and from the States of Massa
chusetts , Connecticut , South Carolina , and Georgia , at still later
periods , this great source of national dissension was at last dried
u
p . ?
1 Secret Journals , 6 Sept . , 1780 , p .442 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 19
7
, 19
8
; 2 Pitk . Hist . ch .
1
1 , p . 19 to 36 .
2 The history o
f
these cessions will be found in the Introduction to the Land Laws
o
f
the United States , printed b
y
order o
f Congress in 1810 , 1817 , and 1828 ; and in the
first volume o
f
the Laws of the United States , printed b
y
Bioren and Duane in 1815 ,
p . 452 , & c .
[This subject is considered somewhat b
y Mr . Rives in hi
s
Life o
f
Madison , I . 257
e
t seq . See Hildreth , Hist . o
f U . S . III . 398 . )
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CHAPTER III.
ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION .
$ 229 . In pursuance of the design already announced , it is now
proposed to give an analysis of the Articles of Confederation , or ,
as they are denominated in th
e
instrument itself , the “ Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States , " as they
were finally adopted b
y
the thirteen States in 1781 .
$ 230 . The style of the confederacy was b
y
the first article
declared to b
e
“ The United States o
f
America . ” The second
article declared that each State retained its sovereignty , freedom ,
and independence , and every power , jurisdiction , and right which
was not b
y
this confederation expressly delegated to the United
States in Congress assembled . The third article declared that
the States severally entered into a firm league of friendship with
each other , for their common defence , the security of their liber
ties , and their mutual and general welfare , binding themselves to
assist each other against all force offered to or attacks made upon
them , or any of them , on account of religion , sovereignty , trade ,
o
r any other pretence whatever . The fourth article declared that
the free inhabitants o
f
each o
f
the States (vagabonds and fugitives
from justice excepted ) should be entitled to a
ll
the privileges of
free citizens in the several States ; that the people of each State
should have free ingress and regress to and from any other State ,
and should enjoy a
ll
the privileges o
f
trade and commerce , subject
to the same duties and restrictions a
s
the inhabitants ; that fugi
tives from justice should , upon demand of the executive of the
State from which they fled , be delivered up ; and that full faith
and credit should be given in each o
f
the States , to the records ,
acts , and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of
every other State .
$ 231 . Having thus provided for the security and intercourse
o
f
the States , the next article (5th ) provided for the organization
o
f
a general Congress , declaring that delegates should be chosen
in such manner as the legislature o
f
each State should direct , to
meet in Congress on the first Monday in every year , with a power
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reserved to each State , to recall any or all of the delegates , and to
send others in their stead . No State was to be represented in
Congress by less than two nor more than seven members . No
delegate was eligible for more than three , in any term of six
years ; and no delegate was capable ofholding any office of emolu
ment under the United States . Each State was to maintain its
own delegates , and in determining questions in Congress was to
have one vote . Freedom of speech and debate in Congress was
not to be impeached or questioned in any other place ; and th
e
members were to be protected from arrest and imprisonment dur
ing the time o
f
their going to and from , and attendance on Con
gress , except for treason , felony , or breach of the peace .
$ 232 . B
y
subsequent articles Congress was invested with the
sole and exclusive rightand power of determining on peace and
war , unless in case of an invasion of a State by enemies , or an
imminent danger of an invasion b
y
Indians ; of sending and re
ceiving ambassadors ; entering into treaties and alliances , under
certain limitations , as to treaties of commerce ; of establishing
rules for deciding a
ll
cases o
f capture on land and water , and for
the division and appropriation o
f prizes taken b
y
the land o
r naval
forces in the service o
f
the United States ; of granting letters of
marque and reprisal in times o
f
peace ; of appointing courts ' fo
r
the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas ; and
o
f establishing courts fo
r
receiving and finally determining appeals
in all cases of captures .
§ 233 . Congress was also invested with power to decide in the
last resort , on appeal , all disputes and differences between two or
more States concerning boundary , jurisdiction , or any other cause
whatsoever ; and the mode of exercising that authority was spe
cially prescribed . And al
l
controversies concerning the private
right of soil , claimed under different grants of two or more States
before the settlement o
f
their jurisdiction , were to be finally de
termined in the same manner , upon the petition of either of the
grantees . But no State was to be deprived of territory fo
r
the
benefit o
f
the United States .
§ 234 . Congress was also invested with the sole and exclusive
1 “ N
o treaty o
f
commerce shall b
e
made ,whereby the legislative power of the States
shall b
e
restrained from imposing such imposts and duties o
n foreigners a
s
their own
people are subjected to , or from prohibiting the exportation o
r
importation o
f any
species o
f goods o
r
commodities whatsoever . ” Art . IX .
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right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck
by their own authority , or that of the United States ; of fixing the
standard of weights and measures throughout the United States ;
of regulating the trade and managing a
ll
affairs with the Indians ,
not members of any of the States , provided that the legislative
right of any State within its own limits should not be infringed or
violated ; of establishing and regulating post -offices from one State
to another , and exacting postage to defray the expenses ; of a
p
pointing a
ll
officers of the land forces in the service o
f
the United
States , except regimental officers ; of appointing all officers of the
naval forces , and commissioning all officers whatsoever in the ser
vice o
f
the United States ; and ofmaking rules fo
r
th
e
government
and regulation o
f
the land and naval forces , and directing their
operations .
$ 235 . Congress was also invested with authority to appoint a
committee o
f
the States to si
t
in the recess o
f Congress , and to con
sist o
f
one delegate from each State , and other committees and
civil officers , to manage the general affairs under their direction ;
to appoint one o
f
their number to preside , but no person was to
serve in the office of president more than one year in the term o
f
three years ; to ascertain the necessary sums fo
r
the public service ,
and to appropriate the same for defraying the public expenses ; to
borrow money , and emit bills on the credit of th
e
United States ;
to build and equip a navy ; to agree upon the number of land forces
and make requisitions upon each State fo
r
it
s quota , in proportion
to the number of white inhabitants in such State . The legislature
o
f
each State were to appoint the regimental officers , raise themen ,
and clothe , arm , and equip them at the expense of the United
States .
$ 236 . Congress was also invested with power to adjourn fo
r
any time not exceeding six months , and to any place within the
United States ; and provision was made for the publication of its
journal , and fo
r
entering th
e
yeas and nays thereon , when desired
b
y
any delegate .
$ 237 . Such were the powers confided in Congress . But even
these were greatly restricted in their exercise ; for it was expressly
provided that Congress should never engage in a war ; nor grant
letters o
f marque or reprisal in time o
f peace ; nor enter into any
treaties o
r alliances ; nor coin money , or regulate the value there
o
f ; nor ascertain the sums or expenses necessary for the defence
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and welfare of the United States ; nor emit bills ; nor borrow
money on the credit of the United States ; nor appropriate money ;
nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or pur
chased ; or the number of land or sea forces to be raised ; nor
appoint a commander- in - chief of the army or navy ; unless nine
States should assent to the same. And no question on any other
point ,except fo
r
adjourning from day to day ,was to be determined ,
except by the vote of a majority of the States . . .
§ 238 . The committee of the States , or any nine of them , were
authorized in the recess o
f Congress to exercise such powers as
Congress , with the assent of nine States , should think it expedient
to vest them with , except such powers , fo
r
the exercise o
f
which ,
by the Articles of Confederation , the assent o
f
nine States was re
quired , which could not be thus delegated .
$ 239 . Itwas further provided , that al
l
bills o
f
credit ,moneys
borrowed ,and debts contracted b
y
o
r
under the authority o
f Con
gress before the confederation , should be a charge against the
United States ; that when land forces were raised b
y
any State fo
r
th
e
common defence , al
l
officers o
f
o
r under the rank o
f
colonel
should b
e appointed b
y
the legislature o
f
the State , or in such
manner as the State should direct ; and al
l
vacancies should b
e
filled u
p
in the same manner ; that al
l
charges of war , and all
other expenses for the common defence or general welfare , should
b
e defrayed out o
f
a common treasury , which should be supplied
b
y
the several States , in proportion to the value of the land within
each State granted o
r surveyed , and the buildings and improve
ments thereon , to be estimated according to the mode prescribed
b
y
Congress ; and the taxes for that proportion were to be laid and
levied b
y
th
e
legislatures o
f
th
e
States within the time agreed upon
b
y
Congress .
§ 240 . Certain prohibitions were laid upon the exercise of pow
e
rs b
y
the respective States . No State ,without the consent of the
United States , could send an embassy to , or receive an embassy
from , o
r
enter into any treaty with any king , prince , or state ;
nor could any person holding any office under th
e
United States ,
o
r any o
f
them , accept any present , emolument , office , or title ,
from any foreign king , prince , or state ; nor could Congress
itself grant any title o
f nobility . No two States could enter
into any treaty , confederation , or alliance with each other , with
out the consent of Congress . No State could la
y
any imposts
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or duties which might interfere with any then proposed trea
ties. No vessels of war were to be kept up by any State in
time of peace , except deemed necessary by Congress for its de
fence o
r
trade , nor any body of forces , except such as should be
deemed requisite b
y Congress to garrison it
s
forts , and neces
sary fo
r
it
s
defence . But every State was required always to keep
u
p
a well -regulated and disciplined militia , sufficiently armed and
accoutred , and to be provided with suitable field -pieces and tents ,
and arms and ammunition and camp equipage . No State could
engage in war without the consent o
f Congress , unless actually
invaded b
y
enemies , or in danger of invasion by the Indians . Nor
could any State grant commissions to any ships o
f
war ,nor letters
o
f marque and reprisal , except after a declaration of war by Con
gress , unless such State were infested b
y pirates , and then subject
to the determination o
f Congress . No State could prevent the
removal of any property imported into any State , to any other
State , of which the owner was an inhabitant . And no imposition ,
duties , or restriction could be laid by any State on the property of
the United States or of either o
f
them .
§ 241 . There was also provision made for the admission o
f
Can
ada into the Union , and of other colonies with the assent of nine
States . And it was finally declared that every State should abide
b
y
the determinations o
f Congress on all questions submitted to it
b
y
the confederation ; that the articles should be inviolably ob
served b
y
every State ; that the union should be perpetual ; and that
no alterations should be made in any of the articles , unless agreed
to b
y Congress , and confirmed b
y
the legislatures o
f every State .
§ 242 . Such is the substance of this celebrated instrument ,
under which the treaty o
f
peace , acknowledging our independence ,
was negotiated , the war o
f
the Revolution concluded , and the union
o
f
the Statesmaintained until the adoption of the present Consti
tution .
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CH A P      IV .
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATION .
$ 243 . Any survey , however slight, of th
e
confederation will
impress the mind with the intrinsic difficulties which attended the
formation o
f
it
s principal features . It is well known that upon
three important points , touching the common rights and interests
o
f
the several States , much diversity of opinion prevailed , and
many animated discussions took place . The first was , as to the
mode of voting in Congress , whether it should be b
y
States , or
according to wealth or population . The second , as to the rule b
y
which th
e
expenses o
f
th
e
Union should be apportioned among the
States . And the third , as has been already seen , relative to the
disposal o
f
the vacant and unappropriated lands in the western
territory . "
§ 244 . But that which strikes us with most force is the un
ceasing jealousy and watchfulness everywhere betrayed in respect
to the powers to b
e
confided to the general government . For this
several causes may be assigned . The colonies had been long en
gaged in struggles against the superintending authority of the
crown , and had practically felt the inconveniences of the restric
tive legislation of the parent country . These struggles had nat
urally led to a general feeling o
f
resistance to a
ll
external author
it
y ; and these inconveniences to extreme doubts , if not to dread
o
f any legislation not exclusively originating in their domestic
assemblies . They had , as yet ,not felt the importance or necessity
o
f
union among themselves , having been hitherto connected with
the British sovereignty in all their foreign relations . What would
b
e
their fate as separate and independent communities ; how far
their interests would coincide o
r vary from each other as such ;
what would be the effects of the Union upon their domestic peace ,
their territorial interests , their external commerce , their political
security , or their civil liberty , — were points to them wholly of a
speculative character , in regard to which various opinions might
1 2 Pitk . Hist . 16 . (Tucker , Hist . of U . S . I . 311 ; Hildreth , Hist . of U . S . II
I
.
398 . )
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be entertained ,and various and even opposite conjectures formed
upon grounds apparently of equal plausibility . They were smart
ing , too , under the severe sufferings of war ; and hardly had time
to look forward to the future events of a peace ; or if they did , it
would be obviously a period fo
r
more tranquil discussions , and fo
r
a better understanding o
f
their mutual interests . They were sud
denly brought together , not so much b
y
any deliberate choice o
f
a
permanent union , as b
y
the necessity o
f mutual co -operation and
support in resistance o
f
th
e
measures o
f
Great Britain . They
found themselves , after having assembled a general Congress for
mutual advice and encouragement , compelled b
y
the course o
f
events to clothe that body with sovereign powers in the most irreg
ular and summary manner , and to permit them to assert the gen
eral prerogatives o
f
peace and war , without any previous compact ,
and sanctioned only b
y
the silent acquiescence of the people .
Under such circumstances each State felt that it was the true
path o
f safety to retain all sovereign powers within it
s
own con
trol , the surrender o
f
which was not clearly seen , under existing
circumstances , to be demanded by an imperious public neces
sity . 1
$ 245 . Notwithstanding the declaration of the articles , that the
union o
f
the States was to b
e perpetual , an examination of the
powers confided to th
e
general government would easily satisfy us
that they looked principally to the existing revolutionary state o
f
things . The principal powers respected the operations of war ,and
would b
e
dormant in times o
f peace . In short , Congress in peace
was possessed o
f
but a delusive and shadowy sovereignty ,with little
more than the empty pageantry o
f
office . They were indeed clothed
with the authority of sending and receiving ambassadors ; of enter
ing into treaties and alliances , of appointing courts for the trial of
piracies and felonies on the high seas ; of regulating the public
coin ; of fixing the standard of weights and measures ; of regu
i Dr . Rush , in apologizing fo
r
the defects o
f
the confederation , has observed , “ The
confederation , together with most o
f
our State constitutions , was formed under very
unfavorable circumstances . We had just emerged from a corrupted monarchy . A
l
though we understood perfectly the principles o
f liberty , yet most of us were ignorant
o
f
the forms and combinations o
f power in republics . Add to this the British army in
the heart o
f
our country , spreading desolation wherever it went . " 1 Amer .Museum ,
8 . See also 1 Amer .Museum , 270 . The North American Review , for Oct . , 1827 , con
tains a summary o
f
some o
f
the prominent defects o
f the confederation . Art . I . p . 249 ,
& c . [And see History o
f
the Constitution b
y
Curtis , B . II . )
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lating trade with the Indians ; of establishing post-offices ; of bor
rowing money , and emitting bills on the credit of the United
States "; of ascertaining and appropriating the sums necessary for
defraying the public expenses , and of disposing of the western ter
ritory . And most of these powers required for their exercise the
assent of nine States. But they possessed not the power to raise
any revenue, to levy any tax , to enforce any law , to secure any
right , to regulate any trade , or even the poor prerogative of com
manding means to pay its own ministers at a foreign court . They
could contract debts , but they were without means to discharge
them . They could pledge the public faith ,but they were incapa
ble o
f redeeming it . They could enter into treaties , but every
State in the Union might disobey them with impunity . They
could contract alliances , but could not command men ormoney to
give them vigor . They could institute courts fo
r
piracies and fel
onies on the high seas , but they had no means to pay either the
judges o
r
the jurors . In short , al
l
powers which did not execute
themselves were a
t
the mercy of the States , and might be tram
pled upon a
t will with impunity .
$ 246 . One of our leading writers addressed the following
strong language to the public : 1 “ By this political compact the
United States in Congress have exclusive power fo
r
the following
purposes ,without being able to execute one of them . They may
make and conclude treaties , but can only recommend the observ
ance o
f
them . They may appoint ambassadors , but cannot defray
even the expenses of their tables . They may borrow money in
their own name on the faith o
f
the Union , but cannot pay a dol
lar . They may coin money , but they cannot purchase an ounce of
bullion . They may make war , and determine what number of
troops are necessary , but cannot raise a single soldier . In short ,
they may declare everything , but do nothing . ” 2
§ 247 . Strong as this language may seem , it has no coloring
beyond what the naked truth would justify 3 Washington himself ,
11 Amer .Mus . 1786 , p . 270 .
Language equally strong ,and almost identical in expression ,will be found in Mr .
Jay ' s Letter , addressed to the people of New York , 1787 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 554 , 556 .
3 Mr . Justice Patterson , in Hylton v . The United States , 3 Dall . 176 , after remarking
that Congress , under the confederation , had n
o
coercive authority , said , “ Requisitions
were a dead letter , unless the State legislatures could be brought into action ; and when
they were , the sums raised were very disproportional . ”
[Mr . Jefferson was of opinion that th
e
confederation possessed powers o
f
coercion b
y
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that patriot without stain or reproach , speaks in 1785 with un
usual significancy on the same subject. “ In a word ,” says he ,
“ the confederation appears to me to be little more than a shadow
without the substance ; and Congress a nugatory body , their ordi
nances being little attended to ." i The same sentiments may be
found in many public documents . One of the most humiliating
proofs of the utter inability of Congress to enforce even the exclu
sive powers vested in it is to be found in the argumentative circu
lar , addressed by it to the several States , in April , 1787, entreat
ing them in the most supplicating manner to repeal such of their
laws as interfered with the treaties with foreign nations . “ If in
theory ," says the historian of Washington , “ the treaties formed
by Congress were obligatory , yet it had been demonstrated that
in practice that body was absolutely unable to carry them into
execution .” 4
§ 248. The leading defects of the confederation may be enu
merated under the following heads:
In the first place , there was an utter want of al
l
coercive author
ity to carry into effect it
s
own constitutional measures . This , o
f
itself , was sufficient to destroy its whole efficiency , as a superin
tending government , if that may be called a government which
possessed n
o
one solid attribute o
f power . It has been justly ob
served that , “ a government authorized to declare war , but relying
o
n independent States for the means o
f prosecuting it ; capable o
f
contracting debts , and of pledging the public faith fo
r
their pay
ment , but depending on thirteen distinct sovereignties fo
r
the
preservation o
f that faith , could only be rescued from ignominy
and contempt by finding those sovereignties administered b
y
men
means o
f
which the obligations o
f
the several States might be enforced . Jefferson ' s
Works , IX . 291 . But as such powers , if possessed , could only be exercised against the
States a
s
States , the process of coercion must necessarily be such as independent nations
resort to under similar circumstances , that is to say , the display o
r
exercise o
f military
o
r
naval force , the seizure and confiscation o
f property , the laying o
f embargoes upon
commerce o
r
intercourse , & c . ; and the very exercise of such coercive authority , with a
view to enforce the objects o
f
the Union , would almost of necessity result in its over
throw . See Life and Correspondence of James Iredell , II . 193 . )
15 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , 64 . See also 2 Pitk . Hist . 217 ; North Amer .
Rev . Oct . 1827 , p . 249 , 254 , 256 , 259 .
? See 1 Amer .Museum , 275 , 290 , 364 , 430 , 447 , 448 , 449 . The Federalist , No . 15
to 2
2 ; 2 Amer .Museum , 383 ; Id . 395 , & c . ; 3 Amer . Museum , 62 to 69 ; Id . 73 ; Id .
334 to 338 ; Id . 342 ; Id . 348 , & c . ; Id . 549 , & c . ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 201 .
3 1 Amer . Museum , 352 .
4 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , 83 . 61 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 63 .
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exempt from the passions incident to human nature.” 1 That is ,
by supposing a case in which all human governments would be
come unnecessary , and al
l
differences o
f
opinion would become
impossible . In truth , Congress possessed only the power o
f
rec
ommendation . It depended altogether upon the good -will of the
States , whether a measure should be carried into effect or not .
And it ca
n
furnish nomatter o
f surprise ,under such circumstances ,
that great differences o
f opinion as to measures should have ex
isted in the legislatures o
f
the different States ; and that a policy ,
strongly supported in some , should have been denounced as ruin
ous in others . Honest and enlightened men might well divide on
such matters ; and in this perpetual conflict of opinion the State
might feel itself justified in a silent or open disregard of the act
o
f Congress .
$ 249 . The fact corresponded with the theory . Even during
th
e
Revolution , while al
l
hearts and hands were engaged in the
common cause ,many of the measures of Congress were defeated
b
y
the inactivity of the States ; and in some instances the exercise
o
f
it
s powers was resisted . But after the peace of 1783 , such
opposition became common , and gradually extended its sphere of
activity , until , in the expressive language already quoted , “ the
confederation became a shadow without the substance . ” There
were n
o national courts having original or appellate jurisdiction
over cases regarding the powers o
f
the Union ; and if there had
been , the relief would have been but of a very partial nature , since ,
without some act o
f
State legislation ,many of those powers could
not be brought into life .
$ 250 . A striking illustration of these remarks may be found in
our juridical history . The power o
f appeal in prize causes , as an
incident to the sovereign powers of peace and war , was asserted
b
y
Congress after the most elaborate consideration , and supported
b
y
the voice o
f
ten States , antecedent to the ratification of th
e
Arti
cles o
f
Confederation . The exercise of that power was , however ,
resisted b
y
the State courts , notwithstanding its immense impor
tance to the preservation o
f
the rights o
f independent neutral
15 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , 31 . See also i Kent ' s Comm . 199 ; 1 Elliot ' s
Debates , 208 , 20
9
, 21
0
, 211 ; North Amer . Rev . Oct . 1827 , p . 249 , 257 , & c . ; The
Federalist , No . 15 .
2 The Federalist , No . 15 .
3 Journals o
f Congress , 6th of March , 1779 , 5th vol . p . 86 , & c . to 90 .
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nations . The confederation gave in express terms this right of
appeal. The decrees of the court of appeals were equally resisted ;
and , in fact , they remained a dead letter , until they were enforced
by the courts of the United States under th
e
present Constitution .
§ 251 . The Federalist speaks with unusual energy on this sub
ject : 2 « The great and radical vice in the construction of the
confederation is in the principle of legislation fo
r
States o
r govern
ments in their corporate or collective capacities , and as contradis
tinguished from the individuals of whom they consist . Though
this principle does not run through al
l
the powers delegated to the
Union , yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy o
f
the rest depends . Except as to the rule of apportionment , the
United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions
for men and money ; but they have no authority to raise either by
regulations extending to the individuals of America . The conse
quence o
f
this is , that though in theory their resolutions concern
ing those objects are laws , constitutionally binding on the members
o
f
the Union ,yet in practice they are mere recommendations ,which
th
e
States observe o
r disregard a
t
their option . ” Again : “ The con
currence o
f
thirteen distinct sovereignties is requisite under the con
federation to the complete execution o
fevery important measure that
proceeds from the Union . It has happened as was to have been
foreseen . The measures of the Union have not been executed .
The delinquencies o
f
the States have , step b
y
step ,matured them
selves to a
n extreme which has a
t length arrested all the wheels
o
f the national government and brought them to an awful stand .
Congress a
t
this time scarcely possess themeans o
f keeping up
the forms of administration till the States can have time to agree
upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow o
f
a
Federal government . ”
$ 252 . A further illustration of this topic may be gathered from
the palpable defect in the confederation o
f any power to give a
sanction to it
s
laws . 8 Congress had no power to exact obedience ,
o
r punish disobedience to it
s
ordinances . They could neither im
pose fines , nor direct imprisonment , nor divest privileges , nor
declare forfeitures , nor suspend refractory officers . There was in
1 Penhallow v . Doane , 3 Dall . 54 ; Carson v . Jennings , 4 Cranch , 2 . ( Se
e
note to
§ 217 , ante .
2 The Federalist , No . 15 . See also 1 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 63 ; President Monroe ' s
Message o
f May , 1822 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . note D . passim .
8 i Kent ' s Comm . 200 .
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the confederation no express authority to exercise force ; and
though it might ordinarily be implied , as an incident , the right to
make such implication was prohibited , for each State was to “ re
tain every power , right, and jurisdiction not expressly delegated to
Congress ." 1 The consequence naturally was, that the resolutions
of Congress were disregarded , not only by States , but by individ
uals . Men followed their interests more than their duties ; they
cared little for persuasions which came without force , or for rec
ommendations which appealed only to their consciences or their
patriotism . Indeed , it seems utterly preposterous to call that a
government which has no power to pass laws ; or those enact
ments laws, which are attended with no sanction , and have no
penalty or punishment annexed to the disobedience of them .
§ 253 . But a still more striking defect was the totalwant of
power to la
y
and levy taxes , or to raise revenue to defray the ordi
nary expenses o
f government . The whole power confided to
Congress upon this head was the power “ to ascertain the sums
necessary to be raised fo
r
th
e
service o
f
the United States , " and
to apportion the quota or proportion on each State . But the power
was expressly reserved to the States to lay and levy the taxes , .
and o
f
course the time , as well as the mode of payment , was ex
tremely uncertain . The evils resulting from this source , even
during th
e
Revolutionary War ,were of incalculable extent ; 5 and ,
but fo
r
the good fortune o
f Congress in obtaining foreign loans , it
is fa
r
from being certain that they would not have been fatal . 6
The principle which formed the basis o
f
the apportionment was
sufficiently objectionable , as it took a standard extremely unequal
in it
s operation upon the different States . The value of its lands
was b
y
n
o means a just representative o
f
the proportionate contri
butions which each State ought to make towards the discharge o
f
the common burdens . ?
$ 254 . But this consideration sinks into utter insignificance in
1 The Federalist , No . 21 .
I 2 Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 84 .
3 The Federalist , No . 15 ; 1 Kent , Comm . 200 , 201 .
4 See in 1 U . S . Laws , (Bioren & Duane ' s ed . , ) p . 37 to 54 , the proceedings of
the old Congress o
n
this subject . See also The Federalist , No . 21 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black .
Comm . 235 to 238 ; The Federalist , Nos . 2
2 , 3
2
6 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , 55 ; 1 Amer . Museum , 449 .
6 2 Pitk . Hist . 158 , 159 , 160 , 163 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 237 , 243 to 246 ;
I U . S . Laws , 37 , 54 .
; The Federalist , Nos . 21 , 30 .
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comparison with others . Requisitions were to be made upon
thirteen independent States , and it depended upon the good -will
o
f
the legislature o
f
each State , whether it would comply at all ;
o
r
if it did comply , atwhat time , and in what manner . The very
tardiness of such an operation , in the ordinary course o
f things ,
was sufficient to involve the government in perpetual financial
embarrassments , and to defeat many of its best measures , even
when there was the utmost good faith and promptitude on the
part of the States , in complying with the requisitions . But many
reasons concurred to produce a total want o
f promptitude on th
e
part of the States , and , in numerous instances , a total disregard
o
f the requisitions . Indeed , from the moment that the peace o
f
1783 secured the country from th
e
distressing calamities of war ,
a general relaxation took place ; and many of the States succes
sively found apologies for their gross neglect in evils common to
all , or complaints listened to by al
l
. Many solemn and affecting
appeals were from time to time made b
y
Congress to the States ,
but they were attended with n
o salutary effect . ? Many measures
were devised to obviate th
e
difficulties ,nay , the dangers , which
threatened the Union ; but they failed to produce any amendments
in the confederation . An attempt was made by Congress , during
the war , to procure from the States an authority to levy an impost
o
f
five per cent upon imported and prize goods , but the assent of
a
ll
the States could not be procured . The treasury was empty ,
the credit o
f
the confederacy was sunk to a low ebb , the public
burdens were increasing , and the public faith was prostrate .
$ 255 . These general remarks may be easily verified b
y
a
n ap
peal to the public acts and history of the times . The close of the
Revolution , independent of the enormous losses occasioned b
y
the excessive issue and circulation , and consequent depreciation
o
f paper money , found the country burthened with a public debt
o
f upwards of forty -two millions of dollars ; 5 eight millions o
f
1 2 Pitk . Hist . 156 , 157 . See also Remarks of Patterson , J . in Hylton v . United
States , 3 Dall . 171 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 208 ; The Federalist , Nos . 21 , 31 .
2 See 1 U . S . Laws , (Bioren & Duane ' s ed . 1815 , ) from page 37 to 54 .
8 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , p . 35 , 36 , 37 .
4 5 Marshall ' s Life o
f
Washington , 37 ; Jour , of Congress , 3d Feb . 1781 , p . 26 ; Id .
16th Dec . 1782 , p . 38 ; Id . 26th April , 1783 , p . 194 , 203 .
6 (Rives , Life of Madison , III . 73 . ] The whole expense of the war was estimated at
135millions of dollars , including the specie value of all treasury bills of the United
States , reduced according to the scale of depreciation established b
y
Congress . 2 Pitk .
Hist . 180 .
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which were due for loans obtained in France or Holland , and the
remainder to our own citizens , and principally to those whose
bravery and patriotism had saved their country . Congress , con
scious of it
s inability to discharge even the interest o
f
this debt
b
y
it
s existing means , on th
e
12th o
f February , 1783 , resolved
that the establishment o
f permanent and adequate funds o
r
taxes
o
r
duties throughout the United States was indispensable to do
justice to the public creditors . On the 18th of April following ,
after much debate , a resolution was passed recommending to the
States to vest Congress with power to levy certain specified duties
o
n spirits ,wines , teas , pepper , sugar , molasses , cocoa , and coffee ,
and a duty o
f
five per cent a
d
valorem o
n all other imported goods .
These duties were to continue for twenty -five years , and were to
b
e applied solely to the payment of the principal and interest of
the public debt , and were to be collected b
y
officers chosen b
y
the
States , but removable b
y
Congress . The States were further re
quired to establish , for th
e
same time and object , other revenues ,
exclusive o
f
the duties o
n imports , according to the proportion
settled b
y
the confederation ; and the system was to take effect
only when the consent o
f all the States was obtained . 2
§ 256 . The measure thus adopted was strongly urged upon the
States in an address , drawn u
p
under the authority o
f Congress
b
y
some of ourmost distinguished statesmen . Whoever reads it ,
even a
t
this distance of time , will be struck with the force of its
style , the loftiness of its sentiments , and the unanswerable reason
ing , by which it sustained this appeal to the justice and patriot
ism o
f the nation . It was also recommended b
y
Washington in
a circular letter addressed to the governors o
f
the several States ,
availing himself o
f
the approaching resignation of his public com
mand to impart his farewell advice to his country . After having
stated that there were , in his opinion , four things essential to the
well -being and existence of the United States , as an independent
1 2 Pitk . Hist . 180 ; 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 33 .
2 2 Pitk . Hist . 180 , 181 ; 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 35 , 36 ; Journals of Congress , 12th
Feb . 1783 , p . 126 ; Id . 20th March , 1783 , p . 154 , 157 , 158 , 160 ; Id . 18th April , 1783 ,
p . 185 to 189 . An attempt was subsequently made in Congress to procure authority
to levy the taxes fo
r
the Union separately from other State taxes ; and to make the col
lectors liable to a
n
execution by the treasurer o
r
his deputy , under the direction o
f
Con
gress . But th
e
measure failed o
f receiving the vote o
f Congress itself . 5 Marsh . Life
o
f Washington , 36 , note .
8 2 Pitk . Hist . 181 , 182 ; 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 32 , 38 , 39 .
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power, - namely , 1. An indissoluble union of the States under one
Federal head ; 2. A sacred regard to public justice ; 3. The adop
tion of a proper peace establishment ; 4 . The prevalence of a
pacific and friendly disposition of th
e
people o
f
the United States
towards each other , - he proceeded to discuss at large the first
three topics . The following passage will at once disclose the
depth o
f his feelings and the extent o
f
his fears : “ Unless (said
h
e
) the States will suffer Congress to exercise those prerogatives
they are undoubtedly invested with b
y
the Constitution , every
thing must very rapidly tend to anarchy and confusion . It is
indispensable to the happiness of the individual States that there
should be lodged somewhere a supreme power to regulate and
govern the general concerns o
f
the confederated republic , without
which the Union cannot be of long duration . There must be a
faithful and pointed compliance on the part of every State with
the late proposals and demands o
f Congress , or the most fatal
consequences will ensue . Whatever measures have a tendency to
dissolve the Union , or contribute to violate or lessen the sovereign
authority , ought to be considered hostile to the liberty and inde
pendence o
f
America , and the authors o
f
them treated accordingly .
And , lastly , unless we can be enabled b
y
the concurrence o
f
the
States to participate o
f
the fruits o
f
the Revolution , and enjoy the
essential benefits of civil society under a form o
f government so
free and uncorrupted , so happily guarded against the danger of
oppression , as has been devised b
y
the Articles o
f
Confederation ,
itwill be a subject of regret that so much blood and treasure have
been lavished fo
r
n
o purpose ; that so many sufferings have been
encountered without compensation ; and that so many sacrifices
have been made in vain . ” 1
$ 257 . Notwithstanding the warmth of this appeal and the
urgency o
f
the occasion , th
e
measure was never ratified . A jeal
ousy began to exist between the State and general governments ;
and the State interests , as might naturally be presumed , predomi
nated . Some of the States adopted the resolution as to the imposts
with promptitude ; others gave a slow and lingering assent ; and
others held it under advisement . ? In the mean time , Congress was ,
15 Marsh . Life of Wash . 46 , 47 , 48 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 216 , 21
7
. See also 2 American
Maseum , 153 to 15
8
, Mr . Pinckney ' s Speech . Se
e
also 1 Kent , Comm . Lect . 10 , p .
212 to 247 ( 2
d
edition ) .
2 Journals of Congress , 1786 , p . 34 . See also 2 American Museum , 153 . The
VOL . I . 12
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obliged to rely , for the immediate supply of the treasury , upon
requisitions annually made and annually neglected . The requisi
tions fo
r
the payment of the interest upon the domestic debt , from
1782 to 1786 , amounted to more than six millions of dollars ; and
o
f
this su
m
u
p
to March , 1787 , about a million only was paid ; 1
and from November , 1784 , to January , 1786 , four hundred and
eighty -three thousand dollars only had been received a
t
the na
tional treasury . But for a temporary loan negotiated in Holland
there would have been an utter prostration o
f
the government . In
this state o
f things the value o
f
the domestic debt sunk down to
about one tenth o
f
it
s
nominal amount . 3
$ 258 . In February , 1786 , Congress determined to make another
and last appeal to the States upon the subject . The report adopted
upon that occasion contains a melancholy picture o
f
the state o
f
the nation . “ In the course of this inquiry (said the report ) it
most clearly appeared that the requisitions of Congress for eight
years past have been so irregular in their operation , so uncertain
in their collection , and so evidently unproductive , that a reliance
o
n
them in future , as a source from whence moneys are to be
drawn to discharge the engagements o
f
the confederation , definite
a
s they are in time and amount ,would be no less dishonorable to the
understandings o
f
those who entertained such confidence , than it
would be dangerous to th
e
welfare and peace of th
e
Union . ” “ It
has become the duty o
f Congress to declare most explicitly , that
the crisis has arrived ,when the people o
f
these United States , b
y
whose will and fo
r
whose benefit th
e
Federal government was insti
tuted , must decide whether they will support their rank , as a
nation , b
y maintaining the public faith a
t
home or abroad ; or
whether , for want of a timely exertion in establishing a general
revenue and thereby giving strength to the confederacy , they will
hazard not only the existence o
f
the Union , but of those great and
invaluable privileges for which they have so arduously and so
honorably contended . ” 4 After the adoption of this report , three
Report o
f
a committee o
f Congress of the 15th o
f February , 1786 , contains a de
tailed statement o
f
the acts o
f
the States relative to the measure . Jour . o
f Congress ,
1786 , p . 3
4 ; 1 Amer . Museum , 282 ; 2 Amer . Museum , 153 to 160 .
1 2 Pitk . Hist . 184 . 2 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 60 .
8 2 Pitk . Hist . 185 .
4 Journals o
f Congress , 1786 , p . 34 to 36 ; 1 Amer . Museum , 282 , & c . The Com
mittee who made the Report were Mr . King , Mr . Pinckney ,Mr . Kean , Mr . Monroe ,
andMr . Pettit .
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States which had hitherto stood aloof came into the measure .
New York alone refused to comply with it ; and after a most ani
mated debate in her legislature , she remained inflexible , and the
fate o
f
the measure was sealed forever b
y
her solitary negative .
$ 259 . Independent ,however , of this inability to lay taxes or
collect revenue , the want of any power in Congress to regulate
foreign o
r
domestic commerce was deemed a leading defect in the
confederation . This evil was felt in a comparatively slight degree
during the war . But when the return of peace restored the coun
tr
y
to it
s ordinary commercial relations , the want of some uniform
system to regulate them was early perceived ; and the calamities
which followed our shipping and navigation , our domestic as well
a
s
our foreign trade , convinced the reflecting that ruin impended
upon these and other vital interests , unless a national remedy
could b
e
devised . We accordingly find th
e
public papers o
f
that
period crowded with complaints on this subject . It was , indeed ,
idle and visionary to suppose , that while thirteen independent
States possessed the exclusive power o
f regulating commerce ,
there could be found any uniformity o
f system , or any harmony
and co -operation fo
r
the general welfare . Measures o
f
a commer
cial nature , which were adopted in one State from a sense of its
own interests , would be often countervailed or rejected by other
States from similar motives . If one State should deem a naviga
tion act favorable to it
s
own growth , the efficacy of such a measure
might b
e
defeated b
y
the jealousy o
r policy o
f
a neighboring State .
If one should levy duties to maintain its own government and re
sources , there were many temptations for its neighbors to adopt the
system o
f
free trade , to draw to itself a larger share of foreign and
domestic commerce . The agricultural States might easily suppose
that they had not an equal interest in the restrictive system with
the navigating States . And , at all events , each State would legis
late according to it
s
estimate o
f
it
s own interests , the importance
1 2 Pitk . Hist . 184 , 222 ; 5 Marsh . Life of Washington , 62 , 63 , 124 ; 1 Tuck . Black .
App . 158 . The speech o
f
Colonel Hamilton , then in the legislature of New York , in Feb
ruary , 1787 , contains a very powerful argument in favor o
f
the impost ; and a statement
o
f
the extent to which each o
f
the States had complied with o
r
refused the requisitions
o
f Congress . During th
e
past five years , he says , New Hampshire , North Carolina ,
South Carolina , and Georgia had paid nothing ; Connecticut and Delaware , about one
third ; Massachusetts , Rhode Island , and Maryland , about one half ; Virginia , three
fifths ; Pennsylvania , near the whole ; and New York ,more than her quota . 1 Amer .
Museum , 445 , 448 .
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of its own products , and the local advantages or disadvantages of
its position in a political or commercial view . To do otherwise
would be to sacrifice it
s
immediate interests , without any adequate
o
r enduring consideration ; to legislate for others , and not for
itself ; to dispense blessings abroad ,without regarding the security
o
f
those a
t home . ?
$ 260 . Such a state of things necessarily gave rise to serious
dissensions among the States themselves . The difference of regu
lations was a perpetual source o
f
irritation and jealousy . Real or
imaginary grievances were multiplied in every direction ; and thus
State animosities and local prejudices were fostered to a high
degree , so as to threaten a
t
once the peace and safety o
f
the
Union . Like evils existed in our colonial state . 3
§ 261 . These evils were aggravated b
y
the situation of our
foreign commerce . During the war , our commerce was nearly
annihilated b
y
the superior naval power o
f
the enemy ; and the
return o
f
peace enabled foreign nations , and especially Great
Britain , in a great measure to monopolize al
l
the benefits o
f
our
home trade . In the first place , our navigation , having no protec
tion , was unable to engage in competition with foreign ships . In
th
e
next place , our supplies were almost altogether furnished b
y
foreign importers or on foreign account . We were almost flooded
with foreign manufactures , while our own produce bore but a re
duced price . It was easy to foresee that such a state of things
must soon absorb all our means , and as our industry had but a
narrow scope , would soon reduce us to absolute poverty . Our
trade in our own ships with foreign nations was depressed in an
equal degree ; for it was loaded with heavy restrictions in their
ports . While , for instance , British ships , with their commodities ,
i New Jersey early felt the want of a power , in Congress , to regulate foreign com
merce , and made it one o
f
her objections to adopting the Articles o
f
Confederation , in her
representation to Congress . 2 Pitk . Hist . 23 , 24 ; 1 Secret Journ . 37
5
; The Federalist ,
No . 3
8
.
? 2 Pitk . Hist . 192 , 214 , 215 ; 1 Amer .Museum , 272 , 273 , 281 , 282 , 288 ; The Fed .
eralist , No . 22 ; 1 Amer . Mus . 13 to 16 ; 2 Amer . Mus . 395 to 399 ; The Federalist ,
No . 7 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 75 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 159 , 248 , 249 . Mons .
Turgot , the comptroller -general of the finances of France , among other errors in our
national policy , observed , that in the several States “ one fixed principle is established
in regard to imposts . Each State is supposed to be at liberty to tax itself at pleasure ,
and to lay it
s
taxes upon persons , consumptions , or importations ; that is to say , to
erect a
n
interestcontrary to that o
f
other States . ” 1 Amer . Museum , 16 .
3 2 Graham ' s Hist . Appx . 498 , 499 .
4 5 Marsh . Lif
e
o
f Washington , 69 , 72 , 75 , 79 , 80 .
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had free admission into our ports , American ships and exports
were loaded with heavy exactions , or prohibited from entry into
British ports . Wewere therefore the victims of our own imbe
cility , and reduced to a complete subjection to the commercial
regulations of other countries , notwithstanding our boasts of free
dom and independence . Congress had been long sensible of the
fatal effects flowing from this source ; but their efforts to ward off
themischiefs had been unsuccessful . Being invested by the Arti
cles of Confederation with a limited power to form commercial
treaties, they endeavored to treat with foreign powers upon princi
ples of reciprocity . But these negotiations were, as might be
anticipated , unsuccessful , fo
r
the parties met upon very unequal
terms . Foreign nations , and especially Great Britain , felt secure
in the possession of their present command o
f
our trade , and had
not the least inducement to part with a single advantage . It was
further pressed upon u
s , with a truth equally humiliating and un
deniable , that Congress possessed no effectual power to guarantee
th
e
faithful observance o
f any commercial regulations ; and there
must in such cases be reciprocal obligations . ? “ America ( said
Washington ) must appear in a very contemptible point of view to
those with whom she was endeavoring to form commercial treaties
without possessing the means o
f carrying them into effect . They
must see and feel that the Union , or the States individually , are
sovereign , as best suits their purposes . In a word , that we are a
nation to -day , and thirteen to -morrow . Who will treat with us on
such terms ? " 8
$ 262 . The difficulty of enforcing even the obligations of the
treaty o
f
peace o
f
1783 was a most serious national evil . Great
Britain made loud complaints o
f
infractions thereof on th
e
part of
the several States , and demanded redress . She refused on account
o
f
these alleged infractions to surrender u
p
the western ports a
c
cording to the stipulations o
f
that treaty ; and the whole confed
eracy was consequently threatened with the calamities o
f
Indian
11 Tuck . Black . App . 157 , 159 ; 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 77 , 78 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 186
to 192 ; 1 Amer .Museum , 282 , 288 ; 2 Amer . Museum , 263 to 276 ; Id . 371 to 373 ; 3
Amer . Museum , 554 to 557 , 562 ; North American Review , Oct . 1827 , p . 249 , 257 ,
258 .
? 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 71 , 72 , 73 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 189 , 190 ; 3 Amer .Museum , 62 ,
6
4 , 6
5
.
85 Marsh . Life of Wash . 73 ; North American Review , Oct . 1827 , p . 257 , 25
8
;
Atcheson ' s Coll . of Reports , p . 55 .
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depredations on the whole of our western borders ,and was in dan
ger of having it
s public peace subverted through it
s
mere inability
to enforce the treaty stipulations . The celebrated address of Con
gress , in 1787 , to the several States on this subject , is replete with
admirable reasoning , and contains melancholy proofs of th
e
utter
inefficiency o
f
the confederation , and of the disregard by the States
in their legislation o
f
the provisions of that treaty .
$ 263 . In April , 1784 , Congress passed a resolution requesting
the States to vest the general government with power , fo
r
fifteen
years only , to prohibit the importation and exportation of goods in
the ships o
f
nations with which we had no commercial treaties ;
and also to prohibit the subjects o
f foreign nations , unless author
ized b
y
treaty , to import any goods into the United States , not the
produce o
r
manufacture o
f
the dominions o
f
their own sovereign .
Although Congress expressly stated , that without such a power no
reciprocal advantages could be acquired , the proposition was never
assented to b
y
the States ; and their own countervailing laws were
either rendered nugatory b
y
th
e
laws o
f
other Stateş , or were re
pealed b
y
a regard to their own interests . ? A
t
a still later period
a resolution was moved in Congress , recommending it to the States
to vest in the general government full authority to regulate exter
nal and internal commerce , and to impose such duties asmight be
necessary fo
r
the purpose , which shared even a more mortifying
fate ; fo
r
it was rejected in that body , although all the duties were
to b
e
collected b
y
and paid over to the States . 8
$ 264 . Various reasons concurred to produce these extraordi
nary results . But the leading cause was a growing jealousy of the
general government , and a more devoted attachment to the local
interests o
f
the States ; a jealousy which soon found its way even
into the councils o
f Congress , and enervated the little power which
it was yet suffered to exert . One memorable instance occurred ,
when it was expected that the British garrisons would surrender
the western posts , and it was thought necessary to provide some
1 Journals o
f Congress , April 13 , 1787 , p . 32 ; Rawle on Constitution , App . 2 , p .
316 . It was drawn u
p
b
y Mr . Jay , then Secretary of Foreign Affairs , and was unani
mously adopted b
y
Congress . It however failed of its object . And the treaty o
f
1783 ,
so far a
s
it respected British debts , was never faithfully executed until after the adop
tion o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United States . See Ware v . Hylton , 3 Dall , R . 19
9
;
Hopkins v . Bell , 3 Cranch , 454 ; (Rives , Life o
f
Madison , II . 10 et se
q
. )
2 2 Pitk . Hist . 192 ; 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 70 .
8 5 Marsh . Life of Washington , 80 , 81 .
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regular troops to take possession of them on the part of America .
The power of Congress to make a requisition on the States for this
purpose was gravely contested ; and , as connected with the right
to borrow money and emit bills of credit , was asserted to be dan
gerous to liberty and alarming to the States. The measure was
rejected , and militia were ordered in their stead .1
§ 265 . There were other defects seriously urged against the con
federation , which , although not of such a fatal tendency as those
already enumerated ,were deemed of sufficient importance to justify
doubts as to its efficacy as a bond o
f
union , or an enduring scheme
o
f government . It is not necessary to go at large into a consider
ation o
f
them . Itwill suffice fo
r
the present purpose to enumerate
the principal heads . 1 . The principle of regulating the contri
butions o
f
the States into the common treasury b
y
quotas , appor
tioned according to the value o
f
lands ,which ( as has been already
suggested ) was objected to as unjust , unequal , and inconvenient
in it
s operation . 2 . The want of a mutual guaranty of the
State governments , so as to protect them against domestic insur
rections , and usurpations destructive of their liberty . 3 . The
want of a direct power to raise armies , which was objected to as
unfriendly to vigor and promptitude o
f
action , as well as to econ
omy and a just distribution o
f
the public burdens . 4 . The
right o
f
equal suffrage among a
ll
the States , so that the least in
point o
f
wealth , population , and means stood equal in the scale of
representation with those which were the largest . From this cir
cumstance it might , nay , it must happen , that a majority of the
States , constituting a third only of the people of America , could
control the rights and interests o
f
the other two thirds . Nay , it
was constitutionally , not only possible , but true in fact , that even
the votes of nine States might not comprehend a majority o
f
the
people in the Union . The minority , therefore , possessed a nega
tive upon the majority . 5 . The organization of th
e
whole pow
ers o
f
the general government in a single assembly , without any
· separate or distinct distribution of the executive , judicial , and
legislative functions . It was objected , that either the whole su
1 5 Marsh . Life of Washington , App . note 1 .
2 The Federalist , No . 21 ; 3 Amer .Museum , 62 , 63 , 64 .
8 The Federalist , N
o
. 21 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 62 , 65 . 4 The Federalist , No . 2
2 .
5 The Federalist , No . 22 ; 1 Amer . Museum , 275 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 62 , 66 .
6 The Federalist , No . 22 ; 1 Amer . Museum , 8 , 9 ; Id . 272 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 6
2 ,
6
6 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 10 , p . 200 ( 2d edit . p . 212 ] .
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perstructure would thus fall , from its own intrinsic feebleness ; o
r ,
engrossing all the attributes of sovereignty , entail upon the country
a most execrable form o
f government in the shape o
f
a
n irrespon
sible aristocracy . 6 . The want of an exclusive power in the
general government to issue paper money ; and thus to prevent
the inundation o
f
the country with a base currency , calculated to
destroy public faith a
s
well a
s private morals . 7 . The to
o
fr
e .
quent rotation required b
y
the confederation in th
e
office o
f mem
bers o
f Congress , by which the advantages resulting from long
experience and knowledge in the public affairs were lost to the
public councils . 8 . The want of judiciary power coextensive
with the powers o
f
the general government .
§ 266 . In respect to this last defect , the language of the Feder
alist 3 contains so full an exposition that no further comment is
required . “ Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and
define their true meaning and operation . The treaties of the
United States , to have any force at a
ll ,must be considered as part
o
f
the law o
f
the land . Their true import , as far as respects indi .
viduals ,must , like al
l
other laws , be ascertained b
y judicial deter
minations . To produce uniformity in these determinations , they
ought to be submitted , in the last resort , to one supreme tribunal .
And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority
which forms the treaties themselves . These ingredients are both
indispensable . If there is in each State a court of final jurisdic
tion , there may be as many different final determinations on the
same point as there are courts . There are endless diversities in
the opinions of men . We often see not only different courts , but
the judges o
f
the same court differing from each other . To avoid
the confusion which would unavoidably result from the contradic
tory decisions o
f
a number o
f independent judicatories , al
l
nations
have found it necessary to establish one tribunal paramount to the
rest , possessing a general superintendence , and authorized to settle
and declare , in the last resort , an uniform rule of justice . ”
$ 267 . “ This is the more necessary where the frame of govern
ment is so compounded that the laws o
f
the whole are in danger
o
f being contravened b
y
the laws of the parts , & c . The treaties
11 Amer . Museum , 8 , 9 ; Id . 363 . ( Se
e
Van Buren , Political Parties , 55 ; Life of
Samuel Adams , II . 480 . ]
2 1 Amer .Museum , 8 , 9 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 62 , 66 .
3 The Federalist , No . 22 .
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of the United States, under the present confederation , are liable
to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures , and as many
different courts of final jurisdiction , acting under the authority of
these legislatures . The faith , the reputation , the peace of the
whole Union , are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices ,
the passions , and the interests of every member of which these
are composed . Is it possible, under such circumstances , that for
eign nations can either respect or confide in such a government ?
Is it possible that the people of America will longer consent to
trust their honor , their happiness, their safety , on so precarious a
foundation ? ” It might have been added that the rights of indi
viduals , so far as they depended upon acts or authorities derived
from the confederation ,were liable to th
e
same difficulties a
s
the
rights of other nations dependent upon treaties . 1
§ 268 . The last defect which seemsworthy of enumeration is ,
that the confederation never had a ratification o
f
the PEOPLE .
Upon this objection , it will be sufficient to quote a single passage
from the same celebrated work , as it affords a very striking com
mentary upon some extraordinary doctrines recently promulgated . ?
• Resting on no better foundation than th
e
consent o
f
the State
legislatures , it (the confederation ] has been exposed to frequent and
intricate questions concerning the validity o
f
it
s powers , and has ,
in some instances , given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right
o
f legislative repeal . Owing its ratification to a law of a State , it
has been contended that the same authority might repeal the law
b
y
which it was ratified . However gross a heresy it may be to
maintain that a party to a compact has a right to revoke that com
pact , the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates . The pos
sibility of a question o
f
this nature proves the necessity o
f laying
the foundations of our national government deeper than in the
mere sanction o
f
delegated authority . The fabric of American
empire ought to rest on the solid basis o
f
the CONSENT O
F
THE
PEOPLE . The streams of national power ought to flow immediately
from that pure , original fountain of all legitimate authority . ” 3
§ 269 . The very defects of the confederation seem also to have
led Congress , from the pressure of public necessity , into some
usurpations o
f authority , and the States into many gross infrac
1 See Chisholm v . Georgia , 2 Dall . R .419 , 447 .
The Federalist , No . 22 .
8 The Federalist , No . 43 .
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tions of it
s legitimate sovereignty . “ A list of the cases ( says
the Federalist ) in which Congress have been betrayed o
r
forced b
y
the defects of the confederation into violations of their chartered
authorities , would not a little surprise those who have paid no
attention to the subject . ” 2 Again , speaking of the western terri
tory , and referring to the Ordinance of 1787 , fo
r
the government
thereof , it is observed : “ Congress have assumed the administra
tion o
f
this stock . They have begun to render it productive .
Congress have undertaken to do more ; they have proceeded to
form new States , to erect temporary governments , to appoint offi .
cers for them ,and to prescribe the conditions on which such States
shall be admitted into the confederacy . All this has been done ,
and done without the least color of constitutional authority . Yet
n
o
blame has been whispered , no alarm has been sounded . ” 3
$ 270 . Whatever may be thought as to some of these enu
merated defects , whether they were radical deficiencies or not ,
there cannot b
e
a doubt that others o
f
them went to the very
marrow and essence of government . There had been , and in fact
then were , different parties in the several States , entertaining
opinions hostile o
r friendly to the existence o
f
a general govern
ment . The former would naturally cling to th
e
State govern
ments with a close and unabated zeal , and deem the least possible
delegation o
f power to the Union sufficient , ( if any were to be
permitted , ) with which it could creep on in a semi -animated state .
The latter would a
s naturally desire that the powers of the general
government should have a real , and notmerely a suspended vital
it
y ; that it should act and move and guide , and notmerely totter
under its own weight , o
r
sink into a drowsy decrepitude , powerless
and palsied . But each partymust have felt that the confederation
had a
t
last totally failed a
s
a
n effectual instrument o
f government ;
that it
s glory was departed , and its days of labor done ; that it
stood the shadow o
f
a mighty name ; that it was seen only as a
decayed monument o
f
th
e
past , incapable of any enduring record ;
that the steps of its decline were numbered and finished ; and that
it was now pausing at the very door of that common sepulchre o
f
the dead whose inscription is , Nulla vestigia retrorsum .
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 43 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 10 , p . 201 ( 2d edit . p . 214 , 21
5
] .
2 The Federalist , No . 42 .
8 The Federalist , No . 38 .
4 5Marsh . Life of Washington , 33 . [See Van Buren , Political Parties , 82 ; Ham
mond , Political Hist . o
f
N . Y . I . 2 . ]
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$ 271 . If this language should be thought too figurative to suit
the sobriety of historical narration , we might avail ourselves of
language as strongly colored and as desponding ,which was at that
period wrung from the hearts of our wisest patriots and states
men . It is , indeed , difficult to overcharge any picture of the
gloom and apprehensions which then pervaded the public councils
as well as the private meditations of the ablest men of the coun
tr
y
. We are told b
y
a
n historian o
f
almost unexampled fidelity
andmoderation , and himself a witness of these scenes , that “ the
confederation was apparently expiring from mere debility . In
deed , its preservation in its actual condition , had it been practica
ble ,was scarcely to be desired . Without the ability to exercise
them , it withheld from the States powers which are essential to
their sovereignty . The last hope of its friends having been de
stroyed , the vital necessity o
f
some measure which might prevent
the separation of the integral parts o
f
which th
e
American em
pire was composed , became apparent even to those who had been
unwilling to perceive it . ” 3
1 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 92 , 93 , 94 , 95 , 96 , 104 , 113 , 114 , 118 , 120 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm .
202 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . note D , 142 , 15
6
; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 208 to 213 ; 3
Elliot ' s Debates , 30 , 31 to 34 .
2 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 124 .
8 Mr . Jefferson uses the following language : " The alliance between the States ,
under the old Articles o
f
Confederation , for the purpose o
f joint defence against the
aggressions o
f Great Britain , was found insufficient , as treaties of alliance generally
are , to enforce compliance with their mutual stipulations ; and these once fulfilled , that
bond was to expire o
f
itself , and each State to become sovereign and independent in a
ll
things . ” 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 444 . Thus , he seems to have held the extraordinary
opinion , that the confederation was to cease with the war , o
r , a
t
a
ll
events , with the
fulfilment o
f
our treaty stipulations .
[ In some instances , however ,Mr . Jefferson appears to have spoken o
f
the confedera
tion a
s possessing considerable vitality , energy , and vigor .
In a letter to John Adams , of the date of February 23 , 1787 , referring to whatMr .
Adams had said of the Congress , that it “ is not a legislative but a diplomatic assem
bly , " Mr . Jefferson says : “ Separating into parts the whole sovereignty o
f
our States ,
some o
f these parts are yielded to Congress . Upon these I should think them both
legislative and executive , and that would have been judiciary also , had not the confed
eration required them for certain purposes to appoint a judiciary . It has accordingly
been the decision o
f
our courts that the confederation is a part o
f
the law o
f
the land ,
and superior in authority to the ordinary laws ,because it cannot b
e
altered b
y
the legisla
ture o
f any one State . I doubt whether they are at al
l
a diplomatic assembly . ” Jef .
ferson ' s Works , II . 128 ; Works of John Adams , VIII . 433 . Elsewhere Mr . Jefferson
expressed the opinion that the confederation had the power to coerce the performance
b
y
individual States o
f
national duties , and that it was implied in the compact . Jeffer
son ' s Works , IX , 291 ; Life of Madison , by Rives , I . 302 . )
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$ 272 . In this state of things , commissioners were appointed by
the legislatures of Virginia and Maryland , early in 1785 , to form a
compact relative to the navigation of the rivers Potomac and Poco
moke , and the Chesapeake Bay . The commissioners having met
at Alexandria in Virginia in March , in that year, felt the want of
more enlarged powers , and particularly of powers to provide
for a local naval force and a tariff of duties upon imports .1
Upon receiving their recommendation , the legislature of Virginia
passed a resolution fo
r
laying the subject o
f
a tariff before a
ll
the
States composing the Union . Soon afterwards , in January , 1786 ,
the legislature adopted another resolution , appointing commission
e
rs , “ who were to meet such asmight be appointed b
y
the other
States in the Union a
t
a time and place to be agreed on , to take
into consideration the trade o
f
the United States ; to examine the
relative situation and trade o
f
the States ; to consider how far a
uniform system in their commercial relations may b
e necessary to
their common interest and their permanent harmony ; and to re
port to the several States such an act , relative to this great object ,
a
s , when unanimously ratified b
y
them , will enable the United
States in Congress assembled to provide fo
r
the same . ” 2
$ 273 . These resolutions were communicated to the States , and
1 [Rives , Life of Madison , I . 548 ; II . 57 . ]
? 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 90 , 91 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 203 ; (Rives , Life of Madison ,
II . 60 . )
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a convention of commissioners from five States only , namely , New
York , New Jersey , Pennsylvania , Delaware , and Virginia ,met at
Annapolis in September , 1786 .1 After discussing the subject ,
they deemed more ample powers necessary, and as well from this
consideration , as because a small number only of the States was
represented , they agreed to come to no decision , but to frame a
report to be laid before the several States , as well as before Con
gress. In this report they recommended the appointment of
commissioners from a
ll
the States , “ tomeet at Philadelphia on the
second Monday of May , then next , to take into consideration the
situation of the United States ; to devise such further provisions
a
s
shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution o
f
the
Federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union ; and
to report such an act for that purpose to the United States in Con
gress assembled , as ,when agreed to by them , and afterwards con
firmed b
y
the legislature o
f
every State , will effectually provide fo
r
the same . " 3
$ 274 . On receiving this report , th
e
legislature of Virginia
passed an act for the appointment o
f delegates to meet such a
s
11 Amer . Museum , 26
7
; 2 Pitk . Hist . 21
8
; [Rives , Life of Madison , II . 98 , 11
7
,
125 . )
2 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 97 ; 2 Pitk . 218 ; I U . S . Laws , (Bioren & Duane ' s edit .
1815 ) , p . 55 , & c . to 58 .
8 1 Amer . Museum , 267 , 26
8
; [Rives , Life ofMadison , II . 12
7
. The preamble of
this act is worthy o
f preservation as a recognition o
f
the immediate and imperative ne
cessity fo
r
radical changes in the bond of union . “ Whereas the General Assembly of
this Commonwealth , taking into view th
e
actual situation o
f
the confederacy , as well as
reflecting o
n
the alarming representations made , from time to time , b
y
the United
States in Congress , particularly in their act of the 15th day of February last , can no
longer doubt that the crisis is arrived a
t
which the good people o
f
America are to decide
the solemn question whether theywill , b
y
wise and magnanimous efforts , reap the just
fruits o
f
that independence which they have so gloriously acquired , and of that Union
which they have cemented with so much o
f
their common blood ; or whether , b
y
giving
way to mutual jealousies and prejudices , or to partial and transitory interests , they will
renounce the auspicious blessings prepared fo
r
them b
y
th
e
Revolution , and furnish to
it
s
enemies a
n
eventual triumph over those b
y
whose virtue and valor it has been accom
plished : and whereas the same noble and extended policy , and the same fraternal and
affectionate sentiments which originally determined the citizens o
f
this Commonwealth
to unite with their brethren o
f
the other States in establishing a Federal government ,
cannot but b
e
felt with equal force now , asmotives to lay aside every inferior considera
tion and to concur in such further concessions and provisions a
s may b
e necessary to
secure the great object fo
r
which that government was established , and to render the
United States a
s happy in peace a
s they have been glorious in war . ” The careful
wording o
f
this preamble was due to a desire , as Mr .Madison says , “ to give this sub
ject a very .solemn dress , and al
l
the weight that could b
e
derived from a single State . ”
Letter to Washington , Rives ' s Life of Madison , II . 13
5
. ]
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might be appointed b
y
other States , at Philadelphia . The report
was also received in Congress . But no step was taken until the
legislature o
f
New York instructed it
s delegation in Congress to
move a resolution , recommending to the several States to appoint
deputies to meet in convention fo
r
the purpose o
f revising and
proposing amendments to the Federal Constitution . O
n
the 21st
o
f February , 1787 , a resolution was accordingly moved and car
ried in Congress , recommending a convention tomeet in Philadel
phia , on the second Monday in May ensuing , “ for the purpose of
revising the Articles o
f
Confederation , and reporting to Congress
and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein ,
a
s shall , when agreed to in Congress and confirmed b
y
the States ,
render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies o
f gov
ernment and the preservation o
f
the Union . ” 3 The alarming
insurrection then existing in Massachusetts ,without doubt , had no
small share in producing this result . The report of Congress on
that subject a
t
once demonstrates their fears and their political
weakness .
$ 275 . A
t
the time and place appointed , the representatives of
twelve States assembled . Rhode Island alone declined to appoint
any o
n this momentous occasion . After very protracted delibera
tions , the convention finally adopted the plan of the present Con
stitution on the 17th o
f September , 1787 ; and b
y
a contempora
neous resolution ,directed it to be “ laid before the United States in
Congress assembled , ” and declared their opinion , “ that it should
afterwards be submitted to a convention o
f
delegates chosen in
each State b
y
the people thereof , under a recommendation of its
legislature fo
r
their assent and ratification ” ; 6 and that each con
vention assenting to and ratifying the same should give notice
thereof to Congress . The convention , b
y
a further resolution , de
clared their opinion , that as soon as nine States had ratified the
Constitution , Congress should fix a day on which electors should
b
e appointed b
y
the States which should have ratified the same ,
1 Marsh . Life of Wash . 98 ; (Rives , Life of Madison , II . 132 . ]
2 Itwas carried in the senate of the State by a majority of one only . 5 Marsh . Life
o
f
Wash . 125 .
8 2 Pitk . Hist . 219 ; 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 12
4
, 12
5
; 12 Journ . of Congress , 12 ,
1
3 , 14 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 219 , 220 , 222 .
4 2 Pitk . Hist . 220 , 221 ; Journ . o
f Congress , Oct . 1786 ; 1 Secret Journ . 268 .
6 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 128 ; [Arnold , Hist . o
f
Rhode Island , II . 537 . )
6 5 Marsh . Life of Washington , 128 , 129 ; Journal o
f
Convention , 370 ; - 12 Journ .
o
f Congress , 109 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 224 , 264 ; (Rives , Life of Madison . II . 477 . ]
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and a day on which the electors should assemble and vote fo
r
the
president , and time and place of commencing proceedings under
the Constitution ; and that after such publication the electors
should b
e appointed and the senators and representatives elected .
The same resolution contained further recommendations fo
r
the
purpose o
f carrying the Constitution into effect .
$ 276 . The convention at the same time addressed a letter to
Congress , expounding their reasons fo
r
their acts , from which the
following extract cannot but be interesting : “ It is obviously im
practicable (says the address ) in the Federal government of these
States , to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each , and
yet provide fo
r
the interest and safety o
f
a
ll . Individuals enter
ing into society must give u
p
a share of liberty to preserve the
rest . Themagnitude of the sacrificemust depend as well on sit
uation and circumstance a
s
o
n the object to be obtained . It is at
all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those -
rights which must be surrendered and those which may be re
served ; and on the present occasion this difficulty was increased
b
y
a difference among the several States as to their situation , ex
tent , habits , and particular interests . In al
l
our deliberations on
this subject , w
e
kept steadily in our view that which appears to u
s
the greatest interest o
f every true American , the consolidation of
our Union , in which is involved our prosperity , felicity , safety , per
haps our national existence . This important consideration , seri
ously and deeply impressed on our minds , led each State in the
convention to be less rigid on points o
f
inferior magnitude than
might have been otherwise expected . And thus the Constitution ,
which we now present , is th
e
result o
f
a spirit of amity , and of that
mutual deference and concession which th
e
peculiarity o
f
our politi
cal situation rendered indispensable . ” 1
§ 277 . Congress , having received the report of the convention
o
n the 28th o
f September , 1787 , unanimously resolved , “ that the
said report ,with the resolutions and letter accompanying the same ,
b
e transmitted to the several legislatures in order to be submitted
to a convention of delegates chosen in each State b
y
the people thereof ,
in conformity to the resolves o
f
the convention ,made and provided
in that case . " 2
1 1
2
Journ . of Congress , 10
9
, 11
0
; Journ . of Convention , 367 , 368 ; 5 Marsh . Life
o
f
Wash . 129 .
2 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 128 ; 12 Journ . of Congress , 99 , 11
0
; Journ . of Convention ,
App . 391 ; (Rives , Life of Madison , II . 480 . ]
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$ 278 . Conventions in the various States which had been repre
sented in the general convention were accordingly called b
y
their
respective legislatures ; and the Constitution having been ratified
b
y
eleven out o
f
the twelve States , Congress , on the 13th of Septem
ber , 1788 , 1 passed a resolution appointing the first Wednesday in
January following for the choice o
f
electors o
f president ; the first
Wednesday o
f February following , for the assembling of the elec
tors to vote fo
r
a president ; and the first Wednesday of March
following , at the then seat of Congress (New York ] , the time and
place fo
r
commencing proceedings under the Constitution . Elec
tors were accordingly appointed in the several States ,who met and
gave their votes for a president ; and the other elections fo
r
sena
tors and representatives having been dulymade , on Wednesday ,
the 4th o
f
March , 1789 , Congress assembled and commenced pro
ceedings under the new Constitution . A quorum of both houses ,
however , did not assemble until the 6th of April , when , the votes
fo
r
president being counted , it was found that George Washington
was unanimously elected president , and John Adams was elected
vice -president . On the 30th of April President Washington was
sworn into office , and the government then went into full opera
tion in a
ll
it
s departments .
$ 279 . North Carolina had not , as yet , ratified the Constitution .
The first convention called in that State , in August , 1788 , refused
to ratify it without some previous amendments and a declaration o
f
rights . In a second convention , however , called in November ,
1789 , this State adopted the Constitution . The State of Rhode
Island had declined to call a convention ; but , finally , by a conven
tion held in May , 1790 , its assent was obtained ; and thus al
l
the
thirteen original States became parties to the new government .
1 Journ . o
f
Convention , App . 449 , 450 , 451 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 291 .
2 5 Marsh . Life o
f
Wash . 133 , 151 , 152 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 317 , 318 ; 1 Lloyd ' s Debates ,
3 , 4 , 5 , 6 .
3 2 Pitk . Hist . 283 ; Journ . o
f
Convention , App . 452 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 204 , 205 .
4 2 Pitk . Hist . 265 ; Journ . of Convention , App . 452 , 458 . (By setting aside the
Articles o
f
Confederation ,which b
y
their terms were to b
e
articles o
f
“ perpetual union , ”
and by substituting instead thereof a Constitution to which two of the States had not
assented , those States were at once and effectually excluded from the Union , b
y
a revo
lution in the government ,which , though peaceful ,was only to be justified on grounds sim
ilar to those on which any revolution can be defended when the established government
has ceased to accomplish the purposes o
f
its creation . But though these States were
thus cut off from constitutional affiliation , they were not put , in their intercourse with
the government and in commercial regulations , on the footing of foreign nations ; but ,
o
n
the other hand , the utmost kindness and forbearance was exercised in the expecta
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$ 280 . Thus was achieved another and still more glorious
triumph in the cause of national liberty than even that which
separated us from the mother country . By it we fondly trust
that our republican institutions will grow up , and be nurtured into
more matured strength and vigor ; our independence be secured
against foreign usurpation and aggression ; our domestic blessings
be widely diffused and generally felt ; and our union , as a people ,
be perpetuated , as our own truest glory and support , and as a
proud example of a wise and beneficent government , entitled to
th
e
respect , if not to the admiration of mankind .
tion that they would not long continue to resist the necessities o
f
their situation and
persevere in their refusal to take their proper places in the American family . Hildreth ,
Hist . of United States , IV . 147 , 149 ; Pitkin , Hist . of United States , II . 336 . )
[ 1 LOCAL SELF -GOVERNMENT . — At this point it may not be inappropriate , in view
o
f
the discussions and controversies which have arisen since this work was published ,
and which still demand some portion of the attention o
f
both the statesman and the
jurist , to call attention to certain principles and usages in American constitutional gove
ernment ,which , though pertaining more particularly to State than to Federal policy , are
nevertheless necessarily had in view when a complete survey o
f
our political system is
desired and sought . We allude here to the system of local self -government , which , in
respect to local concerns , prevails universally .
In another work the present editor has had occasion to say , that , “ in the examination
o
f
American constitutional law we shall not fail to notice the care taken and the means
adopted to bring the agencies b
y
which power is to b
e
exercised a
s
near a
s possible to
the subjects upon which the power is to operate . In contradistinction to those govern
ments where power is concentrated in oneman , or in one or more bodies of men , whose
supervision and active control extend to all the objects o
f government within the terri
torial limits o
f
the State , the American system is one of complete decentralization , the
primary and vital idea o
f
which is , that local affairs shall b
e managed b
y
local authori
ties , and only general affairs b
y
the central authority . It was under the control of this
idea that a national Constitution was formed , under which the States , while yielding to
the national government complete and exclusive jurisdiction over external affairs , con
ferred upon it such powers only , in regard to matters o
f
internal regulation , a
s
seemed
to b
e
essential to national union , strength , and harmony , and withoutwhich the purpose
in organizing the national authority might have been defeated . It is this , also , that
impels the several States , as if b
y
common arrangement , to subdivide their territory
into counties , towns , road and school districts , and to confer upon each the powers of
local legislation , and also to incorporate cities , boroughs , and villages wherever a dense
population requires different regulations from those which are needful fo
r
th
e
rural
districts . This system is one which almost seems a part of th
e
very nature o
f
th
e
race
to which we belong . A similar subdivision o
f
the realm for the purposes o
f municipal
government has existed in England from the earliest ages . Crabbe ' s History of English
Law , ch . 2 ; 1 B
l
. Comm . 114 ; Hallam ' s Middle Ages , ch . 8 , pt . 1 ; 2 Kent , 278 ;
Vaughan ' s Revolutions in English History , b . 2 , ch . 8 . And in America the first set
tlers , as if instinctively , adopted it in their frame of government , and no other has ever
supplanted it , or even found advocates . " Cooley , Const . Lim . 189 .
The writers upon our civil polity ,who have carefully studied its philosophy , have not
only taken notice o
f
this primary fact , but they have invariably attributed to it the liber
VOL . I . 1
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ties we enjoy . De Tocqueville discusses it with clearness , and contrasts it forcibly with
the French idea o
f
centralization under which constitutional freedom has never become
a
n
established fact . Democracy in America , c
h . 5 .
The same comparison is made b
y
Dr . Lieber , who shows that a centralized govern
ment , though it be b
y
representatives freely chosen , must be despotic , as any other
form o
f
centralization necessarily is . Civil Liberty and Self -Government , ch . 2
1 . Mr .
Jefferson in his retirement writes thus to a friend : “ The way to have good and safe
governments is not to trust all to one , but to divide it among the many , distributing to
every one exactly the functions h
e
is competent to . Let the national government b
e
intrusted with the defence o
f
the nation , and it
s foreign and federal relations ; the State
governments with the civil rights , laws , police , and administration o
f
what concerns the
State generally ; the counties with the local concerns o
f
the counties ; and each ward
direct the interests within itself . It is b
y
dividing and subdividing these republics , from
the great national one down through all it
s
subordinations , until it ends in the adminis
tration o
f every man ' s farm by himself ; by placing under every one what hi
s
own eye
may superintend , that al
l
will be done fo
r
the best . What has destroyed liberty and the
rights o
f
man in every government which has ever existed under the sun ? The gener
alizing and concentrating all cares and powers into one body , no matter whether of
the autocrats o
f
Russia o
r
o
f
France , o
r
o
f
the aristocrats o
f
a Venetian Senate . . . . .
The elementary republics o
f
the wards , the county republics , the State republics , and
the republic o
f
the Union would form a gradation o
f authorities , standing each on the
basis o
f
law , holding every one its delegated share of powers , and constituting truly a
system o
f
fundamental balances and checks for the government . Where every man is
a sharer in the direction o
f
his ward republic , or of some o
f
the higher ones , and feels
that h
e
is a participator in th
e
government o
f
affairs , not merely at an election one day
in the year , but every day ; when there shall not b
e
a man in the State who shall not b
e
a member o
f
some one o
f
it
s
councils , great or small , he will let the heart b
e
torn out of
his body sooner than his power be wrested from him b
y
a Cæsar o
r
a Bonaparte . " Let
te
r
to Cabell , Jefferson ' s Works , VI . 543 . Mr . Burke also indicates the fatal defect in
the French system when h
e says , “ The hand of authority was seen in everything and
in every place . All , therefore , that happened amiss , even in domestic affairs ,was attrib
uted to the government ; and a
s it always happens in this kind o
f
officious universal
interference , what began in odious power ended always , I may say without exception ,
in contemptible imbecility . ” Thoughts and Details o
n Scarcity ; Works (Little , Brown ,
& C
o . ' s ed . 1869 ) , V . 168 .
Regarding the usual division o
f authority between the States and the lower munici
palities , De Tocqueville , speaking o
f
New England township government , says : “ In this
part o
f
the Union the impulsion o
f political activity was given in the township , and it
may almost b
e
said that each o
f
them originally formed a
n independent nation . When
the kings o
f England asserted their supremacy , they were contented to assume the central
power o
f
the State . The townships of New England remained as they were before , and ,
although they a
re
n
o
w
subject to the State , they were at first scarcely dependent
upon it . It is important to remember that they have not been invested with privileges ,
but that they seem o
n
the contrary to have surrendered a portion o
f
their independence
to the State . The townships are only subordinate to the States in those interests which
I shall term social , as they are common to all citizens . They are independent in al
l
that concerns themselves , and among the inhabitants o
f
New England I believe that
not a man is to b
e
found who would acknowledge that the State has any right to inter
fere in their local interests . ” Democracy in America , ch . 5 . Mr . Palfrey goes more
into detail ; speaking of th
e
New England colonies collectively , he says : “ While the
superior magistrates were elected b
y
the votes o
f
the freemen o
f
the whole colony counted
together , the deputies were chosen for each town b
y
a majority o
f
it
s
voters . . . . . The
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share which , through their delegated voice in the general courts , the towns had in the
general legislation , was not the chief of the functions which belonged to them . The
municipal jurisdictions present a peculiarity of the social system of New England , than
which none more attracts at this day the attention of intelligent strangers , or has had
more influence on the condition and the character of the people through the eight genera
tions of their history . The territory of these States , with the exception of that small por
tion at the north which remains unoccupied , is laid off into districts of moderate extent ,
and the inhabitants of each form a little body politic , with an administration of its own ,
conducted b
y
officials o
f
it
s
own choice , according to its own will ,within certain limits
imposed b
y
the higher common authority . With something of the same propriety with
which the nation may b
e
said to b
e
a confederacy o
f republics called States , each New
England State may b
e
described a
s
a confederacy o
f minor republics called towns . The
system is the extreme opposite o
f
a political centralization . To the utmost extent con
sistent with the common action and the common welfare o
f
the aggregate o
f
towns that
make the State , the towns severally are empowered to take care o
f
those interests o
f
theirs
which they respectively can best understand , and can most efficiently and most econom
ically provide for ; and these are identical with the interests which most directly concern
the public security , comfort , and morals . Thus it belongs to them , and they are compelled
b
y
general laws o
f
the States within which they are severally included , to protect the
public health and order b
y
means o
f
a police ; to maintain safe and convenient commu
nication about and through their precincts b
y
roads and bridges ; to furnish food , cloth
ing , and shelter to their poor ; to provide for the education o
f
a
ll
their poor a
t
their
common charge . By force o
f
this institution every man in New England belongs to a
small community o
f neighbors known to the law as a corporation , with rights and lia
bilities a
s
such , capable o
f suing and subject to be sued in the courts o
f justice , in dis
putes with any parties individual o
r corporate . Once a year the corporation chooses the
administrators o
f
it
s
affairs , and determines the amount o
f money with which it will
in trust them , and how this shall be raised . If the State levies a general tax , it is the
town treasuries that must pay it ; and the State fixes the proportion due from each
town , leaving it to the town to distribute the burden of its share in the assessment
among it
s
own people . As to matters of their own interest , the towns present their
petitions , and as to matters of general concern they send their advice to the central author
ities . By their magistrates they exercise a responsible supervision o
f
the elections o
f
officers o
f the town , the county , the State , and the nation . ” And he very justly adds :
“ The experience o
f
later times dictated improvements o
f
detail in the municipal sys
tem o
f
New England ; but its outline was complete when it was first devised . ” Hist .
o
f
New England , II . 11 - 13 .
The political organizations under the State were less perfectly formed , less completely
endowed with corporate life and vigor , and brought local affairs less generally under local
control in the Southern colonies than in the Northern ; but the same principle of decen
tralization was recognized , and the difference o
f application was due to a difference o
f
circumstances which need not here b
e gone into . So far as there was difference Mr .
Jefferson lamented it , and sought to put an end to it in Virginia through a division of
the counties into hundreds . “ These little republics , ” he says , “ would be the main
strength o
f
the great one . We owe to them the vigor given to our Revolution in its com
mencement in the Eastern States , ” Letter to Governor Tyler , Jefferson ' s Works , V .
527 . In this Mr . Jefferson was historically and literally correct . The effective resist
ance to the inroads o
f tyranny in New England was through the local municipalities ,
and the first hostile blow struck b
y
the crown was aimed a
t
the liberties possessed and
exercised b
y
Boston and the other towns in the meetings o
f
their freemen . Pitkin , Hist .
o
f
United States , I . 265 - 267 ; Bancroft , Hist . of United States , VI . 518 ; Life of
Samuel Adams , II . 142 . The earlier attempts under the Stuarts to introduce arbitrary
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authority through taking away the colonial charters proved wholly ineffectual while the
lower municipal governments remained . When the charter of Rhode Island was sus
pended it is said that " the American systemof town governments, which necessity had com
pelled Rhode Island to initiate fifty years before, became the means of preserving the
liberty of the individual citizen when that of the State or colony was crushed .” Ar
nold , Hist. of Rhode Island , ch. 7. In Massachusetts , where the civil polity had a
theological basis , itwas even insisted by the deputies that to surrender local government
was contrary to the Sixth Commandment ; for, said they, “ Men may not destroy their
political any more than their natural lives .” So they clung to “ the civil liberties of
New England ” as “ part of the inheritance of their fathers .” Palfrey , Hist. of New
England , III. 301 - 303 ; Bancroft , Hist. of United States , II. 125 - 127 ; Mass . Hist .
Coll . XXI. 74 - 81. The contest with Andros , as well in New England as in New
York and New Jersey , was a struggle of the people in defence of the right of local
government . “ Everywhere the people struggled fo
r
their rights and deserved to b
e
free . ” Dunlap , Hist . o
f
New York , I . 133 : see Trumbull , Hist . of Connecticut , I . 15 .
If we question the historical records more closely we shall find that this right o
f
local
regulation has never been understood to b
e
a grant from any central authority , but it
has been recognized a
s
o
f
course from the first : just asmuch of course , and just asmuch
a necessary part o
f
the civil polity , as the central authority itself . Sometimes itwas one
and sometimes the other which first assumed form and organized vitality , but the prece
dence was determined b
y
the circumstances which made the one o
r
the other th
e
more
immediate need . For all practical purposes they may be regarded as having been sim
ultaneous in origin , and as having sprung from an unquestioning conviction among the
people that each was essential , and that both were to run parallel to each other indefinitely .
Such was the system which was found in force when the Constitution o
f
the United
States superseded the Articles o
f
Confederation . Thirteen States were in existence ,
each o
f
which had it
s
subdivisions o
f
counties , towns or parishes , cities , boroughs , and
villages ; and all these possessing powers o
f
local control more o
r
less extensive . The
most of the States had established new constitutions which recognized these subdivi
sions , without , however , as a rule ,making their perpetuation in express terms imperative .
With this recognition they remained and still remain a part of the American system as
in colonial times .
It may be well now to see what is the theory of State constitutional law regarding
these political entities . Upon this subject it has not often been needful to examine very
closely the limitations , if any there are , upon State power , because the State has gener
ally abstained from asserting any unusual authority , and has confined itself to that im
memorially exercised . Certain principles , however , have been often laid down b
y
the
courts , to which attention may be here directed .
1 . The Federal government is one of enumeratedpowers , the Constitution being the
measure thereof , and the powers not delegated thereby being reserved to the individual
States o
r
to the people . This we need not enlarge upon here , or cite other authority
for than the book before u
s .
2 . The powers o
f
sovereignty not thus delegated rest in the people o
f
the individual
States , who confer the same for ordinary exercise , with such exceptions and limitations
and under such regulations a
s they see fi
t
to establish , upon the departments and officers
o
f government which b
y
their constitutions they create for the States respectively .
3 . The municipal organizations exercise a delegated authority under the State , and
may also b
e regarded a
s governments o
f
enumerated powers . The State legislative
authority shapes their charters according to it
s
view o
f
what is proper and politic , and
it determines their territorial extent . And upon both these subjects it exercises a dis
cretion to enlarge , diminish , or wholly take away what it has conferred to
In the eye o
f
the law they are mere agencies o
f
the State , created and employed for
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the convenience of government ,and the State may therefore se
t
aside their action when
the purpose o
f
their creation is being disregarded , or exercise a compulsory authority
over them whenever duties are neglected o
r unwisely , negligently , or dishonestly per .
formed . See Booth v . Woodbury , 32 Conn . 118 ; Frost v . Belmont , 6 Allen , 152 ; Peters
burg v . Metzker , 2
1 Ill . 205 ; Ottawa v . Walker , 21 Il
l
. 605 ; Commonwealth v . Pittsburg ,
3
4
Penn . S
t
. 496 ; Abendroth v . Greenwich , 29 Coon , 356 ; New London v . Brainard , 2
2
Conn . 552 ; Bailey v . New York , 3 Hill , 531 ; People v . Draper , 15 N . Y . 532 ; Weeks v .
Milwaukee , 10 Wis . 242 ; Indianapolis v . Geisel , 1
9
Ind . 344 ; State v . St . Louis County
Court , 34 Mo , 572 ; St . Louis v . Allen , 13 Mo . 400 ; State v . Cowan , 29 Mo . 330 ; Mc .
Kim v . Odorn , 3 Bland , 407 ; Harrison Justices y . Holland , 3 Grat . 247 ; Mills v .Wil
liams , 11 Ired . 558 ; Langworthy v . Dubuque , 1
6
Iowa , 271 ; State v . Branin , 3 Zab . 484 ;
Aspinwall v . Commissioners , & c . , 2
2
How . 364 . In none of the States , however , has it
been hitherto understood thatwhen a municipal charter was taken away , the exercise
o
f
local authority terminated with it ; o
n
the contrary , some general rule fo
r
local gov
ernment has been universal ; the special charters have only conferred special privileges ,
which when taken away remitted the corporators to their previous condition , which was
one in which they exercised under well -understood principles the usual powers o
f
local
regulation . For a State wholly to take away from any o
f
it
s people these powers would
b
e
not only unprecedented , butwould be so entirely opposed to the common understanding
o
f
the manner in which the powers o
f government were to b
e apportioned and exercised
within the State , that the authority to d
o
so could not justly b
e regarded a
s
within any
grantwhich th
e
people o
f
the State have made o
f
the legislative authority to their rep
resentatives . In other words , the right o
f
local self -government is so universally under
stood and conceded ; it
s
exercise has always been so entirely without question ; to dis
pense with it would require and accomplish s
o complete a revolution in the public
administration , involving , a
s thoughtful men believe , the destruction of the chief prop
and support o
f
ur liberties , - that its purposed continuance must be regarded as having
been within the contemplation o
f
the people o
f every State , when they framed their
Constitution , and that instrument must b
e
read and interpreted accordingly . Local self
government is consequently matter o
f
constitutional right ,and the State cannot abolish
it and regulate the local affairs through agents o
f
it
s
own appointment .
4 . Considered as corporations , the municipalities have a twofold aspect . They are
agents o
f the State in government , and they also have capacity to make contracts and
acquire property , as may be needful o
r
desirable in providing such local conveniences
for their corporators a
s may be contemplated b
y
the laws under which they exist . 2
Kent , 275 ; Ang . & A . on Corp . § 145 ; Reynolds v . Stark County , 5 Ohio , 204 . As
mere corporations , buying , contracting , holding , and improving property , they are en
titled to the same protection a
s all other corporations , and the State cannot take away
what they acquire , nor devote to foreign uses that which they have provided for the
convenience o
f
their people . Dartmouth College v . Woodward , 4 Wheat . 663 , 694 , 695 ;
Trustees v . Tatman , 13 Ill . 30 . A change in corporate bounds , a modification of corpo
rate authority , and sometimes other circumstances may make it necessary fo
r
the State
to intervene , and b
y
virtue o
f
it
s sovereign power to take possession o
f corporate prop
erty with a view to it
s proper appropriation o
r
division ; but when she shall d
o
so , it
will be as trustee merely , and her duty will be to make theappropriation ,not arbitrarily ,
but with due regard to the purposes o
f
it
s acquisition , so that the people concerned shall
still reap the benefit thereof so far a
s
the circumstances and the nature o
f
the casewill
admit .
But while the corporations exist , though the State may lay down rules fo
r
the regu .
lation o
f
their affairs and themanagement o
f
their property , it is nevertheless a part of
th
e
right of self -government that the people concerned should choose their own officers
who are to administer such rules and have the care o
f
such property , and the State can
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not appoint such officers , as itmight those who are to perform duties of a more general
nature fo
r
the public a
t large , such as mustering or disciplining the State militia , en
forcing the State health and police laws , and the like . See Warner v . People , 2 Denio ,
275 ; People v . Blake , 49 Barb . 9 ; State v . Kenyon , 7 Ohio , N . S . 546 .
Such w
e
believe to b
e
the true doctrine regarding these municipalities . Instances
have perhaps occurred in which legislative bodies , under the belief that interference in
local matters was essential to the correction o
f
local abuses , have disregarded the usual
bounds which limit their action in this direction , and taken upon themselves the per
formance o
f
duties not properly pertaining to the central authority . Whether , if this
might rightfully be done , it would be likely to result in correcting more abuses than it
would create , is not for us to speculate ; it is enough that our institutions rest upon an
acceptance o
f
the doctrine that matters purely local are best , most economically , hon
estly , and efficiently managed b
y
the people immediately concerned , who can se
e
and
know and comprehend and personally supervise them , and that the local communities
should b
e expected to rely upon themselves fo
r
the correction o
f
local evils , and not
upon any distant , imperfectly informed and slightly interested body , which , while open
to the same temptations a
s
the local authorities ,would be neither under the like restraint
o
f
interest ,nor subject to have its doings exposed to the same watchful observation of
the parties concerned . ]
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CHAPTER II.
OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION .
$ 281 . Let it not , however , be supposed , that a Constitution ,
which is now looked upon with such general favor and affection
by the people , had no difficulties to encounter at its birth . The
history o
f
those times is full o
f melancholy instruction on this
subject , at once to admonish us of past dangers , and to awaken us
to a lively sense o
f
the necessity o
f
future vigilance . The Consti
tution was adopted unanimously b
y
Georgia , New Jersey , and
Delaware . It was supported b
y
large majorities in Pennsylvania ,
Connecticut , Maryland , and South Carolina . It was carried in
the other States b
y
small majorities , and especially in Massachu
setts , New York , and Virginia by little more than a preponder
ating vote . Indeed , it is believed that in each of these States , at
the first assembling o
f
the conventions , there was a decided ma
jority opposed to the Constitution . The ability of the debates , the
impending evils , and the absolute necessity of the case , seem to
have reconciled some persons to the adoption o
f
it , whose opinions
had been strenuously the other way . 2 “ In our endeavors , ” said
Washington , “ to establish a new general government , th
e
contest ,
nationally considered , seems not to have been so much fo
r
glory
a
s
fo
r
existence . It was for a long time doubtful whether we were
to survive , as an independent republic , or decline from our Federal
dignity into insignificant and withered fragments o
f empire . ” 3
§ 282 . It is not difficult to trace some of the more important
causes which led to so formidable an opposition , and made the
Constitution a
t
that time a theme , notmerely of panegyric , but of
severe invective , as fraught with th
e
most alarming dangers to
public liberty , and at once unequal ,unjust , and oppressive .
§ 283 . Almost contemporaneously with the first proposition for
1 2 Pitk . Hist . 265 , 268 , 273 , 279 , 281 ; North Amer . Rev . Oct . 1827 , p . 279 to 278 .
? 2 Pitk . Hist . 266 , 269 , 281 ; 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 132 , 133 , 188 . [See Rives ,
Life o
f
Madison , ch . 35 ; Hammond , Political History of New York , ch . 1 ; Life o
f
Samuel Adams , ch . 60 ; Van Buren Political Parties , 57 ; Austin ' s Life o
f Gerry , II .
ch . 2 and 3 . ]
8 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , 138 .
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a confederation , jealousies began to be entertained in respect to
the nature and extent o
f
the authority which should be exercised
b
y
the national government . The large States would naturally
feel that in proportion a
s Congress should exercise sovereign pow
ers , their own local importance and sovereignty would be dimin
ished injuriously to their general influence on other States from
their strength , population , and character . On the other hand , by
a
n opposite course o
f reasoning , the small States had arrived
nearly a
t
the same result . Their dread seems to have been lest
they should be swallowed u
p
b
y
the power o
f
the large States in
the general government , through common combinations of inter
est o
r
ambition . "
$ 284 . There was , besides , a very prevalent opinion that the
interests o
f
the several States were not the same ; and there had
been n
o
sufficient experience during their colonial dependence and
intercommunication to settle such a question b
y any general rea
soning , or any practical results . During the period , therefore , in
which the confederation was under discussion in Congress ,much
excitement and much jealousy were exhibited on this subject .
The original draft submitted b
y
D
r
. Franklin , in July , 1775 , con
tained a much more ample grant o
f powers than that actually
adopted ; for Congress were to be invested with power to make
ordinances relating “ to our general commerce or general cur
rency , ” to establish posts , & c . , and to possess other important
powers o
f
a different character . The draft submitted b
y
Mr .
Dickenson , on the 12th of July , 1776 , contains less ample powers ,
but still more broad than the Articles o
f
Confederation . In the
subsequent discussions fe
w
amendments were adopted which were
not of a restrictive character ; and the real difficulties of the task
o
f overcoming the prejudices , and soothing the fears of the differ
ent States , are amply displayed in the secret journals now made
public . In truth , th
e
continent soon became divided into two
great political parties , “ the one of which contemplated America
a
s
a nation , and labored incessantly to invest the Federal head with
powers competent to the preservation o
f
the Union ; the other
attached itself to the State authorities , viewed all the powers of
Congress with jealousy , and assented reluctantly to measures
1 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , 130 , 13
1
; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , & c .
2 1 Secret Journals , 285 , Art . 5 .
8 Id . , 290 .
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which would enable the head to act in any respect independently
of the members ." i During the war, the necessities of the coun
tr
y
confined the operations o
f
both parties within comparatively
narrow limits . But the return of peace , and the total imbecility
o
f
the general government , gave ( as we have seen ) increased
activity and confidence to both .
$ 285 . The differences of opinion between these parties were
too honest , too earnest , and too deep to be reconciled or surren
dered . They equally pervaded the public councils of the States
and the private intercourse of social life . They became more
warm , not to say violent , as the contest became more close and
the exigency more appalling . They were inflamed b
y
new causes ,
o
f
which some were o
f
a permanent , and some of a temporary
character . The field of argument was wide ; and experience had
not as yet furnished the advocates on either side with such a vari
ety o
f political tests as were calculated to satisfy doubts , allay
prejudices , or dissipate the fears and illusions o
f
the imagination .
§ 286 . In this state of things the embarrassments of the coun
try in it
s
financial concerns , the general pecuniary distress among
the people from the exhausting operations o
f
the war , the total
prostration o
f
commerce , and the languishing unthriftiness of
agriculture , gave new impulses to the already marked political
divisions in the legislative councils . Efforts were made , on one
side , to relieve the pressure of the public calamities b
y
a resort
to the issue o
f paper -money , to tender laws , and instalment and
other laws , having for their object the postponement of the pay
ment of private debts , and a diminution of the public taxes . On
the other side , public as well as private creditors became alarmed
from the increased dangers to property , and the increased facility
o
f perpetrating frauds to the destruction o
f
a
ll private faith and
credit . And they insisted strenuously upon the establishment of
a government and system of laws which should preserve the
public faith , and redeem the country from that ruin which always
follows upon the violation o
f
the principles o
f justice and the
moral obligation o
f
contracts . “ A
t
length , ” we are told , 2 “ two
great parties were formed in every State , which were distinctly
marked , and which pursued distinct objects with systematic ar
rangement . The one struggled with unabated zeal fo
r
the exact
observance o
f public and private engagements . The distresses of
1
5
Marsh . Life of Washington , 33 . 2 5 Marsh . Life of Washington , 83 .
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individuals were, they thought , to be alleviated by industry and
frugality , and not by a relaxation of the laws, or by a sacrifice of
the rights of others . They were consequently uniform friends of
a regular administration of justice , and of a vigorous course of
taxation , which would enable the State to comply with its engage
ments . By a natural association of ideas , they were also , with
very fe
w exceptions , in favor of enlarging the powers of the Fed
eral government and o
f enabling it to protect the dignity and
character o
f
the nation abroad , and its interests at home . The
other party marked out fo
r
itself a more indulgent course . They
were uniformly in favor o
f relaxing the administration o
f justice ,
o
f affording facilities for the payment o
f
debts , or of suspending
their collection , and of remitting taxes . The same course of
opinion led them to resist every attempt to transfer from their
own hands into those o
f Congress powers which were b
y
others
deemed essential to the preservation o
f
the Union . In many o
f
the States the party last mentioned constituted a decided majority
o
f
the people , and in all of them it was very powerful . ” Such is
the language o
f
one o
f
our best historians in treating o
f
the period
immediately preceding the formation o
f
the Constitution of the
United States .
$ 287 . Without supposing that the parties here alluded to were
in all respects identified with those of which we have already
spoken , as contemporaneous with the confederation , it is easy to
perceive what prodigious means were already in existence to op
pose a new constitution of government ,which not only transferred
from the States some o
f
the highest sovereign prerogatives , but
laid prohibitions upon the exercise of other powers which were at
that time in possession o
f
the popular favor . The wonder , indeed ,
is not , under such circumstances , that the Constitution should
have encountered the most ardent opposition , but that it should
ever have been adopted a
t ll b
y
a majority o
f
the States .
§ 288 . In the convention itself which framed it , there was a
great diversity o
f judgment , and upon some vital subjects an in
tense and irreconcilable hostility of opinion . It is understood
1 See also 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , 130 , 131 .
2 2 Pitk . Hist . 225 to 260 ; Dr . Franklin ' s Speech , 2 Amer .Museum , 534 , 538 ; 3
Amer . Museum , 62 , 66 , 79 , 157 , 559 , 560 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates . Three members of the
convention ,Mr . Gerry of Massachusetts , and Mr . Mason and Mr . Randolph of Vir
ginia , declined signing th
e
Constitution ; 3 Amer .Museum , 68 . See also Mr . Jay ' s
Letter in 1787 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 554 to 565 .
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that at several periods the convention were upon the point of
breaking up without accomplishing anything . In the State con
ventions , in which the Constitution was presented fo
r
ratification ,
the debates were long and animated and eloquent ; and , imperfect
a
s
the printed collections o
f
those debates are , enough remains to
establish the consummate ability with which every part of the
Constitution was successively attacked and defended . ? Nor did
th
e
struggle end here . The parties which were then formed con
tinued for a long time afterwards to b
e
known and felt in our
legislative and other public deliberations . Perhaps they have
never entirely ceased .
$ 289 . Perhaps , from the very nature and organization of our
government , being partly federal and partly national in its charac
te
r , whatever modifications in other respects parties may undergo ,
there will forever continue to be a strong line of division between
those who adhere to the State governments and those who adhere
to the national government , in respect to principles and policy .
It was long ago remarked that in a contest for power , “ the body
o
f
the peoplewill always be on the side of the State governments .
This will not only result from their love o
f liberty and regard to
their own safety , but from the strong principles of human nature .
The State governments operate upon those familiar personal con
cerns to which the sensibility o
f
individuals is awake . The dis
tribution o
f private justice in a great measure belonging to them ,
they must always appear to the sense of the people a
s
the imme
diate guardians o
f
their rights . They will of course have the
strongest hold on their attachment , respect , and obedience . ” 3 To
which it may be added , that the State governments must naturally
open an easier field fo
r
the operation o
f
domestic ambition , of local
interests , o
f personal popularity ,and o
f flattering influence to those
who have n
o eager desire for a widespread fame , or no acquire
ments to justify it .
$ 290 . On the other hand , if the votaries of the national gov
ernment are fewer in number , they are likely to enlist in its favor
men o
f
ardent ambition , comprehensive views ,and powerful genius .
A love o
f
the Union , a sense of its importance , nay , of its neces
15 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , 128 .
2 2 Pitk . Hist . 265 to 283 ; (Rives ' s Life of Madison , ch . 33 to 36 . ]
8 Gen . Hamilton ' s Speech in 1786 ; 1 Amer .Museum , 445 , 447 . See also The Fed .
eralist , Nos . 17 , 31 , 45 , 46 .
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sity , to secure permanence and safety to our political liberty ; a
consciousness that the powers o
f
the national Constitution are
eminently calculated to preserve peace a
t home and dignity
abroad , and to give value to property , and system and harmony
to the great interests o
f agriculture , commerce , and manufactures ;
a consciousness , too , that the restraints which it imposes upon the
States are the only efficient means to preserve public and private
justice , and to insure tranquillity amidst the conflicting interests
and rivalries o
f
the States ; – these will doubtless combine many
sober and reflecting minds in it
s support . If to this number we
add those whom the larger rewards of fame o
r
emolument o
r in
fluence , connected with a wider sphere of action ,may allure to
the national councils , there is much reason to presume that the
Union will not be without resolute friends .
$ 291 . This view of the subject , on either side , (for it is the
desire o
f
the commentator to abstain , as much as possible , from
mere private political speculation , ) is not without its consolations .
If there were but one consolidated national government to which
the people might look u
p
fo
r
protection and support , they might in
time relax in that vigilance and jealousy which seem so necessary
to the wholesome growth o
f republican institutions . If , on the
other hand , the State governments could engross al
l
the affections
o
f
the people , to the exclusion of the national government , b
y
their
familiar and domestic regulations , there would be danger that the
Union , constantly weakened b
y
the distance and discouragements
o
f
it
s
functionaries ,might at last become , as it was under the con
federation , a mere show , if not a mockery , of sovereignty . So that
this very division o
f empire may in the end , by the blessing of
Providence , be the means of perpetuating our rights and liberties ,
b
y keeping alive in every State at once a sincere love o
f
its own
government and a love of the Union , and b
y
cherishing in differ
ent minds a jealousy of each , which shall check , as well as en
lighten , public opinion .
§ 292 . The objections raised against the adoption of the Consti
tution were o
f very different natures , and , in some instances , of
entirely opposite characters . They will be found embodied in
various public documents , in the printed opinions of distinguished
men , in the debates of the respective State conventions , and in a
still more authentic shape in the numerous amendments proposed
by these conventions , and accompanying their acts of ratification .
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It is not easy to reduce them al
l
into general heads ; but the most
material will here be enumerated , not only to admonish us o
f
the
difficulties o
f
the task o
f framing a general government , but to
prepare u
s
the better to understand and expound the Constitution
itself .
$ 293 . Some of the objections were to the supposed defects and
omissions in the instrument ; others were to the nature and extent
o
f
the powers conferred b
y
it ; and others , again , to the fundamen
tal plan or scheme of it
s organization .
( 1 . ) It was objected , in the first place , that the scheme of gov
ernment was radically wrong , because it was not a confederation
o
f
the States , but a government over individuals . It was said
that the federal form , which regards the Union as a confederation
o
f sovereign States , ought to have been preserved ; instead of
which the convention had framed a national government , which
regards the Union a
s
a consolidation of States . This objection
was far from being universal ; for many admitted that there ought
to b
e
a government over individuals to a certain extent , but b
y
n
o
means to the extent proposed . It is obvious that this objection ,
pushed to it
s full extent ,went to the old question of the confed
eration , and was but a reargument of the point whether there
should exist a national government adequate to the protection and
support o
f
the Union . In its mitigated form it was a mere ques
tion a
s
to the extent o
f powers to b
e
confided to the general gov
ernment , and was to be classed accordingly . It was urged , how
ever ,with no inconsiderable force and emphasis ; and its support
e
rs predicted with confidence that a government so organized
would soon become corrupt and tyrannical , " and absorb the legis
lative , executive , and judicial powers of the several States , and
produce from their ruins one consolidated government which , from
the nature o
f things , would be an iron -handed despotism . " 3 Uni
form experience ( it was said ) ad demonstrated 4 “ that a very
extensive territory cannot b
e governed on the principles o
f
free
dom otherwise than b
y
a confederacy o
f republics , possessing al
l
the powers o
f
internal government , but united in the management
o
f
their general and foreign concerns . " 5 Indeed , any scheme of
i The Federalist , Nos . 38 , 39 ; 2 Amer .Museum , 422 ; Id . 543 , 546 .
2 The Federalist , No . 39 ; Id . No . 38 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 270 , 272 ,
8 Address o
f
the Minority o
f
Penn . Convention , 2 Amer .Museum , 542 , 543 . See
also 2 Pitk . Hist . 272 , 273 .
4 2 Amer .Museum , 542 . 6 See also 2 Amer .Museum , 422 , 423 , 424 .
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a general government , however guarded , appeared to someminds
(which possessed the public confidence ) so entirely impracticable ,
b
y
reason o
f
the extensive territory o
f
the United States , that they
did not hesitate to declare their opinion that it would be destruc
tive of th
e
civil liberty of th
e
citizens . And others of equal
eminence foretold that it would commence in a moderate aristoc
racy , and end either in a monarchy or a corrupt , oppressive aris
tocracy . It was not denied that , in form , the Constitution was
strictly republican ; for al
l
it
s powers were derived directly or in
directly from the people , and were administered b
y
functionaries
holding their offices during pleasure , or fo
r
a limited period , or
during good behavior ; and in these respects it bore an exact simil
itude to the State governments , whose republican character had
never been doubted . 3
§ 294 . But the friends o
f
the Constitution met the objection b
y
asserting the indispensable necessity o
f
a form o
f government like
that proposed , and demonstrating the utter imbecility of a mere
confederation , without powers acting directly upon individuals .
They considered that the Constitution was partly federal and
partly national in it
s
character and distribution o
f powers . In its
origin and establishment it was federal . 4 In some of its relations
itwas federal , in others national . In the Senate it was federal ;
in the House o
f Representatives itwas national ; in the executive it
was o
f
a compound character ; in the operation of its powers it
was national ; in the extent of its powers federal . It acted on
individuals , and not on States merely . But its powers were
limited , and left a large mass o
f sovereignty in the States . In
making amendments , it was also o
f
a compound character , requir
ing the concurrence of more than a majority , and less than the
whole o
f
the States . So that on the whole their conclusion was ,
that “ the Constitution is , in strictness , neither a national nor a
federal Constitution , but a composition of both . In its foundation
it is federal , not national ; in the sources from which the ordinary
powers o
f
the government are drawn , it is partly federal and partly
national ; in the operation of these powers it is national ,not fed
1 Yates and Lansing ' s Letter , 3 Amer . Museum , 15
6
, 15
7
; Mr . Jay ' s Letter , 1787 , 3
Amer . Museum , 554 , 562 . The same objection is repeatedly -taken notice of in the
Federalist , as one then beginning to be prevalent . The Federalist , Nos . 1 , 2 , 9 , 13 , 14 ,
2
3 ; (Life of Samuel Adams , III . 251 . )
2 Mr . George Mason ' s Letter , 2 Amer .Museum , 534 , 536 .
8 The Federalist , No . 39 . 4 Id .
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eral ; in the extent of them , again , it is federal, not national ; and ,
finally , in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments it is
neither wholly federal nor wholly national .
§ 295 . Time has in this, as in many other respects, assuaged
the fears and disproved the prophecies of the opponents of the
Constitution . It has gained friends in its progress . The States
still flourish under itwith a salutary and invigorating energy ; and
it
s power of direct action upon the people has hitherto proved a
common blessing , giving dignity and spirit to the government
adequate to the exigencies o
f
war , and preserving us from domes
ti
c
dissensions and unreasonable burdens in times o
f
peace .
$ 2
9
6
. ( 2 . ) If the original structure of the government was , as
has been shown , a fertile source of opposition , another objection
o
f
a more wide and imposing nature was drawn from the nature
and extent o
f
it
s powers . This , indeed , like the former , gave rise
to most animated discussions , in which reason was employed to
demonstrate themischiefs o
f
the system , and imagination to por
tray them in all the exaggerations which fear and prophecy could
invent . Looking back , indeed , to that period with the calmness
with which we naturally review events and occurrences which are
now felt only a
s
matters of history , one is surprised at the futility
o
f some of the objections , the absurdity of others , and the over
wrought coloring of almost all , which were urged on this head
against the Constitution . That some of them had a just founda
tion need not be denied o
r
concealed ; for the system was human ,
and the result o
f compromise and conciliation , in which something
o
f correctness of theory was yielded to the interests o
r preju
dices o
f particular States , and something of inequality of benefit
borne fo
r
the common good .
$ 297 . The objections from different quarters were not only of
different degrees and magnitude , but often of totally opposite na
tures . With some persons the mass of the powers was a formi
dable objection ; with others the distribution of those powers .
With some the equality o
f
vote in the Senate was exceptionable ;
with others the inequality o
f representation in the House . With
some the power o
f regulating the times and places of elections was
i The Federalist , No . 39 . See also 1 Tucker ' s Black . App . 145 , 146 . The whole
reasoning contained in the 39th number o
f
the Federalist ( o
f
which the above is merely
a summary ) deserves a thorough examination b
y
every statesman . See also on the
same subject , Dane ' s App . $ 14 , p . 25 , & c . ; $ 35 , p . 44 , & c . ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm .
App . 146 , & c . ; the Federalist , No . 9 ; 3 Dall . R . 473 .
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fatal ; with others the power of regulating commerce b
y
a bare
majority . With some the power of direct taxation was an intol
erable grievance ; with others the power of indirect taxation b
y
duties on imports . With some the restraint o
f
the State legis
latures from laying duties upon exports and passing ex post facto
laws was incorrect ; with others the lodging of the executive
power in a single magistrate . 1 With some the term of office of
the senators and representatives was too long ; with others the
term o
f
office o
f
the President was obnoxious to a like censure , as
well a
s
his re -eligibility . With some the intermixture of the
legislative , executive , and judicial functions in the Senate was a
mischievous departure from a
ll
ideas of regular government ; with
others the non - participation of the House of Representatives in the
same functions was the alarming evil . With some the powers of
the President were alarming and dangerous to liberty ; with others
the participation of the Senate in some of those powers . With
some the powers o
f
the judiciary were fa
r
too extensive ; with
others the power to make treaties even with the consent o
f
two
thirds of the Senate . With some the power to keep up a standing
army was a sure introduction to despotism ; with others the power
over th
e
militia . 3 With some the paramount authority of the Con
stitution , treaties , and laws o
f
the United States was a dangerous
feature ; with others the small number composing the Senate and
the House o
f Representatives was an alarming and corrupting evil . 4
§ 298 . In the glowing language o
f
those times the people were
told , “ that the new government will not be a confederacy of
States , as it ought , but one consolidated government , founded
upon the destruction o
f
the several governments o
f
the States .
The powers of Congress , under the new Constitution , are complete
and unlimited over the purse and the sword , and are perfectly in
dependent o
f
and supreme over the State governments , whose
intervention in these great points is entirely destroyed . B
y
vir
tue o
f
their power o
f
taxation , Congress may command the whole
o
r any part o
f
the properties o
f
the people . They may impose
what imposts upon commerce , they may impose what land taxes ,
1 2 Amer .Museum , 534 , 536 , 540 ; Id . 427 , 435 ; Id . 547 , 555 .
? 3 Amer . Museum , 62 ; 2 Pitk . Hist , 283 , 284 ; The Federalist , Nos . 71 , 72 .
8 See 2 Amer . Museum , 422 , & c . ; Id . 435 ; Id . 434 ; Id . 540 , & c . , 543 , & c . ; Id . 553 ;
3 Amer .Museum , 62 ; Id . 157 ; Id . 419 , 420 , & c .
4 Many of th
e
objections are summed u
p
in th
e
Federalist , No . 38 , with great force
and ability .
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and taxes , excises , and duties on all instruments , and duties on
every fine article that they may judge proper .” “ Congress may
monopolize every source of revenue , and thus indirectly demolish
the State governments ; fo
r
without funds they could not exist . ”
“ As Congress have the control over the time of the appointment
o
f
the President , of the senators , and o
f
the representatives o
f
the
United States , they may prolong their existence in office fo
r
life
b
y
postponing the time of their election and appointment from
period to period , under various pretences . ” “ When the spirit of
the people shall b
e gradually broken , when the general government
shall be firmly established , and when a numerous standing army
shall render opposition vain , the Congress may complete the sys
te
m
o
f
despotism in renouncing a
ll
dependence o
n the people , b
y
continuing themselves and their children in the government . ” 1
$ 299 . A full examination of the nature and extent of the ob
jections to the several powers given to the general government
will more properly find a place when those powers come succes
sively under review in our commentary on the different parts o
f
the Constitution itself . The outline here furnished may serve to
show what those were which were presented against them a
s
a
n
aggregate o
r
mass . It is not a little remarkable that some of the
most formidable applied with equal force to the Articles o
f
Con
federation ,with this difference only , that though unlimited in their
terms , they were in some instances checked b
y
the want of power
to carry them into effect , otherwise than b
y
requisitions on the
States . Thus presenting , as has been justly observed , the extraor
dinary phenomenon o
f declaring certain powers in the Federal
government absolutely necessary , and at the same time rendering
them absolutely nugatory . 2
$ 300 . ( 3 . ) Another class of objections urged against the Con
stitution was founded upon its deficiencies and omissions . It can
not b
e
denied that some o
f
the objections on this head were well
taken , and that there was a fitness in incorporating some provision
o
n the subject into the fundamental articles of a free government .
There were others , again , which might fairly enough be left to the
legislative discretion and to the natural influences o
f
the popular
voice in a republican form o
f government . There were others ,
1 Address o
f
th
e
Minority in the Pennsylvania Convention , 2 Amer .Museum , 536 ,
543 , 544 , 545 . See also the Address o
f
Virginia , 2 Pitk . History , 334 .
2 The Federalist , No . 38 .
VOL . I .
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again , so doubtful , both in principle and policy , that they might
properly be excluded from any system aiming a
t permanence in
it
s
securities a
s
well as its foundations .
$ 301 . Among the defects which were enumerated , none at
tracted more attention , or were urged with more zeal , than th
e
want o
f
a distinct bill o
f rights which should recognize the funda
mental principles o
f
a free republican government , and the right
o
f
the people to the enjoyment o
f
life , liberty , property , and the
pursuit of happiness . It was contended that it was indispensable
that express provision should b
e
made fo
r
the trial b
y
jury in civil
cases , and in criminal cases upon a presentment b
y
a grand jury
only ; and that all criminal trials should be public , and the party
b
e confronted with th
e
witnesses against him ; that freedom of
speech and freedom o
f
the press should be secured ; that there
should b
e
n
o national religion , and the rights of conscience should
b
e inviolable ; that excessive bail should not be required , nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted ; that the people should have a
right to bear arms ; that persons conscientiously scrupulous should
not be compelled to bear arms ; that every person should be enti
tled o
f right to petition for the redress of grievances ; that search
warrants should not be granted without oath , nor general warrants
a
t all ; that soldiers should not be enlisted , except for a short ,
limited term , and not be quartered in time of peace upon pri
vate houses without the consent of the owners ; that mutiny bills
should continue in force for two years only ; that causes once
tried b
y
a jury should not b
e
re -examinable upon appeal , otherwise
than according to the course o
f
the common la
w ; and that the
powers not expressly delegated to the general government should
b
e
declared to b
e
reserved to the States . In al
l
these particulars
the Constitution was obviously defective ; and yet ( it was con
tended ) they were vital to the public security . 1
$ 302 . Besides these , there were other defects relied on , such as
the want of a suitable provision for a rotation in office , to prevent
persons enjoying it fo
r
life ; the want of an executive council fo
r
the President ; the want of a provision limiting the duration o
f
standing armies ; the want of a clause securing to the people the
1 2 Amer . Museum , 422 to 430 ; Id . 435 , & c . ; Id . 534 , & c . 536 , 540 , & c . 553 , & c .
557 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 62 ; Id . 157 ; Id . 419 , 420 , & c . ; The Federalist , No . 38 ;
(Rives , Life of Madison , II . 607 , 639 ; Jefferson ' s Works , IIL 3 , 13 , 201 ; Life of
Fisher Ames , I . 52 , 53 . ]
CH. II.] 211OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION .
enjoyment of the common law ; the want of security fo
r
proper
elections o
f public officers ; th
e
want o
f
a prohibition of members
o
f Congress holding any public offices , and of judges holding any
other offices ; and finally , the want of drawing a clear and direct
line between the powers to b
e
exercised b
y
Congress and b
y
the
States .
$ 303 . Many of these objections found their way into the amend
ments , which , simultaneously with the ratification , were adopted
in many o
f
the State conventions . With the view of carrying
into effect popular will , and also of disarming th
e
opponents o
f
the
Constitution o
f
a
ll
reasonable grounds o
f complaint , Congress , at
it
s very first session , took into consideration the amendments so
proposed ; and b
y
a succession o
f supplementary articles provided ,
in substance , a bill of rights , and secured b
y
constitutional dec
larations most o
f
the other important objects thus suggested .
These articles ( in all , twelve ) were submitted by Congress to the
States for their ratification , and ten of them were finally ratified
b
y
the requisite number of States , and thus became incorporated
into the Constitution . It is a curious fact ,however , that , although
the necessity of these amendments had been urged b
y
the enemies
o
f
the Constitution and denied b
y
it
s
friends , they encountered
scarcely any other opposition in th
e
State legislatures than what
was given b
y
the very party which had raised the objections . The
friends of the Constitution generally supported them upon the
ground of a large public policy , to quiet jealousies and to disarm
resentments .
§ 304 . It is perhaps due to the latter to state that they believed
that some o
f
the objections to the Constitution existed only in
imagination , and that others derived their sole support from an
erroneous construction o
f
that instrument . In respect to a bill
o
f rights , it was stated that several of the State constitutions con
tained none in form , and yet were not on that account thought
objectionable . That it was not true that the Constitution of the
1Mr .Mason , 2 Amer .Museum , 534 .
2 2 Amer .Museum ,426 , 428 ; Id . 534 , 537 ; Id . 549 , 557 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 62 ;
Id . 419 , 420 , & c . ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 218 , 267 , 280 , 282 , 283 , 284 .
82 Pitk . Hist . 332 , 334 . [ These amendments were proposed and advocated by Mr .
Madison , through whose efforts in themain their passage through Congress was secured .
See Rives , Life of Madison , II . 38 et se
q
. ; Life , & c . of Fisher Ames , I . 52 ; Van Buren ,
Political Parties , 191 et se
q
. ; Hamilton , History of th
e
Republic , IV . 23 . ]
4 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 209 , 210 . 5 5 Marsh . Life of Wash . 207 , 208 .
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United States did not , in the true sense of the terms , contain a
bill of rights . It was emphatically found in those clauses which
respected political rights , the guaranty of republican forms of gov
ernment , the trial of crimes b
y
jury , the definition of treason , the
prohibition against bills o
f
attainder and ex post facto laws and
titles o
f nobility , the trial b
y
impeachment , and the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus . That a general bill of rights would be
improper in a Constitution o
f
limited powers like that of the
United States , and might even be dangerous , as by containing
exceptions from powers not granted it might give rise to implica
tions of constructive power . That in a government like ours ,
founded b
y
the people and managed b
y
the people , and especially
in one o
f
limited authority , there was no necessity of any bill of
rights ; fo
r
a
ll
powers not granted were reserved , and even those
granted might at will be resumed or altered b
y
the people . That
a bill of rights might be fit in a monarchy , where there were ,
struggles between the crown and the people about prerogatives
and privileges . But here the government is the government of
the people ; al
l
it
s
officers are their officers , and they can exercise
n
o rights or powers but such as the people commit to them . In
such a case the silence o
f
the Constitution argues nothing . The
trial b
y jury , the freedom of the press , and the liberty of con
science are not taken away , because they are not secured . They
remain with the people among the mass o
f ungranted powers , or
find an appropriate place in the laws and institutions of each par
ticular State .
§ 305 . Notwithstanding the force of these suggestions , candor
will compel us to admit that , as certain fundamental rights were
secured b
y
the Constitution , there seemed to be an equal propriety
in securing in like manner others o
f equal value and importance .
The trial b
y
jury in criminal cases was secured ; but this clause
admitted o
f
more clear definition and of auxiliary provisions .
The trial b
y jury in civil cases at common la
w
was a
s
dear to the
people , and afforded at least an equal protection to persons and
property . The same remark may be made o
f
several other pro
visions included in the amendments . But these will more prop
erly fall under consideration in our commentary upon that portion
o
f
the Constitution . The promptitude , zeal , and liberality with
1 The Federalist , No . 84 ; Mr . Jay ' s Address ; 3 Amer . Museum , 554 ,559 ; 2 Amer .
Museum , 422 , 425 .
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which the friends of the Constitution supported these amendments
evince the good faith and sincerity of their opinions , and increase
our reverence for their labors , as well as our sense of their wis
dom and patriotism .1:
1 [ The Constitution was accepted and put in force in anticipation of, and in reliance
upon , the adoption of these amendments , and by them the instrument was completed .
“ I dwell ," said Mr. Choate , “ on that time from 1780 to 1789, because that was our age
of civil greatness . Then first we grew to be one. In that time our nation was born .
That which went before made us independent . Our better liberty , our law, our order ,
our union , our credit, our commerce , our rank among the nations , our page in the great
history , we owe to this. Independence was the work of th
e
higher passions . The Con
stitution was the slow product of wisdom . " Lecture on Jefferson , Burr , and Hamilton ,
1858 . )
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CHAPTER III .
NATURE O
F
THE CONSTITUTION , — WHETHER A COMPACT .
$ 306 . HAVING thus sketched out a general history o
f
the origin
and adoption o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United States , and a sum
mary o
f
the principal objections and difficulties which it had to
encounter , we approach the point a
t
which it may be proper to
enter upon the consideration o
f
the actual structure , organization ,
and powers which belong to it . Our main object will henceforth
b
e
to unfold in detail all its principal provisions , with such com
mentaries as may explain their import and effect , and with such
illustrations , historical and otherwise , as will enable the reader
fully to understand the objections which have been urged against
each o
f
them respectively , the amendments which have been pro
posed to them , and the arguments which have sustained them in
their present form .
§ 307 . Before doing this , however , it seems necessary in the
first place to bestow some attention upon several points which
have attracted a good deal o
f
discussion , and which are prelim
inary in their own nature ; and in the next place to consider what
are the true rules o
f interpretation belonging to the instrument .
$ 308 . In the first place ,what is the true nature and import of
the instrument ? Is it a treaty , a convention , a league , a contract ,
o
r
a compact ? Who are the parties to it ? B
y
whom was it
made ? B
y
whom was it ratified ? What are its obligations ? B
y
whom and in what manner may it be dissolved ? Who are to
decide upon the supposed infractions and violations o
f it ? These
are questions often asked , and often discussed , not merely fo
r
the
purpose o
f
theoretical speculation , but as matters of practical im
portance , and of earnest and even of vehement debate . The
answers given to them b
y
statesmen and jurists are often contra
dictory and irreconcilable with each other ; and the consequences
deduced from the views taken of some of them g
o very deep into
the foundations o
f
the government itself , and expose it , if not to
utter destruction , at least to evils which threaten its existence
and disturb the just operation o
f
it
s powers .
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§ 309 . It will be our object to present in a condensed form
some o
f
the principal expositions which have been insisted on a
t
different times a
s
to th
e
nature and obligations of the Constitu
tion , and to offer some of the principal objections which have been
suggested against those expositions . To attempt a minute enu
meration would indeed be an impracticable task ; and considering
the delicate nature o
f
others , which are still the subject of heated
controversy , where the ashes are scarcely yet cold which cover the
concealed fires o
f
former political excitements , it is sufficiently
difficult to detach some o
f
the more important from the mass o
f
accidental matter in which they are involved .
§ 310 . It has been asserted b
y
a learned commentator , that the
Constitution o
f
the United States is an original , written , federal ,
and social compact , freely , voluntarily , and solemnly entered into
b
y
the several States , and ratified b
y
the people thereof , respec
tively ; whereby the several States and the people thereof respec
tively have bound themselves to each other and to the Federal gov
ernment of the United States , and b
y
which the Federal government
is bound to the several States and to every citizen o
f
the United
States . The author proceeds to expound every part of this defini
tion a
t large . It is (says he ) a compact , by which it is distin
guished from a charter o
r grant ,which is either the act of a supe
rior to an inferior , or is founded upon some consideration moving
from one o
f
the parties to the other , and operates as an exchange
o
r
sale . But here the contracting parties , whether considered as
States in their political capacity and character , or as individuals ,
are a
ll equal ; nor is there anything granted from one to another ,
but each stipulates to part with and receive the same thing pre
cisely without any distinction o
r
difference between any o
f
the
parties .
§ 311 . It is a Federal compact . Several sovereign and inde
1 i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App , note D , p . 140 et seq .
2 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App , note D , p . 141 .
8 Mr . Jefferson asserts that the Constitution of the United States is a compact be
tween the States . “ They entered into a compact , ” says he , ( in a paper designed to be
adopted b
y
the legislature o
f
Virginia a
s
a solemn protest , ) " which is called the Con
stitution o
f
the United States o
f
America , b
y
which they agreed to unite in a single
government , as to their relations with each , and with foreign nations , and a
s to certain
other articles particularly specified . ” 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 415 . It would , I imagine ,
b
e very difficult to point outwhen and in what manner any such compact was made .
The Constitution was neither made nor ratified b
y
the States a
s sovereignties o
r political
communities . It was framed b
y
a convention , proposed to th
e
people o
f
the States fo
r
216 [BOOK III .CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES .
pendent States may unite themselves together b
y
a perpetual con
federation without each ceasing to be a perfect State . They will
together form a Federal republic . The deliberations in common
will offer no violence to each member , though they may in cer
tain respects put some constraint on the exercise of it in virtue of
voluntary engagements . The extent ,modifications , and objects of
the Federal authority are mere matters of discretion . So long as
their adoption b
y
Congress ; and was adopted b
y
State conventions , - the immediate
representatives o
f
the people . (Mr . Calhoun has enlarged upon the view here taken b
y
Mr . Jefferson in two elaborate papers : the “ Discourse on the Constitution and Gov
ernment o
f
the United States , ” Works , I . 111 ; and the “ Address on the Relations of
the States to the General Government , ” Works , VI . 59 . See also the review of this
work b
y
Judge A . P . Upshur , (Petersburg , Va . , 1840 . ) If , however , anything can be
regarded a
s
settled in the constitutional law o
f any people , it must now be looked
upon a
s placed beyond further controversy , that the Constitution o
f
the United States
is a
n
instrument o
f government , agreed upon and established in the several States by
the people thereof , through representatives empowered fo
r
the purpose , operative apon .
the people individually and collectively , and , within the sphere of its powers , upon the
government o
f
the States also . And that the Union which is perfected b
y
means o
f it
is indissoluble through any steps contemplated b
y , or admissible under , its provisions
o
r
o
n
the principles o
n
which it is based , and can only b
e
overthrown b
y
physical force
effecting a revolution . Such has been the view of the judicial department from the first ,
and the practice o
f
the legislative and executive departments has corresponded thereto ;
Mr . Jefferson himself , asMr . Calhoun mournfully concedes , (Calhoun ' s Works , I . 359 , )
having failed a
s
President to offer pract cal resistance to this construction of the Con
stitution . And finally the people of the country , when some of the States endeavored
to treat the Constitution a
s
a compact from which theymight withdraw when they
deemed its provisions violated , have resisted this doctrine with the utmost expenditure
o
f military force , and a
t
a
n
immense sacrifice o
f
life and treasure have overthrown it
s
adherents . In the courts , therefore , in the Cabinet , in the halls of legislation , and in
the arbitrament o
f arms , the national view has invariably prevailed . It may be added ,
also , that the last great struggle has had the effect which able minds had anticipated a
s
the result o
f
thewar , ( se
e
Life , & c . , of Gouverneur Morris , III . 260 ; Calhoun ' s Works ,
I . 361 , ) - to strengthen considerably and in some directions to extend the national
authority . Something of this has come from constitutional changes introduced fo
r
this
express purpose ; something from the great increase in Federal offices , patronage , and
expenditures ; but more than all from the public mind becoming familiarized with the
employment b
y
the Federal government o
f
tremendous discretionary powers during the
existence o
f
hostilities , and o
f
unusual and somewhat arbitrary measures afterwards in
suppressing disorders in the territory lately in rebellion , and in reconstructing the shat
tered fabrics o
f
State government . The constitution o
f any nation is practically what
it has become b
y
the practical construction o
f
those in authority , acquiesced in b
y
the
people , and if doubtful points have been covered b
y
that construction for purposes ap
parently beneficial ,and under circumstances which incline the people to approval or indif
ference , there is very great probability that the ground thus occupied will be permanently
possessed , and instead of being afterwards abandoned voluntarily ,may not even be con
tested b
y
thosewho might have done so with vigor and effect under other circumstances ,
How fa
r
this should b
e
so we d
o
not discuss ; that it is so in fact is unquestionable .
11 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . note V , p . 141 .
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the separate organization o
f
themembers remains , and , from the
nature o
f
the compact , must continue to exist , both fo
r
local and
domestic and fo
r
Federal purposes , the Union is in fact , as well
a
s
in theory , an association o
f
States , or a confederacy .
$ 312 . It is also , to a certain extent , a social compact . In the
act o
f
association , in virtue o
f
which a multitude of men form
together a state or nation , each individual is supposed to have
entered into engagements with all to procure the common wel
fare ; and al
l
are supposed to have entered into engagements with
each other to facilitate the means o
f supplying the necessities o
f
each individual , and to protect and defend him . And this is what
is ordinarily meant b
y
the original contract o
f society . But a con
tract of this nature actually existed in a visible form between
the citizens o
f
each State in their several constitutions . It might ,
therefore , be deemed somewhat extraordinary , that in the estab
lishment o
f
a Federal republic it should have been thought neces
sary to extend it
s operation to the persons o
f
individuals , as well
a
s
to the States composing the confederacy .
§ 313 . It may be proper to illustrate the distinction between
federal compacts and obligations and such a
s
are social , b
y
one or
two examples . A federal compact , alliance , or treaty is an act of
the state or body politic , and not of an individual . On the con
trary , a social compact is understood to mean the ac
t
o
f individ
uals about to create and establish a state o
r body politic among
themselves . If one nation binds itself by treaty to pay a certain
tribute to another , or if al
l
the members of the same confederacy
oblige themselves to furnish their quotas of a common expense
when required , - in either of these cases the state or body politic
only ,and not the individual , is answerable for this tribute or quota .
This is , therefore , a federal obligation . But where b
y
any com
pact , express or implied , a number of persons are bound to con
tribute their proportions o
f
the common expenses , or to submit to
a
ll
laws made b
y
the common consent , and where in default of
compliance with these engagements the society is authorized to
levy the contribution o
r
to punish the person o
f
the delinquent ,
this seems to be understood to bemore in th
e
nature of a social
than a federal obligation . 3
$ 314 . It is an original compact . Whatever political relation
existed between th
e
American colonies antecedent to the Revolu
11 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . note D , p . 144 . 2 Id . p . 145 . 3 Id . 145 .
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tion , as constituent parts of the British Empire ,or as dependencies
upon it, that relation was completely dissolved and annihilated
from that period . From the moment of the Revolution they be
came severally independent and sovereign States , possessing al
l
the rights , jurisdictions , and authority that other sovereign states ,
however constituted , or b
y
whatever title denominated , possess ;
and bound b
y
n
o ties but of their own creation , except such as all
other civilized nations are equally bound b
y , and which together
constitute the customary law of nations . "
§ 315 . It is a written compact . Considered as a federal com
pact o
r alliance between the States , there is nothing new or singu
lar in this circumstance , as al
l
national compacts since the inven
tion o
f
letters have probably been reduced to that form . But
considered in the light of an original social compact , the American
Revolution seems to have given birth to this new political phenom
enon . In every State a written Constitution was framed and
adopted b
y
the people both in their individual and sovereign
capacity and character . 2
i i Tuck . Black . Comm . App . note D , p . 150 . These views are very different from
those which Mr . Dane has , with so much force and perspicuity , urged in hi
s
Appendix
to h
is Abridgment o
f
the Law , $ 2 , p . 10 , & c .
" In order correctly to ascertain this rank , this linking together , and this subordina
tion , we must g
o
back a
s
far a
s January , 1774 , when the thirteen States existed constitu
tionally , in the condition of thirteen British colonies , yet , d
e
facto , the people of them
exercised original , sovereign power in their institution , in 1774 , of th
e
Continental Con .
gress ; and especially in June , 1775 , then vesting in it th
e
great national powers that
will be described ; scarcely any of which were resumed . The result will show that , on
revolutionary principles , the general government was , b
y
the sovereignacts o
f
this people ,
first created d
e
novo , and d
e
facto instituted ; and , by the same acts , the people vested in
it very extensive powers , which have ever remained in it , modified and defined b
y
the
Articles o
f
Confederation , and enlarged and arranged anew b
y
the Constitution o
f
the
United States . 2d . That the State governments and States , as free and independent
States , were , July 4 , 1776 ,created b
y
the general government , empowered to do it b
y
the
people , acting on revolutionary principles , and in their original , sorereign capacity ; and
that all the State governments , as such , have been instituted during the existence o
f
the
general government , and in subordination to it , and two thirds of them since the Con .
stitution o
f
the United States was ordained and established b
y
the people thereof in that
sovereign capacity . The State governments have been , by the people of each State ,
instituted under , and expressly or impliedly in subordination to th
e
general govern
ment , which is expressly recognized b
y
all to be supreme law ; and as the power of the
whole is , in the nature of things , superior to the power of a part , other things being
equal , the power o
f
a State , a part , is inferior to the power o
f
all the States . Asser
tions that each o
f
the twenty -four States is completely sovereign , that is , as sovereign as
Russia o
r
France , of course as sovereign as all the States , and that this sovereignty is
above judicial cognizance ,merit special attention . ”
2 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . note D , p . 153 . There is an inaccuracy here ; Con
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§ 316 . It is a compact freely, voluntarily , and solemnly entered
into by th
e
several States , and ratified by the people thereof re
spectively ; - freely , there being neither external nor internal force
o
r
violence to influence or promote the measure , the United States
being a
t peace with all the world and in perfect tranquillity in each
State ; voluntarily , because the measure had its commencement
in spontaneous acts o
f
the State legislatures , prompted b
y
a sense
o
f
the necessity o
f
some change in the existing confederation ;
and solemnly , as having been discussed , not only in the general
convention which proposed and framed it , but afterwards in the
legislatures o
f
the several States , and finally in the conventions
o
f
all the States , b
y
whom it was adopted and ratified . 1
§ 317 . It is a compact b
y
which the several States and the
people thereof respectively have bound themselves to each other
and to the Federal government . The Constitution had its com
mencement with the body politic o
f
the several States ; and its
final adoption and ratification was b
y
the several legislatures
referred to and completed b
y
conventions especially called and
appointed for that purpose in each State . The acceptance o
f
the
Constitution was not only an act o
f
the body politic o
f
each State ,
but o
f
the people thereof respectively in their sovereign character
and capacity . The body politic was competent to bind itself , so
fa
r
a
s
the constitution o
f
the State permitted . But not having
power to bind the people in cases beyond their constitutional
authority , the assent of the people was indispensably necessary to
the validity o
f
the compact , b
y
which the rights o
f
the people
might b
e
diminished , or submitted to a new jurisdiction , or in any
manner affected . From hence , not only the body politic of the
several States ,but al
l
citizens thereof ,may be considered as parties
to the compact , and to have bound themselves reciprocally to each
other fo
r
the due observance o
f it , and also to have bound them
selves to the Federal government ,whose authority has been thereby
created and established .
necticut did not form a constitution until 1818 ,and existed until that period under her
colonial charter . Rhode Island framed and adopted a constitution in 1842 . [But
until such adoption the colonial charter must be considered as having been accepted for
and a
s constituting a State constitution . This was the view taken b
y
the Superior
Court o
f
Rhode Island in 1786 ,when in the case of Trevett v . Weedon , a legislative
act was declared unconstitutional because in conflict with the royal charter . See also
Luther v . Borden , 7 How . 1 . )
11 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . note D , p . 155 , 156 ,
2 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . note D , p 169 .
8 i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . note D , p . 170 .
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§ 318 . Lastly , it is a compact by which the Federal government
is bound to the several States and to every citizen of the United
States . Although the Federal government can in no possible view
be considered as a party to a compact made anterior to its exist
ence , and b
y
which it was in fact created , yet , as the creature of
that compact , it must be bound b
y
it to it
s
creators , the several
States in the Union and the citizens thereof . Having no existence
but under the Constitution , nor any rights but such as that instru
ment confers , and those very rights being in fact duties , it can
possess n
o legitimate power but such as is absolutely necessary for
the performance of a duty prescribed and enjoined b
y
the Consti
tution . Its duties then become the exact measure of its powers ;
and whenever it exerts a power fo
r
any other purpose than the
performance o
f
a duty prescribed b
y
the Constitution , it trans
gresses it
s proper limits and violates the public trust . Its duties
being moreover imposed for the general benefit and security o
f
the
several States in their political character , and of the people both
in their sovereign and individual capacity , if these objects be not
obtained , the government does not answer the end of its creation .
It is , therefore , bound to the several States respectively , and to
every citizen thereof , for the due execution of those duties ; and
the observance o
f
this obligation is enforced under the solemn
sanction of an oath from those who administer the government .
$ 319 . Such is a summary of the reasoning of the learned au
thor , b
y
which h
e has undertaken to vindicate his views o
f
the
nature o
f
the Constitution . That reasoning has been quoted at
11 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . note D , p . 170 .
? (When , in 1861 , the people of that section of the country in which the doctrines of
Mr . Tucker had taken most root , attempted to withdraw from the Union and establish
a government o
f
Confederate States , they endeavored b
y
their constitution to preclude
forever such a construction o
f
the instrument a
s
had prevailed regarding the Constitu
tion o
f
the United States . The preambles of th
e
two instruments placed side b
y
side
will show very distinctly the difference in the ends sought .
Preamble to the Constitution o
f
the United States . “ We , the people of the United
States , in order to form a more perfect Union , establish justice , insure domestic tranquil
lity , provide fo
r
th
e
commondefence, promotethe generalwelfare , and secure the blessings o
f
liberty to ourselves and our posterity , d
o
ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States o
f
America . ”
Preamble to th
e
Constitution o
f
th
e
Confederate States . “ We , the people of the Confed
erate States , and each State acting in it
s sovereign and independent character , in order to
form a permanent Federal government , establish justice , and secure the blessings o
f
lib
erty to ourselves and our posterity , invoking the favor and guidance o
f Almighty God ,
d
o
ordain and establish this Constitution fo
r
the Confederate States o
f
America . "
The Confederate Constitution in themain was copied from that of the United States ,
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large, and fo
r
the most part in hi
s
own words , not merely as hi
s
own ,but as representing , in a general sense , the opinions of a large
body o
f
statesmen and jurists in different parts o
f
the Union ,
avowed and acted upon in former times , and recently revived
under circumstances which have given them increased importance
if not a perilous influence . 1
but its framers were particular to state that the powers vested in the Congress were
delegated, not granted to that body .
How fa
r
the purpose o
f
these variations from th
e
Constitution o
f
the Union was
accomplished may appear from the statement , doubtless somewhat exaggerated , of a
prominent actor , who declares that “ in less than a twelvemonth after this same boasted
States -rights Constitution was put in operation , it
s very framers notoriously , and in
spite o
f a
ll
remonstrances , succeeded in consolidating al
l
governmental power in the
central agency a
t
Richmond , and , upon the stale plea of military necessity , shamelessly
trod under foot all the reserved rights of the States and the people , and organized an
irresponsible military despotism in the very bosom o
f
the Ancient Dominion , a
s
harsh
and grinding in it
s
character a
s
has ever heretofore existed in any age o
f
the world . ”
The War of the Rebellion , b
y
H . S . Foote , p . 49 . The measures of which Mr . Foote
complained were disapproved o
f b
y
th
e
Vice -President o
f
the Confederacy , and were the
subject o
f protests in some of the States , especially in Georgia ; but in a life -and -death
struggle n
o government is likely to inquire very carefully into paper limitations upon
it
s powers . ]
1 Many traces o
f
these opinions will be found in the public debates in the State legis
latures , and in Congress at different periods . In the resolutions of Mr . Taylor , in the
Virginia legislature in 1798 , it was resolved “ that this assembly doth explicitly and
peremptorily declare , that it views the powers of the Federal government as resulting
from the compact to which the Statesare parties . ” See Dane ' s Appendix , p . 17 . The
original resolution had theword “ alone " after “ States , " which was struck out upon the
motion o
f
th
e
original mover , it having been asserted in th
e
debate that the peoplewere
parties also , and b
y
some o
f
the speakers that the people were exclusively parties .
The Kentucky resolutions of 1797 (which were drafted b
yMr . Jefferson ) declare
“ that to this compact (the Federal Constitution ) each State acceded as a State , and is
a
n integral party . " North American . Review , October , 1830 , p . 501 , 545 . In the
resolutions o
f
the senate o
f
South Carolina , in November , 1817 , it was declared , “ that
the Constitution o
f
the United States is a compact between the people o
f
the different
States with each other , as separate and independent sovereignties . ” In November ,
1799 , the Kentucky legislature passed a resolution , declaring that the Federal States had
a right to judge o
f any infraction o
f
the Constitution , and that a nullification b
y
those
sovereignties o
f
all unauthorized acts done under color o
f
that instrument is the rightful
remedy . North American Review , Id . 503 . Mr . Madison , in the Virginia Report of
1800 , reasserts the right of the States , as parties , to decide upon the unconstitutionality
o
f any measure . Report , p . 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 . The Virginia legislature , in 1829 , passed a
resolution , declaring that “ the Constitution of the United States being a federative
compact between sovereign States , in construing which no common arbiter is known ,
each State has the right to construe the compact for itself . 3 A
m
. An . Reg . : Local His
tory , 131 . Mr . Vice -President Calhoun ' s letter to Gov . Hamilton of August 28 , 1832 ,
contains a very elaborate exposition o
f
this among other doctrines .
Mr . Dane , in his Appendix , ( $ 3 , p . 11 , ) says , that for forty years one great party has
received the Constitution a
s
a federative compact among the States , and the other great
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§ 320 . It is wholly beside our present purpose to engage in a
critical commentary upon the different parts o
f
this exposition . It
will be sufficient , fo
r
a
ll
the practical objects we have in view , to
suggest the difficulties o
f maintaining it
s leading positions , to ex
pound the objections which have been urged against them , and to
bring into notice those opinions , which rest on a very different
basis o
f principles .
§ 321 . The obvious deductions which may be , and indeed have
been , drawn from considering the Constitution as a compact be
tween the States , are , that it operates as a mere treaty or conven
tion between them , and has an obligatory force upon each State no
longer than suits it
s pleasure , or its consent continues ; that each
State has a right to judge for itself in relation to the nature , ex
tent , and obligations of the instrument , without being at al
l
bound
by the interpretation o
f
the Federal government , or b
y
that of any
other State ; and that each retains the power to withdraw from
the confederacy and to dissolve the connection , when such shall
b
e
it
s
choice ; and may suspend the operations of the Federal
government , and nullify its acts within its own territorial limits
whenever , in its own opinion , the exigency of the case may require . 1
party , no
t
a
s
such a compact , but , in the main , national and popular . The grave debate
in the Senate o
f
the United States , on Mr . Foot ' s resolution , in the winter of 1830 ,
deserves to b
e
read for it
s
able e
x position o
f
the doctrines maintained o
n
each side . Mr .
Dane makes frequent references to it in his Appendix . 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 315 to 330 .
See also Life o
f
Webster , by Curtis , II . ch . 16 and 19 . ]
1 Virginia , in the resolutions of her legislature on the tariff , in February , 1829 , de
clared , “ that there is n
o
common arbiter to construe the Constitution ; being a federa
tive compactbetweensovereign States , each State has a right to construe the compact for
itself . ” 9 Dane ' s Abridg . ch . 187 , art . 20 , § 14 , p . 589 . See also North American
Review , October , 1830 , p . 488 to 528 . The resolutions of Kentucky o
f
1798 contain a
like declaration , that “ to this compact (the Constitution ) each State acceded as a State ,
and is a
n integral party ; that the government created b
y
this compact was not made
the exclusive o
r
final judge o
f
th
e
powers delegated to itself , & c . ; but that , as in al
l
other cases o
f compact among parties having n
o
common judge , each party has an
equal right to judge for itself , as well of infractions as of th
e
mode and measures o
f
re
dress . ” North American Review , October , 1830 , p . 501 . The Kentucky resolutions
o
f
1799 g
o
further , and assert “ that the several States who formed that instrument
( the Constitution ) , being sovereign and independent , have the unquestionable right to
judge o
f
it
s
infraction ; and that a nullification b
y
those sovereignties o
f
a
ll
unauthorized
acts done under color o
f
that instrument is the rightful remedy . " North American
Review , Id . 503 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 315 , 32
2
. In Mr . Madison ' s Report in the Vir
ginia legislature , in January , 1800 , it is also affirmed that the States are parties to the
Constitution ; but b
y
States h
e
bere means ( a
s
the context explains ) the people o
f
the
States . The report insists that the States are in the last resort the ultimate judges o
f
the infractions o
f
th
e
Constitution . p . 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 .
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These conclusions may not always be avowed ; but they flow nat
urally from the doctrines which w
e
have under consideration , 1
They g
o
to the extent o
f reducing the government to amere confed
eracy during pleasure ; and of thus presenting the extraordinary
spectacle o
f
a nation existing only a
t
the will of each o
f it
s
constituent parts .
§ 322 . If this be the true interpretation of the instrument , it
has wholly failed to express the intentions o
f
it
s framers , and
brings back , or at least may bring back , upon us al
l
the evils of
the ol
d
confederation , from which we were supposed to have had a
safe deliverance . For the power to operate upon individuals , in
stead o
f operating merely on States , is o
f
little consequence , though
yielded b
y
the Constitution , if that power is to depend fo
r
its exer
cise upon the continual consent of all the members upon every
emergency . We have already seen that the framers of th
e
instru
ment contemplated no such dependence . Even under the confed
eration it was deemed a gross heresy tomaintain that a party to a
compact has a right to revoke that compact ; and the possibility
o
f
a question of this nature was deemed to prove the necessity o
f
laying the foundations o
f
our national government deeper than in the
mere sanction of delegated authority . “ A compact between inde
pendent sovereigns , founded on acts of legislative authority , can
pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the
parties . It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties ,
that a
ll
the articles ar
e
mutually conditions o
f
each other ; that a
1 I do not mean to assert that al
l
those who held these doctrines have adopted th
e
conclusions drawn from them . There are eminent exceptions ; and among them the
learned commentator o
n
Blackstone ' s Commentaries seems properly numbered . See
I Tucker ' s Black . App . 17
0
, 171 , $ 8 . See the debates in the Senate on Mr . Foot ' s
Resolution in 1830 , and Mr . Dane ' s Appendix , and his Abridgment and Digest , Vol .
IX . ch . 187 , art . 20 , § 13 to 22 , p . 588 et se
q
. ; ,North American Review fo
r
October ,
1830 , on the Debates on the Public Lands , p . 481 to 486 , 488 to 528 ; 4 Elliot ' s De
bates , 315 to 330 ; Madison ' s Virginia Report , Ja
n
. , 1800 , p . 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ; 4 Jefferson ' s
Correspondence , 415 ; Vice -President Calhoun ' s letter to Gov . Hamilton , August 28 ,
1832 . (Also Constitutional View of the War between the States , b
y
Alexander H .
Stephens . )
[See Mr . Madison ' s explanation of the Virginia Resolutions , Writings of Madison ,
IV . 95 ; North American Review , October , 1830 ; Randall ' s Jefferson , II . 451 . See
also Mr . Madison ' s elaborate paper on Nullification , in his Writings , IV . 394 . Com
pare , a
s
to the right o
f
the States to judge a
s
to infractions o
f
the Constitution , Report
o
f
the Hartford Convention o
f
1814 , in Dwight ' s History thereof , p . 361 ; Niles ' s Regis
ter , Vol . VII . p . 308 . ]
2 The Federalist ,No . 22 ; Id . No . 43 : see also Mr . Patterson ' s opinion in the con
vention , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 74 , 75 ; and Yates ' s Minutes .
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breach o
f
any one article is a breach o
f
the whole treaty ; and that
a breach committed b
y
either o
f
th
e
parties absolves the others ,
and authorizes them , if they please , to pronounce the compact
violated and void . ” i Consequences like these , which place the
dissolution o
f
the government in the hands of a single State , and
enable it at will to defeat or suspend the operation of the laws of
the Union , are to
o
serious not to require u
s
to scrutinize with the
utmost care and caution the principles from which they flow and
b
y
which they are attempted to be justified .
§ 323 . The word " compact , ” like many other important words
in our language , is susceptible of different shades of meaning , and
may be used in different senses . It is sometimes used merely to
express a deliberate and voluntary assent to any act or thing .
Thus , it has been said b
y
Dr . South , that " in the beginnings of
speech , there was an implicit compact founded upon common con
sent , that such words , voices , or gestures should be signs , whereby
they would express their thoughts " ; ? where , it is obvious , that
nothing more is meant than a mutual and settled appointment in
the use o
f language . It is also used to express any agreement or
contract between parties , b
y
which they are bound and incur legal
obligations . 3 Thus we say that one person has entered into a
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 43 . Mr . Madison , in th
e
Virginia Report of January , 1800 ,
asserts ( p . 6 , 7 ) that , “ the States being parties to the constitutional compact , and in
their sovereign capacity , it follows o
f necessity that there can b
e
n
o tribunal above their
authority to decide , in the last resort ,whether the compact made b
y
them b
e
violated ;
and consequently , that , as the parties to it , they must themselves decide in the last resort
such questions a
s may b
e
o
f
sufficient magnitude to acquire their interposition . ” Id .
p . 8 , 9 .
[ In the Report of th
e
Hartford Convention o
f
1814 , it was declared that “ in cases
o
f
deliberate , dangerous , and palpable infractions o
f
the Constitution affecting the soy
ereignty o
f
a State and liberties o
f
the people , it is not only the right but the duty of
such a State to interpose it
s authority for their protection , in the manner best calculated
to secure that end . When emergencies occur which are either beyond the reach o
f
the
judicial tribunals , or to
o
pressing to admit o
f
the delay incident to their forms , States
which have n
o
commonumpire must b
e
their own judges and execute their own decisions . "
Dwight , Hist . Hartford Convention , 361 ; Niles ' s Register , Vol . VII . p . 308 . ]
2 Cited in Johnson ' s Dictionary , verb Compact . See Heinecc . Elem . Juris , Natur .
L . 2 , ch . 6 , § 109 to 112 .
3 Pothier distinguishes between a contract and a
n agreement . An agreement , he
says , is the consent of two or more persons to form some engagement , or to rescind or
modify a
n engagement already made . “ Duorum vel plurium in idem placitum consen
sus . ” Pand . Lib . 1 , § 1 , de Pactis . An agreement , b
y
which two parties reciprocally
promise and engage , o
r
one o
f
them singly promises and engages to the other , to give
some particular thing , or to do or abstain from a particular act , is a contract ; b
y
which
he means such a
n agreement a
s gives a party the right legally to demand it
s perform
ance . Pothier , Oblig . part 1 , ch . 1 , $ 1 ; art . 1 , § 1 . See 1 Black . Comm . 44 , 45 ,
CH. II.] 225NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION .
compact with another ,meaning that the contracting parties have
entered into some agreement which is valid in point of la
w , and
includes mutual rights and obligations between them . And it is
also used , in an emphatic sense , to denote those agreements and
stipulations which are entered into between nations , such as public
treaties , conventions , confederacies , and other solemn acts of na
tional authority . When we speak of a compact in a legal sense ,
we naturally include in it the notion of distinct contracting par
ties , having mutual rights and remedies to enforce the obligations
arising therefrom . We suppose that each party has an equal and
independent capacity to enter into the contract , and has an equal
right to judge o
f
it
s
terms , to enforce its obligations , and to insist
upon redress fo
r
any violation o
f
them . This , in a general sense ,
is true under our systems o
f municipal law , though practically
that law stops short o
f maintaining it in all the variety of forms
to which modern refinement has pushed the doctrine o
f implied
contracts .
$ 324 . A compact may , then , be said in its most general sense
to import an agreement , according to Lord Coke ' s definition ,aggre
gatio mentium , an aggregation or consent of minds ; in its stricter
sense to import a contract between parties , which creates obliga
tions and rights capable o
f being enforced and contemplated as
such b
y
the parties , in their distinct and independent characters .
This is equally true o
f
them , whether the contract be between
individuals o
r
between nations . The remedies are , or may be ,
different ; but the right to enforce , as accessory to the obligation ,
is equally retained in each case . It forms the very substratum of
the engagement .
§ 325 . The doctrine maintained b
y
many eminent writers upon
public law in modern times is , that civil society has its foundation
in a voluntary consent o
r
submission ; 8 and , therefore , it is often
said to depend upon a social compact o
f
the people composing th
e
nation . And this , indeed , does not , in substance , differ from the
definition o
f it b
y
Cicero , Multitudo , juris consensu et utilitatis
communione sociata ; that is , ( as Burlamaqui gives it , ) a multitude
1 Vattel , B . 2 , ch . 12 , § 152 ; 1 Black . Comm . 43 .
2 2 Black . Comm . 442 .
8 Woodeson ' s Elements of Jurisprudence , 21 , 22 ; 1 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 304 , 305 ;
Vattel , B . 1 , ch . 1 , § 1 , 2 ; 2 Burlamaqui , part 1 , ch . 2 , 3 , 4 ; 1 Black . Comm . 47 , 48 ;
Heinecc . L . 2 , ch . 1 , § 12 to 18 ; ( 2 Turnbull , Heinecc . System o
f
Universal Law , B . 2 ,
ch . 1 , § 9 to 12 ; ) Id . ch . 6 , § 109 to 115 .
VOL . I . 15
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o
f people united together b
y
a common interest , and b
y
common
laws , to which they submit with one accord .
1 Burlamaqui , part 1 , ch . 4 , § 9 ; Heinecc . Elem . Juris . Natur . L . 2 , ch . 6 , § 107 ;
(Maine , Ancient Law , ch . 9 ; Lecture on the Social Compact , at Providence , b
y
John
Quincy Adams , 1842 . )
Mr . Locke is one of the most eminent authors who have treated on this subject . He
founds a
ll civil government upon consent . “ When , " says he , “ any number of men
have so consented to make a community o
r government , they are thereby presently
incorporated , andmake one body politic ,wherein themajority have a right to act , and con
cludethe rest . " Locke o
n
Government , B . 2 , ch . 8 , § 9
5
. And he considers this consent
to b
e
bound b
y
the will of the majority , as the indispensable result of becoming a
community ; " else , " says he , “ this original compact ,whereby h
e , with others , incor .
porates into one society , would signify nothing , and be no compact at al
l
. " Locke on
Government , B . 2 , § 96 , 97 , 98 , 99 ; Id . $ 119 , 120 . Dr . Paley has urged some very
forcible objections against this doctrine , both as matter of theory and o
f
fact , with
which , however , it is unnecessary here to intermeddle . The discussion of them would
more properly belong to lectures upon natural and political la
w
. Paley on Moral and
Political Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 3 . Mr . Burke has , in one of hismost splendid perform
ances ,made some profound reflections on this subject , the conclusion of which seems to
b
e , that if society is to b
e
deemed a contract , it is one of eternal obligation , and not
liable to b
e
dissolved a
t
thewill of those who have entered into it . The passage is as
follows : " Society is indeed a contract . Subordinate contracts fo
r
objects o
f
mere
occasional interest may b
e
dissolved a
t pleasure . But the State ought not to be con
sidered a
s nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade o
f pepper and coffee ,
calico , o
r
tobacco , o
r
some other such low concern , to b
e
taken up for a little temporary
interest , and to be dissolved b
y
the fancy o
f
the parties . It is to be looked on with
other reverence ; because it is not a partnership in things , subservient only to the gross
animal existence o
f
a temporary and perishable nature . It is a partnership in al
l
science , a partnership in all art , a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection . As
the ends o
f
such a partnership cannot b
e
obtained in many generations , it becomes a
partnership not only between those who are living , but between those who are living ,
those who are dead , and those who are to be born . Each contract of each particular
State is but a clause in the great primeval contract o
f
eternal society , linking the lower
with the higher natures , connecting the visible and invisible world according to a fixed
compact , sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral
natures , each in their appointed place . This law is not subject to the will o
f
those who ,
by an obligation above them , and infinitely superior , are bound to submit their will to
that law . The municipal corporations of that universal kingdom are notmorally at
liberty a
t
their pleasure , and on their speculations of a contingent improvement , wholly
to separate and tear asunder the bands o
f
their subordinate community , and to dissolve
it into a
n
unsocial , uncivil , unconnected chaos of elementary principles . It is the first
and supreme necessity only , - a necessity that is not chosen , but chooses , – a necessity
paramount to deliberation , that admits no discussion , and demands no evidence ,which
alone can justify a resort to anarchy . This necessity is no exception to the rule ; be
cause this necessity itself is a part , too , of that moral and physical disposition of things
to which man must b
e
obedient b
y
consent o
r
force . But if that which is only sub
mission to necessity should b
e
made the object o
f
choice , the law is broken , nature is
disobeyed , and the rebellious are outlawed , cast forth , and exiled from this world of
reason , and order , and peace , and virtue ,and fruitful penitence , into the antagonist world
o
f
madness , discord , vice , confusion , and unavailing sorrow . ” Reflections on the Revo
lution in France .
CH. III . ] 227NATURE O
F
THE CONSTITUTION .
§ 326 . Mr . Justice Blackstone has very justly observed that the
theory of an original contract upon the first formation of society
is a visionary notion . “ But though society had not its formal be
ginning from any convention o
f
individuals actuated b
y
their
wants and fears , yet it is the sense of their weakness and imper
fection that keeps mankind together , that demonstrates the neces
sity o
f
this union , and that , therefore , is th
e
solid and natual foun
dation a
s
well a
s
the cement o
f
civil society . And this is what we
mean b
y
the original contract of society ; which , though perhaps
in no instance it has ever been formally expressed a
t
the first in
stitution o
f
a State , yet , in nature and reason , must always be
understood and implied in the very act o
f associating together ;
namely , that the whole should protect al
l
its parts , and that every
part should pay obedience to the will of the whole ; or , in other
words , that the community should guard the rights of each indi
vidual member ; and that in return fo
r
this protection each indi
vidual should submit to the laws o
f
the community . ” i It is in
this sense that the preamble of the constitution of Massachusetts
asserts that “ the body politic is formed b
y
a voluntary association
o
f
individuals ; that it is a social compact , by which the whole peo
ple covenants with each citizen , and each citizen with the whole
people , that al
l
shall b
e governed b
y
certain laws for the common
good ” ; and that in the same preamble the people acknowledge
with grateful hearts , that Providence had afforded them an oppor
tunity “ of entering into an original , explicit , and solemn compact
with each other , and of forming a new constitution of civil gov
ernment for themselves and their posterity . ” It is in this sense ,
too , thatMr . Chief Justice Jay is to be understood when he asserts 2
that “ every State constitution is a compact made b
y
and between
the citizens o
f
a State to govern themselves in a certain manner ;
and the Constitution o
f
the United States is , likewise , a compact
made b
y
the people o
f
the United States , to govern themselves as
to general objects in a certain manner . ” He had immediately
before stated ,with reference to the preamble of the Constitution ,
“ Here we se
e
the people acting a
s sovereigns o
f
the whole coun
i i Black . Comm . 47 . See also 1 Hume ' s Essays , Essay 12 . Mr . Hume considers
that the notion o
f government , being universally founded in original contract , is vis
ionary , unless in the sense of its being founded upon the consent of those who first
associate together and subject themselves to authority . He has discussed the subject at
large in a
n
elaborate essay . Essay 12 , p . 491 . [SeeMaine , Ancient Law , ch . 9 . ]
3 Chisholm v . State of Georgia , 3 Dall . R .419 ; see also 1 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 305 .
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try , and in the language of sovereignty , establishing a constitution ,
by which it was their will that the State governments should be
bound , and to which the State constitutions should be made to
conform ."
§ 327 . But although in a general sense , and theoretically speak
ing , the formation of civil societies and states may thus be said to
be founded in a social compact or contract , that is; in th
e
solemn ,
express , or implied consent of the individuals composing them ,
yet the doctrine itself requires many limitations and qualifications
when applied to the actual condition o
f
nations , even of those
which are most free in their organization . Every state , however
organized , embraces many persons in it who have never assented
to it
s
form o
f government , and many who are deemed incapable
o
f
such assent , and yet who are held bound b
y
it
s
fundamental
institutions and laws . Infants ,minors ,married women , persons
insane , and many others , are deemed subjects of a country , and
bound b
y
it
s
laws , although they have never assented thereto ,and
may by those very laws be disabled from such an act . Even our
most solemn instruments of government , framed and adopted as
the constitutions o
f
our State governments , are not only not
founded upon the assent o
f all the people within the territorial
jurisdiction ,but that assent is expressly excluded by the very man
ner in which the ratification is required to b
e
made . That ratifi
cation is restricted to those who are qualified voters ; and who are
o
r
shall be qualified voters is decided b
y
themajority in the con
vention or other body which submits the constitution to the peo
ple . All of the American constitutions have been formed in this
manner . The assent of minors , of women , and of unqualified
voters has never been asked or allowed ; ye
t
these embrace ama
jority o
f
the whole population in every organized society , and are
governed b
y
it
s existing institutions . Nay ,more ; a majority only
1 In the ordinance o
f Congress o
f
1787 , fo
r
the government o
f
the territory o
f
the
United States northwest o
f
river Ohio , in which the settlement of the territory and the
establishment o
f
several States therein were contemplated , it was declared that certain
articles therein enumerated “ shall b
e
considered as articles o
f compactbetween the origi
nal States and the people and States in the said territory , and forever remain unalter
able , unless by common consent . " Here is a
n express enumeration o
f parties , some of
whom were not then in existence , and the articles of compact attached as such only ,
when they were brought into life . And then , to avoid all doubt as to their obligatory
force , they were to b
e
unalterable except b
y
common consent. One party could not
change o
r
absolve itself from the obligation to obey them .
? See Burke ' s Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs .
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o
f
the qualified voters is deemed sufficient to change the funda
mental institutions o
f
the State , upon the general principle that
the majority has a
t
a
ll
times a right to govern the minority , and
to bind the latter to obedience to the will o
f
the former . And if
more than a plurality is in any case required to amend o
r change
the actual constitution of the society , it is a matter of political
choice with th
e
majority fo
r
the time being , and not of right on
the part o
f
the minority
$ 328 . It is a matter of fact ,therefore , in the history of our own
forms o
f government , that they have been formed without the con
sent , express or implied , of the whole people ; and that , although
firmly established , they owe their existence and authority to the
simple will of the majority of the qualified voters . There is not
probably a single State in the Union whose constitution has not
been adopted against the opinions and wishes o
f
a large minority ,
even o
f
the qualified voters ; and it is notorious that some of them
have been adopted b
y
a small majority o
f
votes . How , then , can
we assert with truth , that even in our free constitutions the gov
ernment is founded , in fact , on th
e
assent o
f
the whole people ,
when many o
f
them have not been permitted to express any opin
ion , and many have expressed a decided dissent ? In what man
ner are we to prove that every citizen o
f
the State has contracted
with a
ll
the other citizens that such constitution shall be a bind
ing compact between them ,with mutual obligations to observe and
keep it , against such positive dissent ? If it be said that b
y
enter
ing into th
e
society an assent is necessarily implied to submit to
the majority , how is it proved that a majority of al
l
the people o
f
all ages and sexes were ever asked to assent , or did assent , to such
a proposition ? And as to persons subsequently born , and sub
jected by birth to such society , where is th
e
record o
f
such assent
in point o
f
law o
r fact ? 1
§ 329 . In respect to the American Revolution itself , it is noto
rious that it was brought about against the wishes and resistance
o
f
a formidable minority o
f
the people , and that the Declaration
o
f Independence never had the universal assent of the inhabitants
o
f
the country . So that this great and glorious change in the
organization o
f
our government owes it
s
whole authority to the
efforts o
f
a triumphant majority . And the dissent on the part of
the minority was deemed in many cases a crime , carrying along
1 See 1 Hume ' s Essays , Essay 12 .
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with it the penalty o
f
confiscation , forfeiture , and personal and
even capital punishment ; and in it
s
mildest form was deemed a
n
unwarrantable outrage upon the public rights , and a total disregard
o
f
the duties of patriotism .
$ 330 . The truth is , that the majority of every organized society
have always claimed and exercised the right to govern the whole
o
f
that society , in the manner pointed out b
y
the fundamental laws
which from time to time have existed in such society . Every
revolution , a
t
least when not produced b
y
positive force , has been
founded upon the authority o
f
such majority . And the right
results from the very necessities o
f
our nature ; for universal con
sent can never b
e practically required o
r
obtained . The minority
are bound , whether they have assented or not ; for the plain reason
that opposite wills in the same society , on the same subjects , can
not prevail at the same time ; and , as society is instituted fo
r
the
general safety and happiness , in a conflict of - opinion themajority
must have a right to accomplish that object b
y
themeans which they
deem adequate fo
r
the end . The majority may , indeed , decide how
far they will respect the rights or claims of the minority ; and how
far they will , from policy or principle , insist upon or absolve them
from obedience . But this is a matter on which they decide fo
r
themselves , according to their own notions of justice or conven
ience . In a general sense the will of the majority of the people
is absolute and sovereign , limited only b
y
their means and power
to make their will effectual . 2 The Declaration of Independence
(which , it is historically known , was not the act of the whole
American people ) puts the doctrine on it
s
true grounds . Men are
endowed , it declares , with certain unalienable rights , and among
these are life , liberty , and the pursuit of happiness . To secure
these rights governments are instituted among men , deriving their
just powers from the consent o
f
the governed . Whenever any
form o
f government becomes destructive of these ends , it is th
e
right o
f
the people (plainly intending the majority o
f
th
e
people )
to alter o
r
to abolish it , and to institute a new government , laying
11 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 16
8
; Id . 172 ,173 ; Burke ' s Appeal from the New to
the Old Whigs ; Grotius , B . 2 , ch . 5 , § 17 .
2 Mr . Dane , in hi
s
Appendix to the ninth volume o
f
h
is Abridgment , has examined
this subject very much a
t large . See , especially , pages 37 to 43 . Mr . Locke , the most
strenuous asserter o
f liberty and o
f
the original compact of society , contends resolutely
fo
r
this power o
f
the majority to bind the minority , as a necessary condition in the
original formation of society . Locke on Government , B . 2 , ch . 8 , from $ 95 to $ 100 .
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it
s
foundation on such principles , and organizing its powers in
such forms , as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety
and happiness .
$ 331 . But whatever may be the true doctrine as to the nature
o
f
the original compact of society , or of the subsequent institution
and organization o
f governments consequent thereon , it is a very
unjustifiable course o
f reasoning to connect with the theory a
ll
the
ordinary doctrines applicable to municipal contracts between indi
viduals , or to public conventions between nations . We have
already seen that the theory itself is subject to many qualifica
tions ; but whether true or not , it is impossible ,with a just regard
to the objects and interests o
f society , or the nature of compacts
o
f government , to subject them to the same constructions and
conditions a
s belong to positive obligations created between inde
pendent parties contemplating a distinct and personal responsi
bility . One of the first elementary principles of al
l
contracts is ,
to interpret them according to the intentions and objects of the
parties . They are not to be so construed as to subvert the obvi
ous objects fo
r
which they were made , or to lead to results wholly
beside the apparent intentions of those who framed them .
$ 332 . Admitting , therefore , fo
r
the sake o
f argument , that the
institution of a government is to b
e
deemed , in the restricted sense
already suggested , an original compact or contract between each
citizen and the whole community , is it to be construed as a contin
uing contract after it
s adoption , so as to involve the notion o
f
there
being still distinct and independent parties to the instrument capa
ble and entitled , as matter of right , to judge and act upon its
construction according to their own views o
f
it
s import and obli
gations ? to resist the enforcement of the powers delegated to the
government at the good pleasure o
f
each ? to dissolve a
ll
connec
1 It was the consideration of the consequences deducible from the theory o
f
a
n origi
nal subsisting compact between the people , upon the first formation o
f
civil societies
and governments , that induced Dr . Paley to reject it . He supposed that , if admitted ,
it
s
fundamental principles were still disputable and uncertain ; that , if founded on com
pact , the form o
f government , however absurd or inconvenient , was still obligatory ;
and that every violation o
f
the compact involved a right o
f
rebellion and a dissolution
o
f
the government . Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 3 . Mr . Wilson (afterwards
Mr . Justice Wilson ) urged the same objection very forcibly in the Pennsylvania Con
vention for adopting the Constitution . 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 286 , 287 , 288 . Mr . Hume
considers the true reason for obedience to government to b
e , not a contract or promise
to obey , but the fact that society could not otherwise subsist . i Hume ' s Essays ,
Essay 1
2
.
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tion with it ,whenever there is a supposed breach of it on the other
side ? 1 These aremomentous questions ,and go to the very founda
tion o
f every government founded on the voluntary choice o
f
the
people ; and they should be seriously investigated before we admit
the conclusions which may b
e
drawn from one aspect o
f
them . ?
$ 333 . Take , for instance , the constitution of Massachusetts ,
which in its preamble contains the declaration already quoted , that
government “ is a social compact , b
y
which the whole people cov
enants with each citizen , and each citizen with the whole govern
ment ” ; are we to construe that compact , after the adoption of the
constitution , as still a contract in which each citizen is still a dis
tinct party , entitled to his remedy for any breach of its obligations ,
and authorized to separate himself from the whole society ,and to
throw off all allegiance whenever he supposes that any of the
fundamental principles o
f that compact are infringed or miscon
strued ? Did the people intend that it should be thus in the
power o
f any individual to dissolve the whole government a
t
his
pleasure , or to absolve himself from all obligations and duties
thereto a
t his choice , or upon his own interpretation of the in
strument ? If such a power exists , where is the permanence or
security o
f
the government ? In what manner are the rights and
property o
f
the citizens to be maintained o
r
enforced ? Where
are the duties o
f allegiance or obedience ? May one withdraw his
consent to -day , and reassert it to -morrow ? May one claim the
protection and assistance o
f
the laws and institutions to -day , and
to -morrow repudiate them ? May one declare war against all the
others fo
r
a supposed infringement o
f
the Constitution ? If he
may , then each one has the same right in relation to all others ;
and anarchy and confusion , and not order and good government
and obedience , are the ingredients which are mainly at work in all
19 Dane ' s Abridg . ch . 187 , ar
t
. 20 , $ 13 , p . 589 .
? Mr . Woodeson (Elements of Jurisp . p . 22 ) says , “ However the historical fact may
b
e
o
f
a social compact , government ought to be and is generally considered as founded
o
n
consent , tacit o
r express , or a real o
r quasi compact . This theory is a material
basis o
f political rights ; and as a theoretical point is not too difficult to b
e
maintained ,
& c . , & c . Not that such consent is subsequently revocable at the will , even o
f
all the sub
jects o
f
th
e
state , for that would be making a part of the community equal in power to
the whole originally , and superior to the rulers thereof after their establishment . "
However questionable this latter position may b
e , (and it is open to many objections ;
see i Wilson ' s Lectures , 417 , 418 , 419 , 420 , ) it is certain that a right of the minority
to withdraw from the government , and to overthrow its powers , has no foundation in
any just reasoning .
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free institutions founded upon the will and choice and compact of
the people . Theexistence of the government and its peace and its
vital interests will , under such circumstances , be at the mercy and
even a
t the caprice of a single individual . It would not only be
vain ,but unjust to punish him fo
r
disturbing society ,when it is
but b
y
a just exercise o
f
the original rights reserved to him b
y
the
compact . The maxim that in every government the will of the
majority shall and ought to govern the rest ,would be thus sub
verted ; and society would , in effect , be reduced to its original
elements . The association would be temporary and fugitive , like
those voluntary meetings among barbarous and savage communi
ties , where each acts fo
r
himself , and submits only while it is his
pleasure .
$ 334 . It can readily be understood in what manner contracts
entered into b
y private persons are to be construed and enforced
under the regular operations of an organized government . Under
such circumstances , if a breach is insisted on b
y
either side , the
proper redress is administered b
y
the sovereign power , through
the medium o
f
it
s delegated functionaries , and usually b
y
the judi
cial department , according to the principles established b
y
the
laws which compose the jurisprudence o
f that country . In such a
case n
o person supposes that each party is a
t liberty to insist abso
lutely and positively upon his own construction , and to redress
himself accordingly b
y
force o
r by fraud . He is compellable to
submit the decision to others , not chosen b
y
himself , but appointed
b
y
the government , to secure the rights and redress the wrongs
o
f
the whole community . In such cases the doctrine prevails ,
inter leges silent arma . But the reverse maxim would prevail upon
the doctrine o
f
which we are speaking , inter arma silent leges . It
is plain that such a resort is not contemplated b
y
any o
f
our forms
o
f government , by a suit of one citizen against the whole for a
redress o
f his grievances , or fo
r
a specific performance o
f
the obli
gations o
f
the constitution . He may have , and doubtless in our
forms o
f administering justice has , a complete protection of his
rights secured b
y
the constitution , when they are invaded b
y
any
other citizen . But that is in a suit b
y
one citizen against another ,
and not against the body politic , upon the notion of contract .
$ 335 . It is easy , also , to understand how compacts between
independent nations are to b
e
construed , and violations of them
redressed . Nations , in their sovereign character , are al
l
upon a
n
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equality , and do not acknowledge any superior b
y
whose decrees
they are bound , or to whose opinions they ar
e
obedient . When
ever , therefore , any differences arise between them as to the inter
pretation o
f
a treaty , or of the breach of its terms , there is no
common arbiter whom they are bound to acknowledge , having
authority to decide them . There are but three modes in which
these differences can b
e adjusted : first , b
y
new negotiations em
bracing and settling th
e
matters in dispute ; secondly , by referring
the same to some common arbiter , pro hac vice , whom they invest
with such power ; or , thirdly , by a resort to arms ,which is the
ultima ratio regum , o
r
the last appeal between sovereigns .
$ 336 . It seems equally plain , that in our forms of government
the constitution cannot contemplate either o
f
these modes o
f in
terpretation or redress . Each citizen is not supposed to enter into
the compact , as a sovereign with all the others as sovereign ,
retaining an independent and coequal authority to judge and
decide for himself . He has no authority reserved to institute new
negotiations , or to suspend the operations of the constitution , or
to compel the reference to a common arbiter , or to declare war
against the community to which he belongs .
§ 337 . No such claim has ever ( at least to our knowledge ) been
asserted b
y any jurist or statesman in respect to any o
f
our State
constitutions . The understanding is general , if not universal ,
that , having been adopted b
y
the majority o
f
the people , the con
stitution of the State binds the whole community proprio vigore ;
and is unalterable , unless b
y
the consent o
f
the majority o
f
the
people , or at least of the qualified voters of the State , in theman
ner prescribed b
y
the constitution , or otherwise provided fo
r
b
y
themajority . No right exists , or is supposed to exist , on the part
o
f any town or county , or other organized body within the State ,
short of a majority o
f
the whole people o
f
the State , to alter , sus
pend , resist , or dissolve the operations of that constitution , or to
withdraw themselves from it
s jurisdiction . Much less is the com
pact supposed liable to interruption o
r suspension o
r
dissolution
a
t
th
e
will of any private citizen upon his own notion of its obli
gations , or of any infringements o
f
them b
y
the constituted author
ities . The only redress for any such infringements , and the only
guaranty o
f
individual rights and property , are understood to
consist in the peaceable appeal to the proper tribunals constituted
1 Dane ' s App . $ 14 , p . 25 , 26 .
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by th
e
government fo
r
such purposes ; or if these should fail , by
the ultimate appeal to the good sense and integrity and justice o
f
the majority of the people . And this , according to Mr . Locke , is
the true sense o
f
the original compact , b
y
which every individual
has surrendered to the majority of the society the right permanently
to control and direct the operations o
f government therein . 1
$ 338 . The true view to be taken of our State constitutions is ,
that they are forms o
f government ordained and established b
y
the people in their original sovereign capacity to promote their own
happiness , and permanently to secure their rights , property , inde
pendence , and common welfare . The language of nearly al
l
these
State constitutions is , that the people do ordain and establish this
constitution ; and where these terms are not expressly used , they
are necessarily implied in the very substance of the frame o
f gov
ernment . They may be deemed compacts , (though not generally
declared so on their face , ) in the sense of their being founded on
the voluntary consent or agreement of a majority of the qualified
voters o
f
the State . But they are not treated as contracts and
conventions between independent individuals and communities
having no common umpire . The language o
f
these instruments
is not the usual or appropriate language for mere matters resting
and forever to rest in contract . In general the import is , that the
people “ ordain and establish , ” that is , in their sovereign capacity ,
meet and declare what shall be the fundamental Law for the gov
ernment o
f
themselves and their posterity . Even in the constitu
tion o
f
Massachusetts , which ,more than any other , wears the air
o
f
contract , the compact , is declared to be a mere " constitution of
civil government , ” and the people “ do agree on , ordain , and
establish the following declaration o
f rights and frame o
f govern
ment as the constitution of government . ” In this very bill of
rights the people are declared “ to have the sole and exclusive
right of governing themselves , as a free , sovereign , and indepen
dent State ” ; and that “ they have an incontestable , unalienable ,
1 Locke o
n
Government , B . 2 , ch . 8 , § 95 to 100 ; ch . 19 , $ 212 , 220 , 226 , 240 , 243 ; 1 .
Wilson ' s Law Lectures , 310 , 384 , 417 ,418 . Mr . Dane (App . p . 32 ) says , that if there
b
e any compact , it is a compact to make a constitution ; and that done , the agreement
is a
t
a
n
end . It then becomes an executed contract , and , according to the intent of the
parties , a fundamental law .
2 Dane ' s App . $ 16 , 17 , p . 29 , 30 ; Id . $ 14 , p . 25 , 26 .
3 Heineccius , Elemen . Juris . Natur . L . 2 , ch . 6 , § 109 to 115 ; ( 2 Turnbull , Heinecc .
p . 95 ; ) & c .
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and indefeasible right to institute government , and to reform , alter ,
or totally change the same , when their protection , safety, pros
perity , and happiness require it.” It is, and accordingly has
always been , treated as a fundamental law , and not as a mere
contract of government , during the good pleasure of al
l
the per
sons who were originally bound b
y
it or assented to it . 1
$ 339 . A constitution is in fact a fundamental law or basis of
government , and falls strictly within the definition of law as given
by Mr . Justice Blackstone . It is a rule of action prescribed by
the supreme power in a state , regulating the rights and duties of
the whole community . It is a rule , as contradistinguished from a
temporary o
r
sudden order ; permanent , uniform , and universal .
It is also called a rule , to distinguish it from a compact or agree
ment ; for a compact ( he adds ) is a promise proceeding from us ,
law is a command directed to u
s . The language of a compact is ,
I will or will not do this ; that of a law is , Thou shalt or shalt not
d
o
it . “ In compacts we ourselves determine and promise what
shall b
e
done before we are obliged to do it . In laws we are
obliged to act without ourselves determining o
r promising anything
a
t
a
ll . ” 3 It is a rule prescribed ; that is , it is laid down , promul
gated , and established . It is prescribed b
y
the supreme power in
a state , that is , among us , by the people , or a majority of them in
their original sovereign capacity . Like the ordinary municipal
laws , it may be founded upon our consent or that of our represen
tatives ; but it derives its ultimate obligatory force as a law , and
not as a compact .
$ 340 . And it is in this light that the language of the Constitu
tion o
f
the United States manifestly contemplates it ; fo
r
it declares
( article 6th ) that this Constitution and the laws , & c . , and treaties
made under the authority o
f
the United States , “ shall be the
supreme Law o
f
the land . ” This ( as has been justly observed b
y
1 Mr . Justice Chase , in Ware v . Hylton , 3 Dall . R . 199 , declares the constitution of a
State to b
e
the fundamental law o
f
the State . Mr . Dane has with great force said , that
a constitution is a thing constituted , a
n
instrument ordained and established . If a
committee frame a constitution for a State , and the people thereof meet in their several
counties and ratify it , it is a constitution ordained and established , and not a compact ,
o
r
contract among the counties . So , if they meet in several towns and ratify it , it is a
compact among them . A compact among States is a confederation , and is always so
named , ( as was the old confederation , ) and never a constitution . 9 Dane ' s Abridgment ,
ch . 187 ,art . 20 , § 15 , p . 590 .
? 1 Black . Comm . 38 , 44 , 45 . See also Burlamaqui , Part 1 , ch . 8 , p . 48 , § 3 , 4 , 5 .
8 i Black . Comm . 45 .
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the Federalist ) results from the very nature of political institu
tions . A law , by the very meaning of the terms, includes suprem
acy . If individuals enter into a state of society , the laws of
that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct . If a
number of political societies enter into a larger political society ,
th
e
laws which th
e
latter may enact , pursuant to the powers in
trusted to it b
y
it
s
constitution ,must be supreme over those socie
ties and the individuals o
f
whom they are composed . It would
otherwise be a mere treaty , dependent on the good faith of the
parties , and not a government ,which is only another word fo
r
polit
ical power and supremacy . A State constitution is then , in a just
and appropriate sense , not only a law , but a supreme law , fo
r
the
government o
f
the whole people , within the range of the powers
actually contemplated and the right secured b
y
it . It would ,
indeed , be an extraordinary use of language to consider a declara
tion o
f rights in a constitution , and especially of rights which it
proclaims to be “ unalienable and indefeasible , ” to be a matter of
contract , and resting on such a basis , rather than a solemn recog
nition and admission o
f
those rights , arising from the law of nature
and the gift o
f
Providence , and incapable of being transferred or
surrendered . 3
i Th
e
Federalist , No . 33 . Se
e
also , N
o
. 15 . ? The Federalist , No . 33 .
Mr . Adams , in his oration on the 4t
h
o
f July , 1831 , uses the following language :
“ In the constitution o
f
this commonwealth (Massachusetts ) it is declared that the body
politic is formed b
y
a voluntary association o
f
individuals ; that it is a social com
pact , & c . The body politic o
f
the United States was formed b
y
a voluntary association
o
f
the people o
f
the united colonies . The Declaration of Independence was a social
compact , by which the whole people covenanted with each citizen o
f
the united colonies ,
and each citizen with the whole people , that the united colonies were , and of right
ought to be , freeand independent States . To this compact , union was as vital as free
dom and independence . From the hour of that independence no one of the States
whose people were parties to it could , without a violation of that primitive compact ,
secede o
r separate from the rest . Each was pledged to all ; and all were pledged to
each other b
y
a concert o
f
soul , without limitation of time , in the presence of Almighty
God , and proclaimed to al
l
mankind . The colonies were not declared to b
e sovereign
States . The term ' sovereign ' is not even to be found in the Declaration . ” Again ,
“ Our Declaration of Independence , our Confederation , our Constitution of the United
States , and all our State constitutions ,without a single exception , have been voluntary
compacts ,deriving all their authority from the free consent of the parties to them . ”
And h
e proceeds to state that th
e
modern doctrine o
f
nullification o
f
the laws o
f
the
Union , b
y
a single State , is a solecism of language , and imports self -contradiction , and
goes to the destruction o
f
the government and the Union . It is plain , from the whole
reasoning o
f Mr . Adams , that when he speaks of the Constitution as a compact , he
means n
o
more than that it is a voluntary and solemn consent o
f
the people to adopt it ,
a
s
a form o
f government ; and not a treaty obligation to b
e abrogated a
t will b
y
a
single State .
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§ 341 . The ’resolution of the convention of th
e
Peers and Com
mons in 1688 , which deprived King James the Second of the
throne o
f England ,may perhaps be thought b
y
some persons to
justify the doctrine o
f
a
n original compact o
f government in the
sense o
f
those who deem the Constitution o
f
the United States a
treaty o
r
league between the States , and resting merely in con
tract . It is in the following words : “ Resolved , that King James
the Second ,having endeavored to subvert the Constitution of the
kingdom by breaking the original contract between king and people ;
and b
y
the advice o
f Jesuits and other wicked persons having vio
lated the fundamental laws , and withdrawn himself out of the
kingdom , hath abdicated the government , and that the throne is
thereby become vacant . ” 1
$ 342 . It is well known that there was a most serious difference
o
f opinion between the House of Peers and the House of Com
mons upon the language o
f
this resolution , and especially upon
that part which declared the abdication and vacancy o
f
the throne .
In consequence o
f
which a free conference was held b
y
commit
tees o
f
both houses , in which themost animated debates took place
between some o
f
th
e
most distinguished men in th
e
kingdom . But
the Commons adhering to their vote , the Lords finally acceded to
it . The whole debate is preserved ,and the reasoning on each side
is given a
t large . In the course of the debate notice was fre
quently taken o
f
the expression o
f breaking the original contract
between king and people . The Bishop of Ely said , “ Imay say ,
that this breaking the original contract is a language that hath not
been long used in this place , nor known in any of our law -books
o
r public records . It is sprung u
p , but as taken from some late
authors , and those none of the best received ; and the very phrase
might bear a great debate , if that were now to be spoken to . ” —
“ The making o
f
new laws being a
s
much a part o
f
the original
compact a
s
the observing old ones , or anything else , we are obliged
to pursue those laws till altered b
y
the legislative power ,which ,
singly o
r jointly , without the royal assent , I suppose we do not
pretend to . ” — “ Wemust think sure that meant of the compact
that was made at first time ,when the government was first insti
tuted ,and the conditions , that each part of the government should
observe on their part ; of which this was most fundamental , that
1 1 Black . Comm . 211 , 22
2
, 232 .
2 Parliamentary Debates , 1688 , edit . 1742 , p . 203 et seq .
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king , lords , and commons in Parliament assembled shall have th
e
power o
f making new laws and altering o
f
o
ld ones . ” 1 Sir
George Treby said , “ We are gone too fa
r ,when we offer to inquire
into the original contract ,whether any such thing is known or un
derstood in our la
w
o
r
Constitution , and whether it be new lan
guage among u
s . ” “ First , it is a phrase used b
y
the learned Mr .
Hooker in his book of Ecclesiastical Polity , whom I mention as a
valuable authority , ” & c . “ But I have yet a greater authority than
this to influence thismatter , and that is your lordships ' own , who
have agreed to all the vote , but this word , abdicated , and the
vacancy o
f
the throne . ” He then supposes the king to say , “ The
title of kingship I hold b
y original contract , and the fundamental
constitutions o
f
the government , and my succession to and pos
session o
f
the crown on these terms is a part o
f
that contract .
This part o
f
the contract I am weary of , ” & c . The Earl of Not
tingham said , " I know no laws , as laws , but what are fundamental
constitutions , as the laws are necessary so far to support the foun
dation . ” 3 Si
r
Thomas Lee said , “ The contract was to settle the
Constitution a
s
to the legislature ; and it is true that it is a part
o
f
the contract , the making of laws , and that those laws should
oblige a
ll
sides when made . But yet not so as to exclude this
original constitution in al
l
governments that commence b
y
compact , that there should be a power in the states to make
provision in all times , and upon al
l
occasions fo
r
extraordinary
cases o
f necessity , such as ours now is . ” 4 Si
r
George Treby
again said , “ The laws made are certainly part of the original con
tract , and b
y
the laws made , & c . , we are tied u
p
to keep in the
hereditary line , " & c . 5 Mr . Sergeant Holt (afterwards Lord Chief
Justice ) said , " The government and magistracy are all under a
trust , and any acting contrary to that trust is a renouncing of the
trust , though it be not a renouncing b
y
formal deed . For it is a
plain declaration b
y
act and deed , though not in writing ,that he who
hath the trust ,acting contrary , is a disclaimer of the trust . ” 6 Mr .
Sergeant Maynard said , “ The Constitution , notwithstanding the
vacancy , is the same . The laws , that are the foundations and
rules of that Constitution , are the same . But if there be in any
instance a breach o
f
that Constitution , that will be an abdication ,
1 Parliamentary Debates , 1688 , edit . 1742 , p . 21
7
, 218 .
* Id . p . 221 , 223 , 224 .
4 Id . p . 246 . 5 Id . p . 24
9
.
3 Id . p . 225 , 226 .
6 Id . p . 213 .
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and that abdication will confer a vacancy ." i Lord Nottingham
said , “ Acting against a man 's trust (says Mr. Sergeant Holt ) is
a renunciation of that trust . I agree it is a violation of his trust
to act contrary to it. And he is accountable fo
r
that violation to
answer what the trust suffers out o
f his own estate . But I deny
it to be presently a renunciation o
f
the trust , and that such a one
is no longer a trustee . ” 2
§ 343 . Now it is apparent from th
e
whole reasoning o
f
a
ll
the
parties , that they were not considering how fa
r
the original insti
tution o
f government was founded in compact , that is , how far
society itself was founded upon a social compact . It was not a
question brought into discussion , whether each of the people con
tracted with the whole people , or each department o
f
the govern
ment with all others , or each organized community within the
realm with all others , that there should be a frame of government
which should form a treaty between them , of which each was to
judge for himself , and from which each was a
t liberty to withdraw
a
t
his pleasure , whenever he or they supposed it broken . All of
the speakers on all sideswere agreed that th
e
Constitution was not
gone ; that it remained in full force ,and obligatory upon the whole
people , including the lawsmade under it , notwithstanding the vio
lations b
y
the king .
$ 344 . The real point before them was upon a contract of a very
different sort , a contract by which the king upon taking upon him
self the royal office undertook ,and bound himself to thewhole people
to govern them according to the laws and constitution o
f
the gov
ernment . It was , then , deemed a contract on his part singly with
the whole people , they constituting an aggregate body on the other
part . It was a contract or pledge b
y
the executive , called upon to
assume an hereditary ,kingly authority , to govern according to the
rules prescribed b
y
the form o
f government already instituted b
y
the people . The constitution of government and its limitations of
authority were supposed to b
e
fixed ( n
omatter whether in fiction
only o
r
in fact ) antecedently to his being chosen to the kingly
office . We ca
n
readily understand how such a contract may be
formed and continue even to exist . It was actually made with
William the Third , a few days afterwards ; it has been recently
made in France b
y King Louis Philippe , upon the expulsion of the
old line o
f
the Bourbons . But in both these cases the constitution of
1 Parliamentary Debates , 1688 , edit . 1742 , p . 21
3
,214 . 2 Id . p . 22
0
.
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government was supposed to exist independent of, and antecedent
to , this contract . There was a mere call of a particular party to
the throne , already established in the government , upon certain
fundamental conditions , which if violated by the incumbent he
broke his contract , and forfeited his right to the crown. But the
constitution of government remained , and th
e
only point le
ft
was
to supply the vacancy b
y
a new choice .
§ 345 . Even in this case a part of the people did not undertake
to declare the compact violated or the throne vacant . The decla
ration was made b
y
the peers in their own right , and b
y
the com
mons b
y
their representatives , both being assembled in convention
expressly to meet the exigency . “ For , ” says Blackstone , “ when
ever a question arises between th
e
society a
t large and anymagis
trate vested with powers originally delegated b
y
that society , it
must be decided b
y
the voice o
f that society itself . There is not
upon earth any other tribunal to resort to . ” 2
$ 346 . This was precisely the view entertained b
y
the great
revolutionary Whigs in 1688 . They di
d
not declare the govern
ment dissolved , because the king had violated the fundamental
laws and obligations o
f
the Constitution . But they declared that
those acts amounted to a renunciation and abdication o
f
the gov
ernment b
y
him ; and that the throne was vacant , and must be
supplied b
y
a new choice . The original contract with him was
gone . He had repudiated it , and lost al
l
rights under it . But
these violations did not dissolve the social organization , or vary
the existing Constitution and laws , or justify any of th
e
subjects in
renouncing their own allegiance to th
e
government ; but only to
King James 3 In short , the government was no more dissolved
than our own would be if the President of the United States should
violate his constitutional duties , and upon an impeachment and
trial should be removed from office .
$ 347 . There is no analogy whatsoever between that case and
the government o
f
the United States , or the social compact , or
original constitution o
f government adopted by a people . If there
were any analogy it would follow that every violation of the Con
1 | Black . Comm . 212 , 213 .
2 1 Black . Comm . 211 , 212 .
8 i Black . Comm . 212 , 213 . The same doctrines were avowed b
y
the great Whig
leaders o
f
the House o
f
Commons o
n
the trial of Dr . Sacheverell , in 1709 . Mr . Burke ,
in h
is Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs , has given a summary of the reason
ing , and supported it b
y
copious extracts from the trial .
VOL . I . 16
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stitution o
f
the United States b
y any department o
f
the govern
ment would amount to a renunciation b
y
the incumbent or incum
bents o
f all rights and powers conferred on that department b
y
the
Constitution , ipso facto , leaving a vacancy to be filled u
p
b
y
a new
choice ; a doctrine that has never yet been broached , and indeed
is utterly unmaintainable , unless that violation is ascertained in
some mode known to the Constitution , and a removal takes place
accordingly . For otherwise such a violation by any functionary
o
f
th
e
government would amount to a renunciation of the Consti
tution b
y
all the people of the United States , and thus produce a
dissolution o
f
the government eo instanti ; a doctrine so extrava
gant and so subversive o
f
the rights and liberties o
f
the people ,
and so utterly at war with all principles of common sense and
common justice , that it could never find its way into public favor
b
y
any ingenuity o
f reasoning or any vagaries of theory .
§ 348 . In short , it never entered into the heads o
f
the great
men who accomplished the glorious Revolution o
f
1688 that a
constitution o
f government , however originating , whether in posi
tive compact o
r
in silent assent and acquiescence , after it was
adopted b
y
the people , remained a mere contract or treaty , open
to question b
y
a
ll , and to be annihilated at the will of any of them
for any supposed o
r
real violations o
f
it
s provisions . They sup
posed that from themoment it became a Constitution it ceased to
b
e
a compact , and became a fundamental law of absolute para
mount obligation , until changed b
y
the whole people in the manner
prescribed b
y
it
s
own rules , or b
y
the implied resulting power
belonging to the people in a
ll
cases o
f necessity to provide for
their own safety . Their reasoning was addressed , not to the Con
stitution , but to the functionaries who were called to administer
it . They deemed that the Constitution was immortal , and could
not be forfeited ; fo
r
it was prescribed b
y
and fo
r
the benefit of
the people . But they deemed , and wisely deemed , that the magis
tracy is a trust , a solemn public trust ; and he who violates his
duties forfeits his own right to office , but cannot forfeit the rights
o
f
the people .
§ 349 . The subject has been , thus far , considered chiefly in ref
erence to the point how far government is to be considered as a
compact , in the sense of a contract , as contradistinguished from
a
n
a
ct
o
f solemn acknowledgment or assent ; and how fa
r
our
State constitutions are to b
e
deemed such contracts , rather than
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fundamental laws prescribed b
y
the sovereign power . The con
clusion to which we have arrived is , that a State constitution is no
further to b
e
deemed a compact than that it is amatter of consent b
y
the people , binding them to obedience to its requisitions ; and that
it
s proper character is that o
f
a fundamental law prescribed b
y
the will of the majority of the people of the State (who are enti
tled to prescribe it ) , fo
r
the government and regulation of the
whole people . It binds them as a supreme rule ordained by the
sovereign power , and not merely as a voluntary contract entered
into b
y
parties capable o
f contracting , and binding themselves b
y
such terms as they choose to select . If this be a correct view of
the subject , it will enable us to enter upon the other parts of the
proposed discussion with principles to guide u
s
in the illustration
o
f
the controversy .
$ 350 . In what light , then , is the Constitution of the United
States to be regarded ? Is it a mere compact , treaty , or confeder
ation o
f
the States composing the Union , or of the people thereof ,
whereby each of the several States , and the people thereof , have
respectively bound themselves to each other ? O
r
is it a form of
government which , having been ratified b
y
a majority o
f
the peo
ple in all the States , is obligatory upon them , as the prescribed
rule of conduct o
f
the sovereign power , to the extent of its pro
visions ?
$ 351 . Let us consider , in the first place , whether it is to be
deemed a compact . By this we do not mean an act of solemn
assent b
y
the people to it , as a form of government ( of which
there is n
o
room fo
r
doubt ) ; but a contract imposing mutual obli
gations , and contemplating th
e
permanent subsistence o
f parties
having an independent right to construe , control , and judge of its
obligations . If in this latter sense it is to be deemed a compact ,
it must be either because it contains on it
s
face stipulations to
that effect , or because it is necessarily implied from the nature
and objects o
f
a frame o
f government .
1 It is in this sense that Mr . Chief Justice Jay is to be understood in hi
s
opinion in
Chisholm v . Georgia , ( 2 Dall . R . 419 , ) when he says , “ every State constitution is a
compact , made by and between the citizens o
f
the State to govern themselves in a cer
tain manner ; and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact ,made b
y
th
e
people o
f
the United States to govern themselves , as to general objects , in a certain
manner . ” The context abundantly shows that be considered it a fundamental law of
government , and that its powers did not rest on mere treaty , but were supreme and were
to be construed by the judicial department ; and that the States were bound to obey .
2 Heineccius , Elem . Juris . Natur . L . 2 , ch . 6 , § 109 to 112 ; 2 Turnbull ' s Heinecc .
p . 95 , & c .
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a $ 352 . There is nowhere found upon th
e
face o
f
the Constitution
any clause intimating it to be a compact , or in any wise providing
for it
s interpretation a
s
such . On the contrary , the preamble
emphatically speaks of it as a solemn ordinance and establishment
o
f government . The language is : “ We the people of the United
States d
o ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States o
f
America . ” The people do ordain and establish , not con
tract and stipulate with each other . The people of the United
States , not the distinct people of a particular State with the people
o
f
the other States . The people ordain and establish a “ consti
tution , " not a “ confederation . ” The distinction between a consti
tution and a confederation is well known and understood . The
latter , or at least a pure confederation , is a mere treaty . or league
between independent states , and binds no longer than during the
good pleasure o
f
each . 2 It rests forever in articles of compact ,
where each is o
rmay be the supreme judge of it
s
own rights and
duties . The former is a permanent form of government , where
the powers , once given , are irrevocable , and cannot be resumed or
withdrawn a
t pleasure . Whether formed b
y
a single people , or b
y
different societies of people , in their political capacity , a constitu
tion , though originating in consent , becomes when ratified obliga
tory , as a fundamental ordinance or law . The constitution of a
confederated republic , that is , of a national republic formed of
several states , is , or at least may be ,not less an irrevocable form
o
f government than the constitution o
f
a state formed and ratified
b
y
the aggregate of the several counties of the state .
i The words “ ordain and establish ” are also found in the third article of the Consti
tation : “ The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court , and in such inferior
courts a
s
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish . ” How is this to be
done by Congress ? Plainly by a law ; and when ordained and established , is such a
la
w
a contract o
r compact between the legislature and the people , or the court , or the
different departments o
f
the government ? No . It is neither more nor less than a law ,
made b
y
competent authority , upon an assent or agreement of minds . In Martin v .
Hunter , ( 1 Wheat . R . 304 , 324 , ) the Supreme Court said , “ The Constitution of the
United States was ordained and established , not b
y
the States in their sovereign capaci
ties , but emphatically , as the preamble of the Constitution declares , b
y
the people o
f
the United States . ' ” To the same effect is the reasoning o
fMr . Chief Justice Marsball ,
in delivering the opinions o
f
the court in McCulloch v . Maryland ( 4 Wheaton , 316 , 402 ,
to 405 , already cited ) .
2 The Federalist , No . 9 , 15 , 17 , 18 , 33 ; Webster ' s Speeches , 1830 ; Dane ' s App . $ 2 ,
p . 11 , § 14 , p . 25 , & c . ; Id . § 10 , p . 21 ; Mr . Martin ' s Letter , 3 Elliot , 63 ; 1 Tucker ' s
Black . Comm . App . 146 .
31Wilson ' s Lectures , 417 .
4 See The Federalist ,No . 9 ; Id . No . 15 , 16 ; Id . No . 32 ; Id . No . 39 .
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$ 353 . If it had been the design of the framers of the Consti
tution , or of the people who ratified it , to consider it a mere con
federation , resting on treaty stipulations , it is difficult to conceive
that the appropriate terms should not have been found in it . The
United States were n
o strangers to compacts o
f
this nature . 1
They had subsisted to a limited extent before the Revolution .
The Articles o
f
Confederation , though in some few respects na
tional ,were mainly of a pure federative character , and were
treated a
s stipulations between States fo
r many purposes inde
pendent and sovereign . 2 And yet ( as has been already seen ) it
was deemed a political heresy to maintain that under it any State
had a right to withdraw from it a
t pleasure and repeal its opera
tion ; and that a party to the compact had a right to revoke that
compact . The only places where the terms confederation or com
pact are found in the Constitution apply to subjects o
f
a
n entirely
different nature , and manifestly in contradistinction to constitution .
Thus , in the tenth section of the first article it is declared that “ no
State shall enter into any treaty , alliance , or confederation ” ; “ no
State shall , without the consent of Congress , & c . , enter into any
agreement o
r compact with another State , or with a foreign power . ”
Again , in the sixth article it is declared that “ al
l
debts contracted
and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Consti
tution shall be a
s
valid against the United States under this
Constitution a
s under the confederation . ” Again , in the tenth
amendment it is declared that “ the powers not delegated b
y
the
Constitution ,nor prohibited by it to the States , are reserved to the
States respectively , or to th
e
people . ” A contract can in no just
sense b
e
called a delegation o
f
powers .
$ 354 . But that which would seem conclusive on the subject
( as has been already stated ) is the very language of the Constitu
1 New England Confederacy o
f
1643 ; 3 Kent ' s Comm . 190 , 19
1
, 192 ; Rawle on
Const . Introduct . p . 24 , 25 . In the ordinance o
f
1787 , fo
r
the government o
f
the
territory northwest o
f
the Ohio , certain articles were expressly declared to be " articles
o
f
compact between the original States , ( i . e . the United States , ) and the people and
States [States in futuro , fo
r
none were then in being ) in the said territory . " But to
guard against any possible difficulty , itwas declared that these articles should “ forever
remain unalterable unless b
y
commonconsent . ” So that , though a compact , neither
party was a
t liberty to withdraw from it a
t
it
s pleasure , or to absolve itself from its
obligations . Why was not the Constitution of the United States declared to be articles
o
f compact , if that was the intention o
f
the framers ?
2 The Federalist , No . 15 , 22 , 39 , 40 , 43 ; Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheaton ' s R . 1 , 187 .
3 The Federalist , No . 22 ; Id . No . 43 .
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tion itself , declaring it to be a supreme fundamental law , and to
b
e o
f judicial obligation and recognition in the administration of
justice . “ This Constitution , ” says the sixth article , " and the
laws o
f
the United States , which shall be made in pursuance
thereof , and al
l
treaties made or which shall b
e
made under the
authority o
f
the United States , shall be the supreme law of the land ;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby , anything in
the Constitution or laws o
f any State to the contrary notwithstand
ing . ” If it is the supreme law , how can the people of any State ,
either b
y any form o
f
its own constitution o
r
laws or other pro
ceedings , repeal or abrogate or suspend it ?
$ 355 . But if the language o
f
the Constitution were less ex
plicit and irresistible , no other inference could be correctly deduced
from a view o
f
the nature and objects of the instrument . The
design is to establish a form o
f government . This , of itself , im
ports legal obligation , permanence , and uncontrollability b
y any
but the authorities authorized to alter o
r
abolish it . The object
was to secure the blessings o
f liberty to the people and to their
posterity . The avowed intention was to supersede the old confed
eration , and substitute in its place a new form of government .
Wehave seen that the inefficiency of the old confederation forced
the States to surrender the league then existing , and to establish
a national Constitution . The convention also ,which framed the
Constitution , declared this in the letter accompanying it . “ It is
obviously impracticable in the Federal government o
f
these States , "
says that letter , " to secure al
l
rights o
f independent sovereignty
to each , and yet provide fo
r
the interest and safety o
f
a
ll . Indi
viduals entering into society must give u
p
a share o
f liberty to
preserve the rest . ” 2 " In al
l
our deliberations on this subject we
kept steadily in our view that which appeared to u
s
the greatest
interest o
f every true American , the consolidation of our Union , in
which is involved our prosperity , felicity , safety , perhaps our na
1 The very first resolution adopted b
y
the convention ( si
x
States to two States ) was
in the following words : “ Resolved , that it is the opinion of this committee that a
national government ought to b
e
established o
f
a supreme legislative , judiciary , and
executive , " ( Journal o
f
Convention , p . 8
3 , 134 , 139 , 207 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 49 .
See also 2 Pitkin ' s History , 232 ; ] plainly showing that it was a national government ,
not a compact ,which theywere about to establish , – a supreme legislative , judiciary , and
executive , and not a mere treaty for the exercise of dependent powers during the good
pleasure o
f
a
ll
the contracting parties .
? Journal o
f
Convention , p . 367 , 368 .
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tional existence.” Could this be attained consistently with th
e
notion of an existing treaty o
r confederacy , which each at its
pleasure was a
t liberty to dissolve ? 1
1 The language o
f
the Supreme Court in Gibbons v . Ogden ( 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 187 ) is
very expressive o
n this subject .
“ As preliminary to the very able discussions of the Constitution , which we have
heard from the bar , and a
s having some influence o
n
its construction , reference has
been made to the political situation o
f
these States anterior to it
s
formation . It has
been said that they were sovereign , were completely independent , and were connected
with each other only b
y
a league . This is true . But when these allied sovereigns
converted their league into a government , when they converted their Congress o
f Am
bassadors , deputed to deliberate on their common concerns and to recommend measures
o
f general utility , into a legislature empowered to enact laws o
n
the most interesting
subjects , the whole character in which the States appear underwent a change , the ex
tent o
f
which must b
e
determined b
y
a fair consideration o
f
the instrument b
y
which
that change was effected . ”
Nowhere is the indissoluble character o
f
the Federal Union more forcibly presented
than in the following passages from the opinion o
f Chief Justice Chase , in l 'exas v .
White , 7 Wal . 724 .
“ It is needless to discuss at length the question whether the right of a State to with
draw from the Union for any cause , regarded b
y
herself a
s
sufficient , is consistent with
the Constitution o
f
the United States .
“ The Union o
f
the States was never a purely artificial and arbitrary relation . It
began among the colonies , and grew out of common origin ,mutual sympathies , kindred
principles , similar interests , and geographical relations . It was confirmed and strength
ened b
y
the necessities o
f
war , and received definite form and character and sanction
from the Articles o
f
Confederation . B
y
these the Union was solemnly declared to be
perpetual , ' and when these articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies o
f
the
country , the Constitution was ordained to form a more perfect Union . It is difficult
to convey the idea o
f
indissoluble unity more clearly than b
y
these words : What can
b
e
indissoluble , if a perpetualunion ,made more perfect , is not ?
“ But the perpetuity and indissolubility o
f
the Union b
y
n
o
means implies th
e
loss
o
f
distinct and individual existence , or of the right of self -government b
y
the States .
Under the Articles of Confederation each State retained it
s sovereignty , freedom , and
independence , and every power , jurisdiction , and right not expressly delegated to the
United States . Under the Constitution , though the powers of the States were much
restricted , still al
l
powers not delegated to the United States nor prohibited to the
States , are reserved to the States respectively or to the people , and we have already had
occasion to remark a
t
this term , that ' the people of each State compose a State , having
it
s
own government , and endowed with al
l
the functions essential to separate and in
dependent existence , ' and that 'without the States in union there could be no such
political body as the United States . ' County of Lane v . The State of Oregon , supra , p . 76 .
“ Not only , therefore , can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to
the States , through their anion under the Constitution , but it may be not unreasonably
said that the preservation o
f
the States and themaintenance o
f
their governments are
a
s
much within th
e
design and care o
f
the Constitution a
s
the preservation o
f
the Union
and the maintenance o
f
the national government . The Constitution , in al
l
it
s pro
visions , looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States .
“ When , therefore , Texas became one of the United States , she entered into an indis
soluble relation : al
l
the obligations o
f perpetual union and a
ll
the guaranties o
f repub
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§ 356 . It is also historically known that one of the objections
taken b
y
the opponents o
f
the Constitution was , “ that it is not a
confederation o
f the States ,but a government of individuals . ” 1 It
was , nevertheless , in the solemn instruments of ratification b
y
the
people o
f
the several States , assented to , as a Constitution . The
language o
f
those instruments uniformly is , “ We , & c . , do assent
to and ratify the said Constitution . ” 2 The forms of the conven
tion o
f
Massachusetts and New Hampshire are somewhat peculiar
in their language . “ The convention , & c . , acknowledging , with
grateful hearts , the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the universe
in affording the people o
f
the United States , in the course of his
providence , an opportunity , deliberately and peaceably , without
force o
r surprise , of entering into an explicit and solemn compact
with each other , by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution ,
& c . , do assent to and ratify the said Constitution . ” 3 And although
many declarations of rights , many propositions of amendments ,
and many protestations o
f
reserved powers are to b
e
found accom
panying the ratifications o
f
the various conventions , sufficiently
evincive of the extreme caution and jealousy of those bodies , and
o
f
the people a
t large , it is remarkable that there is nowhere to be
found the slightest allusion to the instrument a
s
a confederation
lican government in the Union a
t
once attached to the State . The act which consum
mated her admission into th
e
Union was something more than a compact ; it was the
incorporation o
f
a new member into the political body . And it was final . The union
between Texas and the other States was a
s complete , as perpetual , and as indissoluble
a
s
the union between the original States . There was no place for reconsideration or
revocation , except through revolution o
r through consent o
f
the States .
“ Considered , therefore , as transactions under the Constitution , the ordinance o
f
seces
sion , adopted b
y
the convention and ratified by a majority o
f
the citizens o
f
Texas , and
all the acts o
f
her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance , were absolutely
null . They were utterly without operation in law . The obligations of the State as a
member o
f
the Union , and o
f every citizen o
f
the State a
s
a citizen o
f
the United
States , remained perfect and unimpaired . It certainly follows that the State did not
cease to b
e
a State nor her citizens to b
e
citizens o
f
the Union . If this were otherwise ,
the State must have become foreign , and her citizens foreigners . The war must have
ceased to b
e
a war fo
r
th
e
suppression o
f
a rebellion , and must have become a war for
conquest and subjugation .
“ Our conclusion , therefore , is , that Texas continued to b
e
a State , and a State of the
Union , notwithstanding the transactions to which we have referred , and this conclusion ,
in our judgment , is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any department of the
national government , but entirely in accordance with the whole series o
f
such acts and
declarations since the first outbreak o
f
the rebellion . " )
1 The Federalist , No . 38 , p . 247 ; Id . No . 39 , p . 256 .
? See the forms in the Journals o
f
the Convention , & c . , ( 1819 , ) p . 390 to 465 .
8 Journals o
f
the Convention , & c . , (1819 , ) p . 401 , 402 , 412 .
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o
r compact o
f
States in their sovereign capacity , and no reserva
tion o
f any right , on the part o
f any State , to dissolve its connec
tion , or to abrogate its assent , or to suspend the operations of the
Constitution , as to itself . On the contrary , that of Virginia ,which
speaks most pointedly to the topic , merely declares “ that the pow
ers granted under the Constitution , being derived from the people of
th
e
United States , may be resumed by them [not b
y
any one of the
States ] whenever the same shall b
e perverted to their injury o
r
oppression . ” .
$ 357 S
o that there is very strong negative testimony against
the notion o
f
it
s being a compact o
r
confederation , of the nature
o
f
which we have spoken , founded upon the known history of the
times , and the acts of ratification , as well as upon the antecedent
Articles of Confederation . The latter purported on their face to
b
e
a mere confederacy . The language of the third article was ,
“ The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league o
f friend
ship with each other for their common defence , & c . , binding them
selves to assist each other . ” And the ratification was b
y
delegates
o
f
the State legislatures ,who solemnly plighted and engaged the
faith o
f
their respective constituents , that they should abide by the
determination of the United States in Congress assembled on a
ll
questions which , b
y
the said confederation , are submitted to them ;
and that the articles thereof should be inviolably observed b
y
the
States they respectively represented . ?
$ 358 . It is not unworthy of observation , that in the debates of 20 . 7
the various conventions called to examine and ratify the Constitu
tion this subject did not pass without discussion . The opponents ,
o
n many occasions , pressed the objection that itwas a consolidated
government , and contrasted it with the confederation . None of
1 Journals o
f
the Convention , & c . , (1819 , ) p . 416 . O
f
the right of a majority o
f
the
whole people to change their Constitution a
t
will there is no doubt . See 1 Wilson ' s
Lectures , 418 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . 165 .
2 Articles of Confederation , 1781 , art . 1
3 . [ The national view of the Constitution
is very forcibly presented b
y
that eminent lawyer , Mr . A . J . Dallas . Life and Writ
ings , by G . M . Dallas , 100 – 107 . )
8 I do not say that the manner of stating the objection was just , but the fact abun
dantly appears in the printed debates . For instance , in the Virginia debates , ( 2 Elliot ' s
Deb . 47 , )Mr . Henry said , “ That this is a consolidated government is demonstrably
clear . ” “ The language [ is ] 'We , the people , ' instead of “We , the States. ' States are
the characteristics and soul o
f
a confederation . If the States be not the agents of this
compact , itmust be one great consolidated national government o
f
the people o
f
all the
States . ” The like suggestion will be found in various places in Mr . Elliot ' s Debates in
other States . See 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 91 , 92 , 110 . See also 3 Amer .Museum , 422 ;
2 Amer . Museum , 540 , 546 ; Mr .Martin ' s Letter , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , p . 53 .
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it
s
advocates pretended to deny that it
s design was to establish a
national government a
s contradistinguished from a mere league
o
r treaty , however they might oppose the suggestions that it
was a consolidation of the States . In the North Carolina de
bates one o
f
the members laid it down as a fundamental principle
o
f
every safe and free government , that “ a government is a com
pact between the rulers and the people . ” This was most strenu
ously denied on the other side b
y gentlemen o
f great eminence .
They said , “ A compact cannot be annulled , but b
y
the consent o
f
both parties . Therefore , unless the rulers are guilty o
f
ppression ,
the people , on the principles of a compact , have no right to new
model their government . This is held to be the principle of some
monarchial governments in Europe . Our government is founded
o
n much nobler principles . The people are known with certainty
to have originated it themselves . Those in power are their ser
vants and agents . And the people , without their consent , may
new -model the government whenever they think proper , notmerely
because it is oppressively exercised , but because they think another
form will be more conducive to their welfare . " 2
$ 359 . Nor should it be omitted , that in the most elaborate
expositions o
f
the Constitution b
y
it
s
friends , it
s
character , as a
permanent form o
f
government , as a fundamental law , as a supreme
rule ,which no State was at liberty to disregard , suspend , or annul ,
was constantly admitted and insisted on , as one of the strongest rea
sons why it should be adopted in lieu of th
e
confederation . It is
matter of surprise , therefore , that a learned commentator should
have admitted the right o
f any State , or of the people o
fany State ,
without the consent o
f
the rest , to secede from the Union at its
own pleasure . The people of the United States have a right to
abolish or alter the Constitution o
f
the United States ; but that
the people of a single State have such a right is a proposition
requiring some reasoning beyond the suggestion that it is implied
13 Elliot ' s Debates , 14
5
, 25
7
, 29
1
; The Federalist , N
o
. 32 , 38 , 39 , 44 , 45 ; 3 Amer .
Museum , 422 , 424 .
2 Mr . Iredell , 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 24 , 25 ; Id . 200 , Mr .McClure , Id . 25 ; Mr .Spen
cer , Id . 2
6 , 2
7 ; Id . 139 . See also 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 156 . See also Chisholm v . Georgia ,
3 Dall . 419 . See also in Penn . Debates ,Mr . Wilson ' s denial that the Constitution was
a compact ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 286 , 287 . See also McCulloch v .Maryland , 4 Wheaton ,
316 , 404 .
8 The Federalist , No . 15 to 20 , 38 , 39 , 44 ; North Amer . Review , October , 1827 , p .
265 , 266 .
* Rawle o
n
the Constitution , ch . 32 , p . 295 , 29
6
, 29
7
, 302 , 305 .
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in the principles on which our political systems ar
e
founded . It
seems , indeed , to have its origin in the notion of al
l
governments
being founded in compact , and therefore liable to be dissolved by
the parties , or either of them ; a notion which it has been our
purpose to question , at least in the sense to which the objection
applies .
$ 360 . To us the doctrine o
f Mr . Dane appears far better
founded , that “ the Constitution of the United States is not a com
pact o
r
contract agreed to b
y
two o
r
more parties , to be construed
b
y
each for itself , and here to stop for the want of a common
arbiter to revise the construction o
f
each party o
r
State . But that
it is , as the people have named and called it , truly a Constitution ;
and they properly said , “We , the people of the United States , do
ordain and establish this Constitution , ' and not we , the people of
each State . " 2 And this exposition has been sustained by opinions
o
f
some of our most eminent statesmen and judges . It was truly
remarked b
y
the Federalist , 4 that the Constitution was the result
neither from the decision o
f
a majority o
f
the people of the Union ,
nor from that of a majority o
f
th
e
States . It resulted from th
e
unanimous assent o
f
the several States that are parties to it , dif
1 Dane ' s App . $ 59 , 60 , p . 69 , 71 .
2 Mr . (afterwards Mr . Justice )Wilson , who was a member of the Federal Conven
tion , uses , in the Pennsylvania Debates , the following language : “ We were told , & c . ,
that the convention n
o
doubt thought they were forming a compact o
r
contract o
f
the
greatest importance . It was matter of surprise to se
e
the great leading principles o
f
this system still so very much misunderstood . I cannot answer for what everymember
thought , but I believe it cannot be said they thought they were making a contract ,
because I cannot discover the least trace of a compact in that system . There can be no
compact , unless there aremore parties than one . It is a new doctrine , that one can make a
compact with himself . “ The convention were forming contracts ! ' With whom ? I know
n
o bargains that were theremade , I am unable to conceive who the parties could be .
The State governments make a bargain with each other . That is the doctrine that is
endeavored to b
e
established b
y
gentlemen in the opposition ; their State sovereignties
wish to b
e represented . But far other were th
e
ideas o
f
the convention . This is no
t
a
government foundedupon compact . It is founded upon the power of the people . They ex
press in their name and their authority , we , the people do ordain and establish , ” & c . 3
Elliot ' s Debates , 286 , 287 . He adds , ( Id . 288 , ) “ This system is not a compact or con
tract . The system tells youwhat it is ; it is an ordinance and establishment o
f
the peo
ple . ” 9 Dane ' s Abridg . ch . 187 , art . 20 , § 15 , p . 589 , 590 ; Dane ' s App . § 10 , p . 21 ,
$ 5
9 , p . 69 .
8 See Ware v . Hylton , 3 Dall . 199 ; Chisholm v . Georgia , 3 Dall . 419 ; 1 Elliot ' s De
bates , 72 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 47 ; Webster ' s Speeches , p . 410 ; The Federalist ,No . 22 ,
3
3 , 39 ; 2 Amer .Museum , 536 , 546 ; Virginia Debates , in 1798 , on the Alien Laws , p .
111 , 136 , 138 , 140 ; North American Review , October , 1830 , p . 437 , 444 .
4 No . 39 .
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fering n
o
otherwise from their ordinary assent than it
s being ex
pressed ,not by the legislative authority , but b
y
that o
f
the peo
ple themselves .
§ 361 . But if the Constitution could , in the sense to which we
have alluded , be deemed a compact , between whom is it to be
deemed a compact ? Wehave already seen that the learned com
mentator on Blackstone deems it a compact with several aspects ;
and first between the States , ( as contradistinguished from the peo
ple o
f
the States , ) b
y
which the several States have bound them
selves to each other and to the Federal government . The Vir
ginia Resolutions of 1798 assert that “ Virginia views th
e
powers
o
f
th
e
Federal government as resulting from the compact to which
the States are parties . ” This declaration was , at the time ,matter
o
f
much debate and difference o
f opinion among the ablest repre
sentatives in the legislature . But when it was subsequently ex
pounded by Mr . Madison , in the celebrated Report of January ,
1800 , after admitting that the term “ states " is used in different
senses ,and among others that it sometimes means the people com
posing a political society in their highest sovereign capacity , he
considers the resolution unobjectionable , at least in this last sense ,
because in that sense the Constitution was submitted to the
“ States ” ; in that sense the “ States ” ratified it ; and in that
sense the States are consequently parties to the compact from
which the powers o
f
the Federal government result . And that is
the sense in which he considers the States parties in his later and
more deliberate examinations . 3
§ 362 . This view of the subject is , however , wholly at variance
with that on which we are commenting ; and which , having no
foundation in the words o
f
the Constitution , is altogether a gratui
tous assumption , and therefore inadmissible . It is no more true
that a State is a party to the Constitution , as such , because it was
framed b
y delegates chosen b
y
the States , and submitted by the
legislatures thereof to the people o
f
th
e
States for ratification , and
that the States are necessary agents to give effect to some of it
s
provisions , than that fo
r
the same reasons the governor or senate
o
r
house o
f representatives or judges , either of a State or the
11 Tuck . Black . Comm . 169 ; Hayne ' s Speech in the Senate , in 1830 ; 4 Elliot ' s
Debates , 315 , 316 .
2 Resolutions o
f
1800 , p . 5 , 6 .
8 North American Review , Oct . 1830 , p . 53
7
, 544 ; [Writings of Madison , IV . 95 ,
395 . )
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United States , are parties thereto . No State , as such , that is , the
body politic , as it was actually organized , had any power to enter
into a contract fo
r
the establishment of any new government over
the people thereof , or to delegate the powers of government in
whole or in part to any other sovereignty . The State governments
were framed b
y
the people to administer the State constitutions ,
such a
s they were , and not to transfer the administration thereof
to any other persons o
r sovereignty . They had no authority to
enter into any compact o
r
contract for such a purpose . It is no
where given o
r implied in the State constitutions ; and conse
quently , if actually entered into , ( as it was not , ) would have had
n
o obligatory force . The people , and the people only , in their
original sovereign capacity , had a right to change their form of
government , to enter into a compact , and to transfer any sover
eignty to the national government . And the States never , in fact ,
1 4 Wheaton , 40
4
. (Obviously , State governments , created by the people and hold
ing from them certain delegated powers in trust , which they exercised for the States
severally , as members of a confederacy , had no authority under their delegation to set
aside the confederation , inaugurate a revolution , and institute a new and more ener
getic government b
y
which the States they represented a
s agencies would b
e
shorn o
f
many most important powers , and subjected , together with their people , to many
restraints unknown before . Revolutions must originate with , and be effected b
y
, the
people ; existing governments have only to confine themselves to a faithful execution o
f
the trusts confided to them ; and if the persons in authority g
o
beyond this limit and
take steps to set aside the instrument o
f government under which alone they have the
right to represent the people , they may justify their conduct , perhaps , a
s
individuals , if
revolution shall b
e accomplished and prove beneficial ; but it is an abuse o
f
terms to
speak o
f
their act a
s
that o
f
the government o
f
which they were members , when in truth
it is something so far from being contemplated b
y , that it is actually repugnant to , the
delegation o
f authority , and therefore , instead of being within the trust conferred , is
necessarily subversive o
f it .
Mr . Buchanan appears to have fallen into this errorwhen he assumed , in 1860 , that
to put forth the power of the government to retake the forts , arsenals , and other prop
erty o
f
the United States , and to enforce the performance of national duties within
one o
f
the States , themembers of whose legislative and executive departments had b
y
forinal acts and declarations announced its withdrawal from the Union , would be to
wage war against such State . See his message o
f
December 4 , 1860 , and his ex
planation thereof in his account o
f
his administration , ch . 6 .
The power “ to coerce a State " was that which Mr . Buchanan was solicitous not to
recognize . “ Not for all the land of the continent o
f
North America would I agree that
the Federal government had power to coerce a State , " said Mr . Senator Jefferson Davis ,
in addressing his constituents o
f
Mississippi o
n
the admission o
f
Kansas . To this
Governor Wise of Virginia replied : “ This surely cannot be meant in an absolute
sense , either that a State cannot be coerced , or that in some cases she ought not to be
coerced . If so , a case can be put in which I presume every patriot ought to be willing
to give the price o
f all the waste lands of the continent , if necessary , to coerce her . "
Or , as the context shows hi
s
meaning to b
e , to compel the persons in authority , as well
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did in their political capacity , as contradistinguished from the peo
ple thereof ,ratify the Constitution . They were not called upon to
d
o
it b
y
Congress , and were not contemplated as essential to give
validity to it . 1
a
s
th
e
people o
f
the State in general , to submit to such laws of Congress as , having
been passed in pursuance o
f
the Constitution , have become the supremelaw of the land ,
Wise on Territorial Government and the Admission of States , p . 103 . ]
1 The Federalist , No . 39 . In confirmation of this view , w
e
may quote the reasoning
o
f
the Supreme Court in the case o
f Mc Culloch v . Maryland , ( 4 Wheaton ' s R . 316 , ) in
answer to the very argument . “ The powers of the general government , it has been
said , are delegated b
y
the States , who alone are truly sovereign , and must b
e
exercised
in subordination to the States , who alone possess supreme dominion .
“ It would b
e
difficult to sustain this proposition . The convention which framed the
Constitution was indeed elected b
y
the State legislatures . But the instrument , when
it came from their hands , was a mere proposal , without obligation o
r pretensions to it .
It was reported to the then existing Congress of the United States with a request that
it might be submitted to a convention of delegates , chosen in each State b
y
the people
thereof , under the recommendation of its legislature , for their assent and ratification .
This mode o
f proceeding was adopted ; and b
y
the convention , b
y
Congress , and b
y
the
State legislatures , the instrument was submitted to the people . They acted upon it in
the only manner in which they can act safely , effectively , and wisely , on such a subject ,
by assembling in convention . It is true , they assembled in their several States , - and
where else should they have assembled ? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to
think o
f breaking down the lines which separate the States , and of compounding the
American people into one common mass . O
f
consequence ,when they act , they ac
t
in
their States . But the measures they adopt do pot , on that account , cease to be the
measures o
f
th
e
people themselves , or become th
e
measures o
f
th
e
State governments .
“ From these conventions the Constitution derives it
s
whole authority . The govern
ment proceeds directly from the people ; is 'ordained and established in the name of
the people ; and is declared to b
e
ordained , ' in order to form a more perfect Union ,
establish justice , insure domestic tranquillity , and secure the blessings o
f liberty to
themselves and to their posterity . ' The assent o
f
the States , in their sovereign capacity ,
is implied in calling a convention , and thus submitting that instrument to the peo
ple . But the people were a
t perfect liberty to accept or reject it , and their act was final .
It required not the affirmance , and could not be negatived by the State governments .
The Constitution ,when thus adopted ,was of complete obligation , and bound the State
sovereignties .
“ It has been said that the people had already surrendered a
ll
their powers to the
State sovereignties , and ha
d
nothing more to give . But , surely , the question whether
they may resume and modify the powers granted to government does not remain to b
e
settled in this country . Much more might the legitimacy of the general government
b
e
doubted , had it been created b
y
the States . The powers delegated to the State sov .
ereignties were to b
e
exercised b
y
themselves , not b
y
a distinct and independent sov
ereignty created b
y
themselves . To the formation of a league , such a
s
was the confed
eration , the State sovereignties were certainly competent . But when , in order to form
a more perfect union , ' it was deemed necessary to change this alliance into an effective
government , possessing great and sovereign powers , and acting directly on the people ,
the necessity o
f referring it to th
e
people , and of deriving its powers directly from them ,
was felt and acknowledged b
y
all .
“ The government o
f
th
e
Union , then , (whatever may be the influence of this fact on
CH. III . ] 255NATURE O
F
THE CONSTITUTION .
§ 363 . The doctrine , then , that the States are parties is a gra
tuitous assumption . In the language of a most distinguished states
man , “ th
e
Constitution itself in it
s very front refutes that . It
declares that it is ordained and established b
y
the PEOPLE o
f
th
e
United States . So fa
r
from saying that it is established b
y
the
governments of the several States , it does not even say that it is
established b
y
th
e
people o
f
the several States . But it pronounces
that it is established b
y
the people o
f
the United States in the
aggregate . Doubtless the people of the several States , taken col
lectively , constitute the people of the United States . But it is in
this their collective capacity , it is as all the people of the United
States , that they establish the Constitution . ” 2
§ 364 . But if it were admitted that the Constitution is a com
pact between the States , " the inferences deduced from it , " as has
been justly observed b
y
the same statesman , 8 “ are warranted b
y
n
o just reason . Because , if the Constitution be a compact between
the States , still that Constitution or that compact has established
a government with certain powers ; and whether it be one of these
powers , that it shall construe and interpret for itself the terms o
f
the compact in doubtful cases , can only be decided b
y
looking to
the compact , and inquiring what provisions it contains on that
point . Without any inconsistency with natural reason , the gov
the case , ) is emphatically and truly a government of the people . In form and sub
stance it emanates from them . It
s powers are granted b
y
them , and are to be exercised
directly o
n
them and for their benefit .
" This government is acknowledged b
y
a
ll
to b
e
one o
f
enumerated powers . The
principle that it can exercise only the powers granted to it would seem too apparent to
have required to b
e
enforced b
y
a
ll
those arguments which it
s enlightened friends , while
it was depending before the people , found it necessary to urge . That principle is now
universally admitted . But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually
granted is perpetually arising , and will probably continue to arise as long as our sys
tem shall exist . "
i Webster ' s Speeches , 1830 , p .431 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 32
6
; [ 3 Webster ' s Works ,
346 . See also Id . 449 e
t seq. ]
2 Mr . Dane reasons to the same effect , though it is obvious that he could not at the
time have had any knowledge o
f
the views o
f Mr . Webster . 9 Dane ' s Abridg . ch . 189 ,
art . 20 , § 15 , p . 589 , 590 ; Dane ' s App . 40 , 41 , 42 . He adds , “ If a contract , when
and how d
id
the Union become a party to it ? If a compact , why is it never so denom
inated , but often and invariably in the instrument itself , and in its amendments , styled
this Constitution ' ? and if a contract ,why did the framers and people call it the
supreme law ? 9 Dane ' s Abridg . 590 . In Martin v . Hunter , ( 1 Wheat . R . 304 , 324 , )
the Supreme Court expressly declared that the Constitution was ordained and estab
lished , ' not b
y
the States in their sovereign capacity , but emphatically , a
s
the preamble
o
f
the Constitution declares , b
y
the people o
f
the United States . ' "
8 .Webster ' s Speeches , 429 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 324 .
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ernment even thus created might be trusted with this power of
construction . The extent of its powersmust , therefore , be sought
in the instrument itself . ” “ If the Constitution were themere crea
tion o
f
the State governments , it might be modified , interpreted ,
o
r
construed according to their pleasure . But even in that case it
would be necessary that they should agree . One alone could not
interpret it exclusively . One alone could not construe it . One alone
could not modify it . ” “ If al
l
the States are parties to it , one alone
can have n
o right to fix upon it her own peculiar construction . ” 1
§ 365 . Then is it a compact between the people of the several
States , each contracting with all the people of the other States ? 2
Itmay be admitted , as was the early exposition of its advocates ,
" that the Constitution is founded o
n
the assent and ratification o
f
the people o
f
America , given by deputies elected fo
r
the special
purpose ; but that this assent and ratification is to be given b
y
the
whole people , not as individuals composing one entire nation , but
a
s composing the distinct and independent States , to which they
respectively belong . It is to be th
e
assent and ratification o
f
the
several States , derived from the supreme authority in each State ,
the authority of the people themselves . The act , therefore , estab
lishing the Constitution , will not be [ is not to be ] a national , but
a federal ac
t
. ” 3 “ It may also be admitted , ” in the language of
one of its most enlightened commentators , that " it was formed ,
not b
y
the governments o
f
the component States , as the Federal
government , fo
r
which it was substituted , was formed . Nor was
it formed b
y
a majority o
f
the people o
f
the United States , as a
single community , in the manner of a consolidated government .
1 Even under the confederation , which was confessedly in many respects a mere
league o
r treaty ,though in other respects national , Congress unanimously resolved that
it was not within the competency o
f any State to pass acts for interpreting , explaining ,
o
r construing a national treaty , o
r any part or clause of it . Yet in that instrument
there was n
o express judicial power given to the general government to construe it . It
was ,however , deemed a
n
irresistible and exclusive authority in the general government ,
from th
e
very nature o
f
the other powers given to them ; and especially from the power
to make war and peace , and to form treaties . Journals of Congress , April 13 , 1787 , p .
3
2 , & c . ; Rawle o
n
Const . App . 2 , p . 316 , 320 .
? In the resolutions passed b
y
the Senate o
f
South Carolina , in December , 1827 , it
was declared that ' the Constitution o
f
the United States is a compact between the
people o
f
the different States with each other , as separate and independent sovereign
ties . " Mr . Grimké filed a protest founded on different views of it . See Grimké ' s Ad
dress and Resolutions in 1828 , ( edition , 1729 , at Charleston , ) where his exposition o
f
the Constitution is given a
t large , and maintained in a very able speech .
3 The Federalist , No . 39 ; see Sturgis v . Crowninshield , 4 Wheat . R . 122 , 193 .
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It was formed by the States , that is, by the people in each of the
States ,acting in their highest sovereign capacity ; and formed con
sequently by the same authority which formed the State constitu
tions ." 1 But this would not necessarily draw after it the conclu
sion that it was to be deemed a compact, ( in th
e
sense to which w
e
have so often alluded , ) b
y
which each State was still ,after the ratifi
cation , to act upon it , as a league or treaty , and to withdraw from
it at pleasure . A government may originate in the voluntary
compact or assent of the people o
f
several States , or of a people
never before united , and yet when adopted and ratified b
y
them
b
e
n
o longer a matter resting in compact , but become an executed
government or constitution , a fundamental law , and not a mere
league . But the difficulty in asserting it to be a compact between
the people of each State and a
ll
the people of the other States is ,
that the Constitution itself contains no such expression , and no
such designation o
f parties . We , “ the people of the United
States , & c . , do ordain and establish this Constitution , ” is the lan
guage ; and not we , the people of each State , do establish this
compact between ourselves and the people o
f all the other States .
We are obliged to depart from the words of the instrument to
sustain the other interpretation ; an interpretation which can serve
no better purpose than to confuse themind in relation to a sub
ject otherwise clear . It is for this reason that we should prefer
a
n adherence to the words o
f
the Constitution , and to the judicial
exposition of these words according to their plain and common
import . 3
1 Mr . Madison ' s Letter in North American Review , October , 1830 , p . 537 , 538 .
2 See Dane ' s App . $ 32 , 33 , p . 41 , 42 , 43 .
3 Chisholm v . Georgia , 2 Dall . 419 ; Martin v . Hunter , 1 Wheat . R . 304 , 324 ; Dane ' s
App . p . 22 , 24 , 29 , 30 , 37 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 51 .
This subject is considered with much care b
y
President Monroe , in his Exposition
accompanying his Message o
f
the 4th o
f May , 1822 . It is due to his memory to insert
the following passage , which exhibits his notion of the supremacy o
f
the Union :
“ The Constitution o
f
the United States , being ratified b
y
the people o
f
the several
States , became , o
f
necessity , to the extent of its powers , the paramount authority o
f
the
Union . On sound principles it can be viewed in no other light . The people , the high
estauthority known to our system , from whom al
l
our institutions spring , and on whom
they depend , formed it . Had the people of the several States thought proper to incor
porate themselves into one community under one government , they might have done it .
They had the power , and there was nothing then , nor is there anything now , should
they b
e
so disposed , to prevent it . They wisely stopped , however , at a certain point ,
extending the incorporation to that point ,making the national government thus far a
consolidated government , and preserving the State governments , without that limit ,
VOL . I . 12
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§ 3
6
6
. But supposing that it were to be deemed such a compact
among the people o
f
the several States , le
t
u
s
see what the en
lightened statesman , who vindicates that opinion , holds as the
appropriate deduction from it . “ Being thus derived (says he )
from the same source a
s
the constitutions o
f
the States , it has
within each State the same authority as the constitution o
f
the
State ; and is as much a constitution within the strict sense o
f
the
term , within its prescribed sphere , as the constitutions of the
States are within their respective spheres . But with this obvious
and essential difference , that , being a compact among the States
in their highest sovereign capacity , and constituting the people
thereof one people fo
r
certain purposes , it cannot be altered or an
perfectly sovereign and independent o
f
th
e
national government . Had the people of
the several States incorporated themselves into one community , theymust have remained
such ; their constitution becoming then , like the constitutions of the several States , in
capable o
f change until altered b
y
the will o
f
the majority . In the institution o
f
a
State government b
y
the citizens o
f
a State , a compact is formed to which al
l
and every
citizen are equal parties . They are also the sole parties , and may amend it a
t
pleasure .
In the institution of the government of the United States b
y
the citizens o
f every State ,
a compact was formed between the whole American people ,which has the same force ,
and partakes o
f
a
ll
the qualities , to the extent of its powers , as a compact between the
citizens o
f
a State in the formation o
f
their own constitution . It cannot be altered ,
except b
y
those who formed it , or in the mode prescribed b
y
the parties to the compact
itself .
“ This Constitution was adopted for the purpose o
f remedying all the defects of the
confederation ; and in this it has succeeded beyond any calculation that could have
been formed o
f any human institution . By binding the States together , th
e
Constitu
tion performs the great office o
f
th
e
confederation , but it is in that senseonly that it has
any o
f
the properties o
f
that compact , and in that it is more effectual to the purpose ,
a
s it holds them together b
y
a much stronger bond , and in al
l
other respects , in which
the confederation failed , the Constitution has been blessed with complete success . The
confederation was a compact between separate and independent States ; the execution
o
f
whose articles , in the powers ,which operated internally , depended o
n
the State gov
ernments . But the great office of the Constitution b
y
incorporating the people o
f
the
several States , to the extent o
f
its powers , into one community , and enabling it to act
directly o
n
the people , was to annul the powers of the State governments to that ex
tent , except in caseswhere they were concurrent , and to preclude their agency in giv
ing effect to those o
f
the general government . The government of the United States
relies o
n
it
s
own means fo
r
the execution o
f
it
s powers , as the State governments do fo
r
the execution o
f
theirs ; both governments having a common origin or sovereign , th
e
people , — the State governments ,the people o
f
each State ; thenational government , the
people o
f every State , - and being amenable to the power which created it . It is b
y
ex
ecuting it
s
functions a
s
a government , thus originating and thus acting , that the Consti
tution o
f
the United States holds the States together , and performs the office o
f
a league .
It is owing to the nature of its powers and the high source from whence they are d
e
rived , the people , that it performs that office better than the confederation o
r any league
which cver existed , being a compact , which the State governments di
d
not form , to
which they are not parties , and which executes its own powers independently of them , "
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nulled at the will of the States individually , as the constitution of
a State may be at its individual will . ” 1
§ 367 . The other branch of the proposition we have been con
sidering is , that it is not only a compact between the several States
and the people thereof , but also a compact between the States and
the Federal government ; and e converso between the Federal gov
ernment and the several States and every citizen o
f
the United
States . This seems to be a doctrine fa
r
more involved and ex
traordinary and incomprehensible than any part o
f
the preceding .
The difficulties have not escaped the observation of those b
y
whom it has been advanced . Although ( says the learned com
mentator ) the Federal government can , in no possible view , be
considered a
s
a party to a compact made anterior to it
s
existence ,
yet , as the creature of that compact , itmust be bound by it to its
creators , the several States in the Union and the citizens thereof . " 3
If b
y
this n
o
more were meant than to state that the Federal
government cannot lawfully exercise any powers except those con
ferred on it b
y
the Constitution , its truth could not admit of dis
pute . But it is plain that something more was in the author ' s
mind . A
t
the same time that he admits that the Federal govern
ment could not be a party to the compact of the Constitution “ in
any possible view , ” he still seems to insist upon it as a compact
b
y
which the Federal government is bound to the several States
and to every citizen ; that is , that it has entered into a contract
with them for the due execution of its duties .
1 Mr . Madison ' s ,Letter , North American Review , October , 1830 , p . 538 . Mr . Pat
erson (afterwards Mr . Justice Paterson ) , in the convention which framed the Constitu
tion , held the doctrine that , under the confederation , no State had a right to withdraw
from the Union without the consent o
f all . “ The confederation (said he ) is in the
nature o
f a compact ; and can any State , unless b
y
the consent o
f
the whole , either in
politics o
r
law , withdraw their powers ? Let it be said b
y
Pennsylvania and the other
large States , that they for the sake of peace assented to the confederation ; can she now
resume her original right without the consent o
f
the donee ? ” Yates ' s Debates , 4
Elliot ' s Debates , 75 . Mr . Dane unequivocally holds the same language in respect to
the Constitution . “ It is clear ( says he ) the people of any one State alone never can
take o
r
withdraw power from the United States , which was granted to it b
y
a
ll , as the
people o
f
a
ll
the States can d
o rightfully in a justifiable revolution , or a
s
the people can
d
o
in the manner their Constitution prescribes . ” Dane ' s App . § 10 , p . 21 .
The ordinance o
f
1787 , for the government of the Northwestern territory , contains ( as
wehave seen ) certain articles declared to b
e
“ articles o
f
compact ” ; but they are also de
clared to " remain forever unalterable , except by commonconsent . ” So that theremay
b
e
a compact , and yet b
y
the stipulations neither party may b
e
a
t liberty to withdraw
from it , or absolve itself from its obligations . Ante , p . 269 .
? 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . 169 , 170 . 81 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . 170 .
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§ 368 . And a doctrine of a like nature , viz . that the Federal
government is a party to the compact , seems to have been gravely
entertained on other solemn occasions . The difficulty ofmain
taining it , however , seems absolutely insuperable . The Federal
government is th
e
result o
f
the Constitution , or ( if the phrase is
deemed b
y
any person more appropriate ) the creature o
f
the com
pact . How , then , can it be a party to that compact to which it
owes it
s
own existence ? 2 How can it be said that it has entered
into a contract , when a
t
the time it had no capacity to contract ,
and was not even in esse ? If any provision was made fo
r
the
general government ' s becoming a party and entering into a com
pact after it was brought into existence ,where is that provision to
b
e
found ? It is not to be found in th
e
Constitution itself . Are we
a
t liberty to imply such a provision , attaching to no power given in
the Constitution ? This would be to push the doctrine of implication
to a
n extent truly alarming ; to draw inferences , not from what
is , but from what is not stated in the instrument . But if any
such implication could exist , when did the general government
signify it
s
assent to become such a party ? When did the people
authorize it to do so ? 3 Could the government do so without the
express authority o
f
the people ? These are questions which are
more easily asked than answered .
§ 369 . In short , th
e
difficulties attendant upon a
ll
the various
theories under consideration , which treat the Constitution o
f
the
United States a
s
a compact , either between the several States , o
r
between the people o
f
the several States , or between th
e
whole
people o
f
the United States and th
e
people o
f
the several States ,
o
r
between each citizen o
f
a
ll
the States and all other citizens ,
are , if not absolutely insuperable , so serious , and so wholly founded
upon mere implication , that it is matter of surprise that they
should have been so extensively adopted and so zealously propa
gated . These theories , to
o , seem mainly urged with a view to
draw conclusions which are a
t
war with the known powers and
reasonable objects of the Constitution ; and which , if successful ,
would reduce the government to a mere confederation . They are
objectionable , then , in every way : first , because they are not jus
1 Debate in the Senate , in 1830 , on Mr . Foot ' s resolution , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 31
5
to
331 .
2 Webster ' s Speeches , 429 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 324 .
3 Dane ' s App . $ 32 , p . 41 ; Id . $ 38 , p . 46 .
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tified b
y
the language o
f
the Constitution ; secondly , because they
have a tendency to impair , and indeed to destroy , its express
powers and objects ; and , thirdly , because they involve conse
quences which , a
t
the will o
f
a single State , may overthrow the
Constitution itself . One of the fundamental rules in the exposi
tion o
f every instrument is , so to construe its terms , if possible ,
a
s not to make them the source of their own destruction or to
make them utterly void and nugatory . And if this be generally
true , with how much more force does the rule apply to a constitu
tion o
f government framed fo
r
the general good and designed
fo
r
perpetuity ? Surely , if any implications are to be made beyond
it
s
terms , they are implications to preserve , and not to destroy it . 1
§ 370 . The cardinal conclusion for which this doctrine of a
compact has been ,with so much ingenuity and ability , forced into
the language of the Constitution ( fo
r
the language nowhere alludes
to it ) , is avowedly to establish that , in construing the Constitution ,
there is no common umpire ; but that each State ,nay , each de
partment o
f
the government o
f
each State , is the supreme judge
for itself o
f
the powers and rights and duties arising under that
instrument . Thus , it has been solemnly asserted on more than
one occasion , b
y
some of the State legislatures , that there is no
common arbiter or tribunal authorized to decide in the last re
sort upon th
e
powers and the interpretation of th
e
Constitution .
And the doctrine has been recently revived with extraordinary
zeal and vindicated with uncommon vigor . 3 A majority of the
1 The following strong language is extracted from Instructions given to some repre
sentatives o
f
the State o
f Virginia b
y
their constituents in 1787 , with reference to the
confederation : “ Government without coercion is a proposition at once so absurd and
self -contradictory that the idea creates a confusion o
f
the understanding . It is form
without substance ; a
t
best a body without a soul . Ifmen would act right , govern
ments o
f
all kinds would be useless . If states or nations ,who are but assemblages of
men , would do right , there would be no wars or disorders in the universe . Bad as indi
viduals are , states are worse . Clothe men with public authority , and almost universally
they consider themselves a
s
liberated from the obligations o
f moral rectitude , because
they are n
o longer amenable to justice . " 1 Amer .Mus . 290 .
? Madison ' s Virginia Report , January , 1800 , p . 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ; Webster ' s Speeches , 407
to 409 , 410 , 411 , 419 to 421 .
8 The legislature o
f Virginia , in 1829 , resolved “ that there is no common arbiter to
construe the Constitution o
f
the United States ; the Constitution being a federative com
pact between sovereign States , each State has a right to construe the compact for itself . ”
Georgia and South Carolina have recently maintained the same doctrine ; and it has
been asserted in the Senate o
f
the United States with a
n
uncommon display o
f elo
quence and pertinacity . 8 Dane ' s Abridg . ch . 187 , art . 20 , § 13 , p . 589 , & c . , 591 ;
Dane ' s App . 52 to 59 , 67 to 72 ; 3 American Annual Register , Local Hist . 131 . It is
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States , however , have never assented to this doctrine ; and it has
been , at different times , resisted b
y
the legislatures o
f
several o
f
the States , in themost formal declarations . 1
$ 371 . But if it were admitted that the Constitution is a com
pact , the conclusion that there is no common arbiter would neither
b
e
a necessary nor natural conclusion from that fact standing
alone . To decide upon the point , it would still behoove us to ex
amine the very terms o
f
the Constitution and the delegation o
f
powers under it . It would be perfectly competent even fo
r
con
federated States to agree upon and delegate authority to construe
the compact to a common arbiter . The people of the United
States had an unquestionable right to confide this power to the
government o
f
the United States or to any department thereof , if
they chose so to d
o . The question is whether they have done it .
If they have , it becomes obligatory and binding upon al
l
the
States .
$ 372 . It is not , then , b
y
artificial reasoning founded upon
theory , but upon a careful survey of the language of the Constitu
tion itself , that we are to interpret its powers and its obligations .
not a little remarkable that , in 1810 , the legislature of Virginia thought very differently ,
and then deemed the Supreme Court a fi
t
and impartial tribunal . North American
Review , October , 1830 , p . 509 , 512 ; 6 Wheat . R . 320 , 358 . Pennsylvania at the same
time , though she did not deny the court to b
e , under the Constitution , the appropriate
tribunal , was desirous o
f substituting some other arbiter . North American Review , id .
507 , 508 . The recent resolutions of her own legislature ( in March , 1831 ) show that
she now approves o
f
the Supreme Court a
s
the true and common arbiter . One o
f
the
expositions o
f
the doctrine is , that if a single State deny a power to exist under the
Constitution , that power is to be deemed defunct , unless three fourths of the States shall
afterwards reinstate that power b
y
a
n
amendment to th
e
Constitution . 4 Elliot ' s De
bates , 321 . What , then , is to be done ,where ten States resolve that a power exists ,
and one that it does not exist ? See Mr . Vice -President Calhoun ' s Letter of 28th
August , 1832 , to Governor Hamilton .
1 Massachusetts openly opposed it in th
e
resolutions o
f
her legislature o
f
the 12th o
f
February , 1799 , and declared “ that the decision of al
l
cases in la
w
and equity arising
under the Constitution o
f
the United States , and the construction o
f
all laws made in
pursuance thereof , are exclusively vested b
y
the people in the judicial courts o
f
th
e
United States . ” Dane ' s App . 58 . Six other States , at that time , seem to have come
to the same result . North American Review , October , 1830 , p . 500 . And o
n
other
occasions a larger number have concurred o
n
the same point . Dane ' s App . 67 ; Id . 52
to 5
9 . Similar resolutions have been passed b
y
the legislatures o
f
Delaware and Con
necticut in 1831 , and b
y
some other States . How is it possible for a moment to recon
cile the notion that each State is the supreme judge fo
r
itself o
f
the construction o
f
the
Constitution with the very first resolution o
f
the convention which formed the Consti
tution : “ Resolved , & c . , that a national governmentought to be established , consisting of
a supreme , legislative , judiciary , and executive ” ? Journals of Convention , 8
3 ; 4
Elliot ' s Deb . 59 .
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We are to treat it, as it purports on its face to be , as a CONSTITU
TION o
f government ; and we are to reject all other appellations
and definitions o
f it , such as that it is a compact , especially as
they may mislead u
s
into false constructions and glosses , and can
have no tendency to instruct u
s
in it
s
real objects .
1 (Besides the writers referred to b
y Mr . Justice Story ,whoever desires to make him
self familiar with the views opposed to those here presented will be likely to consult
Construction Construed and Constitutions Vindicated , b
y
John Taylor o
f
Caroline (1820 ) ,
New Views o
f
th
e
Constitution o
f
th
e
United States , by th
e
samewriter (1823 ) , th
e
Review
o
f
these Commentaries b
y Judge A . P . Upshur ( Petersburg , Va . , 1840 ) , Professor
Henry S
t . George Tucker ' s Lectures on Constitutional Law ( Richmond , 1843 ) , and the
Constitutional View o
f
th
e
War between th
e
States , by Alexander H . Stephens , 1867 – 70 . )
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WHO IS FINAL JUDGE OR INTERPRETER IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRO
VERSIES .
§ 373 . The consideration of the question whether the Constitu
tion has made provision fo
r
any common arbiter to construe it
s
powers and obligations would properly find a place in the analysis
o
f
the different clauses o
f
that instrument . But , as it is imme
diately connected with the subject before u
s , it seems expedient in
this place to give it a deliberate attention .
$ 374 . In order to clear the question of al
l
minor points , which
might embarrass us in the discussion , it is necessary to suggest a
fe
w preliminary remarks . The Constitution , contemplating the
grant o
f
limited powers , and distributing them among various
functionaries , and the State governments , with their function
aries , being also clothed with limited powers , subordinate to those
1 The point was very strongly argued , and much considered , in the case of Cohens v .
Virginia , in the Supreme Court in 1821 ( 6 Wheat . R . 264 ) . The whole argument , as
well as the judgment , deserves an attentive reading . The result to which the argument
against the existence o
f
a common arbiter leads is presented in a very forcible manner
by Mr . Chief Justice Marshall , in pages 376 , 377 .
“ The questions presented to the court b
y
the two first points made a
t
the bar are o
f
greatmagnitude , and may b
e truly said vitally to affect the Union . They exclude the
inquiry whether the Constitution and laws o
f
the United States have been violated b
y
the judgment , which the plaintiffs in error seek to review ; and maintain that , admitting
such violation , it is not in the power o
f
the government to apply a corrective . They
maintain that the nation does not possess a department capable o
f restraining peacea
bly , and b
y
authority o
f
law , any attempts which may be made b
y
a part against the
legitimate powers o
f
thewhole ; and that the government is reduced to the alternative o
f
submitting to such attempts o
r
o
f resisting them by force . They maintain that the Con
stitution o
f
the United States has provided n
o tribunal for the final construction of itself ,
o
r
o
f
the laws o
r
treaties o
f
the nation ; but that this power may be exercised in the
last resort b
y
the courts o
f every State in the Union . That the Constitution , laws , and
treaties may receive a
s many constructions a
s
there are States ; and that this is not a
mischief , or , if a mischief , is irremediable . These abstract propositions are to be deter
mined ; fo
r
h
e
who demands decision without permitting inquiry affirms that the de
cision h
e
asks does not depend o
n inquiry .
“ If such be the Constitution , it is the duty of this court to bow with respectful sub
mission to it
s provisions . If such be not the Constitution , it is equally the duty of this
court to say so ; and to perform that task which the American people have assigned to
the judicial department . ”
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granted to the general government , - whenever any question
arises as to the exercise of any power by any of these function
aries under the State or Federal government , it is of necessity that
such functionaries must , in the first instance , decide upon the con
stitutionality of the exercise of such power. Itmay arise in the
course of the discharge of the functions of any one , or of al
l , of
the great departments o
f government , the executive , the legisla
tive , and the judicial . The officers of each of these departments
are equally bound b
y
their oaths o
f
office to support the Constitu
tion o
f
the United States , and are therefore conscientiously bound
to abstain from a
ll
acts which are inconsistent with it . Whenever ,
therefore , they are required to act in a case not hitherto settled by
any proper authority , these functionaries must , in the first instance ,
decide each for himself ; whether , consistently with the Constitu
tion , the act can be done . · If , for instance , the President is re
quired to d
o any act , he is not only authorized but required to
decide for himself , whether , consistently with his constitutional
duties , he can do the ac . t ? So , if a proposition be before Congress ,
' 1 See the Federalist , No . 33 .
2 Mr . Jefferson carries his doctrine much further , and holds that each department of
government has a
n
exclusive right , independent of the judiciary , to decide for itself as
to the true construction o
f
the Constitution . “ My construction , ” says he , " is very
different from that you quote . It is , that each department of the government is truly
independent o
f
the others , and has an equal right to decide for itself what is themean
ing o
f
the Constitution in the laws submitted to it
s
action , and especially when it is to
act ultimately and without appeal . ” And he proceeds to give examples in which he
disregarded , when President , the decisions of the judiciary , and refers to the alien and
sedition laws , and the case o
f Marbury v . Madison ( 1 Cranch , 137 ) . 4 Jefferson ' s Cor
respondence , 316 , 317 . See also 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 27 ; Id . 75 ; Id . 372 , 37
4
.
[ In Attorney -General v . Barstow , 4 Wis . 587 , the view of Mr . Jefferson was pressed
still further . The facts were that Barstow , the governor of the State , was defeated b
y
the people in a canvass fo
r
re -election . Certain spurious election returns were , never
theless , placed on fil
e
with the State Board o
f
Canvassers , which , together with the gen
uine returns , gave him a
n apparent majority over the opposing candidate . Thereupon
h
e
declined to surrender the office a
t
the end o
f
the term , and on quowarranto against
him in the Supreme Court denied the authority o
f
that court to consider and decide upon
th
e
title to the office . His position , as stated b
y
his counsel , was as follows :
“ 1 . The three departments of the State government , the legislative , the executive ,
and judicial , are equal , co -ordinate , and independent of each other ; and that each de
partment must b
e
and is the ultimate judge o
f
the election and qualification o
f
it
s
own
member o
r
members , subject only to impeachment and appeal to the people .
“ 2 . That this court must take judicial notice o
f
who is governor o
f
the State ,
when h
e was inaugurated , the genuineness o
f
h
is signature , & c . ; and therefore cannot
hear argument o
r
evidence upon the subject . That who is rightfully entitled to the
office o
f governor can in n
o
case become a judicial question , and
" 3 . That the Constitution provides no means fo
r
ousting a successful usurper o
f
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every member o
f
th
e
legislative body is bound to examine and
decide fo
r
himself whether the bill or resolution is within the con
stitutional reach of the legislative powers confided to Congress .
And in many cases th
e
decisions o
f
the executive and legislative
departments , thus made , become final and conclusive , being from
their very nature and character incapable o
f
revision . Thus , in
measures exclusively o
f
a political , legislative , or executive char
acter , it is plain that as the supreme authority , as to these ques
tions , belongs to the legislative and executive departments , they
cannot be re -examined elsewhere . Thus , Congress having the
power to declare war , to levy taxes , to appropriate money , to regu
late intercourse and commerce with foreign nations , their mode of
executing these powers can never become the subject o
f
re -exam
ination in any other tribunal . So the power to make treaties being
confided to the President and Senate , when a treaty is properly
ratified it becomes the law of the land , and no other tribunal can
gainsay it
s stipulations . Yet cases may readily be imagined in
which a tax may be laid o
r
a treaty made , upon motives and
grounds wholly beside the intention o
f
the Constitution . The
remedy , however , in such cases is solely by an appeal to the peo
p
le
a
t
the elections , or b
y
the salutary power o
f
amendment pro
vided b
y
the Constitution itself . ?
§ 375 . But where the question is of a different nature , and
capable o
f judicial inquiry and decision , there it admits of a very
different consideration . The decision then made ,whether in favor
o
r against the constitutionality o
f
the act , b
y
the State or b
y
the
national authority , b
y
the legislature o
r b
y
the executive , being
capable , in its own nature , of being brought to the test of the Con
stitution , is subject to judicial revision . It is in such cases , as we
either o
f
the three departments o
f
the government ; that that power rests with the peo
ple , to b
e
exercised by them when they think the exigency requires it . ”
The startling doctrine so broadly stated received so little countenance from the court
to which it was addressed a
s scarcely to b
e
treated with the courtesy o
f
a discussion . )
1 See 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 315 to 320 .
2 The Federalist , No . 44 . Mr . Madison , in the Virginia Report of January , 1800 ,
has gone into a consideration o
f
this point , and very properly suggested that there may
b
e
infractions o
f
the Constitution not within th
e
reach o
f
the judicial power , or capable
o
f
remedial redress through the instrumentality o
f
courts o
f
law . But we cannot
agree with him , that in such caseseach State may take the construction of the Constitu
tion into it
s
own hands , and decide for itself in the last resort ; much less that in a case
o
f judicial cognizance the decision is not binding on the States . See Report , p . 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 .
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conceive, that there is a final and common arbiter provided by the
Constitution itself , to whose decisions a
ll
others are subordinate ;
and that arbiter is the supreme judicial authority of the courts of
the Union . "
1 Dane ' s App . $ 44 , 45 , p . 52 to 59 . It affords me very sincere gratification to quote
the following passage from the learned Commentaries o
f Mr . Chancellor Kent , than
whom very fe
w
judges in our country are more profoundly versed in constitutional law .
After enumerating the judicial powers in the Constitution , he proceeds to observe : “ The
propriety and fitness o
f
these judicial powers seem to result , as a necessary consequence ,
from the union o
f
these States in one national government , and they may be considered
a
s requisite to it
s
existence . The judicial power in every government must be coexten
sive with the power o
f legislation . Were there no power to interpret , pronounce , and
execute the law , the government would either perish through it
s
own imbecility , a
s
was
the casewith the old confederation , or other powers must be assumed b
y
the legislative
body to the destruction o
f liberty . " 1 Kent ' s Comm . ( 2d ed . p . 296 , ) Lect . 14 , 277 .
[Our author speaks here of a decision for or against the constitutionality of a partic
ular act . Upon such a question , as he truly remarks , the final arbiter is “ the supreme ju
dicial authority o
f
the courts o
f
the Union . ” The final decision o
f
that authority is binding
upon all the people , all the States , and all the departments of the general government .
But as between these several departments , there are and must be bounds to this con
clusiveness o
f adjudication . The question that is judicial to -day may be political to
morrow . Judicial questions the courts decide ; political are addressed to the wisdom
o
f
the legislature . To -day the question may be whether an existing act is constitutional .
That is purely judicial . To -morrow the act may have expired , and the question may
b
e
whether it should b
e
re -enacted . That question is political . Suppose there be no
other objection to it
s
re -enactment than doubts o
f
it
s constitutionality , are legislators
bound to defer to the judgment o
f
the court in the exercise o
f
the legislative function ,
and therefore to re -enact the law , though in their own view it may be a clear and dan
gerous infraction o
f
the Constitution ? This is a question quite aside from that here
discussed by our author .
A
s illustrating this question a noted instance may b
e
referred to . Previous to 1832
the Supreme Court o
f
the United States had in a deliberate decision declared that Con
gress had the power to charter a Bank o
f
the United States . But in 1832 the question
o
f
re -charter arising , and a bill having passed th
e
two houses fo
r
the purpose , President
Jackson vetoed it . In the course of his veto message he says : -
" It is maintained b
y
the advocates o
f
the bank , that it
s constitutionality , in al
l
it
s
features , ought to be considered as settled b
y
precedent and b
y
the decision o
f
the Su
preme Court . To this conclusion I cannot assent . Mere precedent is a dangerous
source o
f authority , and should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional
power , except where the acquiescence o
f
the people and the States ca
n
b
e
considered a
s
well settled . So far from this being the case on this subject , an argument against the
bank might be based on precedent . One Congress , in 1791 , decided in favor of a bank ;
another , in 1811 , decided against it . One Congress , in 1815 , decided against a bank ;
another , in 1816 , decided in its favor . Prior to the present Congress , therefore , the
precedents drawn from that source were equal . If we resort to the States , the expres
sions o
f legislative ,executive , and judicial opinions against the bank have been probably
to those in it
s
favor a
s
four to one . There is nothing in precedent , therefore , which , if
it
s authority were admitted , ought to weigh in favor of the act beforeme .
" If the opinion o
f
the Supreme Court covered the whole ground o
f
this act , it ought
not to control the co -ordinate authorities of this government . The Congress , the exec .
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$ 376 . Let us examine the grounds on which this doctrine is
maintained . The Constitution declares , (Art . 6 , ) that “ This Con
utive , and the court must each fo
r
itself b
e guided b
y
it
s
own opinion o
f
the Constitu
tion . Each public officer , who takes an oath to support the Constitution , swears that
h
e will support it as he understands it , and not as it is understood b
y
others . It is as
much the duty o
f
the House o
f Representatives , o
f
the Senate , and o
f
the President , to
decide upon the constitutionality o
f any bill or resolution which may be presented to
them for passage o
r approval , a
s
it is o
f
the supreme judges when it may be brought
before them for judicial decision . The opinion of the judges has no more authority
over Congress than the opinion o
f Congress has over the judges ; and , on that point ,
the President is independent o
f
both .
“ The authority o
f
the Supreme Court must not , therefore , be permitted to control
the Congress o
r
th
e
executive , when acting in their legislative capacities , but to have
only such influence a
s
the force o
f
their reasoning may deserve . ”
Again : during the administration of President Buchanan the Supreme Court , in a
case before it involving a question o
f personal liberty , denied the power o
f Congress to
exclude slavery from the Territories . This opinion became of vital interest and impor
tance in the Presidential election which followed , and President Lincoln thus referred to
it in his inaugural : “ I do not forget the position assumed b
y
some , that constitutional
questions are to b
e
decided b
y
the Supreme Court ; nor do I deny that such decisions
must b
e binding , in any case ,upon the parties to a suit , as to the object of that suit ,while
they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases b
y
all
other departments o
f
th
e
government . And while it is obviously possible that such decis
ion may b
e
erroneous in any given case , still the evil effect following it , being limited to
that particular case , with the chance that it may be overruled , and never become a
precedent for other cases , can better b
e
borne than could the evils o
f
a different prac
tice . At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the govern
ment upon vital questions , affecting the whole people , is to be itrevocably fixed b
y
decisions o
f
the Supreme Court , the instant they are made in ordinary litigation be
tween parties in personal actions , the people will have ceased to be their own rulers ,
having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands o
f
that emi
nent tribunal .
“ Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court o
r
the judges . It is a duty
from which they may not shrink , to decide cases properly brought before them , and it is
no fault o
f
theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes . One sec
tion o
f
our country believes slavery is right and ought to b
e
extended , while the
other believes it is wrong and ought not to b
e
extended . This is the only substantial
dispute . The fugitive -slave clause o
f
the Constitution , and the law fo
r
the suppression
o
f
the foreign slave - trade , are each aswell enforced , perhaps , as any law ca
n
ever b
e
in a
community where themoral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself . The
great body o
f
the people abide b
y
the dry legal obligation in both cases , and a few
break over in each . This I think cannot be perfectly cured ; and it would be worse in
both cases after the separation o
f
the sections than before . The foreign slave - trade , now
imperfectly suppressed , would be ultimately revived without restriction in one section ;
while fugitive slaves , now only partially surrendered , would not be surrendered at al
l ,
b
y
the other . ”
Such were the views o
f
Presidents Jackson and Lincoln . The first were strongly
condemned b
y
able statesmen , under the lead ofMr . Clay and Mr . Webster , and as
earnestly defended . The second have also been subjected to sharp criticism , notably at
the hands o
f
Professor Samuel Tyler in h
is Memoir of Chief Justice Taney . We con
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stitution and the laws of the United States , which shall be made
in pursuance thereof, and all treaties , & c., shall be the supreme law
o
f
the land . ” It also declares , (Art . 3 , ) that “ the judicial power
shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Con
stitution , the laws of the United States , and treaties made , and
which shall be made , under their authority . ” It further declares ,
(Art . 3 , ) that the judicial power of the United States “ shall be
vested in one Supreme Court , and in such inferior courts as the Con
gress may , from time to time , ordain and establish . ” Here , then ,
we have express and determinate provisions upon the very subject .
Nothing is imperfect , and nothing is left to implication . The
Constitution is the supreme law ; the judicial power extends to all
cases arising in law and equity under it ; and the courts of the
United States are , and , in the last resort , the Supreme Court of
th
e
United States is , to be vested with this judicial power . No
man ca
n
doubt o
r deny that the power to construe the Constitu
tion is a judicial power . The power to construe a treaty is clearly
so , when the case arises in judgment in a controversy between in
dividuals . The like principle must apply where the meaning of
the Constitution arises in a judicial controversy ; for it is an appro
priate function o
f
the judiciary to construe laws . If , then , a case
under the Constitution does arise , if it is capable of judicial ex
amination and decision , we see that the very tribunal is appointed
to make the decision . The only point left open for controversy is ,
whether such decision , when made , is conclusive and binding upon
the States and the people o
f
the States . The reasons why it should
b
e
so deemed will now be submitted .
$ 377 . In the first place , the judicial power of the United States
rightfully extending to all such cases , its judgment becomes ip80
tent ourselves here with a single remark : The boundary between legislative and judicial
power is in general clear . To declare what the law is , is the province of the latter ; to
declare what it shall be , within the limits of the Constitution , pertains to the former .
And when the question is , what are those limits , it is the duty o
f every party called
upon to exercise a
n independent authority , carefully and conscientiously , on a full con
sideration o
f
all the light he can obtain , to satisfy himself that he does not overstep
the bounds which the people , in delegating their authority to him , have set to his power .
That is a safe , proper , and just rule fo
r
every citizen , every officer , and every tribunal
to apply wherever there is a discretion to exercise .
14 Dane ' s Abridg . ch . 18
7
, art . 20 , § 15 , p . 590 ; Dane ' s App . § 42 , p . 49 , 50 ; § 44 ,
p . 5
2 , 5
3 ; 1 Wilson ' s Lectures , 461 , 462 , 463 .
? See Address o
f Congress , Feb . 1787 ; Journals of Congress , p . 33 ; Rawle on the
Constitution , App . 2 , p . 316 .
3 Bacon ' s Abridgment , Statute H ,
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facto conclusive between the parties before it , in respect to the
points decided , unless some mode be pointed out by th
e
Constitu
tion in which that judgment may be revised . No such mode is
pointed out . Congress is vested with ample authority to provide
fo
r
th
e
exercise b
y
the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction
from the decisions o
f
all inferior tribunals , whether State or na
tional , in cases within the purview of the judicial power of the
United States ; but no mode is provided b
y
which any superior
tribunal can re -examine what the Supreme Court has itself de
cided . Ours is emphatically a government of laws and not of
men ; and judicial decisions of the highest tribunal , by the known
course o
f
the common la
w , are considered as establishing the true
construction o
f
th
e
laws which are brought into controversy before
it . The case is not alone considered as decided and settled , but
the principles of the decision are held , as precedents and author
it
y , to bind future cases of the same nature . This is the constant
practice under our whole system o
f jurisprudence . Our ancestors
brought it with them when they first emigrated to this country ,
and it is , and always has been , considered as the great security o
f
our rights , our liberties , and our property . It is on this account
that our law is justly deemed certain , and founded in permanent
principles , and not dependent upon the caprice or will of particu
lar judges . A more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated
b
y
any American court , than that it was a
t liberty to disregard all
former rules and decisions , and to decide fo
r
itself , without refer
ence to the settled course o
f
antecedent principles .
$ 378 . This known course of proceeding , this settled habit of
thinking , this conclusive effect of judicial adjudications ,was in the
full view of the framers o
f
the Constitution . It was required and
enforced in every State in the Union , and a departure from it
would have been justly deemed an approach to tyranny and arbi
trary power , to the exercise of mere discretion , and to the aban
donment o
f
a
ll
the just checks upon judicial authority . It would
seem impossible , then , to presume , if the people intended to intro
duce a new rule in respect to the decisions o
f
the Supreme Court ,
and to limit the nature and operations o
f
their judgments in a
manner wholly unknown to the common la
w
and to our existing
jurisprudence , that some indication of that intention should not be
apparent on the face of the Constitution . We find (Art . 4 ) that
the Constitution has declared , that full faith and credit shall be
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given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every other
State. But no like provision has been made in respect to the
judgments of the courts of the United States, because they were
plainly supposed to be of paramount and absolute obligation
throughout a
ll
the States . If the judgments of th
e
Supreme
Court upon constitutional questions are conclusive and binding
upon the citizens a
t large ,must they not be equally conclusive
upon the States ? If the States are parties to that instrument ,are
not the people of the States also parties ?
$ 379 . It has been said “ that however true itmay be that the
judicial department is , in all questions submitted to it b
y
the forms
o
f
the Constitution , to decide in the last resort , this resort must
necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the other departments
o
f
the government , not in relation to the rights of the parties to the
constitutional compact , from which the judicial , as well as the other
departments , hold their delegated trusts . On any other hypothe
si
s , the delegation of judicial power would annul the authority
delegating it ; and the concurrence of this department with the
others in usurped powers might subvert forever , and beyond the
possible reach o
f any rightful remedy , the very Constitution which
a
ll
were instituted to preserve . ” 1 Now it is certainly possible
that all the departments of a government may conspire to subvert
the constitution o
f that government by which they are created .
But if they should so conspire , there would still remain an ade
quate remedy to redress the evil . In the first place , the people ,
b
y
the exercise o
f
the elective franchise , can easily check and
remedy any dangerous , palpable , and deliberate infraction of the
Constitution in two o
f
the great departments o
f government ; and
in the third department they can remove the judges , b
y
impeach
ment , fo
r
any corrupt conspiracies . Besides these ordinary reme
dies , there is a still more extensive one embodied in the form o
f
the Constitution , b
y
the power o
f amending it , which is always in
the power o
f
three fourths o
f
the States . It is a supposition not
to b
e
endured for a moment , that three fourths of the States
would conspire in any deliberate , dangerous , and palpable breach
o
f
the Constitution . And if the judicial department alone should
attempt any usurpation , Congress , in its legislative capacity , has
full power to abrogate the injurious effects of such a decision .
Practically speaking , therefore , there can be very little danger of
any such usurpation o
r
deliberate breach .
1 Madison ' s Virginia Report , Jan . 1800 , p . 8 , 9 .
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$ 380 . But it is always a doubtful mode of reasoning to argue ,
from the possible abuse o
f powers , that they do not exist . Let
u
s
look fo
r
a moment a
t
the consequences which flow from the
doctrine on the other side . There are now twenty -four States in
the Union ,and each has , in its sovereign capacity , a right to decide
for itself in the last resort what is the true construction of the
Constitution , what are its powers , and what are the obligations
founded on it . We may , then , have , in the free exercise of that
right , twenty -four honest but different expositions of every power
in that Constitution , and of every obligation involved in it . What
one Statemay deny , another may assert ; what one may assert at
one time , it may deny at another time . This is not mere supposi
tion . It has , in point of fact , taken place . There never has been
a single constitutional question agitated , where different States , if
they have expressed any opinion , have not expressed different
opinions ; and there have been , and from th
e
fluctuating nature
o
f legislative bodies it may be supposed that there will continue
to b
e , cases in which the same State will at different times hold
different opinions on the same question . · Massachusetts at one
time thought the embargo o
f
1807 unconstitutional ; at another a
majority , from the change of parties ,was as decidedly the other
way . Virginia , in 1810 , thought that the Supreme Court was the
common arbiter ; in 1829 she thought differently . What , then , is
to become o
f
the Constitution , if its powers are thus perpetually to
be the subject o
f
debate and controversy ? What exposition is to
b
e
allowed to be of authority ? Is the exposition o
f
one State
to b
e o
f authority there , and the reverse to be of authority in a
neighboring State entertaining an opposite exposition ? Then
there would b
e
a
t
n
o
time in the United States the same Constitu
tion in operation over the whole people . Is a power which is
doubted o
r
denied b
y
a single State to b
e suspended either
wholly or in that State ? Then the Constitution is practically
gone , as a uniform system , or , indeed , as any system at all , at the
pleasure o
f any State . If the power to nullify the Constitution
exists in a single State , it may rightfully exercise it at its pleasure .
Would not this be a fa
r
more dangerous and mischievous power
than a power granted b
y
all the States to the judiciary to construe
the Constitution ? Would not a tribunal , appointed under the
1 See Anderson v . Dunn , 6 Wheaton ' s R . 204 , 232 .
2 Dane ' s App . $ 44 , 45 , p . 52 to 59 , 54 , p . 66 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 338 , 339 .
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authority of a
ll , be more safe than twenty -four tribunals , acting at
their own pleasure , and upon no common principles and co -opera
tion ? Suppose Congress should declare war ; shall one State
have power to suspend it ? Suppose Congress should make peace ;
shall one State have power to involve the whole country in war ?
Suppose the President and Senate should make a treaty ; shall one
State declare it a nullity , or subject the whole country to reprisals
fo
r
refusing to obey it ? Yet , if every State may for itself judge
o
f
it
s obligations under the Constitution , it may disobey a partic
ular law o
r treaty , because it may deem it an unconstitutional
exercise of power , although every other State shall concur in a
contrary opinion . Suppose Congress should la
y
a tax upon im
ports burdensome to a particular State , or for purposes which
such State deems unconstitutional ,and yet all the other States are
in its favor ; is the law laying the tax to become a nullity ? That
would be to allow one State to withdraw a power from the Union
which was given by the people o
f all the States . That would be
to make the general government the servant o
f twenty -four mas
ters o
f
different wills and different purposes , and yet bound to
obey them all . 1
$ 381 . The argument , therefore , arising from a possibility of an
abuse o
f power , is , to say the least of it , quite as strong the other
way . The Constitution is in quite as perilous a state from the
power o
f overthrowing it lodged in every State in the Union , as it
can b
e b
y
its being lodged in any department of the Federal gov
ernment . There is this difference , however , in the cases , that if
there b
e
Federal usurpation , it may be checked b
y
the people o
f
a
ll
the States in a constitutional way . If there be usurpation b
y
a single State , it is , upon the theory we are considering , irreme
diable . Other difficulties , however , attend the reasoning we are
considering . When it is said that the decision of the Supreme
Court in the last resort is obligatory and final “ in relation to the
authorities of the other departments of the government , ” is it
meant o
f
the Federal government only , or of the States also ? If
o
f
the former only , then the Constitution is no longer the supreme
law o
f the land , although al
l
the State functionaries are bound b
y
a
n oath to support it . If of the latter also , then it is obligatory
upon the State legislatures , executives , and judiciaries . It binds
them ; and yet it does not bind the people of the States , or the
i Webster ' s Speeches ,420 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 339 .
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States in their sovereign capacity . The States maymaintain one
construction o
f it , and the functionaries of the State are bound by
another . If , on the other hand , the State functionaries are to
follow the construction o
f
the State in opposition to the con
struction o
f
the Supreme Court , then the Constitution , as actually
administered b
y
the different functionaries , is different ; and the
duties required of them may be opposite and in collision with
each other . If such a state of things is the just result of the
reasoning ,may it not justly be suspected that the reasoning itself
is unsound ?
$ 382 . Again , it is a part of this argument that the judicial
interpretation is not binding “ in relation to the rights of the par
ties to the constitutional compact . ” “ On any other hypothesis
the delegation o
f judicial power would annul the authority dele
gating it . ” Who , then , are the parties to this contract ? Who
did delegate the judicial power ? Let the instrument answer fo
r
itself . The people of the United States are the parties to the
Constitution . The people of the United States delegated the
judicial power . It was not a delegation b
y
the people o
f
one
State , but by the people of all the States . Why , then , is not a
judicial decision binding in each State ,until al
l
who delegated the
power in some constitutional manner concur in annulling or over
ruling the decision ? Where shall we find the clause which gives
the power to each State to construe the Constitution fo
r
a
ll , and
thus o
f
itself to supersede in it
s
own favor the construction o
f
a
ll
the rest ? Would not this be justly deemed a delegation of judi
cial power which would annul the authority delegating it ? i Since
the whole people of the United States have concurred in estab
lishing the Constitution , it would seem most consonant with rea
son to presume , in the absence of all contrary stipulations , that
they did not mean that it
s obligatory force should depend upon
the dictate or opinion of any single State . Even under the confed
eration ( as has been already stated ) it was unanimously resolved
by Congress that “ as State legislatures are not competent to the
making of such compacts or treaties (with foreign states ) , so
neither are they competent in that capacity authoritatively to decide
1 There is vast force in the reasoning o
f Mr .Webster on this subject , in his great
speech o
n Mr . Foot ' s resolutions in the Senate , in 1830 , which well deserves the atten
tion o
f every statesman and jurist . See 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 338 , 339 , 343 , 344 , and
Webster ' s Speeches , p . 407 , 408 , 418 , 419 , 420 ; Id . 430 , 431 , 432 .
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on or ascertain the construction and sense of them .” And the
reasoning by which this opinion is supported seems absolutely
unanswerable . If this was true under such an instrument , and
that construction was avowed before the whole American people
and brought home to the knowledge of the State legislatures , how
can we avoid the inference that under the Constitution , where an
express judicial power in cases arising under the Constitution was
provided fo
r , the people must have understood and intended that
the States should have no right to question o
r
control such judi
cial interpretation ?
$ 383 . In the next place , as the judicial power extends to al
l
cases arising under the Constitution , and that Constitution is de
clared to b
e
the supreme law , that supremacy would naturally be
construed to extend not only over the citizens ,but over the States .
This , however , is not left to implication , for it is declared to be
the supreme law o
f
the land , “ anything in the Constitution or laws
o
f any State to the contrary notwithstanding . ” The people of any
State cannot , then , b
y
any alteration o
f
their State constitution ,
destroy o
r impair that supremacy . How , then , can they do it in
any other less direct manner ? Now , it is the proper function o
f
the judicial department to interpret laws , and b
y
the very terms o
f
the Constitution to interpret the supreme law . It
s interpretation ,
then , becomes obligatory and conclusive upon al
l
the departments
o
f
the Federal government , and upon the whole people , so fa
r
a
s
their rights and duties are derived from or affected b
y
that Consti
tution . If , then , al
l
the departments of the national government
may rightfully exercise all the powers which the judicial department
has ,by its interpretation , declared to be granted b
y
the Constitution ,
and are prohibited from exercising those which are thus declared
not to be granted b
y
it , would it not be a solecism to hold , not
withstanding , that such rightful exercise should not be deemed the
supreme law o
f
the land ,and such prohibited powers should still be
deemed granted ? It would seem repugnant to the first notions of
justice , that in respect to the same instrument of government dif
ferent powers and duties and obligations should arise , and differ
ent rules should prevail , at the same time , among the governed ,
from a right of interpreting the same words (manifestly used in
1 Journals o
f Congress , April 13 , 1787 , p . 32 , & c . Rawle on the Constitution , App .
2 , p . 316 , & c .
2 The Federalist , No . 33 .
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one sense only ) in different , nay , in opposite senses. If there ever
was a case , in which uniformity of interpretation might well be
deemed a necessary postulate , it would seem to be that of a
fundamental law of a government . It might otherwise follow
that the same individual , as a magistrate ,might be bound by one
rule, and in his private capacity by another , at the very same
moment .
§ 384 . There would be neither wisdom nor policy in such a doc
trine ; and it would deliver over the Constitution to interminable
doubts , founded upon the fluctuating opinions and characters of
those who should from time to timebe called to administer it .
Such a Constitution could in no just sense be deemed a law ,much
less a supreme or fundamental law . It would have none of the
certainty or universality which are the proper attributes of such a
sovereign rule . It would entail upon us al
l
the miserable servi
tude which has been deprecated a
s
the result o
f vague and uncer
tain jurisprudence . Misera es
t
servitus , ubi jus est vagum aut incer
tum . It would subject us to constant discussions , and perhaps to
civil broils , from the perpetually recurring conflicts upon consti
tutional questions . On the other hand , the worst that could hap
pen from a wrong decision o
f
the judicial department would b
e
that it might require the interposition of Congress , or , in the last
resort , of the amendatory power of the States , to redress the
grievance .
$ 385 . We find the power to construe the Constitution expressly
confided to the judicial department , without any limitation or
qualification as to it
s
conclusiveness . Who , then , is at liberty , b
y
general implications , not from th
e
terms of th
e
instrument ,but
from mere theory and assumed reservations of sovereign right , to
insert such a limitation or qualification ? We find , that to produce
uniformity o
f interpretation , and to preserve the Constitution as
a perpetual bond o
f
union , a supreme arbiter or authority of con
struing is , if not absolutely indispensable , at least o
f
the highest
possible practical utility and importance . Who , then , is a
t liberty
to reason down the terms o
f
the Constitution , so as to exclude
their natural force and operation ?
§ 386 . We find that it is the known course of the judicial de
partment o
f
the several States to decide in the last resort upon all
constitutional questions arising in judgment ; and that this has
always been maintained as a rightful exercise of authority , and
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conclusive upon the whole State . As such , it has been constantly
approved by the people , and never withdrawn from the courts by
any amendment of their constitutions , when the people have been
called to revise them . We find that the people of the several
States have constantly relied upon this last judicial appeal as the
bulwark of their State rights and liberties ; and that it is in per
fect consonance with th
e
whole structure o
f
the jurisprudence o
f
the common law . Under such circumstances is it notmost natural
to presume that the same rule was intended to be applied to the
Constitution of the United States ? And when we find that the
judicial department of the United States is actually intrusted with
a like power , is it not an irresistible presumption that it had the
same object , and was to have the same universally conclusive
effect ? Even under the confederation , an instrument framed with
infinitely more jealousy and deference fo
r
State rights , the judg
ments o
f
the judicial department appointed to decide controversies
between States were declared to be final and conclusive ; and the
appellate power in other cases was held to overrule a
ll
State deci
sions and State legislation . 2
§ 387 . If , then , reasoning from the terms of the Constitution
and the known principles o
f
our jurisprudence , the appropriate
conclusion is that the judicial department o
f
th
e
United States is ,
in the last resort , the final expositor of the Constitution as to all
questions o
f
a judicial nature , le
t
u
s
see , in the next place , how
fa
r
this reasoning acquires confirmation from the past history o
f
the Constitution and the practice under it .
§ 388 . That this view of the Constitution was taken b
y
it
s
framers and friends , and was submitted to the people before its
adoption , is positively certain . The Federalist 3 says , “ Under
the national government , treaties and articles of treaties , as well
a
s the law o
f
nations , will always be expounded in one sense
and executed in the samemanner ; whereas adjudications on the
same points and questions in thirteen States , or three o
r
four con
federacies , will not always accord or be consistent ; and that as
well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed
b
y
different and independent governments as from the different
1 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 248 , 328 , 329 , 395 ; Grimke ' s Speech in 1828 , p . 25 , & c . ; Dane ' s
App . § 4
4 , 4
5 , p . 5
2
to 59 ; Id . $ 4
8 , p . 62 .
? Dane ' s App . § 52 , p . 65 ; Penhallow y . Doane , 3 Dall . 54 ; Journals of Congress ,
1779 , Vol . 5 , p . 86 to 90 ; 4 Cranch , 2 .
3 The Federalist , No . 3 .
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local laws , which may affect and influence them . The wisdom of
the convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction
and judgment o
f
courts appointed b
y , and responsible only to , one
national government , cannot be to
o
much commended . ” Again ,
referring to th
e
objection taken , that the government was national ,
and not a confederacy o
f
sovereign States , and after stating that
the jurisdiction of the national government extended to certain
enumerated objects only , and left the residue to the several States ,
it proceeds to say : 1 6 It is true , that in controversies between the
two jurisdictions (State and national ) the tribunalwhich is ulti
mately to decide is to be established under the general government .
But this does not change the principle of the case . The decision
is to be impartially made according to the rules of the Constitution ,
and a
ll
the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure
this impartiality . Some such tribunal is clearly essential to pre
vent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution o
f
the compact .
And that it ought to be established under the general rather than
under the local governments , or , to speak more properly , that it
could b
e safely established under the first alone , is a position not
likely to b
e
combated . ” 2
§ 389 . The subject is still more elaborately considered in
another number , 3 which treats of the judicial department in rela
tion to the extent o
f
it
s powers . It is there said , that there ought
always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to consti
tutional provisions ; that if there are such things as political axioms ,
the propriety of the judicial department of a government being co
extensive with it
s legislature may b
e
ranked among the number ; 4
that the mere necessity o
f uniformity in the interpretation of the
national law decides the question ; that thirteen independent courts
o
f
final jurisdiction over the same causes is a hydra o
f government ,
from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed ;
that controversies between the nation and it
s
members can only be
properly referred to the national tribunal ; that the peace of the
whole ought not to be left a
t
the disposal o
f
a part ; and thatwhat
ever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony o
f
the
States are proper objects of Federal superintendence and control .
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 39 . ? Se
e
also the Federalist , N
o
. 33 .
3 The Federalist , No . 80 .
4 The same remarks will be found pressedwith great force b
yMr . Chief Justice Mar
shall , in delivering the opinion of the court in Cohens v . Virginia ( 6 Wheat . 264 , 384 ) .
• In the Federalist , No . 78 and 82 , the same course of reasoning is pursued , and the
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$ 390 . The same doctrine was constantly avowed in the State
conventions called to ratify the Constitution . With some persons
it formed a strong objection to the Constitution ; with others it was
deemed vital to it
s
existence and value . So , that it is indisputa
ble , that the Constitution was adopted under a full knowledge of
this exposition o
f
it
s grant o
f power to the judicial department . 2
$ 391 . This is not al
l
. The Constitution has now been in full
final nature o
f
the appellate jurisdiction o
f
the Supreme Court is largely insisted o
n .
In the convention o
f
Connecticut ,Mr . Ellsworth (afterwards Chief Justice of the United
States ) used the following language : “ This Constitution defines the extent of the
powers o
f
the general government . If the general legislature should at any time over
leap their limits , the judicial department is the constitutional check . If the United
States g
o
beyond their powers , — if they make a law which the Constitution does not
authorize , it is void ; and the judicial power , th
e
national judges , who , to secure their
impartiality , are to be made independent , will declare it void . On the other hand , if
the States g
o
beyond their limits , — if they make a la
w
which is a usurpation upon the
general government , the la
w
is void , and upright and independent judges will declare
it . Still , however , if the United States and the individual States will quarrel , if they
want to fight , they may do it , and no frame of government can possibly prevent it . ”
In the debates in the South Carolina legislature , when the subject of calling a conven
tion to ratify o
r reject the Constitution was before them , Mr . Charles Pinckney (one of
the members o
f
the convention ) avowed th
e
doctrine in the strongest terms . " That
a supreme Federal jurisdiction was indispensable , ” said he , “ cannot be denied . It is
equally true , that , in order to insure the administration o
f justice , it was necessary to
give all the powers , original as well as appellate , the Constitution has enumerated .
Without it we could not expect a due observance of treaties , that the State judiciaries
would confine themselves within their proper sphere , or that a general sense of justice
would pervade the Union , & c . That to insure these , extensive authorities were neces
sary ; particularly so were they in a tribunal , constituted as this is ,whose duty it would
b
e , not only to decide all national questions which should arise within the Union , but
to control and keep the State judiciaries within their proper limits , whenever they
should attempt to interfere with the power . ” Debates in 1778 , printed b
y
A . E . Miller ,
1831 , Charleston , p . 7 .
1 It would occupy too much space to quote the passages a
t large . Take , for in
stance , in the Virginia debates , Mr . Madison ' s remarks : “ It may be a misfortune ,
that in organizing any government the explication o
f it
s authority should b
e
left to any
o
f
it
s
co -ordinate branches . There is no example in any country where it is otherwise .
There is n
o
new policy in submitting it to the judiciary o
f
the United States . ” 2 Elliot ' s
Debates , 390 . See also Id . 380 , 383 , 395 , 400 , 404 , 418 . See also North Carolina De
bates , 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 125 , 127 , 128 , 130 , 133 , 134 , 139 , 141 , 142 , 143 ; Pennsylvania
Debates , 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 280 , 313 . Mr . Luther Martin , in his letter to the Maryland
Convention , said : “ By the third article the judicial power is vested in one Supreme
Court , & c . These courts , and theseonly , will have a right to decide upon the laws of
the United States and a
ll questionsarising upon their construction , & c . Whether , there
fore , any laws , & c . , of Congress , o
r
acts o
f
it
s
President , & c . , are contrary to o
r
war
ranted b
y
the Constitution , rests only with the judges ,who are appointed b
y
Congress
to determine ; b
y
whose determinations every State is bound . ” 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 44 , 45 ;
Yates ' s Minutes , & c . See also the Federalist , No . 78 .
? SeeMr . Pinckney ' s Observations cited in Grimké ' s Speech in 1828 , p . 86 , 87 .
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operation more than forty years ; and during this period the Su
preme Court has constantly exercised this power o
f
final interpre
tation in relation not only to the Constitution and laws of the
Union , but in relation to State acts and State constitutions and
laws , so far as they affected the Constitution and laws and treaties
o
f
the United States . Their decisions upon these grave questions
have never been repudiated or impaired b
y Congress . No State
has ever deliberately or forcibly resisted the execution of the judg .
ments founded upon them ; and the highest State tribunals have ,
with scarcely a single exception , acquiesced in and , in most in
stances , assisted in executing them . During the same period ,
i Dane ' s App . $ 44 , p . 53 , 54 , 55 ; Grimké ' s Speech , 1828 , p . 34 to 42 . [ In this dis
cussion it is assumed , of course , that the question arising under the Constitution has in
some form become the subject o
f judicial controversy , so as to be brought to the notice
o
f
the court in a manner to demand it
s judgment . The court does not si
t
to declare
principles o
f
law except a
s they arise in actual litigation ; it must have authority under
the law to adjudicate upon some subject matter in regard to which a controversy has
arisen before it is warranted in laying down rules which are to govern any one in the
construction o
f
the Constitution o
r o
f
any other law . It is , therefore , quite possible
that questions o
f
constitutional law may for a long period never b
e brought to the notice
o
f
the court in a form to justify the expression o
f
it
s opinion ; and a practical construc
tion may come to be settled b
y
the action o
f
the other departments o
f
the government ,
which it would be difficult and mischievous afterwards to disturb . Indeed , as the origi
nal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited , and the appellate is b
y
the Constitution
expressly conferred , “ with such exceptions and under such regulations a
s
the Congress
shall prescribe , ” (Ex parte Yerger , 8 Wal . 85 ; The Lucy , Id . 307 , ) it has been found
possible b
y
that body in a case in wbich a decision on a question of constitutional power
was thought notdesirable , and where the question could only arise on appeal , to preclude
a decision by taking away the appellate jurisdiction . This was done in McCardle ' s
Case , 7 Wal . 506 , after the appeal had been taken ; the question involved being the
constitutionality o
f
the Reconstruction Acts , so called . O
f
th
e
propriety o
f
such action
we say nothing here .
The Federal courts have also held that though they may compel the performance o
f
mere ministerial duties b
y
a
n
officer o
f
the United States , (Marbury v . Madison , I
Cranch , 137 ; Kendall v . United States , 12 Pet . 524 ; United States v . Guthrie , 17 How .
284 , ) yet they have no power to interfere , to require the performance of purely political
duties , or to restrain or control the executive in the exercise of discretionary powers .
The allegation that he is proceeding to put in force an unconstitutional law does not
give a court a jurisdiction to interfere . Mississippi v . Johnson , 4 Wal . 475 . The laws
in question here were also the Reconstruction Acts . See also Georgia v . Stanton , 6
Wal . 51 . ]
2 In the debates in the first Congress organized under the Constitution , the same doc
trine was openly avowed , as indeed it has constantly been b
y
the majority o
f Congress at
a
ll subsequent periods . See 1 Lloyd ' s Debates , 219 to 596 ; 2 Lloyd ' s Debates , 284 to 327 .
8 Chief Justice M 'Kean , in Commonwealth v . Cobbett , ( 3 Dall . 473 , ) seems to have
adopted a modified doctrine , and to have held that the Supreme Court was not the com
mon arbiter ; but if not , the only remedy was , not b
y
a State deciding fo
r
itself , as in
case o
f
a treaty between independent governments , but b
y
a constitutional amendment
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eleven States have been admitted into the Union ,under a full per
suasion that the same power would be exerted over them . Many
of the States have, at different times within the same period , been
called upon to consider and examine the grounds on which the
doctrine has been maintained , at the solicitation of other States ,
which felt that it operated injuriously ,ormight operate injuriously ,
upon their interests . A great majority of the States which have
been thus called upon in their legislative capacities to express
opinions have maintained the correctness of the doctrine , and the
beneficial effects of the power , as a bond of union , in terms of the
most unequivocal nature . Whenever any amendment has been
proposed to change the tribunal and substitute another common
umpire or interpreter , it has rarely received the concurrence of
more than two or three States , and has been uniformly rejected by
a great majority , either silently or by an express dissent. And
instances have occurred in which the legislature of the same State
has, at different times , avowed opposite opinions , approving at one
time what it had denied , or at least questioned , at another . So
that it may be asserted with entire confidence , that for forty years
three fourths of al
l
the States composing the Union have expressly
assented to or silently approved this construction o
f
the Consti
tution , and have resisted every effort to restrict or alter it . A
weight of public opinion among the people for such a period , uni
formly thrown into one scale so strongly and so decisively , in the
midst of all the extraordinary changes of parties , the events of
b
y
th
e
States . But se
e , on the other hand , the opinion of Chief Justice Spencer , in
Andrews v . Montgomery , 19 Johns . R . 164 .
1 Massachusetts , in her Resolve o
f February 1
2 , 1799 , ( p . 57 , ) in answer to the Res
olutions o
f Virginia o
f
1798 , declared " that the decision of all cases in law and equity ,
arising under the Constitution o
f
the United States , and the construction of al
l
laws
made in pursuance thereof , are exclusively vested by the people in the jndicial court o
f
the United States " ; and “ that the people in that solemn compact , which is declared
to b
e
the supreme la
w
o
f
th
e
land , have not constituted the State legislatures the judges
o
f
the acts o
r
measures o
f
the Federal government , but have confided to them the power
o
f proposing such amendments , ” & c . ; and “ that b
y
this construction o
f
the Constitu
tion a
n
amicable and dispassionate remedy is pointed out for any evil which experi
ence may prove to exist , and the peace and prosperity o
f the United States may b
e
preserved without interruption . " See also Dane ' s App . § 44 , p . 56 ; Id . 80 . Mr .
Webster ' s Speech in the Senate , in 1830 , contains an admirable exposition of the same
doctrines . Webster ' s Speeches ,410 , 41
9
,420 , 421 . In June , 1821 , the House of Rep
resentatives o
f
New Hampshire passed certain resolutions , ( 172 yeas to 9 nays , ) drawn
u
p
( a
s
is understood ) b
y
one o
f
her most distinguished statesmen , asserting the same
doctrines . Delaware , in January , 1831 , and Connecticut and Massachusetts held the
same , in May , 1831 .
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peace and o
f
war , and the trying conflicts ofpublic policy and State
interests , is perhaps unexampled in the history of a
ll
other free
governments . It affords as satisfactory a testimony in favor o
f
the just and safe operation of the system a
s
can well be imagined ;
and , as a commentary upon the Constitution itself , it is as abso
lutely conclusive as any ever can be , and affords the only escape
from the occurrence o
f
civil conflicts , and the delivery over of the
subject to interminable disputes . ?
1 . Virginia an
d
Kentucky denied the power in 1798 and 1800 ; Massachusetts , Dela
ware , Rhode Island , New York , Connecticut , New Hampshire , and Vermont disap
proved o
f
the Virginia Resolutions , and passed counter resolutions . (North American
Review , October , 1830 , p . 500 . ) No other State appears to have approved the Virginia
Resolutions . ( Ibid . ) In 1810 Pennsylvania proposed the appointment o
f
another tri
bunal than the Supreme Court to determine disputes between the general and State gov
ernments . Virginia , on that occasion , affirmed that the Supreme Court was the proper
tribunal ; and in that opinion New Hampshire , Vermont , North Carolina , Maryland ,
Georgia , Tennessee , Kentucky , and New Jersey concurred ; and n
o
one State approved
o
f
the amendment . (North American Review , October , 1830 , p . 507 to 512 ; Dane ' s
App . $ 55 , p . 67 ; 6 Wheat . R . 358 , note . ) Recently , in March , 1831 , Pennsylvania
has resolved that the 25th section o
f
the judiciary act o
f
1789 , ch . 2
0 , which gives the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction from State courts o
n
constitutional questions , is
authorized b
y
the Constitution and sanctioned b
y
experience , and also all other laws
empowering the Federal judiciary to maintain the supreme laws .
2 Upon this subject the speech o
f Mr .Webster in the Senate , in 1830 , presents the
whole argument in a very condensed and powerful form . The following passage is
selected a
s peculiarly appropriate : “ The people , then , si
r , erected this government .
They gave it a Constitution , and in that Constitution they have enumerated the powers
which they bestow o
n it . They havemade it a limited government . They have de
fined it
s authority . They have restrained it to the exercise o
f
such powers a
s
are
granted ; and a
ll
others , they declare , are reserved to the States o
r
the people . But ,
sir , they have not stopped here . If they had , they would have accomplished but half
their work . No definition can be so clear as to avoid possibility o
f
doubt ; no limita
tion so precise a
s
to exclude a
ll uncertainty : Who , then , shall construe this grant o
f
the people ? Who shall interpret their will , where it may be supposed they have left it
doubtful ? With whom do they repose this ultimate right o
f
deciding o
n
the powers
o
f
the government ? Sir , they have settled all this in the fullest manner . They have
left it , with the government itself , in it
s appropriate branches . Sir , the very chief end ,
the main design , for which the whole Constitution was framed and adopted , was to
establish a government that should not be obliged to act through State agency , o
r de
pend o
n
State opinion and State discretion . The people had had quite enough of that
kind of government under the confederacy . Under that system the legal action ,
the application o
f
law to individuals , belonged exclusively to the States . Congress
could only recommend , — their acts were not of binding force till the States had
adopted and sanctioned them . Are we in that condition still ? Are we yet a
t
the
mercy o
f
State discretion and State construction ? Sir , if we are , then vain will b
e
our attempt to maintain the Constitution under which we s
it .
“ But , si
r , the people have wisely provided , in the Constitution itself , a proper , suita
ble mode and tribunal for settling questions o
f
constitutional law . There are , in the
Constitution , grants o
f powers to Congress , and restrictions on these powers . There
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$ 392 . In this review of the power of the judicial department ,
upon a question of it
s supremacy in th
e
interpretation o
f
the Con
a
re , also , prohibitions on the States . Some authority must , therefore ,necessarily exist ,
having the ultimate jurisdiction to fi
x
and ascertain the interpretation o
f
these grants ,
restrictions , and prohibitions . The Constitution has itself pointed out , ordained , and
established that authority . How has it accomplished this great and essential end ? By
declaring , sir , that ' the Constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance
thereof shall b
e
the supremelaw o
f
the land , anything in th
e
Constitution o
r
laws o
f any State
to the contrary notwithstanding . '
“ This , si
r , was the first great step . By this the supremacy of the Constitution and
laws o
f
the United States is declared . The people so will it . No State la
w
is to b
e
valid which comes in conflict with the Constitution , o
r any law o
f
the United States
passed in pursuance o
f it . But who shall decide this question of interference ? To
whom lies the last appeal ? This , sir , the Constitution itself decides , also , b
y
declaring
that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws o
f
the
United States . ' These two provisions , sir , cover the whole ground . They are , in
truth , the keystone o
f
the arch . With these , it is a Constitution ; without them , it is a
confederacy . In pursuance of these clear and express provisions , Congress established
a
t
it
s very first session , in the judicial act , a mode fo
r
carrying them into full effect ,
and for bringing a
ll questions o
f
constitutional power to the final decision o
f
the
Supreme Court . It then , si
r , became a government . It then had themeans of self -pro
tection ; and but for this itwould , in all probability , have been now among things
which are past . Having constituted the government , and declared its powers , the peo
ple have further said that since somebodymust decide on the extent of these powers ,
the government shall itself decide ; subject , always , like other popular governments ,
to it
s responsibility to the people . And now , si
r , I repeat , how is it that a State legis
lature acquires any power to interfere ? Who , or what , gives them the right to say to
the people , “We ,who ar
e
your agents and servants for one purpose , will undertake to
decide that your other agents and servants , appointed b
y
you fo
r
another purpose , have
transcended the authority you gave them ' ? The reply would be , I think , not imperti
nent , 'Who made you a judge over another ' s servants ? To their own masters they
stand o
r
fall . '
“ Sir , I deny this power of State legislatures altogether . It cannot stand the test of
examination . Gentlemen may say that , in a
n
extreme case , a State government might
protect the people from intolerable oppression . Sir , in such a case the peoplemight
protect themselves , without the aid o
f
the State governments . Such a case warrants
revolution . Itmust make , when it comes , a law fo
r
itself . A nullifying act of a State
legislature cannot alter the case , nor make resistance any more lawful . In maintaining
these sentiments , si
r
, I am but asserting the rights o
f
the people . I state what they
have declared , and insist on their right to declare it . They have chosen to repose this
power in the general government , and I think itmy duty to support it , like other con
stitutional powers . "
See also 1 Wilson ' s Law Lectures , 461 , 462 . It is truly surprising that Mr . Vice
President Calhoun , in his letter o
f
the 28th o
f
August , 1832 , to Governor Hamilton ,
(published while the present work was passing through the press , ) should have thought
that a proposition merely offered in the convention , and referred to a committee for
their consideration , that “ the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be extended to all
controversies between the United States and a
n
individual State , or the United States
and the citizens o
f
a
n individual State , ” ( Journal o
f
Convention , 20th Aug . p . 265 , )
should , in connection with others giving a negative o
n
State laws , establish the conclu .
sion that the convention which framed the Constitution was opposed to granting the
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stitution , it hasnot been thought necessary to rely on the deliberate
judgments o
f
that department in affirmance of it . But it may be
proper to add , that the judicial department has not only constantly
exercised this right of interpretation in the last resort , but its
whole course o
f reasonings and operations has proceeded upon the
ground that , oncemade , the interpretation was conclusive , as well
upon the States a
s
the people .
power to the general government in any form , to exercise any control whatever over a
State b
y
force , veto , or judicial process , o
r
in any other form . This clause for confer
ring jurisdiction o
n
the Supreme Court in controversies between the United States and
the States ,must , like the other controversies between States or between individuals ,
referred to the judicial power , have been intended to apply exclusively to suits o
f
a civil
nature , respecting property , debts , contracts , o
r
other claims b
y
the United States
against a State , and not to the decision of constitutional questions in the abstract . A
t
a subsequent period o
f
the convention , the judicial power was expressly extended to all
cases arising under the Constitution , laws , and treaties of the United States , and to all
controversies to which the United States should b
e
a party , (Journal of Convention ,
27th Aug . p . 298 , ) thus covering the whole ground o
f
a right to decide constitutional
questions o
f
a judicial nature . And this , as the Federalist informs us , was the substi
tute for a negative upon State laws , and the only one which was deemed safe o
r
efficient .
The Federalist , No . 80 .
1 Martin v . Hunter , 1 Wheat . R . 304 , 334 , & c . , 342 , 348 ; Cohens v . The State of
Virginia , 6 Wheat . R . 264 , 376 , 377 to 392 ; Id . 413 to 423 ; Bank of Hamilton v . Duid
le
y
, 2 Peters , R . 524 ; Ware v . Hylton , 3 Dall . 199 . The language of Mr . Chief Jus
tice Marshall , in delivering the opinion of the court in Cohens v . Virginia , ( 6 Wheat .
384 to 390 , ) presents the argument in favor of the jurisdiction of the judicial depart
ment in a very forcible manner . “ While weighing arguments drawn from the nature
o
f
government and from the general spirit of an instrument , and urged fo
r
the purpose
o
f narrowing the construction which the words o
f
that instrument seem to require , it is
proper to place in the opposite scale those principles , drawn from the same sources ,
which g
o
to sustain thewords in their full operation and natural import . One of these ,
which has been pressed with great force b
y
the counsel for the plaintiffs in error , is , that
the judicial power of every well -constituted government must be coextensive with the
legislative , and must be capable of deciding every judicial question which grows out of
the Constitution and laws .
“ If any proposition may be considered as a political axiom , this , we think ,may be so
considered . In reasoning upon it , a
s
a
n
abstract question , there would probably exist
n
o contrariety o
f opinion respecting it . Every argument proving the necessity of the
department proves also the propriety o
f giving this extent to it . We do not mean to
say that the jurisdiction o
f
the courts o
f
the Union should b
e
construed to b
e
coextensive
with the legislative ,merely because it is fit that it should be so ; but we mean to say ,
that this fitness furnishes a
n argument in construing the Constitution which ought never
to b
e
overlooked , and which is most especially entitled to consideration when w
e
are
inquiring whether the words of the instrument , which purport to establish this princi
p
le , shall be contracted for the purpose of destroying it .
“ The mischievous consequences of the construction , contended for on the part o
f
Virginia , are also entitled to great consideration . It would prostrate , it has been said ,
the government and it
s
laws a
t
the feet o
f every State in the Union . And would not this
b
e
it
s
effect ? What power of the government could be executed b
y
it
s
own means , in
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$ 393 . But itmay be asked , as it has been asked , what is to be
the remedy , if there be any misconstruction of the Constitution
any State disposed to resist it
s
execution b
y
a course o
f legislation ? The lawsmust be
executed b
y
individuals acting within the several States . If these individuals may be
exposed to penalties , and if the courts of the Union cannot correct the judgments b
y
which these penalties may b
e
enforced , the course of the government may be , at any
time , arrested b
y
the will of one of its members . Each member will possess a veto on
the will of the whole .
" The answer which has been given to this argument does not deny it
s
truth , but
insists that confidence is reposed , and may be safely reposed , in the State institutions ;
and that , if they shall ever become so insane o
r
so wicked a
s
to seek the destruction o
f
the government , they may accomplish their object by refusing to perform the functions
assigned to them .
“ We readily concur with the counsel for the defendant in the declaration that the
cases , which have been put , of direct legislative resistance , for the purpose of opposing
the acknowledged powers o
f
the government , are extreme cases , and in the hope that
they will never occcur ; but we cannot help believing that a general conviction of the
total incapacity o
f
the government to protect itself and it
s laws in such caseswould
contribute in n
o
inconsiderable degree to their occurrence .
“ Let it b
e
admitted that the cases which have been put are extreme and improbable ,
yet there are gradations of opposition to the laws , far short of those cases , which might
have a baneful influence o
n
the affairs o
f
the nation . Different States may entertain
different opinions o
n
th
e
true construction o
f
the constitutional powers o
f Congress . We
know that a
t
one time the assumption o
f
the debts contracted b
y
the several States dur
ing the war of our Revolution was deemed unconstitutional by some o
f
them . We
know , too , that at other times certain taxes imposed b
y
Congress have been pronounced
unconstitutional . Other laws have been questioned partially ,while they were supported
by the great majority of the American people . We have no assurance that we shall be
less divided than we have been . States may legislate in conformity to their opinions ,
and may enforce those opinions b
y
penalties . It would be hazarding toomuch to assert
that the judicatures o
f
the States will be exempt from the prejudices b
y
which the legis
latures and people are influenced , and will constitute perfectly impartial tribunals . In
many States the judges ar
e
dependent for office and fo
r
salary o
n
th
e
will o
f
the legisla
ture . The Constitution of the United States furnishes no security against the universal
adoption o
f
this principle . When we observe the importance woich that Constitution
attaches to th
e
independence o
f judges , we are the less inclined to suppose that it can
have intended to leave these constitutional questions to tribunals , where this indepen
dence may not exist , in all caseswhere a State shall prosecute an individual who claims
the protection o
f
a
n
act o
f Congress . These prosecutions may take place even without
a legislative act . A person ,making a seizure under an act of Congress ,may be indicted
a
s
a trespasser if force has been employed , and of this a jury may judge . How exten
sive may b
e
the mischief if the first decision in such cases should b
e
final !
“ These collisions may take place in times o
f
no extraordinary commotion . But a
constitution is framed for ages to come , and is designed to approach immortality , as
nearly a
s
human institutions can approach it . It
s
course cannot always b
e tranquil . It
is exposed to storms and tempests , and its framers must be unwise statesmen indeed , if
they have not provided it , as far as its nature will permit , with themeans of self -preser
vation from the perils itmay b
e
destined to encounter . No government ought to b
e
so
defective in it
s organization a
s not to contain within itself themeans of securing the
execution o
f
it
s
own laws against other dangers than those which occur every day .
Courts o
f justice are the means most usually employed ; and it is reasonable to expect ,
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on the part of the government of the United States or its func
tionaries , and any power exercised by them not warranted by it
s
that a government should repose on it
s
own courts rather than o
n
others . There is
certainly nothing in the circumstances under which our Constitution was formed , noth
ing in the history o
f
the times , which would justify the opinion , that the confidence re
posed in the States was so implicit a
s
to leave in them and their tribunals the power o
f
resisting o
r defeating , in the form o
f
law , the legitimate measures o
f
the Union . The
requisitions o
f
Congress , under the confederation , were as constitutionally obligatory as
the laws enacted b
y
the present Congress . That they were habitually disregarded , is a
fact o
f
universal notoriety . With the knowledge of this fact , and under it
s full pressure ,
a convention was assembled to change the system . Is it so improbable that they should
confer o
n
the judicial department the power o
f construing the Constitution and laws of
the Union in every case , in the last resort , and o
f preserving them from all violation
from every quarter , so far as judicial decisions can preserve them , that this improbabil
ity should essentially affect the construction o
f
the new system ? We are told , and we
are truly told , that the great change which is to give efficacy to the present system is its
ability to act o
n
individuals directly , instead o
f acting through the instrumentality of
State governments . But ought not this ability , in reason and sound policy , to b
e applied
directly to the protection o
f
individuals employed in the execution o
f
the laws , as well
a
s
to their coercion ? Your laws reach the individual without the aid o
f any other
power ; why may they not protect him from punishment for performing his duty in
executing them ?
“ The counsel fo
r
Virginia endeavor to obviate the force of these arguments b
y
say .
ing that the dangers they suggest , if not imaginary , are inevitable ; that the Constitu
tion can make n
o provision against them ; and that , therefore , in construing that instru
ment , they ought to be excluded from our consideration . This state of things , they say ,
cannot arise until there shall b
e
a disposition so hostile to the present political system
a
s
to produce a determination to destroy it ; and when that determination shall b
e pro
duced , its effects will not be restrained b
y
parchment stipulations . The fate of the Con
stitution will not then depend on judicial decisions . But , should n
o appeal b
e
made
to force , the States can put a
n
end to the government by refusing to act . They have
only not to elect senators , and it expires without a struggle .
“ It is very true that , whenever hostility to the existing system shall become univer
sal , it will be also irresistible . The people made the Constitution , and the people can
unmake it . It is the creature of their will , and lives only b
y
their will . But this
supreme and irresistible power to make o
r
to unmake , resides only in the whole body o
f
the people , not in any subdivision of them . The attempt o
f any o
f
the parts to exer
cise it is usurpation , and ought to be repelled b
y
those to whom the people have dele
gated their power o
f repelling it .
" The acknowledged inability o
f
the government , then , to sustain itself against the
public will , and , b
y
force o
r
otherwise , to control the whole nation , is no sound argu
ment in support o
f
it
s
constitutional inability to preserve itself against a section o
f
the
nation acting in opposition to the general will .
“ It is true , that if all the States , o
r
a majority o
f
them , refuse to elect senators , the
legislative powers o
f the Union will be suspended . But if any one State shall refuse to
elect them , the Senate will not on that account be the less capable o
f performing a
ll
it
s
functions . The argument founded on this fact would seem rather to prove the subordi
nation o
f
the parts to thewhole , than the complete independence o
f
any one o
f
them .
The framers o
f
the Constitution were , indeed , unable to make any provisions which
should protect that instrument against a general combination o
f
the States , or of the
people , for its destruction ; and , conscious of this inability , they have not made the
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true meaning ? To this question a general answer may be given
in the words of it
s early expositors : “ The same as if the State
legislatures should violate their respective constitutional authori
ties . ” In the first instance , if this should be by Congress , “ the
success o
f
the usurpation will depend on the executive and judi
ciary departments , which are to expound and give effect to the
legislative acts ; and , in the last resort , a remedy must be obtained
from the people ,who can , b
y
the election of more faithful repre
sentatives , annul the acts of the usurpers . The truth is , that this
ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional
acts o
f
the Federal than of the State legislatures , for this plain
reason , that , as every act of the former will be an invasion of the
rights of the latter , these will ever be ready to mark the innova
tion , to sound the alarm to the people , and to exert their local
influence in effecting a change of Federal representatives . There
being no such intermediate body between the State legislatures
and the people , interested in watching the conduct of the former ,
violations o
f
the State constitution are more likely to remain
unnoticed and unredressed . ” 1
§ 394 . In the next place , if the usurpation should be b
y
the
President , an adequate check may be generally found , not only in
the elective franchise , but also in the controlling power of Con
gress , in its legislative or impeaching capacity , and in an appeal
to the judicial department . In the next place , if the usurpation
should be b
y
the judiciary , and arise from corrupt motives , the
power o
f impeachment would remove the offenders ; and in most
other cases the legislative and executive authorities could inter
pose a
n
efficient barrier . A declaratory or prohibitory law would ,
in many cases , be a complete remedy . We have , also , so far at
least as a conscientious sense o
f
the obligations o
f duty , sanc
tioned b
y
a
n oath o
f
office , and an indissoluble responsibility to
the people for the exercise and abuse o
f
power , on the part of
different departments o
f
the government , can influence human
attempt . But they were able to provide against the operation of measures adopted in
any one State ,whose tendency might be to arrest the execution of the laws , and this it
was the part o
f
true wisdom to attempt . We think they have attempted it . ”
See also M 'Culloch v .Maryland ( 4 Wheat , 316 , 405 , 406 ) . See also the reasoning of
Mr . Chief Justice Jay , in . Chisholm v . Georgia ( 2 Dall . 419 ) ; Osborn v . Bank of th
e
United States ( 9 Wheat . 738 , 818 , 819 ) ; and Gibbons v . Ogden ( 9 Wheat . 1 , 210 ) .
1 The Federalist , No . 44 ; 1 Wilson ' s Law Lectures , 461 , 462 ; Dane ' s App . § 58 ,
p . 68 .
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minds , some additional guards against known and deliberate
usurpations ; for both are provided for in the Constitution itself .
“ The wisdom and the discretion of Congress , ( it has been justly
observed , ) their identity with the people , and the influence which
their constituents possess a
t
elections , are , in this , as in many
other instances , — as , for example , that of declaring war , — the sole
restraints ; on this they have relied to secure them from abuse .
They are th
e
restraints on which th
e
people must often solely rely
in a
ll representative governments . ” 1
$ 395 . But in the next place , (and it is that which would fur
nish a case o
f
most difficulty and danger , though it may fairly be
presumed to b
e
o
f
rare occurrence , ) if the legislative , executive ,
and judicial departments should concur in a gross usurpation ,
there is still a peaceable remedy provided b
y
the Constitution .
It is by the power of amendment , which may always be applied at
the will of three fourths of the States . If , therefore , there should
b
e
a corrupt co -operation o
f
three fourths of the States fo
r
perma
nent usurpation , ( a case not to be supposed , or if supposed , it dif
fers not a
t a
ll
in principle or redress from the case o
f
a majority
o
f
a State o
r
nation having the same intent ) the case is certainly
irremediable under any known forms o
f
the Constitution . The
States may now , b
y
a constitutional amendment ,with few limita
tions , change the whole structure and powers of the government ,
and thus legalize any present excess o
f power . And the general
right o
f
a society in other cases to change the government a
t
the
will of a majority o
f
the whole people , in any manner that may
suit it
s pleasure , is undisputed , and seems indisputable . If there
b
e any remedy at a
ll
for the minority in such cases , it is a remedy
never provided fo
r
b
y
human institutions . It is b
y
a resort to the
ultimate right of all human beings in extreme cases to resist
oppression , and to apply force against ruinous injustice . 2
§ 396 . As a fit conclusion to this part of these commentaries ,
we cannot d
o
better than to refer to a confirmatory view which
has been recently presented to the public b
y
one o
f
the framers
o
f
the Constitution , who is now , it is believed , the only surviving
member o
f
the Federal convention , and who , b
y
his early as well
1 Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 197 . See also , on the same subject , th
e
observa
tions o
f
Mr . Justice Johnson in delivering the opinion o
f
the court , in Anderson v .
Dunn , 6 Wheat . R . 204 , 226 .
? S
e
c
Webster ' s Speeches , p . 40
8
, 409 ; 1 Black . Comm . 161 , 162 . Se
e
also 1 Tuck
e
r ' s Black . Comm . App . 73 to 75 ,
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as his later labors , has entitled himself to the gratitude of his
country as one of its truest patriots and most enlightened friends .
Venerable , as he now is , from age and character , and absolved
from all those political connections which may influence the judg
ment and mislead the mind , he speaks from his retirement in a
voice which cannot b
e disregarded , when it instructs us b
y
it
s
profound reasoning , o
r
admonishes u
s
o
f
our dangers b
y
its search
ing appeals . However particular passages may seem open to
criticism , the general structure of the argument stands on im
movable foundations , and can scarcely perish but with the Con
stitution which it seeks to uphold .
1 Reference is here made to Mr .Madison ' s Letter , dated Angust , 1830 , to Mr . Ed
ward Everett , published in the North American Review for October , 1830 . The fo
l
.
lowing extract is taken from p . 537 e
t se
q
. : -
“ In order to understand the true character o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United States ,
the error , not uncommon ,must be avoided o
f viewing it through themedium either of
a consolidated government o
r
o
f
a confederated government , whilst it is neither the one
nor the other , but a mixture of both . And having , in n
o
model , the similitudes and
analogies applicable to other systems o
f government , it must ,more than any other , be
its own interpreter according to it
s text and the facts of thecase .
“ From these it will be seen that the characteristic peculiarities of the Constitution are ,
1 , the mode of its formation ; 2 , the division of th
e
supreme powers o
f government be
tween the States in their united capacity and the States in their individual capacities .
“ 1 . It was formed , not b
y
the governments o
f
the component States , a
s
the Federal ·
government for which it was substituted was formed . Nor was it formed by a majority
o
f
the people o
f
the United States , as a single community , in the manner of a consoli
dated government .
“ It was formed b
y
the States , that is , b
y
the people in each o
f
the States , acting in
their highest sovereign capacity ; and formed consequently b
y
the same authority which
formed the State constitutions .
" Being thus derived from the same source a
s
the constitutions o
f
the States , it has
within each State the same authority a
s
the constitution o
f
the State ; and is asmuch a
constitution , in the strict sense o
f
the term , within it
s prescribed sphere , a
s
the constitu
tions o
f
the States are within their respective spheres ; but with this obvious and essen
tial difference , that , being a compactamong th
e
States in their highest sovereigncapacity , and
constituting the people thereof one people fo
r
certain purposes , it cannot be altered or
annulled a
t
the will o
f
the States individually , as the constitution of a State may be at
it
s
individual will .
“ 2 . And that it divides the supreme powers of government between the government
o
f
the United States and the governments o
f
the individual States , is stamped on the
face o
f
the instrument ; the powers of war and of taxation , o
f
commerce and o
f
treaties ,
and other enumerated powers vested in the government o
f
the United States being o
f
a
s high and sovereign a character a
s any o
f
the powers reserved to the State govern
ments .
“ Nor is the government o
f
the United States , created b
y
th
e
Constitution , less a
government in the strict sense o
f
the term , within the sphere of its powers , than th
e
governments created b
y
the constitutions o
f
the States are within their several spheres .
It is , like them , organized into legislative , executive , and judiciary departments . It
VOL . I . 19
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operates, like them , directly on persons and things. And , like them, it hasat command
a physical force for executing the powers committed to it. The concurrent operation in
certain cases is one of the features marking the peculiarity of the system .
“ Between these different constitutional governments , the one operating in all the
States , the others operating separately in each,with the aggregate powers of government
divided between them, - it could not escapeattention that controversies would arise con
cerning the boundaries of jurisdiction , and that some provision ought to bemade for
such occurrences. A political system that does not provide for a peaceable and author
itative termination of occurring controversies would not be more than the shadow of a
government ; the object and end of a real government being the substitution of law
and order for uncertainty , confusion , and violence.
“ That to have left a final decision , in such cases, to each of the States , then thirteen
and already twenty -four , could not fail to make the Constitution and laws of the United
States different in different States ,was obvious ; and not less obvious , that this diversity
of independent decisions must altogether distract th
e
government o
f
the Union , and
speedily put a
n
end to the Union itself . A uniform authority o
f
the laws is in itself a
vital principle . Some of the most important laws could not be partially executed .
They must b
e
executed in all the States , or they could be duly executed in none . An
impost o
r a
n
excise , for example , if not in force in some States , would b
e
defeated in
others . It is well known that this was among the lessons of experience which had a
primary influence in bringing about the existing Constitution . A loss of its general
authority would moreover revive the exasperating questions between the States holding
ports for foreign commerce and the adjoining States without them ; to which are now
added a
ll
the inland States , necessarily carrying on their foreign commerce through
other States .
“ T
o
have made th
e
decisions under th
e
authority o
f
the individual States co -ordinate
in a
ll
cases with decisions under the authority o
f
the United States , would unavoidably
produce collisions incompatible with the peace o
f society , and with that regular and effi
cient administration which is o
f
the essence o
f
free governments . Scenes conld not be
avoided in which a ministerial officer o
f
the United States and th
e
correspondent officer
o
f
a
n
individual State would have rencounters in executing conflicting decrees , the
result o
f
which would depend o
n
the comparative force o
f
th
e
local p
o
ses attending
them , and that a casualty depending on the political opinions and party feelings in
different States .
“ T
o
have referred every clashing decision , under the two authorities , for a final de
cision to the States a
s parties to the Constitution , would be attended with delays , with
inconveniences , and with expenses amounting to a prohibition o
f
the expedient ; not to
mention it
s tendency to impair the salutary veneration for a system requiring such fre
quent interpositions , nor the delicate questions which might present themselves as to
the form o
f stating the appeal , and as to the quorum for deciding it .
“ T
o
have trusted to negotiation for adjusting disputes between the government o
f
the United States and the State governments , as between independent and separate sov
ereignties , would have lost sight altogether o
f
a constitution and gvernment for the
Union , and opened a direct road from a failure of that resort to the ultima ratio between
nations wholly independent o
f
and alien to each other . If the idea had its origin in
the process o
f adjustment between separate branches o
f
the same government , the anal
ogy entirely fails . In the case of disputes between independent parts of the same gov
ernment , neither part being able to consummate it
s will , nor the government to proceed
without a concurrence o
f
the parts , necessity brings about an accommodation . In dis
putes between a State gorernment and the government o
f
the United S ates , the case
is practically a
s well as theoretically different ; each party possessing all the depart
ments o
f
a
n organized government , legislative , executive , and judiciary , and having
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each a physical force to support it
s pretensions . Although the issue of negotiation
might sometimes avoid this extremity , how often would it happen among so many
States , that a
n unaccommodating spirit in somewould render that resource unavailing ?
A contrary supposition would not accord with a knowledge o
f
human nature o
r
the
evidence o
f
our own political history .
“ The Constitution , not relying on any of the preceding modifications for its safe and
successful operation , has expressly declared , o
n
the one hand , 1 , ' that the Constitution
and th
e
laws made in pursuance thereof , and all treaties made under the authority of the
United States , shall be the supreme law of the land ; 2 , that the judges of every State
shall b
e
bound thereby , anything in the constitution and laws of any State to the con
trary notwithstanding ; 3 , that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to a
ll
cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution , the laws of the United States ,
and treaties made under their authority , ' & c .
" On the other hand , as a security of the rights and powers of the States , in their indi
vidual capacities , against a
n
undue preponderance o
f
the powers granted to the govern
ment over them in their united capacity , the Constitution has relied on , 1 , the respon
sibility o
f
th
e
senators and representatives in th
e
legislature o
f
the United States to the
legislatures and people o
f
the States ; 2 , the responsibility o
f
the President to the people
o
f
the United States ; and , 3 , the liability of the executive and judicial functionaries
o
f
the United States to impeachment b
y
the representatives o
f
the people o
f
the States ,
in one branch o
f
the legislature o
f
the United States , and trial by the representatives of
the States in the other branch : the State functionaries , legislative , executive , and judi
cial , being at the same time , in their appointment and responsibility , altogether inde
pendent o
f
the agency o
r authority o
f
the United States .
“ How far this structure o
f
the government o
f
the United States is adequate and safe
for its objects , time alone can absolutely determine . Experience seems to have shown ,
that whatever may grow out o
f
future stages o
f
our national career , there is , as yet , a
sufficient control in the popular will , over the executive and legislative departments of
the government . When the alien and sedition laws were passed , in contravention to the
opinions and feelings o
f
the community , the first elections that ensued put an end to
them . And whatever may have been the character of other acts , in the judgment o
f
many o
f
u
s , it is but true that they have generally accorded with the views o
f
thema
jority o
f
the States and o
f
the people . At the present day it seemswell understood that
the lawswhich have createdmost dissatisfaction have had a like sanction without doors ;
and that , whether continued , varied , o
r repealed , a like proof will be given of the sym .
pathy and responsibility o
f
the representative body to th
e
constituent body . Indeed , the
great complaint now is , against the results o
f
this sympathy and responsibility in the
legislative policy o
f
the nation .
“ With respect to the judicial power o
f
the United States , and the authority of the
Supreme Court in relation to the boundary o
f jurisdiction between the Federal and the
State governments , I may be permitted to refer to the thirty -ninth number o
f
the Feder
alist for the light in which the subject was regarded by its writer at the period when the
Constitution was depending ; and it is believed that the same was the prevailing view
then taken o
f it ; that the same view has continued to prevail , and that it does so at this
time ,notwithstanding the eminent exceptions to it .
" But it is perfectly consistent with the concession of this power to the Supreme Court ,
in cases falling within the course o
f
it
s
functions , to maintain that the power has not
always been rightly exercised . To say nothing of the period , happily a short one , when
judges in their seats did not abstain froin intemperate and party harangues , equally at
variance with their duty and their dignity , there have been occasional decisions from
the bench which have incurred scrious and extensive disapprobation . Still , it would
seem that , with but fe
w
exceptions , the course of the judiciary has been hitherto sus .
tained b
y
the prominent sense o
f
the nation .
292 [BOOK II
I .CONSTITUTION O
F
THE UNITED STATES .
" Those who have denied or doubted th
e
supremacy o
f
th
e
judicial power of th
e
United States , and denounce at the same time a nullifying power in a State ,seem not to
have sufficiently adverted to the utter inefficiency o
f
a supremacy in a law o
f
the land ,
without a supremacy in the exposition and execution o
f
the law ; nor to the destruction
o
f
a
ll equipoise between the Federal government and the State governments , if , whilst
the functionaries o
f
the Federal government are directly o
r indirectly elected b
y , and
responsible to , th
e
States , and the functionaries of the States are in their appointment
and responsibility wholly independent o
f
the United States , no constitutional control o
f
any sort belonged to the United States over the States . Under such an organization , it
is evident that it would b
e
in the power o
f
the States , individually , to pass unauthorized
laws , and to carry them into complete effect , anything in the Constitution and laws of
the United States to the contrary notwithstanding . This would be a nullifying power
in it
s plenary character ; and whether it had it
s final effect through the legislative , ex
ecutive , o
r judiciary organ of the State , would be equally fatal to the constituted rela
tion between the two governments .
“ Should the provisions o
f
the Constitution , as here reviewed , be found not to secure
the government and rights o
f
the States against usurpations and abuses o
n
the part o
f
the United States , the final resort within the purview o
f
the Constitution lies in a
n
amendment o
f
the Constitution , according to a process applicable by the States .
" And in the event o
f
a failure o
f every constitutional resort , add an accumulation of
usurpations and abuses , rendering passive obedience and non -resistance a greater evil
than resistance and revolution , there can remain but one resort , the last of all ; an ap
peal from the cancelled obligations o
f
the constitutional compact to original rights and
the law o
f
self -preservation . This is the ultima ratio under all governments , whether
consolidated , confederated , or a compound of both ; and it cannot be doubted that a
single member o
f
the Union , in the extremity supposed , but in that only , would have a
right , as an extra and ultra constitutional right , to make the appeal .
“ This brings u
s
to the expedient lately advanced ,which claims for a single State a
right to appeal against a
n
exercise o
f power b
y
the government o
f
the United States ,
decided b
y
the State to b
e
unconstitutional to the parties to the constitutional compact ;
the decision o
f
the State to have the effect o
f nullifying the act o
f
the government o
f
the United States , unless the decision of the State be reversed b
y
three fourths o
f
the
parties .
“ The distinguished names and high authorities which appear to have asserted and
given a practical scope to this doctrine , entitle it to a respect which itmight be difficult
otherwise to feel fo
r
it .
“ If thedoctrine were to be understood as requiring the three fourths o
f
the States to
sustain , instead of that proportion to reverse , the decision of the appealing State , the de
cision to b
e without effect during the appeal , it would be sufficient to remark that this
extra -constitutional coursemight well give way to that marked out b
y
the Constitution ,
which authorizes two thirds of the States to institute , and three fourths to effectuate , an
amendment o
f
the Constitution , establishing a permanent rule o
f
the highest authority ,
in place o
f
a
n irregular precedent o
f
construction only .
“ But it is understood that the nullifying doctrine imports that the decision o
f
the
State is to b
e presumed valid , and that it overrules the law of the United States , unless
overruled b
y
three fourths o
f
the States .
“ Can more b
e necessary to demonstrate the inadmissibility o
f
such a doctrine than
that it puts it in the power o
f
the smallest fraction over one fourth o
f
the United States ,
that is , of seven States out of twenty -four , to give the law , and even the Constitution ,
to seventeen States , each of the seventeen having , as parties to the Constitution , an
equal right with each o
f
the seven to expound it ,and to insist on the exposition ? That
the seven might in particular instances be right , and the seventeenwrong , is more than
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possible . But to establish a positive and permanent rule, giving such a power to such
aminority over such amajority ,would overturn the first principle of free government ,
and in practice necessarily overturn the government itself.
“ It is to be recollected that the Constitution was proposed to the people of the States
as a whole, and unanimously adopted by the States as a whole, it being a part of the
Constitution , that not less than three fourths of the States should be competent tomake
any alteration inwhat had been unanimously agreed to. So great is the caution on
this point , that in two caseswhere peculiar interests were at stake, a proportion even
of three fourths is distrusted , and unanimity required to make an alteration .
"When the Constitution was adopted as awhole , it is certain that there were many
parts which , if separately proposed , would have been promptly rejected. It is fa
r
from
impossible that every part o
f
a constitution might be rejected by a majority , and yet
taken together a
s
a whole , be unanimously accepted . Free constitutions will rarely , if
ever , be formed without reciprocal concessions , without articles conditioned on and
balancing cach other . Is there a constitution of a single State out o
f
the twenty - four
that would bear the experiment o
f having its component parts submitted to the people
and separately decided o
n
?
“ What the fate of the Constitution o
f
th
e
United States would b
e , if a small propor
tion o
f
the States could expunge parts o
f it particularly valued b
y
a large majority , can
have but one answer .
“ The difficulty is not removed b
y
limiting the doctrine to cases o
f
construction .
How many cases o
f
that sort , involving cardinal provisions o
f
the Constitution , have
occurred ? How many now exist ? How manymay hereafter spring u
p
? How many
might be ingeniously created , if entitled to the privilege o
f
a decision in the mode pro
posed ?
" Is it certain that the principle o
f
that mode would not reach further than is con
templated ? If a single State can , of right , require three fourths of its co -States to over
rule it
s exposition o
f
the Constitution , because that proportion is authorized to amend
it , would the plea be less plausible that , as the Constitution was unanimously estab
lished , it ought to be unanimously expounded ?
“ The reply to all such suggestions seems to be unavoidable and irresistible ; that the
Constitution is a compact ; that its text is to be expounded according to the provisions
for expounding it , - making a part of the compact ; and that none of the parties can
rightfully renounce the expounding provision more than any other part . When such
a right accrues , as may accrue , itmust grow out of abuses of the compact releasing tho
sufferers from their fealty to it . ”
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CHAPTER V .
RULES OF INTERPRETATION .
§ 397 . In our future commentaries upon the Constitution wo
shall treat it , then , as it is denominated in the instrument itself ,
as a CONSTITUTION of government , ordained and established by the
people of the United States fo
r
themselves and their posterity . 1
They have declared it the supreme law o
f
the land . They have
made it a limited government . They have defined its authority .
They have restrained it to th
e
exercise o
f
certain powers , and re
served a
ll
others to the States or to the people . It is a popular
government . Those who administer it are responsible to the
people . It is as popular , and just as much emanating from the
people , as the State governments . It is created fo
r
one purpose ,
the State governments fo
r
another . It may be altered and
amended and abolished a
t
the will of the people . In short , it
was made b
y
the people ,made fo
r
the people , and is responsible
to the people .
§ 398 . In this view of the matter , let u
s
now proceed to con
sider the rules b
y
which it ought to b
e interpreted ; fo
r , if these
rules are correctly laid down , it will save u
s
from many embar
rassments in examining and defining it
s powers . Much of the
difficulty which has arisen in a
ll
the public discussions on this
subject has had it
s origin in the want of some uniform rules of
interpretation , expressly o
r tacitly agreed on b
y
the disputants .
Very different doctrines on this point have been adopted b
y
dif
1 “ The government o
f the Union , ” says Mr . Chief Justice Marshall , in delivering
the opinion o
f
the court in McCulloch v . Maryland , 4 Wheat . 316 , “ is empbatically and
truly a government o
f
the people . It emanates from them ; it
s powers are granted b
y
them , and are to be exercised directly on them and for their benefit . ” Id . 404 , 405 ;
see also Cohens v , Virginia , 6 Wheat . R . 264 , 413 , 414 .
“ The government o
f the United States was erected , ” says Mr . Chancellor Kent ,
with equal force and accuracy , " b
y
the free voice and the joint will o
f
the people o
f
America fo
r
their common defence and general welfare . " 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 10 ,
p . 189 .
? I have used the expressive words of Mr . Webster , deeming them as exact as any
that could b
e
used . See Webster ' s Speeches , p . 410 , 418 , 419 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 338 ,
343 .
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ferent commentators ; and not unfrequently very different lan
guage held by the same parties at different periods . In short , the
rules of interpretation have often been shifted to suit the emer
gency ; and th
e
passions and prejudices o
f
the day , or the favor
and odium o
f
a particular measure , have not unfrequently fur
nished a mode o
f argument which would , on the one hand , leave
the Constitution crippled and inanimate , or , on the other hand ,
give it an extent and elasticity subversive o
f
all rational boun
daries .
$ 399 . Let us , then , endeavor to ascertain what are the true
rules of interpretation applicable to the Constitution ; so that we
may have some fixed standard b
y
which to measure its powers
and limit it
s prohibitions , and guard its obligations , and enforce
it
s
securities of our rights and liberties .
$ 400 . I . The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation
o
f
all instruments is , to construe them according to the sense of
the terms and the intention of the parties . Mr . Justice Black
stone has remarked that the intention of a law is to be gathered
from the words , the context , the subject matter , the effects and
consequence , or the reason and spirit of the law . " He goes on to
justify the remark b
y stating , that words are generally to be under
stood in their usual and most known signification , not so much
regarding the propriety o
f grammar as their general and popular
use ; that if words happen to be dubious , their meaning may be
established b
y
the context , or by comparing them with other words
and sentences in the same instrument ; that illustrations may be
further derived from the subject matter , with reference to which
the expressions are used ; that the effect and consequence of a
particular construction is to be examined , because , if a literal
meaning would involve a manifest absurdity , it ought not to be
adopted ; and that the reason and spirit of the law , or the causes
which le
d
to it
s
enactment , are often the best exponents of the
words , and limit their application . 2
11 Black . Comm . 59 , 60 . See also Ayliffe ' s Pandects , B . 1 , tit . 4 , p . 25 , & c . ; I Do
mat , Prelim . Book , p . 9 ; Id . Treaties on Laws , ch . 12 , p . 74 .
3 Id . See also Woodes . Elem . o
f Jurisp . p . 36 . Rules of a similar nature will be
found laid down in Vattel , B . 2 , ch . 17 , from 262 to 310 , with more ample illustrations
and more various qualifications . But not a few o
f
his rules appear to me to want ac
curacy and soundness . Bacon ' s Abridg . title , Statute I . contains an excellent sum
mary o
f
the rules for construing statutes . Domat , also , contains many valuable rules ,
in respect to interpretation . See his treatise o
n Laws , ch . 12 , p . 74 , & c . , and Prelimi
Dary Discourse , ti
t
. 1 , § 2 , p . 6 to 1
6
.
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$ 401 . Where the words are plain and clear , and the sense dis
tinct and perfect arising on them , there is generally no necessity
to have recourse to other means o
f interpretation . It is only when
there is some ambiguity or doubt arising from other sources that
interpretation has it
s proper office . There may be obscurity as to
the meaning , from the doubtful character of the words used , from
other clauses in the same instrument , or from an incongruity or
repugnancy between the words , and the apparent intention derived
from the whole structure o
f
the instrument or it
s
avowed object .
In all such cases interpretation becomes indispensable .
$ 402 . Rutherforth has divided interpretation into three kinds ,
literal , rational , and mixed . The first is , where we collect the in
tention o
f
the party from his words only , as they lie before us .
The second is , where his words do not express that intention per
fectly , but exceed it , or fall short of it , and we are to collect it
from probable o
r
rational conjectures only . The third is ,where
the words , though they do express the intention , when they are
rightly understood , are themselves o
f
doubtful meaning , and we
are bound to have recourse to the like conjectures to find out in
what sense they are used . In literal interpretation the rule ob
served is , to follow that sense in respect both of the words and of
the construction o
f
them which is agreeable to common use , with
out attending to etymological fancies or grammatical refinements .
In mixed interpretation , which supposes the words to admit of two
o
r
more senses , each of which is agreeable to common usage , we
are obliged to collect the sense partly from the words and partly
from conjecture o
f
the intention . The rules then adopted are , to
construe the words according to the subject -matter , in such a sense
a
s
to produce a reasonable effect , and with reference to the cir
cumstances o
f
th
e
particular transaction . Light may also be ob
*tained in such cases from contemporary facts o
r expositions , from
antecedent mischiefs , from known habits , manners , and insti
tutions , and from other sources almost innumerable , which may
justly affect the judgment in drawing a fit conclusion in the par
ticular case .
$ 403 . Interpretation also may be strict or large ; though we do
not always mean the same thing when we speak of a strict o
r large
interpretation . When common usage has given two senses to the
same word , one of which is more confined , or includes fewer par
1 Book 2 , ch . 7 , § 3 .
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ticulars than the otlier , the former is called its strict sense , and
the latter , which is more comprehensive or includes more particu
lars , is called its large sense . If we find such a word in a law ,
and we take it in its more confined sense , we are said to interpret
it strictly . If we take it in its more comprehensive sense , we are
said to interpret it largely . But whether we do the one or the
other , we still keep to the letter of the law . But strict and large
interpretations are frequently opposed to each other in a different
sense . The words o
f
a law may sometimes express themeaning of
the legislator imperfectly . They may , in their common acceptation ,
include either more o
r
less than his intention . And as , on the
one hand , we call it a strict interpretation where we contend that
the letter is to be adhered to precisely , so , on the other hand , we
call it a large interpretation where we contend that the words
ought to be taken in such a sense a
s
common usage will not fully
justify , or that the meaning of the legislator is something differ
ent from what his words in any usage would import . In this
sense a large interpretation is synonymous with what has before
been called a rational interpretation . And a strict interpretation
in this sense includes both literal and mixed interpretation ; and
may , as contradistinguished from the former , be called a close , in
opposition to a free o
r
liberal , interpretation .
§ 404 . These elementary explanations furnish little room for
controversy ; but they may nevertheless aid us in making a closer
practical application when we arrive at more definite rules .
$ 405 . II . In construing the Constitution of the United States ,
we are , in the first instance , to consider what are its nature and
objects , its scope and design , as apparent from the structure o
f
the instrument , viewed as a whole , and also viewed in it
s
com
ponent parts . Where its words are plain , clear , and determinate ,
they require n
o interpretation ; and it should , therefore , be admit
ted , if at al
l ,with great caution , and only from necessity , either
to escape some absurd consequence , or to guard against some fatal
evil . Where th
e
words admit of two senses , each of which is
conformable to common usage , that sense is to be adopted which ,
without departing from the literal import o
f
the words , best har
monizes with the nature and objects , the scope and design , o
f
the
1 The foregoing remarks are borrowed almost in terms from Rutherforth ’ s Institutes
o
f Natural Law , ( B . 2 , ch . 7 , § 4 to 1
1 , ) which contains a very lucid ex position o
f
the
general rules o
f interpetation . The whole chapter deserves a
n
attentive perusal .
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instrument . Where the words are unambiguous , but the pro
vision may cover more or less ground according to the intention ,
which is yet subject to conjecture , or where itmay include in its
general termsmore o
r
less than might seem dictated b
y
th
e
gen
eral design , as that may be gathered from other parts of the
instrument , there is much more room fo
r
controversy ; and the
argument from inconvenience will probably have different influ
ences upon different minds . Whenever such questions arise , they
will probably be settled ,each upon its own peculiar grounds ; and
whenever it is a question of power , it should be approached with
infinite caution , and affirmed only upon the most persuasive rea
sons . In examining the Constitution , the antecedent situation of
the country and its institutions , the existence and operations of
the State governments , the powers and operations of the confeder
ation , in short , al
l
the circumstances which had a tendency to pro
duce or to obstruct it
s
formation and ratification , deserve a careful
attention . Much , also ,may be gathered from contemporary history
and contemporary interpretation to ai
d
u
s
in just conclusions . "
§ 405 a . Itwill probably be found , when we look to the charac
ter o
f
the Constitution itself , the objects which it seeks to attain ,
the powers which it confers , the duties which it enjoins , and the
rights which it secures , as well as the known historical fact that
many of it
s provisions were matters o
f compromise o
f opposing
interests and opinions , that no uniform rule o
f interpretation can
be applied to it which may not allow , even if it does not positively
demand ,many modifications in it
s
actual application to particular
clauses . And perhaps the safest rule of interpretation after al
l
will be found to be to look to the nature and objects of the par
ticular powers , duties , and rights , with al
l
the lights and aids o
f
contemporary history , and to give to the words o
f
each just such
operation and force , consistent with their legitimate meaning , as
may fairly secure and attain the ends proposed . 2
1 The value o
f contemporary interpretation is much insisted o
n b
y
the Supreme
Court , in Stuart v . Laird , 2 Cranch , 299 , 309 , in Martin v . Hunter , 1 Wheat . R . 304 ,
and in Cohens v . Virginia , 6 Wheat . R . 264 , 418 to 421 . There are several instances ,
however , in which the contemporary interpretations b
y
some o
f
themost distinguished
founders o
f
the Constitution have been overruled . One o
f
the most striking is to b
e
found in the decision o
f
the Supreme Court o
f
the suability o
f
a State b
y
any citizen o
f
another State ( Chisholm v . Georgia , 2 Dall . 419 ) ; and another in the decision b
y
the
executive and the Senate , that the consent of the latter is not necessary to removal
from office , although it is fo
r
appointments . The Federalist , No . 77 .
? P
e
r
Mr . Justice Story in Prigg v . The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania , 16 Peters ' s
S . C . R . 210 .
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§ 406 . It is obvious , however , that contemporary interpretation
must be resorted to with much qualification and reserve. In the
first place , the private interpretation of any, particular man or
body of men must manifestly be open to much observation . The
Constitution was adopted by the people of the United States , and
it was submitted to the whole upon a just survey of its provisions
a
s they stood in the text itself . In different States and in differ
ent conventions , different and very opposite objections are known
to have prevailed , and might well be presumed to prevail . Oppo
site interpretations , and different explanations of different provi
sions ,may well be presumed to have been presented in different
bodies , to remove local objections , or to win local favor . And
there can be no certainty , either that the different State conven
tions in ratifying the Constitution gave the same uniform inter
pretation to it
s language , or that even in a single State convention
the same reasoning prevailed with a majority ,much less with the
whole o
f
the supporters o
f it . In the interpretation of a State
statute , no man is insensible o
f
the extreme danger o
f resorting
to the opinions o
f
those who framed it or those who passed it .
Its terms may have differently impressed different minds . Some
may have implied limitations and objects which others would have
rejected . Some may have taken a cursory view o
f
it
s
enactments ,
and others have studied them with profound attention . Some
may have been governed b
y
a temporary interest or excitement ,
and have acted upon that exposition which most favored their
present views . Others may have seen lurking beneath its text
what commended it to their judgment against even present inter
ests . Some may have interpreted its language strictly and closely ;
others , from a different habit of thinking , may have given it a
large and liberal meaning . It is not to be presumed that , even
in the convention which framed the Constitution , from the causes
above mentioned and other causes , th
e
clauses were always under
stood in the same sense , or had precisely the same extent o
f oper
ation . Every member necessarily judged for himself ; and the
judgment o
f
n
o
one could , or ought to be , conclusive upon that of
others . The known diversity of construction of different parts
o
f
it , as well as of the mass o
f
its powers in the different State
conventions , the total silence upon many objections which have
since been started , and the strong reliance upon others which
have since been universally abandoned , add weight to these sug
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gestions . Nothing but the text itself was adopted by the people .
And it would certainly be a most extravagant doctrine to give to
any commentary then made , and à fortiori , to any commentary
since made , under a very different posture of feeling and opinion ,
a
n authority which should operate a
s
a
n absolute limit upon the
text , or should supersede its natural and just interpretation .
$ 407 . Contemporary construction is properly resorted to , to
illustrate and confirm the text , to explain a doubtful phrase , o
r
to
expound an obscure clause ; and in proportion to the uniformity
and universality o
f
that construction , and the known ability and
talents o
f
those b
y
whom it was given , is the credit to which it is
entitled . It can never abrogate the text , it can never fritter away
it
s
obvious sense , it can never narrow down its true limitations ,
it can never enlarge it
s natural boundaries . We shall have
ļ 1 Mr . Jefferson has laid down two rules ,which he deems perfect canons for the inter
pretation o
f
the Constitution . The first is , “ The capital and leading object of the
Constitution was , to leave with the States all authorities which respected their own citi .
zens only , and to transfer to the United States those which respected citizens o
f foreign
o
r
other States ; to make us several a
s
to ourselves , but one as to all others . In the lat
ter case , then , constructions should lean to the general jurisdiction , if the words will
bear it ; and in favor of the States in th
e
former , if possible to be so construed . ” 4 Jef
ferson ' s Corresp . 373 ; Id . 391 , 392 ; Id . 396 . Now the very theory on which this canon
is founded is contradicted b
y
the provisions o
f
the Constitution itself . In many instances
authorities and powers are given which respect citizens o
f
the respective States without
reference to foreigners o
r
the citizens o
f
other States . 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 391 , 392 ,
396 . But if this general theory were true , it would furnish no just rule of interpreta
tion , since a particular clause might form an exception to it ; and , indeed , every clause
ought a
t all events to be construed according to its fair intent and objects , as disclosed
in it
s language . What sort of a rule is that , which ,without regard to the intent or
objects o
f
a particular clausc , insists that it shall , if possible , (not if reasonable , ) be con
strued in favor o
f
the States , simply because it respects their citizens ? The second
canon is , “ On every question of construction (we should ] carry ourselves back to the
timewhen the Constitution was adopted ; recollect the spirit manifested in the debates ;
and instead o
f trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text , or invented
against it , conform to the probable one in which it was passed . ” Now , who does not
see the utter looseness and incoherence o
f
this canon ? How are we to know what was
thought o
f particular clauses of the Constitution at the time o
f
it
s adoption ? In many
cases , no printed debates give any account of any construction ; and where any is given
different persons held different doctrines . Whose is to prevail ? Besides , of all the
State conventions , the debates of five only are preserved , and these very imperfectly .
What is to be done as to th
e
other eight States ? What is to be done as to the eleven
new States , which have come into the Union under constructions which have been estab
lished against what some persons may deem the meaning o
f
the framers o
f it ? How
are we to arrive a
t
what is the most probable meaning ? Are Mr . Hamilton and Mr .
Madison and Mr . Jay , th
e
expounders in the Federalist , to be followed ? Or ar
e
others
o
f
a different opinion to guide u
s
? Are we to b
e governed b
y
the opinions o
f
a fe
w ,
now dead ,who have left them on record ? O
r
b
y
those o
f
a fe
w
now living , simply
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abundant reason hereafter to observe, when we enter upon the
analysis of the particular clauses of th
e
Constitution , how many
loose interpretations and plausible conjectures were hazarded a
t
a
n
early period , which have since silently died away , and are now
retained in n
o living memory , as a topic either of praise or blame ,
o
f
alarm o
r
o
f congratulation .
$ 408 . And , after all , themost unexceptionable source of collat
eral interpretation is from the practical exposition o
f
the govern
ment itself in it
s
various departments upon particular questions
discussed , and settled upon their own single merits . These ap
proach the nearest in their own nature to judicial expositions , and
have the same general recommendation that belongs to the latter .
They are decided upon solemn argument , pro re natà upon a doubt
raised , upon a lismota , upon a deep sense of their importance and
difficulty , in the face of the nation , with a view to present action ,
in the midst of jealous interests , and by men capable of urging or
repelling the grounds o
f argument , from their exquisite genius ,
their comprehensive learning , or their deep meditation upon the
because they were actors in those days ( constituting not one in a thousand o
f
those
who were called to deliberate upon the Constitution , and not one in ten thousand o
f
those who were in favor o
f
o
r against it , among the people ) ? Or are we to be governed
b
y
the opinion o
f
those who constituted a majority o
f
thosewho were called to act on
that occasion , either as framers of or voters upon the Constitution ? If b
y
the latter , in
what manner can we know those opinions ? Are we to be governed b
y
the sense o
f
a
majority o
f
a particular State , o
r
o
f all the United States ? If so , how are we to ascer
tain what that sense was ? Is the sense of the Constitution to be ascertained , not b
y
it
s
own text , but b
y
the " probablemeaning ” to b
e gathered b
y
conjectures from scattered
documents , from private papers , from the table -talk of some statesman , or the jealous
exaggerations o
f
others ? Is the Constitution o
f
the United States to b
e
the only instru
mentwhich is not to be interpreted b
y
what is written , but b
y
probable guesses , aside
from the text ? What would be said o
f interpreting a statute of a State legislature b
y
endeavoring to find out , from private sources , the objects and opinions o
f every member ,
how every one thought , what he wished , how he interpreted it ? Suppose different
persons had different opinions , what is to b
e
done ? Suppose different persons are not
agreed a
s
to " the probable meaning " o
f
the framers o
r
o
f
th
e
people ,what interpreta
tion is to b
e
followed ? These , and many questions o
f
the same sort , might be asked .
It is obvious that there can be no security to the people in any constitution of govern
ment , if they are not to judge o
f it by the fair meaning o
f
the words o
f
the text ; but
the words are to b
e
bent and broken b
y
the “ probable meaning " o
f persons whom they
never knew , and whose opinions and means of information may be no better than their
own ? The people adopted the Constitution according to the words o
f
the text in their
reasonable interpretation , and not according to the private interpretation o
f any particu
lar men . The opinions of the latter may sometimes ai
d
u
s
in arriving a
t just results ;
but they can never be conclusive . The Federalist denied that the President could re
move a public officer without the consent o
f
the Senate . The first Congress affirmed
h
is right b
y
a mere majority . Which is to be followed ?
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absorbing topic . How light , compared with these means of in
struction , are the private lucubrations of the closet , or the retired
speculations of ingenious minds , intent on theory , or general
views , and unused to encounter a practical difficulty at every
step !1
$ 409 . But to return to the rules of interpretation arising ex
directo from the text of the Constitution . And first the rules to be
drawn from the nature of the instrument . 1. It is to be con
strued as a frame or fundamental law of government , established
by the PEOPLE of the United States , according to their own free
pleasure and sovereign will. In this respect it is in no wise dis
tinguishable from the constitutions of the State governments .
Each of them is established by the people fo
r
their own purposes ,
and each is founded on their supreme authority . The powers
which are conferred , the restrictions which are imposed , the
authorities which are exercised , the organization and distribution
thereof which are provided , are in each case fo
r
the same object ,
th
e
common benefit of the governed , and not fo
r
the profit or dig
nity of the rulers .
§ 410 . And yet it has been a very common mode of interpreta
tion to insist upon a diversity o
f
rules in construing the State con
stitutions and that o
f
the general government . Thus , in the
Commentaries o
f Mr . Tucker upon Blackstone , we find it laid
down , as if it were an incontrovertible doctrine in regard to the
Constitution of the United States , that “ as federal , it is to be con
strued strictly , in al
l
cases , where the antecedent rights of a State
may b
e
drawn in question . ” As a social compact , it ought likewise
“ to receive the same strict construction ,wherever the right of per
sonal liberty o
r
o
f personal security o
r o
f private property may
become the object o
f
dispute ; because every person , whose liberty
o
r property was thereby rendered subject to the new government ,
was antecedently a member of a civil society , to whose regulations he
had submitted himself , and under whose authority and protection
1 [ That a practical exposition of the Constitution long acquiesced in will not be
departed from , see Stewart v . Laird , 1 Cranch , 299 ; McCulloch v . Maryland , 4 Wheat .
316 ; Briscoe v . Bank of Kentucky , 11 Pet . 257 ; West River Bridge C
o
. v . Dir , 6 How .
507 ; Bank of U . S . v . Halstead , 10 Wheat . 63 ; Ogden v . Saunders , 12 Wheat . 290 ;
Union In
s
. Co . v . Hoge , 21 How . 66 ; United States v . Gilmore , 8 Wal . 330 ; Hughes v .
Huyhes , 4 T . B .Monr . 42 ; Burgess v . Pue , 2 Gill , 11 ; Coutant v . People , 11 Wend .
511 ; Norris v . Clymer , 2 Penn . St . 277 ; Pike v . Megoun , 44 Mo . 499 ; Britton v . Ferry ,
1
4 Mich . 66 ; Stale v . Parkinson , 5 Nev . 15 ; H .dgecote v . Davis , 64 N . C . 652 ; Plum
mer v . Plummer , 37 Miss , 185 ; Chambers v . Fisk , 22 Texas , 504 . )
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he still remains , in al
l
cases not expressly submitted to the new
government . ” 1
$ 411 . We here see that the whole reasoning is founded ,not on
the notion that the rights of the people are concerned , but the rights
o
f
the States . And b
y
strict construction is obviously meant the
most limited sense belonging to the words . And the learned
author relies , for the support of his reasoning , upon some rules
laid down b
y
Vattel in relation to the interpretation of treaties in
relation to odious things . It would seem , then , that the Constitu
tion o
f
the United States is to be deemed an odious instrument .
And why , it may be asked ? Was it not framed fo
r
the good o
f
the people , and b
y
th
e
people ? One o
f
the sections o
f
Vattel ,
which is relied on , states this proposition , 2 " That whatever tends
to change the present state o
f things is also to be ranked in the
class o
f odious things . ” Is it not most manifest that this propo
sition is , o
r
a
t least may be , in many cases , fundamentally wrong ?
If a people free themselves from a despotism , is it to be said that
the change o
f government is odious , and ought to be construed
strictly ? What , upon such a principle , is to become of the Amer
ican Revolution , and of our State governments and State consti
tutions ? Suppose a well -ordered government arises out o
f
a state
o
f
disorder and anarchy , is such a government to be considered
odious ? Another section 3 adds : “ Since odious things are those
whose restriction tends more certainly to equity than their exten
sion , and since we ought to pursue that line which is most con
formable to equity , when the will of the legislature or of the
contracting parties is not exactly known , we should , where there
is a question o
f
odious things , interpret the terms in the most
limited sense . Wemay even , to a certain degree , adopt a figura
tive meaning in order to avert the oppressive consequences o
f
the
proper and literal sense , or anything of an odious nature which
it would involve . ” Does not this section contain most lax and
unsatisfactory ingredients fo
r
interpretation ? Who is to decide
whether it is most conformable to equity to extend or to restrict
the sense ? Who is to decide whether the provision is odious ?
According to this rule , the most opposite interpretations of the
same words would be equally correct , according as the interpreter
should deem it odious or salutary . Nay , the words are to be de
serted and a figurative sense adopted , whenever he deems it ad
i i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 15
1
. B . 2 , § 30
5
. 8 g 508 .
304 [ BOOK II
I
.CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES .
visable , looking to the odious nature or consequence of the common
sense . He who believes the general government founded in wis
dom and sound policy and the public safety may extend the
words . He who deems it odious , or the State governments the
truest protection o
f
all our rights , must limit the words to the
narrowest meaning .
§412 . The twelfth amendment to the Constitution is also relied
o
n b
y
the same author , which declares “ that the powers not dele
gated to the United States b
y
the Constitution , nor prohibited by
it to the States , are reserved to the States respectively , or to the
people . ” i He evidently supposes that this means “ in al
l
cases
not expressly submitted to the new government ” ; yet the word
“ expressly ” is nowhere found in the amendment . But we are
not considering whether any powers can be implied ; the only
point now before u
s
is , how the express powers are to be con
strued . Are they to be construed strictly , that is , in their most
limited sense ? O
r
are they to receive a fair and reasonable con
struction ,according to the plain meaning of the terms and the
objects for which they are used ?
$ 413 . When it is said that the Constitution of the United
States should b
e
construed strictly , viewed as a social compact ,
whenever it touches the rights of property , or of personal security
o
r liberty , the rule is equally applicable to the State constitutions
in the like cases . The principle upon which this interpretation
rests , if it has any foundation ,must be that the people ought not
to b
e presumed to yield u
p
their rights o
f property or liberty be
yond what is th
e
clear sense o
f
the language and th
e
objects o
f
the
Constitution . All governments are founded on a surrender of some
natural rights , and impose some restrictions . Wemay not be at
liberty to extend the grants o
f power beyond the fair meaning of
the words in any such case ; but that is not the question here un
der discussion . It is , how we are to construe the words as used ,
whether in the most confined or in the more liberal sense prop
erly belonging to them . Now , in construing a grant or surrender
o
f powers by the people to a monarch , for his own benefit or use ,
it is not only natural but just to presume , as in all other cases of
grants , that the parties had not in view any large sense of the
terms ,because the objects were a derogation permanently from their
1 [See Golden v . Prince , 3 Wash . C . C . 313 ; Calder v . Bull , 3 Dall . 386 ; Gilman v .
Philadelphia , 3 Wall . 713 . )
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rights and interests . But in construing a constitution of govern
ment , framed by the people fo
r
their own benefit and protection ,
for th
e
preservation o
f
their rights , and property and liberty ,
where the delegated powers are not and cannot b
e
used fo
r
the
benefit of their rulers , who are but their temporary servants and
agents , but are intended solely fo
r
the benefit o
f
the people , no
such presumption o
f
a
n intention to use the words in the most
restricted sense necessarily arises . The strict , or the most ex
tended sense , both being within the letter ,may be fairly held to
b
e within their intention , as either shall best promote the very
objects o
f
the people in the grant ; as either shall best promote or
secure their rights , property , or liberty . The words are not , in
deed , to be stretched beyond their fair sense ; but within that
range the rule o
f interpretation must b
e
taken which best follows
out the apparent intention . This is themode ( it is believed ) uni
versally adopted in construing the State constitutions . It has its
origin in common -sense . And it never can be a matter of just
jealousy ; because the rules can have no permanent interest in a
free government , distinct from that of the people , o
f
whom they
are a part , and to whom they ar
e
responsible . Why the same
reasoning should not apply to th
e government o
f
the United
States it is not very easy to conjecture .
§ 414 . But it is said that the State governments being already
in existence and the people subjected to them , their obedience to
the new government may endanger their obedience to the States ,
o
r
involve them in a conflict of authority , and thus produce incon
venience . In the first place , it is not true , in a just sense , ( if w
e
are right in our view o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United States ,
that such a conflict can ultimately exist . For if the powers of
the general government are o
f paramount and supreme obligation ,
if they constitute the supreme law of the land , no conflict as to
obedience can be found . Whenever the question arises as to
whom obedience is due , it is to be judicially settled ; and being
settled , it regulates at once the rights and duties of al
l
the citi
zens .
$ 415 . In the next place , the powers given by th
e
people to the
general government are not necessarily carved out o
f
the powers
already confided b
y
them to theState governments . They may be
such a
s they originally reserved to themselves . And , if they are not ,
1 Rawle o
n
th
e
Constitution , ch . 1 , p . 31 .
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the authority of the people in their sovereign capacity to withdraw
power from their State functionaries , and to confide it to the func
tionaries of the general government , cannot be'doubted or denied .
If they withdraw the power from the State functionaries , it must
be presumed to be because they deem it more useful fo
r
them
selves ,more for the common benefit and common protection , than
to leave it where it has been hitherto deposited . Why should a
power in the hands o
f
one functionary be differently construed in
the hands of another functionary , if in each case the same object
is in view , the safety of the people ? The State governments have
n
o right to assume that the power is more safe o
r
more useful with
them than with the general government ; that they have a higher
capacity and a more honest desire to preserve the rights and lib
erties o
f
the people than the general government ; that there is
n
o danger in trusting them , but that al
l
the peril and all the
oppression impend on the other side . The people have not so ,
said o
r thought ; and they have the exclusive right to judge for
themselves on the subject . They avow that the Constitution of
the United States was adopted b
y
them " in order to form a more
perfect Union , establish justice , insure domestic tranquillity , pro
vide fo
r
the common defence , promote the general welfare , and
secure the blessings o
f liberty to themselves and their posterity . ”
It would be a mockery to ask if these are odious objects . If these
require every grant of power withdrawn from the State govern
ments to be deemed strictissimi juris , and construed in the most
limited sense , even if it should defeat these objects , what p
e
culiar sanctity have the State governments in the eyes o
f
the
people beyond these objects ? Are they not framed fo
r
the same
general ends ? Was not the very inability of the State govern
ments suitably to provide for our national wants and national
independence and national protection the very groundwork of the
whole system ?
$ 416 . If this be the true view of the subject , the Constitution
o
f
the United States is to receive a
s
favorable a construction as
those of the States . Neither is to be construed alone , but each
with a reference to the other . Each belongs to the same system of
government , each is limited in its powers , and within the scope of
it
s powers each is supreme . Each , by the theory of our govern
ment , is essential to the existence and due preservation of the
1 Martin v . Hunter , 1 Wheat . R . 304 , 325 .
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power and obligations of the other . The destruction of either
would be equally calamitous , since it would involve the ruin of that
beautiful fabric of balanced government which has been reared
with so much care and wisdom , and in which the people have re
posed their confidence as the truest safeguard of their civil,
religious , and political liberties . The exact limits of the powers
confided by the people to each may not always be capable , from
the inherent difficulty of the subject , of being defined or ascer
tained in a
ll
cases with perfect certainty . " But the lines are gen
erally marked out with sufficient broadness and clearness ; and
in the progress o
f
the development o
f
the peculiar functions o
f
each , the part of true wisdom would seem to be , to leave in every
practicable direction a wide , if not an unmeasured , distance be
tween the actual exercise o
f
the sovereignty o
f
each . In every
complicated machine slight causes may disturb the operations ;
and it is often more easy to detect the defects than to apply a safe
and adequate remedy .
$ 417 . The language of the Supreme Court in the case of Martin
v . Hunter 2 seems peculiarly appropriate to this part of our subject .
“ The Constitution of the United States , " say the court , “ was
ordained and established , not b
y
the States in their sovereign ca
pacities , but emphatically , as the preamble of the Constitution
declares , b
y
the people o
f
the United States . There can be no
doubt that it was competent to the people to invest the general
government with a
ll
the powers which they might deem proper
and necessary , to extend or restrain those powers according to
their own good pleasure , and to give them a paramount and su
preme authority . As little doubt can there be that the people had
a right to prohibit to the States the exercise of any powers which
were in their judgment incompatible with the objects o
f
the gen
eral compact , to make the powers of the State governments , in
given cases , subordinate to those of the nation , or to reserve to
themselves those sovereign authorities which they might not choose
to delegate to either . The Constitution was not , therefore ,neces
sarily carved out o
f existing State sovereignties , nor a surrender
o
f powers already existing in State institutions . For the powers
o
f the State governments depend upon their own constitutions ;
1 The Federalist , No . 37 . 2 1 Wheat . R . 304 .
8 This is still more forcibly stated b
y Mr . Chief Justice Marshall in delivering the
opinion o
f
the court in McCulloch v . Maryland , in a passage already cited , 4 Wheat . R .
316 , 402 to 405 .
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and the people of every State had a right to modify o
r
restrain
them according to their own views o
f policy o
r principle . On the
other hand , it is perfectly clear that the sovereign powers vested
in the State governments b
y
their respective constitutions re
mained unaltered and unimpaired , except so fa
r
a
s they were
granted to the government o
f
the United States . ” These deduc
tions d
o
not rest upon general reason , plain and obvious as they
seem to b
e . They have been positively recognized b
y
one o
f
the
articles in amendment of the Constitution , which declares that
" the powers not delegated to the United States b
y
th
e
Constitu
tion , nor prohibited b
y
it to the States , are reserved to the States
respectively , or to the people . 1
“ The government , then , of the United States can claim no
powers which are not granted to it b
y
the Constitution ; and the
powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given , or
given b
y necessary implication . On the other hand , this instru
ment , like every other grant , is to have a reasonable construction
according to the import o
f
it
s
terms . And where a power is ex
pressly given in general terms , it is not to be restrained to par
ticular cases , unless that construction grow out of the context
expressly , or b
y
necessary implication . The words are to be taken
in their natural and obvious sense ,and not in a sense unreasonably
restricted o
r enlarged . ”
§ 418 . A still more striking response to the argument for a
strict construction of the Constitution will be found in the language
o
f
the court in the case o
f
Gibbons v . Ogden ( 9 Wheat . 1 , & c . ) .
Mr . Chief Justice Marshall , in delivering the opinion of the court ,
says : “ This instrument contains an enumeration of powers ex
pressly granted by the people to their government . It has been
said that these powers ought to b
e
construed strictly . But why
ought they to be so construed ? Is there one sentence in th
e
Con
stitution which gives countenance to this rule ? In the last o
f
the
enumerated powers , that which grants expressly the means for
carrying a
ll
others into execution , Congress is authorized tomake
all laws which shall be necessary and proper ' for the purpose .
But this limitation on the means which may be used is not ex
tended to the powers which are conferred ; nor is there one sen
tence in the Constitution which has been pointed ou
t
b
y
th
e
1 See also McCulloch v . Maryland , 4 Wheat . R . 316 , 402 to 406 ; ( Spooner v .McCon
nell , 1 McLean , 337 ; Rhode Island v . Massachusetts , 12 Pet . 720 . )
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gentlemen of the bar , or which we have been able to discern , that
prescribes this rule . We do not, therefore , think ourselves justi
fied in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean by a strict con
struction ? If they contend only against that enlarged construction
which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious
import , wemight question the application of the terms , but should
not controvert the principle . If they contend fo
r
that narrow
construction which , in support of some theory not to be found in
the Constitution , would deny to the government those powers
which the words o
f
the grant , as usually understood , import , and
which are consistent with the general views and objects o
f
the
instrument , - for that narrow construction which would cripple the
government and render it unequal to the objects fo
r
which it is
declared to be instituted , and to which th
e
powers given , as fairly
understood , render it competent , — then we cannot perceive the
propriety o
f
this strict construction , nor adopt it as the rule b
y
which the Constitution is to be expounded . As men whose inten
tions require no concealment generally employ the words which
most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey ,
the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution , and the
people who adopted it ,must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense , and to have intended what they have
said . If , from the imperfection of human language , there should
b
e
serious doubts respecting the extent o
f any given power , it is a
well -settled rule that the objects for which it was given , especially
when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself , should
have great influence in the construction . We know o
f
n
o
reason
for excluding this rule from the present case . The grant does not
convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor if retained
by himself , or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee ,
but is an investment o
f power fo
r
the general advantage , in the
hands o
f agents selected fo
r
that purpose ; which power can never
b
e exercised b
y
the people themselves , but must be placed in the
hands of agents , or lie dormant . We know of no rule for con
struing the extent o
f
such powers , other than is given by the lan
guage o
f
the instrument which confers them , taken in connection
with the purposes for which they were conferred . ” 1
i See also Id . 22
2
, and Mr . Chief Justice Marshall ' s opinion in Ogden v . Saunders ,
1
2
Wheat . R . 332 .
It has been remarked b
y
President J . Q . Adams , that “ it is a circumstance which
will not escape the observation o
f
a philosophical historian , that the constructive powers
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§ 419 . IV . From the foregoing considerations we deduce the
conclusion that , as a frame or fundamental law of government ,
the Constitution o
f
the United States is to receive a reasonable
interpretation o
f
it
s language and it
s powers , keeping in view
the objects and purposes fo
r
which those powers were conferred .
By a reasonable interpretation wemean , that , in case the words are
susceptible o
f
two different senses , the one strict , the other more
enlarged , that should be adopted which ismost consonant with the
apparent objects and intent o
f
the Constitution ; that which will
give efficacy and force a
s
a government ,rather than that which will
impair it
s operations and reduce it to a state o
f imbecility . O
f
course we d
o not mean that the words fo
r
this purpose are to b
e
strained beyond their common and natural sense , but , keeping
within that limit , the exposition is to have a fair and just latitude ,
so a
s
o
n the one hand to avoid obvious mischief , and on the other
hand to promote the public good . 1
o
f
th
e
national government have been stretched to their extremest tension b
y
that party ,
when in power , which has been most tenderly scrupulous of the State sovereignty when
uninvested with the authority o
f
the Union themselves . ” He adds , “ o
f
these inconsis
tencies , our two great parties can have little to say in reproof of each other . " Without
inquiring into the justice o
f
the remark in general , it may b
e truly stated that the e
m
bargo o
f
1807 , and the admission of Louisiana into the Union , are very striking illus
trations o
f
the application o
f
constructive powers .
[ “ If we have a doubt relative to any power ,we ought not to exercise it , ” was the
declaration o
f Mr . Edward Livingston , as a member of Congress . Hunt ' s Life of
Livingston , 285 . This , a
s
a maxim in constitutional government , had the approval of
Mr . Jefferson . In the case of Louisiana , however , he did not deny that in his opinion
h
e
was exercising a power not conferred b
y
the Constitution , and at first he looked to
a
n
amendment o
f
the Constitution to ratify the acquisition . See letter to Mr . Brecken
ridge , 4 Jefferson ' s Works , 500 , and to Lincoln , Id . 504 . But surely no such
ratification was necessary . A leader in Southern opinions of th
e
next generation has
presented the prevailing view very clearly : “ It was absurd to say that the United
States government could not acquire territory b
y
purchase o
r b
y
arms , as well as any
other national sovereignty on earth . Were we to be circumscribed in our limits , and
not to b
e
allowed to make the necessity o
f
outlet like that o
f
the Mississippi River our
own ? Could other nations take territory b
y
arms , to enforce indemnity , or purchase it
for the sake o
f
peace and safety , and a country like the United States be obliged to
grow in confined boundaries , and b
e cramped to death , it might b
e , for want o
f
the
power o
f expansion ? No ; the President and Senate had the treaty -making power ,
and the Congress was expressly given the power to pass all laws necessary to carry that
power , and al
l
other powers vested in the government , into execution . This power o
f
acquisition and expansion is a
n absolutely necessary power , resulting from the very ex
istence o
f every nation , and essentially vital to our institutions , capable o
f bearing , like
Atlas , a world in their embrace o
f
freedom . The separate States could not acquire the
territory ; and if Congress could not , th
e
progress o
f
civil liberty itself was constrained
and stopped within our infant dimensions . " H . A .Wise , Treatise on Territorial Goy .
ernment and Admission o
f
New States , 57 . 1
1 See Ogden v . Saunders , 12Wheat . R . 332 , opinion of Mr . Chief Justice Marshall .
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§ 420 . This consideration is of great importance in construing a
frame of government , and à fortiori a frame of government the
free and voluntary institution of the people for their common
benefit , security , and happiness . It is wholly unlike the case of a
municipal charter or a private grant in respect both to it
s
means
and it
s
ends . When a person makes a private grant of a particu
la
r
thing , or of a license to do a thing , or of an easement for the
exclusive benefit o
f
the grantee , we naturally confine the terms ,
however general , to the objects clearly in the view of the parties .
But even in such cases doubtful words within the scope of those
objects are construed most favorably for the grantee , because ,
though in derogation of the rights o
f
the grantor , they are pro
motive o
f
the general rights secured to the grantee . But where
the grant enures solely and exclusively for the benefit o
f
the grantor
himself , no one would deny the propriety of giving to the words of
the grant a benign and liberal interpretation . In cases ,however ,
o
f private grants , the objects generally are few ; they are certain ;
they are limited ; they neither require nor look to a variety o
f
means o
r changes which are to control o
r modify either the end
o
r
the mcans .
$ 421 . In regard also to municipal charters or public grants ,
similar considerations usually apply . They are generally deemed
restrictive o
f
the royal or public prerogative , or of the common
rights secured b
y
the actual organization o
f
the government to
other individuals or communities . They are supposed to be pro
cured ,not so much for public good , as for private o
r
local con
venience . They are supposed to arise from personal solicitation
upon general suggestions , and not ex certa causa , or ex mero motu
o
f
the king or government itself . Hence such charters are often
required b
y
the municipal jurisprudence to be construed strictly ,
because they yield something which is common fo
r
the benefit o
f
a
few . And yet where it is apparent that they proceed upon greater
o
r broader motives , a liberal exposition is not only indulged , but
is encouraged , if it manifestly promotes the public good . So that
we see that even in these cases common - sense often dictates a de
parture from a narrow and strict construction o
f
the terms , though
the ordinary rules ofmere municipal law may not have favored it .
$ 422 . But a constitution of government , founded by the people
1 See Gibbons v . Ogden , 9Wheat . R . 1 , 189 . (Also Perrine v . Chesapeake Delaware
Canal C
o . , 9 How . 172 ; The Binghamton Bridge , 3 Wall . 51 . ]
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fo
r
themselves and their posterity , and fo
r
objects o
f
the most mo
mentous nature , for perpetual union , fo
r
the establishment o
f jus
tice , fo
r
the general welfare ,and fo
r
a perpetuation o
f
the blessings
o
f liberty , necessarily requires that every interpretation of its pow
ers should have a constant reference to these objects . No inter
pretation o
f
the words in which those powers are granted can b
e
a sound one which narrows down their ordinary import so as to
defeat those objects . That would be to destroy the spirit and to
cramp the letter . It has been justly observed that “ the Consti
tution unavoidably deals in general language . It did not suit the
purposes o
f
the people in framing this great charter o
f
our liberties
to provide fo
r
minute specification o
f
it
s powers , or to declare the
means b
y
which those powers should b
e
carried into execution . It
was foreseen that it would be a perilous and difficult , if not
a
n impracticable , task . The instrument was not intended to pro
vide merely fo
r
the exigencies o
f
a fe
w years , but was to endure
through a long lapse o
f ages , the events of which were locked up in
the inscrutable purposes of Providence . It could not be foreseen
what new changes and modifications of power might be indispen
sable to effectuate the general objects of the charter , and restric
tions and specifications which at the presentmight seem salutary
might in the end prove the overthrow o
f
the system itself . Hence
it
s powers are expressed in general terms , leaving the legislature
from time to time to adopt it
s
own means to effectuate legitimate
objects , and to mould and model the exercise o
f
it
s powers as it
s
own wisdom and the public interests should require . " 1 Language
to the same effect will be found in other judgments o
f
the same
tribunal . 2
$ 423 . If , then , we are to give a reasonable construction to this
instrument as a constitution o
f government established fo
r
the
common good ,wemust throw aside al
l
notions o
f subjecting it to
a strict interpretation , as if it were subversive of the great interests
o
f
society , or derogated from th
e
inherent sovereignty o
f
the people .
And this will naturally lead us to some other rules properly belong
ing to the subject .
$ 424 . V . Where the power is granted in general terms , the
power is to be construed a
s
coextensive with the terms , unless
some clear restriction upon it is deducible from the context . We
1 Hunter v . Martin , 1 Wheat . R . 304 , 326 , 327 .
? See Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 187 , & c . , 222 , & c .
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do not mean to assert that it is necessary that such restriction
should be expressly found in the context . It will be sufficient if
it arise by necessary implication . But it is not sufficient to show
that there was, or might have been , a sound or probable motive to
restrict it . A restriction founded on conjecture is wholly inad
missible . The reason is obvious : the text was adopted by the
people in it
s
obvious and general sense . We have no means of
knowing that any particular gloss short o
f
this sense was either
contemplated or approved b
y
the people ; and such a gloss might ,
though satisfactory in one State , have been the very ground of ob
jection in another . Itmight have formed amotive to reject it in
one and to adopt it in another . The sense of a part of the people
has no title to be deemed the sense o
f
the whole . Motives of State
policy or State interest may properly have influence in the ques
tion of ratifying it ; but the Constitution itself must be expounded
a
s it stands , and not as that policy or that interest may seem now
to dictate . We are to construe ,and not to frame , the instrument .
§ 425 . VI . A power , given in general terms , is not to be re
stricted to particular cases merely because itmay be susceptible of
abuse , and if abused may lead to mischievous consequences . This
argument is often used in public debate , and in its common aspect
addresses itself so much to popular fears and prejudices that it in
sensibly acquires a weight in the public mind to which it is nowise
entitled . The argument ab inconvenienti is sufficiently open to
question from the laxity of application as well as of opinion , to
which it leads . But the argument from a possible abuse of a
power against it
s
existence or use is in it
s
nature not only perilous ,
but in respect to governments would shake their very foundation .
Every form o
f government unavoidably includes a grant o
f
some
discretionary powers . It would be wholly imbecile without them .
It is impossible to foresee all the exigencies which may arise in
the progress o
f
events connected with the rights , duties , and oper
ations of a government . If they could be foreseen it would be im
possible ab ante to provide fo
r
them . Themeans must be subject
to perpetual modification and change ; they must be adapted to the
existing manners , habits , and institutions of society , which are
never stationary ; to the pressure of dangers or necessities ; to the
ends in view ; to general and permanent operations as well as to
fugitive and extraordinary emergencies . In short , if th
e
whole
1 S
e
e
Sturgis v . Crowninshield , 4 Wheat . R . 112 , 202 .
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society is not to be revolutionized at every critical period , and re
modelled in every generation , there must be left to those who
administer the government a very large mass o
f discretionary
powers , capable o
f greater or less actual expansion , according to
circumstances , and sufficiently flexible not to involve the nation in
utter destruction from the rigid limitations imposed upon it b
y
a
n
improvident jealousy . Every power , however limited , as well as
broad , is in its own nature susceptible of abuse . No constitution
can provide perfect guards against it . Confidence must be re
posed somewhere , and in free governments the ordinary securities
against abuse are found in the responsibility o
f
rulers to the peo
ple , and in the just exercise of their elective franchise , and ulti
mately in the sovereign power of change belonging to them in
cases requiring extraordinary remedies . Few cases are to be sup
posed in which a power , however general , will be exerted for the
permanent oppression o
f
the people . And yet cases may easily
b
e put in which a limitation upon such a power might b
e
found in
practice to work mischief , to incite foreign aggression , or encourage
domestic disorder . The power of taxation , for instance ,may be
carried to a ruinous excess , and yet a limitation . upon that power
might , in a given case , involve the destruction o
f
the independence
o
f
the country .
§ 426 . VII . On the other hand , a rule of equal importance is
not to enlarge the construction o
f
a given power beyond the fair
scope o
f its terms merely because the restriction is inconvenient ,
impolitic , or even mischievous . If it be mischievous , the power
o
f redressing the evil lies with the people b
y
a
n exercise o
f the
power of amendment . If they do not choose to apply the remedy ,
it may fairly be presumed that themischief is less than what would
arise from a further extension o
f
the power , or that it is the least
o
f
two evils . Nor should it ever be lost sight of , that the govern
ment of the United States is one of limited and enumerated pow
ers , and that a departure from the true import and sense of its
1 Mr . Justice Johnson , in delivering th
e
opinion o
f
th
e
court in Anderson v . Dunn ,
( 6 Wheat . 204 , 226 , ) uses the following expressive language : “ The idea is Utopian ,
that government can exist without leaving the exercise o
f
discretion somewhere . Pub
lic security against the abuse o
f
such discretion must rest o
n responsibility and stated
appeals to public approbation . Where al
l
power is derived from the people , and pub
lic functionaries a
t
short intervals deposit it a
t
the feet o
f
the people , to be resumed again
only a
t
their own wills , individual fearsmay be alarmed b
y
the monsters o
f imagination ,
but individual liberty can be in little danger . "
See United States v . Fisher , 2 Cranch , 358 .
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powers is pro tanto the establishment of a new constitution . It is
doing fo
r
the people what they have not chosen to do fo
r
them
selves . It is usurping the functions of a legislator , and deserting
those o
f
a
n expounder o
f
the la
w . Arguments drawn from im
policy or inconvenience ought here to be of no weight . The only
sound principle is to declare , ita lex scripta es
t , to follow , and to
obey . Nor , if a principle so just and conclusive could be over
looked , could there well be found a more unsafe guide in practice
than mere policy and convenience . Men on such subjects com
plexionally differ from each other . The same men differ from
themselves a
t
different times . Temporary delusions , prejudices ,
excitements , and objects have irresistible influence in mere ques
tions o
f policy . And the policy of one age may ill suit the wishes
o
r
the policy o
f
another . The Constitution is not to be subject to
such fluctuations . It is to have a fixed , uniform , permanent con
struction . . It should be , so far at least as human infirmity will
allow , not dependent upon the passions or parties of particular
times , but the same yesterday , to -day , and forever .
$ 427 . It has been observed , with great correctness , that al
though the spirit o
f
a
n instrument , especially of a constitution , is
to b
e respected not less than it
s
letter , yet the spirit is to be
collected chiefly from the letter . It would be dangerous in the
extreme to infer from extrinsic circumstances that a case , fo
r
which the words of an instrument expressly provide , shall be
exempted from it
s operation . Where words conflict with each
other , where the different clauses o
f
a
n instrument bear upon each
other , and would be inconsistent unless the natural and common
import o
f
words be varied , construction becomes necessary , and a
departure from the obvious meaning o
f
words is justifiable . But
if in any case the plain meaning of a provision ,not contradicted
b
y
any other provision in the same instrument , is to be disregarded
because we believe the framers o
f
that instrument could not intend
what they say , it must be one where the absurdity and injustice of
applying the provision to the case would b
e
so monstrous that all
mankind would , without hesitation , unite in rejecting th
e
appli
cation . This language has reference to a case where the words
i [See People v . Fisher , 24 Wend . 220 ; Cochran v . Van Surlay , 20 Wend . 381 ;
Wynehamer v . People , 13 N . Y : 391 , 453 , 477 ; People v . Gallagher , 4 Mich . 24
4
; State
v . Staten , 6 Cold . 233 ; Dwarris on Statutes , b
y
Potter , 202 , 203 . ]
3 Sturgis v . Crowninshield , 4 Wheat . R . 122 , 202 .
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o
f
a constitutional provision are sought to be restricted . But it
appears with equal force where they are sought to b
e enlarged .
§ 428 . VIII . No construction of a given power is to be allowed
which plainly defeats or impairs it
s
avowed objects . If , therefore ,
the words are fairly susceptible of two interpretations , according
to their common sense and use , the one o
f
which would defeat one
o
r
all o
f
the objects fo
r
which it was obviously given , and the other
o
f
which would preserve and promote a
ll , the former interpretation
ought to be rejected , and the latter be held th
e
true interpretation .
This rule results from the dictates o
f
mere common -sense , for
every instrument ought to be so construed , ut magis valeat , quam
pereat . For instance , the Constitution confers on Congress th
e
power to declare war . Now the word declare has several senses .
It may mean to proclaim , or publish . But no person would
imagine that this was th
e
whole sense in which the word is used
in this connection . It should be interpreted in the sense in which
the phrase is used among nations when applied to such a subject
matter . A power to declare war is a power to make and carry on
war . It is not a mere power to make known an existing thing ,
but to give life and effect to the thing itself . The true doctrine
has been expressed b
y
the Supreme Court : “ If from the imper
fection of human language there should b
e any serious doubts re
specting the extent of any given power , the objects for which it was
given , especially when those objects are expressed in the instru
ment itself , should have great influence in the construction . ” 3
$ 429 . IX . Where a power is remedial in its nature , there is
much reason to contend that it ought to be construed liberally .
That was the doctrine o
f
Mr . Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm v .
Georgia , 4 and it is generally adopted in th
e interpretation o
f laws . 5
But this liberality of exposition is clearly inadmissible if it extends
beyond the just and ordinary sense o
f
the terms .
§ 430 . X . In the interpretation of a power , al
l
the ordinary and
appropriate means to execute it are to b
e
deemed a part o
f
the
power itself . This results from the very nature and design of a
constitution . In giving the power , it does not intend to limit it to
any one mode o
f exercising it , exclusive of all others . Itmust be
1 S
e
e
Bacon ' s Abridg . Statute I . ; Vattel , B . 2 , ch . 17 , § 277 to 28
5
, 29
9
to 302 .
3 See Bas v . Tingy , 4 Dall . R . 37 .
8 Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 188 , 189 .
4 2 Dall . R . 419 . 6 Bacon ' s Abridg . Statute I . 8 .
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obvious (as has been already suggested ) that the means of carry
ing into effect the objects of a power may , nay, must be varied , in
order to adapt themselves to the exigencies of the nation at differ
ent times .) A mode efficacious and useful in one age , or under
one posture of circumstances ,may be wholly vain , or even mis
chievous at any other time. Government presupposes the exist
ence of a perpetual mutability in it
s
own operations on those who
are it
s subjects , and a perpetual flexibility in adapting itself to
their wants , their interests , their habits , their occupations , and
their infirmities . ?
1 The Federalist ,No . 44 .
? The reasoning o
fMr . Chief Justice Marshall on this subject , in McCulloch v . Mary
land , ( 4 Wheat . 316 , ) is so cogent and satisfactory , that we shall venture to cite it at
large . After having remarked that words have various senses , and that what is the
true construction o
f any used in th
e
Constitution must depend upon the subject ,the con
text , and the intentions of the people , to be gathered from the instrument , he proceeds
thus :
“ The subject is the execution o
f
those great powers o
n
which the welfare o
f
a nation
essentially depends . Itmust have been the intention of those who gave these powers ,
to insure , as fa
r
a
s
human prudence could insure , their beneficial execution . This could
not b
e
done b
y
confiding the choice o
fmeans to such narrow limits , as not to leave it in
the power o
f Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate , and which were con
ducive to the end . This provision is made in a Constitution intended to endure for
ages to come , and , consequently , to b
e adapted to the various crises o
f
human affairs .
T
o
have prescribed themeans b
y
which government should , in al
l
future time , execute
it
s powers , would have been to change entirely the character of the instrument and give
it the properties of a legal code . It would have been an unwise attempt to provide , b
y
immutable rules , fo
r
exigencies ,which , if foreseen at al
l ,must have been seen dimly , and
which can b
e
best provided for a
s they occur . T
o
have declared that the best means
shall not be used , but those alone withoutwhich the power given would be nugatory ,
would have been to deprive the legislature o
f
the capacity to avail itself o
f experience ,
to exercise its reason , and to accommodate it
s legislation to circumstances . If we apply
this principle o
f
construction to any o
f
the powers o
f
the government , we shall find it so
pernicious in it
s operation that we shall b
e compelled to discard it . The powers vested
in Congress may certainly be carried into execution without prescribing an oath o
f
office .
The power to exact this security for the faithful performance o
f duty is not given , nor is
it indispensably necessary . The different departments may be establi hed , taxes may
b
e imposed and collected , armies and navies may be raised and maintained ; and money
may b
e
borrowed , without requiring an oath of office . It might be argued , with as
much plausibility a
s
other incidental powers have been assailed , that the convention
was not unmindful o
f
this subjection . The oath which might be exacted — that of
fidelity to the Constitution - is prescribed , and no other can be required . Yet , he would
b
e charged with insanity who should contend that the legislature might not sup -radd ,
to the oath directed b
y
the Constitution , such other oath o
f
office a
s
it
s
wisdom might
suggest .
“ S
o , with respect to the whole penal code o
f
the United States : whence arises the
power to punish in cases not prescribed b
y
the Constitution ? All admit that the gov
ernment may legitimately punish any violation o
f
it
s
law ; and yet , this is not among
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§ 431 . Besides , if the power only is given , without pointing out
the means , how are we to ascertain that any one means is exclu
sively within it
s scope rather than another ? The same course o
f
reasoning which would deny a choice o
f
means to execute the
power would reduce the power itself to a nullity . For , as it never
could b
e
demonstrated that any onemode in particular was intended ,
and to be exclusively employed , and as it might be demonstrated
that other means might be employed , the question whether th
e
power were rightfully put into exercise would forever be subject
to doubt and controversy . If one means is adopted to give it
effect , and is within its scope , because it is appropriate , how are
we to escape from the argument that another , falling within the
same predicament , is equally within its scope ? If each is equally
appropriate , how is th
e
choice to bemade between them ? If one
is selected , how does that exclude al
l
others ? If one is more
appropriate a
t
one time , and another at another time , where is the
the enumerated powers o
f Congress . The right to enforce the observance of la
w , by
punishing it
s
infraction , might be denied with the more plausibility , because it is
expressly given in some cases . Congress is empowered to provide for the punishment
o
f counterfeiting the securities and current coin o
f
the United States , ' and ' to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed o
n
the high scas , and offences against the
law o
f
nations . The several powers of Congress may exist , in a very imperfect state ,
to b
e
sure , but they may exist and be carried into execution , although no punishment
should b
e
inflicted in cases where the right to punish is not expressly given .
“ Take , for example , the power to establish post -offices and post -roads . This power
is executed b
y
the single act o
f making the establishment . But , from this has been
inferred the power and duty o
f carrying the mail along the post -road , from one post
office to another . And from this implied power has again been inferred the right to
punish those who steal letters from the post -office o
r
rob the mail . It may be said ,
with some plausibility , that the right to carry the mail , and to punish those who rob it ,
is not indispensably necessary to the establishment o
f
a post -office and post -road . This
right is indeed essential to the beneficial exercise of the power , but not indispensably
necessary to it
s
existence . So , of the punishment of the crimes of stealing or falsifying
a record o
r process o
f
a court o
f
the United States , or of perjury in such court . To
punish these offences is certainly conducive to the due administration o
f justice . But
courts may exist , and may decide the causes brought before them , though such crimes
escape punishment .
“ The baneful influence o
f
this narrow construction o
n all the operations of the gov
ernment , and the absolute impracticability of maintaining it without rendering the gov
ernment incompetent to it
s great objects , might be illustrated b
y
numerous examples
drawn from the Constitution and from our laws . The good sense o
f
the public has pro
nounced , without hesitation , that the power o
f punishment appertains to sovereignty ,
and may b
e
exercised , whenever th
e
sovereign has a right to act , as incidental to his
constitutional powers . It is a means fo
r
carrying into execution all sovereign powers ,
and may b
e
used , although not indispensably necessary . It is a right incidental to the
power and conducive to it
s
beneficial exercise . "
1 See United States v . Fisher , 2 Cranch , 358 .
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restriction to be found which allows the one and denies the
other ? A power granted in a frame of government is not con
templated to be exhausted in a single exertion of it, or uno flatu .
It is intended fo
r
free and permanent exercise ; and if the dis
cretion o
f
the functionaries who are to exercise it is not limited ,
that discretion , especially as those functionaries must necessarily
change ,must be coextensive with the power itself . Take , fo
r
in
stance , the power to make war . In one age , this would authorize
the purchase and employment of the weapons then ordinarily used
for this purpose . But suppose these weapons are wholly laid aside ,
and others substituted more efficient and powerful , is the govern
ment prohibited from employing the new modes of offence and
defence ? Surely not . The invention of gunpowder superseded
the old modes o
f
warfare , and may perhaps , b
y
future inventions ,
b
e superseded in its turn . No one can seriously doubt that the
new modes would b
e
within the scope o
f
the power to make war ,
if they were appropriate to the end . It would , indeed , be a most
extraordinary mode of interpretation o
f
the Constitution , to give
such a restrictive meaning to its powers a
s
should obstruct their
fair operation . A power being given , it is the interest of the na
tion to facilitate it
s
execution . It can never be their interest , and
cannot be presumed to b
e
their intention , to clog and embarrass
its execution b
y withholding the most appropriate means . There
can be n
o
reasonable ground fo
r
preferring that construction which
would render the operations o
f
the government difficult ,hazard
ous , and expensive ; or fo
r
imputing to the framers o
f
the Consti
tution a design to impede the exercise of it
s powers b
y
withholding
a choice o
f
means . 1
§ 432 . In the practical application of government , then , the
public functionaries must be left a
t liberty to exercise the powers
with which the people b
y
the Constitution and laws have intrusted
them . They must have a wide discretion as to the choice of
means ; and the only limitation upon that discretion would seem
to b
e that the means are appropriate to the end . And this must
naturally admit o
f
considerable latitude ; for the relation between
the action and the end ( a
s
has been justly remarked ) is not always
so direct and palpable as to strike the eye o
f every observer . If
1 McCulloch v . Maryland , 4 Wheat . R . 316 , 408 .
2 See the remarks o
f Mr . Justice Johnson , in delivering the opinion of the court in
Anderson v . Dunn , 6 Wheat . R . 204 , 226 ; United States v . Fisher , 2 Cranch , 358 .
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the end be legitimate and within the scope o
f
the Constitution , all
the means which are appropriate , and which are plainly adapted
to that end , and which are not prohibited ,may be constitutionally
employed to carry it into effect . When , then , it is asked who is
to judge o
f
the necessity and propriety of the laws to be passed
for executing the powers o
f
the Union , the true answer is , that the
national government , like every other ,must judge in the first in
stance of the proper exercise o
f
it
s powers ; and its constituents in
the last . If th
e
means are within the reach o
f
th
e
power , no other
department can inquire into the policy or convenience o
f
the use
o
f
them . If there be an excess by overleaping the just boundary
o
f
the power , the judiciary may generally afford the proper relief ;
and in the last resort the people , by adopting such measures to
redress it as the exigency may suggest and prudence may dictate . ?
§ 433 . XI . And this leads us to remark , in the next place , that
in the interpretation o
f
the Constitution there is n
o
solid objec
tion to implied powers . Had the faculties of man been com
petent to the framing o
f
a system o
f government which would
leave nothing to implication , it cannot be doubted that the effort
would have been made b
y
the framers o
f
our Constitution . The
fact , however , is otherwise . There is not in the whole of that
admirable instrument a grant o
f powers which does not draw after
it others not expressed , but vital to their exercise ; not substantive
and independent , indeed , but auxiliary and subordinate . There
is no phrase in it , which , like the Articles of Confederation , ex
cludes incidental and implied powers , and which requires that
everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described .
Even the tenth amendment , which was framed for the purpose of
quieting the cxcessive jealousies which had been excited , omits
the word “ expressly , ” (which was contained in the Articles of
Confederation , ) and declares only , that “ the powers not delegated
to the United States ,nor prohibited b
y
it to the States ,are reserved
1 McCulloch v .Marylund , 4 Wheat . R . 316 , 409 ,410 ,421 , 423 ; United States v . Fisher ,
2 Cra " ch , 358 .
2 The Federalist , Nos . 33 , 44 ; McCulloch v . Maryland , 4 Wheat . R . 316 , 423 .
8 In the discussions a
s
to the constitutionality o
f
the Bank o
f
the United States , in
the cabinet o
f
President Washington , upon the original e tablishment of the Bank , there
was a la g
e
range o
f argument , pro el contra , in respect to implied powers . The reader
will find a summary of the leading views o
n
each side in the fifth volume o
f
Marshall ' s
Life o
f Washington , App . p . 3 , note 3 , & c . ; 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 523 to 526 ; and in
Hamil ' on ' s Argument on Constitutionality of Bank , 1 Hamilton ' s Works , 111 to 155 .
4 Anderson v . Dunn , 6 Wheat . 204 , 226 . 6 Article 2 .
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to the States respectively , or to the people ” ; thus leaving the
question , whether the particular power which may become the
subject of contest has been delegated to the one government , or
prohibited to the other , to depend upon a fair construction of the
whole instrument . The men who drew and adopted this amend
ment had experienced the embarrassments resulting from the
insertion of this word in the Articles of Confederation , and proba
bly omitted it to avoid those embarrassments . A constitution , to
contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which it
s
great powers will admit , and of al
l
the means b
y
which these may
b
e
carried into execution ,would partake of the prolixity of a legal
code , and could scarcely be embraced b
y
th
e
human mind . It
would probably never be understood b
y
the public . Its nature ,
therefore , requires that only its great outlines should be marked ,
it
s important objects designed , and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects b
e
deduced from the nature of those objects
themselves . That this idea was entertained by th
e
framers o
f
the
American Constitution , is not only to be inferred from the nature
o
f
the instrument , but from the language . Why , else , were some
o
f
the limitations found in the ninth section of the first article
introduced ? It is also in some degree warranted , b
y
their hav
ing omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its
receiving a fair and just interpretation . In considering this point ,
we should never forget that it is a constitution w
e
are expound
ing . 1
§ 434 . The reasoning of the Federalist is to the same effect .
Every power which is the means o
f carrying into effect a given
power is implied from the very nature of the original grant . It
is a necessary and unavoidable implication from the act o
f
consti
tuting a government and vesting it with certain specified powers .
What is a power , but the ability or faculty of doing a thing ?
What is the ability to do a thing , but th
e
power of employing the
means necessary to it
s
execution ? What is a legislative power ,
but a power o
fmaking laws ? What are the means to execute a
legislative power , but laws ? 2 No axiom , indeed , is more clearly
established in law or in reason than that where the end is required ,
the means are authorized . Whenever a general power to do a
1 P
e
r
Mr . Chief Justice Marshall , in McCulloch v . Marylund , 4 Wheat . R . 31
6
, 40
6
,
407 , 421 .
? The Federalist , No . 33 .
VOL . I . 2
1
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thing is given , every particular power necessary for doing it is
included . In every new application of a general power , the par
ticular powers which are themeans of attaining the object of the
general power must always necessarily vary with that object , and
be often properly varied , whilst the object remains the same.?
Even under th
e
confederation ,where the delegation of authority
was confined to express powers , the Federalist remarks that it
would be easy to show that no important power delegated b
y
the
Articles o
f
Confederation had been , or could be , executed b
y
Con
gress , without recurring more or less to the doctrine of construc
tion o
r implication !
$ 435 . XII . Another point , in regard to the interpretation of
the Constitution , requires us to advert to the rules applicable to
cases o
f
concurrent and exclusive powers . In what cases are the
powers given to the general government exclusive , and in what
casesmay the States maintain a concurrent exercise ? Upon this
subject we have an elaborate exposition b
y
the authors o
f
the Fed
eralist ; 3 and as it involves some of the most delicate questions
growing out o
f
the Constitution , and those in which a conflict
with the States is most likely to arise , we cannot do better than to
quote the reasoning . .
§ 436 . “ An entire consolidation of the States into one com
plete national sovereignty would imply an entire subordination o
f
the parts ; and whatever powersmight remain in them would be
altogether dependent on the general will . But as the plan of the
convention aims only at a partial union o
r
consolidation , the State
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty
which they before had , and which were not , by that act , exclusively
delegated to the United States . This exclusive delegation , or
rather this alienation o
f
State sovereignty , would only exist in
three cases : where the Constitution in express terms granted an
exclusive authority to the Union ; where it granted , in one in
stance , an authority to the Union , and in another prohibited the
States from exercising the like authority ; and where it granted
a
n authority to the Union , to which a similar authority in the
States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant .
I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which
might appear to resemble it , but which would , in fact , be essen
tially different : Imean , where the exercise of concurrent jurisdic
1 The Federalist , No . 44 . 2 Id . No . 44 . 3 Id . No . 32 .
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tion might be productive of occasional interferences in the policy
of any branch of administration , but would not imply any direct
contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority .
These three cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal govern
ment may be exemplified by the following instances . The last
clause but one in the eighth section of the first article provides
expressly that Congress shall exercise exclusive legislation ' over
the district to be appropriated as the seat of government . This
answers to the first case . The first clause of the same section
empowers Congress ' to lay and collect taxes , duties , imposts , and
excises ' ; and the second clause of the tenth section of the same
article declares that no State shall , without the consent of Con
gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports , except for
the purpose of executing it
s inspection laws . Hence would re
sult an exclusive power in the Union to lay duties on imports and
exports , with the particular exception mentioned . But this power
is abridged by another clause which declares that no tax or duty
shall be laid on articles exported from any State ; in consequence
o
f
which qualification it now only extends to the duties on imports .
This answers to the second case . The third will be found in that
clause which declares that Congress shall have power to establish
a
n
uniform rule o
f
naturalization throughout the United States . '
This must necessarily be exclusive , because , if each State had
power to prescribe a distinct rule , there could be no uniform rule . ”
The correctness o
f
these rules o
f interpretation has never been
controverted , and they have been often recognized by the Supreme
Court . 1
§ 437 . The first two rules are so completely self -evident that
every attempt to illustrate them would be vain , if it had not a
tendency to perplex and confuse . The last rule , vi
z
. that which
declares that the power is exclusive in the national government
where an authority is granted to the Union , to which a similar
authority in the States would b
e absolutely and totally contradic
tory and repugnant , is that alone which may be thought to require
comment . This rule seems in its own nature as little susceptible
o
f
doubt as the others in reference to the Constitution . For , since
the Constitution has declared that the Constitution and laws and
1 See Houston v . Moore , 5 Wheat . R . 1 , 22 , 24 , 48 ; Ogden v . Gibbons , 9Wheat . R . 1 ,
198 , 210 , 228 , 235 ; Sturgis v . Crowninshield , 4 Wheat . R . 122 , 192 , 193 ; Ogden v .
Saunders, 1
2 Wheat . I , 275 , 307 , 322 , 334 , 335 .
324 [BOOK II
I .CONSTITUTION O
F
THE UNITED STATES .
treaties in pursuance of it shall be the supreme la
w
o
f
the land ,
it would be absurd to say that a State law repugnant to it might
have concurrent operation and validity , and especially as it is ex
pressly added , anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding . The repugnancy , then , being made
out , it follows that the State law is just as much void as though it
had been expressly declared to be void , or the power in Congress
had been expressly declared to be exclusive . Every power given
to Congress is b
y
the Constitution necessarily supreme , if , from
it
s
nature , o
r
from the words o
f
the grant , it is apparently intended
to b
e exclusive ; and is as much so as if the States were expressly
forbidden to exercise it . 1
$ 438 . The principal difficulty lies not so much in the rule , as
in it
s application to particular cases . Here the field fo
r
discussion
is wide , and the argument upon construction is susceptible of great
modifications and o
f
very various force . But unless from th
e
na
ture o
f
the power , or from the obvious results of its operations , a
repugnancy must exist , so as to lead to a necessary conclusion that
the power was intended to be exclusive , the true rule of interpre
tation is that the power is merely concurrent . Thus , fo
r
instance ,
a
n affirmative power in Congress to la
y
taxes is not necessarily in
compatible with a like power in the States . Both may exist with
out interference ,and if any interference should arise in a particular
case the question o
f supremacy would turn ,not upon the nature of
the power ,but upon supremacy of right in the exercise of the power
in that case . In our complex system , presenting the rare and
difficult scheme o
f
one general government , whose action extends
over the whole , butwhich possesses only enumerated powers , and
o
f
numerous State governments , which retain and exercise many
powers not delegated to the Union , contests respecting powermust
arise . Were it even otherwise , the measures taken b
y
the respec
tive governments to execute their acknowledged powers would be
often o
f
the same description , and might some time interfere .
This , however , does not prove that the one is exercising , or has a
right to exercise , the powers of the other . 3
Sturgis v . Crowninshield , 4 Wheat . R . 12
2
, 19
2
, 19
3
; Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R .
1 , 198 , & c .
2 The Federalist , N
o
. 32 ; Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 198 , 199 to 205 ; Mc
Culloch v . Maryland , 4 Wheat . R . 316 , 425 .
8 Gibbons v . Oyden , 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 205 . Mr . Chancellor Kent has given this whole
subject o
f exclusive and concurrent power a thorough examination ; and the result will
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$ 439 . And this leads us to remark that, in the exercise of con
current powers , if there be a conflict between th
e
laws o
f
the Union
and the laws o
f
the States , the former being supreme , the latter
must o
f
course yield . The possibility ,nay , the probability , o
f
such
a conflict was foreseen b
y
the framers o
f
the Constitution , and was
accordingly expressly provided fo
r . If a State pass a law incon
sistent with the Constitution o
f
the United States , it is a mere
nullity . If it pass a law clearly within its own constitutional
powers , still if it conflict with the exercise of a power given to
Congress , to the extent o
f
the interference it
s operation is sus
pended ; fo
r
in a conflict o
f
laws that which is supreme must
govern . Therefore it has often been adjudged that if a State law
is in conflict with a treaty or an act of Congress , it becomes ipso
facto inoperative to the extent of the conflict .
$ 440 . From this great rule , that the Constitution and laws
made in pursuance thereof are supreme , and that they control the
constitutions and laws o
f
the States , and cannot be controlled b
y
them , - from this ,which may be deemed an axiom ,other auxiliary
corollaries may be deduced . In the first place , that if a power is
given to create a thing , it implies a power to preserve it . Secondly ,
that a power to destroy , if wielded b
y
a different hand , is hostile to
and incompatible with this power to create and preserve . Thirdly ,
that where this repugnancy exists , the authority which is supreme
must control , and not yield to that over which it is supreme . Con
sequently , the inferior power becomes a nullity . 3
§ 441 . But a question of a stillmore delicate nature may arise ;
and that is , how far in the exercise of a concurrent power the actual
legislation o
f Congress supersedes the State legislation , or suspends
it
s operation over th
e
subject -matter . Are the State laws inoper
ative only to th
e
extent of the actual conflict , or does th
e
legislation
o
f Congress suspend the legislative power o
f
the States over the
subject -matter ? To such an inquiry , probably no universal answer
b
e
found most ably stated in his learned Commentaries , Lecture 1
8 . i Kent , Comm .
364 to 379 , 2d edit . p . 387 to 405 .
1 Ware v . Hylton , 3 Dall . 199 ; Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 210 , 211 ; McCul
loch v . Maryland , 4 Wheat . R . 31
6
, 405 , 406 , 425 to 436 ; Houston v . Moore , 5 Wheat .
R . 1 , 2
2 , 2
4 , 4
9 , 51 , 5
3 , 5
6 ; Sturgis v . Crowninshield , 2 Wheat . R . 1 , 190 , 196 ; Golden v .
Prince , 3 Wash . C . C . R . 313 , 321 ; The Federalist , No . 32 ; Brown v . Maryland , 1
2
Wheat . R . 419 , 459 .
? McCulloch v . Maryland , 12 Wheat . R . 316 , 426 .
3 Sturgis v . Crowninshield , 4 Wheat . R . 1 , 193 .
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could b
e given . Itmay depend upon the nature of the power , the
effect o
f
the actual exercise , and the extent of the subject -matter .
§ 442 . This may perhaps be best illustrated b
y
putting a case
which has been reasoned out b
y
a very learned judge in hi
s
own
words . “ Congress has power , ” says he , “ to provide fo
r organiz
ing ,arming , and disciplining the militia ,and it is presumable that
the framers o
f
the Constitution contemplated a full exercise of al
l
these powers . Nevertheless , if Congress had declined to exercise
them , it was competent to the State governments to provide fo
r
organizing , arming , and disciplining their respective militia in
such manner as they might think proper . But Congress has pro
vided fo
r
these subjects in the way which that body must have
supposed the best calculated to promote the general welfare and to
provide fo
r
the national defence . After this , can the State gov
ernments enter upon the same ground , provide fo
r
the same ob
jects a
s they may think proper , and punish in their own way
violations of the laws they have so enacted ? The affirmative of
this question is asserted b
y
counsel , & c . , who contend that ,unless
such State laws are in direct contradiction to those of the United
States , they are not repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States . From this doctrine I must , for one , be permitted to dis
sent . The two laws may not be in such absolute opposition to
each other a
s
to render the one incapable of execution without
violating th
e
injunctions of th
e
other , and yet the will of the one
legislature may b
e
in direct collision with that o
f
the other . This
will is to be discovered , as well b
y
what the legislature bas not de
clared a
s
b
y
what they have expressed . Congress , fo
r
example ,
have declared that the punishment for disobedience of the act of
Congress shall be a certain fine . If that provided b
y
the State
legislature for the same offence be a similar fine with the addition
o
f imprisonment o
r
death , the latter law would not prevent the
former from being carried into execution , and may be said , there
fore , not to be repugnant to it . But surely the will of Congress
is nevertheless thwarted and opposed . ” He adds : “ I consider
it a novel and unconstitutional doctrine , that in cases where the
State governments have a concurrent power o
f legislation with
the national government , they may legislate upon any subject
o
n which Congress has acted , provided th
e
two laws are not in
1Mr . Justice Washington , Houston v . Moore , 5 Wheat . R . 1 , 21 , 22 .
2 5 Wheat . R . p . 22 .
CH. V. ] 327RULES OF INTERPRETATION .
terms or in their operation contradictory and repugnant to each
other.” 1
§ 443. Another illustration may be drawn from the opinion of
the court in another highly important case. One question was,
whether the power of Congress to establish uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies was exclusive , or concurrent with the
States. “ It does not appear," it was then said , “ to be a violent
construction of the Constitution , and is certainly a convenient one,
to consider the power of the States as existing over such cases as
the laws of the Union may not reach . Be this as it may , the
power of Congress may be exercised or declined as the wisdom of
that body shall decide . If in the opinion of Congress uniform
laws concerning bankruptcies ought not to be established , it does
not follow that partial lawsmay not exist , or that State legislation
on the subject must cease. It is not the mere existence of the
power , but its exercise , which is incompatible with the exercise of
the same power by the States. It is not the right to establish
these uniform laws , but their actual establishment , which is incon
sistent with the partial acts of the States. If the right of the
States to pass a bankrupt law is not taken away by the mere grant
of that power to Congress, it cannot be extinguished . It can only
be suspended by the enactment of a general bankrupt la
w . The
repeal of that law cannot , it is true , confer the power on the States ,
but it removes a disability to it
s
exercise which was created b
y
the
act o
f Congress . ” 2
It is not our intention to comment on these cases , but to offer
them a
s examples of reasoning in favor and against the exclusive
power where a positive repugnancy cannot b
e predicated .
$ 444 . It has been sometimes argued that when a power is
granted to Congress to legislate in specific cases fo
r
purposes
growing out of the Union , the natural conclusion is that the power
is designed to b
e
exclusive ; that the power is to be exercised fo
r
15 Wheat . R . p . 24 . Se
e
also Golden v . Prince , 3 Wash . C . C . R . 313 , 32
4
, & c .
2 Sturgis v . Crowninshield , 4 Wheat . R . 122 , 195 , 196 . See also Gibbons v . Ogden , 9
Wheat . R . 1 , 197 , 227 , 235 , 238 ; Houston v . Moore , 5 Wheat . R . 34 , 49 , 52 , 54 , 55 .
This opinion , that the power to pass bankrupt laws is not exclusive , has not been unan
imously adopted b
y
the Supreme Court . Mr . Justice Washington maintained at all
times a
n opposite opinion ; and his opinion is known to have been adopted b
y
a
t least
one other o
f
the judges o
f
the Supreme Court . The reasons on which Mr . Justice
Washington ' s opinion is founded , will be found at large in the case of Golden v . Prince ,
3 Wash . C . C . R . 313 , 322 , & c . See also Ogden v . Saunders , 12 Wheat . R . 213 , 264 ,
265 , and Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 209 , 226 , 238 .
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the good o
f
the whole b
y
the will of the whole , and consistently
with the interests of the whole ; and that these objects can no
where be so clearly seen o
r
so thoroughly weighed a
s
in Congress ,
where the whole nation is represented . But the argument proves
too much , and , pursued to its full extent , it would establish that
a
ll
the powers granted to Congress are exclusive , unless where
concurrent authority is expressly reserved to the States . For
instance , upon this reasoning the power of taxation in Congress
would annul the whole power o
f
taxation of the States , and thus
operate a virtual dissolution o
f
their sovereignty . Such a preten
sion has been constantly disclaimed .
$ 445 . On the other hand , it has been maintained with great
pertinacity that the States possess concurrent authority with Con
gress in a
ll
cases where the power is not expressly declared to be
exclusive , or expressly prohibited to the States ; and if , in the ex
ercise o
f
a concurrent power , a conflict arises , there is no reason
why each should not be deemed equally rightful . But it is plain
that this reasoning goes to the direct overthrow of the principle of
supremacy , and , if admitted , it would enable the subordinate sov
ereignty to annul the powers of the superior . There is a plain re
pugnance in conferring on one government a power to control the
constitutional measures o
f
another , which other , with respect to
these very measures , is declared to be supreme over that which
exerts the control . 3 For instance , the States have acknowledgedly
a concurrent power o
f
taxation . But it is wholly inadmissible to
allow that power to be exerted over any instrument employed b
y
the general government to execute it
s powers , fo
r
such a power to
tax involves a power to destroy ,and this power to destroy may de
feat and render useless the power to create . Thus a State may
tax themail , the mint , patent rights , custom -house papers , or ju
dicial process of the courts o
f
the United States . And yet there
is n
o
clause in the Constitution which prohibits the States from
exercising the power , nor any exclusive grant to the United States .
The apparent repugnancy creates , by implication , the prohibition .
S
o Congress , by the Constitution , possess power to provide for
governing such part o
f
th
e
militia a
smay be employed in the ser
1 Houston v . Moore , 5 Wheat . R . 1 , 49 , 55 , 56 .
3 See Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 19
7
, 21
0
; McCulloch v . Maryland , 4 Wheat .
R . 316 , 527 .
3 McCulloch v .Maryland , 4 Wheat . R . 31
6
, 431 .
4 Ibid . 6 Id . 432 .
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vice of the United States . Yet it is not said that such power of
government is exclusive . But it results from the nature of the
power. No person would contend that a State militia ,while in
the actual service and employment of the United States , might yet
be at the same time governed and controlled by the laws of the
State . The very nature of military operations would in such case
require unity of command and direction . And the argument from
inconvenience would be absolutely irresistible to establish an im
plied prohibition . On the other hand , Congress have power to
provide for organizing , arming , and disciplining the militia ; but
if Congress should make no such provision , there seems no reason
why the States may not organize , arm , and discipline their own
militia . No necessary incompatibility would exist in the nature
of the power , though , when exercised by Congress , the authority
of the States mustnecessarily yield . And here the argument from
inconvenience would be very persuasive the other way. For the
power to organize , arm , and discipline the militia , in the absence
of congressional legislation ,would seem indispensable for the de
fence and security of the States . Again , Congress have power to
call forth th
e
militia to execute the laws o
f
the Union , to suppress
insurrections , and repel invasions . But there does not seem any
incompatibility in the States calling out their own militia a
s aux
iliaries for the same purpose .
$ 446 . In considering , then , this subject , it would be impracti
cable to lay down any universal rule a
s
to what powers are , b
y
im
plication , exclusive in the general government , or concurrent in
the States ; and in relation to the latter , what restrictions either
o
n the power itself , or on the actual exercise of the power , arise
b
y implication . In some cases , as we have seen , there may exist
a concurrent power , and yet restrictions upon it must exist in re
gard to objects . In other cases the actual operations of the power
only are suspended or controlled when there arises a conflict with
the actual operations o
f
the Union . Every question of this sort
must be decided b
y
itself upon its own circumstances and reasons .
Because the power to regulate commerce , from its nature and ob
jects , is exclusive , it does not follow that the power to pass bank
rupt laws also is exclusive .
1 Houston v . Moore , 5 Wheat . R . 1 , 53 .
3 Id . 50 , 51 , 52 . 8 Id . 54 , 55 .
• Sturgis v . Crowninshield , 4 Wheat . 122 , 193 , 19
7
, 199 ; Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat .
R . I , 196 , 197 , 209 .
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§ 447. We may , however , la
y
down some fe
w
rules deducible
from what has been already said , in respect to cases of implied
prohibitions upon th
e
existence o
r
exercise of powers b
y
the States ,
a
s guides to aid our inquiries . 1 . Wherever the power given
to the general government requires that , to b
e
efficacious and ade
quate to it
s
end , it should be exclusive , there arises a just impli
cation fo
r
deeming it exclusive . Whether exercised or not in such
a case makes n
o
difference . 2 . Wherever the power in its own
nature isnot incompatible with a concurrent power in the States ,
either in it
s
nature or exercise , there the power belongs to the
States . 3 . But in such a case the concurrency of the power may
admit o
f
restrictions or qualifications in it
s
nature o
r
exercise . In
it
s
nature , when it is capable from its general character of being
applied to objects o
r purposes which would control , defeat , or de
stroy the powers o
f
the general government . In its exercise ,when
there arises a conflict in the actual laws and regulations made in
pursuance o
f
the power b
y
the general and State governments .
In the former case there is a qualification ingrafted upon the gen
erality o
f
the power , excluding its application to such objects and
purposes . In the latter there is ( at least generally ) a qualification
not upon the power itself , but only upon its exercise , to the extent
o
f
the actual conflict in the operations o
f
each . 4 . In cases of
implied limitations or prohibitions of power , it is not sufficient to
show a possible o
r potential inconvenience . There must be a plain
incompatibility , a direct repugnancy , or an extreme practical in
convenience leading irresistibly to the same conclusion . 5 . If
such incompatibility , repugnancy , or extreme inconvenience would
result , it is no answer , that in the actual exercise of the power each
party may , if it chooses , avoid a positive interference with the
other . The objection lies to the power itself , and not to the exer
cise o
f it . If it exist , it may be applied to the extent of control
ling , defeating , or destroying the other . It can never be presumed
that the framers of the Constitution , declared to be supreme , could
intend to put it
s powers a
t
hazard upon th
e
good wishes o
r
good
intentions o
r
discretion o
f
the States in the exercise o
f
their a
c
knowledged powers . 6 . Where no such repugnancy , incompati
bility , or extreme inconvenience would result , then the power in
the States is restrained , not in its nature , but in its operations ,
and then only to the extent o
f
the actual interference . In fact , it
is obvious that the same meansmay often be applied to carry into
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operation different powers . And a State may use th
e
samemeans
to effectuate an acknowledged power in itself which Congress may
apply for another purpose in the acknowledged exercise o
f
a very
different power . Congress may make that a regulation of com
merce which a State may employ as a guard for it
s
internal policy ,
o
r
to preserve the public health or peace , or to promote its own
peculiar interests . These rules seem clearly deducible from the
nature o
f
the instrument , and they are confirmed b
y
the positive
injunctions o
f
the tenth amendment of the Constitution .
$ 448 . XIII . Another rule of interpretation deserves consider
ation in regard to the Constitution . There are certain maxims
which have found their way not only into judicial discussions , but
into the business of common life , as founded in common -sense and
common convenience . Thus it is often said that in an instrument
a specification o
f particulars is an exclusion of generals , or the ex
pression o
f
one thing is th
e
exclusion o
f
another . Lord Bacon ' s
remark , “ that as exception strengthens the force of a law in cases
not excepted , so enumeration weakens it in cases not enumerated , "
has been perpetually referred to as a fine illustration . Thesemax
ims , rightly understood and rightly applied , undoubtedly furnish
safe guides to assist u
s
in the task o
f exposition . But they are
susceptible o
f being applied , and indeed are often ingeniously ap
plied , to the subversion of the text and the objects of the instru
ment . Thus it has been suggested that an affirmative provision in
a particular case excludes the existence o
f
the like provision in
every other case , and a negative provision in a particular case
admits the existence o
f
the same thing in every other case . Both
o
f
these deductions are , or rather may be , unfounded in solid
reasoning . Thus it was objected to the Constitution that , having
provided for the trial b
y
jury in criminal cases , there was an im
plied exclusion of it in civil cases . As if there was not an essen
tial difference between silence and abolition , between a positive
adoption o
f it in one class of cases and a discretionary right ( it
being clearly within the reach o
f
the judicial powers confided to
th
e
Union ) to adopt or reject it in al
l
o
r any other cases . One
might with just asmuch propriety hold that because Congress has
power “ to declare war , " but no power is expressly given tomake
i See Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R . 203 , 210 .
See the Federalist , No . 83 , 84 .
8 Cohens v . Virginia , 6 Wheat . R . 395 to 401 . 4 The Federalist , No . 83 .
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peace , the latter is excluded ; or that , because it is declared that
“ n
o bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed ” b
y
Con
gress , therefore Congress possess in all other cases the right to
pass any laws . The truth is , that , in order to ascertain how far an
affirmative or negative provision excludes or implies others , we
must look to the nature of the provision , the subject -matter , the
objects , and the scope o
f
the instrument . These , and these only ,
can properly determine the rule o
f
construction . There can be no
doubt that an affirmative grant o
f powers in many cases will imply
a
n exclusion o
f all others . As , for instance , the Constitution de
clares that the powers o
f Congress shall extend to certain enumer
ated cases . This specification o
f
particulars evidently excludes all
pretensions to a general legislative authority . Why ? Because
a
n
affirmative grant o
f special powers would be absurd , as well as
useless , if a general authority were intended . In relation , then ,
to such a subject a
s
a constitution , th
e
natural and obvious sense
o
f
it
s provisions , apart from any technical o
r
artificial rules , is the
true criterion o
f
construction .
$ 449 . XIV . Another rule of interpretation of the Constitution
suggested by the foregoing is , that the natural import of a single
clause is not to b
e
narrowed so as to exclude implied powers re
sulting from it
s
character , simply because there is another clause
which enumerates certain powers which might otherwise be deemed
implied powers within it
s scope ; fo
r
in such cases we are not , as
a matter o
f
course , to assume that the affirmative specification ex
cludes all other implications . This rule has been put in a clear
and just light b
y
one o
f
our most distinguished statesmen , and his
illustration will bemore satisfactory , perhaps , than any other which
can be offered . “ The Constitution , ” says he , “ vests in Congress
expressly the power to lay and collect taxes , duties , imposts , and
excises , and the power to regulate trade . That the former power ,
if not particularly expressed ,would have been included in the lat
ter a
s
one o
f
the objects o
f
a general power to regulate trade , is
not necessarily impugned b
y
it
s being so expressed . Examples of
this sort cannot sometimes b
e
easily avoided , and are to be seen
elsewhere in the Constitution . Thus the power to define and
punish offences against the law o
f
nations ' includes the power ,
afterwards particularly expressed , ' to make rules concerning cap
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 83 . Se
e
Vattel , B . 2 , ch . 17 , § 28
2
.
2 The Federalist , No . 83 .
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tures ,' & c., from offending neutrals . So , also , a power to coin
money ' would doubtless include that of regulating its value , ' had
not the latter power been expressly inserted . The term taxes , if
standing alone , would certainly have included duties , imposts ,
and excises . ' In another clause it is said , ' no tax or duty shall be
laid on exports , ' & c . Here the two terms are used as synonymous .
And in another clause , where it is said · no State shall la
y
any im
posts o
r
duties , ' & c . , the terms imposts and duties are synonymous .
Pleonasms , tautologies , and the promiscuous use of terms and
phrases , differing in their shades of meaning , (always to be ex
pounded with reference to the context ,and under the control of the
general character and manifest scope o
f
the instrument in which
they are found , ) are to be ascribed , sometimes to the purpose of
greater caution , sometimes to the imperfections o
f language , and
sometimes to the imperfection o
f
man himself . In this view of the
subject it was quite natural , however certainly the power to regu
late trade might include a power to impose duties on it , not to omit
it in a clause enumerating the several modes o
f
revenue authorized
b
y
the Constitution . In few cases could the [rule ] , ex majori
cautela , occur with more claim to respect . ” 1
$ 450 . Wemay close this view of some of the more important
rules to be employed in the interpretation o
f
the Constitution b
y
adverting to a few belonging to mere verbal criticism , which are
indeed but corollaries from what has been said , and have been
already alluded to , but which , at the same time , it may be of some
use again distinctly to enunciate .
$ 451 . XV . In the first place , then , every word employed in
th
e
Constitution is to be expounded in it
s plain , obvious , and com
mon sense , unless the context furnishes some ground to control ,
qualify , or enlarge it . Constitutions are not designed fo
r
meta
physical o
r logical subtleties , fo
r
niceties o
f expression , for critical
propriety , fo
r
elaborate shades of meaning , or fo
r
the exercise o
f
philosophical acuteness o
r judicial research . They are instruments
o
f
a practical nature , founded on th
e
common business o
f
human
life , adapted to common wants , designed fo
r
common use , and
fitted fo
r
common understandings . The people make them , the
people adopt them , th
e
people must be supposed to read them ,with
the help o
f
common -sense , and cannot be presumed to admit in
them any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss .
1 Mr . Madison ' s Letter to Mr . Cabell , 18th September , 1828 .
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$ 452 . XVI . But , in the next place , words from the necessary
imperfection o
f
a
ll
human language acquire different shades o
f
meaning , each of which is equally appropriate and equally legiti
mate ; each of which recedes in a wider or narrower degree from
the others , according to circumstances ; and each of which re
ceives from it
s general use some indefiniteness and obscurity as to
it
s
exact boundary and extent . We are , indeed , often driven to
multiply commentaries from the vagueness o
f
words in themselves ,
and perhaps still more often from the different manner in which
different minds are accustomed to employ them . They expand o
r
contract , not only from the conventional modifications introduced
by the changes of society , but also from the more loose or more
exact uses to which men o
f
different talents , acquirements , and
tastes from choice o
r necessity apply them . No person can fail to
remark the gradual deflections in the meaning o
f
words from one
age to another ; and so constantly is this process going on that
the daily language o
f
life in one generation sometimes requires the
aid o
f
a glossary in another . It has been justly remarked , that
n
o language is so copious a
s
to supply words and phrases for every
complex idea , or so correct as not to include many equivocally de
noting different ideas . Hence it must happen that however ac
curately objects may be discriminated in themselves , and however
accurately the discrimination may be considered , the definition of
them may b
e
rendered inaccurate b
y
the inaccuracy o
f
the terms
in which it is delivered . We must resort then to the context , and
shape the particular meaning so a
s
to make it fit that of the con
necting words and agree with the subject -matter .
$ 453 . XVII . In the next place , where technical words are used ,
the technical meaning is to b
e applied to them , unless it is repelled
b
y
the context . But the same word often possesses a technical
and a common sense . In such a case the latter is to be preferred ,
unless some attendant circumstance points clearly to the former .
No one would doubt , when the Constitution has declared that
“ the privilege o
f the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
unless ” under peculiar circumstances , that it referred , not to
every sort o
f
writ which has acquired that name , but to that which
has been emphatically so called , on account of its remedial power
to free a party from arbitrary imprisonment . So , again , when it
1 S
e
e
Vattel , B . 2 , ch . 17 , $ 262 , 29
9
. ? The Federalist , No . 37 .
8 See Vattel , B . 2 , ch . 17 , § 276 , 27
7
. • Ex parteBollman & Swartwout , 4 Cranch , 75 .
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declares that in suits at common law , & c., the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved , though the phrase " common law ” admits of
differentmeanings , no one can doubt that it is used in a technical
sense . When , again , it declares that Congress shall have power to
provide a navy , we readily comprehend that authority is given to
construct , prepare , or in any other manner to obtain a navy . But
when Congress is further authorized to provide fo
r
calling forth the
militia , we perceive at once that the word “ provide " is used in a
somewhat different sense .
$ 454 . XVIII . And this leads us to remark , in the next place ,
that it is b
y
n
o
means a correct rule o
f interpretation to construe
the same word in the same sense wherever it occurs in the same
instrument . It does not follow , either logically or grammatically ,
that because a word is found in one connection in the Constitution
with a definite sense , therefore the same sense is to be adopted in
every other connection in which it occurs . This would be to sup
pose that the framers weighed only the force o
f single words , as
philologists o
r
critics , and not whole clauses and objects , as states
men and practical reasoners . And yet nothing has been more
common than to subject the Constitution to this narrow and mis
chievous criticism . Men of ingenious and subtle minds ,who seek
for symmetry and harmony in language , having found in the Con
stitution a word used in some sense which falls in with their
favorite theory o
f interpreting it , have made that the standard b
y
which to measure its use in every other part of the instrument .
They have thus stretched it , as it were , on the bed of Procrustes ,
lopping off it
s meaning when it seemed too large for their pur
poses , and extending it when it seemed too short . They have
thus distorted it to themost unnatural shapes , and crippled where
they have sought only to adjust it
s proportions according to their
own opinions . It was very justly observed b
y
Mr . Chief Justice
Marshall , in The Cherokee Nation v . The State of Georgia , 2 that
“ it has been said that the same words have not necessarily the
samemeaning attached to them when found in different parts o
f
the same instrument . Their meaning is controlled by the con
text . This is undoubtedly true . In common language th
e
same
word has various meanings ,and the peculiar sense in which it is
used in any sentence is to be determined b
y
the context . ” A very
easy example o
f
this sort will be found in the use of the word
1 Vattel , B . 2 , ch . 17 , § 28
1
. 2 5 Peters ' s Rep . 1 , 19 .
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“ establish , ” which is found in various places in the Constitution .
Thus , in the preamble , one object of the Constitution is avowed to
be “ to establish justice , " which seems here to mean to settle
firmly , to fix unalterably , or rather , perhaps , as justice , abstract
ly considered , must be considered as forever fixed and unalter
able , to dispense or administer justice . Again , th
e
Constitution
declares that Congress shall have power “ to establish an uniform
rule o
f
naturalization and uniform laws on the subject o
f bank
ruptcies , " where it is manifestly used as equivalent to make , or
form , and not to fix or settle unalterably and forever . Again ,
“ Congress shall have power to establish post -offices and post
roads , ” where the appropriate sense would seem to be to create , to
found , and to regulate , not so much with a view to permanence of
form a
s
to convenience o
f
action . Again , it is declared that “ Con
gress shall make n
o
law respecting an establishment of religion , "
which seems to prohibit any laws which shall recognize , found ,
confirm , or patronize any particular religion , or form of religion ,
whether permanent or temporary , whether already existing or
to arise in future . In this clause , establishment seems equiva
lent in meaning to settlement , recognition , or support . And
again , in the preamble , it is said , “ We , the people , & c . , do ordain
and establish this Constitution , " & c . , where the most appropriate
sense seems to b
e
to create , to ratify , and to confirm . So the
word “ State " will bė found used in the Constitution in al
l
the
various senses to which w
e
have before alluded . It sometimes
means the separate sections o
f territory occupied by the political
societies within each ; sometimes the particular governments es
tablished b
y
these societies ; sometimes these societies asorganized
into these particular governments ; and , lastly , sometimes the peo
p
le
composing these political societies in their highest sovereign
capacity .
$ 455 . XIX . But the most important rule in cases of this na
ture is , that a constitution of government does not , and cannot ,
from it
s
nature , depend in any great degree upon mere verbal
criticism , or upon th
e
import of single words . Such criticism may
not be wholly without use ; it may sometimes illustrate or unfold
the appropriate sense ; but unless it stands well with the context
and subject matter , it must yield to the latter . While , then ,we
may well resort to the meaning o
f single words to assist our in
1 M
r
. Madison ' s Virginia Report , January 7 , 1800 , p . 5 ; ante , $ 20
8 , p . 19
3
.
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quiries , we should never forget that it is an instrument of govern
ment we are to construe ; and , as has been already stated , that
must be the truest exposition which best harmonizes with its de
sign , its objects , and its general structure .
$ 4
5
6
. The remark ofMr . Burke may ,with a very slight change
o
f phrase , be addressed as an admonition to al
l
those who are
called upon to frame or to interpret a constitution . Government
is a practical thing made fo
r
the happiness o
f
mankind , and not to
furnish out a spectacle o
f uniformity to gratify the schemes o
f
visionary politicians . The business o
f
those who are called to ad
minister it is to rule , and not to wrangle . It would be a poor
compensation that one had triumphed in a dispute whilst we had
lost an empire ; ? that we had frittered down a power , and at the
same time had destroyed the Republic .
1 See Vattel , B . 2 , ch . 17 , § 285 , 286 . [See Henshaw v . Foster , 9 Pick . 316 , fo
r
forci
ble remarks o
n
this subject b
y
Chief Justice Parker . ]
? Burke ' s Letter to th
e
Sheriffs o
f
Bristol in 1777 . [Mr . Jefferson said of our gov .
ernment in his Inaugural that it was " the strongest government on earth , " — " the only
one where everyman , at the call of the law , would fl
y
to the standard o
f
the law , and
would meet invasions o
f
the public order a
s
his own personal concern . " The events o
f
1861 - 1865 demonstrated the truth o
f
this remark . But to make and continue it such we
must not confine it
s powers within the limits o
f
a narrow and partisan construction .
“ We are to suppose that those who are delegated to the great business of distributing
the powers which emanated from the sovereignty o
f
the people , and to the establishment
o
f
rules fo
r
the perpetual security o
f
the rights o
f person and property , had the wisdom
to adapt their language to future a
s well as existing emergencies ; so that words com
petent to the then existing state o
f
the community and a
t
the same time capable o
f
being expanded to embrace more extensive relations , should not b
e
restrained to their
more obvious and immediate sense , if , consistently with the general object o
f
the
authors and the true principles o
f
the compact , they can be extended to other relations
and circumstances which a
n improved state o
f society may produce . ” Henshaw v . Fos .
te
r , 9 Pick . 317 , per Parker , Ch . J . ]
VOL . I . 22
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CHAPTER VI .
THE PREAMBLE .
$ 457 . HAVING disposed of these preliminary inquiries , we are
now arrived a
t
that part of our labors which involves a commen
tary upon the actual provisions o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United
States . It is proposed to take u
p
the successive clauses in the
order in which they stand in the instrument itself , so that the
exposition may naturally flow from the terms o
f
the text .
$ 458 . We begin then with the preamble of the Constitution .
It is in the following words :
6 We , the people of the United States , in order to form a more
perfect union , establish justice , insure domestic tranquillity , pro
vide for the common defence , promote the general welfare , and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity , do
ordain and establish this Constitution fo
r
the United States o
f
America . ”
$ 459 . The importance of examining the preamble , for the pur
pose of expounding the language of a statute ,has been long felt ,
and universally conceded in a
ll juridical discussions . It is an ad
mitted maxim in the ordinary course of the administration o
f jus
tice , that the preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of
themakers , as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied and the
objects which are to be accomplished b
y
the provisions of the
statute . We find it laid down in some of our earliest authorities
in the common law , and civilians are accustomed to a similar ex
pression , cessante legis præmio , cessat et ipsa lex . Probably it has
a foundation in the expression o
f
every code o
f
written law , from
the universal principle o
f interpretation , that the will and intention
o
f
th
e
legislature are to be regarded and followed . It is properly
resorted to where doubts o
r ambiguities arise upon the words of
the enacting part ; fo
r
if they are clear and unambiguous , there
seems little room fo
r
interpretation , except in cases leading to an
obvious absurdity , or to a direct overthrow of the intention ex
pressed in the preamble .
1 Bac . Abridg . Statute I . ; 2 Plowden , R . 369 ; 1 Inst . 79 .
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§ 460 . There does not seem any reason why, in a fundamental
law or constitution of government , an equal attention should not
be given to the intention of the framers , as stated in the preamble .
And accordingly we find that it has been constantly referred to
by statesmen and jurists to aid them in the exposition of its pro
visions .1
§ 461 . The language of the preamble of the Constitution was
probably in a good measure drawn from that of the third article
of the confederation , which declared that “ The said States hereby
severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other ,
fo
r
their common defence , the security of their liberties , and their
mutual and general welfare . " And we accordingly find that the
first resolution proposed in the convention which framed the Con
stitution was , that the Articles o
f
the Confederation ought to be so
corrected and enlarged a
s
to accomplish the objects proposed b
y
their institution , namely , common defence , security of liberty , and
general welfare .
$ 462 . And here w
e
must guard ourselves against an error
which is too often allowed to creep into the discussions upon this
subject . The preamble never can be resorted to to enlarge the
powers confided to the general government or any o
f
it
s depart
ments . It cannot confer any power pe
r
se ; it ca
n
never amount ,
b
y
implication , to an enlargement of any power expressly given .
It can never be the legitimate source of any implied power , when
otherwise withdrawn from the Constitution . Its true office is to
expound the nature and extent and application o
f
the powers act
ually conferred b
y
the Constitution , and not substantively to create
them . For example , the preamble declares one object to be , " to
provide for the common defence . ” No one can doubt that this
does not enlarge the powers of Congress to pass any measures
which they may deem useful fo
r
the common defence . But sup
pose the terms o
f
a given power admit o
f
two constructions , the
one more restrictive , the other more liberal , and each of them is
consistent with the words , but is , and ought to be , governed b
y
the intent o
f
the power ; if one would promote and the other
defeat the common defence , ought not the former , upon the sound
est principles of interpretation , to be adopted ? Are we at liberty ,
1 S
e
e
Chisholm v . Georgia , Chief Justice Jay ' s opinion , 2 Dall . 419 .
2 Journal o
f
Convention , 67 ; Id . 88 .
8 Y
e
t
, strangely enough , this objection was urged very strenuously against the adop
tion o
f
the Constitution ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 293 , 300 .
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upon any principles o
f
reason o
r
common -sense , to adopt a re
strictive meaning which will defeat an avowed object of the Con
stitution , when another equally natural and more appropriate to
the object is before u
s
? Would not this be to destroy an instru
ment b
y
a measure o
f
it
s
words , which that instrument itself
repudiates ?
$ 463 . We have already had occasion , in considering the nature
o
f
the Constitution , to dwell upon the terms in which the pream
b
le
is conceived , and the proper conclusion deducible from it . It
is an act o
f
the people , and not of the States in their political
capacities . It is an ordinance or establishment of government ,
and not a compact , though originating in consent ; and it binds as
a fundamental law promulgated b
y
the sovereign authority , and
not as a compact or treaty entered into and in fieri , between each
and a
ll
the citizens o
f
the United States as distinct parties . The
language is : “ We , the people of the United States , ” (not ,We , the
States , ) “ do ordain and establish ” (not , do contract and enter into a
treaty with each other ) “ this Constitution fo
r
the United States o
f
America " (not this treaty between the several States ) . And it is ,
therefore , an unwarrantable assumption , not to call it a most ex
travagant stretch o
f interpretation , wholly at variance with the
language , to substitute other words and other senses for the words
and senses incorporated , in this solemn manner , into the sub
stance o
f
the instrument itself . We have the strongest assur
ances that this preamble was not adopted as amere formulary , but
a
s
a solemn promulgation o
f
a fundamental fact , vital to the char
acter and operations of the government . The obvious object was
to substitute a government of the people fo
r
a confederacy o
f
States ; a constitution for a compact . The difficulties arising
from this source were not slight ; fo
r
a notion commonly enough ,
however incorrectly ,prevailed , that , as it was ratified by th
e
States
only , the States respectively at their pleasure might repeal it ; and
this , o
f
itself , proved the necessity of laying the foundations of a
i See 2 Lloyd ' s Debates , 1789 , p . 178 , 180 , 181 .
? By a constitution is to be understood (says Mr . Justice Wilson ) a supreme law ,
made and ratified b
y
those in whom the sovereign power o
f
the state resides , which
prescribes the manner in which that sovereign power wills that the government should
b
e
instituted and administered . I Wilson ' s Lectures ,417 . (See Jameson , Constitu
tional Convention , $ 63 . ]
It contributed not a little to the infirmities of the Articles of the Confederation , that
it never had a ratification b
y
the people . The Federalist , 22 .
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national government deeper than in the mere sanction of del
egated power . The convention determined that the fabric of
American empire ought to rest and should rest on th
e
solid basis
o
f
the consent o
f
the people . The streams of national power
ought to flow and should flow immediately from the highest origi
nal fountain o
f
a
ll legitimate authority . And , accordingly , the
advocates o
f
the Constitution so treated it in their reasoning in
favor of it
s adoption . “ The Constitution , " said the Federalist ,
“ is to be founded on the assent and ratification o
f
the people o
f
America , given b
y
deputies elected fo
r
that purpose ; but this
assent and ratification is to be given b
y
the people , not as individ
uals composing a whole nation , but as composing the distinct and
independent States to which they belong . " 3 And the uniform
doctrine o
f
the highest judicial authority has accordingly been ,
that it was the act of the people , and not of the States ; and that
it bound the latter as subordinate to the people . “ Let us turn , "
said Mr . Chief Justice Jay , “ to the Constitution . The people
therein declare that their design in establishing it comprehended
si
x objects : 1 . to form a more perfect union ; 2 . to establish
justice ; 3 . to insure domestic tranquillity ; 4 . to provide for the
common defence ; 5 . to promote the general welfare ; 6 . to se
cure the blessings o
f liberty to themselves and their posterity .
It would , ” he added , “ be pleasing and useful to consider and
trace the relations which each o
f
these objects bears to the others ,
and to show that , collectively , they comprise everything requisite ,
with the blessing o
f
Divine Providence , to render a people pros
perous and happy . ” 3 In Martin v . Hunter ' s Lessee , 4 the Supreme
Court say , ( as we have seen , ) “ The Constitution of th
e
United
States was ordained and established , not b
y
the States in their
sovereign capacities ,but emphatically , as the preamble of the Con
stitution declares , b
y
the people of the United States ” ; and lan
guage still more expressive will be found used on other solemn
occasions . 5
$ 464 . But this point has been so much dwelt upon in the dis
cussion o
f
other topics , that it is wholly unnecessary to pursue it
1 The Federalist , No . 22 ; se
e
also N
o . 43 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 75 ; ante , p . 248 .
2 The Federalist , No . 39 ; Id . No . 84 .
8 Chisholm v . Georgia , 2 Dall .419 . 41Wheat . R . 305 , 324 .
6 S
e
e
McCulloch v . Maryland , 4 Wheat . R . 31
6
, 404 , 405 ; Cohens v . Virginia , 6
Wheat . R . 264 , 413 , 414 ; see also 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 10 , r . 189 .
6 Ante , p . 318 to 322 .
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further . It does , however , deserve notice , that this phraseology
was a matter of much critical debate in some o
f
the conventions
called to ratify the Constitution . On the one hand it was pressed ,
a
s
a subject of just alarm to the States , that the people were sub
stituted for the States ; that this would involve a destruction of
the States in one consolidated national government ; and would
terminate in the subversion of the public liberties . On the other
hand , it was urged , as the only safe course for the preservation of
th
e
Union and the liberties o
f
the people , that the government
should emanate from the people , and not from the States ; that it
should not be , like the confederation , a mere treaty , operating b
y
requisitions on the States ; and that the people , fo
r
whose benefit
it was framed , ought to have the sole and exclusive right to ratify ,
amend , and control its provisions .
§ 465 . A
t
this distance o
f
time , after all the passions and in
terests which then agitated the country have passed away , it
cannot but be matter of surprise that it should have been urged ,
a
s
a solid objection to a government intended fo
r
the benefit o
f
the
people and to operate directly on them , that it was required to be
ratified b
y
them , and not b
y
bodies politic created b
y
them fo
r
other purposes , and having no implied authority to act on the
subject .
$ 466 . The Constitution having been in operation more than
forty years , and being generally approved , it may , at first sight ,
seem unnecessary to enter upon any examination o
f
the manner
and extent to which it is calculated to accomplish the objects pro
posed in the preamble , or the importance of those objects , not
merely to the whole , in a national view , but also to the individual
States . Attempts have , however , been made a
t
different times , in
different parts o
f
the Union , to stir u
p
a disaffection to the theory ,
a
s
well a
s
the actual exercise of the powers o
f
the general govern
ment ; to doubt its advantages ; to exaggerate the unavoidable ine
qualities o
f
it
s operations ; to accustom the minds of the people
to contemplate the consequences o
f
a division , as fraught with no
1 The debates in the Virginia Convention are very pointed o
n
this subject . Mr .
Henry urged these objections against it in a very forcible manner ( 2 Elliot ' s Virginia
Debates , 47 , 61 , 131 ) ; and he was replied to , and the preamble vindicated with great
ability b
y Mr . Randolph ,Mr . Pendleton , Mr . Lee ,Mr . Nicholas , and Mr . Corbin . 2
Elliot ' s Virginia Debates , 51 , 57 , 97 , 98 . The subject is also discussed in the North
Carolina Debates , ( 3 Elliot ' s Deb . 134 , 145 , ) and in the Massachusetts Debates . I
Elliot ' s Deb . 72 , 110 . See also 2 Pitk . Hist . 370 ; 3 Amer .Museum , 536 , 546 .
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dangerous evils ; and thus to lead the way , if not designedly , at
least insensibly , to a separation , as involving no necessary sacri
fice of important blessings or principles , and , on the whole , under
some circumstances , as not undesirable or improbable .
$ 467 . It is easy to see how many different and even opposite
motives may , in different parts of the Union , at different times ,
give rise to and encourage such speculations . Political passions
and prejudices , the disappointments of personal ambition , the ex
citements and mortifications of party strife , the struggles for par
ticular systems and measures , the interests , jealousies , and rivalries
of particular States, the unequal local pressure of a particular sys
tem of policy , either temporary or permanent , the honest zeal of
mere theorists and enthusiasts in relation to government , the real
or imaginary dread of a national consolidation , the debasive and
corrupt projects of mere demagogues , — these , and many other in
fluences of more or less purity and extent ,may , and we almost
fear must , among a free people , open to argument and eager fo
r
discussion , and anxious for a more perfect organization of society ,
forever preserve the elements o
f
doubt and discord , and bring into
inquiry among many minds the question o
f
the value o
f
the Union .
$ 468 . Under these circumstances , itmay not be without some
use to condense , in an abridged form , some of those reasons which
become , with reflecting minds , the solid foundation on which the
adoption o
f
the Constitution was originally rested , and which , be
ing permanent in their nature , ought to secure its perpetuity as
the sheet -anchor of our political hopes . Let us follow out , then ,
the suggestion o
f Mr . Chief Justice Jay , in the passage already
cited . 1
$ 469 . The Constitution , then , was adopted , first , “ to form a
more perfect union . ” Why this was desirable has been in some
measure anticipated in considering the defects o
f
the confederation .
When the Constitution , however , was before the people fo
r
ratifi
cation , suggestions were frequently made b
y
those who were o
p
posed to it , that the country was too extensive for a single national
government , and ought to be broken u
p
into several distinct con
federacies o
r sovereignties ; and some even went so far as to doubt
whether it were not , on the whole , best that each State should
i Chisholm v . Georgia , 2 Dall . R . 419 . We shall freely us
e
the admirable reasoning
o
f
the Federalist o
n
the subject o
f
the Union , without in every instance quoting the par
ticular citations , as they would encumber the text .
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retain a separate , independent , and sovereign political existence . 1
Those who contemplated several confederacies speculated upon a
dismemberment into three great confederacies , one of the Northern ,
another o
f
the Middle , and a third of the Southern States . The
greater probability , certainly , then was of a separation into two
confederacies ; the one composed of the Northern and Middle
States , and the other of the Southern . The reasoning of the
Federalist on this subject seems absolutely irresistible . The
progress o
f
the population in the Western territory , since that
period , has materially changed the basis of all that reasoning .
There could scarcely now exist upon any dismemberment (with a
view to local interests , political associations , o
r public safety ) less
than three confederacies , and most probably four . And it is more
than probable that the line o
f
division would be traced out b
y geo
graphical boundaries which would separate the slaveholding from
the non - slaveholding States . Such a distinction in government is
so fraught with causes o
f
irritation and alarm that no honest patriot
could contemplate it without many painful and distressing fears .
§ 470 . But the material consideration which should be kept
steadily in view is , that under such circumstances a national gov
ernment , clothed with powers a
t
least equally extensive with those
given b
y
the Constitution , would be indispensable for the preser
vation of each separate confederacy . Nay , it cannot be doubted
that much larger powers and much heavier expenditures would be
necessary . No nation could long maintain its public liberties , sur
rounded b
y powerful and vigilant neighbors , unless it possessed a
government clothed with powers o
f great efficiency , prompt to act ,
and able to repel every invasion of its rights . Nor would it afford
the slightest security that a
ll
the confederacies were composed o
f
a people descended from the same ancestors , speaking the same
language , professing th
e
same religion , attached to the same prin
ciples o
f government , and possessing similar manners ,habits , and
customs . If it be true that these circumstances would not be suf
ficient to hold them in a bond o
f
peace and union when forming
one government , acting for the interests and as the representatives
o
f
the rights o
f
the whole ,how could a better fate be expected when
the interests and the representation were separate , and ambition ,
1 The Federalist , Nos . 1 , 2 , 9 , 13 , 14 ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 28
5
, 286 ; Paley ' s Moral
and Political Philosophy , B . 4 , ch . 6 .
9 The Federalist , Nos . 13 , 14 .
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and local interests and feelings , and peculiarities of climate and
products , and institutions , and imaginary or real aggressions and
grievances , and the rivalries of commerce and the jealousies of
dominion should spread themselves over the distinct councils
which would regulate their concerns by independent legislation ? 1
The experience of the whole world is against any reliance fo
r
se
curity and peace between neighboring nations under such circum
stances . The Abbe Mably has forcibly stated in a single passage
the whole result o
f
human experience on this subject . “ Neigh
boring states , " says he , “ are naturally enemies of each other , unless
their common weakness forces them to league in a confederative
republic , and their constitution prevents the differences that neigh
borhood occasions , extinguishing that secret jealousy which dis
poses all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense o
f
their
neighbors . ” This passage , as has been truly observed , at the same
time points out the evil and suggests the remedy . ?
$ 471 . The same reasoning would apply with augmented force
to the case of a dismemberment when each State should b
y
itself
constitute a nation . The very inequalities in the size , the reve
nues , the population , the products , the interests , and even in the
institutions and laws o
f
each would occasion a perpetual petty
warfare o
f legislation , of border aggressions and violations , and of
political and personal animosities , which , first or last ,would ter
minate in the subjugation o
f
the weaker to the arms o
f
the strong
e
r . In our further observations on this subject , it is not proposed
to distinguish the case o
f
several confederacies from that o
f
a com
plete separation o
f
a
ll
the States , as in a general sense the remarks
apply with irresistible , if not with uniform , force to each .
$ 472 . Does , then , the extent of our territory form any solid ob
1 The Federalist , Nos . 2 , 5 , 6 , 7 ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 286 ; Paley ' s Moral and Politi
cal Philosophy , B . 4 , ch . 6 .
2 The Federalist , No . 6 .
The remarks which Tacitus puts in themouth o
f Calgacus , in his Life o
f
Agricola ,
a
re
here applicable : “ Nostris ill
i
discessionibus a
c
discordiis clari , vitia hostium in glo
riam exercitus sui vertunt ; quem contractum ex diversissimis gentibus , ut secundæ res
tenent , ita adversæ dissolvent ; nisi siGallos et Germanos et (pudet dictu ) Britannorum
plerosque , licetdominationi alienæ sanguinem commodent , diutius tamen hostes quam
servos , fide e
t
affectu teneri putatis : metus e
t
terror est , infirma vincula caritatis ; quæ
ubi removeris , qui timere desierint , odisse incipient . ” – Tacitus , Vita Agricolæ , cap .
xxxii .
3 The Federalist , Nos . 5 , 6 , 7 . It was so in our colonial state . See 2 Grahame ' s
Hist . App . p . 498 , 499 .
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jection against forming “ this more perfect union ” ? This ques
tion , so far as respects the original territory included within the
boundaries of the United States b
y
treaty o
f
peace o
f
1783 , seems
almost settled b
y
the experience of the last forty years . It is no
longer a matter o
f conjecture how far the government is capable
( a
ll
other things being equal ) o
f
being practically applied to the
whole o
f
that territory . The distance between the utmost limits
o
f
our present population , and the diversity of interests among the
whole , seem to have presented no obstacles under the beneficent
administration o
f
the general government to the most perfect
harmony and general advancement o
f all . Perhaps it has been
demonstrated ( so far as our limited experience goes ) that the
increased facilities o
f
intercourse , the uniformity of regulations and
laws , the common protection , the mutual sacrifices of local inter
ests , when incompatible with that of al
l
, and the pride and confi
dence in a government in which all are represented and all are
equal in rights and privileges , - perhaps ,wesay , it has been demon
strated that these effects o
f
the Union have promoted , in a higher
degree , the prosperity of every State than could have been attained
b
y any single State standing alone in the freest exercise o
f
a
ll
it
s
intelligence , it
s
resources , and its institutions , without any check
o
r
obstruction during the same period . The great change which
has been made in our internal condition , as well as in our terri
torial power , b
y
the acquisition o
f
Louisiana and Florida , have ,
indeed , given rise to many serious reflections whether such an
expansion o
f
our empire may not hereafter endanger the original
system . But time alone can solve this question ; and to time it
is the part o
f
wisdom and patriotism to leave it .
$ 473 . When , however , the Constitution was before the people
for adoption , objections , as has been already suggested , were
strenuously urged against a general government , founded upon
the then extent o
f
our territory , and the authority of Montes
quieu was relied on in support o
f
the objections . It is not a
little surprising that Montesquieu should have been relied on fo
r
this purpose . He obviously had in view ,when he recommends a
moderate extent o
f territory as best suited to a republic , small
states , whose dimensions were far less than the limits of one half
o
f
those in the Union ; so that , upon strictly following out his sug
gestions , the latter ought to have been divided . But he suggests
11Montesquiea ' s Spirit of Laws , B . 9 , ch . 1 . See also Beccaria , ch . 26 .
CH. VI.] 347THE PREAMBLE .
the appropriate remedy of a confederate republic , (the very form
adopted in the Constitution , ) as the proper means of at once se
curing safety and liberty with extensive territory . The truth is ,
that what size is safe for a nation , with a view to the protection of
it
s rights and liberties , is a question which admits of no universal
solution . Much depends upon its local position , its neighbors , its
resources , the facilities of invasion and of repelling invasion , the
general state o
f
the world , themeans and weapons o
f
warfare , the
interests o
f
other nations in preserving or destroying it , and other
circumstances , which scarcely admit of enumeration . How far a
republican government can , in a confederated form , be extended ,
and b
e
a
t
once efficient abroad and a
t
home , can insure general
happiness to it
s
own citizens , and perpetuate the principles of lib
erty and preserve the substance o
f justice , is a great problem in
the theory o
f government ,which America is now endeavoring to
unfold , and which , b
y
the blessing o
f God , we must a
ll earnestly
hope that she may successfully demonstrate .
$ 474 . In the mean time , the following considerations may
serve to cheer our hopes and dispel our fears : first , 1 . the ex
tent o
f territory is not incompatible with a just spirit o
f patriot
is
m ; 2 . nor with a general representation of al
l
the interests
and population with it ; 3 . nor with a due regard to the peculiar
local advantages o
r disadvantages o
f any part ; 4 . nor with a
rapid and convenient circulation o
f
information useful to all ,
whether they are rulers o
r people . On the other hand , it has
some advantages o
f
a very important nature . 1 . It can afford
greater protection against foreign enemies . 2 . It can give a
wider range to enterprise and commerce . 3 . It can secure more
thoroughly national independence to a
ll
the great interests o
f
society , agriculture , commerce , manufactures , literature , learning ,
religion . 4 . It can more readily disarm and tranquillize domes
ti
c
factions in a single State . 5 . It can administer justice more
completely and perfectly . 6 . It can command larger revenues
fo
r
public objects without oppression o
r heavy taxation . 7 . It
can economize more in a
ll
it
s
internal arrangements , whenever
necessary . In short , as has been said with equal truth and force ,
“ One government can collect and avail itself o
f
the talents and
experience o
f
the ablest men , in whatever part of the Union they
1 The Federalist , No . 9 ; 1 Wilson ' s Works , 347 to 359 ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 276 to
278 .
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may b
e
found . It can move on uniform principles of policy . It
can harmonize , assimilate , and protect th
e
several parts and mem
bers , and extend the benefit o
f
its foresight and precautions to
each . In the formation of treaties , it will regard the interests of
the whole , and the particular interests of the parts as connected
with that o
f
the whole . It can apply th
e
revenues of the whole
to the defence o
f any particular part , and that more easily and
expeditiously than State governments o
r separate confederacies
can possibly do , fo
r
want o
f
concert and unity of system . ” 1
Upon some of these topics w
e may enlarge hereafter .
1 The Federalist , No . 4 . The following passages from the Federalist , No . 51 , present
the subject o
f
the advantages o
f
the Union in a striking light : “ There are ,moreover ,
two considerations particularly applicable to the Federal system o
f
America , which place
it in a very interesting point o
f view .
“ First , in a single republic , a
ll
the power surrendered b
y
the people is submitted to
the administration o
f
a single government ; and the usurpations are guarded against b
y
a division o
f
the government into distinct and separate departments . In the compound
republic o
f
America , the power surrendered b
y
the people is first divided between two
distinct governments , and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct
and separate departments . Hence a double security arises to the rights o
f
the people .
The different governments will control each other , at the same time that each will be
controlled b
y
itself .
“ Secondly , it is of great importance in a republic , not only to guard the society
against the oppression o
f
it
s
rulers , but to guard one part o
f
the society against the
injustice o
f
the other part . Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of
citizens . If a majority be united b
y
a common interest , the rights o
f
the minority will
b
e
insecure . There are but two methods o
f
providing against this evil : the one b
y
creating a will in the community independent o
f
the majority , that is , of the society
itself ; the other , b
y
comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions o
f citi
zens a
swill render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable ,
if not impracticable . The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hered
itary o
r
self -appointed authority . This , at best , is but a precarious security ; because
a power independent o
f
the society may a
s
well espouse the unjust views o
f themajor
a
s
the rightful interests o
f
the minor party , and may possibly b
e
turned against both
parties . The second method will be exemplified in the Federal republic of the United
States . Whilst al
l
authority in it will be derived from , and dependent on , the society ,
the society itself will be broken into so many parts , interests , and classes of citizens ,
that the rights o
f
individuals o
r o
f
theminority will b
e
in little danger from interested
combinations o
f
themajority . In a free government , the security for civil rights must
b
e
the same a
s
that for religious rights . It consists , in the one case , in the multiplicity
o
f
interests , and , in the other , in the multiplicity of sects . The degree of security in
both caseswill depend on the number of interests and sects ; and this may be presumed
to depend o
n
the extent o
f country and number o
f people comprehended under the same
government . This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper Federal
system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government ; since it
shows , that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more
circumscribed confederacies o
r
States , oppressive combinations of a majority will be
facilitated ; the best security , under the republican form , for the rights o
f every class o
f
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$ 475 . The union of these States , “ the more perfect union ,” is ,
then , and must forever be, invaluable to al
l , in respect both to
foreign and domestic concerns . Itwill prevent some of the causes
o
f
war , that scourge of the human race , b
y enabling the general
government , not only to negotiate suitable treaties for the pro
tection o
f
the rights and interests o
f
a
ll , but b
y
compelling a gen
eral obedience to them , and a general respect for the obligations
o
f
the law o
f
nations . It is notorious that , even under the con
federation , the obligations of treaty stipulations were openly vio
lated or silently disregarded ; and the peace of the whole confed
eracy was a
t
the mercy o
f
the majority o
f any single State . If
the States were separated , they would , or might , form separate
and independent treaties with different nations , according to
their peculiar interests . These treaties would , or might , involve
jealousies and rivalries a
t
home as well a
s
abroad , and introduce
conflicts between nations struggling fo
r
a monopoly o
f
the trade
with each State . Retaliatory or evasive stipulations would be
made , to counteract the injurious system of a neighboring o
r dis
citizens ,will be diminished ; and , consequently , th
e
stability and independence o
f
some
member o
f
the government , the only other security , must be proportionably increased .
Justice is the end o
f government . It is the end of civil society . It ever has been , and
ever will be , pursued until it be obtained , o
r until liberty be lost in the pursuit . In a
society under the forms o
f
which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker , anarchy may as truly be said to reign a
s
in a state o
f
nature where the weaker
individual is not secured against the violence o
f
the stronger . And , as in the latter
state , even the stronger individuals are prompted b
y
the uncertainty o
f
their condition
to submit to a government which may protect the weak , a
s well a
s
themselves , s
o , in
the former state , will the more powerful factions b
e gradually induced b
y
a like motive ,
to wish for a government which will protect all parties , the weaker a
s well as the more
powerful . It can be little doubted , that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from
the confederacy and left to itself , the insecurity of rights , under the popular form of
government within such narrow limits , would be displayed b
y
such reiterated oppres
sions o
f
the factious majorities , that some power , altogether independent of the people ,
would soon b
e
called fo
r
b
y
the voice o
f
the very factions whose misrule had proved
the necessity o
f
it . In the extended republic of the United States , and among the great
variety o
f interests , parties , and sects which it embraces , a coalition o
f
a majority o
f
the
whole society could seldom take place upon any other principles than those o
f justice
and the general good ; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor , from thewill o
f
themajor party , there must be less pretext also to provide fo
r
the security o
f the former ,
b
y
introducing into the government a will not dependent o
n
the latter ; or , in other
words , a will independent of the society itself . It is no less certain that it is important ,
notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained , that the larger the
society , provided it lie within a practicable sphere , the more duly capable it will b
e
o
f
self -government . And , happily fo
r
th
e
republican cause , th
e
practicable sphere may be
carried to a very great extent , b
y
a judicious modification and mixture o
f
the Federal
principle . "
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tant State , and thus the scene be again acted over with renewed
violence which succeeded the peace of 1783 , when the common
interests were forgotten in the general struggle for superiority .
It would manifestly be the interest of foreign nations to promote
these animosities and jealousies , that , in the general weakness ,
the States might seek their protection b
y
a
n undue sacrifice o
f
their interests , or fall an easy prey to their arms .
$ 476 . The dangers , too , to all the States in case of division ,
from foreign wars and invasion ,must be imminent , independent
o
f
those from the neighborhood o
f
the colonies and dependencies
o
f
other governments on this continent . Their very weakness
would invite aggression . The ambition of the European govern
ments to obtain a mastery of power in colonies and distant pos
sessions would be perpetually involving them in embarrassing
negotiations or conflicts , however peaceable might be their own
conduct , and however inoffensive their own pursuits and objects .
America , as of old , would become the theatre of warlike opera
tions in which she had n
o
interests ; and , with a view to their own
security , the States would be compelled to fall back into a general
colonial submission , or sink into dependencies of such of the great
European powers a
s might be most favorable to their interests , or
most commanding over their resources . ?
§ 477 . There are also peculiar interests of some of the States ,
which would , upon a separation , be wholly sacrificed , or become
the source o
f
immeasurable calamities . The New England States
have a vital interest in the fisheries with their rivals , England and
France ; and how could New England resist either of these pow
ers in a struggle fo
r
the common right , if attempted to be re
strained o
r
abolished ? What would become o
f Maryland and Vir
ginia , if the Chesapeake were under the dominion of different for
eign powers de facto , though not in form ? The free navigation of
the Mississippi and the lakes , and , it may be added , the exclusive
navigation o
f
them , seems indispensable to the security as well
a
s the prosperity of the Western States . How , otherwise than b
y
a general union , could this bemaintained or guaranteed ? 8
$ 478 . And again , as to commerce , so important to the navi
gating States , and so productive to the agricultural States , itmust
be at once perceived that no adequate protection could be given to
1 : The Federalist , Nos . 2 , 3 , 4 ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 290 .
2 The Federalist , Nos . 3 , 4 , 5 . 8 The Federalist ,No . 15 .
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either, unless by the strong and uniform operations of a general
government . Each State by its own regulations would seek to
promote it
s
own interests , to the ruin or injury of those of others .
The relative situation o
f
these States ; the number of rivers by
which they ar
e
intersected , and of bays that wash their shores ;
the facility o
f
communication in every direction , the affinity of
language and manners ; the familiar habits of intercourse , — a
ll
these circumstances would conspire to render an illicit trade be
tween them matter o
f
little difficulty , and would insure frequent
evasions o
f
the commercial regulations o
f
each other . All for
eign nations would have a common interest in crippling u
s ; and all
the evils o
f
colonial servitude and commercial monopoly would b
e
inflicted upon u
s b
y
the hands o
f
our own kindred and neighbors . ?
But this topic , though capable of being presented in detail from
our past experience in such glowing colors a
s
to startle themost
incredulous into a conviction o
f
the ultimate poverty ,wretchedness ,
and distress which would overwhelm every State ,does not require
to b
e more than hinted a
t . We have already seen , in our former
examination o
f
the defects o
f
the confederation , that every State
was ruined in it
s
revenues , as well as in its commerce , by the want
o
f
a more efficient government .
$ 479 . Nor should it be imagined that , however injurious to
commerce , the evils would be less in respect to domestic manu
factures and agriculture . In respect to manufactures , the truth
is so obvious that it requires no argument to illustrate it . In
relation to the agricultural States , however , an opinion has , at
some times and in some sections o
f
the country , been prevalent ,
that the agricultural interests would be equally safe without any
general government . The following , among other considerations ,
may serve to show the fallacy o
f
a
ll
such suggestions . A large
and uniform market a
t
home fo
r
native productions has a tendency
to prevent those sudden rises and falls in prices which are so
deeply injurious to the farmer and the planter . The exclusive
possession o
f
the home market against a
ll foreign competition
gives a permanent security to investments which slowly yield
their returns , and encourages the laying out of capital in agri
1 The Federalist , No . 12 .
3 The Federalist , Nos . 11 , 12 .
. The Federalist , Nos . 5 , 7 , 11 , 12 ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 290 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 74 ,
144 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 248 , 249 ; Brown v . Maryland , 12 Wheat . R . 419 ,
445 , 446 .
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cultural improvements . Suppose cotton , tobacco , and wheat were
at a
ll
times admissible from foreign states without duty , would
not the effect b
e permanently to check any cultivation beyond what
a
t
the moment seems sure o
f
a safe sale ? Would not foreign
nations be perpetually tempted to send their surplus here , and
thus , from time to time , depress or glut the home market ?
§ 480 . Again , the neighboring States would often engage in the
same species of cultivation , and yet with very different natural
o
r
artificial means ofmaking the products equally cheap . This
inequality would immediately give rise to legislative measures to
correct the evil , and to secure , if possible , superior advantages
over the rival State . This would introduce endless crimination
and retaliation , laws fo
r
defence and laws for offence . Smug
gling would be everywhere openly encouraged o
r secretly connived
a
t . The vital interests of a State would lie in many instances at
the mercy o
f
it
s neighbors , who might , at the same time , feel that
their own interests were promoted b
y
the ruin o
f
their neighbors .
And the distant States , knowing that their own wants and pur
suits were wholly disregarded , would become willing auxiliaries
in any plans to encourage cultivation and consumption elsewhere .
Such is human nature ! Such are the infirmities which history
severely instructs us belong to neighbors and rivals ; to those who
navigate , and those who plant ; to those who desire , and those
who repine a
t
the prosperity o
f surrounding States . "
§ 481 . Again , foreign nations , under such circumstances ,must
have a common interest , as carriers , to bring to the agricultural
States their own manufactures a
t
a
s dear a rate as possible , and
to depress the market o
f
the domestic products to the minimum
price o
f
competition . They must have a common interest to stim
ulate the neighboring States to a ruinous jealousy ; or , b
y
foster
ing the interests o
f
one with whom they can deal upon more
advantageous terms , or over whom they have acquired a decisive
influence , to subject to a corresponding influence others which
struggle fo
r
a
n independent existence . This is not mere theory .
Examples , and successful examples , of this policy may be traced
through the period between the peace o
f
1783 and the adoption o
f
the Constitution .
i The Federalist , No . 7 . The like course in our colonial state , 2 Grahame ' s Hist ,
App . 498 , 499 .
2 The Federalist , Nos . 4 , 5 , 11 .
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$ 482. But not to dwell further on these important inducements
“ to form a more perfect union ," let us pass to the next object ,
which is to “ establish justice .” This must forever be one of the
great ends of every wise government ; and even in arbitrary gov
ernments itmust , to a great extent , be practised , at least in respect
to private persons, as the only security against rebellion , private
vengeance,and popular cruelty. But in a free government it lies at
the very basis of all it
s
institutions . Without justice being freely ,
fully , and impartially administered , neither our persons , nor our
rights , nor our property , can be protected . And if these , or
either o
f
them , are regulated b
y
n
o
certain laws , and are subject
to n
o
certain principles , and are held b
y
n
o
certain tenure , and
are redressed , when violated , b
y
no certain remedies , society fails
o
f
a
ll
it
s
value ; and men may as well return to a state of savage
and barbarous independence . No one can doubt , therefore , that
the establishment o
f justice must be one main object of a
ll
our
State governments . Why , then ,may it be asked , should it form
so prominent a motive in the establishment o
f
the national govern
ment ?
$ 483 . This is now proposed to be shown in a concise manner .
In the administration of justice , foreign nations and foreign in
dividuals , as well as citizens , have a deep stake ; but the former
have not always a
s complete 'means of redress as the latter ; for
it may be presumed , that the State laws will always provide ade
quate tribunals to redress the grievances and sustain the rights o
f
their own citizens . But this would be a very imperfect view of
the subject . Citizens of contiguous States have a very deep inter
est in the administration o
f justice in each State ; and even those
which are most distant , but belonging to the same confederacy ,
cannot but be affected b
y
every inequality in the provisions o
r
the
actual operations o
f
the laws of each other . While every State
remains a
t
full liberty to legislate upon the subject o
f rights , priv
ileges , contracts , and remedies , as it may please , it is scarcely
to b
e expected that they will all concur in the same general sys
tem o
f policy . The natural tendency o
f
every government is to
favor it
s
own citizens ; and unjust preferences , not only in the
administration of justice , but in the very structure o
f
the laws ,
may reasonably be expected to arise . Popular prejudices , or
passions , supposed or real injuries , th
e
predominance of home
pursuits and feelings over the comprehensive views o
f
a liberal
VOL . I . 23
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jurisprudence , will readily achieve the most mischievous projects
for this purpose . And these , again , b
y
a natural reaction , will
introduce correspondent regulations and retaliatory measures in
other States .
$ 484 . Now , exactly what this course o
f reasoning has led us to
presume a
s probable ,has been demonstrated by experience to be
true in respect to our own confederacy during the short period of
it
s
existence , and under circumstances well calculated to induce
each State to sacrifice many o
f
it
s
own objects for the general
good . Nay , even when we were colonies , dependent upon the
authority o
f
the mother country , these inequalities were ob
servable in the local legislation o
f
several o
f
th
e
States , and pro
duced heartburnings and discontents , which were not easily a
p
peased .
$ 485 . First , in respect to foreign nations . After the confeder
acy was formed , and we had assumed the general rights o
f
war
a
s
a sovereign , belligerent nation , authority to make captures and
to bring in ships and cargoes for adjudication naturally flowed
from the proper exercise o
f
these rights b
y
the la
w
o
f
nations .
The States respectively retained the power of appointing prize
tribunals , to take cognizance of thesematters in the first instance ;
and thus thirteen distinct jurisdictions were established , which
acted entirely independent o
f
each other . It is true that the Arti
cles of Confederation had delegated to the general government the
authority o
f establishing courts fo
r
receiving and determining ,
finally , appeals in all cases of captures . Congress accordingly
instituted proper appellate tribunals , to which the State courts
were subordinate , and ,upon constitutional principles , were bound
to yield obedience . But it is notorious , that the decisions of
the appellate tribunals were disregarded , and treated asmere nul
lities , for no power to enforce them was lodged in Congress . They
operated , therefore ,merely b
y
moral influence and requisition , and
a
s
such , soon sank into insignificance . Neutral individuals , as
well as neutral nations , were left wholly without any adequate
redress fo
r
the most inexcusable injustice , and the confederacy
subjected to imminent hazards . And until the Constitution of the
United States was established , no remedy was ever effectually
administered . Treaties , too , were formed b
y
Congress with
1 S
e
e
the resolves o
f Congress , Journals of 1779 , p . 86 ; Penhallow v . Doane , 3 Dall .
5
4 ; Jennings v . Carson , 4 Cranch , 2 ; Chisholm v . Georgia , 2 Dall . 419 , 474 .
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various nations ; and above al
l , the treaty of peace of 1783 ,
which gave complete stability to our independence against Great
Britain . These treaties were , b
y
the theory of the confederation ,
absolutely obligatory upon a
ll
the States . Yet their provisions
were notoriously violated both b
y
State legislation and State judi
cial tribunals . The non -fulfilment of the stipulations of th
e
Brit
is
h
treaty o
n our part more than once threatened to involve the
whole country again in war . And the provision in that treaty for
the payment o
f
British debts was practically disregarded in many ,
if not in a
ll , the State courts . These debts never were enforced
until the Constitution gave them a direct and adequate sanction ,
independently o
f
State legislation and State courts .
$ 486 . Besides the debts due to foreigners , and the obligations
to pay the same , the public debt of the United States was left
utterly unprovided for ; and the officers and soldiers of the Revo
lution , who had achieved our independence , were , as we have had
occasion to notice , suffered to languish in want , and their just
demands evaded , or passed b
y
with indifference . No efficient
system to pay the public creditors was ever carried into operation ,
until the Constitution was adopted ; and , notwithstanding the
increase o
f
the public debt , occasioned b
y
intermediate wars , it is
now on the very eve o
f
a total extinguishment .
§ 487 . These evils ,whatever might be their magnitude , did not
create so universal a distress , or so much private discontent , as
others o
f
a more domestic nature , which were subversive o
f
the
first principles o
f justice . Independent of the unjustifiable pref
erences , which were fostered in favor of citizens of the State over
those belonging to other States , which were not few nor slight ,
there were certain calamities inflicted b
y
the common course of
legislation in most o
f
the States , which went to the prostration of
all public faith and all private credit . Laws were constantly
made b
y
the State legislatures violating , with more o
r
less degrees
o
f aggravation , the sacredness of private contracts . Laws com
pelling the receipt o
f
a depreciated and depreciating paper cur
rency in payment o
f
debts were generally , if not universally , prev
alent . Laws authorizing the payment of debts by instalments ,
1 See 1 Wait ' s State Papers , 226 to 388 ; Ware v . Hylton , 3 Dall , R . 199 ; Hopkins v .
Ben , 3 Cranch , 454 ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 290 ; Chisholm v . Georgia , 2 Dall . 419 , 474 .
2 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , ch . 1 , p . 46 to 49 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 180 to 183 ; Jour
dal of Congress , 1783 , p . 194 et s
e
q
. ; 3 Wilson ' s Works , 290 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 84 .
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at periods differing entirely from the original terms of the con
tract ; laws suspending , fo
r
a limited o
r
uncertain period , the
remedies to recover debts in the ordinary course o
f legal proceed
ings ; laws authorizing the delivery of any sort of property , how
ever unproductive o
r
undesirable , in payment of debts upon an
arbitrary or friendly appraisement ; laws shutting u
p
the courts
for certain periods and under certain circumstances , — were not
infrequent upon the statute -books of many of the States now com
posing the Union . In the rear o
f
all these came the systems of
general insolvent laws , some of which were of a permanent nature ,
and others again were adopted upon the spur o
f
the occasion , like
a sort o
f gaol delivery under the lords ' acts in England , which
had so few guards against frauds o
f every kind b
y
the debtor ,
that in practice they amounted to an absolute discharge from any
debt , without anything more than a nominal dividend ; and
sometimes even this vain mockery was dispensed with . In short ,
b
y
the operations o
f paper currency , tender laws , instalment laws ,
suspension laws , appraisement laws , and insolvent laws , contrived
with a
ll
the dexterous ingenuity o
f
men oppressed b
y
debt , and
popular b
y
the very extent of private embarrassments , th
e
States
were almost universally plunged into a ruinous poverty , distrust ,
debility , and indifference to justice . The local tribunals were
bound to obey the legislative will ; and in the few instances in
which it was resisted , the independence of the judges was sacri
ficed to the temper of the times . It is well known , that Shay ' s
rebellion in Massachusetts took its origin from this source . The
object was to prostrate the regular administration of justice b
y
a
system o
f
terror , which should prevent the recovery of debts and
taxes . 3
$ 488 . The Federalist speaks on this subject with unusual em
phasis . “ The loss which America has sustained from the pesti
i See Chase , J . , in Ware v . Hylton , 3 Dall . 199 .
2 The case o
f
Trevett v . Weeden , in 1796 , in Rhode Island , is a
n
instance o
f
this
sort which is in point and illustrates the text , though itwould not be difficult to draw
others from States o
f larger extent . The judges in that case decided that a law mak
ing paper -money a tender in payment o
f
debts was unconstitutional , and against the
principles o
f Magna Charta . They were compelled to appear before the legislature to
vindicate themselves ; and the next year (being chosen annually ) they were left out of
office for questioning the legislative power . (See this case and another one in Ohio ,
referred to in Cooley ' s Constitutional Limitations , 160 , n . )
3 . 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , 111 , 112 , & c . ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 214 ; Minot ' s His
tory o
f
the Insurrection in Massachusetts .
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lent effects of paper-money on the necessary confidence between
man and man , on the necessary confidence in the public councils ,
on the industry and morals of the people , and on the character of
republican government , constitutes an enormous debt against the
States , chargeable with this unadvised measure ,which must long
remain unsatisfied ; or rather an accumulation of guilt ,which can
be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar
of justice of the power which has been the instrument of it.” 1
“ Laws impairing the obligation of contracts are contrary to the
first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of
sound legislation .” 2 And the Federalist dwells on the sugges
tion , that as such laws amount to an aggression on the rights of
the citizens of those States , whose citizens are injured by them ,
they must necessarily form a probable source of hostilities among
the States . Connecticut retaliated in an exemplary manner upon
enormities of this sort , which she thought had been perpetrated by
a neighboring State upon the just rights of her citizens . Indeed ,
war constitutes almost the only remedy to chastise atrocious
breaches ofmoral obligations and social justice in respect to debts
and other contracts .” 3
$ 489 . So , that we see completely demonstrated by our own
history the importance of a more effectual establishment of justice
under the auspices of a national government .4
2 Id.1 The Federalist , No . 44 . 8 Id . No . 7.
4 The remarks of Mr. Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia ( 2 Dall. R . 419,
474 ) illustrate the truth of these reasonings in an interesting manner . “ Prior to the
date,” says he, “ of the Constitution , the people had not any national tribunal to which
they could resort for justice ; the distribution of justice was then confined to State judi
catories , in whose institution and organization the people of the other States had no
participation , and over whom they had not the least control . There was then no
general court of appellate jurisdiction , by whom the errors of State courts, affecting
either the nation at large or the citizens of any other State , could be revised and
corrected. Each State was obliged to acquiesce in the measure of justice which an
other State might yield to her or to her citizens ; and that even in cases where State
considerations were not always favorable to themost exact measure . There was danger
that from this source animosities would in time result ; and as the transition from ani
mosities to hostilities was frequent in the history of independent states, a common
tribunal fo
r
the termination o
f
controversies became desirable , from motives both of
justice and o
f policy .
" Prior also to that period , the United States had , b
y
taking a place among the
nations o
f
the earth , become amenable to the laws o
f
nations ; and it was their interest
a
s
well as their duty to provide that those laws should be respected and obeyed . In
their national character and capacity , the United States were responsible to foreign
nations for the conduct o
f
each State relative to the laws o
f
nations and the perform
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$ 490 . The next clause in the preamble is to insure domestic
tranquillity .” The illustrations appropriate to this head have been
in a great measure anticipated in our previous observations . The
security of the States against foreign influence , domestic dissen
sions, commercial rivalries , legislative retaliations , territorial dis
putes , and the petty irritations of a border warfare for privileges ,
exemptions , and smuggling , have been already noticed . The
very habits of intercourse , to which the States were accustomed
with each other during their colonial state , would , as has been
justly remarked , give a keener edge to every discontent excited by
any inequalities , preferences , or exclusions , growing out of the
public policy of any of them . These , however , are not the only
evils . In small communities domestic factions may well be ex
pected to arise , which , when honest , may lead to the most perni
cious public measures ; andwhen corrupt , to domestic insurrections ,
and even to an overthrow of the government . The dangers to a
republican government from this source have been dwelt upon by
the advocates of arbitrary government with much exultation ; and
it must be confessed , that the history of free governments has fur
nished but too many examples to apologize fo
r , though not to
justify their arguments , drawn not only against the forms o
f repub
lican government , but against the principles o
f
civil liberty . They
have pointed out the brief duration of republics , the factions b
y
which they have been rent , and the miseries which they have
suffered from distracted councils , and time -serving policy , and
popular fury and corruption , in a manner calculated to increase
the solicitude of every well -wisher to the cause of rational liberty .
And even those who ar
e
most favorable in their views seem to
have thought that the experience o
f
the world had never yet
furnished any conclusive proofs in it
s support . We know but too
well that factions have been the special growth o
f republics . B
y
a faction , we are to understand a number o
f
citizens , whether
amounting to a minority or a majority o
f
the whole , who are
ance o
f
treaties ; and there the inexpediency of referring a
ll
such questions to State
courts , and particularly to the courts o
f delinquent States , became apparent . While all
the States were bound to protect each , and the citizens o
f
each , it was highly proper and
reasonable that they should b
e
in a capacity , not only to cause justice to be done to
each and the citizens o
f
each , but also to cause justice to be done b
y
each and the citi
zens o
f
each ; and that , not b
y
violence and force , but in a stable , sedate , and regular
course o
f judicial procedure . " See also 2 Grahame ' s Hist . Appx . 498 , 499 .
i The Federalist , Nos . 6 , 7 , 12 . 2 Id . No . 7 .
8 The Federalist , No . 9 .
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united by some common impulse of passion , or interest , or party ,
adverse to the rights of the other citizens , or to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community .1
$ 491 . The latent causes of faction seem sown in the nature of
man . A zeal fo
r
different opinions concerning religion and gov
ernment , and many other points ,both of speculation and practice ;
a
n attachment to different leaders ; mutual rivalries and animosi
ties ; the restlessness of ambition ; the pride of opinion ; the de
sire for popular favor , - commonly supply a ready origin to fac
tions . And where deeper causes are not at work , the most trivial
differences , and the most accidental circumstances , occasionally
excite the most severe conflicts . But themost durable as well as
the most alarming form in which faction has displayed itself has
grown out of the unequal distribution o
f
property . Those who
have and those who have not property have , and must forever
have , distinct interests in society . The relation of debtor and
creditor , a
t
all times delicate , sometimes assumes à shape which
threatens the overthrow o
f
the government itself .
$ 492 . There are but two methods of curing the mischiefs of
faction : the one , by removing its causes , which , in a free govern
ment , is impracticable without the destruction of liberty ; the
other , b
y
controlling it
s
effects . If a faction be a minority , the
majority may apply the proper corrective , b
y
defeating o
r check
ing the violence o
f
the minority in the regular course o
f legisla
tion . In small states , however , this is not always easily attain
able , from the difficulty of combining in a permanent form suffi
cient influence for this purpose . A feeble domestic faction will
naturally avail itself , not only of al
l
accidental causes o
f
dissatis
faction a
t home , but also of all foreign aid and influence to carry
it
s projects . And , indeed , in the gradual operations of factions ,
so many combinations are formed and dissolved , so many private
resentments become embodied in public measures , and success
and triumph so often follow after defeat , that the remnants of
different factions , which have had a brief sway , however hostile to
each other , have an interest to unite in order to put down their
rivals . But if the faction be a majority , and stand unchecked ,
except b
y
it
s
own sense o
f duty , or its own fears , the dangers are
imminent to a
ll
those whose principles , or interests , or characters ,
stand in the way o
f
their supreme dominion . 3
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 10 . 2 Id . No . 10 . 3 Id . No . 10 .
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§ 493 . These evils ar
e
fe
lt
in great states ; but it has been
justly observed , that in small states they are far more aggravated ,
bitter , cruel , and permanent . The most effectual means to con
trol such effects seem to be in the formation o
f
a confederate
republic , consisting of several states . It will be rare , under such
circumstances , if proper powers are confided to the general gov
ernment , that the state line does not form the natural , as it will
the jurisdictional , boundary of the operations of factions . The
authority o
f
the general government will have a natural tendency
to suppress the violence o
f
faction , b
y
diminishing the chances o
f
ultimate success ; and the example of the neighboring states , who
will rarely , at the same time , partake of the same feelings , or have
the same causes to excite them into action ,will mitigate , if it does
not wholly disarm , the violence of the predominant faction .
§ 494 . One of the ordinary results of disunion among neigh
boring states is the necessity of creating and keeping u
p
stand
ing armies , and other institutions unfavorable to liberty . The
immediate dangers from sudden inroads and invasions , and the
perpetual jealousies and discords incident to their local position ,
compel them to resort to the establishment o
f
armed forces , either
disproportionate to their means , or inadequate fo
r
their defence .
Either alternative is fraught with public mischiefs . If they do
not possess an adequate military force to repel invasion , they have
n
o security against aggression and insult . If they possess an
adequate military force , there is much reason to dread that it
may , in the hands of aspiring or corrupt men , become the means
o
f
their subjugation . There is no other refuge in such cases , but
to seek a
n alliance , always unequal , and to be obtained only by
important concessions to some powerful nation , or to form a con
federacy with other states , and thus to secure the co -operation and
the terror o
f
numbers . Nothing has so strong a tendency to sup
press hostile enterprises as the consciousness that they will not
b
e easily successful . Nothing is so sure to produce moderation
a
s
the consciousness that resistance will steadily maintain the
dictates o
f justice . Summary , nay , even arbitrary , authority must
b
e granted , where the safety o
f
a state cannot await the slow
measures o
f ordinary legislation to protect it . That government
is , therefore , most safe in its liberties , as well as in its domestic
1 The Federalist , No . 9 . 2 Id . Nos . 9 , 10 .
8 The Federalist , No . 41 .
CH. VI.] 361THE PREAMBLE .
peace , whose numbers constitute a preventive guard against all
internal as well as external attacks .
$ 495 . We now proceed to the next clause in the preamble , to
“ provide for the common defence.” And many of the considera
tions already stated apply with still greater force under this head .
One of the surest means of preserving peace is said to be , by being
always prepared fo
r
war . But a still more sure means is the
power to repel , with effect , every aggression . That power can
scarcely b
e
attained without a wide extent o
f population , and a
t
least a moderate extent o
f territory . A country which is large in
it
s limits , even if thinly peopled , is not easily subdued . Its
variety of soil and climate , its natural and artificial defences , nay ,
it
s very poverty and scantiness o
f supplies , make it difficult to
gain o
r
to secure a permanent conquest . It is far easier to over
ru
n , than to subdue it . Armies must be divided , distant posts
must be maintained , and channels of supplies kept constantly
open . But where the territory is not only large , but populous ,
permanent conquest can rarely occur , unless (which is not our
case ) there are very powerful neighbors on every side , having a
common interest to assist each other , and to subjugate their
enemy . It is far otherwise , where there are many rival and inde
pendent states , having no common union of government or inter
ests . They are half subdued by their own dissensions , jealousies ,
and resentments before the conflict is begun . They are easily
made to act a part in the destruction o
f
each other , or easily fall a
prey fo
r
want of proper concert and energy o
f operations .
§ 496 . Besides , the resources of a confederacy must be far
greater than those of any single state belonging to it , both fo
r
peace and war . It ca
n
command a wider range o
f
revenue , of
military power , of naval armaments , and of productive industry .
It is more independent in it
s employments , in its capacities , and
in it
s
influences . In the present state of the world , a few great
powers possess the command o
f
commerce , both on land and at
se
a
. In war , they trample upon the rights of neutrals who are
feeble ; for their weakness furnishes an excuse both fo
r
servility
and disdain . In peace , they control the pursuits of the rest of
the world , and force their trade into every channel by the activity
o
f
their enterprise , their extensive navigation , and their flourish
in
g
manufactures . They little regard the complaints of those
who are subdivided into petty states with varying interests ; and
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use them only as instruments to annoy or check the enterprise of
each other . Such states are not formidable in peace or in war .
To secure their rights and maintain their independence they must
become a confederated nation , and speak with the force of num
bers , as well as the eloquence of truth . The navy or army
which could be maintained by any single State in the Union
would be scarcely formidable to any second -rate power in Europe .
It would be a grievious public burden , and exhaust the whole
resources of the State . But a navy or army for al
l
the purposes
o
f
home defence o
r protection upon the ocean is within the com
pass o
f
the resources o
f
the general government , without any
severe exaction . And with the growing strength of the Union
must be at oncemore safe for us , and more formidable to foreign
nations . The means , therefore , to provide for the common de
fence are ample ; and they can only be rendered inert and inade
quate b
y
a division among the States , and a want o
f unity of
operations .
$ 497 . We pass , in the next place , to the clause to “ promote
the general welfare . ” And itmay be asked , as th
e
State govern
ments are formed fo
r
the same purpose b
y
the people , why should
this be set forth as a peculiar or prominent object o
f
the Constitu
tion of the United States ? To such an inquiry two general
answers may be given . The States , separately , would not possess
the means . If they did possess the means , they would not pos
sess the power to carry the appropriate measures into operation .
§ 498 . First , in respect tomeans . It is obvious , that from the
local position and size o
f
several o
f
the States , they must forever
possess but a moderate revenue ,not more than what is indispen
sable for their own wants ,and , in the strictest sense , for domestic
improvements . In relation to othersmore favorably situated for
commerce and navigation , the revenues from taxation may be
larger ; but the main reliance must be placed upon the taxation
b
y
way of imposts upon importations . Now , it is obvious , from
the remarks already made , that no permanent revenue ca
n
b
e
raised from this source , when the States are separated . The
evasions o
f
the laws , which will constantly take place from the
rivalries and various interests o
f
the neighboring States ; the
facilities afforded b
y
the numerous harbors , rivers , and bays
which indent and intersect our coasts ; the strong interest of for
1 The Federalist , No . II . 2 The Federalist , Nos . 24 , 25 .
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eigners to promote smuggling ; the want of uniformity in the
duties laid by the different States ; the means of intercourse along
the internal territorial boundaries of the commercial States ;
— these, and many other causes , would inevitably lead to a very
feeble administration of any local revenue system , and would
make it
s
returns moderate and unsatisfactory . What could New
York do with a single seaport , surrounded on each side b
y jealous
maritime neighbors with numerous ports ? What could Massachu
setts or Connecticut do with the intermediate territory of Rhode
Island running into the heart o
f
the States b
y
water communica
tions admirably adapted fo
r
the security of illicit trade ? What
could Maryland o
r Virginia do with the broad Chesapeake be
tween them with it
s
thousand landing -places ? What could Penn
sylvania oppose to the keen resentments o
r
the facile policy o
f
her
weaker neighbor , Delaware ? What could any single State on the
Mississippi do to force a steady trade for itself with adequate pro
tecting duties ? In short , turn to whichever part of the continent
we may , the difficulties of maintaining an adequate system of
revenue would b
e
insurmountable , and the expenses of collecting
it enormous . After some few struggles fo
r
uniformity , and co
operation fo
r
mutual support ,each State would sink back into list
less indifference o
r gloomy despondency , and rely , principally ,
upon direct taxation fo
r
it
s ordinary supplies . 1 The experience of
the fe
w
years succeeding the peace o
f
1783 fully justifies the
worst apprehensions on this head .
$ 499 . On the other hand , a general government , clothed with
suitable authority over all the States , could easily guard th
e
whole
Atlantic coast , andmake it the interest o
f
all honorable merchants
to assist in a regular and punctilious payment o
f
duties . Vessels
arriving a
t
different ports o
f
the Union would rarely choose to
expose themselves to the perils o
f
seizure ,not in a single State
only , but in every State into which the goods might be succes
sively imported . The dangers upon the coast , from the vigilant
operations o
f
the revenue officers and revenue vessels , would be
great ; and they would bemuch enhanced b
y
the expenses of
concealment after the goods were landed . And the fact has
corresponded with the theory . Since the establishment of the
national government , there has been comparatively little smug
gling on our coasts ; and the revenue from the duties upon
1 The Federalist , No . 12 . 2 The Federalist , No . 12 .
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importations has steadily increased with th
e
development o
f
the
other resources o
f
the country .
$ 500 . And this leads us to remark , in the next place , that the
establishment of a general government is not only beneficial , as a
source o
f
revenue , but as a means of economy in its collection ,
distribution , and expenditure . Instead of a large civil list for
each State ,which shall be competent of itself to discharge al
l
the
functions applicable to a sovereign nation , a comparatively small
one fo
r
the whole nation will suffice to carry into effect its powers ,
and to receive and disburse it
s
revenues . Besides the economy in
the civil department , we have already seen how much less actual
expenditures will be necessary fo
r
the military and naval depart
ments , fo
r
the security of a
ll
the States , than would be if each
were compelled to maintain at all points its independent sover
eignty . No fortifications , no commanding posts , no naval flotilla ,
will be necessary to guard the States against each other ; nor any
corps o
f
officers to protect the frontiers of each against invasion
o
r smuggling . The exterior boundary of the whole Union will be
that alone which will require to be protected at the national ex
pense . Besides , there will be a uniformity of operations and
arrangements upon a
ll subjects of the common welfare under the
guidance of a single head , instead ofmultifarious and often con
flicting systems b
y
distinct States .
$ 501 . But if the means were completely within the reach o
f
the several States , it is obvious that the jurisdiction would be
wanting to carry into effect any great o
r comprehensive plan fo
r
the welfare o
f
the whole . The idea of a permanent and zealous
co -operation of thirteen (and now of twenty - four ) distinct govern
ments in any scheme for the common welfare , is o
f
itself a vision
ary notion . In the first place , laying aside al
l
local jealousies and
accidental jars , there is no plan for the benefit of the whole which
would not bear unequally upon some particular parts . Is it a reg
ulation o
f
commerce o
r mutual intercourse which is proposed ?
Who does not see that th
e
agricultural , the manufacturing , and
the navigating States may have a real or supposed difference o
f
interest in it
s adoption ? If a system o
f regulations , on the other
hand , is prepared b
y
a general government , the inequalities of one
part may , and ordinarily will , under the guidance of wise coun
cils , correct and ameliorate those of another . The necessity of a
1 The Federalist , Nos . 13 , 14 .
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sacrifice of one fo
r
the benefit o
f
a
ll may not , and probably will
not , be felt at the moment b
y
the State called upon to make it .
But in a general government , representing the interests of al
l , the
sacrifice , though first opposed , will , in the end , be found ade
quately recompensed b
y
other substantial good . Agriculture ,
commerce , manufactures , may each in turn be compelled to
yield something of their peculiar benefits , and yet , on the
whole , be still each a gainer b
y
the general system . The very
power o
f
thus redressing the evils , felt b
y
each in it
s
intercourse
with foreign nations , by prohibitory regulations , or countervailing
duties ,may secure permanent privileges of an incalculable value . ?
And the fact has been as theoretical reasoning would lead us to
suppose . The navigation and commerce , the agriculture and
manufactures , of all the States have received an advancement in
every direction b
y
th
e
union , which has fa
r
exceeded the most
sanguine expectation o
f it
s
warmest friends .
$ 502 . But the fact alone of an unlimited intercourse , without
duty o
r
restriction , between all the States , is of itself a blessing
o
f
almost inconceivable value . It makes it an object with each
permanently to look to the interests o
f
a
ll , and to withdraw its
operations from the narrow sphere of its own exclusive territory .
Without entering here into the inquiry , how fa
r
the general gov
ernment possesses the power to make o
r
a
id the making o
f
roads ,
canals , and other general improvements , which will properly arise
in our future discussions , it is clear , that if there were no general
government , the interest of each State to undertake o
r
to promote
in it
s
own legislation any such project would be fa
r
less strong
than it now is ; since there would be no certainty as to the value
o
r duration of such improvements , looking beyond the boundaries
o
f the State . The consciousness that the union of the States is
permanent , and will not be broken up b
y
rivalries , or conflicts of
policy , — that caprice or resentment will not divert any State from
it
s proper duties , as a member of the Union , — will give a solid char
acter to a
ll improvements . Independent o
f
the exercise of any
authority b
y
the general government fo
r
this purpose , it was justly
foreseen that roads would be everywhere shortened and kept in
better order ; accommodations for travellers would be multiplied
and meliorated ; an interior navigation on our eastern side would
b
e opened throughout the whole extent o
f
our coast ; and , by
1 The Federalist , No . 11 .
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canals and improvements in river navigation , a boundless field
opened to enterprise and emigration , to commerce and products ,
through the interior States , to the farthest limits of our western
territories .
$ 503 . Passing from these general considerations to those of
a direct practical nature , le
t
u
s
see how far certain measures , con
fessedly promotive o
f
the general welfare , have been , or would be ,
affected b
y
a disunion o
f
the States . Take , fo
r
example , the post
office establishment , the benefits of which can scarcely be too
strongly stated in respect to the public interests o
r
to private con
venience . With what a wonderful facility it now communicates
intelligence , and transmits orders and directions , and money and
negotiable paper , to every extremity of the Union . The govern
ment is enabled to give the most prompt notice of approaching
dangers , o
f
its commands , its wishes , its interests , its duties , its
laws , and its policy , to the most distant functionaries ,with incred
ible speed . Compare this with the ol
d
course o
f private posts
and special expresses . Look to the extensive advantages to trade ,
navigation , and commerce , to agriculture and manufactures , in the
ready distribution o
f
news , of knowledge of markets , and of trans
fers o
f
funds , independent of the inestimable blessings of commu
nication between distant friends , to relieve the heart from its
oppressive anxieties . In our colonial state it took almost as long
a period o
f time to convey a letter ( independent of the insecurity
and uncertainty o
f
it
s
transmission ) from Philadelphia to Boston ,
a
s
it now takes to pass from the seat of government to the farthest
liinits o
f any o
f
the States . Even under the confederation , from
the want of efficient funds and an efficient government , the post
moved on with a tardy indifference and delay , which made it
almost useless . We now communicate with England and the
continent o
f Europe , within periods not essentially different from
those which were then consumed in passing from the centre to the
eastern and southern limits o
f
the Union . Suppose the national
government were now dissolved , how difficult would it be to get
the twenty -four States to agree upon any uniform system of opera
tions , o
r proper apportionment o
f
the postage to be paid on the
transmission o
f
the mail . Each State must ac
t
continually by a
separate legislation ; and th
e
least change b
y any one would dis
turb the harmony o
f
the whole system . It is not at al
l
improbable
1 The Federalist , No . 14 .
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that before a single letter could reach New Orleans from Eastport ,
it would have to pay a distinct postage in sixteen independent
States , subject to no common control or appointment of officers .
The very statement of such a case amounts to a positive prohibi
tion upon any extensive internal intercourse by th
e
mail , as the
burdens and the insecurity o
f
the establishment would render it
intolerable . With what adınirable ease and expedition ,and noise
less uniformity o
f
movement , is the whole now accomplished
through the instrumentality o
f
the national government !
$ 504 . Let us take another example , drawn from th
e
perils of
navigation , and ask ourselves how it would be possible ,without an
efficient national government , to provide adequately for the erec
tion and support o
f lighthouses , monuments , buoys , and other
guards against shipwreck . Many of these are maintained at an
expense wholly disproportionate to their advantage to the State in
which they are situate . Many of them never would be maintained ,
except for the provident forecast of a national government intent
o
n the good o
f
the whole , and possessing powers adequate to
secure it . The same considerations apply to all measures of inter
nal improvement , either to navigation b
y
removing obstructions
in rivers and inlets , or by erecting fortifications fo
r
purposes
o
f
defence and to guard our harbors against the inroads o
f
ene
mies .
$505 . Independent of these means of promoting the general
welfare , we shall at once see , in our negotiations with foreign
powers , the vast superiority of a nation combining numbers and
resources over States of small extent and divided by different
interests . If w
e
are to negotiate fo
r
commercial or other advan
tages , the national government has more authority to speak , as
well a
s
more power to influence , than can belong to a single State .
It has more valuable privileges to give in exchange , and more
means o
fmaking those privileges felt b
y
prohibitions o
r relaxa
tions o
f
it
s
commercial legislation . Is money wanted ; how much
more easy and cheap to borrow upon the faith of a nation compe
tent to pay , than of a single State of fluctuating policy . Is confi
dence asked fo
r
the faithful fulfilment o
f
treaty stipulations ; how
much more strong the guaranty o
f
the Union with suitable author
ities , than any pledge of an individual State . Is a currency
wanted a
t
once fixed on a solid basis , and sustained b
y
adequate
sanctions to enlarge public or private credit ; how much more
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decisive is the legislation o
f
the Union , than of a single State
with a view to extent o
r uniformity o
f operations .
$ 506 . Thus we see that the national government , suitably or
ganized , has more efficient means and more extensive jurisdiction
to promote th
e
general welfare , than can belong to any single
State o
f
the confederacy . And there is much truth in the sug
gestion that it will generally be directed b
y
a more enlightened
policy , a more liberal justice , and more comprehensive wisdom , in
the application o
f
it
s
means and it
s powers to their appropriate
end . Generally speaking , it will be better administered , because
it will command higher talents ,more extensive experience ,more
practical knowledge , and more various information of the wants
o
f
the whole community , than can belong to smaller societies .
The wider the sphere o
f
action , the less reason there is to pre
sume that narrow views o
r
local prejudices will prevail in the
public councils . The very diversities of opinion in the different
representatives o
f
distant regions will have a tendency , not only
to introduce mutual concession and conciliation , but to elevate
the policy and instruct the judgment of those who are to direct
the public measures .
$ 507 . The last clause in the preamble is to “ secure the bless
ings o
f liberty to ourselves and our posterity . ” And surely no
object could b
e
more worthy o
f
the wisdom and ambition o
f
the
best men in any age . If there be anything which may justly
challenge the admiration o
f all mankind , it is that sublime patri
otism which , looking beyond its own times and its own fleeting
pursuits , aims to secure the permanent happiness of posterity b
y
laying the broad foundations o
f government upon immovable prin
ciples o
f justice . Our affections , indeed , may naturally be pre
sumed to outlive the brief limits of our own lives , and to repose
with deep sensibility upon our own immediate descendants . But
there is a noble disinterestedness in that forecast which disregards
present objections for the sake o
f all mankind , and erects struct
ures to protect , support , and bless the most distant generations .
He who founds a hospital , a college , or even a more private and
limited charity , is justly esteemed a benefactor of the human race .
How much more d
o they deserve our reverence and praise , whose
lives are devoted to the formation of institutions which , when
they and their children are mingled in the common dust , may
1 The Federalist , No . 27 .
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continue to cherish the principles and the practice of liberty in
perpetual freshness and vigor !
$508 . The grand design of the State governments is,doubtless ,
to accomplish this important purpose ; and there can be no doubt
that they are , when well administered , well adapted to the end .
But the question is not so much whether they conduce to the
preservation of the blessings of liberty , as whether they of them
selves furnish a complete and satisfactory security . If the re
marks which have been already offered are founded in sound
reasoning and human experience, they establish the position that
the State governments , per se, are incompetent and inadequate to
furnish such guards and guaranties as a free people have a right
to require for the maintenance of their vital interests , and espe
cially of their liberty . The inquiry then naturally presents itself
whether the establishment of a national government will afford
more effectual and adequate securities .
$ 509 . The fact has been already adverted to that when the
Constitution was before the people for adoption , it was generally
represented by it
s opponents that it
s
obvious tendency to a con
solidation o
f
th
e
powers o
f government would subvert the State
sovereignties , and thus prove dangerous to th
e
liberties o
f
the
people . This indeed was a topic dwelt on with peculiar empha
si
s ; and it produced so general an alarm and terror that it came
very nigh accomplishing the rejection o
f
the Constitution . And
yet the reasoning b
y
which it was supported was so vague and
unsatisfactory , and the reasoning on the other side was so cogent
and just , that it seems difficult to conceive how , at that time or at
any later time , (for it has often been resorted to for the same pur
pose , ) the suggestion could have had any substantial influence
upon the public opinion .
$ 510 . Let us glance at a few considerations ( some of which
have been already hinted a
t
) which are calculated to suppress all
alarm upon this subject . In the first place , the government of the
United States is one of limited powers , leaving al
l
residuary gen
eral powers in the State governments , or in the people thereof .
The jurisdiction o
f
the general government is confined to a few
enumerated objects which concern the common welfare o
f
a
ll
the
11 Elliot ' s Debates , 278 , 29
6
, 297 , 332 , 33
3
; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 47 , 96 , 136 ; 3
Elliot ' s Debates , 243 , 257 , 294 ; The Federalist , Nos . 39 , 45 , 17 , 31 .
2 The Federalist , No . 17 .
VOL . I . 24
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States . The State governments have a full superintendence and
control over the immense mass of local interests of their respec
tive States , which connect themselves with the feelings , the affec
tions , the municipal institutions , and the internal arrangements
o
f
the whole population . They possess , too , the immediate ad
ministration o
f justice in all cases , civil and criminal , which con
cern the property , personal rights , and peaceful pursuits of their
own citizens . They must of course possess a large share o
f
influ
ence ; and , being independent of each other , will have many op
portunities to interpose checks , as well as to combine a common
resistance to any undue exercise o
f power by the general govern
ment , independent of direct force . ?
$ 511 . In the next place , the State governments are , b
y
the
very theory o
f
the Constitution , essential constituent parts o
f
the
general government . They can exist without the latter , but the
latter cannot exist without them . Without the intervention of
the State legislatures , the President of the United States cannot
b
e
elected a
t all ; and the Senate is exclusively and absolutely
under the choice o
f
the State legislatures . The Representatives
are chosen b
y
the people of the States . So that the executive
and legislative branches of the national government depend upon ,
and emanate from the States . Everywhere the State sovereignties
are represented ; and the national sovereignty , as such , has no
representation . How is it possible under such circumstances ,
that the national government can be dangerous to the liberties o
f
the people , unless the States , and the people of the States , con
spire together fo
r
their overthrow ? If there should be such a
conspiracy , is not this more justly to be deemed an act of the
States through their own agents , and b
y
their own choice , rather
than a corrupt usurpation b
y
the general government ?
§ 512 . Besides , the perpetual organization of the State govern
ments , in al
l
their departments , executive , legislative , and judi
cial ; their natural tendency to co -operate in cases of threatened
danger to their common liberties ; the perpetually recurring right
o
f
the elective franchise , at short intervals , — must present the most
formidable barriers against any deliberate usurpation , which does
not arise from the hearty co -operation of the people of the States .
And when such a general co -operation for usurpation shall exist ,
it is obvious that neither the general nor the State governments
1 The Federalist , Nos . 14 , 15 . 3 Id . No . 45 . 8 Id . No . 45 .
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can interpose any permanent protection . Each must submit to
that public will which created and may destroy them .
$513 . Another not unimportant consideration is, that the
powers of the general government will be , and indeed must be ,
principally employed upon external objects , such as war, peace ,
negotiations with foreign powers , and foreign commerce. In its
internal operations it can touch but few objects , except to intro
duce regulations beneficial to the commerce , intercourse ,and other
relations between the States , and to lay taxes for the common
good . The powers of the States , on the other hand , extend to all
objects which , in the ordinary course of affairs , concern the lives
and liberties and property o
f
the people , and the internal order ,
improvement , and prosperity of the State . The operations of the
general government will be most extensive and important in times
o
f
war and danger ; those of the State governments , in times of
peace and security . Independent of all other considerations , the
fact that the States possess a concurrent power of taxation , and
a
n exclusive power to regulate the descent , devise , and distribu
tion o
f
estates , ( a power the most formidable to despotism , and
the most indispensable in it
s right exercise to republicanism , ) will
forever give them an influence which will be as commanding as ,
with reference to the safety of the Union , they could deliberately
desire . 2
$ 514 . Indeed , the constant apprehension of some o
f
the most
sincere patriots , who b
y
their wisdom have graced our country ,
has been of an opposite character . They have believed that the
States would , in the event , prove too formidable fo
r
the Union ;
that the tendency would be to anarchy in the members , and not
to tyranny in the head . Whether their fears , in this respect ,
were not those of men whose judgments were misled b
y
extreme
solicitude fo
r
the welfare o
f
their country , or whether they but too
well read the fate o
f
our own in the history of other republics ,
time , the great expounder of such problems , can alone deter
mine . The reasoning on this subject , which has been with so
1 The Federalist , No . 45 . ? Id . No . 31 .
8 Id . Nos . 17 , 45 , 46 , 31 .
4 M . Turgot appears to have been strongly impressed with the difficulty o
f
maintain
ing a national government under such circumstances . In his letter to Dr . Price h
e
says : “ In the general union of the States I do not observe a coalition , a fusion of all
the parts to form one homogeneous body . It is only a jumble of communities too dis
cordant , and which contain a constant tendency to separation , owing to the diversity in their
laws , customs , and opinions , to the inequality of their present strength , but stillmore to
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much profoundness and ability advanced b
y
the Federalist ,will ,
in the mean time , deserve the attention of every considerate man
in America .
$ 515 . Hitherto our experience has demonstrated the entire
safety o
f
the States , under the benign operations of the Constitu
tion . Each of the States has grown in power , in vigor of opera
tion , in commanding influence , in wealth , revenue , population ,
commerce , agriculture , and general efficiency . No man will ven
ture to affirm , that their power , relative to that of the Union , has
been diminished , although our population has , in the intermediate
period , passed from three to more than twelve millions . No man
will pretend to say , that the affection for the State governments
has been sensibly diminished b
y
the operations o
f
the general
government . If the latter has become more deeply an object of
regard and reverence , of attachment and pride , it is because it is
felt to be the parental guardian o
f
our public and private rights ,
and the natural ally of all the State governments , in the adminis
tration of justice , and the promotion of the general prosperity .
It is beloved , not for its power , but fo
r
it
s
beneficence ; not be
cause it commands , but because it protects ; not because it con
trols , but because it sustains the common interests , and the com
mon liberties , and the common rights of the people .
§ 516 . That there have been measures adopted b
y
the general
government which have not met with universal approbation ,must
b
e admitted . But was not this difference of opinion to be ex
pected ? Does it not exist in relation to the acts of the State
governments ? Must it not exist in every government , formed
and directed b
y
human beings o
f
different talents , characters , pas
sions , virtues , motives , and intelligence ? That some of the
measures of the general government have been deemed usurpa
tions b
y
some o
f
the States is also true . But it is equally true ,
the inequality o
f
their advances to greater strength . It is only a copy of the Dutch
republic , with this difference , that the Dutch republic had nothing to fear , as the Amer
ican republic has , from the future possible increase of any one of the provinces . All
this edifice has been hitherto supported upon the erroneous foundation of the most
ancient and vulgar policy ; upon the prejudice that nations and states , as such ,may
have a
n
interest distinct from the interest which individuals have to b
e
free , and defend
their property against the attacks o
f
robbers and conquerors , ” & c . , & c . Similar views
seem to have occupied the mind o
f
a distinguished American gentleman , who published
a pamphlet in 1788 , ( edit . Worcester , ) entitled “ Thoughts upon the Political Situation
o
f
the United States o
f
America , ” & c . , p . 37 , & c .
1 The Federalist , Nos . 45 , 46 , 31 .
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that those measures were deemed constitutional by a majority of
the States , and as such received the most hearty concurrence of
th
e
State authorities . It is also true that some measures whose
constitutionality has been doubted or denied b
y
some States have ,
a
t
other times , upon re -examination ,been approved of by th
e
same
States . Not a single measure has ever induced three quarters of
the States to adopt any amendment to the Constitution founded
upon the notion o
f usurpation . Wherever an amendment has
taken place it has been to clear a real doubt , or obviate an incon
venience established b
y
our experience . And this very power of
amendment , at the command of th
e
States themselves , forms the
great balance -wheel of our system , and enables us silently and
quietly to redress a
ll irregularities , and to put down al
l
practical
oppressions . And what is not a little remarkable in the history of
the government , is , that two measures , which stand confessedly
upon the extreme limits o
f
constitutional authority , and carry the
doctrine of constructive power to the last verge , have been brought
forward b
y
those who were the opponents o
f
the Constitution , or
the known advocates for it
s
most restricted construction . In each
case , however , they received the decided support of a great major
it
y
o
f
a
ll
the States o
f
the Union ; and the constitutionality of
them is now universally acquiesced in , if not universally affirmed .
We allude to the unlimited embargo , passed in 1807 , and the pur
chase and admission of Louisiana into the Union , under the
treaty with France in 1803 . That any act has ever been done b
y
1 If there be any exception , it is the decision as to the suability of the States . But
even this deserves not the name o
f usurpation , for the case falls clearly within thewords
o
f
the Constitution .
2 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 257 . President Jefferson himself , under whose administration
both these measures were passed , which were , in the highest sense , his own measures ,
was deliberately o
f opinion that a
n
amendment o
f
the Constitution was necessary to
authorize the general government to admit Louisiana into the Union . Yet he ratified
the very treaty which secured this right ; and confirmed the laws which gave it effect .
4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 1 , 2 , 3 . A more particular consideration of these subjects will
naturally arise in some future discussions . (See Cocke ' s Constitutional History , p .
209 , 234 . This author , alluding to this acquisition , and to Mr . Jefferson ' s opinion upon
the power to make it , has not failed to remark the readiness of every party in power to
exercise greater authority than they were willing to concede that the government pos
sessedwhen in the hands o
f
their opponents ; and it might thence be argued that the
tendency to a constant accretion o
f
Federal authority was to b
e expected , if not inevita
ble . Using theterms “ Federal ” and “ Republican ” in their original sense , as applied to
those who were respectively for a liberal and a strict construction o
f
the powers o
f gov
ernment , it might , b
y
modifying a little Mr . Jefferson ' s famous aphorism , be said , “ Out
o
f power , we are al
l
Republicans ; in power , we are a
ll
Federalists . " )
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the general government ,which even amajority of the States in th
e
Union have deemed a clear and gross usurpation ,may be safely
denied . On the other hand , it is certain that many powers posi
tively belonging to the general government have never yet been
put into full operation . So that the influence of State opinions and
State jealousies and State policy may be clearly traced through
out the operations o
f
the general government , and especially in
the exercise of the legislative powers . This furnishes no just
ground o
f complaint o
r
accusation . It is right that it should be
so . But it demonstrates that the general government has many
salutary checks silently a
t
work to control it
s
movements ; and
that experience coincides with theory in establishing that it is cal
culated to secure “ the blessings o
f liberty to ourselves and our
posterity . ”
$ 517 . If , upon a closer survey of all the powers given b
y
the
Constitution , and al
l
the guards upon their exercise , we shall per
ceive still stronger inducements to fortify this conclusion , and to
increase our confidence in the Constitution , may we not justly
hope that every honest American will concur in the dying expres
sion o
f
Father Paul , “ Esto perpetua , ” may it be perpetual ?
CH. VII.]
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$ 518 . In surveying the general structure of the Constitution
o
f
the United States , we are naturally led to an examination o
f
the fundamental principles on which it is organized fo
r
the pur
pose o
f carrying into effect the objects disclosed in the preamble .
Every government must include within it
s scope , at least if it is
to possess suitable stability and energy , th
e
exercise of the three
great powers upon which all governments are supposed to rest ,
viz . the executive , the legislative , and the judicial powers . The
manner and extent in which these powers are to be exercised ,
and the functionaries in whom they are to be vested , constitute
the great distinctions which are known in the forms of govern
ment . In absolute governments the whole executive , legislative ,
and judicial powers ar
e , at least in their final result , exclusively
confined to a single individual ; and such a form of government
is denominated a despotism , as the whole sovereignty of the state
is vested in him . If the same powers are exclusively confided to
a few persons , constituting a permanent sovereign council , the
government may be appropriately denominated an absolute o
r
despotic aristocracy . If they are exercised b
y
the people a
t large
in their original sovereign assemblies , the government is a pure
and absolute democracy . But it is more common to find these
powers divided , and separately exercised b
y
independent func
tionaries , the executive power b
y
one department , the legislative
b
y
another , and the judicial by a third ; and in these cases the
government is properly deemed a mixed one ; a mixed monarchy ,
if th
e
executive power is hereditary in a single person ; a mixed
aristocracy , if it is hereditary in several chieftains or families ;
and a mixed democracy or republic , if it is delegated b
y
election ,
and is not hereditary . In mixed monarchies and aristocracies
some o
f
the functionaries o
f
the legislative and judicial powers
are , or at least may be , hereditary . But in a representative repub
lic a
ll power emanates from the people , and is exercised b
y
their
choice , and never extends beyond the lives o
f
the individuals , to
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whom it is intrusted . It may be intrusted fo
r
any shorter period ;
and then it returns to them again , to be again delegated b
y
a new
choice .
§519 . In the convention which framed the Constitution of the
United States , the first resolution adopted b
y
that body was , that
“ a national government ought to be established , consisting of a
supreme legislative , judiciary , and executive . " 1 And from this
fundamental proposition sprung the subsequent organization o
f
the
whole government o
f
the United States . It is , then , our duty to
examine and consider the grounds on which this proposition rests ,
since it lies at the bottom of all our institutions , State as well as
national .
$ 520 . In the establishment of a free government , the division
o
f
the three great powers of government , the executive , th
e
legis
lative , and the judicial , among different functionaries , has been
a favorite policy with patriots and statesmen . It has by many
been deemed a maxim of vital importance , that these powers
should forever be kept separate and distinct . And accordingly
we find it laid down with emphatic care in the bill of rights of
several o
f
th
e
State constitutions . In the constitution of Massa
chusetts , for example , it is declared , that “ in the government of
this commonwealth , the legislative department shall never exer
cise the executive and judicial powers , or either of them ; the
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers ,
o
r
either o
f
them ; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative
and executive powers , or either of them ; to the end it may be a
government o
f
laws and not of men . ” 2 Other declarations of a
similar character are to be found in other State constitutions . 3
$ 521 . Montesquieu seems to have been the first who , with a
truly philosophical eye , surveyed th
e
political truth involved in
1 Journals o
f
Convention , 82 , 83 , 139 , 207 , 215 .
2 Bill o
f
Rights , article 30 .
8 The Federalist , No . 47 . It has been remarked b
y
Mr . J . Adams , that the practi
cability o
r
the duration o
f
a republic , in which there is a governor , a senate , and a
house o
f
representatives , is doubted b
y
Tacitus , though he admits the theory to be
laudable . Cunctas nationes et urbes populus , aut priores , aut singuli regunt . Delecta
e
x
his e
t
constituta reipublicæ forma laudari facilius quam inveniri , vel si evenit , haud
diuturna esse potest . Tacit . Ann . lib . 14 . Cicero asserts , “ Statuo esse optime consti
tutam rempublicam , quæ ex tribus generibus illis , regali , optimo , et populari ,modice
confusa . ” Cic . Frag . de Repub . 1 Adams ' s Amer . Constitutions , Preface , 19 . The
British government perhaps answers more nearly to the form o
f government proposed
b
y
these writers , than what we in modern times should esteem strictly a republic .
CH. VI
I
. ] 377DISTRIBUTION O
F
POWERS .
this maxim in it
s full extent , and gave to it a paramount impor
tance and value . As it is tacitly assumed , as a fundamental basis
in the Constitution o
f
the United States , in the distribution of its
powers , it may be worth inquiry , what is the true nature , object ,
and extent o
f
the maxim , and o
f
the reasoning b
y
which it is
supported . The remarks of Montesquieu on this subject will be
found in a professed commentary upon the constitution o
f Eng
land . “ When , ” says he , “ the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person , or in the same body of magistrates ,
there can b
e
n
o liberty , because apprehensions may arise , lest th
e
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws , or execute
them in a tyrannical manner . Again , there is no liberty , if the
judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and execu
tive . Were it joined with the legislative , the life and liberty of
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control ; for th
e
judge
would be the legislator . Were it joined to the executive power ,
the judge might behave with violence and oppression . There
would be an end o
f everything were the same man , or the same
body , whether o
f
the nobles o
r
o
f
the people , to exercise these
three powers , that o
f enacting laws , that of executing the public
resolutions , and o
f trying the causes of individuals . " 2
$ 522 . The same reasoning is adopted b
y
Mr . Justice Black
stone , in his Commentaries . 3 In all tyrannical governments , "
says h
e , “ the supreme magistracy , or the right both of making
and o
f enforcing laws , is vested in the same man , or one and the
same body o
f
men ; and wherever these two powers are united
together , there ca
n
b
e n
o public liberty . The magistrate may
enact tyrannical laws , and execute them in a tyrannical manner ,
since he is possessed , in quality of dispenser o
f justice , with all the
power which h
e a
s legislator thinks proper to give himself . But
where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands ,
the former will take care not to intrust the latter with so large a
power a
s may tend to the subversion o
f
it
s
own independence , and
1 Montesquieu , B . 11 , ch . 6 .
2 M . Turgot uses the following strong language : “ The tyranny of the people is the
most cruel and intolerable , because it leaves the fewest resources to the oppressed . A
despot is restrained b
y
a sense o
f
his own interest . He is checked b
y
remorse o
r public
opinion . But the multitude never calculate ; the multitude are never checked b
y
re
morse , and will even ascribe to themselves th
e
highest honor when they deserveonly
disgrace . " Letter to Dr . Price .
8 | Black . Comm . 146 .
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therewith o
f
th
e
liberty o
f
the subject . ” Again : “ In this dis
tinct and separate existence o
f
the judicial power in a peculiar
body o
f
men , nominated , indeed , by , but not removable a
t , the
pleasure o
f
the crown , consists one main preservative of the public
liberty ; which cannot long subsist in any state , unless the admin
istration o
f
common justice b
e
in some degree separated from the
legislative , and also the executive power . Were it joined with
the legislative , the life , liberty , and property of the subject would
b
e in the hands o
f arbitrary judges , whose decisions would then
b
e regulated only b
y
their opinions , and not b
y
any fundamental
principles o
f
la
w ; which , though legislators may depart from , yet
judges are bound to observe . Were it joined with the executive ,
this union might soon be an overbalance for the legislative . ” 1
11 Blaek . Comm . 26
9
. See 1 Wilson ' s Law Lectures , 39
4
, 399 ,400 , 40
7
,408 ,409 ;
Woodeson ' s Elem . of Jurisp . 53 , 56 . The remarks of Dr . Paley , on the same subject ,
are full of hi
s
usual practical sense . “ The first maxim , " says he , " of a free state is ,
that th
e
laws b
e
made b
y
one set o
f
men and administered b
y
another ; in other words ,
that the legislative and judicial characters b
e kept separate . When these offices are
united in the same person o
r assembly , particular laws are made fo
r
particular cases ,
springing oftentimes from partial motives , and directed to private ends . Whilst they
are kept separate , general laws aremade b
y
one body o
f
men , without foreseeing whom
they may affect ; and when made , they must be applied b
y
the other , let them affect
whom they will .
“ For the sake o
f
illustration le
t
it b
e supposed , in this country , either that , Parlia
ments being laid aside , the courts o
f
Westminster Hall made their own laws ; or , that
the two houses o
f
Parliament , with the king at their head , tried and decided causes a
t
their bar . It is evident , in the first place , that the decisions of such a judicature would
b
e
so many laws ; and , in the second place , that ,when the parties and the interests to
b
e
affected b
y
the laws were known , the inclinations of the law -makers would inevitably
attach o
n
one side o
r
the other ; and that where there were neither any fixed rules to
regulate their determinations , nor any superior power to control their proceedings , these
inclinations would interfere with the integrity o
f public justice . The consequence of
which must b
e , that the subjects o
f
such a constitution would live either without any
constant laws , that is , without any known pre -established rules of adjudication what
ever ; or under laws made fo
r
particular persons , and partaking of the contradictions
and iniquity o
f
the motives to which they owed their origin .
“ These dangers , b
y
the division o
f
the legislative and judicial functions , are in this
country effectually provided against . Parliament knows not the individuals upon
whom it
s
acts will operate ; it has no cases or parties before it ; no private designs to
serve ; consequently its resolutions will be suggested b
y
the consideration o
f
universal
effects and tendencies , which always produce impartial and commonly advantageous
regulations . When laws are made , courts of justice , whatever be the disposition of the
judges ,must abide b
y
them ; fo
r
the legislative being necessarily the supreme power o
f
the state , the judicial and every other power is accountable to that ; and it cannot be
doubted that the persons who possess the sovereign authority o
f
government will be
tenacious o
f
th
e
laws which they themselves prescribe , and sufficiently jealous of the
assumption o
f dispensing judicial and legislative power b
y
any others . " Paley ' s
Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 8 .
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$ 523 . And the Federalist has with equal point and brevity
remarked , that “ the accumulation of al
l
powers , legislative ,execu
tive , and judiciary , in the same hands , whether of one , a few , or
many , and whether hereditary , self -appointed , or elective ,may be
justly pronounced the very definition o
f tyranny . ” 1
$ 524 . The general reasoning by which the maxim is supported ,
independently o
f
the just weight of the authority in it
s
favor , seems
entirely satisfactory . What is of far more value than any mere
reasoning , experience has demonstrated it to be founded in a just
view o
f
the nature of government , and the safety and liberty of the
people . And it is no small commendation of the Constitution o
f
the United States , that instead of adopting a new theory , it has
placed this practical truth as the basis o
f
it
s organization . It has
placed the legislative , executive , and judicial powers in different
hands . It has , as we shall presently see , made their term of office
and their organization different ; and , for objects o
f permanent
and paramount importance , has given to the judicial department a
tenure o
f
office during good behavior ; while it has limited each of
the others to a term o
f years .
i The Federalist , No . 47 ; Id . No . 22 . See also Gov .Randolph ' s Letter , 4 Elliot ' s
Deb . 133 ; Woodeson ' s Elem . of Jurisp . 53 , 56 . Mr . Jefferson , in his Notes on Vir .
ginia , ( Jefferson ' s Notes , p . 195 , ) has expressed the same truth with peculiar fervor and
force . Speaking of the constitution of government of his own State , he says , “ All the
powers o
f government , legislative , executive , and judiciary , result to the legislative
body . The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition o
f
a
despotic government . It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised b
y
a
plurality o
f
hands , and not b
y
a single one . One hundred and seventy -three despots
would surely be a
s oppressive a
s
one . Let those who doubt it , turn their eyes on the
republic o
f
Venice . An elective despotism is not the government we fought for ; but
one which should not only b
e
founded o
n
free principles , but in which the powers of
government should b
e
so divided and balanced among several bodies o
f
magistracy , as
that no one could transcend their legal limits without being effectually checked and re
strained b
y
the others . " Yet Virginia lived voluntarily under this constitution more
than fifty years ( see 2 Pitkin ' s Hist . 298 , 299 , 300 ) ; and , notwithstanding this solemn
warning b
y
her own favorite statesman , in the recent revision of her ol
d
constitution
and th
e
formation o
f
a n
e
w
one , she has not in this respect changed the powers of the
government . The legislature still remains with al
l
it
s great powers .
No person , however , has examined this whole subject more profoundly and with more
illustrations from history and political philosophy , than Mr . John Adams , in hi
s
cele
brated Defence o
f
the American Constitutions . It deserves a thorough perusal b
y
every statesman .
Milton was an open advocate for concentrating all powers , legislative and executive ,
in one body ; and hi
s
opinions , aswell as those of some other men of a philosophical
cast , are sufficiently wild and extravagant to put us upon our guard against too much
reliance o
n
mere authority . See 1 Adams ' s Def . of Amer . Const . 36
5
to 371 .
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$ 525 . But when we speak of a separation of the three great
departments o
f government , and maintain that that separation is
indispensable to public liberty , we are to understand this maxim
in a limited sense . It is not meant to affirm that they must be
kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct , and have no com
mon link o
f
connection or dependence , the one upon the other , in
the slightest degree . The true meaning is , that the whole power
o
f
one o
f
these departments should not be exercised b
y
the same
hands which possess the whole power o
f
either o
f
the other depart
ments ; and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the
principles o
f
a free constitution . This has been shown with great
clearness and accuracy b
y
the authors o
f
th
e
Federalist . It was
obviously the view taken of the subject by Montesquieu and Black
stone in their commentaries ; fo
r
they were each speaking with
approbation of a constitution of government , which embraced this
division o
f powers in a general view ; but which , at the same time ,
established an occasional mixture of each with the others , and
a mutual dependency of each upon the others . The slightest
examination of the British constitution will at once convince us
that the legislative , executive , and judiciary departments are by
no means totally distinct and separate from each other . The ex
ecutive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative depart
ment ; fo
r
Parliament consists of the king , lords , and commons ;
and no la
w
can b
e passed except b
y
the assent o
f
the king . In
deed , he possesses certain prerogatives , such as , fo
r
instance , that
o
f making foreign treaties , by which he can , to a limited extent ,
impart to them a legislative force and operation . He also pos
sesses the sole appointing power to the judicial department ,
though the judges , when once appointed , are not subject to his
will , or power of removal . The house of lords also constitutes
not only a vital and independent branch of the legislature , but is
also a great constitutional council o
f
the executive magistrate , and
is , in the last resort , the highest appellate judicial tribunal .
Again , the other branch of the legislature , the commons , possess ,
in some sort , a portion o
f
the executive and judicial power , in
exercising the power o
f
accusation b
y
impeachment ; and in this
case , as also in th
e
trial of peers , the house of lords sits as a grand
court o
f
trials for public offences . The powers of the judiciary
department are , indeed , more narrowly confined to their own
1 The Federalist , No . 42 .
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proper sphere . ' Yet still the judges occasionally assist in the
deliberations o
f the house of lords b
y
giving their opinions upon
matters o
f
la
w
referred to them fo
r
advice ; and thus they may ,
in some sort , be deemed assessors to th
e
lords in their legislative ,
a
s well as judicial capacity .
$ 526 . Mr . Justice Blackstone has illustrated the advantages of
a
n occasional mixture of the legislative and executive functions in
the English constitution in a striking manner . “ It is highly
necessary , ” says he , “ fo
r
preserving the balance o
f
the constitu
tion , that the executive power should be a branch , though not the
whole of the legislative . The total union o
f
them , we have seen ,
would be productive of tyranny . The total disjunction o
f
them ,
for the present , would , in the end , produce the same effects b
y
causing that union , against which it seems to provide . The legis
lative would soon become tyrannical b
y
making continual en
croachments , and gradually assuming to itself the rights of the
executive power , & c . To hinder , therefore , any such encroach
ments , the king is , himself , a part of the Parliament ; and , as this
is the reason o
f his being so , very properly , therefore , the share
o
f legislation , which the constitution has placed in the crown ,
consists in the power o
f rejecting , rather than resolving ; this
being sufficient to answer the end proposed . For we may apply
to the royal negative , in this instance ,what Cicero observes of the
negative o
f
the Roman tribunes , that the crown has not any
power o
f doing wrong , but merely of preventing wrong from
being done . The crown cannot begin of itself any alterations in
the present established law ; but it may approve or disapprove of
the alterations suggested and consented to b
y
the two houses . ” ?
$ 527 . Notwithstanding the memorable terms in which this
maxim o
f
a division o
f powers is incorporated into the bills o
f
rights o
f many o
f
our State constitutions , the same mixture will
b
e
found provided for , and indeed required in the same solemn
instruments o
f government . Thus , th
e
governor o
f
Massachu
setts exercises a part o
f
the legislative power , possessing a quali
fied negative upon a
ll
laws . The house of representatives is a
grand inquest fo
r
accusation ; and the senate is a high court fo
r
the trial of impeachments . The governor , with the advice of the
executive council , possesses the power of appointment in general ;
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 47 ; De Lolme on th
e
English Constitution , B . 2 , ch . 3 .
2 1 Black . Comm . 154 .
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but the appointment of certain officers still belongs to the senate
and house of representatives . On the other hand , although the
judicial department is distinct from the executive and legislative
in many respects , either branch may require the advice of the
judges , upon solemn questions of law referred to them . The
same general division , with the same occasional mixture ,may be
found in the constitutions o
f
other States . And in some of them
the deviations from the strict theory are quite remarkable . Thus ,
until the late revision , the constitution of New York constituted
the governor , the chancellor ,and the judges of the supreme court ,
o
r any two o
f
them with the governor , a council of revision ,which
possessed a qualified negative upon all laws passed by the senate
and house o
f representatives . And , now , the chancellor and the
judges o
f
the supreme court o
f
that State constitute , with the
senate , a court of impeachment , and fo
r
the correction o
f
errors .
In New Jersey the governor is appointed b
y
the legislature , and is
the chancellor and ordinary , or surrogate , a member of the su
preme court o
f appeals , and president ,with a casting vote , of one
o
f
the branches o
f
the legislature . In Virginia the great mass of
the appointing power is vested in the legislature . Indeed , there
is not a single constitution of any State in th
e
Union , which does
not practically embrace some acknowledgment o
f the maxim , and
a
t
the same time some admixture of powers constituting an excep
tion to it . 1
$ 528 . It would not , perhaps , be thought important to have
dwelt on this subject , if originally it had not been made a special
objection to the Constitution of the United States , that though it
professed to be founded upon a division o
f
the legislative , execu
tive , and judicial departments , yet it was really chargeable with
a departure from the doctrine b
y
accumulating in some instances
the different powers in the same hands ,and by a mixture of them
in others ; so that it , in effect , subverted the maxim , and could
not but be dangerous to the public liberty . The fact must be
admitted , that such an occasional accumulation and mixture exist ;
but the conclusion , that the system is therefore dangerous to the
public liberty , is wholly inadmissible . If the objection were well
founded , it would apply with equal , and in some cases with far
greater , force to most of our State constitutions ; and thus the peo
1 The Federalist ,Nos . 47 , 48 . (Many of these things are now otherwise . ]
? 1 Amer .Museum , 536 , 549 , 550 ; Id , 553 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 78 , 79 .
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ple would be proved their own worst enemies, by embodying in
their own constitutions the means of overthrowing their liberties .
$529 . The authors of the Federalist thought this subject a
matter of vast importance , and accordingly bestowed upon it a
most elaborate commentary . At the present time the objection
may not be felt as possessing much practical force , since expe
rience has demonstrated the fallacy of the suggestions on which
it was founded . But, as the objection may be revived , and as a
perfect separation is occasionally found supported by the opinions
of ingenious minds,dazzled by theory ,and extravagantly attached
to the notion of simplicity in government , it may not be without
use to recur to some of the reasoning by which those illustrious
statesmen who formed the Constitution , while they admitted the
general truth of the maxim , endeavored to prove that a rigid
adherence to it in a
ll
cases would be subversive of the efficiency
o
f
the government , and result in the destruction of the public lib
erties . The proposition which they undertook to maintain was
this , that “ unless these departments be so far connected and
blended , as to give to each a constitutional control over the others ,
th
e
degree o
f separation , which the maxim requires , as essential
to a free government , can never in practice be duly maintained . ” 1
$ 530 . It is proper to premise , that it is agreed on al
l
sides
that the powers belonging to one department ought not to be
directly and completely administered b
y
either o
f
the other de
partments ; and , as a corollary , that , in reference to each other ,
neither o
f
them ought to possess ,directly o
r indirectly , an overrul
ing influence in the administration o
f
their respective powers . 2
Power , however , is of an encroaching nature , and it ought to be
effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it . Hav
ing separated the three great departments b
y
a broad line from
each other , th
e
difficult task remains to provide some practical
means fo
r
the security o
f
each against the meditated o
r
occasional
invasions o
f
the others . Is it sufficient to declare on parch
ment in the Constitution , that each shall remain , and neither shall
usurp the functions o
f
the other ? No one , well read in history
in general , or even in our own history during the period of the
existence of our State constitutions , will place much reliance on
such declarations . In the first place ,men may and will differ as
to the nature and extent o
f the prohibition . Their wishes and
1 The Federalist , No . 48 . 2 Id .
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their interests , the prevalence of faction , an apparent necessity ,
o
r
a predominant popularity ,will give a strong bias to their judg
ments , and easily satisfy them with reasoning which has but a
plausible coloring . And it has been accordingly found , that the
theory has bent under the occasional pressure , as well as under
the occasional elasticity o
f public opinion , and as well in the
States , as in the general government under the confederation .
Usurpations of power have been notoriously assumed by particular
departments in each ; and it has often happened that these very
usurpations have received popular favor and indulgence . 1
$ 531 . In the next place , in order to preserve in full vigor the
constitutional barrier between each department , when they are
entirely separated , it is obviously indispensable that each should
possess equally , and in the same degree , the means of self -protec
tion . Now , in point of theory , this would be almost impracti
cable , if not impossible ; and in point of fact , it is well known
that the means o
f
self -protection in the different departments are
immeasurably disproportionate . The judiciary is incomparably
the weakest o
f
either ; and must forever , in a considerable meas
ure , be subjected to the legislative power . And the latter has ,
and must have , a controlling influence over the executive power ,
since it holds a
t
it
s
own command all the resources b
y
which a
chiefmagistrate could make himself formidable . It possesses the
power over the purse o
f
the nation and the property o
f
the peo
ple . It can grant or withhold supplies ; it ca
n
levy o
r
withdraw
taxes ; it can unnerve the power o
f
the sword b
y
striking down
the arm which wields it .
$ 532 . De Lolme has said with great emphasis : “ It is , without
doubt , absolutely necessary fo
r
securing the constitution o
f
a
state , to restrain the executive power ; but it is still more neces
sary to restrain the legislative . What the former can only do by
successive steps , ( Imean , subvert the laws , ) and through a longer ,
o
r
a shorter train o
f enterprises , the latter does in amoment . As
it
s
bare will ca
n
give being to the laws , so its bare will can also
annihilate them ; and if I may be permitted the expression , the
legislative power can change the constitution , as God created the
light . In order , therefore , to insure stability to the constitution
o
f
a state , it is indispensably necessary to restrain the legislative
authority . But , here ,we must observe a difference between the
i The Federalist ,No . 48 . See also The Federalist , Nos . 38 , 42 .
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legislative and executive powers . The latter may be confined , and
is even more easily so ,when undivided . The legislative , on the con
trary , in order to its being restrained , should absolutely be divided . ” 1
· $ 533 . The truth is , that the legislative power is the great and
overruling power in every free government . It has been remarked
with equal force and sagacity , that the legislative power is every
where extending th
e
sphere o
f
it
s activity , and drawing al
l
power
into it
s impetuous vortex . The founders of our republics , wise
a
s they were , under the influence and the dread of the royal pre
rogative , which was pressing upon them , never fo
r
a moment
seem to have turned their eyes from the immediate danger to liberty
from that source , combined as it was with an hereditary authority
and an hereditary peerage to support it . They seem never to
have recollected the danger from legislative usurpation , which , b
y
ultimately assembling all power in the same hands ,must lead to
the same tyranny a
s
is threatened b
y
executive usurpations . The
representatives o
f
the people will watch with jealousy every en
croachment o
f
the executive magistrate , for it trenches upon their
own authority . But who shall watch the encroachment o
f
these
representatives themselves ? Will they be as jealous o
f
the exer
cise o
f power b
y
themselves a
s by others ? In a representative
republic , where the executive magistracy is carefully limited , both
in the extent and duration of it
s power ; and where the legislative
power is exercised b
y
a
n assembly , which is inspired by a sup
posed influence over the people , with an intrepid confidence in its
own strength , — which is sufficiently numerous to feel al
l
the
passions which actuate the multitude , yet not so numerous as
to b
e incapable o
f pursuing the objects of it
s passions by means
which reason prescribes , — it is easy to see that the tendency to the
usurpation o
f power is , if not constant , at least probable ; and
that it is against the enterprising ambition o
f
this department
that the people may well indulge a
ll
their jealousy , and exhaust
all their precautions . 2
1 De Lolme , B . 2 , ch . 3 .
? The Federalist , Nos . 48 , 49 . [Mr .Gouverneur Morris expresses this very strongly :
“ What does it signify that men should have a written constitution , containing unequiv .
ocal provisions and limitations ? The legislative lion will not be entangled in the
meshes o
f
a logical net . The legislature will always make the power which it wishes
to exercise , unless it b
e
so organized a
s
to contain within itself the sufficient check .
Attempts to restrain it from outrage b
y
other means will only render it more outrageous .
The idea o
f binding legislators b
y
oaths is puerile . Having sworn to exercise the
VOL . I . 2
5
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$ 534 . There are many reasons which may be assigned fo
r
the
engrossing influence o
f
the legislative department . In the first
place , its constitutional powers are more extensive , and less capa
ble o
f being brought within precise limits , than those of either o
f
the other departments . The bounds of the executive authority
are easily marked out and defined . It reaches few objects , and
those are known . It cannot transcend them without being
brought in contact with the other departments . Laws may check
and restrain and bound it
s
exercise . The same remarks apply with
still greater force to the judiciary . The jurisdiction is , or may be ,
bounded to a fe
w objects o
r
persons ; or , however general and
unlimited , its operations are necessarily confined to the mere
administration of private and public justice . It cannot punish
without la
w . It cannot create controversies to act upon . It can
decide only upon rights and cases , as they are brought by others
before it . It can do nothing for itself . It must do everything for
others . It must obey the laws ; and if it corruptly administers
them , it is subjected to the power of impeachment . On the other
hand , the legislative power , except in the few cases of constitu
tional prohibition , is unlimited . It is forever varying its means
and it
s
ends . It governs the institutions and laws and public
policy o
f
the country . It regulates al
l
it
s
vast interests . It
disposes o
f all it
s property . Look but at the exercise of two or
three branches o
f
it
s ordinary powers . It levies all taxes ; it
directs and appropriates a
ll supplies ; it gives the rules fo
r
the
descent ,distribution , and devise of all property held by individuals .
It controls the sources and the resources of wealth . It changes
a
t
it
s will the whole fabric of the laws . It moulds at its pleasure
almost all the institutions which give strength and comfort and
dignity to society .
§ 535 . In the next place , it is the direct , visible representative
o
f
the will of the people in al
l
the changes o
f
times and circum
stances . It has the pride a
s
well a
s
the power o
f
numbers . It
powers granted according to their true intent and meaning , they will ,when they feel a
desire to g
o
further , avoid the shame , if not the guilt , o
f perjury h
y
swearing the true
intent and meaning to b
e , according to their comprehension , that which suits their pur
pose . ” Life , & c . , b
y
Sparks , Vol . III . p . 323 . And again : “ Perhaps our experience will
sufficiently prove , without reasoning on the subject , that paper constitutions are indeed
but cobweb chains to the strong arm o
f legislation . ” Id . 251 . ]
1 “ Numerous assemblies , ” says M . Turgot , “ are swayed in their debates b
y
the
smallest motives . "
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is easily moved and steadily moved by the strong impulses of pop
ular feeling and popular odium . It obeys, without reluctance , the
wishes and the will of the majority for the time being . The path
to public favor lies open by such obedience ; and it finds not only
support, but impunity , in whatever measures the majority advises ,
even though they transcend the constitutional limits. It has no
motive , therefore , to be jealous , or scrupulous in its own use of
power ; and it finds its ambition stimulated and its arm strength
ened b
y
the countenance and the courage o
f
numbers . These views
are not alone those of men who look with apprehension upon the
fate o
f republics ; but they are also freely admitted b
y
some o
f
the
strongest advocates for popular rights and the permanency o
f
republican institutions . Our domestic history furnishes abundant
examples to verify these suggestions .
$ 536 . If , then , the legislative power possesses a decided pre
ponderance o
f
influence over either o
r
both o
f
th
e
others , and if ,
in it
s
own separate structure , it furnishes no effectual security fo
r
the others , or for its own abstinence from usurpations , it will not
b
e sufficient to rely upon a mere constitutional division of the
powers to insure our liberties . 3
$ 537 . What remedy , then , can be proposed adequate for the
exigency ? It has been suggested that an appeal to the people , at
stated times ,might redress any inconvenience of this sort . But ,
if these be frequent , it will have a tendency to lessen that respect
for , and confidence in , the stability of our institutions , which is so
essential to their salutary influence . If it be true that all gov
ernments rest on opinion , it is no less true that the strength of
opinion in each individual , and its practical influence on his con
duct , depend much upon the number which he supposes to have
entertained the same opinion . There is , too , no small danger in
disturbing the public tranquillity b
y
a frequent recurrence to
questions respecting the fundamental principles o
f government . 5
Whoever has been present in any assembly convened fo
r
such a
purpose , must have perceived the great diversities of opinion upon
the most vital questions , and the extreme difficulty in bringing a
i SeeMr . Jefferson ' s very striking remarks in his Notes on Virginia , p . 195 ,196 , 197 ,
248 . In December , 1776 , and again , June , 1781 , the legislature of Virginia , under a
great pressure , were near passing an act appointing a dictator . Id . p . 207 .
2 The Federalist , Nos . 4
8 , 49 .
8 See Jefferson ' s Notes on Virginia , 195 , 19
6
, 197 .
4 The Federalist , No . 48 . 5 Id . Nos . 48 , 50 .
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majority to concur in the long -sighted wisdom of the soundest
provisions . Temporary feelings and excitements , popular preju
dices , an ardent love of theory , an enthusiastic temperament , inex
perience , and ignorance , as well as preconceived opinions , operate
wonderfully to blind the judgment and seduce the understanding .
It will probably be found in the history ofmost conventions of this
sort , that the best and soundest parts of the constitution , those
which give it permanent value as well as safe and steady opera
tion , are precisely those which have enjoyed the least of the public
favor at themoment , or were least estimated by the framers . A
lucky hit, or a strong figure , has not unfrequently overturned the
best-reasoned plan . Thus , Dr. Franklin 's remark , that a legisla
ture with two branches was a wagon drawn by a horse before and
a horse behind , in opposite directions , is understood to have been
decisive in inducing Pennsylvania in her original constitution to
invest a
ll
the legislative power in a single body . In her present
constitution , that error has been fortunately corrected . It is not
believed that the clause in th
e
constitution of Vermont providing
for a septennial council o
f
censors to inquire into the infractions
o
f
her constitution during the last septenary , and to recommend
suitable measures to the legislature , and to call , if they se
e
fi
t , a
convention to amend the constitution , has been of any practical
advantage in that State in securing it against legislative or other
usurpations , beyond the security possessed by other States having
no such provision . 2
$ 538 . On the other hand , if an appeal to the people , or to a
convention , is to be made only at great distances of time , it will
afford n
o
redress for the most pressing mischiefs . And if the
measures which are supposed to be infractions of the constitution
enjoy popular favor , or combine extensive private interests , or
have taken root in the habit o
f
the government , it is obvious
that the chances o
f
any effectual redress will be essentially dimin
ished . 3
$ 539 . But a more conclusive objection is , that the decisions
upon a
ll
such appeals would not answer the purpose o
f maintain
11 Adams ' s American Constitutions , 105 , 106 .
2 The history o
f
the former constitution o
f Pennsylvania , and the report of its coun
ci
l
o
f
censors , show the little value of provisions of this sort in a strong light . The
Federalist , Nos . 49 , 50 . [ The council o
f
censors was abolished in Vermont in 1870 ,
b
y
a constitutional amendment proposed b
y
the council itself . ]
8 The Federalist , No . 50 .
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ing o
r restoring the constitutional equilibrium of th
e
government .
The remarks o
f
the Federalist on this subject are so striking ,
that they scarcely admit o
f abridgment without impairing their
force : “ We have seen that the tendency of republican govern
ments is to aggrandizement o
f
the legislature a
t
the expense o
f
the other departments . The appeals to the people , therefore ,
would usually be made b
y
the executive and judiciary departments .
But whether made b
y
one side or the other , would each side enjoy
equal advantages on the trial ? Let us view their different situa
tions . The members of the executive and judiciary departments
are fe
w
in number , and can be personally known to a small part
only of the people . The latter , b
y
the mode o
f
their appointment ,
a
s
well as b
y
the nature and permanency o
f
it , are too fa
r
re
moved from the people to share much in their prepossessions . The
former are generally objects of jealousy ; and their administration
is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular . The
members o
f
the legislative department , on the other hand , are
numerous . They are distributed and dwell among the people at
large . Their connections of blood , of friendship , and of acquaint
ance embrace a great proportion o
f
the most influential part o
f
the society . The nature of their public trust implies a personal
weight with the people , and that they are more immediately the
confidential guardians o
f
their rights and liberties . With these
advantages , it can hardly be supposed that the adverse party
would have an equal chance for a favorable issue . But the legis
lative party would not only be able to plead their case most
successfully with the people ; they would probably be consti
tuted themselves the judges . The same influence which had
gained them an election into the legislature would gain them a
seat in the convention . If this should not be the case with al
l
, it
would probably be the case with many , and pretty certainly with
those leading characters , on whom everything depends in such
bodies . The convention , in short , would be composed chiefly of
men who had been , or who actually were , or who expected to be ,
members o
f
the department whose conduct was arraigned . They
would consequently be parties to the very question to b
e
decided
b
y
them . ” 1
1 The Federalist , No . 49 . The truth of this reasoning , as well as the utter inefficacy
o
f any such periodical conventions , is abundantly established b
y
the history o
f
Penn
sylvania under her former constitution . The Federalist , No . 50 . See 2 Pitkin ' s His .
tory , 305 , 306 .
390 [BOOK NI.CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES .
$ 540. If, then , occasional or periodical appeals to the people
would not afford an effectual barrier against the inroads of the legis
lature upon th
e
other departments o
f
the government , it ismani
fest that resort must b
e
had to some contrivances in the interior
structure o
f
the government itself , which shall exert a constant
check , and preserve the mutual relations of each with the other .
Upon a thorough examination o
f
the subject , it will be found that
this can b
e
best accomplished , if not solely accomplished , by an
occasional mixture o
f
the powers of each department with that o
f
the others , while the separate existence and constitutional inde
pendence o
f
each are fully provided fo
r
. Each department should
have a will of it
s
own , and the members of each should have but a
limited agency in the acts and appointments o
f
the members o
f
the
others . Each should have its own independence secured beyond
th
e
power o
f
being taken away b
y
either , or both of the others .
But at the same time the relations o
f
each to th
e
other should b
e
so strong , that there should be a mutual interest to sustain and
protect each other . There should not only be constitutional
means , but personal motives , to resist encroachments o
f
one , o
r
either o
f
the others . Thus , ambition would bemade to counter
act ambition ; the desire of power to check power ; and the pres
sure o
f
interest to balance an opposing interest . 1
$541 . There seems no adequate method of producing this
result but b
y
a partial participation o
f
each in the powers of the
other ; and b
y introducing into every operation of the govern
ment , in all its branches , a system of checks and balances , on
which the safety of free institutions has ever been found essen
tially to depend . Thus , for instance , a guard against rashness
and violence in legislation has often been found , b
y distributing
the power among different branches , each having a negative check
upon the other . A guard against the inroads of the legislative
power upon the executive has been in like manner applied , by giv
in
g
the latter a qualified negative upon the former ; and a guard
against executive influence and patronage , or unlawful exercise of
authority , by requiring the concurrence of a select council , or a
branch o
f
the legislature in appointments to office , and in the
discharge o
f
other high functions , as well as b
y
placing the com
mand o
f
a revenue in other hands .
$ 542 . The usual guard , applied for the security of the judicial
i The Federalist , Nos . 48 , 50 , 51 .
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department , has been in the tenure of office of the judges, who
commonly are to hold office during good behavior . But this is
obviously an inadequate provision ,while the legislature is intrusted
with a complete power over the salaries of the judges , and over
the jurisdiction of the courts , so that they ca
n
alter o
r
diminish
them a
t pleasure . Indeed , the judiciary is naturally , and almost
necessarily , ( as has been already said , ) the weakest department . 1
It can have no means of influence b
y
patronage . Its powers can
never be wielded for itself . It has no command over the purse or
the sword o
f
the nation . It ca
n
neither lay taxes , nor appropriate
money ,nor command armies , nor appoint to offices . It is never
brought into contact with the people b
y
constant appeals and soli
citations and private intercourse , which belong to al
l
the other
departments o
f government . It is seen only in controversies , or
in trials and punishments . Its rigid justice and impartiality give
it n
o claims to favor , however they may to respect . It stands soli
tary and unsupported , except by that portion of public opinion
which is interested only in the strict administration of justice . It
can rarely secure the sympathy o
r
zealous support either o
f
the ex
ecutive o
r
the legislature . If they are not ( as is not unfrequently
the case ) jealous of it
s prerogatives , the constant necessity of
scrutinizing the acts o
f
each , upon the application of any private
person , and the painful duty of pronouncing judgment , that these
acts are a departure from the law o
r
constitution , can have no
tendency to conciliate kindness o
r
nourish influence . It would
seem , therefore , that some additional guards would , under such
circumstances , be necessary to protect this department from the
absolute dominion o
f
the others . Yet rarely have any such guards
been applied ; and every attempt to introduce them has been
resisted with a pertinacity which demonstrates how slow popular
leaders are to introduce checks upon their own power , and how
slow the people are to believe that the judiciary is th
e
real bul
wark o
f
their liberties . In some of the States the judicial depart
ment is partially combined with some branches o
f
the executive
and legislative departments ; and it is believed that , in those
cases , it has been found no unimportant auxiliary in preserving a
1 Montesq . Spirit of Laws , B . 11 , ch . 6 . [This is a truth which has often been re
marked upon b
y
writers upon government , and some forcible illustrations o
f it might be
given from our own history , if it were important . Mr . Van Buren comments upon one
o
f
them in his Political Parties , 307 - 310 . ]
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wholesome vigor in the laws , as well as a wholesome administra
tion o
f public justice .
$ 543 . How far the Constitution of the United States , in the
actual separation o
f
these departments , and the occasional mix
tures o
f
some o
f
the powers o
f
each , has accomplished the objects
o
f
the great maxim which we have been considering , will appear
more fully when a survey is taken o
f
the particular powers con
fided to each department . But the true and only test must , after
all , be experience , which corrects a
t
once the errors of theory and
fortifies and illustrates the eternal judgments o
f
nature .
$ 544 . It is not a little singular , however , ( as has been already
stated , ) that one of the principal objections urged against the
Constitution a
t
the time o
f
it
s adoption was this occasional mix
ture o
f powers , ' upon which , if the preceding reasoning (drawn ,
a
s
must be seen , from the ablest commentators ) be well founded ,
it must depend fo
r
life and practical influence . It was said that
the several departments o
f power were distributed and blended
in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty
o
f
form , and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice
to the danger o
f being crushed b
y
the disproportionate weight o
f
the other parts . The objection , as it presents itself in details ,
will be more accurately examined hereafter . But it may here be
said , that the experience of more than forty years has demon
strated th
e
entire safety of this distribution , at least in the quar
ter where the objection was supposed to apply with most force .
If any department of the government has an undue influence or
absorbing power , it certainly has not been either the executive or
judiciary .
The Federalist , No . 47 ; Id . 38 .
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$ 545 . The first article of the Constitution contains the struct
ure , organization , and powers of the legislature of the Union .
Each section o
f that article , and indeed of every other article , will
require a careful analysis and distinct examination . It is pro
posed , therefore , to bring each separately under review , in the
present Commentaries , and to unfold the reasons on which each is
founded , the objections which have been urged against it , and the
interpretation , so far as it can satisfactorily be ascertained , of the
terms in which each is expressed .
$ 546 . The first section of the first article is in the following
words : “ All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States , which shall consist of a Senate
and House o
f Representatives . ”
$ 547 . This section involves , as a fundamental rule , the exercise
o
f
the legislative power b
y
two distinct and independent branches .
Under the confederation , the whole legislative power of the Union
was vested in a single branch . Limited as was that power , the
concentration o
f
it in a single body was deemed a prominent de
fect o
f
the confederation . But if a single assembly could properly
b
e
deemed a fi
t receptacle of the slender and fettered authorities ,
confided to the Federal government b
y
that instrument , it could
scarcely be consistent with the principles of a good government to
entrust it with the more enlarged and vigorous powers delegated
in the Constitution . 1
$ 548 . The utility of a subdivision of the legislative power into
different branches having a negative upon each other , is , perhaps ,
a
t
the present time admitted b
y
most persons o
f
sound reflection . 2
But it has not always found general approbation , and is , even now ,
sometimes disputed b
y
men o
f speculative ingenuity and recluse
habits . It has been justly observed that there is scarcely in th
e
1 The Federalist , No . 22 .
3 Jefferson ' s Notes on Virginia , 194 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 208 ; De Lolme on the Con
stitution o
f England , B . 2 , ch . 3 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 62 , 66 , Gov . Randolph ' s Letter .
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whole science o
f politics a more important maxim , and one which
bears with greater influence upon the practical operations o
f gov
ernment . It has been already stated that Pennsylvania , in her
first constitution , adopted the scheme of a single body as the de
positary o
f
the legislative power , under the influence , as is under
stood , of a mind of a very high philosophical character . Georgia ,
also , is said in her first constitution (since changed ) to have con
fided the whole legislative power to a single body . Vermont
adopted the same course , giving , however , to the executive council
a power o
f
revision and of proposing amendments , to which she
yet adheres . We are also told b
y
a distinguished statesman o
f
great accuracy and learning , that a
t
the first formation o
f
our
State constitutions it was made a question of transcendent impor
tance , and divided the opinions of our most eminent men . Legis
lation , being merely the expression of the will o
f
the community ,
was thought to be an operation so simple in it
s
nature that inex
perienced reason could not readily perceive the necessity of com
mitting it to two bodies of men , each having a decisive check
upon the action o
f
the other . All the arguments derived from
the analogy between the movements of political bodies and the
operations o
f physical nature , all the impulses of political parsi
mony , al
l
th
e
prejudices against a second co -ordinate legislative
assembly stimulated b
y
the exemplification o
f it in the British
Parliament , were against a division of the legislative power . 4
$ 549 . It is also certain that the notion that the legislative
power ought to be confided to a single body , has been , a
t
various
times , adopted b
y
men eminent for their talents and virtues .
Milton , Turgot , Franklin , are but a few among those who have
professedly entertained and discussed the question . Si
r
James
Mackintosh , in a work of a controversial character , written with a
zeal and eloquence o
f youth , advocated the doctrine of a single
legislative body . Perhaps hi
s
mature life may have changed this
early opinion . A
t
all events , he can , in our day , count few fol
1 1 Adams ' s Defence of American Constitutions ,105 , 106 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 29
4
, 305 , 316 .
2 i Kent ' s Comm . 208 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 315 .
8 2 Pitk . Hist . 314 , 316 ; Const . of Vermont , 1793 , ch . 2 , § 2 , 16 . (Ante , p . 388 ,
note 2 . ]
4 President J . Q . Adams ' s Oration , 4th July , 1831 . See also Adams ' s Defence of
American Constitutions , per tot ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 208 , 209 , 210 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 233 ,
305 ; Paley ' sMoral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 7 .
6 1 Adams ' s Defence of American Constitutions , 3 ; Id . 10
5
; Id . 36
6
; 2 Pitk . Hist .
233 . Ante , p . 19 , $ 536 .
6 Mackintosh o
n
the French Revolution , (1792 , ) 4t
h
edit . p . 266 to 273 .
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lowers . Against his opinion , thus uttered , there is the sad exam .
p
le
o
f
France itself , whose first constitution , in 1791 , was formed
o
n
this basis , and whose proceedings the genius of this great man
was employed to vindicate . She stands a monument of the folly
and mischiefs o
f
the scheme ; and b
y
her subsequent adoption o
f
a division o
f
the legislative power , she has secured to herself ( as
it is hoped ) the permanent blessings of liberty . Against al
l
visionary reasoning o
f
this sort ,Mr . Chancellor Kent has , in a few
pages o
f pregnant sense and brevity , condensed a decisive argu
ment . There is danger , however , that it may hereafter be re
vived ; and indeed it is occasionally hinted b
y gifted minds , as a
problem yet worthy o
f
a fuller trial . 3
$ 550 . It may not , therefore , be uninstructive to review some
o
f
the principal arguments b
y
which this division is vindicated .
The first and most important ground is , that it forms a great
check upon undue , hasty , and oppressive legislation . Public
bodies , like private persons , are occasionally under the dominion
o
f strong passions and excitements ; impatient , irritable , and im
petuous . The habit of acting together produces a strong tendency
to what , for want of a better word ,may be called the corporation
spirit , orwhat is so happily expressed in a foreign phrase , l 'esprit
d
u
corps . Certain popular leaders often acquire an extraordinary
ascendency over the body , by their talents , their eloquence , their
intrigues , or their cunning . Measures are often introduced in a
hurry , and debated with little care , and examined with less cau
tion . The very restlessness of many minds produces an utter
impossibility o
f debating with much deliberation when a measure
has a plausible aspect and enjoys a momentary favor . Nor is it
infrequent , especially in cases of this sort , to overlook well -founded
objections to a measure , not only because th
e
advocates o
f it have
little desire to bring them in review , but because the opponents
are often seduced into a credulous silence . A legislative body is
not ordinarily apt to mistrust it
s
own powers , and fa
r
less the
temperate exercise o
f
those powers . As it prescribes its own
rules fo
r
it
s
own deliberations , it easily relaxes them , whenever
any pressure is made for an immediate decision . If it feels n
o
check but it
s
own will , it rarely has the firmness to insist upon
11 Kent ' s Comm . 209 , 21
0
. 2 1 Kent ' s Comm . 208 to 210 .
8 Mr . Tucker , the learned author of the Commentaries on Blackstone , seems to hold
the doctrine , that a division of the legislative power is not useful or important . See
Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 226 , 227 .
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holding a question long enough under it
s
own view to see and
mark it in a
ll
it
s bearings and relations on society . 1
$ 551 . But it is not merely inconsiderate and rash legislation
which is to b
e guarded against , in the ordinary course of things .
There is a strong propensity in public bodies to accumulate power
in their own hands , to widen the extent of their own influence ,
and to absorb within their own circle the means and the motives
o
f patronage . If the whole legislative power is vested in a single
body , there can be , practically , no restraint upon the fullest exer
cise o
f
that power ; and of any usurpation , which it may seek to
excuse o
r justify , either from necessity or a superior regard to th
e
public good . It has been often said , that necessity is the plea of
tyrants ; but it is equally true , that it is the plea of al
l
public
bodies invested with power , where no check exists upon its exer
cise . Mr . Hume has remarked with great sagacity , that men are
generally more honest in their private than in their public capa
city ; andwill go greater lengths to serve a party , than when their
own private interest is alone concerned . Honor is a great check
upon mankind . But where a considerable body of men act to
gether , this check is in a great measure removed , since a man is
sure to be approved o
f
b
y
his own party , fo
r
what promotes the
common interest ; and he soon learns to despise the clamors o
f
adversaries . This is b
y
n
o
means a
n opinion peculiar to Mr .
11 Kent ' s Comm . 208 , 209 ; 3 Amer .Museum , 66 .
2 The facility with which even great men satisfy themselves with exceeding their
constitutional powers was never better exemplified than b
yMr . Jefferson ' s own prac
tice and example , as stated in his own correspondence . In 1802 , he entered into a
treaty , by which Louisiana was to become a part o
f
the Union , although , ( as we have
seen , ) in his own opinion , it was unconstitutional . 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 .
And , in 1810 , he contended for the right of the executive to purchase Florida , if in his
own opinion the opportunity would otherwise b
e
lost , notwithstanding it might in
volve a transgression o
f
the law . Id . 149 , 150 . Such are the examples given o
f
a
State necessity ,which is to supersede the Constitution and laws . Such are the princi
pleswhich , he contended , justified him in an arrest of persons not sanctioned b
y
law .
Id . 151 . [During the late civil war a great number of arrests were made without
authority o
f
law ; some o
f
them , doubtless , in the belief , which was sometimes avowed
and justified , that to save the Constitution and laws it was necessary in the emergency
that for the time being o
n
some subjects they should b
e
silent . Many of these cases
never became the subject o
f judicial consideration ; but in E . x parte Milligan , 4 Wal . 2 ,
it was decided b
y
the Supreme Court that the guaranties o
f individual liberty in the
Constitution were intended fo
r
a state o
f
war a
s
well a
s
a state o
f peace , and were
equally binding upon rulers and people a
t all times and under al
l
circumstances . ]
8 1 Hume ' s Essays , Essay 6 ; Id . Essay 16 . Mr . Jefferson has said that " the func
tionaries o
f public power rarely strengthen in their dispositions to abridge it . ” 4 Jef
ferson ' s Corresp . 277 .
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Hume . It will be found lying at the foundation of the political
reasonings o
f many o
f
the greatest men in all ages , as the result
o
f
a close survey o
f
the passions and infirmities o
f
the history and
experience o
f
mankind . With a view , therefore , to preserve the
rights and liberties o
f
the people against unjust encroachments ,
and to secure the equal benefits o
f
a free constitution , it is of vital
importance to interpose some check against the undue exercise of
the legislative power , which in every government is the predomi
nating and almost irresistible power . 2
$ 552 . This subject is put in a very strong light b
y
a
n eminent
writer , , whose mode of reasoning can be best conveyed in his own
words . “ If , ” says he , “ we should extend our candor so far as
to own that the majority o
f
mankind are generally under the
dominion o
f
benevolence and good intentions , yet it must be
confessed that a vast majority frequently transgress , and what is
more decidedly in point , not only a majority , but almost all , con
fine their benevolence to their families , relations , personal friends ,
parish , village , city , county , province , and that very few indeed
extend it impartially to the whole community . Now , grant but
this truth and the question is decided . If a majority are capable
o
f preferring their own private interests , or that of their families ,
counties , and party , to that of the nation collectively , some pro
vision must be made in the Constitution in favor o
f
justice , to
compel a
ll
to respect the common right , the public good , the uni
versal law in preference to a
ll private and partial considerations . " 4
Again : 6 Of al
l
possible forms of government , a sovereignty in
one assembly , successively chosen b
y
the people , is , perhaps , the
best calculated to facilitate the gratification of self -love , and the
pursuit of the private interests of a fe
w
individuals . A few emi
nent , conspicuous characters will be continued in their seats in
the sovereign assembly from one election to another , whatever
1 See 1 Adams ' s Defence of American Constitutions , p . 121 , Letter 26 , & c . ; Id . Let
ter 2
4 ; Id . Letter 55 ; 1 Hume ' s Essays , Essay 16 ; 1 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 394 to 397 ;
3 Adams ' s Defence of American Constitutions , Letter 6 , p . 209 , & c .
2 Mr . Hume ' s thoughts are often striking and convincing ; but hismode of a perfect
commonwealth ( 1 Hume ' s Essays , Essay 16 ) contains some of the most extravagant
vagaries o
f the human mind , equalled only b
y
Locke ' s Constitution of Carolina . These
examples show th
e
danger o
f
relying implicitly upon the mere speculative opinions o
f
the wisest men .
8 Mr . John Adams .
4 3 Adams ' s Defence of American Constitutions , Letter 6 , p . 215 , 216 . See Norih
American Review , Oct . 1827 , p . 263 .
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changes are made in the seats around them . By superior art ,
address , and opulence , by more splendid birth , reputations , and
connections , they will be able to intrigue with their people, and
their leaders out of doors, until they worm out most of their op
posers and introduce their friends . To this end they will bestow
all offices, contracts, privileges in commerce , and other emolu
ments on th
e
latter , and their connections , and throw every vexa
tion and disappointment in the way of the former , until they
establish such a system of hopes and fears throughout th
e
whole
State a
s
shall enable them to carry a majority in every fresh elec
tion o
f
the house . The judges will be appointed by them and
their party , and of consequence will be obsequious enough to their
inclinations . The whole judicial authority , as well as the execu
tive , will be employed , perverted , and prostituted to th
e
purposes
o
f electioneering . No justice will be attainable , nor will inno
cence or virtue be safe in the judicial courts but fo
r
the friends o
f
the prevailing leaders . Legal prosecutions will be instituted and
carried on against opposers , to their vexation and ruin . And as
they have the public purse a
t
command , as well as the executive
and judicial power , the public money will be expended in the
same way . No favors will be attainable but by those who will
court the ruling demagogues o
f
the house b
y voting fo
r
their
friends and instruments ; and pensions , and pecuniary rewards and
gratifications , as well as honors and offices of every kind , voted to
friends and partisans , etc . , etc . The press , that great barrier and
bulwark o
f
the rights o
f
mankind , when it is protected b
y
law , can
n
o longer b
e
free . If the authors , writers , and printers will not
accept o
f
the hire that will be offered them , they must submit to
the ruin that will be denounced against them . The presses , with
much secrecy and concealment , will be made the vehicles of
calumny against the minority , and of panegyric and empirical ap
plauses o
f
the leaders o
f
the majority , and no remedy can possibly
b
e
obtained . In one word , the whole system of affairs , and every
conceivable motive o
f hope o
r
fear , will be employed to promote
the private interests o
f
a few , and their obsequious majority ; and
there is n
o remedy but in arms . Accordingly we find in all the
Italian republics , the minority always were driven to arms in de
spair . ” 1
$ 553 . Another learned writer has ventured on the bold declara
1 3 Adams ' s Defence of American Constitutions , 28
4
to 2
8
6
.
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tion , that " a single legislature is calculated to unite in it al
l
the
pernicious qualities o
f
the different extremes o
f
bad government .
It produces general weakness , inactivity , and confusion , and these
are intermixed with sudden and violent fits o
f
despotism , injus
tice , and cruelty . ”
$ 554 . Without conceding that this language exhibits an unex
aggerated picture o
f
the results o
f
the legislative power being
vested in a single assembly , there is enough in it to satisfy the
minds of considerate men , that there is great danger in such an
exclusive deposit o
f
it . 2 Some check ought to be provided , to
maintain the real balance intended b
y
the Constitution ; and this
check will be most effectually obtained b
y
a co -ordinate branch of
equal authority , and different organization , which shall have the
same legislative power , and possess an independent negative upon
the doings of the other branch . The value of the check will ,
indeed , in a great measure , depend upon this difference o
f organ
ization . If the term of office , the qualifications ,themode of elec
tion , the persons and interests represented b
y
each branch are
exactly the same , the check will be less powerful , and the guard
less perfect , than if some or al
l
o
f
these ingredients differ , so as
to bring into play a
ll
the various interests and influences which
belong to a free , honest , and enlightened society .
$ 555 . The value , then , of a distribution of th
e
legislative
power between two branches , each possessing a negative upon the
other , may be summed up under the following heads . First : it
operates directly as a security against hasty , rash , and dangerous
legislation ; and allows errors and mistakes to be corrected , before
they have produced any public mischiefs . It interposes delay
between the introduction and final adoption of a measure , and
thus furnishes time fo
r
reflection , and fo
r
the successive delibera
tions o
f
different bodies , actuated by different motives , and organ
ized upon different principles .
$ 556 . In the next place , it operates indirectly as a preventive
to attempts to carry private , personal , o
r party objects , not con
nected with the common good . The very circumstance that there
exists another body clothed with equal power , and jealous of its
own rights , and independent of the influence of the leaders who
favor a particular measure , b
y
whom it must be scanned , and to
11 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 393 to 405 ; The Federalist , No . 22 .
? See Sidney o
n
Government , ch . 3 , § 45 .
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whom it must be recommended upon it
s
own merits , will have a
silent tendency to discourage the efforts to carry it b
y
surprise , or
b
y
intrigue , or by corrupt party combinations . It is far less easy
to deceive , or corrupt , or persuade two bodies into a course sub
versive of the general good , than it is one ; especially if the ele
ments o
f
which they are composed are essentially different .
$ 557 . In the next place , as legislation necessarily acts , or may
act , upon the whole community , and involves interests of vast
difficulty and complexity , and requires nice adjustments and com
prehensive enactments , it is o
f
the greatest consequence to secure
a
n independent review o
f it b
y
different minds , acting under dif
ferent and sometimes opposite opinions and feelings ; so that it
may be a
s perfect as human wisdom can devise . An appellate
jurisdiction , therefore , that acts and is acted upon alternately , in
the exercise o
f
a
n independent revisory authority ,must have the
means , and can scarcely fail to possess the will , to give it a full
and satisfactory review . Everyone knows , notwithstanding all
the guards interposed to secure due deliberation , how imperfect
a
ll
human legislation is ; how much it embraces of doubtful prin
ciple , and of still more doubtful utility ; how various , and yet how
defective , are its provisions to protect rights and to redress
wrongs . Whatever , therefore , naturally and necessarily awakens
doubt , solicits caution , attracts inquiry , or stimulates vigilance and
industry , is of value to aid us against precipitancy in framing or
altering laws , as well as against yielding to the suggestions o
f
indolence , the selfish projects of ambition , or the cunning devices
o
f corrupt and hollow demagogues . For this purpose , no better
expedient has , as yet ,been found , than the creation of an inde
pendent branch of censors to revise the legislative enactments of
others , and to alter , amend , o
r reject them a
t
its pleasure , while ,
in return , its own are to pass through a like ordeal .
$ 558 . In the next place , there can scarcely be any other ade
quate security against encroachments upon the constitutional rights
and liberties of the people . Algernon Sidney has said with great
force , that the legislative power is always arbitrary and not to be
trusted in the hands o
f any who are not bound to obey the laws
1 “ Look , ” says an intelligent writer , “ into every society , analyze public measures ,
and get a
t
the real conductors of them , and it will be found that fe
w
, very few men in
every government , and in themost democratical perhaps the fewest, are , in fact , the persons
who give the lead and direction to all which is brought to pass . " - Thoughts upon the
Political Situation o
f
the United States o
f
America , printed a
t
Worcester , 1788 .
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they make . But it is not less true that it has a constant tendency
to overleap it
s proper boundaries , from passion , from ambition ,
from inadvertence , from the prevalence of faction , or from the
overwhelming influence o
f private interests . 2 Under such circum
stances , the only effectual barrier against oppression ,accidental or
intentional , is to separate it
s operations , to balance interest against
interest , ambition against ambition , the combinations and spirit o
f
dominion o
f
one body against the like combinations and spirit of
another . And it is obvious that the more various the elements
which enter into the actual composition o
f
each body , the greater
the security will be . Mr . Justice Wilson has truly remarked ,
that “ when a single legislature is determined to depart from the
principles o
f
the Constitution , and its uncontrollable power may
prompt th
e
determination , there is no constitutional authority to
check its progress . It may proceed b
y long and hasty strides in
violating the Constitution , till nothing but a revolution can check
it
s
career . Far different will the case be when the legislature
consists o
f
two branches . If one of them should depart , or at
tempt to depart , from the principles o
f
the Constitution , itwill be
drawn back b
y
the other . The very apprehension of the event
will prevent the departure , or the attempt . ” 4
$ 559 . Such is an outline of the general reasoning b
y
which the
system o
f
a separation o
f
th
e
legislative power into two branches
has been maintained . Experience has shown that if in all cases
it has not been found a complete check to inconsiderate or uncon
stitutional legislation , yet that it has , upon many occasions , been
found sufficient for the purpose . There is not probably a
t
this
moment a single State in the Union which would consent to unite
the two branches into one assembly , though there have not been
wanting a
t
all times minds of a high order , which have been led
1 Sidney ' s Disc . on Government , ch . 3 , § 45 .
2 The Federalist , Nos . 15 . 8 Id . Nos . 62 , 15 .
4 1 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 396 ; The Federalist , Nos . 62 , 63 . Mr . Jefferson was decid
edly in favor o
f
a division o
f
the legislative power into two branches , as will be evident
from a
n
examination o
f
his Notes o
n Virginia , ( p . 194 , ) and his correspondence a
t
this
period when this subject was discussed . 2 Pitk . Hist . 283 . De Lolme , in hi
s
work o
n
the Constitution o
f England , has ( ch . 3 , p . 214 , & c . ) some very striking remarks on the
same subject , in the passage already cited . He has added : “ The result o
f
a division
o
f
the executive power is either a more o
r
less speedy establishment o
f
the right o
f
the
strongest , or a continued state o
f
war ; that of a division of the legislative power is
either truth o
r general tranquillity . ” Se
e
also Paley ' s Moral and Political Philosophy ,
B . 6 , ch . 6 , 7 .
VOL . I . 26
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b
y
enthusiasm , or a love of simplicity , or a devotion to theory , to
vindicate such a union with arguments striking and plausible , if
not convincing .
$ 560 . In the convention which formed the Constitution , upon
the resolution moved , “ that the national legislature ought to
consist of two branches , " al
l
the States present , except Pennsyl
vania , voted in the affirmative . 1 A
t
a subsequent period , however ,
seven only , of eleven States present , voted in the affirmative ,
three in the negative , and one was divided . But , although in the
convention this diversity o
f opinion appears , it seems probable
that ultimately when a national government was decided o
n , which
should exert great controlling authority over the States , all oppo
sition was withdrawn , as the existence of two branches furnished
a greater security to the lesser States . It does not appear that
this division of the legislative power became with the people any
subject of ardent discussion o
r
o
f real controversy . If it had
been so , deep traces of it would have been found in the public
debates , instead of a general silence . The Federalist touches the
subject in but few places , and then principally with reference to
the articles o
f
confederation , and the structure o
f
the Senate . 4
In fact the opponents of the Constitution felt that there was addi
tional security given to the States , as such , b
y
their representation
in the Senate , and as the large States must have a commanding
influence upon the actual basis in the House , the lesser States
could not but unite in a desire to maintain their own equality in a
co -ordinate branch . 5
$ 561 . Having considered the general reasoning b
y
which the
division o
f
the legislative power has been justified , it may be
proper , in conclusion , to give a summary of those grounds which
were deemed most important , and which had most influence in
settling the actual structure o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United
States . The question , of course , had reference altogether to the
establishment o
f
the Senate , fo
r
n
o
one doubted the propriety o
f
establishing a House o
f Representatives , as a depositary of the
legislative power , however much any might differ as to the nature
o
f
it
s composition .
1 Journal o
f
the Convention , 85 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 233 .
2 Journal of the Convention , 140 .
3 Yates ’ s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 59 , 75 , 76 ; Id . 87 , 88 , 89 ; Id . 12
4
, 125 .
4 The Federalist , Nos . 22 , 62 , 63 .
5 The Federalist , No . 22 ; Id . Nos . 37 , 38 ; Id . No . 39 ; Id . No . 62 .
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$ 562. In order to justify the existence of a senate with co-ordi
nate powers , it was said , first, that it was a misfortune incident to
republican governments , though in a less degree than to other
governments , that those who administer them may forget their
obligations to their constituents , and prove unfaithful to their im
portant trust . In this point of view , a senate , as a second branch
of the legislative assembly , distinct from and dividing the power
with a first,must be in al
l
cases a salutary check on the govern
ment . It doubles the security to the people by requiring the con
currence o
f
two distinct bodies in schemes o
f usurpation o
r perfidy ,
whereas the ambition or corruption o
f
one would otherwise be
sufficient . This precaution , it was added , was founded on such
clear principles , and so well understood in the United States , that
it was superfluous to enlarge on it . As the improbability of sinis
ter combinations would be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the
genius o
f
the two bodies , it must be politic to distinguish them
from each other b
y every circumstance which would consist with a
due harmony in a
ll proper measures , and with the genuine princi
ples o
f republican government .
§ 563 . Secondly . The necessity of a senate was not less indi
cated b
y
the propensity o
f
a
ll single and numerous assemblies to
yield to the impulse o
f
sudden and violent passions , and to be
seduced b
y
factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious reso
lutions . Examples of this sort might be cited without number ,
and from proceedings in the United States as well as from the
history o
f
other nations . A body which is to correct this infirmity
ought to be free from it , and consequently ought to be less numer
ous , and to possess a due degree of firmness ,and a proper tenure
o
f
office .
$ 564 . Thirdly . Another defect to be supplied by a senate lay
in the want o
f
a due acquaintance with the objects and principles
o
f legislation . A good government implies two things , — fidelity
to the objects o
f
the government ; secondly , a knowledge of the
means b
y
which those objects ca
n
b
e best attained . It was sug
gested that in the American governments too little attention had
been paid to the last , and that the establishment o
f
a senate upon
a proper basis would greatly increase the chances of fidelity and
1 The Federalist , No . 62 .
2 The Federalist , N
o
. 62 ; Paley ' s Moral and Political Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 6 , 7 ; 2
Wilson ' s Law Lect . 144 to 148 .
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o
f
wise and safe legislation . What it was asked ) are al
l
the re
pealing , explaining , and amending laws , which fill and disgrace
our voluminous codes , but so many monuments o
f
deficient wis
dom , so many impeachments exhibited b
y
each succeeding against
each preceding session , so many admonitions to the people of the
value of those aids ,which may be expected from a well -constituted
senate ? 1
$ 565 . Fourthly . Such a body would prevent too great a muta
| bility in the public councils , arising from a rapid succession of
new members , fo
r
from a change o
f
men there must proceed a
change o
f opinions , and from a change of opinions a change of
measures . Such instability in legislation has a tendency to dimin
ish respect and confidence abroad , as well as safety and prosperity
a
t
home . It has a tendency to damp the ardor of industry and
enterprise , to diminish the security of property , and to impair the
reverence and attachment which are indispensable to the perma
nence of every political institution . ”
$ 566 . Fifthly . Another ground , illustrating the utility of a
senate , was suggested to be the keeping alive o
f
a due sense o
f
national character . In respect to foreign nations this was of vital
importance , for in our intercourse with them , if a scrupulous and
uniform adherence to just principles were not observed , it must
subject us to many embarrassments and collisions . It is difficult
to impress upon a single body , which is numerous and changeable ,
a deep sense o
f the value o
f national character . A small portion
o
f
the praise o
r
blame o
f
any particular measure can fall to the
lot o
f any particular person , and the period o
f
office is so short
that little responsibility is felt , and little pride is indulged , as to
the course o
f
the government . 3
$ 567 . Sixthly . It was urged that , paradoxical as it might
seem , the want in some important cases of a due responsibility in
the government arises from that very frequency o
f
elections which
in other cases produces such responsibility . In order to be rea
sonable , responsibility must be limited to objects within the power
o
f the responsible party ; and in order to be effectual it must
relate to operations o
f
that power , o
f
which a ready and proper
judgment can be formed b
y
the constituents . Some measures
have singly an immediate and sensible operation ; others , again ,
depend on a succession of well -connected schemes , and have a
i The Federalist , No . 62 . 2 Id . N
o
. 62 . 3 Id . N
o . 63 .
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gradual and perhaps unobserved operation . If , therefore , there
b
e but one assembly , chosen fo
r
a short period , it will be difficult
to keep u
p
th
e
train o
f proper measures , or to preserve the proper
connection between the past and the future . And the more nu
merous the body , and th
e
more changeable it
s component parts ,
the more difficult it will be to preserve the personal responsibility ,
a
s well a
s
the uniform action , of the successive members to the
great objects o
f
the public welfare . ?
$ 568 . Lastly . A senate duly constituted would not only oper
ate a
s
a salutary check upon the representatives , but occasionally
upon the people themselves , against their own temporary delu
sions and errors . The cool , deliberate sense of the community
ought , in al
l
governments , and actually will in al
l
free govern
ments , ultimately prevail over the views of their rulers . But
there are particular moments in public affairs when the people ,
stimulated b
y
some irregular passion o
r
some illicit advantage , or
misled b
y
the artful misrepresentations o
f
interested men , may
call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the
most ready to lament and condemn . In these critical moments
how salutary will be the interference of a body of respectable citi
zens , chosen without reference to the exciting cause , to check the
misguided career o
f public opinion , and to suspend the blow , until
reason , justice , and truth can regain their authority over the pub
lic mind . It was thought to add great weight to al
l
these con
siderations that history has informed u
s
o
f
n
o long -lived republic
which had not a senate . Sparta , Rome , Carthage ,were , in fact ,
the only states to whom that character ca
n
b
e applied .
1 The Federalist , No . 63 . 2 Jd .
8 The Federalist , No . 63 . There are some very striking remarks on this subject in
the reasoning o
f
the convention , in the county of Essex , called to consider the consti
tation proposed for Massachusetts , in 1778 , * and which was finally rejected . “ The
legislative power , " said that body , “must not be trusted with one assembly . A single
assembly is frequently influenced b
y
the vices , follies , passions , and prejudices o
f
a
n
in
dividual . It is liable to be avaricious , and to exempt itself from the burdens it lays on
it
s
constituents . It is subject to ambition ; and after a series o
f years will be prompted
to vote itself perpetual . The Long Parliament in England voted itself perpetual , and
thereby fo
r
a timedestroyed the political liberty o
f the subject . Holland was governed
b
y
one representative assembly , annually elected . They afterwards voted themselves
from annual to septennial , then for life ; and finally exerted the power o
f filling u
p
all
* It is contained in a pamphlet entitled " The Essex Result , ” and was printed in 1778 . I
quote the passage fromMr . Savage ' s valuable Exposition of the Constitution o
f
Massachu
setts , printed in the New England Magazine for March , 1882, p . 9 . See also , o
n this subject ,
Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 7 , p . 388 ; The Federalist , Nos . 6
2 , 68 .
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$ 569 . It will be observed that some parts of the foregoing rea
soning apply to the fundamental importance o
f
a
n actual division
o
f
the legislative power , and other parts to the true principles
upon which that division should b
e subsequently organized , in
order to give full effect to th
e
constitutional check . Some parts
g
o
to show the value o
f
a senate , and others what should be its
structure in order to insure wisdom , experience , fidelity , and dig
nity in it
s
members . All of it , however , instructs us that in
order to give it fair play and influence a
s
a co -ordinate branch of
government , it ought to be less numerous ,more select , and more
durable than the other branch , and be chosen in a manner which
should combine and represent different interests with a varied
force . How fa
r
these objects are attained b
y
the Constitution will
b
e
better seen when the details belonging to each department are
successively examined .
$ 570 . This discussion may be closed b
y
the remark that in the
Roman republic the legislative authority , in the last resort , resided
fo
r
ages in two distinct political bodies , not as branches o
f
the
same legislature , but as distinct and independent legislatures , in
each o
f
which an opposite interest prevailed . In one the patri
cian , in the other the plebeian , predominated . And yet , during the
coexistence o
f
these two legislatures , the Roman republic attained
to the supposed pinnacle o
f
human greatness . 2
vacancies , without application to their constituents . The government of Holland is
now a tyranny , though a republic . The result of a single assembly will be hasty and
indigested , and their judgments frequently absurd and inconsistent . Theremust be a
second body to revise with coolness and wisdom and to control with firmness , indepen
dent upon the first , either for their creation o
r
existence . Yet the first must retain a
right to a similar revision and control over the second . "
1 The Federalist ,Nos . 62 , 63 .
2 The Federalist , No . 3
4
.
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$ 571. The second section of th
e
first article contains the
structure and organization o
f
the House o
f Representatives . The
first clause is a
s
follows :
“ The House o
f Representatives shall be composed o
f
members
chosen every second year b
y
the people o
f
the several States , and
the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors o
f
themost numerous branch o
f
the State legislature . ”
$ 572 . As soon as it was settled that the legislative power
should be divided into two separate and distinct branches , a very
important consideration arose in regard to the organization o
f
those branches respectively . It is obvious that the organization
o
f
each is susceptible o
f
very great diversities and modifications in
respect to the principles of representation , the qualification o
f
the
electors and the elected , the term of service of the members , the
ratio o
f representation , and the number o
f
which the body should
b
e composed .
$ 573 . First , the principle of representation . The American
people had long been in the enjoyment o
f
the privilege o
f electing
a
t
least one branch o
f
the legislature , and in some of the colonies
o
f electing a
ll
the branches composing the legislature . A house of
representatives , under various denominations , such as a house
o
f delegates , a house of commons , o
r simply a house of representa
tives , emanating directly from , and responsible to , the people , and
possessing a distinct and independent legislative authority , was
familiar to a
ll
the colonies , and was held b
y
them in the highest
reverence and respect . They justly thought , that as the govern
ment in general should always have a common interest with the
people , and be administered fo
r
their good , so it was essential to
their rights and liberties that the most numerous branch should
have a
n
immediate dependence upon , and sympathy with , the peo
ple . There was no novelty in this view . It was not the mere
1 The Federalist , No . 52 ; 1 Black . Comm . 158 , 15
9
; Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B .
6 , ch . 7 ; 1 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 429 to 433 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 122 to 132 .
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result of a state of colonial dependence , in which their jealousy
was awake to all the natural encroachments of power in a foreign
realm . They had drawn their opinions and principles from the
practice of the parent country . They knew the inestimable value
of the house of commons , as a component branch of the British
Parliament ; and they believed that it had at al
l
times furnished
the best security against the oppressions o
f
the crown and the aris
tocracy . While the power of taxation , of revenue , and of supplies
remained in the hands o
f
a popular branch , it was difficult fo
r
usurpation to exist fo
r
any length of time without check ; and
prerogative must yield to that necessity which controlled a
t
once
the sword and the purse . No reasoning , therefore , was necessary
to satisfy the American people o
f
the advantages o
f
a house o
f
representatives , which should emanate directly from themselves ;
which should guard their interests , support their rights , express
their opinions ,make known their wants , redress their grievances ,
and introduce a pervading popular influence throughout all the
operations o
f
the government . Experience , as well as theory ,
had settled it in their minds , as a fundamental principle of a free
government , and especially of a republican government , that no
laws ought to b
e passed without the co -operation and consent of
the representatives o
f
the people ; and that these representatives
should b
e
chosen b
y
themselves , without the intervention of any
other functionaries to intercept o
r
vary their responsibility . 1
$ 574 . The principle , however , had been hitherto applied to the
political organization o
f
the State legislatures only ; and its appli
cation to that o
f
the Federal government was not without some
diversity o
f opinion . This diversity had not its origin in any doubt
o
f
the correctness o
f
the principle itself ,when applied to simple
republics ; but the propriety of applying it to cases o
f
confeder
ated republics was affected b
y
other independent considerations .
Those who might wish to retain a very large portion of State
sovereignty in it
s representative character in the councils o
f
the
Union ,would naturally desire to have the House of Representatives
elected b
y
the State in it
s political character , as under the old
confederation . Those , on the other hand ,who wished to impart to
the government a national character would as naturally desire an
independent election b
y
the people themselves in their primary
meetings . Probably these circumstances had some operation upon
i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 28 .
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the votes given on the question in the convention itself. For it
appears that, upon the original proposition in the convention ,
“ That the members of the first branch of the national legislature
ought to be elected by the people of the several States,” si
x
States
voted for it , two against it , and two were divided . And upon a
subsequent motion to strike out the word “ people , " and insert in
it
s place the word “ legislatures , ” three States voted in the affirma
tive and eight in the negative . A
t
a subsequent period a motion ,
that the representatives should be appointed in such manner as
the legislature o
f
each State should direct , was negatived , six
States voting in the affirmative , three in the negative , and one
being divided ; and the final vote in favor of an election b
y
the
people was decided b
y
the vote o
f nine States in the affirmative ,
one voting in the negative , and one being divided . The result
was not therefore obtained without much discussion and argu
ment , though at last an entire unanimity prevailed . It is satis
factory to know that a fundamental principle o
f public liberty
has been thus secured to ourselves and our posterity , which will
forever indissolubly connect the interests o
f
th
e
people with those
o
f
the Union . Under the confederation , though the delegates to
Congress might have been elected b
y
th
e
people , they were , in
fact , in al
l
the States , except two , elected b
y
the State legisla
ture . 6
$ 575 . We accordingly find , that in the section under considera
tion , the House of Representatives is required to be composed of
1 Journal o
f
Convention ,May 31 , 1787 , p . 85 , 86 , 135 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , (Yates ' s
Minutes , ) 58 .
2 Journal o
f
Convention ,May 31 , 1787 , p . 103 , 10
4
; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , ( 1 Yates ' s
Minutes , ) 62 , 63 , 90 , 91 .
8 Journal of Convention , June 21 , 1787 , p . 140 , 141 , 215 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 90 , 91
(Yates ' s Minutes ) .
4 Journal o
f
Convention , p . 216 , 233 .
5 Mr . Burke , in his Reflections on the French Revolution , has treated the subject of
the mischiefs o
f
a
n
indirect choice only b
y
the people o
f
their representatives in amas
terly manner . He has demonstrated , that such a system must remove all real respon
sibility to the people from the representative . Mr . Jefferson has expressed his approba
tion o
f
the principle o
f
a direct choice in a very qualified manner . He says , “ I approve
o
f
the greater house being chosen b
y
the people directly . For though I think a house
so chosen will be very inferior to the present Congress ,will be very ill qualified to legislate
fo
r
the Union , for foreign nations , & c . , yet this evil does not weigh against the good o
f
preserving inviolate the fundamental principle , that the people ought not to be taxed
but b
y
representatives chosen immediately b
y
themselves . " — 2 Jefferson ' s Corresp . p .
273 .
6 The Federalist , No . 40 .
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representatives chosen b
y
the people of the several States . The
choice , too , is to be made immediately by them ; so that the
power is direct , the influence direct , and the responsibility
direct . If any intermediate agency had been adopted , such as a
choice through a
n
electoral college , or b
y
official personages , or by
select and specially qualified functionaries pro hac vice , it is ob
vious that the dependence o
f
the representative upon the people ,
and the responsibility to them , would have been fa
r
less felt and
far more obstructed . Influence would have naturally grown up
with patronage ; and here , as in many other cases , the legal
maxim would have applied , causa proxima , non remota , spectatur .
The select body would have been a
t
once the patrons and the
guides of the representative ; and the people themselves have
become the instruments of subverting their own rights and
power .
$ 576 . The indirect advantages from this immediate agency of
the people in the choice o
f
their representatives are o
f incalcu
lable benefit , and deserve a brief mention in this place , because
they furnish us with matter for most serious reflection , in regard
to the actual operations and influences o
f republican governments .
In the first place , the right confers an additional sense ofpersonal
dignity and duty upon the mass o
f
the people . It gives a strong
direction to the education , studies , and pursuits of the whole com
munity . It enlarges the sphere of action , and contributes in a
high degree to the formation o
f
the public manners and national
character . It procures to the common people courtesy and sym
pathy from their superiors , and diffuses a common confidence , as
well as a common interest , through all the ranks o
f
society . It
awakens a desire to examine and sift and debate all public pro
ceedings , and thus nourishes a lively curiosity to acquire knowl
edge , and , at the same time , furnishes the means o
f gratifying it .
The proceedings and debates o
f
the legislature , the conduct of
public officers from the highest to the lowest , the character and
conduct o
f
the executive and his ministers , the struggles , intrigues ,
and conduct o
f
different parties , and the discussion of the great
public measures and questions which agitate and divide th
e
com
munity , are not only freely canvassed , and thus improve and ele
vate conversation , but they gradually furnish the mind with safe
and solid materials fo
r
judgment upon a
ll public affairs , and
check that impetuosity and rashness to which sudden impulses
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might otherwise lead the people , when they are artfully misguided
by selfish demagogues , and plausible schemes of change .
$ 577 . But this fundamental principle of an immediate choice
by the people , however important , would alone be insufficient fo
r
the public security , if the right of choice had not many auxiliary
guards and accompaniments . It was indispensable , secondly , to
provide for the qualifications o
f
the electors . It is obvious that
even when the principle is established , that the popular branch
o
f
th
e
legislature shall emanate directly from the people , there
still remains a very serious question , by whom and in what man
ner the choice shall be made . It is a question vital to the sys
te
m , and in a practical sense decisive , as to the durability and
efficiency o
f
the powers o
f government . Here there is much room
fo
r
doubt , and ingenious speculation , and theoretical inquiry upon
which different minds may arrive , and indeed have arrived , at
very different results . To whom ought the right of suffrage in a
free government to be confided ? Or , in other words ,who ought
to b
e permitted to vote in the choice o
f
the representatives o
f
the
people ? Ought the right of suffrage to be absolutely universal ?
Ought it to be qualified and restrained ? Ought it to belong to
many , or few ? If there ought to be restraints and qualifications ,
what are the true boundaries and limits o
f
such restraints and
qualifications ?
$ 578 . These questions are sufficiently perplexing and disquiet
ing in theory ; and in the practice of different states , and even of
free states , ancient as well as modern , they have assumed almost
infinite varieties o
f
form and illustration . Perhaps they do not
admit o
f any general ,much less of any universal answer , so as to
furnish a
n unexceptionable and certain rule for a
ll ages and a
ll
nations . The manners , habits , institutions , characters , and pur
suits o
f
different nations ; the local position of the territory , in
regard to other nations ; the actual organizations and classes of
society ; the influences of peculiar religious , civil , or political
institutions ; the dangers as well as the difficulties of the times ;
the degrees of knowledge or ignorance pervading the mass o
f
so
ciety ; the national temperament , and even the climate and pro
ducts o
f
the soil ; the cold and thoughtful gravity o
f
the north ;
I I have borrowed these views from Dr . Paley , and fear only that by abridging them
I have lessened their force . Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 6 . See also 2 Wil
son ' s Law Lect . 124 to 128 .
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and the warm and mercurial excitability of tropical or southern
regions ; — al
l
these may , and probably will , introduce modifica
tions o
f principle , as well as of opinion , in regard to the right
o
f suffrage ,which it is not easy either to justify or to overthrow . "
$ 579 . The most strenuous advocate for universal suffrage has
never y
e
t
contended that the right should be absolutely universal .
No one has ever been sufficiently visionary to hold , that al
l
per
sons , of every age , degree , and character , should be entitled to
vote in a
ll
elections o
f all public officers . Idiots , infants ,minors ,
and persons insane o
r utterly imbecile , have been , without scruple ,
denied the right as not having the sound judgment and discretion
fi
t for it
s
exercise . In many countries , persons guilty of crimes
have also been denied the right , as a personal punishment , or as a
security to society . In most countries , females , whether married
o
r single , have been purposely excluded from voting , as interfer
ing with sound policy and th
e
harmony of social life . In the few
cases in which they have been permitted to vote , experience has
not justified the conclusion that it has been attended with any
correspondent advantages either to the public o
r
to themselves .
And yet it would be extremely difficult , upon any mere theoretical
reasoning , to establish any satisfactory principle , upon which the
one half of every society has thus been systematically excluded by
the other half from a
ll right o
f participating in government , which
would not , at the same time , apply to and justify many other ex
clusions . If it be said that all men have a natural , equal , and
unalienable right to vote , because they are all born free and
equal ; that they al
l
have common rights and interests entitled to
i i Black . Comm . 171 , 172 . Mr . Justice Blackstone ( Id . 171 ) has remarked , “ That
the true reason o
f
requiring any qualification with regard to property in voters is to ex
clude such persons a
s
are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have n
o
will o
f
their own . If these persons had votes , they would be tempted to dispose of them
under some undue influence o
r
other . This would give a great , an artful , or a wealthy
man a larger share in elections than is consistent with general liberty . If it were prob
able that everyman would give his vote freely and without influence o
f any kind , then ,
upon the true theory and genuine principles o
f liberty , every member o
f
the community ,
however poor , should have a vote in electing those delegates to whose charge is com
mitted the disposal o
f
his property , his liberty , and hi
s
life . But since that can hardly
b
e expected in persons o
f indigent fortunes , o
r
such a
s
are under the immediate domin .
ion o
f
others , a
ll popular states have been obliged to establish certain qualifications ,
whereby some , who are suspected to have n
o will of their own , are excluded from voting ,
in order to set other individuals , whose will may be supposed independent , more
thoroughly upon a level with each other . " Similar reasoning might be employed to
justify other exclusions , besides those founded upon a want of property .
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protection , and therefore have an equal right to decide, either
personally or by their chosen representatives , upon the laws and
regulations which shall control ,measure , and sustain those rights
and interests ; that they cannot be compelled to surrender , except
by their free consent ,what , by th
e
bounty and order o
f
Providence ,
belongs to them in common with all their race ; — what is there
in these considerations , which is not equally applicable to females ,
a
s
free , intelligent , moral , responsible beings , entitled to equal
rights and interests and protection , and having a vital stake in
all the regulations and laws of society ? And if an exception from
the nature o
f
th
e
case could b
e felt in regard to persons who are
idiots , infants , and insane , how ca
n
this apply to persons who
are of more mature growth , and are yet deemed minors b
y
the
municipal law ? Who has an original right to fix the time and
period o
f pupilage or minority ? Whence was derived the right
o
f
th
e
ancient Greeks and Romans to declare that women should
b
e
deemed never to be o
f
age , but should be subject to perpetual
guardianship ? Upon what principle o
f
natural law did the Ro
mans , in after times , fix the majority of females , as well as of
males , at twenty - five years ? 1 Who has a right to say that in
England it shall , for some purposes , be at fourteen , fo
r
others a
t
seventeen , and fo
r
a
ll
a
t twenty -one years ; while in France a
person arrives , for all purposes , at majority , only at thirty years ,
in Naples a
t eighteen , and in Holland at twenty - five ? 2 Who
shall say that one man is not a
s
well qualified a
s
a voter a
t eigh
teen years o
f age , as another is at twenty -five , or a third at forty ;
and fa
r
better than most men are a
t eighty ? And if any society
is invested with authority to settle the matter of the age and sex
o
f
voters , according to its own view of its policy , or convenience ,
o
r justice , who shall say that it has not equal authority , for like
reasons , to settle any other matter regarding the rights , qualifica
tions , and duties of voters ? 3
$ 580 . The truth seems to be that the right of voting , like many
other rights , is one which , whether it has a fixed foundation in
natural law or not , has always been treated in the practice o
f
na
tions as a strictly civil right , derived from , and regulated b
y , each *
society , according to its own circumstances and interests . It is
difficult , even in th
e
abstract , to conceive how it could have other
11 Black . Comm . 463 , 464 . 2 Id . 3 Id . 171 .
4 i Black . Comm . 171 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 130 ; Montesquieu ' s Spirit of Laws ,
B . 11 , ch . 6 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 52 , 53 .
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wise been treated . The terms and conditions upon which any
society is formed and organized must essentially depend upon the
will of those who are associated , or at least of those who consti
tute a majority , actually controlling th
e
rest . Originally , no man
could have any right but to act fo
r
himself ; and the power to
choose a chief magistrate or other officer to exercise dominion o
r
authority over others a
s
well a
s
himself could arise only upon a
joint consent o
f
the others to such appointment ; and their con
sent might be qualified exactly according to their own interests
o
r power o
r policy . The choice of representatives to act in a
legislative capacity is not only a refinement of much later stages
o
f
actual association and civilization , but could scarcely occur ,
until the society had assumed to itself the right to introduce such
institutions , and to confer such privileges as it deemed conducive
to the public good , and to prohibit the existence o
f any other .
In point o
f
fact , it is well known that representative legislative
bodies , a
t
least in the form now used , are the peculiar invention
o
f
modern times , and were unknown to antiquity . If , then , every
well -organized society has the right to consult fo
r
the common
good o
f
the whole , and if , upon the principles of natural law , this
right is conceded b
y
the very union o
f society , it seems diffi
cult to assign any limit to this right which is compatible with
the due attainment of the end proposed . If , therefore , any society
shall deem the common good and interests o
f
the whole society
best promoted under the particular circumstances in which it is
placed , by a restriction of the right of suffrage , it is not easy to
state any solid ground o
f objection to it
s
exercise o
f
such a
n
authority . A
t
least , if any society has a clear right to deprive
females , constituting one half of the whole population , of th
e
right of suffrage , (which , with scarcely an exception , has been
uniformly maintained , ) it will require some astuteness to find
upon what ground this exclusion can b
e
vindicated , which does
justify , or at least excuse ,many other exclusions . Government
( to use the pithy language o
f Mr . Burke ) has been deemed a
practical thing ,made fo
r
the happiness o
f
mankind , and not to
furnish out a spectacle o
f uniformity to gratify the schemes o
f
visionary politicians . 3
1 But se
e
Aristotle ' s Politics .
? See Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 7 , p . 392 ; 1 Black . Comm . 171 ; Montes
quieu ' s Spirit of Laws , B . 11 , ch . 6 .
8 Burke ' s Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol in 1777 .
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$ 581. Without laying any stress upon this theoretical reason
ing, which is brought before the reader, not so much because it
solves all doubts and objections ,as because it presents a view of
the serious difficulties attendant upon the assumption of an origi
nal and unalienable right of suffrage , as originating in natural
law , and independent of civil law , it may be proper to state that
every civilized society has uniformly fixed ,modified ,and regulated
the right of suffrage for itself, according to its own free will and
pleasure . Every constitution of government in these United
States has assumed a
s
a fundamental principle the right of the
people of the State to alter , abolish , and modify the form of its
own government , according to the sovereign pleasure of the peo
ple . In fact , the people of each State have gone much farther ,
and settled a far more critical question , b
y deciding who shall be
the voters entitled to approve and reject th
e
constitution framed
b
y
a delegated body under their direction . In th
e
adoption o
f
n
o
State constitution , has the assent been asked of any but the quali
fied voters ; and women and minors and other persons not recog
nized as voters b
y existing laws have been studiously excluded .
And yet the constitution has been deemed entirely obligatory
upon them a
s
well as upon the minority who voted against it .
From this itwill be seen how little , even in the most free of repub
lican governments , any abstract right of suffrage or any original
and indefeasible privilege has been recognized in practice . If
this consideration do not satisfy ourminds , it at least will prepare
u
s
to presume that there may be an almost infinite diversity in the
established right o
f voting , without any State being able to assert
that it
s
own mode is exclusively founded in natural justice , or is
most conformable to sound policy , or is best adapted to the public
security . It will teach us that the question is necessarily complex
and intricate in it
s
own nature , and is scarcely susceptible of any
simple solution which shall rigidly apply to th
e
circumstances and
conditions , the interests and the feelings , the institutions and th
e
manners , o
f
a
ll nations . What may best promote the public weal
and secure the public liberty and advance the public prosperity in
one age o
r
nation may totally fail of similar results under local ,
physical , ormoral predicaments essentially different .
$ 582 . It would carry us to
o
fa
r
from the immediate object o
f
1 See Locke o
n
Government , p . 2 , $ 149 , 227 .
2 Dr . Lieber ' s Encyclopædia Americana , art . Constitution .
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these commentaries to take a general survey o
f
the various modi
fications under which the right of suffrage , either in relation to
laws o
r magistracy , or even judicial controversies , has appeared
in different nations in ancient and modern times . The examples
o
f
Greece and Rome in ancient times , and of England in modern
times , will be found most instructive . In England , the qualifica
tions o
f
voters , as also the modes of representation , are various
and framed upon no common principle . The counties are repre
sented b
y knights , elected b
y
the proprietors of lands who are
freeholders ; 2 the boroughs and cities are represented b
y
citizens
and burgesses , or others chosen b
y
the citizens or burgesses ,
according to the qualifications prescribed b
y
custom o
r
b
y
the
respective charters and b
y
-laws o
f
each borough or city . 3 In
these the right o
f voting is almost infinitely varied and modified . 4
In the American colonies , under their charters and laws , no uni
form rules in regard to the right of suffrage existed . In some o
f
the colonies the course o
f
the parent country was closely followed ,
so that freeholders alone were voters ; ; in others a very near ap
proach was made to universal suffrage among the males o
f compe
tent age ; and in others , again , a middle principle was adopted ,
which made taxation and voting dependent upon each other , or
annexed to it the qualification of holding some personal estate , or
the privilege o
f being a freeman , or the eldest son of a freeholder
o
f
the town or corporation . When the Revolution brought about
the separation o
f
the colonies and they formed themselves into
independent States , a very striking diversity was observable in the
original constitutions adopted b
y
them ; ? and a like diversity has
1 See 3 Adams ' s Amer . Constitut . Letter 6 , p . 263 , & c . p . 440 , & c . ; 1 Black . Comm .
171 , 172 , 173 ; Montesquieu ' s Spirit of Laws , Book 11 , ch . 13 ; Id . B . 2 , ch . 2 .
? 1 Black . Comm . 172 , 173 ; Paley ' sMoral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 7 ; The Federalist ,
No . 57 .
3 i Black . Comm . 172 to 275 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 209 to 212 . See also
Burke ' s Reflections on the French Revolution .
4 See Dr . Lieber ' s Encyclopædia Americana , art . Election ; Great Britain , Constitu
tion o
f . [But since these commentaries were written the Reform Acts o
f 1832 and
1867 have changed the basis o
f suffrage in England very greatly , admitting large num
bers to it
s
exercise who were excluded before , and introducing uniformity in qualifica
tions . See Cooley ' s Blackstone , 172 , note ; American Annual Cyclopædia for 1869 ,
art . Great Britain . ]
5 See Jefferson ' s Notes on Virginia , 191 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 96 to 100 .
6 See Charter o
f
Rhode Island , 1663 , and Rhode Island Laws , ( edit . 1798 , ) p . 114 .
See also Connecticut Charter , 1662 , and Massachusetts Charters , 1628 and 1692 .
7 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 132 to 138 ; 2 Pitkin ' s Hist . ch . 19 , p . 294 to 316 .
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pervaded all the constitutions of the new States which have since
grown up , and al
l
the revised constitutions o
f
the ol
d
States which
have received the final ratification o
f
the people . In some of th
e
States the right o
f suffrage depends upon a certain length o
f
resi
dence and payment o
f
taxes ; in others upon mere citizenship and
residence ; in others upon the possession of a freehold or some
estate o
f
a particular value , or upon the payment of taxes , or per
formance o
f
some public duty , such as service in the militia or on
the highways . In no two of these State constitutions will it be
found that the qualifications o
f
the voters are settled upon the
same uniform basis . So that we have the most abundant proofs
that among a free and enlightened people , convened for the pur
pose o
f establishing their own forms of government and the rights
o
f
their own voters , the question as to the due regulation of the
qualifications has been deemed a matter o
f
mere State policy , and
varied to meet the wants , to suit the prejudices , and to foster the
interests of themajority . An absolute , indefeasible right to elect
o
r
be elected scems never to have been asserted on one side or
denied on the other ; but the subject has been freely canvassed as
one o
f
mere civil polity , to be arranged upon such a basis as the
majority may deem expedient with reference to the moral , physi
cal , and intellectual condition of the particular State . 3
$ 583 . It was under this known diversity of constitutional pro
visions in regard to State elections , that the convention which
framed the Constitution o
f the Union was assembled . The defini
tion of the right o
f suffrage is very justly regarded as a funda
mental article of a republican government . Itwas incumbent on
the convention , therefore , to define and establish this right in the
Constitution . To have left it open fo
r
the occasional regulation o
f
Congress would have been improper , fo
r
the reason just men
tioned . To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the
States would have been inproper , for the same reason , and for
the additional reason that it would have rendered to
o dependent
o
n the State governments that branch of the Federal government
1 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 132 to 138 . Mr . Hume in his Idea of a Perfect Common
wealth , proposes that the representatives should be freeholders o
f
201. a year , and house
holders worth 5001 . 1 Hume ' s Essays , Essay 16 , p . 526 .
2 See the Federalist , No . 54 ; 2Wilson ' s Law Lectures , 132 to 138 ; 2 Pitkin ' s Hist .
294 to 316 .
3 D
r . Lieber ' s Encyclopædia Americana , art . Constitutions of th
e
United States . The
Federalist , No . 52 to 54 .
VOL . I . 2
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which ought to be dependent on the people alone . Two modes of
providing for the right of suffrage in the choice of representatives
were presented to the consideration o
f
that body . One was to
devise some plan which should operate uniformly in all the States ,
o
n
a common principle ; the other was to conform to the existing
diversities in the States , thus creating a mixed mode of repre
sentation . In favor o
f
the former course , it might be urged that
all the States ought , upon the floor of the House o
f Representa
tives , to be represented equally ; that this could be accomplished
only b
y
the adoption o
f
a uniform qualification o
f
the voters ,who
would thus express the same public opinion o
f
the same body of
citizens throughout the Union ; that if freeholders alone in one
State chose th
e
representative , and in another al
l
male citizens o
f
competent age , and in another al
l
freemen o
f particular towns or
corporations , and in another al
l
taxed inhabitants , it would be ob
vious that different interests and classes would obtain exclusive
representations in different States , and thus the great objects of
the Constitution , the promotion of the general welfare and com
mon defence , might be unduly checked and obstructed ; that a
uniform principle would a
t
least have this recommendation , that
it could create no well -founded jealousies among the different
States , and would be most likely to satisfy the body of the people
by its perfect fairness , its permanent equality of operation , and its
entire independence o
f
a
ll
local legislation , whether in the shape
o
f
State laws o
r o
f
amendments to State constitutions .
§ 584 . On the other hand , itmight be urged in favor of the lat
ter course , that the reducing of the different qualifications ,already
existing in the different States , to one uniform rule , would have
been a very difficult task , even to the convention itself , and would
b
e dissatisfactory to the people o
f
different States . It would not
b
e very easy fo
r
the convention to frame any rule which would
satisfy the scruples , the prejudices , or the judgments of a major
it
y
o
f
it
s
own members . It would not be easy to induce Virginia
to give u
p
the exclusive right of freeholders to vote ; or Rhode
Island o
r
Connecticut the exclusive right of freemen to vote ; or
Massachusetts the right of persons possessing a given value of
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 52 . [ A change is introduced by the recent constitutional
amendments . The fifteenth forbids the right to vote being denied or abridged on
account o
f
race , color , or previous condition of servitude ; but except upon these
grounds the people o
f
the States establish such discriminations a
s they see fi
t . ]
2 The Federalist , No . 52 .
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personal property to vote ; or other States the right of persons
paying taxes , or having a fixed residence , to vote . The subject
itself was not susceptible of any very exact limitations upon any
general reasoning . The circumstances of different States might
create great diversities in the practical operation of any uniform
system . And th
e
natural attachments which long habit and usage
had sanctioned , in regard to the exercise o
f
the right , would enlist
a
ll
the feelings and interests and opinions o
f every State against
any substantial change in it
s
own institutions . A great embar
rassment would be thus thrown in the way of the adoption o
f
the
Constitution itself , which perhaps would be thus put at hazard ,
upon the mere ground o
f
theoretical propriety .
$ 585 . Besides , it might be urged that it is far from being clear ,
upon reasoning or experience , that uniformity in the composition
o
f
a representative body is either desirable or expedient , founded
in sounder policy , or more promotive of the general good , than a
mixed system , embracing and representing and combining dis
tinct interests , classes , and opinions . In England th
e
house o
f
commons , as a representative body , is founded upon no uniform
principle , either of numbers , or classes , or places . The represen
tation is made u
p
o
f persons chosen b
y
electors having very differ
ent , and sometimes very discordant qualifications : in some cases ,
1 Rawle on the Constitution , ch . 4 , p . 40 .
2 Mr . Burke manifestly thought , that no system o
f
representative government could
b
e
safe without a large admixture o
f
different persons and interests . “ Nothing , ” says
h
e , “ is a due and adequate representation of a state that does not represent its ability
a
s
well a
s
it
s property . But as ability is a vigorous and active principle , and as prop
erty is sluggish , inert ,and timid , it can never be safe from the invasion of ability ,unless
it be , out of al
l
proportion , predominant in the representation . ” Burke ' s Reflections
o
n
the French Revolution . See also Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 7 . In a sub
sequent page o
f
h
is
Reflections o
n
the French Revolution , he discusses th
e
then favorito
theory o
f representation proposed fo
r
the constitution o
f
France , upon the triple basis
o
f territory , population , and taxation , and demonstrates with great clearness it
s incon
venience , inequality , and inconsistency . The representatives , to
o , were to be chosen
indirectly , by electors appointed b
y
electors , who were again chosen b
y
other electors .
“ The member , ” says Mr . Burke , “ who goes to the national assembly is not chosen b
y
the people , nor accountable to them . There are three elections before he is chosen ;
two sets o
f magistrates intervene between him and the primary assembly , so as to
render him , as I have said , an ambassador of a state , and not the representative o
f
the
people within a state . " S
o
much for mere theory in the hands o
f visionary and specu
lative statesmen .
8 Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 7 , p . 380 , 381 to 394 ; De Lolme , Const . o
f
England , B . I , ch . 4 , p . 61 , 62 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 219 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App .
209 , 210 , 211 ; 1 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 431 .
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property is exclusively represented ; in others , particular trades
and pursuits ; in others , inhabitancy and corporate privileges ; in
others , the reverse . In some cases the representatives are chosen
b
y
very numerous voters ; in others , b
y
very few : in some cases a
single patron possesses the exclusive power o
f choosing represent
atives , as in nomination boroughs ; in others , very populous cities
have no right to choose any representatives at all : in some cases
a select body , forming a very small part of the inhabitants , has
the exclusive right of choice ; in others , non -residents can control
the whole election : in some places a half -million o
f
inhabitants
possess the right to choose no more representatives than are
assigned to the most insignificant borough ,with scarcely an inhab
itant to point out it
s
local limits . Yet this inequality has never
o
f
itself been deemed an exclusive evil in Great Britain . 2 And in
every system o
f
reform which has found public favor in that country ,
many of these diversities have been embodied from choice , as im
portant checks upon undue legislation ; as facilitating the represen
tation o
f
different interests and different opinions ; and as thus
securing , by a well -balanced and intelligent representation o
f
all
the various classes o
f society , a permanent protection of the public
liberties o
f
the people , and a firm security o
f
the private rights o
f
persons and property . 3 Without , therefore , asserting that such a
mixed representation is absolutely and under all circumstances
th
e
best , itmight be safely affirmed that the existence of various
elements in the composition o
f
the representative body is not ne
cessarily inexpedient ,unjust , or insecure , and , in many cases , may
1Mr . Jefferson in his Notes on Virginia , ( 192 , ) insists with great earnestness upon
the impropriety o
f allowing to different counties in that State th
e
same number o
f
representatives , without any regard to their relative population . And yet in the new
constitution adopted in 1830 – 1831 , Virginia has adhered to the same system in princi
ple , and her present representation is apportioned upon a
n arbitrary and unequal basis .
(Under th
e
existing constitution o
f Virginia , (1872 , ) senators and representatives are
apportioned b
y
population . ]
? Burke ' s Reflections on the French Revolution .
8 Mr . Wilson in his Lectures (430 to 433 ) considers the inequality of representation
in the house o
f
commons a
s
a prominent defect in the British government . But his
objections are mainly urged against the mode o
f
apportioning the representation , and
not against the qualifications of the voters . In the reform now under the consideration
o
f
Parliament , there is a very great diversity of electoral qualifications allowed , and
apparently supported b
y
a
ll parties . Mr . Burke , in his Reflections on the French Revo
lution , holds doctrines essentially different in many points from Mr . Wilson . See also
in Wynne ' s Eunomus , Dialogue 3 , § 18 , 19 , 20 , ar
t
ingenious defence o
f
the existing
system in Great Britain .
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promote a wholesome restraint upon partial plans of legislation ,
and insure a vigorous growth to th
e
general interests of the
Union . The planter , the farmer , the mechanic , th
e
merchant ,
and themanufacturer might thus be brought to act together , in a
body representing each ; and thus superior intelligence , as well as
mutual good -will and respect , be diffused through the whole of the
collective body . 1
$ 586 . In the judgment of the convention this latter reasoning
seems to have obtained a decisive influence , and to have estab
lished the final result ; and it was accordingly declared , in the
clause under consideration , that “ the electors in each State shall
have the qualifications requisite for electors o
f
the most numerous
branch of the State legislature . ” 2 Upon this clause (which was
finally adopted b
y
a unanimous vote ) the Federalist has remarked :
“ The provision made b
y
the convention appears to be the best
that la
y
within their option . It must be satisfactory to every
State , because it is conformable to the standard already established
b
y
the State itself . It will be safe to the United States , because ,
being fixed b
y
the State constitutions , it is not alterable b
y
the
State governments , and it cannot be feared that the people of the
States will alter this part o
f
their constitutions in such a manner
a
s
to abridge the rights secured to them b
y
the Federal Constitu
tion . ” 3 The remark , in a general sense , is true ,but th
e
provision
has not , in fact ,and may not have , all the security against altera
tion b
y
the State governments which is so confidently affirmed .
A
t
the time when it was made , Connecticut and Rhode Island
were acting under the royal charters o
f
1662 and 1663 , and their
legislatures possessed the power o
f modifying , from time to time ,
the right of suffrage . Rhode Island yet continues without any
written constitution , unless the charter of 1663 is to be deemed
1 See Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 7 , p . 380 ; Id . 394 . See also Franklin ' s
Remarks ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 242 . Dr . Paley has placed the inequalities of representation
in the house o
f
commons in a strong light ; and he has attempted a vindication of
them , which , whether satisfactory o
r
not , is a
t
least urged with great skill and ingenuity
o
f reasoning . Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 7 , p . 391 to 400 . See also 2 Pitk .
Hist . 242 .
2 Journal of Convention , 216 , 233 . The clause , however , did not pass without oppo
sition ; a motion to strike outwas made and negatived , seven States voting in the nega
tive , one in the affirmative , and one being divided . Journ . of Convention , 7 August , p .
233 .
8 The Federalist ,No . 52 . See also 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 38 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect .
123 , 130 , 131 .
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such . 1 In Maryland successive legislatures may change the form
o
f government , and in other States amendments may be , and in
deed have been , adopted ,materially varying the rights of suffrage .
S
o that absolute stability is not to be predicated of the existing
modes of suffrage , though there is little practical danger of any
changes which would work unfavorably to popular rights .
$ 587 . In the third place , the term of service of representatives .
In order to insure permanent safety to the liberties of the people ,
other guards are indispensable besides those which are derived
from th
e
exercise o
f
the right o
f suffrage and representation . If ,
when the legislature is once chosen , it is perpetual , or may last
during the life o
f
the representatives , and in case of death or
resignation only the vacancy is to be supplied b
y
the election o
f
new representatives , it is easy to perceive that in such cases there
will be but a very slight check upon their acts , on the part o
f
the
people . In such cases , if the legislative body should be once cor
rupted , the evil would be past al
l
remedy , a
t
least without some
violent revolution or extraordinary calamity . But when different
legislative bodies are to succeed each other a
t
short intervals , if
the people disapprove o
f
the present , they may rectify its faults
by the silent exercise of their power in the succeeding election .
Besides , a legislative assembly which is sure to be separated again ,
and it
s
members soon return to private life , will feel its own inter
ests , as well as duties , bound u
p
with those o
f
the community at
large . It may , therefore , be safely laid down as a fundamental
axiom o
f republican governments , that there must be a depend
ence on , and responsibility to , the people , on the part of the rep
resentative , which shall constantly exert an influence upon his
acts and opinions , and produce a sympathy between him and hi
s
constituents . If , when he is once elected , he holds his place fo
r
life , or during good behavior , or fo
r
a long period o
f years , it is
obvious that there will be little effective control exercised upon
him , and he will soon learn to disregard the wishes , the interests ,
1 [ The charter o
f
Rhode Island continued to b
e
it
s
constitution o
f government until
1845 , when a constitution was framed upon a more liberal basis of suffrage , and was
adopted b
y
the people . )
? See 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . note ( a ) , 13
6
, 13
7
. ( This is no longer true of Mary
land . )
8 i Black . Comm . 189 ; Montesquieu ' s Spirit of Laws , B . 11 , ch . 6 .
4 1 Black . Comm . 189 .
6 The Federalist , Nos . 52 , 57 .
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and even the rights of his constituents , whenever they interfere
with h
is
own selfish pursuits and objects . When appointed , he
may not , indeed , consider himself as exclusively their representa
tive , bound b
y
their opinions and devoted to their peculiar local
interests , although they may be wholly inconsistent with the good
o
f
the Union . He ought rather to deem himself a representative
o
f
the nation , and bound to provide for the general welfare , and
to consult fo
r
the general safety . But still , in a just sense , he
ought to feel his responsibility to them , and to act for them in
common with the rest of the people , and to deem himself , in an
emphatic manner , their defender and their friend . 2
$ 588 . Frequent elections are unquestionably the soundest , if
not the sole policy , b
y
which this dependence and sympathy and
responsibility can be effectually secured . 8 But the question what
degree o
f frequency is best calculated to accomplish that object , is
not susceptible of any precise and universal answer , and must
essentially depend upon very different considerations in different
nations , and vary with their size , their age , their conditions , their
institutions , and their local peculiarities .
1 i Black . Comm . 159 . See also Dr . Franklin ' s Remarks ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 242 ; Rawlo
o
n
Const . 38 , 39 . But see 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 193 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 209 .
Mr . Burke in his speech to the electors of Bristol , in 1774 , has treated this subject with
great candor and dignity and ability . “ Parliament , " said h
e , “ is not a congress o
f
ambassadors from different and hostile interests , which interests eachmust maintain as
a
n agent and advocate against other agents and advocates . But Parliament is a delib
erative assembly o
f
one nation , with one interest , that of the whole ; where not local
purposes , not local prejudices , ought to guide , but the general good resulting from
the general reason o
f
the whole . You choose a member indeed ; butwhen you have
chosen him , he is not a member o
f
Bristol , but he is a member o
f
Parliament . " See ,
o
n
this subject , 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 193 ; 2 Lloyd ' s Deb . in 1789 , p . 199 to
217 .
2 See Burke ' s Speech to the Electors of Bristol in 1774 .
8 The Federalist , Nos . 52 , 57 .
4 D
r
. Paley , with his usual practical sense , has remarked in regard to the composi
tion and tenure o
f
office o
f
the British house o
f
commons , that “ the number , the for
tune , and quality o
f
themembers ; the variety of interests and characters among them ;
above a
ll , the temporary duration of their power , and the change o
f
men , which every new
election produces , - are so many securities to the public , a
s
well against the subjection o
f
their judgments to any external dictation , a
s against the formation o
f
a junto in their
own body , sufficiently powerful to govern their decisions . The representatives are so
intermixed with the constituents , and the constituents with the rest of the people , that
they cannot , without a partiality too flagrant to b
e
endured , impose any burden upon
the subject , in which they do not share themselves . Nor scarcely ca
n
they adopt a
n
advantageous relation , in which their own interests will not participate o
f
the advan
tage . ” Paley ' sMoral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 7 .
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$ 589 . It has been a current observation that “ where annual
elections end tyranny begins . ” i But this remark , like many
others o
f
a general nature , is open to much question . There is no
pretence that there is any natural connection between the period
o
f
a year o
r any other exact revolution o
f
time and the political
changes fit for governments o
r magistrates . Why is the election
o
f
a magistrate o
r representative more safe fo
r
one year than fo
r
two years ? For one year more than for si
x
months ? For six
months more than fo
r
three months ? It is certainly competent
fo
r
a state to elect it
s
own rulers , daily , or weekly , or monthly , or
annually , or for a longer period , if it is deemed expedient . In
this respect it must be or ought to be governed b
y
it
s
own con
venience , interests ,and safety . It is therefore a question of sound
policy dependent upon circumstances , and not resolvable into any
absolute elements dependent upon the revolution o
r
return o
f
natural seasons . The aim of every political constitution is , or
ought to be , first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wis
dom to discern and most virtue to pursue the common good of the
society , and in the next place to take the most effectual precau
tions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue their public
trust . 3 Various means may be resorted to fo
r
this purpose ; and
doubtless one o
f
the most efficient is the frequency of elections .
But who is there thatwill not perceive upon the slightest examina
tion o
f
the subject what a wide space there is fo
r
the exercise o
f
discretion and for diversity o
f judgment ?
$ 590 . Without pretending to go into a complete survey of the
subject in all its bearings , the frequency of elections may be ma
terially affected as matter o
f policy by the extent of the popula .
tion and territory of a country , the concentration or sparseness of
the population , the nature of the pursuits and employments and
engagements o
f
the people , and by the local and political situation
o
f
the nation in regard to contiguous nations . If the government
b
e
o
f small extent , or be concentrated in a single city , itwill be
far more easy fo
r
the citizens to choose their rulers frequently , and
to change them without mischief , than it would be if the territory
· were large , the population sparse , and the means of intercourse
1 The Federalist , No . 53 . See Montesquieu ' s Spirit of Laws , B . 2 , ch . 3 .
2 The Federalist , Nos . 52 , 53 ; Montesquieu ' s Spirit of Laws , B . 2 , ch . 3 ; 1 Elliot ' s
Debates , 30 , 31 , 39 .
8 The Federalist , No . 57 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 42 .
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few and liable to interruption . If all the inhabitants who are to
vote reside in towns and villages , there will be little inconvenience
in assembling together at a short notice to make a choice . It will
be fa
r
otherwise if the inhabitants are scattered over a large terri
tory , and are engaged in agricultural pursuits , like the planters
and farmers o
f
the Southern and Western States , who must meet
a
t
a distance from their respective homes ,and a
t
some common
place o
f assembling . In cases of this sort the sacrifice of time
necessary to accomplish the object , the expenses of the journey ,
the imperfect means of communication , the slow progress of inter
changes o
f opinion , would naturally diminish the exercise of the
right o
f
suffrage . There would be great danger under such cir
cumstances that there would grow u
p
a general indifference o
r
inattention to elections if they were frequent , since they would
create little interest and would involve heavy charges and burdens .
The nature o
f
the pursuits and employments o
f
the people must
also have great influence in settling the question . If the mass o
f
the citizens are engaged in employments which take them away
fo
r
a long period from home , such as employments in the whale
and cod fisheries , in th
e
fur -trade , in foreign and distant com
merce , in periodical caravans , or in other pursuits , which require
constant attention , or long -continued labors at particular seasons ,
it is obvious that frequent elections which should interfere with
their primary interests and objects would be at once inconvenient ,
oppressive , and unequal . They would enable the few to obtain a
complete triumph and ascendency in the affairs o
f
the State over
the many . Besides , the frequency of elections must be subject to
other considerations affecting the general comfort and convenience
a
s
well o
f
rulers a
s
o
f
electors . In th
e
bleak regions o
f Lapland
and the farther north , and in the sultry and protracted heats of
th
e
south , a due regard must be had to the health of the inhab
itants and to the ordinary means o
f travelling . If the territory be
large the representatives must come from great distances , and are
liable to b
e
retarded b
y
a
ll
the varieties o
f
climate and geologi
cal features o
f
the country , b
y
drifts o
f impassable snows , b
y
sud
den inundations , by chains of mountains , b
y
extensive prairies ,
b
y
numerous streams , b
y sandy deserts .
$ 591 . The task of legislation , too , is exceedingly different in a
small state from what it is in a large one ; in a state engaged in
1 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 33 , Ames ' s Speech .
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a single pursuit , o
r living in pastoral simplicity , from what it is in
a state engaged in the infinitely varied employments o
f agricul
ture , manufacture , and commerce , where enterprise and capital
rapidly circulate , and new legislation is constantly required b
y
the new fortunes o
f
society . A single week might suffice fo
r
the
ordinary legislation o
f
a state o
f
the territorial extent of Rhode
Island , while several months would scarcely suffice fo
r
that o
f
New York . In Great Britain a half -year is consumed in legisla
tion for it
s
diversified interests and occupations ; while a week
would accomplish a
ll
that belongs to that o
f Lapland or Green
land , of the narrow republic of Geneva , or o
f
the subordinate prin
cipalities of Germany . Athensmight legislate , without obstruct
ing the daily course o
f
common business , for her own meagre ter
ritory ; but when Rome had become the mistress of the world , the
year seemed too short fo
r
all the exigencies of her sovereignty .
When she deliberated for a world , she felt that legislation , to be
wise or safe ,must be slow and cautious ; that knowledge as well as
power was indispensable for the true government of her provinces .
$ 592 . Again , the local position of a nation in regard to other
nations may require very different courses o
f legislation and very
different intervals o
f
elections from what would be dictated b
y
a
sense o
f
its own interest and convenience under other circumstan
ces . If it is surrounded b
y
powerful and warlike neighbors , its
own government must be invested with proportionately prompt
means to act and to legislate in order to repel aggressions and
secure it
s
own rights . Frequent changes in the public councils
might not only leave it exposed to the hazard of having no effi
cient body in existence to act upon any sudden emergency , but
also , b
y
the fluctuations o
f opinion necessarily growing out o
f
these changes , introduce imbecility , irresolution , and the want of
due information into those councils . Men , to act with vigor and
effect , must have time to mature measures and judgment and
experience a
s
to the best method o
f applying them . They must
not be hurried on to their conclusions b
y
the passions o
r
the fears
o
f
the multitude . They must deliberate as well as resolve . If
the power drops from their hands before they have an opportunity
to carry any system into full effect , or even to put it on its trial , it
is impossible that foreign nations should not be able , by intrigues ,
b
y
false alarms , and b
y
corrupt influences , to defeat the wisest
measures of the best patriots .
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$ 593 . One other consideration of a general nature deserves
attention . It is that while on the one hand constantly recurring
elections afford a great security to public liberty , they are not, on
the other hand , without some dangers and inconveniences of a
formidable nature . The very frequency of elections has a ten
dency to create agitations and dissensions in the public mind , to
nourish factions and encourage restlessness , to favor rash inno
vations in domestic legislation and public policy , and to produce
violent and sudden changes in the administration of public affairs
founded upon temporary excitements and prejudices .
$ 594 . It is plain that some of the considerations which have ;
been stated must apply with very different force to the condition
and interests of different states , and they demonstrate , if not the
absurdity , at least the impolicy of laying down any general maxim
as to the frequency of elections to legislative or other offices.?
There is quite asmuch absurdity in laying down as a general rule
that where annual elections end tyranny begins, as there is in
saying that the people are free only while they are choosing their
representatives , and slaves during the whole period of their ser
vice .
$ 595 . If we examine this matter by the light of history , or at
least of that portion of it which is best entitled to instruct us on
the point, it will be found that there is no uniformity of practice
or principle among free nations in regard to elections . In Eng
land it is not easy to trace out any very decided course . The his
tory of Parliament after Magna Charta proves that that body had
been accustomed usually to assemble once a year ; but as these
sessions were dependent upon the good pleasure and discretion of
the crown , very long and inconvenient intermissions occasionally
occurred from royal contrivance , ambition , or policy . But even
when Parliament was accustomed to si
t
every year , themembers
were not chosen every year . On th
e
contrary , as the dissolution
o
f
Parliament was solely dependent on the will o
f
the crown , it
might , and formerly it sometimes did ,happen that a single Parlia
ment lasted through the whole life o
f
the king who convened it . 4
T
o remedy these grievances it was provided b
y
a statute passed in
1 SeeMr . Ames ' s Speech , 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 31 , 33 ; Ames ' s Works , 20 , 24 .
2 Montesquieu ' s Spirit of Laws , B . 2 , ch . 3 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 30 to 42 .
8 The Federalist , No . 52 .
4 1 Black . Comm . 189 , and note .
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the reign o
f
Charles the Second , that the intermissions should not
b
e protracted beyond the period o
f
three years ; and b
y
a subse
quent statute o
f
William and Mary , that the same Parliament
should not si
t
longer than three years , but be at the end of that
period dissolved and a new one elected . This period was , b
y
a
statute o
f George the First , prolonged to seven years , after an ani
mated debate ; and thus septennial became a substitute fo
r
triennial
Parliaments . Notwithstanding the constantly increasing influence
o
f
the house o
f
commons , and it
s popular cast of opinion and
action ,more than a century has elapsed without any successful
effort o
r
even any general desire to change the duration o
f Parlia
ment . So that as the English constitution now stands the Parlia
ment must expire or die a natural death at the end o
f
the seventh
year , and not sooner , unless dissolved b
y
the royal prerogative . ?
Yet no man tolerably well acquainted with the history of Great
Britain fo
r
the last century would venture to affirm that the
people had not enjoyed a higher degree of liberty and influence in
all the proceedings of the government than ever existed in any
antecedent period .
$ 596 . If we bring our inquiries nearer home , it will be found
that the history o
f
the American colonies before the Revolution
affords a
n equally striking proof o
f
the diversity o
f opinion and
usage . It is very well known that the principle of representation
in one branch of the legislature was ( a
s
has been already stated )
established in all the colonies . But the periods o
f
election o
f
the
representatives were very different . They varied from a half -year
to seven years . In Virginia the elections were septennial ; in
North and South Carolina , biennial ; in Massachusetts , annual ; in
Connecticut and Rhode Island , semiannual . It has been very
justly remarked b
y
the Federalist , that there is not any reason to
infer from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the
people prior to the Revolution , that biennial elections would have
been dangerous to the public liberties . The spirit which every
where displayed itself a
t
the commencement o
f
the struggle , and
which vanquished the obstacles to independence , is the best of
proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere
1 1 Black . Comm . 18
9
; The Federalist , Nos . 52 , 53 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 37 , 39 ; 2
Elliot ' s Debates , 42 .
? i Black . Comm . 189 ; The Federalist , No . 52 .
8 The Federalist , No . 52 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 41 , 42 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 42 ; 3
Elliot ' s Debates , 40 .
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enjoyed to inspire both a sense of it
s
worth and a zeal fo
r
it
s
proper enlargement . This remark holds good as well with regard
to the then colonies whose elections were least frequent as to those
whose elections were most frequent . Virginia was the colony
which stood first in resisting the parliamentary encroachments o
f
Great Britain ; it was the first also in espousing , b
y
a public act ,
the resolution o
f independence . Yet her house of representatives
was septennial . When , after the Revolution , the States freely
framed and adopted their own constitutions o
f government , a
similar , though not so marked a diversity of opinion was exhib
ited . In Connecticut , until her recent constitution , the repre
sentatives were chosen semiannually ; in Rhode Island they are
still chosen semiannually ; in South Carolina , Tennessee , North
Carolina , Missouri , Illinois , and Louisiana , they are chosen bien
nially ; and in the rest of the States annually . And it has been
justly observed in the Federalist , 3 that it would not be easy to
show that Connecticut o
r
Rhode Island is better governed , or en
joys a greater share o
f
rational liberty , than South Carolina ( o
r
any o
f
the other States having biennial elections ) , or that either
the one o
r
the other o
f
these States is distinguished , in these re
spects and b
y
these causes , from the States whose elections are
different from both .
$ 597 . These remarks are sufficient to establish the futility of
the maxim alluded to respecting the value o
f
annual elections .
The question , how frequent elections should be , and what should
b
e
the term o
f
service o
f representatives , cannot be answered in
any universal form , applicable to all times and al
l
nations . It is
very complex in it
s
nature , and must ultimately resolve itself into
a question o
f policy and sound discretion with reference to the
particular condition and circumstances o
f
each nation to which it
is sought to be applied . The same fundamental principles of gov
ernment may require very different , if not entirely opposite , prac
tices in different States . There is great wisdom in th
e
observa
tions o
f
one o
f
our eminent statesmen on this subject . “ It is
apparent , ” said he , “ that a delegation for a very short period , as
fo
r
a single day ,would defeat the design of representation . The
1 The Federalist , No . 52 .
2 Dr . Lieber ' s Encycl . Americana , ar
t
. Constitutions of th
e
United States ; 3 Elliot ' s
Debates , 260 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 215 .
3 The Federalist , No . 53 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 260 .
41 Elliot ' s Debates , 40 , 41 , 42 .
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election in that case would not seem to the people to be of any
importance , and the person elected would think as lightly of his
appointment . The other extreme is equally to be avoided . An
election for a long term of years , or fo
r
life , would remove the
member too far from the control of the people ,would be dangerous
to liberty , and in fact repugnant to the purposes o
f
the delegation .
The truth , as usual , is placed somewhere between the extremes ,
and I believe is included in this proposition : the term of election
must be so long that th
e
representative may understand th
e
inter
ests o
f
th
e
people , and yet so limited that his fidelity may be
secured b
y
a dependence upon their approbation . " i
$ 598 . The question , then , which was presented to the consid
eration o
f
the convention was , what duration of office on the part
o
f
the members o
f
the House o
f Representatives was ,with refer
ence to the structure of the other branches of the legislative depart
ment o
f
the general government , best adapted to preserve the pub
lic liberty and to promote the general welfare . I say with reference
to the structure o
f
the other branches o
f
the legislative depart
ment of the general government , because it is obvious that the
duration o
f
office o
f
the President and Senate , and the nature and
extent o
f
the powers to be confided to Congress , must most ma
terially affect th
e
decision upon this point . Absolute unanimity
upon such a subject could hardly b
e expected ; and accordingly it
will be found that no inconsiderable diversity of opinion was
exhibited in the discussion in the convention . Itwas in the first
instance decided in a committee o
f
the whole that the period
should be three years , seven States voting in the affirmative and
four in the negative . That period was afterwards struck out b
y
a vote o
f
the convention , seven States voting in the affirmative ,
three in the negative , and one being divided , and the word “ two ”
was unanimously inserted in it
s
stead . In the subsequent revision
the clause took the shape in which it now stands in the Consti
tution .
$599 . The reasons which finally prevailed in the conven
tion and elsewhere in favor o
f
biennial elections in preference
1 Mr . Ames ' s Speech , 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 30 , 31 ; Ames ' s Works , 21 ; 2 Elliot ' s De
bates , 4
4 , 4
6
.
? Journal of th
e
Convention , p . 67 , 11
5
, 11
6
, 135 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , (Yates ' s
Minutes , ) 70 , 71 .
8 Journal of the Convention , p . 141 , 207 , 21
6
; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 30 ; 4 Elliot ' s De
bates , ( Yates ' s Minutes , ) 91 , 92 .
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to any other period may be arranged under the following
heads : -
$ 600 . In the first place , an argument might properly be drawn
from the extent of the country to be governed . The territorial
extent of the United States would require the representatives to
travel from great distances , and the arrangements rendered neces
sary by that circumstance would furnish much more serious
objections with men fi
t
fo
r
this service , if limited to a single year ,
than if extended to two years . 1 Annual elections might be very
well adapted to the State legislatures , from the facility o
f
con
vening the members , and from the familiarity of the people with
all the general objects of local legislation , when they would be
highly inconvenient fo
r
the legislature of the Union . If , when
convened , the term of Congress was of short duration , there
would scarcely be time properly to examine and mature measures .
A new election might intervene before there had been an oppor
tunity to interchange opinions and acquire the information indis
pensable fo
r
wise and salutary action . Much of the business of
the national legislature must necessarily be postponed beyond a
single session ; and if new men are to come every year , a great
part of the information already accumulated will be lost , or be una
voidably open fo
r
re -examination before any vote can be properly
had .
$ 601 . In the next place , however well founded the maxim
might b
e , that where no other circumstances affect the case , the
greater the power is , the shorter ought to be its duration ; and
conversely , the smaller the power , themore safely its duration may
b
e protracted ; 3 that maxim , if it applied at al
l
to the government
o
f
the Union , was favorable to the extension of the period of ser
vice beyond that o
f
the State legislatures . The powers of Con
gress are fe
w
and limited , and of a national character ; those of
the State legislatures are general ,and have few positive limitations .
If annual elections are safe for a State , biennial elections would
not be less safe fo
r
the United States . No just objection , then ,
could arise from this source , upon any notion that there would be
a more perfect security fo
r
public liberty in annual than in bien
nial elections .
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 53 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 30 , 40 , 41 , 42 .
2 The Federalist , No . 53 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 40 , 41 , 42 .
8 The Federalist , No . 52 ; Montesquieu ' s Spirit of Laws , B . 2 , ch . 3 .
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$ 602 . But a fa
r
more important consideration grows out of the
nature and objects o
f
the powers o
f Congress . The aim of every
political constitution is , or ought to be , first , to obtain fo
r
rulers
men who possess most wisdom to discern , and most virtue to pur
sue , the common good o
f
society ; and , in the next place , to take
the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst
they continue to hold their public trust . Frequent elections have ,
without question , a tendency to accomplish the latter object . But
too great a frequency will almost invariably defeat the former
object , and in most cases put at hazard the latter . As has been
already intimated , it has a tendency to introduce faction and rash
councils , and passionate appeals to the prejudices rather than to
the sober judgment o
f
the people . And we need not to be reminded
that faction and enthusiasm are the instruments b
y
which popular
governments are destroyed . It operates also as a great discourage
ment upon suitable candidates offering themselves fo
r
the public
service . They ca
n
have little opportunity to establish a solid rep
utation a
s
statesmen o
r patriots , when their schemes are liable to
b
e suddenly broken in upon b
y demagogues , who may create in
jurious suspicions , and even displace them from office before their
measures are fairly tried . And they are apt to grow weary of
continued appeals to vindicate their character and conduct a
t
the
polls , since success , however triumphant , is of such short dura
tion , and confidence is so easily loosened . These considerations ,
which are always o
f
some weight , are especially applicable to ser
vices in a national legislature , a
t
a distance from the constituents ,
and in cases where a great variety of information , not easily ac
cessible , is indispensable to a right understanding of the conduct
and votes o
f representatives .
$ 603 . But the very nature and objects of the national govern
ment require fa
r
more experience and knowledge than what may
b
e thought requisite in the members o
f
a Statè legislature . For
the latter a knowledge o
f
local interests and opinions may ordi
narily suffice . But it is fa
r
different with a member of Congress .
He is to legislate for the interest and welfare , not of one State
only ,but of all the States . It is not enough that he comes to the
task with an upright intention and sound judgment , but lie must
have a competent degree o
f knowledge o
f
a
ll
the subjects on
1 The Federalist , No . 57 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 215 .
? Ames ' s Speech , 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 33 . 8 i Kent ' s Comin . 215 .
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which he is called to legislate , and he must have skill as to the
best mode of applying it. The latter can scarcely be acquired ,
but by long experience and training in the national councils . The
period of service ought, therefore , to bear some proportion to the
variety of knowledge and practical skill which the duties of the
station demand .1
$604 . The most superficial glance at the relative duties of a
member of a State legislature and of those of a member of Con
gress will put this matter in a striking light. In a single State
the habits ,manners , institutions, and laws are uniform , and all
the citizens aremore or less conversant with them . The relative
bearings of the various pursuits and occupations of the people are
well understood or easily ascertained . The general affairs of the
State lie in a comparatively narrow compass , and are daily dis
cussed and examined b
y
those who have an immediate interest in
them , and b
y
frequent communication with each other can inter
change opinions . It is very different with the general govern
ment . There every measure is to be discussed with reference to
the rights , interests , and pursuits of al
l
the States . When the
Constitution was adopted there were thirteen , and there are now
twenty -four States , having different laws , institutions , employ
ments , products , and climates , and many artificial as well as nat
ural differences in the structure of society growing out of these
circumstances . Some o
f
them are almost wholly agricultural , some
commercial , some manufacturing , some have a mixture of al
l , and
• in n
o two o
f
them are there precisely the same relative adjust
ments o
f all these interests . No legislation for the Union can be
safe o
r
wise which is not founded upon an accurate knowledge o
f
these diversities and their practical influence upon public meas
ures . What may be beneficial and politic with reference to the
interests of a single State may be subversive o
f
those o
f other
States . A regulation of commerce wise and just fo
r
th
e
commer
cial States may strike a
t
the foundation o
f
th
e
prosperity o
f
the
agricultural or manufacturing States . And , on the other hand , a
measure beneficial to agriculture o
r
manufactures may disturb
and even overwhelm the shipping interest . Large and enlightened
views , comprehensive information , and a just attention to the local
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 53 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 30 , 37 , 39 , 40 , 41 ; Id . 22
0
; 2 Elliot ' s
Debates , 42 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 215 .
2 The Federalist , Nos . 53 , 56 .
VOL . I . 28
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peculiarities and products and employments of different States
are absolutely indispensable qualifications fo
r
a member of Con
gress . Yet it is obvious that if very short periods of service are
to b
e allowed to members o
f Congress , the continual fluctuations
in the public councils , and the perpetual changes of members , will
b
e very unfavorable to the acquirement o
f
the proper knowledge ,
and the due application o
f
it fo
r
the public welfare . One se
t
o
f
men will just have mastered the necessary information ,when they
will be succeeded b
y
a second set , who are to g
o
over the same
grounds , and then are to be succeeded b
y
a third . So that inex
perience , instead of practical wisdom , hasty legislation , instead of
sober deliberation , and imperfect projects , instead o
f
well -con
structed systems , would characterize the national government . 1
$ 605 . Congress has power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States . How can foreign trade be
properly regulated b
y
uniform laws without ( I do not say some
acquaintance ,but ) a large acquaintance with the commerce , ports ,
usages , and regulations o
f foreign states , and with the pursuits
and products o
f
the United States ? How can trade between the
different States b
e duly regulated , without an accurate knowledge
o
f
their relative situation , and climate and productions , and facili
ties o
f
intercourse ? 2 Congress has power to la
y
taxes and im
posts ; but how can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectively
collected ,unless they are accommodated to the local circumstances
o
f
the several States ? The power o
f
taxation , even with the
purest and best intentions ,might , without a thorough knowledge
o
f
the diversified interests o
f
the States , become a most oppressive
and ruinous engine o
f power . It is true that difficulties o
f
this
sort will occur more frequently in the first operations of the gor
ernment than afterwards . But in a growing community , like that
o
f
the United States ,whose population has already increased from
three to thirteen millions within forty years , theremust be a per
petual change o
f
measures to suit the new exigencies o
f agriculture ,
commerce , and manufactures , and to insure the vital objects o
f
the
Constitution . And so fa
r
is it from being true that the national
government has by its familiarity become more simple and facile
in it
s machinery and operations , that itmay be affirmed that a fa
r
more exact and comprehensive knowledge is now necessary to
preserve it
s adjustments , and to carry on its daily operations , than
1 The Federalist , Nos . 53 , 56 . 2 Id . 3 Id . * Id .
.
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was required or even dreamed of at its first institution . Its very
success a
s
a plan o
f government has contributed , in no small
degree , to give complexity to its legislation . And the important
changes in the world during its existence have required very many
developments o
f
it
s powers and duties which could hardly have
occurred as practical truths to it
s enlightened founders .
$ 606 . There are other powers belonging to the national govern
ment which require qualifications of a high character . They re
gard our foreign intercourse and diplomatic policy . Although the
House o
f Representatives does not directly participate in foreign
negotiations and arrangements , yet , from the necessary connection
between the several branches o
f public affairs , its co -operation with
the other departments o
f
the government will be often indispensa
ble to carry them into full effect . Treaties with foreign nations
will often require the sanction of laws , not merely b
y
way o
f ap
propriations o
f money to comply with their stipulations , but also
to provide suitable regulations to give them a practical operation .
Thus , a purchase of territory , like that of Louisiana , would not
only require the House o
f Representatives to vote an appropria
tion o
f money , and a treaty , containing clauses o
f indemnity , like
the British treaty o
f
1794 , in like manner require an appropri
ation to give it effect ; but commercial treaties , in an especial
manner ,would require many variations and additions to the ex
isting laws in order to adjust them to the general system , and
produce , where it is intended , a just reciprocity . It is hardly
necessary to say that a competent knowledge o
f
the law o
f
nations
is indispensable to every statesman ; and that ignorance may not
only involve the nation in embarrassing controversies with other
nations , but may also involve it in humiliating sacrifices . Con
gress alone is intrusted with the power to declare war . What
would b
e
said o
f representatives called upon to exercise this ulti
mate appeal o
f sovereignty , who were ignorant of the just rights
and duties of belligerent and neutral nations ? 2
$ 607 . Besides , the whole diplomacy of the executive depart
ment , and all those relations with independent powers which con
nect themselves with foreign intercourse ; are so intimately blended
with the proper discharge of legislative duties , that it is impossi
ble that they should not b
e constantly brought under review in the
public debates . They must frequently furnish matter for censure
1 The Federalist , No . 53 . 2 Id .
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o
r
praise , for accusation or vindication , fo
r
legislative checks o
r
legislative aids , fo
r
powerful appeals to popular favor or popular
resentment , fo
r
the ardent contests o
f
party , and even fo
r
the
graver exercise o
f
the power o
f impeachment .
$ 608 . And this leads us naturally to another remark ; and that
is , that a due exercise of some of the powers confided to the
House o
f Representatives , even in its most narrow functions , re
quires that the members should a
t
least be elected for a period o
f
two years . The power of impeachment could scarcely be exerted
with effect b
y
any body which had not a legislative life o
f
such a
period . It would scarcely be possible , in ordinary cases , to begin
and end an impeachment a
t
a single annual session . And the
effect o
f
change o
f members during it
s prosecution would be at
tended with no inconsiderable embarrassment and inconvenience .
If the power is ever to be exerted so as to bring great offenders
to justice , there must be a prolonged legislative term of office , so
a
s
to meet the exigency . One year will not suffice to detect guilt
and to pursue it to conviction . 1
$ 609 . Again , the House o
f Representatives is to be the sole
judge o
f
the elections o
f
its own members . Now , if but one legis
lative session is to b
e
held in a year , and more than one cannot
ordinarily be presumed convenient o
r proper , spurious elections
cannot be investigated and annulled in time to have a due effect .
The sitting member must either hold his seat during the whole
period o
f
the investigation , or hemust be suspended during the
same period . In either case the public mischief will be very
great . The uniform practice has been to allow the member who
is returned to hold his seat and vote until he is displaced b
y
the
order of the House , after full investigation . If , then , a return can
b
e
obtained , no matter b
y
what means , the irregular member is
sure o
f holding his seat until a long period has elapsed , ( for that
is indispensable to any thorough investigation o
f
facts arising a
t
great distances , ) and thus a very pernicious encouragement is
given to the use o
f unlawful means fo
r
obtaining irregular returns
and fraudulent elections . 2
$610 . There is one other consideration ,not without its weight
in all questions o
f
this nature . Where elections are very frequent ,
a few o
f
the members , as happens in all such assemblies , will pos
sess superior talents ; will , by frequent re -elections , become mem
1 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 34 ,Mr . Ames ' s Speech . 2 Th
e
Federalist , No . 53 .
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bers of long standing ; will become thoroughly masters of the
public business ; and thus will acquire a preponderating and
undue influence , of which they will naturally be disposed to avail
themselves . The great bulk of the House will be composed of
new members , who will necessarily be inexperienced , diffident ,
and undisciplined , and thus be subjected to the superior ability
and information of the veteran legislators . If biennial elections
would have no more cogent effect than to diminish the amount of
this inequality ; to guard unsuspecting confidence against the
snares which may be set fo
r
it , and to stimulate a watchful and
ambitious responsibility , it would have a decisive advantage over
mere annual elections .
$ 611 . Such were some of the reasons which produced , on the
part o
f
the framers of the Constitution , and ultimately of the
people themselves , an approbation of biennial elections . Expe
rience has demonstrated the sound policy and wisdom of the
provision . But looking back to the period when the Constitution
was upon its passage , one cannot but be struck with the alarms
with which the public mind was on this subject attempted to be
disturbed . It was repeatedly urged in and out of the State conven
tions that biennial elections were dangerous to the public liberty ;
and that Congress might perpetuate itself , and reign with absolute
power over the nation . 2
§612 . In the next place , as to the qualifications of the elected .
The Constitution on this subject is as follows : 3 “ No person shall
be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of
twenty - five years , and been seven years a citizen of th
e
United
States ; and who shall not , when elected , be an inhabitant of that
State in which he shall be chosen . ”
$ 613 . It is obvious that the inquiry as to the due qualifications
o
f representatives , like that as to the due qualifications of electors
in a government , is susceptible , in its own nature , o
f
very different
answers , according to the habits , institutions , interests , and local
peculiarities of different nations . It is a point upon which we can
arrive a
t
n
o
universal rule which will accommodate itself to the
welfare and wants o
f
every people , with the same proportionate
advantages . The great objects are , or ought to be , to secure , on
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 53 . See also 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 229 ; 2 Wilson ' s
Law Lectures , 151 .
3 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 28 , 37 , 38 , 43 ; Id . 21
7
. 8 Art . 1 , § 2 , paragraph 3 .
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the part o
f
th
e
representatives , fidelity , sound judgment , compe
tent information , and incorruptible independence . The best
modes b
y
which these objects can be attained are matters of dis
cussion and reasoning , and essentially dependent upon a large
and enlightened survey o
f
the human character and passions , as
developed in the different stages of civilized society . There is
great room , therefore , for diversities of judgment and opinion
upon a subject so comprehensive and variable in it
s
elements . It
would be matter o
f
surprise , if doctrines essentially different ,
nay , even opposite to each other , should not , under such circum
stances , be maintained by political writers equally eminent and
able . Upon questions of civil policy and the fundamental struct
ure o
f governments there has hitherto been too little harmony o
f
opinion among the greatest men , to encourage any hope that the
future will be less fruitful in dissonances than the past . In the
practice o
f governments a very great diversity o
f qualifications
has been insisted on as prerequisites o
f
office ; and this alone
would demonstrate that there was not admitted to exist any com
mon standard o
f superior excellence adapted to al
l
ages and all
nations .
$ 614 . In Great Britain , besides those negative qualifications
which are founded in usage o
r positive law , such as the exclusion
o
f persons holding certain offices and pensions , it is required that
every member for a county , or knight of a shire , ( as he is techni
cally called , ) shall have a clear estate of freehold or copyhold to
the value of £600 sterling per annum ; and every member fo
r
a
city or borough , to the value o
f
£300 , except the eldest sons of
peers , and o
f persons qualified to be knights of shires , and except
the members o
f
the two universities .
$ 615 . Among the American colonies antecedent to the Revolu
tion , a great diversity of qualifications existed ; and the State con
stitutions , subsequently formed , b
y
n
o means lessen that diversity .
Some insist upon a freehold or other property of a certain value ;
others require a certain period o
f
residence , and citizenship only ;
others require a freehold only ; others a payment of taxes , or an
equivalent ; others , again ,mix u
p
all the various qualifications of
property , residence ,citizenship ,and taxation , or substitute some of
these , as equivalents for others . ?
1 1 Black . Comm . 176 . See 4 Instit . 46 to 48 .
2 Dr . Lieber ' s Encycl . Americana , art . Constitutions of th
e
United States .
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$ 616 . The existing qualifications in the States being then so
various , it may be thought that the best course would have been
to adopt the rules o
f
the States respectively , in regard to th
e
most
numerous branch o
f
their own legislatures . And this course
might not have been open to serious objections . But , as the
qualifications o
f
members were thought to be less carefully defined
in the State constitutions ,and more susceptible of uniformity than
those o
f
the electors , the subject was thought proper fo
r
regulation
b
y
the convention . And it is observable , that the positive quali
fications are few and simple . They respect only age , citizenship ,
and inhabitancy .
$617 . First , in regard to age . The representative must have
attained twenty -five years . And certainly to this no reasonable
objection can b
e
made . If experience or wisdom or knowledge
b
e
o
f
value in the national councils , it can scarcely be pretended
that an earlier age could afford a certain guaranty for either .
That some qualification of age is proper , no one will dispute . No
one will contend that persons who are minors ought to be eligible ;
o
r
that those who have not attained manhood , so as to be entitled
b
y
the common law to dispose o
f
their persons o
r
estates , at their
own will , would be fit depositaries o
f
the authority to dispose of
the rights , persons , and property of others . Would the mere at
tainment o
f twenty -one years of age be a more proper qualifica
tion ? All just reasoning would be against it . The characters
and principles o
f young men ca
n
scarcely be understood at the
moment o
f
their majority . They are then new to the rights of
self -government , warm in their passions , ardent in their expecta
tions , and , just escaping from pupilage , are strongly tempted to
discard the lessons o
f
caution which riper years inculcate . What
they will become remains to be seen , and four years beyond that
period is but a very short space in which to tr
y
their virtues , de
velop their talents , enlarge their resources , and give them a prac
tical insight into the business o
f
life adequate to their own imme
diate wants and duties . Can the interests of others be safely con
fided to those who have yet to learn how to take care o
f
their own ?
The British constitution has , indeed , provided only for the mem
bers of the house of commons not beingminors ; 4 and illustrious
1 The Federalist , No . 295 . ? 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 197 .
81 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 213 , 214 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 139 , 140 .
4 1 Black . Comm . 162 , 173 , 175 ; 4 Instit . 46 , 47 .
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instances have occurred to show that great statesmen may be
formed even during their minority . But such instances are rare ;
they are to be looked at as prodigies , rather than as examples ; as
the extraordinary growth of a peculiar education and character ,
and a hotbed precocity in amonarchy, rather than as the sound and
thrifty growth of the open air , and the bracing hardihood of a
republic . In the convention this qualification as to age did not
pass without a struggle . It was originally carried by a vote of
seven States against three , one being divided ; though it was ulti
mately adopted without a division . In the State conventions it
does not seem to have formed any important topic of debate .2
$ 618 . Secondly , in regard to citizenship . It is required that
the representative shall have been a citizen of the United States
seven years . Upon the propriety of excluding aliens from eligi
bility , there could scarcely be any room for debate ; for there
could be no security for a due administration of any government
by persons whose interests and connections were foreign , and who
owed no permanent allegiance to it , and had no permanent stake
in it
s
measures or operations . Foreign influence , o
f
themost cor
rupt and mischievous nature , could not fail to make its way into
the public councils , if there was no guard against the introduction
o
f
alien representatives . It has accordingly been a fundamental
policy o
f
most , if not of all , free states to exclude all foreigners
from holding offices in the state . The only practical question
would seem to be ,whether foreigners , even after naturalization ,
should be eligible a
s representatives ,and if so ,whatwas a suitable
period o
f citizenship fo
r
the allowance o
f
the privilege . In Eng
land , all aliens born , unless naturalized , were originally excluded
from a seat in Parliament ; and now , b
y
positive legislation , no
1 Journal of Convention , June 22 , p . 143 ; Id . Aug . 8 , p . 235 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates ,
( Yates ' sMinutes , ) 94 .
2 Lord Coke has with much gravity enumerated the proper qualifications o
f
a Parlia
ment -man , drawing the resemblances from the properties of the elephant . First , that
he should be without gall ; that is , without malice , rancor , heat , and envy . Secondly ,
that h
e
should b
e
constant , inflexible , and not to be bowed or turned from the right ,
either for fear , reward , o
r
favor , nor in judgment respect persons . Thirdly , that h
e
should b
e
o
f
a ripe memory , that , remembering perils past , h
emight remember dangers
to come . Fourthly , that though he be of the greatest strength and understanding , yet
h
e
b
e
sociable and g
o
in companies . And , fifthly , that he be philanthropic , showing the
way to every man . 4 Instit . 3 . Whatever one may now think of this quaint analogy ,
these qualities would not , in our day , be thought a bad enumeration of the proper quali .
ties o
f
a good modern member o
f
Parliament o
r Congress .
8 The Federalist , No . 62 .
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alien , though naturalized , is capable of being a member of either
house of Parliament. A different course , naturally arising from
the circumstances of the country , was adopted in the American
colonies antecedent to the Revolution , with a view to invite emi
grations and settlements, and thus to facilitate the cultivation of
their wild and waste lands . A similar policy had since pervaded
the State governments , and had been attended with so many ad
vantages , that it would have been impracticable to enforce any
total exclusion of naturalized citizens from office . In the conven
tion it was originally proposed that three years ' citizenship should
constitute a qualification ; but that was exchanged fo
r
seven years ,
b
y
a vote o
f
ten States to one . ? No objection seems even to have
been suggested against this qualification ; and hitherto it has
obtained a general acquiescence or approbation . It certainly sub
serves two important purposes : 1 . That the constituents have a
full opportunity of knowing the character and merits of their rep
resentative ; 2 . That the representative has a like opportunity of
learning the character and wants and opinions o
f
his constit
uents . 3
$ 619 . Thirdly , in regard to inhabitancy . It is required that
the representative shall , when elected , be an inhabitant of the
State in which he shall b
e
chosen . The object of this clause ,
doubtless , was to secure an attachment to , and a just representa
tion o
f , the interests of the State in the national councils . It was
supposed that an inhabitant would feel a deeper concern and pos
sess a more enlightened view o
f
the various interests o
f
his con
stituents , than a mere stranger . And , at al
l
events , he would
generally possess more entirely their sympathy and confidence .
It is observable that the inhabitancy required is within the State ,
and not within any particular district o
f
the State , in which the
member is chosen . In England , in former times , it was required
that a
ll
the members o
f
the house o
f
commons should be inhabi
tants of the places for which they were chosen . But this was for a
long time wholly disregarded in practice , and was a
t
length re
pealed by statute o
f
1
4 Geo . 3 , ch . 58 . 4 This circumstance is not
a little remarkable in parliamentary history ; and it establishes ,
in a very striking manner , how little mere theory can be regarded
1 1 Black . Comm . 62 , 17
5
; 4 Inst . 146 .
2 Journal of the Convention , 8 August , 233 , 234 . 8 2 Wilson ' s Law Lectures , 141 .
4 | Black . Comm . 17
5
; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 142 .
442 [ BOOK III .CONSTITUTION O
F
THE UNITED STATES .
in matters o
f government . It was found by experience that bor
oughs and cities were often better represented b
y
men o
f
emi
nence and known patriotism , who were strangers to them , than
by those chosen from their own vicinage . And to this very hour
some o
f
the proudest names in English history , as patriots and
statesmen , have been the representatives of obscure , and , if one
may so say , of ignoble boroughs .
$ 620 . An attempt was made in the convention to introduce a
qualification o
f
one year ' s residence before the election ; but it
failed , four States voting in favor of it , six against it , and one
being divided . The omission to provide that a subsequent non
residence shall be a vacation of the seat ,may in some measure
defeat the policy o
f
the original limitation . For it has happened ,
in more than one instance , that a member , after his election , has
removed to another State , and thus ceased to have that intimate
intercourse with , and dependence upon , his constituents , upon
which so much value has been placed in all the discussions on this
subject .
$621 . It is observable that no qualification , in point of estate ,
has been required on the part of members o
f
the House of Repre
sentatives . Yet such a qualification is insisted on b
y
a consid
erable number o
f
the States a
s
a qualification for the popular
branch o
f
the State legislature . The probability is , that it was
not incorporated into the Constitution o
f
the Union , from the diffi
culty o
f framing a provision that would be generally acceptable .
Two reasons have , however , been assigned b
y
a learned coinmen
tator fo
r
the omission , which deserve notice . First , that in a rep
resentative government the people have an undoubted right to
judge fo
r
themselves o
f
the qualification o
f
their representative ,
and if , in their opinion ,his integrity and ability will supply the
want of estate , there is better reason for contending that it ought
not to prevail . Secondly , that b
y requiring a property qualifica
tion , itmay happen that men the best qualified in other respects
might be incapacitated from serving their country . There is ,
doubtless , weight in each of these considerations . The first , how
ever , is equally applicable to al
l
sorts o
f qualifications whatsoever ,
1 Journal of Convention , 8 August , p . 224 , 225 .
2 Journal of Convention , 26 July , p . 204 , 205 ; Id . 12 ; Id . 241 , 242 .
8 D
r
. Lieber ' s Encycl . Americana , art . Constitutions of th
e
United States . (The state
ment o
f
the text is n
o longer (1872 ) correct . ]
* 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 212 , 213 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 55 , 56 .
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and proceeds upon an inadmissible foundation ; and that is, that
th
e
society has n
o just right to regulate fo
r
th
e
common good
what a portion of the community may deem fo
r
their special good .
The other reason has a better foundation in theory , though , gen
erally speaking , it will rarely occur in practice . But it goes very
fa
r
towards overturning another fundamental guard , which is
deemed essential to public liberty ; and that is , that the repre
sentative should have a common interest in measures with his
constituents . Now , the power of taxation , one of the most deli
cate and important in human society , will rarely be exerted op
pressively b
y
those who are to share the common burdens . The
possession o
f
property has in this respect a great value among the
proper qualifications o
f
a representative , since it will have a ten
dency to check any undue impositions , or sacrifices , which may
equally injure his own as well as theirs . 1
$ 622 . In like manner there is a total absence of any qualifica
tion founded on religious opinions . However desirable itmay be
that every government should b
e
administered b
y
those who have
a fixed religious belief , and feel a deep responsibility to an infi
nitely wise and eternal Being , and however strong may be our
persuasion o
f
the everlasting value o
f
a belief in Christianity fo
r
our present as well a
s
our immortal welfare , the history of the
world has shown the extreme dangers a
swell as difficulties o
f
connecting the civil power with religious opinions . Half the
calamities with which the human race have been scourged have
arisen from the union o
f
Church and State ; and the people of
America , above al
l
others , have too largely partaken of the ter
rors and the sufferings o
f persecution for conscience ' sake , not to
feel an excessive repugnance to the introduction o
f religious tests .
Experience has demonstrated the folly as well as the injustice o
f
exclusions from office , founded upon religious opinions . They
have aggravated a
ll
other evils in the political organization o
f
societies . They carry in their train discord , oppression , and
bloodshed . They perpetuate a savage ferocity and insensibility
to human rights and sufferings . Wherever they have been abol
ished , they have introduced peace and moderation and enlight
ened legislation . Wherever they have been perpetuated , they
have always checked , and in many cases have overturned , all the
securities o
f public liberty . The right to burn heretics survived
11 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 212 , 213 . See 4 Black . Comm . 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 .
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in England almost to the close of the reign of Charles the Sec
ond ; and it has been asserted (but I have not been able to ascer
tain the fact b
y
examination o
f
the printed journals ) that on that
occasion the whole bench o
f bishops voted against th
e
repeal .
We al
l
know how slowly the Roman Catholics have recovered
their just rights in England and Ireland . The triumph has been
but just achieved , after a most painful contest for a half -century .
In the Catholic countries to this very hour , Protestants are , fo
r
the most part , treated with a cold and reluctant jealousy , toler
ated , perhaps , but never cherished . In the actual situation of the
United States , a union of the States would have been impractica
ble , from the known diversity of religious sects , if anything more
than a simple belief in Christianity , in the most general form o
f
expression , had been required . And even to this some of the
States would have objected , as inconsistent with the fundamental
policy o
f
their own charters , constitutions , and laws . Whatever ,
indeed , may have been th
e
desire o
f many persons o
f
a deep
religious feeling to have embodied some provision on this subject
in th
e
Constitution , it may be safely affirmed that hitherto the
absence has not been felt a
s
a
n evil ; and that while Christianity
continues to be the belief of the enlightened and wise and pure
among the electors , it is impossible that infidelity ca
n
find an easy
home in the House o
f Representatives .
$623 . It has been justly observed that under the reasonable
qualifications established b
y
the Constitution , the door of this part
o
f
the Federal government is open to merit o
f every description ,
whether native o
r adoptive , whether young or old , and without
regard to poverty or wealth or any particular profession o
f re
ligious faith . 2
$624 . A question , however , has been suggested upon this sub
ject which ought not to be passed over without notice . And that
is , whether the States can superadd any qualifications to those
prescribed b
y
the Constitution o
f
the United States . The laws of
some o
f
the States have already required that the representative
should b
e
a freeholder , and be resident within the district for
which he is chosen . If a State legislature has authority to pass
laws to this effect , they may impose any other qualifications be
yond those provided b
y
the Constitution , however inconvenient ,
1 4 Black . Comm . 49 . 2 The Federalist , N
o
. 52 .
81 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 213 .
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restrictive , or even mischievous they may be to the interests of the
Union . The legislature of one State may require that none but a
Deist , a Catholic , a Protestant , a Calvinist , or a Universalist shall
be a representative . The legislature of another State may require
that none shall be a representative but a planter , a farmer , a
mechanic , or a manufacturer . It may exclude merchants and
divines and physicians and lawyers. Another legislature may
require a high moneyed qualification , a freehold of great value , or
personal estate of great amount . Another legislature may require
that the party shall have been born and always lived in the State ,
or district, or that he shall be an inhabitant of a particular
town or city , free of a corporation , or an eldest son . In short ,
there is no end to the varieties of qualifications which , without
insisting upon extravagant cases ,may be imagined . A State may ,
with the sole object of dissolving the Union , create qualifications
so high and so singular that it shall become impracticable to elect
any representative .
$625 . It would seem but fair reasoning , upon the plainest prin
ciples of interpretation , that when the Constitution established
certain qualifications as necessary for office , it meant to exclude
a
ll
others a
s prerequisites . From the very nature of such a pro
vision , the affirmation of these qualifications would seem to imply
a negative o
f
a
ll
others . And a doubt of this sort seems to have
pervaded th
e
mind o
f
a learned commentator . A power to add
new qualifications is certainly equivalent to a power to vary them .
It adds to the aggregate what changes the nature of the former
requisites . The House of Representatives seems to have acted
upon this interpretation , and to have held that the State legisla
tures have no power to prescribe new qualifications , unknown to
the Constitution of th
e
United States . A celebrated American
statesman , however ,with hi
s
avowed devotion to State power , has
intimated a contrary doctrine . “ If , ” says he , “ whenever the
Constitution assumes a single power out o
f many which belong to
the same subject ,we should consider it as assuming the whole , it
would vest the general government with a mass of powers never
contemplated . On the contrary , the assumption of particular
powers seems an exclusion o
f all not assumed . This reasoning
appears to me to be sound , but on so recent a change of view ,
i i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 213 . ? Jefferson ' s Corresp . 238 .
8 Mr . Jefferson .
446 [BOOK II .CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
caution requires us not to be over-confident ." i He intimates ,
however , that unless the case be either clear or urgent , itwould
be better to let it lie undisturbed . 2
$626 . It does not seem to have occurred to this celebrated
statesman , that the whole of this reasoning , which is avowedly
founded upon that amendment to the Constitution which provides
that “ the powers not delegated nor prohibited to the States
are reserved to the States respectively , or to the people , ” proceeds
upon a basis which is inapplicable to the case . In the first place ,
n
o powers could b
e
reserved to the States , except those which
existed in th
e
States before the Constitution was adopted . The
amendment does not profess , and , indeed , did not intend , to con
fer on the States any new powers ,but merely to reserve to them
what were not conceded to the government o
f
the Union . Now ,
it may properly be asked ,where did the States get the power to
appoint representatives in the national government ? Was it a
power that existed a
t
a
ll
before the Constitution was adopted ? If
derived from the Constitution ,must it not be derived exactly under
the qualifications established by the Constitution , and none others ?
If the Constitution has delegated no power to the States to add
new qualifications , how can they claim any such power b
y
the mere
adoption o
f
that instrument , which they did not before possess ?
$627 . The truth is , that the States ca
n
exercise no powers
whatsoever which exclusively spring out of the existence of the
national government , which the Constitution does not delegate to
them . They have just as much right , and no more , to prescribe
new qualifications for a representative , as they have for a Presi
dent . Each is an officer of the Union , deriving his powers and
qualifications from the Constitution , and neither created b
y , de
pendent upon , nor controllable b
y
the States . It is no original
prerogative o
f
State power to appoint a representative , a senator ,
o
r
President for the Union . Those officers owe their existence
and functions to the united voice o
f
the whole , not of a portion
o
f
the people . Before a State can assert the right , it must show
that the Constitution has delegated and recognized it . No State
can say that it has reserved what it never possessed .
$628 . Besides , independent of this , there is another fundamen
ta
l
objection to the reasoning . The whole scope of the argument
is , to show that the legislature of the State has a right to prescribe
1 Jefferson ' s Corresp , 239 . ? 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . p . 23
9
.
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new qualifications . Now , if th
e
State in it
s political capacity had
it , it would not follow that the legislature possessed it . That
must depend upon the powers confided to the State legislature b
y
it
s
own constitution . A State , and the legislature of a State , are
quite different political beings . Now it would be very desirable to
know in which part of any State constitution this authority , exclu
sively o
f
a national character , is found delegated to any State
legislature . But this is not al
l
. The amendment does not re
serve the powers to the States exclusively , as political bodies , fo
r
the language o
f
the amendment is , that the powers not delegated ,
& c . , are reserved to the States or to the people . To justify , then ,
the exercise o
f
the power b
y
a State , it is indispensable to show
that it has not been reserved to the people of the State . The peo
ple o
f
the State , b
y adopting the Constitution , have declared what
their will is , as to the qualifications fo
r
office . And here the
maxim , if ever ,must apply , expressio unius es
t
exclusio alterius . It
might further be urged , that the Constitution ,being the act of the
whole people of the United States , formed and fashioned according
to their own views , it is not to be assumed , as the basis of any
reasoning , that they have given any control over th
e
functionaries
created b
y
it to any State , beyond what is found in the text of the
instrument . When such a control is asserted , it is matter of
proof ,not of assumption ; it is matter to be established , as of right ,
and not to b
e
exercised b
y
usurpation , until it is displaced . The
burthen o
f proof is on the State , and not on the government of the
Union . The affirmative is to be established , the negative is not
to b
e denied , and the denial taken for a concession .
$629 . In regard to the power of a State to prescribe the quali
fication o
f inhabitancy o
r
residence in a district , as an additional
qualification , there is this forcible reason fo
r
denying it , that it is
undertaking to act upon the very qualification prescribed b
y
the
Constitution , as to inhabitancy in the State , and abridging its
operation . It is precisely the same exercise of power on the part
o
f
th
e
States , as if they should prescribe that a representative
should be forty years o
f
age , and a citizen for ten years . In each
case , the very qualification fixed by the Constitution is completely
evaded and indirectly abolished .
1 [ It is now universally conceded that a State cannot prescribe qualifications fo
r
members o
f Congress , or establish disabilities . The whole subject is beyond the sphere
o
f
it
s powers . Congress has always , with entire propriety , disregarded State regula
ions o
n
the subject . ]
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$630 . The next clause of the second section o
f
the first article
respects the apportionment o
f
the representatives among the States .
It is as follows : “ Representatives and direct taxes shall be appor
tioned among the several States which may be included in this
Union , according to their respective numbers , which shall be de
termined b
y
adding to the whole number o
f
free persons ,including
those bound to service fo
r
a term o
f years , and excluding Indians
not taxed , three fifths of al
l
other persons . The actual enumera
tion shall b
e
made within three years after the first meeting o
f
the
Congress o
f
the United States , and within every subsequent term
o
f
te
n years , in such manner as they shall b
y
la
w
direct . The
number o
f representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty
thousand ; but each State shall have at least one representative .
And until such enumeration shall be made , the State of New
Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three , Massachusetts eight ,
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one , Connecticut five ,
New York si
x , New Jersey four , Pennsylvania eight , Delaware
one , Maryland six , Virginia ten , North Carolina five , South Caro
lina five , and Georgia three . ”
$631 . The first apportionment thus made , being of a tempo
rary and fugacious character , requires no commentary . The
basis assumed was probably very nearly the same which the Con
stitution pointed out fo
r
a
ll
future apportionments , or , at least , of
a
ll
the free persons in the States . 2
It is obvious , that the question , how the apportionment should
be made , was one upon which a considerable diversity of judg
mentmight , and probably would , exist . Three leading principles
o
f apportionment would at once present themselves . One was to
adopt the rule already existing , under the confederation ; that is ,
a
n equality o
f representation and vote b
y
each State , thus giving
each State a right to send not less than two , normore than seven
representatives , and in the determination of questions each State
to have one vote . This would naturally receive encouragement
from all those who were attached to the confederation , and pre
ferred a mere league o
f
States to a government in any degree na
tional . 4 And accordingly it formed , as it should seem , the basis
1 Journ . of Convention , 10th July , 165 , 166 , 167 , 171 , 172 , 179 , 216 .
? Journ . of Convention , 159 , note . But see the Federalist , No . 55 .
3 Confederation , Art . 5 .
4 Journ . of Convention , 111 , 153 , 159 .
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of what was called the New Jersey Plan .' This rule of apportion
mentmet , however , with a decided opposition , and was negatived
in the convention at an early period , seven States voting against
it, three being in its favor , and one being divided . 2
$ 632 . Another principle might be to apportion the representa
tion o
f
the States according to the relative property o
f
each , thus
making property the basis o
f representation . This might com
mend itself to some persons , because it would introduce a salutary
check into the legislature in regard to taxation , b
y
securing , in
some measure , an equalization of the public burdens b
y
the voice
o
f
those who were called to give most towards the common con
tributions . That taxation ought to go hand in hand with repre
sentation , had been a favorite theory of the American people .
Under the confederation al
l
the common expenses were required
to b
e
borne b
y
the States in proportion to the value o
f
the land
within each State . But it has been already seen that this mode
o
f contribution was extremely difficult and embarrassing , and
unsatisfactory in practice , under the confederation . There do
not , indeed , seem to be any traces in the proceedings of the con
vention , that this scheme had an exclusive influence with any
persons in that body . It mixed itself up with other considera
tions , without acquiring any decisive preponderance . In the first
place , it was easy to provide a remedial check upon undue direct
taxation , the only species of which there could be the slightest
danger of unequal and oppressive levies . And it will be seen
that this was sufficiently provided for b
y
declaring that represent
atives and direct taxes should be apportioned b
y
the same ratio .
$633 . In the next place , although property may not be d
i
rectly aimed a
t
a
s
a basis in the representation provided fo
r
b
y
the Constitution , it cannot , on the other hand , be deemed to be
totally excluded , aswill presently be seen . In the next place , it
1Mr . Patterson ' s Plan , Journ . of Convention , 123 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , (Yates ' s
Minutes , ) 7
4 ; Id . 81 ; Id . 107 to 113 , 116 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 228 , 229 , 232 .
2 Journ . of Convention , 11th June , 111 . See also Id . 153 , 154 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates ,
( Yates ' s Minutes , ) 68 .
3 4 Elliot ' s Debates , (Yates ' s Minutes , ) 68 , 69 ; Journ . of Convention , 11th June ,
111 ; Id . 5t
h
July , 158 ; Id . 11th July , 169 .
Confederation , art . 8 .
5 Journals o
f Congress , 17th Feb . 1783 , Vol . 8 , p . 129 to 133 ; Id . 27th Sept . 1785 ,
Vol . 10 , p . 328 ; Id . 18th April , 1783 , Vol . 8 , p . 188 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 56 ; 2 Elliot ' s
Debates , 113 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 235 , 236 , 243 to 246 ; The Federalist , No .
3
0 ; Id . No . 21 .
VOL . I . 2
9
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is not admitted that property alone can , in a free government ,
safely be relied on a
s
the sole basis of representation . It may be
true , and probably is , that in the ordinary course of affairs , it is
not the interest or policy of those who possess property to oppress
those who want it . But , in every well -ordered commonwealth ,
persons , aswell as property , should possess a just share of influ
ence . The liberties of the people are too dear and too sacred to be
intrusted to any persons who may not a
t
a
ll
times have a common
sympathy and common interest with the people in the preserva
tion of their public rights , privileges , and liberties . Checks and
balances , if not indispensable to , are at least a great conservative
in the operations o
f all free governments . And , perhaps , upon
mere abstract theory , it cannot be justly affirmed that either per
sons o
r property , numbers or wealth , can safely be trusted , as the
final repositaries o
f
the delegated powers o
f government . B
y ap
portioning influence among each , vigilance , caution , and mutual
checks are naturally introduced and perpetuated .
$ 634 . The third and remaining principle was to apportion the
representatives among the States according to their relative
numbers . This had the recommendation of great simplicity and
uniformity in it
s operation , of being generally acceptable to the
people , and o
f being less liable to fraud and evasion than any other
which could be devised . Besides , although wealth and property
cannot be affirmed to be in different States exactly in proportion
to the numbers , they are not so widely separated from it as at a
hasty glance might be imagined . There is , if not a natural , a
t
least a very common connection between them , and perhaps an
apportionment o
f
taxes according to numbers is a
s equitable a
rule for contributions according to relative wealth a
s
any which
can b
e practically obtained . 3
$635 . The scheme , therefore , under al
l
the circumstances , o
f
making numbers the basis of the representation of the Union ,
seems to have obtained more general favor than any other in the
convention , because it had a natural and universal connection
with the rights and liberties o
f
the whole people . 4
$ 636 . But here a difficulty o
f
a very serious nature arose .
There were other persons in several o
f
the States than those who
1 The Federalist . No . 54 . 2 Id .
8 The Federalist , No . 54 ; Resolve of Congress , 18th April , 1783 ( 8 Journals of
Congress , 188 , 194 , 198 ) ; 1 United States Laws , (Bioren and Duane ' s edit . , ) 29 , 32 , 35 ,
4 The Federalist , No . 54 .
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were free. There were some persons who were bound to service
fo
r
a term o
f
years , though these were so few that they would
scarcely vary the result o
f
the general rule in any important de
gree . There were Indians also in several , and probably in most ,
o
f
the States a
t that period , who were not treated as citizens , and
yet who di
d
not form a part o
f independent communities or tribes
exercising general sovereignty and powers o
f government within
the boundaries o
f
the States . It was necessary , therefore , to pro
vide for these cases , though they were attended with no practical
difficulty . There seems not to have been any objection in includ
ing in the ratio of representation persons bound to service for a
term o
f years , and in excluding Indians not taxed . The real
(and it was a very exciting ) controversy was in regard to slaves ,
whether they should be included in the enumeration or not . On
the one hand it was contended that slaves were treated in the
States which tolerated slavery a
s property and not a
s persons . 2
They were bought and sold , devised and transferred , like any
other property . They had no civil rights or political privileges .
They had no will of their own , but were bound to absolute obedi
ence to their masters . There was then no more reason for includ
ing them in the census of persons than there would be for includ
ing any brute animals whatsoever . If they were to be represented
a
s property , the rule should be extended so as to embrace al
l
other
property . It would be a gross inequality to allow representation
for slaves to the Southern States , for that in effect would be to
allow to their masters a predominant right founded on mere prop
erty . Thus , five thousand free persons in a slave State might
possess the same power to choose a representative a
s thirty thou
sand free persons in a non -slaveholding State . 4
$637 . On the other hand it was contended that slaves are
deemed persons a
s
well a
s property . They partake of the quali .
ties o
f
both . In being compelled to labor , not fo
r
himself , but for
his master , in being vendible b
y
one master to another , and in
being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chas
tised in h
is body by the will o
f
another , the slave may appear to
b
e degraded from the human rank and classed with the irrational
1 2 Pitk . Hist . 233 to 245 .
2 Thu Federalist , No . 54 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 58 to 60 ; Id . 204 , 212 , 213 ; 4 Elliot ' s
Debates , (Martin ' s Address , ) 24 .
8 4 Elliot ' s Debates , ( Yates ' s Minutes , ) 69 ; Id . 24 .
4 4 Elliot ' s Debates , (Martin ' s Address , ) 24 ; Id . ( Yates ' s Minutes , ) 69 .
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animals which fall under the denomination of property . But in
being protected in his life and limbs against the violence o
f
others ,
even o
f
the master o
f
his labor and liberty , and in being punish
able himself for a
ll
violence committed against others , the slave is
no less evidently regarded b
y
law a
s
a member o
f
the society , and
not as a part of the irrational creation , as a moral person , and
not as a mere article o
f property . The Federal Constitution
should , therefore , view them in the mixed character of persons
and property , which was in fact their true character . It is true
that slaves are not included in the estimate o
f representatives in
any o
f
the States possessing them . They neither vote themselves
nor increase the vote of their masters . But it is also true that
the Constitution itself does not proceed upon any ratio o
f merely
qualified voters , either as to representatives or as to electors of
them . If , therefore , those who are not voters are to be excluded
from the enumeration or census , a similar inequality will exist in
the apportionment among the States . For the representatives
are to b
e
chosen b
y
those who are qualified voters for the most
numerous branch o
f
the State legislature , and th
e
qualifications in
different States are essentially different , and , indeed ,are in no two
States exactly alike . The Constitution itself ,therefore , lays down
a principle which requires that n
o regard shall b
e
had to the pol
icy o
f particular States towards their own inhabitants . Why
should not the same principle apply to slaves as to other persons
who were excluded a
s
voters in the States ? ?
$ 638 . Some part of this reasoning may not be very satisfac
tory , and especially the latter part of it . The distinction between
a free person ,who is not a voter , butwho is , in no sense ,property ,
and a slave , who is not a voter , and who is , in every practical
sense , property , is , and forever must form , a sound ground for dis
criminating between them in every constitution of government .
$ 639 . It was added , that the idea was not entirely a just one ,
that representation relates to persons only , and not to property .
Government is instituted no less fo
r
the protection o
f
the prop
erty than of the persons of individuals . The one as well as the
other may , therefore , be considered as proper to be represented b
y
those who are charged with the government . And , in point of
1 The Federalist , No . 54 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 212 , 213 .
? The Federalist , No . 54 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 190 , 191 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates ,
213 , 214 .
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fact, this view of the subject constituted the basis of some of the
representative departments in several of the State governments ."
$ 640 . There was another reason urged , why the votes allowed
in the Federal legislature to the people of each State ought to bear
some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. It was ,
that States have not an influence over other States, arising from
the superior advantages of fortune , as individuals in the same
State possess over their needy fellow -citizens from the like cause .
The richest State in the Union can hardly indulge the hope of in
fluencing the choice of a single representative in any other State ;
nor will th
e
representatives o
f
th
e
largest and richest States pos
sess any other advantages in the national legislature , than what
results from superior numbers alone . 2
$641 . It is obvious that these latter reasons have no just appli
cation to the subject . They are not only overstrained and founded
in a
n ingenious attempt to gloss over the real objections , but they
have this inherent vice , that , if well founded , they apply with
equal force to the representation o
f
a
ll
property in all the States ;
and if not entitled to respect on this account , they contain amost
gross and indefensible inequality in favor o
f
a single species o
f
property ( slaves ) existing in a fe
w
States only . It might have
been contended , with full as much propriety , that rice , or cotton ,
o
r
tobacco , o
r
potatoes should have been exclusively taken into
account in apportioning the representation .
$ 642 . The truth is , that the arrangement adopted by th
e
Con
stitution was a matter o
f compromise and concession , confessedly
unequal in it
s operation , but a necessary sacrifice to that spirit of
conciliation which was indispensable to the union o
f
States hav
ing a great diversity o
f
interests and physical condition and politi
cal institutions . It was agreed that slaves should be represented
under the mild appellation o
f
“ other persons , " not as free per
sons ,but only in the proportion of three fifths . The clause was in
substance borrowed from the resolve , passed b
y
the continental
Congress on the 18th o
f April , 1783 , recommending the States to
amend the Articles of Confederation in such manner that the
national expenses should be defrayed out of a common treasury ,
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 54 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 213 .
2 The Federalist , No . 54 .
8 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 212 , 213 ; 2 Pitk . Hist . 233 to 244 ; Id . 245 , 24
6
, 247 , 248 ; 1
Kent ' s Comm . 216 , 217 ; The Federalist , Nos . 37 , 54 ; 3 Dall . 171 , 177 , 178 .
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" which shall be supplied b
y
the several States , in proportion to
the whole number o
f
white o
r
other free inhabitants , of every age ,
sex , and condition , including those bound to servitude for a term
o
f years , and three fifths o
f
all other persons ,not comprehended in
the foregoing description ,except Indians , not paying taxes , in each
State . ” 1 In order to reconcile the non -slaveholding States to
this provision ,another clause was inserted , that direct taxes should
b
e apportioned in the samemanner as representatives . So that ,
theoretically , representation and taxation might go pari -passu . ?
This provision , however , is more specious than solid ; fo
r ,while in
the levy of direct taxes , it apportions them on three fifths of per
sons not free , it , on the other hand , really exempts the other two
fifths from being taxed a
t
a
ll
a
s property . 3 Whereas , if direct
taxes had been apportioned , as upon principle they ought to be ,
according to the real value o
f property within the State , the whole
o
f
the slaves would have been taxable a
s property . But a fa
r
more striking inequality has been disclosed b
y
the practical opera
tions o
f
the government . The principle of representation is con
stant and uniform ; the levy of direct taxes is occasional and rare .
In the course o
f forty years , nomore than three direct taxes 4 have
been levied ; and those only under very extraordinary and press
ing circumstances . The ordinary expenditures of the government
are , and always have been , derived from other sources . Imposts
upon foreign importations have supplied , and will generally sup
ply , all the common wants ; and if these should not furnish an
adequate revenue , excises are next resorted to , as the surest and
most convenient mode o
f
taxation . Direct taxes constitute the
last resort , and ( as might have been foreseen ) would never be laid
until other resources had failed .
$ 643 . Viewed in its proper light as a real compromise , in a
case o
f conflicting interests , fo
r
the common good , the provision
is entitled to great praise fo
r
it
s
moderation , its aim at practical
utility , and its tendency to satisfy the people that the Union ,
framed b
y
a
ll , ought to be dear to all , b
y
the privileges it confers
1 Journals o
f Congress , 1783 , Vol . 8 , p . 188 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 56 . ( This provis
io
n
is somewhat modified b
y
the fourteenth amendment , which will be considered here
after . )
2 The Federalist , No . 54 ; Journal of Convention , 12th July , 171 , 172 ; Id . 174 , 175 ,
176 , 179 , 180 , 210 ; Id . 235 ; Id . 372 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 56 , 57 , 58 , 60 ; Id . 213 .
8 i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . 190 , 191 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 58 , 59 .
4 In 1798 , 1813 , 1815 . The last was partially repealed in 1816 .
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as well as the blessings it secures. It had a material influence in
reconciling the Southern States to other provisions in the Consti
tution , and especially to the power of making commercial regula
tions by a mere majority ,which was thought peculiarly to favor
the Northern States . It has sometimes been complained of as a
grievance ; but he who wishes well to hi
s
country will adhere
steadily to it as a fundamental policy which extinguishes some of
the most mischievous sources of all political divisions , – those
founded on geographical positions and domestic institutions . It
did not , however , pass the convention without objection . Upon
it
s
first introduction , it was supported b
y
the votes of nine States
against two . In subsequent stages of the discussion it met with
some opposition ; ? and in some of the State conventions it was
strenuously resisted . The wish of every patriot ought now to be ,
requiescat in pace .
$ 644 . Another part of the clause regards the periods at which
the enumeration or census of the inhabitants of the United States
shall be taken , in order to provide for new apportionments of rep
resentatives ,according to the relative increase of the population
o
f
the States . Various propositions fo
r
this purpose were laid , at
different times ,before the convention . It was proposed to have the
census taken once in fifteen years , and in twenty years ; but the
vote finally prevailed in favor o
f
te
n . The importance of this
provision for a decennial census can scarcely b
e
overvalued . It is
the only effectual means b
y
which the relative power o
f
th
e
sev
eral States could be justly represented . If the system first estab
lished had been unalterable , very gross inequalities would soon
have taken place among the States , from the very unequal in
crease o
f
their population . The representation would soon have
exhibited a system very analogous to that o
f
the house o
f
com
mons in Great Britain , where old and decayed boroughs send rep
resentatives ,not only wholly disproportionate to their importance ,
but in some cases , with scarcely a single inhabitant , they match
the representatives o
f
the most populous counties .
1 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 212 , 213 .
2 Journal o
f
Convention , 11th June , 111 , 112 . See also Id . 11th July , 168 , 169 , 170 ,
235 , 236 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , ( Yates ' s Minutes , ) 69 .
8 | Elliot ' s Debates , 58 , 59 , 60 , 204 , 212 , 213 , 241 .
- Journal of Convention , 163 , 164 , 167 , 168 , 169 , 172 , 174 , 180 .
6 Journal o
f
Convention , 12th July , 168 , 170 , 173 , 180 .
6 1 Black . Comm . 158 , 173 , 174 ; Rawle on Constit . ch . 4 , p . 44 .
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$645 . In regard to the United States , the slightest examina
tion of the apportionment made under the first three censuses will
demonstrate this conclusion in a very striking manner. The rep
resentation of Delaware remains as it was at the first apportion
ment ; those of New Hampshire , Rhode Island, Connecticut , New
Jersey , and Maryland have had but a small comparative increase ;
whilst that of Massachusetts (including Maine ) has swelled from
eight to twenty ; that of New York , from six to thirty -four ; and
that of Pennsylvania , from eight to twenty - six . In the mean
time , the new States have sprung into being ; and Ohio , which in
1803 was only entitled to one , now counts fourteen representatives .
The census o
f
1831 exhibits still more striking results . In 1790 ,
the whole population o
f
the United States was about three million
nine hundred and twenty -nine thousand ; and in 1830 , it was
about twelve million eight hundred and fifty -six thousand . ? Ohio ,
in 1833 , contained at least one million , and New York two mil
.lion of inhabitants . These facts show the wisdom of th
e
pro
vision for a decennial apportionment ; and , indeed , it would
otherwise have happened that the system , however sound at the
beginning , would by this time have been productive of gross
abuses , and probably have engendered feuds and discontents of
themselves sufficient to have occasioned a dissolution of the
Union . We probably owe this provision to those in th
e
conven
tion who were in favor of a national government in preference to
a mere confederation o
f
States . s
$ 646 . The next part of the clause relates to the total number
o
f
the House o
f Representatives . It declares that “ the number
o
f representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand . ”
This was a subject o
f great interest ; and it has been asserted that
scarcely any article of the whole Constitution seems to be ren
dered more worthy o
f
attention b
y
the weight o
f
character , and
the apparent force o
f argument , with which it was originally as
sailed . The number fixed by the Constitution to constitute the
1 [ The population o
f
the United States and Territories , as shown b
y
the census o
f
1870 ,was 38 ,923 ,210 . It is estimated that itwould have been 3 ,000 ,000more but fo
r
thewar of 1861 – 1865 . Indians not taxed are not included in this enumeration ]
2 [ The population o
f
New York , as shown b
y
the census o
f
1870 , was 4 ,382 ,759 , and
that o
f
Ohio 2 ,665 ,260 . )
See Journal of Convention , 165 , 168 , 169 , 17
4
, 179 , 180 .
4 The Federalist , No . 55 ; 3 Amer .Museum , 427 ; Id . 534 ; Id . 547 ; 4 Elliot ' s De
bates , (Yates and Lansing ' s Letter to Gov . Clinton , ) 129 , 130 .
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body , in the first instance, and until a census was taken , was
sixty -five .
$647 . Several objections were urged against the provision .
First, that so small a number of representatives would be an un
safe depositary of the public interests . Secondly , that they would
not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their
numerous constituents . Thirdly , that they would be taken from
that class of citizens which would sympathize least with the feel
ings of the people , and bemost likely to aim at a permanent eleva
tion of the few , on the depression of the many . Fourthly , that,
defective as the number in the first instance would be , it would be
more and more disproportionate by the increase of the population ,
and the obstacles which would prevent a correspondent increase
of the representatives .1
$ 648. Time and experience have demonstrated th
e
fallacy o
f
some , and greatly impaired , if they have not utterly destroyed , the
force o
f all of these objections . The fears which were at that period
so studiously cherished , the alarms which were so forcibly spread ,
the dangers to liberty which were so strangely exaggerated , and
the predominance o
f
aristocratical and exclusive power .which was
so confidently predicted , have al
l
vanished into a
ir , into thin ai
r
.
Truth has silently dissolved the phantoms raised b
y imaginations
heated b
y prejudice o
r controversy , and a
t
the distance o
f forty
years we look back with astonishment a
t
the laborious reasoning
which was employed to tranquillize the doubts and assuage the
jealousies of the people . It is fit , however , even now , to bring
this reasoning under review , because it inculcates upon us the im
portant lesson , how little reliance can be placed upon mere theory
in any matters of government , and how difficult it is to vindicate
the most sound practical doctrines against the specious question
ing o
f ingenuity and hostility .
$ 649 . The first objection was to the smallness of the number
composing the House o
f Representatives . ? It was said that it was
unsafe to deposit the legislative powers o
f
the Union with so small
i The Federalist , No . 58 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 56 ; Id . 206 , 214 , 215 , 218 , 219 , 220 ,
221 to 225 ; Id . 229 to 232 .
2 It is remarkable that th
e
American writer whom I have several times cited takes
a
n opposite objection . He says , “ The national House o
f Representatives will be a
t
first
too large ; and hereafter may b
e
much too large to deliberate and decide upon the best
measures . " Thoughts upon the Political Situation o
f
the United States o
f
America
(Worcester , 1788 ) .
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a body o
f
men . It was but the shadow o
f representation . Under
the confederation , Congress might consist of ninety -one ; whereas ,
in the first instance , the House would consist of but sixty -five .
There was n
o certainty that it would ever b
e
increased , as that
would depend upon the legislature itself in it
s
future ratio of ap
portionments ; and it was left completely in its discretion , not
only to increase , but to diminish the present number . Under
such circumstances , there was , in fact , no constitutional security ,
for the whole depended upon the mere integrity and patriotism o
f
those who should be called to administer it . 3
$ 650 . In reply to these suggestions it was said that the present
number would certainly be adequate until a census was taken .
Although under the confederation ninety -one members might be
chosen , in point o
f
fact a fa
r
less number attended . At the very
first census , supposing the lowest ratio of thirty thousand were
adopted , the number of representatives would be increased to one
hundred . At the expiration of twenty -five years it would , upon the
same ratio , amount to two hundred ,and in fifty years to four hun
dred , a number which no one could doubt would be sufficiently large
to allay all the fears of the most zealous admirers o
f
a full repre
sentation . In regard to the possible diminution of the number of
representatives , it must be purely an imaginary case . As every
State is entitled to at least one representative , the standard never
would probably be reduced below the population of the smallest
State . The population of Delaware , which increases more slowly
than that of any other State ,would ,under such circumstances , fur
nish th
e
rule . And , if the other States increase to a very large
degree , it is idle to suppose that they will ever adopt a ratio which
will give the smallest State a greater relative power and influence
than themselves .
$ 651 . But the question itself , what is the proper and conven
ient number to compose a representative legislature , is as little
susceptible o
f
a precise solution a
s any which can be stated in the
whole circle o
f politics . There is no point upon which different
nations are more a
t
variance , and the policy of the American
1 2 Amer .Museum , 247 , 534 , 547 , 551 , 554 .
2 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 56 , 57 ; Id . 204 , 205 , 206 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 53 , 54 ; Id . 99 .
8 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 205 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 53 , 54 , 132 , 206 ; Id . 223 , 224 .
• 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 57 , 249 .
6 The Federalist , No . 55 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 214 , 215 , 227 .
6 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 242 , 249 .
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States themselves on this subject, while they were colonies and
since they have become independent , has been exceedingly dis
cordant . Independent of the differences arising from the popula
tion and size of the States , there will be found to be great diversi
ties among those whose population and size nearly approach each
other . In Massachusetts the house of representatives is com
posed of a number between three and four hundred ; in Pennsyl
vania , of not more than one fifth of that number ; and in New
York , of not more than one fifth . In Pennsylvania the represent
atives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents than
one fo
r
every four o
r
five thousand . In Rhode Island and Massa
chusetts they bear a proportion o
f
a
t least one for every thousand .
And according to the old constitution o
f Georgia , the proportion
may be carried to one fo
r
every ten electors .
$ 652 . Neither is there any ground to assert that the ratio be
tween the representatives and the people ought , upon principle ,
to b
e the same , whether the latter be numerous or few . If the
representatives from Virginia were to b
e
chosen b
y
the standard
o
f
Rhode Island , they would then amount to five hundred , and in
twenty or thirty years to one thousand . On the other hand , the
ratio of Pennsylvania applied to Delaware would reduce the repre
sentative assembly to seven . Nothing can bemore fallacious than
to found political calculations on arithmetical principles . Sixty
o
r seventy men may b
e
more properly trusted with a given degree
o
f power than si
x
o
r
seven . But it does not follow that six or
seven hundred would be proportionably a better depositary . And
if the supposition is carried on to six or seven thousand , the whole
reasoning ought to be reversed . The truth is , that in al
l
cases ,
a certain number seems necessary to secure the benefits o
f
free
consultation and discussion , to guard against to
o
easy a combina
tion fo
r
improper purposes , and to prevent hasty and ill -advised
legislation . On th
e
other hand , the number ought to be kept
within a moderate limit , in order to avoid the confusion , intemper
ance , and inconvenience of amultitude . It was a famous say
ing o
f Cardinal De Retz , that every public assembly consisting of
more than one hundred members was a mere mob . But surely
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 55 . See also th
e
State constitutions o
f
that period . 1 Elliot ' s
Debates , 214 , 219 , 220 , 225 , 228 , 252 , 253 .
| 2 The Federalist , No . 55 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 219 , 220 , 226 , 227 , 241 , 242 , 245 , 246 ,
253 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 150 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 217 .
3 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 150 .
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this is just a
s
incorrect a
s
itwould be to aver that every one which
consisted o
f
ten members would b
e
wise .
$ 653 . The question then is , and forever must be , in every
nation , a mixed question of sound policy and discretion with
reference to it
s
size , its population , its institutions , its local and
physical condition , and all the other circumstances affecting its
own interests and convenience . As a present number , sixty - five
was sufficient fo
r
a
ll
the exigencies o
f
the United States , and it
was wisest and safest to leave a
ll
future questions o
f
increase to
b
e
judged o
f b
y
the future condition and exigencies of the Union .
What ground could there be to suppose that such a number chosen
biennially , and responsible to their constituents ,would voluntarily
betray their trusts o
r
refuse to follow the public will ? The very
state o
f
the country forbade the supposition . They would be
watched with th
e
jealousy and the power of the State legislatures . 1
They would have the highest inducements to perform their duty .
And to suppose that th
e
possession o
f
power fo
r
so short a period
could blind them to a sense o
f
their own interests , o
r tempt them to
destroy the public liberties , was as improbable as anything which
could b
e
within the scope o
f
the imagination . At al
l
events , if
they were guilty o
f
misconduct , their removal would be inevitable ,
and their successors would be above a
ll
false and corrupt conduct .
For to reason otherwise would be equivalent to a declaration of the
universal corruption o
f
a
ll
mankind ,and the utter impracticability
o
f
a republican government . The congress which conducted us
through th
e
Revolution was a less numerous body than their suc
cessors will be . 3 They were not chosen b
y , nor responsible to ,
the people a
t large ; 4 and though appointed from year to year ,and
liable to be recalled at pleasure , they were generally continued fo
r
three years . They held their consultations in secret . They
transacted all our foreign affairs . They held the fate o
f
their
country in their hands during the whole war . Yet they never
betrayed our rights o
r
our interests . Nay , calumny itself never
ventured to whisper anything against their purity o
r patriotism . 5
1 The Federalist , No . 5
5 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 238 , 239 .
2 The Federalist , No . 55 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 252 , 253 , 254 .
3 The Federalist , No . 55 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 206 , 223 , 249 .
• Generally they were chosen b
y
the State legislatures ; but in two States , namely ,
Rhode Island and Connecticut , they were chosen b
y
the people . The Federalist ,
No . 40 .
6 The Federalist , No . 55 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 25
4
.
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$654 . The suggestion is often made that a numerous represen
tation is necessary to obtain the confidence of the people . This is
not generally true . Public confidence will be easily gained by a
good administration , and it will be secured by no other . The
remark made upon another occasion by a great man is correct in
regard to representatives , non numerantur , ponderantur . Dela
ware has just asmuch confidence in her representation of twenty
one as New York has in hers of sixty - five , and Massachusetts has
in hers of more than three hundred .3
$ 655 . Nothing can be more unfair and impolitic than to sub
stitute fo
r arguinent an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy
with which all reasoning must be vain . The sincere friends of lib
erty , who give themselves u
p
to the extravagances o
f
this passion ,
inflict th
e
most serious injury upon their own cause . As there is
a degree o
f depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree
o
f circumspection and distrust , so there are other qualities in
human nature which justify a certain portion o
f
esteem and con
fidence . A republican government presupposes and requires the
existence o
f
these qualities in a higher degree than any other form ;
and wholly to destroy our reliance on them is to sap a
ll
the founda
tion on which our liberties must rest .
$ 656 . The next objection was , that the House of Representa
tives would be too small to possess a due knowledge o
f
the inter
ests o
f
their constituents . It was said that the great extent o
f
the United States , the variety o
f
it
s
interests and occupations and
institutions ,would require a very numerous body in order to bring
home information necessary and proper for wise legislation .
$ 657 . In answer to this objection , itwas admitted that the rep
resentative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circum
stances of his constituents . But this principle can extend no
further than to those interests and circumstances to which the
authority and care o
f
the representative relate . Ignorance of
very minute objects which do not lie within the compass of legis
lation is consistent with every attribute necessary to the perform
ance o
f
the legislative trust . If the argument , indeed , required
1 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 206 , 217 .
? Id . 227 , 228 .
3 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 227 , 228 , 241 , 252 , 253 , 254 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 107 , 116 .
4 The Federalist , No . 55 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 238 , 239 .
5 | Elliot ' s Debates , 219 , 220 , 228 , 232 , 233 , 241 .
6 The Federalist , No . 55 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 228 , 229 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 217 .
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the most minute knowledge , applicable even to al
l
the professed
objects o
f legislation , it would overturn itself ; for the thing would
b
e utterly impracticable . No representative , either in the State or
national councils , ever could know , or even pretend to know , all
arts and sciences and trades and subjects upon which legislation
may operate . One of the great duties of a representative is , to
inquire into and to obtain the necessary information to enable
him to act wisely and correctly in particular cases . And this is
attained b
y bringing to the investigation of such cases talents ,
industry , experience , and a spirit of comprehensive inquiry . No
onewill pretend that he who is to make laws ought not to be well
instructed in their nature , interpretation , and practical results .
But what would be said if , upon such a theory , it was to be seri
ously urged that none but practical lawyers ought ever to be eligi
ble a
s legislators ? The truth is , that we must rest satisfied with
general attainments ; and it is visionary to suppose that any one
man ca
n
represent a
ll
the skill and interests and business and
occupations o
f
a
ll
his constituents in a perfect manner ,whether
they b
e
few o
r many . The most that can be done is , to take a
comprehensive survey o
f
the general outlines , and to search , as
occasion may require , for that more intimate information which
belongs to particular subjects requiring immediate legislation .
$ 658 . It is b
y
n
o
means true that a large representation is
necessary to understand the interests o
f
the people . It is not
either theoretically o
r practically true that a knowledge of those
interests is augmented in proportion to the increase o
f representa
tives . The interests of the State of New York are probably as
well understood b
y
it
s sixty -five representatives a
s
those o
fMassa
chusetts b
y
it
s
three or four hundred . In fact , higher qualifica
tions will usually be sought and required where the representatives
are fe
w
than where they are many . And there will also be a
higher ambition to serve where th
e
smallness o
f
the number cre
ates a desirable distinction , than where it is shared with many ,and
o
f
course individual importance is essentially diminished .
§ 659 . Besides , in considering this subject , it is to be recol
lected that the powers of the general government are limited , and
embrace only such objects a
s are o
f
a national character . Infor
mation o
f peculiar local interests is , consequently , of less value
and importance than it would be in a State legislature , where the
1 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 229 .
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powers are general .1 The knowledge required of a national rep
resentative is, therefore , necessarily of a more large and compre
hensive character than that of a mere State representative .
Minute information , and a thorough knowledge of local interests ,
personal opinions , and private feelings , are fa
r
more important to
the latter than th
e
former . 2 Nay , th
e
very devotion to local
views and feelings and interests ,which naturally tends to a narrow
and selfish policy , may be a just disqualification and reproach to
a member of Congress . 3 A liberal and enlightened policy , a
knowledge o
f
national rights , duties , and interests , a familiarity
with foreign governments and diplomatic history , and a wide sur
vey o
f
the operations o
f
commerce , agriculture , and manufactures ,
seem indispensable to a lofty discharge o
f his functions . A
knowledge o
f
the peculiar interests and products and institutions
o
f the different States of the Union is doubtless o
f great value ;
but it is rather as it conduces to the performance o
f
the higher
functions already spoken o
f
than as it sympathizes with the local
interests and feelings of a particular district , that it is to be esti
mated . And in regard to those local facts which are chiefly of
use to a member of Congress , they are precisely those which are
most easily attainable from the documentary evidence in the
departments o
f
the national government , or which lie open to an
intelligent man in any part of the State which hemay represent . .
A knowledge o
f
commerce and taxation and manufactures can b
e
obtained with more certainty by inquiries conducted through
many than through a single channel of communication . The
representatives o
f
each State will generally bring with them a
considerable knowledge o
f
it
s
laws and o
f
the local interests of
their districts . They will often have previously served as mem
bers in the State legislatures , and thus have become , in some
measure , acquainted with all the local views and wants of the
whole State .
$ 660 . The functions , too , of a representative in Congress re
i The Federalist , No . 56 .
? 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 22
8
, 229 , 253 ; 2 Lloyd ' s Debates , ( in 1789 , ) 189 ; The Federal
is
t
, No . 5
6
.
8 i Elliot ' s Debates , 238 .
4 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 228 , 229 , 253 ; The Federalist , No . 56 .
6 The Federalist , No . 56 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 220 , 241 , 242 , 246 , 253 .
6 The Federalist , No . 56 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 228 , 229 , 253 .
7 The Federalist , No . 56 .
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quire very different qualifications and attainments from those
required in a State legislature . Information relative to local ob
jects is easily obtained in a single State , fo
r
there is no difference
in it
s
laws , and its interests ar
e
but little diversified . But th
e
legislation o
f Congress reaches over all the States ; and as the
laws and local circumstances o
f a
ll
differ , the information which
is requisite fo
r
safe legislation is far more difficult and various ,
and directs the attention abroad rather than a
t
home . Few mem
bers , comparatively speaking , will be found ignorant of the local
interests o
f
their district o
r
State ; but time and diligence , and a
rare union o
f sagacity and public spirit , are indispensable to avoid
egregious mistakes in nationalmeasures .
$ 661 . The experience of Great Britain upon this subject fur
nishes a very instructive commentary . Of the five hundred and
fifty -eight members o
f
the house of commons , one ninth are
elected by three hundred and sixty -four persons , and one half b
y
five thousand seven hundred and twenty -three persons . And this
half certainly have little or no claim to be deemed the guardians
o
f
the interests o
f
the people , and indeed are notoriously elected
b
y
other interests . Taking the population of th
e
whole kingdom ,
the other half will not average more than one representative fo
r
about twenty -nine thousand of the inhabitants . Itmay be added ,
that nothing is more common than to select men for rep
resentatives o
f large and populous cities and districts , who do
not reside therein , and cannot be presumed to be intimately
acquainted with their local interests and feelings . The choice ,
however , is made from high motives , a regard to talents , pub
lic services , and political sagacity . And whatever may be the
defects o
f
the representative system o
f Great Britain , very few
o
f
the defects o
f
it
s legislation have been imputed to the ignorance
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 56 ; Id . N
o
. 35 .
2 See Mr . Christian ' s note , ( 34 , ) to 1 Black . Comm . 174 ,where he states the number
o
f
which the house o
f
commons has consisted a
t
different periods , from which itap
pears that it has been nearly doubled since the beginning o
f
the reign o
f Henry the
Eighth . See also 4 Inst . 1 .
3 The Federalist , No . 56 ; Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 7 .
4 The Federalist , Nos . 56 , 57 . Much ofwhat is said in this chapter regarding Great
Britain has , since the Reform Acts o
f
1832 and 1867 , no longer any application . The
house o
f
commons is now much more nearly than formerly a representative body o
f
the people . England , with a population , according to the census o
f
1871 , of 22 ,704 ,108 ,
has 493 members ; Scotland has 6
0 , representing 3 ,358 ,613 people ; and Ireland has 105 ,
representing 5 ,402 ,759 people . The average is one representative to about 48 ,000
inhabitants . )
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of the house of commons of the true interests or circumstances of
the people .
$662 . In the history of the Constitution it is a curious fact ,
that with some statesmen , possessing high political distinction , it
was made a fundamental objection against the establishment of any
national legislature , that if it " were composed of so numerous a
body of men as to represent the interests of a
ll
the inhabitants o
f
the United States in the usual and true ideas of representation ,
the expense of supporting it would be intolerably burdensome ;
and that if a few only were vested with a power of legislation ,
th
e
interests o
f
a great majority o
f
the inhabitants o
f
th
e
United
States must be necessarily unknown ; or , if known , even in the
first stages o
f
the operations o
f
the new government , unattended
to . ” 2 In their view a free government seems to have been incom
patible with a great extent o
f territory or population . .What , then ,
would become of Great Britain , or of France , under the present
constitution o
f
their legislative departments ?
$ 663 . The next objection was that the representatives would
b
e
chosen from that class o
f
citizens which would have the least
sympathy with the mass o
f
the people , and would bemost likely to
aim a
t
a
n ambitious sacrifice o
f
themany to the aggrandizement of
th
e
fe
w . 3 It was said , that the Author of Nature had bestowed on
some men greater capacities than on others . Birth , education ,
talents , and wealth created distinctions among men as visible ,
and o
f a
s
much influence , as stars , garters ,and ribbons . In every
society men o
f
this class will command a superior degree of re
spect ; and if the government is so constituted as to admit but
fe
w
to exercise it
s powers , it will , according to the natural course
o
f things , be in their hands . Men in the middling class , who are
qualified a
s representatives ,will not be so anxious to be chosen as
those o
f the first ; and if they are , theywill not have the means
o
f
so much influence . 4
$ 664 . It was answered , that the objection itself is of a very
i The Federalist , N
o
. 56 . See also Dr . Franklin ' s Remarks , 2 Pitk . Hist . 242 ; 1
Wilson ' s Law Lect . 431 , 432 ; Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B , 6 , ch . 7 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm .
219 .
2 Letter o
fMessrs . Yates and Lansing to Gov . Clinton , 1788 ( 3 Amer . Museum ,
156 , 158 ) .
3 The Federalist , No . 57 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 220 , 22
1
. See also the Federalist ,
No . 35 .
4 i Elliot ' s Debates , 221 , 222 .
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extraordinary character ; fo
r
while it is levelled against a pretended
oligarchy , in principle it strikes at the very root of a republican
government ; for it supposes the people to be incapable o
fmaking
a proper choice o
f representatives , or indifferent to it , or utterly
corrupt in the exercise of the right of suffrage . It would not be
contended that the first class of society , the men of talents ,experi
ence , and wealth , ought to be constitutionally excluded from office .
Such an attempt would not only be unjust , but suicidal ; for it
would nourish an influence and faction within the state ,which ,
upon the very supposition ,would continually exert its whole means
to destroy the government and overthrow the liberties o
f
the peo
p
le
. What , then , is to be done ? If the people are free to make
the choice , they will naturally make it from that class ,whatever it
may be , which will in their opinion best promote their interests
and preserve their liberties . Nor are the poor , any more than
the rich , beyond temptation or love of power . Who are to be the
electors of the representatives ? Not the rich , more than the
poor ; not the learned ,more than the ignorant ; not the heirs of
distinguished families ,more than the children of obscurity and
unpropitious fortune . The electors are to be th
e
body of the peo
ple o
f
the United States , jealous of their rights , and accustomed
to the exercise o
f
their power . Who are to be the objects of their
choice ? Every citizen , whose merit may commend him to the
esteem and confidence o
f
his fellow -citizens . No qualification of
wealth o
r
birth o
r religion or civil profession is recognized in the
Constitution ; and , consequently , the people are free to choose from
any rank of society according to their pleasure .
$ 665 . The persons who shall be elected representatives must
have all the inducement to fidelity , vigilance , and a devotion to
the interests o
f
the people which can possibly exist . They must
b
e presumed to be selected from their known virtues and estima
ble qualities , as well as from their talents . They must have a
desire to retain and exalt their reputation , and be ambitious to
deserve the continuance o
f
that public favor b
y
which they have
been elevated . There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of
honor , of favor , of esteem , and of confidence , which , apart from
all considerations of interest , is some pledge for grateful and be
.11 Elliot ' s Debates , 222 , 22
3
. 2 The Federalist , N
o
. 35 ; Id . N
o
. 36 ; Id . N
o
. 57 .
8 The Federalist , No . 57 ; Id . No . 35 ; Id . No . 36 .
4 The Federalist , No . 57 ; Id . No . , 35 ; Id . No . 36 .
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nevolent returns. But the interest of the representative , which
naturally binds him to his constituents , will be strengthened by
motives of a selfish character . His election is biennial ; and he
must soon return to the common rank of a citizen , unless he is
re -elected . Does he desire office ? Then that very desire will
secure his fidelity . Does he feel the value of public distinctions ?
Then his pride and vanity will equally attach him to a government
which affords him an opportunity to share in its honors and dis
tinctions, and to th
e
people , who alone can confer them . Besides ,
h
e
can make no law which will not weigh as heavily on himself
and his friends a
s
o
n others ; and he can introduce no oppression
which must not be borne b
y
himself , when he sinks back to the
common level . A
s
fo
r
usurpation , or a perpetuation of his author
ity independent o
f
the popular will , that is hopeless , until the
period shall have arrived in which the people are ready to barter
their liberties , and are ready to become the voluntary slaves of
any despot . 3 Whenever that period shall arrive , it will be useless
to speak o
f guardians o
r
o
f rights . Where al
l
are corrupt , it is
idle to talk o
f
virtue . Quis custodiet custodes ? Who shall keep
watch over the people when they choose to betray themselves ?
$ 666 . The objection itself is , in truth , utterly destitute of any
solid foundation . It applies with the same force to the State
legislatures as to that o
f
the Union . It attributes to talents and
wealth and ambition an influence which may be exerted a
t all
times and everywhere . It speaks in no doubtful language that
republican government is but a shadow , and incapable of preserv
ing life , liberty , or property . It supposes that the people are
always blind to their true interests , and always ready to betray
them ; that they can safely trust neither themselves nor others .
If such a doctrine be maintainable , al
l
the constitutions o
f Amer
ic
a
are founded in egregious errors and delusions .
$ 667 . The only perceptible difference between the case of a
representative in Congress and in the State legislature as to this
point is , that the one may be elected by five or six hundred citi
zens , and the other by as many thousands . Even this is true
only in particular States ; for the representatives in Massachusetts
(who are all chosen b
y
the towns ) may be elected b
y
si
x
thousand
1 The Federalist , No . 57 .
2 The Federalist , N
o
. 57 .
4 Id . No . 57 ; Id . Nos . 35 , 36 .
8 Id . No . 57 ; Id . Nos . 35 , 36 .
6 Id . No . 57 .
-
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citizens , nay , b
y
any larger number ;according to the population of
the town . But , giving the objection its full force , could this cir
cumstance make any solid objection ? Are not the senators in
several o
f
the States chosen b
y
a
s large a number ? Have they
been found more corrupt than the representatives ? Is the objec
tion supported b
y
reason ? Can it be said that five or six thou
sand citizens are more easily corrupted than five or six hundred ? 1
That the aggregate mass will be more under the influence of
intrigue than a portion o
f
it ? Is the consequence deducible from
the objection admissible ? If it is , then wemust deprive the peo
ple o
f
a
ll
choice o
f
their public servants , in all cases where num
bers are not required . What , then , is to be done in those States
where the governors are b
y
the State constitution to be chosen b
y
the people ? Is the objection warranted b
y
facts ? The represen
tation in the British house o
f
commons ( as has been already
stated ) very little exceeds the proportion o
f
one for every thirty
thousand inhabitants . Is it true that the house of commons have
elevated themselves upon the ruin o
f
the many ? Is it true that
the representatives o
f boroughs have been more faithful , or wise ,
o
r honest , or patriotic than those of cities and o
f
counties ? Let
us come to our own country . The districts in New Hampshire , in
which the senators are chosen immediately b
y
the people , are
nearly as large a
s
will be necessary for her representatives in
Congress . Those in Massachusetts come from districts having a
larger population , and those in New York from districts still
larger . In New York and Albany th
e
members o
f
assembly a
re
elected b
y
nearly as many voters a
s
will be required for a member
o
f Congress , calculating on the number of sixty -five only . In
some o
f
the counties o
f Pennsylvania the State representatives
are elected in districts nearly as large as those required for the
Federal representatives . In the city of Philadelphia (composed
o
f sixty thousand inhabitants ) every elector has a right to vote
for each o
f
the representatives in the State legislature , and actu
ally elects a single member to the executive council . These are
facts which demonstrate the fallacy o
f
the objection , for no one
will pretend that the rights and liberties of these States are not
a
swell maintained and as well understood b
y
their senators and
representatives a
s
those o
f any other States in the Union b
y
1 The Federalist , No . 57 .
3 Id Nos . 56 , 57 .
? Id . No . 57 .
- The Federalist ,No . 57 .
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theirs. There is yet one stronger case , that of Connecticut ; fo
r
there one branch of the legislature is so constituted that each
member o
f
it is elected b
y
the whole State , 1
$ 668 . The remaining objection was , that there was no secu
rity , that the number of members would be augmented from time
to time , as the progress of the population might demand . ?
$ 669 . It is obvious that this objection is exclusively founded
upon the supposition that the people will be too corrupt , or to
o
indifferent , to select proper representatives , or that the represent
atives when chosen will totally disregard the true interests o
f
their
constituents o
r wilfully betray them . Either supposition ( if the
preceding remarks are well founded ) is equally inadmissible .
There are , however , some additional considerations which are
entitled to great weight . In the first place , it is observable that
th
e
Federal Constitution will not suffer in comparison with the
State constitutions in regard to the security which is provided fo
r
a gradual augmentation o
f
the number o
f representatives . In
many of them the subject has been left to the discretion of the
legislature , and experience has thus far demonstrated not only
that the power is safely lodged , but that a gradual increase of
representatives (where it could take place ) has kept pace with
that of the constituents . In the next place , as a new census is
to take place within every successive te
n
years fo
r
the avowed pur
pose o
f readjusting the representation from time to time according
to the national exigencies , it is no more to be imagined that Con
gress will abandon it
s proper duty in this respect than in respect
to any other power confided to it . Every power may be abused ,
every duty may be corruptly deserted . But as the power to cor
rect the evil will recur a
t
least biennially to the people , it is im
possible that there ca
n
long exist any public abuse or dereliction
o
fduty , unless the people connive at and encourage the violation . 4
In th
e
next place there is a peculiarity in the Federal Constitution
which must favor a constitutional augmentation o
f
the represent
atives . One branch of the national legislature is elected b
y
the
people , the other by the States . In the former , consequently , the
large States will have more weight , in the latter the smaller
States will have the advantage . From this circumstance itmay
1 The Federalist , No . 57 .
2 The Federalist , No . 58 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 204 , 224
8 The Federalist , No . 5
8 liot ' s Debates , 239 .
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b
e fairly inferred that the larger States , and especially those of a
growing population , will be strenuous advocates fo
r
increasing the
number and weight of that part of the legislature in which their
influence predominates . ?
$670 . Itmay be said that there will be an antagonist influence
in the Senate to prevent an augmentation . But ,upon a close view ,
this objection will be found to lose most of its weight . In the
first place , the House o
f Representatives , being a co -ordinate
branch , and directly emanating from the people , and speaking
the known and declared sense o
f
the majority of the people , will ,
upon every question o
f this nature , have no small advantage as to
the means of influence and resistance . In the next place , the
contest will not be to be decided merely b
y
the votes o
f great
States and small States , opposed to each other , but b
y
States o
f
intermediate sizes , approaching the two extremes by gradual ad
vances . They will naturally arrange themselves on the one side
o
r
the other , according to circumstances ; and cannot be calcu
lated upon as identified permanently with either . Besides , in the
new States , and those whose population is advancing , whether
they are great or small , there will be a constant tendency to favor
augmentations o
f
the representatives ; and , indeed , the large States
may compel it b
y making reapportionments and augmentations
mutual conditions of each other . In the third place , the House
o
f Representatives will possess an exclusive power of proposing
supplies for the support o
f government , or , in other words , it will
hold th
e
purse -strings of the nation . This must forever give it a
powerful influence in the operations o
f
the government , and ena
ble it effectually to redress every serious grievance . The House
o
f Representatives will , at all times , have as deep a concern in
maintaining the interest o
f
the people a
s
the Senate can have in
maintaining that of the States .
§ 671 . Such is a brief view of the objections urged against this
part o
f
the Constitution , and of the answers given to them . Time ,
a
s
has been already intimated , has already settled them by its
own irresistible demonstrations . But it is impossible to withhold
our tribute o
f
admiration from those enlightened statesmen whose
profound reasoning and mature wisdom enabled the people to see
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 58 ; 2 Lloyd ' s Debates , in 1789 , p . 19
2
.
2 The Federalist , No . 58 .
8 The Federalist , No . 57 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 226 , 227 .
" The Federalist , No . 58 .
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the true path of safety . What was then prophecy and argument
has now become fact. At each successive census the number of
representatives has been gradually augmented . In 1792 the
ratio adopted was 33 ,000 ,which gave an aggregate of one hundred
and si
x representatives . In 1802 th
e
same ratio was adopted ,
which gave a
n aggregate o
f
one hundred and forty -one members .
In 1811 the ratio adopted was 35 ,000 , which gave an aggregate of
one hundred and eighty -one members . In 1822 the ratio adopted
was 4
0 ,000 , which gave an aggregate of two hundred and ten
members . In 1832 the ratio adopted was 47 ,700 , which gave an
aggregate o
f
two hundred and forty members . ?
$ 672 . In the mean time the House of Representatives has
silently acquired vast influence and power over public opinion b
y
it
s
immediate connection and sympathy with the people . No
complaint lias been urged , o
r
could now with truth b
e urged , that
it did not understand , or did not represent , the interests of the
people , or bring to the public councils a competent knowledge of ,
and devotion to the local interests and feelings of its constituents .
Nay , so little is and so little has the force of this objection been
felt , that several States have voluntarily preferred to elect their
representatives by a general ticket , rather than b
y
districts . And
th
e
electors fo
r
President and Vice -President are more frequently
chosen in that than in any other manner . The representatives
are not , and never have been , chosen exclusively from any high
o
r privileged class of society . A
t
this moment , and at all previ
ous times , the House has been composed ofmen from almost every
rank and class o
f society , — planters , farmers ,manufacturers ,me
chanics , lawyers , physicians , and divines ; the rich and the poor ;
the educated and the uneducated men o
f genius ; the young and the
old ; the eloquent and the taciturn ; the statesman o
f
a half -century ,
and the aspirant just released from his academical studies . Merit
o
f every sort has thus been able to assert its claims , and occasion
ally to obtain it
s just rewards . And if any complaint could justly
b
e made , it would be that the choice had sometimes been directed
b
y
a spirit of intolerance , that forgot everything but its own creed ;
o
r b
y
a spirit o
f party , that remembered everything but its own
duty . Such infirmities , however , are inseparable from the condi
1 Act o
f
1792 , ch . 23 ; Act of 1802 , ch . 1 ; Act of 1811 , ch . 9 ; Act of 1822 , ch . 10 ,
i Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 190 ; Rawle on Constitution , 45 .
? Act o
f
22d May , 1832 , ch . 91 .
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tion o
f
human nature ; and their occurrence proves nothing more
than that th
e
moral , like th
e
physical ,world is occasionally visited
b
y
a whirlwind o
r deluged by a storm .
$ 673 . It remains only to take notice of two qualifications of
the general principle o
f representation , which are ingrafted on the
clause . One is , that each State shall have at least one represent
ative ; the other is that already quoted , that the number of repre
sentatives shall not exceed one for every 30 ,000 . The former was
indispensable in order to secure to each State a just representation
in each branch o
f
the legislature ; which , as the powers of each
branch were not exactly coextensive , and especially as the power
o
f originating taxation was exclusively vested in the House o
f
Representatives , was indispensable to preserve the equality of the
small States , and to reconcile them to a surrender of their sov
ereignty . This proviso was omitted in the , first draft of the Con
stitution , though proposed in one of the preceding resolutions .
But it was adopted without resistance when the draft passed un
der the solemn discussion o
f
the convention . The other was a
matter o
f
more controversy . The original limitation proposed was
4
0 ,000 ; 3 and itwas not until the very last day o
f
the session o
f
the
convention that the number was reduced to 30 ,000 . The object
o
f fixing some limitation was to prevent the future existence of
a very numerous and unwieldy House o
f Representatives . The
friends of a national government had no fears that the body would
ever become too small for real , effective , protecting service . The
danger was , that from the natural impulses of the popular will ,
and the desire o
f
ambitious candidates to attain office , the number
would be soon swollen to an unreasonable size , so that it would at
once generate and combine factions , obstruct deliberations , and
introduce and perpetuate turbulent and rash counsels . 5
$ 674 . On this subject le
t
the Federalist speak in it
s
own fear
less and expressive language : " In all legislative assemblies , the
greater the number composing them may b
e , the fewerwill the men
be who will , in fact , direct their proceedings . In the first place ,
1 Journal of Convention , 157 , 158 , 209 , 21
5
.
? Journal of Convention , 8th Aug . p . 236 .
8 Journal of Convention , 157 , 217 , 235 , 352 .
4 Journal of Convention , 17th Sept . 1787 , p . 389 .
5 i Lloyd ' s Debates in 1789 , 427 , 434 ; 2 Lloyd ' s Debates , 183 , 185 , 186 , 188 , 189 , 190 .
6 The same thought is expressed with still more force in the American pamphlet ,
entitled Thoughts upon the Political Situation o
f
America , (Worcester , 1788 , ) 5
4 .
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themore numerous any assembly may be , of whatever characters
composed , the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion
over reason . In the next place , the larger the number , the greater
will be the proportion of members of limited information and
weak capacities . Now , it is precisely on characters of this de
scription that the eloquence and address of the few are known
to act with all their force. In th
e
ancient republics , where the
whole body o
f
th
e
people assembled in person , a single orator or
a
n artful statesman was generally seen to rule with as complete a
sway a
s
if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand . On the
same principle , the more multitudinous a representative assembly
may b
e
rendered , the more it will partake of the infirmities inci
dent to collective meetings o
f
the people . Ignorance will be the
dupe o
f cunning , and passion the slave of sophistry and declama
tion . The people can never err more than in supposing that in
multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit they
strengthen the barrier against the government o
f
a fe
w . Expe
rience will forever admonish them that , on the contrary , after
securing a sufficient number for the purposes of safety , of local
information , and of diffusive sympathy , they will counteract their
own views b
y
every addition to their representatives . The coun
tenance o
f
the government may become more democratic , but the
soul that animates it will be more oligarchic . The machine will
b
e enlarged , but the fewer , and often the more secret , will be the
springs b
y
which it
s motions are directed . ” 1
$ 675 . As a fit conclusion of this part of the subject it may be
remarked that Congress , at its first session in 1789 , in pursuance
o
f
a desire expressed b
y
several of the State conventions in favor
o
f
further declaratory and restrictive amendments to the Consti
tution , proposed twelve additional articles . The first was on the
very subject now under consideration , and was expressed in the
following terms : “ After the first enumeration , required b
y
the
first article of th
e
Constitution , there shall be one representative
fo
r
every thirty thousand , until the number shall amount to one
1 The Federalist , No . 58 . Mr . Ames , in a debate in Congress , in 1789 , on amend .
ing the Constitution in regard to representation , observed , “ B
y
enlarging the repre
sentation , we lessen the chance of selecting men of the greatest wisdom and abilities ;
because small districts may b
e
conducted b
y
intrigue ; but in large districts nothing but
real dignity o
f
character can secure a
n
election . ” 2 Lloyd ' s Debates , 183 . Unfortu .
nately , the experience of th
e
United States has not justified the belief that large dis
tricts will always choosemen of the greatest wisdom , abilities , and real dignity .
474 [BOOK II
I
.CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES .
hundred ; after which the proportion shall be so regulated b
y
Con
gress that there shall not be less than one hundred representatives ,
nor less than one for every forty thousand persons , until the num
ber o
f representatives shall amount to two hundred ; after which ,
the proportion shall be so regulated b
y Congress that there shall
not be less than two hundred representatives , nor more than one
representative fo
r
every fifty thousand . ” ] This amendment was
never ratified b
y
a competent number o
f
the States to b
e incor
porated into the Constitution . It was probably thought that the
whole subject was safe where it was already lodged ; and that
Congress ought to be left free to exercise a sound discretion ,
according to the future exigencies o
f
the nation , either to increase
o
r
diminish the number o
f representatives .
§ 676 . There yet remain two practical questions of no inconsid
erable importance , connected with the clause of the Constitution
now under consideration . One is ,what are to be deemed direct
taxes within th
e
meaning of th
e
clause . The other is , in what
manner the apportionment o
f representatives is to be made . The
first will naturally come under review in examining the powers of
Congress and the constitutional limitations upon those powers ;
and may , therefore , for the present , be passed over . The other
was a subject o
f
much discussion a
t
the time when the first appor
tionment was before Congress , after the first census was taken ,
and has been recently revived with new and increased interest and
ability . It deserves , therefore , a very deliberate examination .
§ 677 . The language of 'the Constitution is , that “ representa
tives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among th
e
several
States , & c . , according to their respective numbers " ; and at the
first view it would not seem to involve the slightest difficulty . A
moment ' s reflection will dissipate the illusion , and teach us that
there is a difficulty intrinsic in the very nature o
f
the subject . In
regard to direct taxes , the natural course would be to assume a
particular sum to be raised , as three millions of dollars , and to
apportion it among the States according to their relative numbers .
But even here there will always be a very small fractional amount
incapable o
f
exact distribution , since the numbers in each State
will never exactly coincide with any common divisor , or give an
1 Journal o
f
Convention , & c . Supp . 466 to 481 .
% The debates in Congress o
n
this amendment will be found in 2 Lloyd ' s Debates ,
182 to 194 ; Id . 250 .
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exact aliquot part for each State without any remainder . But, as
the amount may be carried through a long series of descending
money fractions , it may be ultimately reduced to the smallest frac
tion of any existing or even imaginary coin .
§ 678 . But the difficulty is fa
r
otherwise in regard to represent
atives . Here there can be no subdivision of th
e
unit ; each State
must be entitled to an entire representative , and a fraction of a
representative is incapable of apportionment . Yet it will be per
ceived a
t
once , that it is scarcely possible , and certainly is wholly
improbable , that the relative numbers , in each State should bear
such a
n exact proportion to th
e
aggregate that there should exist
a common divisor for a
ll , which should leave no fraction in any
Statè . Such a case never yet has existed , and in al
l
human
probability it never will . Every common divisor ,hitherto applied ,
has left a fraction , greater o
r
smaller , in every State ; ? and what
has been in the pastmust continue to be fo
r
the future . Assume
the whole population to be three , or six , or nine , or twelve mil
lions , or any other number ; if you follow the injunctions of the
Constitution , and attempt to apportion the representatives accord
ing to the numbers in each State , it will be found to be absolutely
impossible . The theory , however true , becomes practically false
in it
s application . Each State may have assigned a relative pro
portion o
f representatives u
p
to a given number , the whole being
divisible b
y
some common divisor ; but the fraction of population
belonging to each beyond that point is left unprovided for . So
that the apportionment is , at best , only an approximation to the
rule laid down by the Constitution , and not a strict compliance
with the rule . The fraction in one State may be ten times as
great as that in another ; and so may differ in each State in any
assignable mathematical proportion . What , then , is to be done ?
Is the Constitution to be wholly disregarded on this point ? O
r
is
it to be followed out in it
s
true spirit , though unavoidably differ
ing from the letter , by th
e
nearest approximation to it ? If an
additional representative can be assigned to one State beyond its
relative proportion to the whole population , it is equally true that
it can be assigned to all that are in a similar predicament . If a
fraction admits o
f representation in any case , what prohibits the
application of the rule to a
ll
fractions ? The only constitutional
limitation seems to be that no State shall havemore than one rep
i See 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , ch . 5 , p . 31
9
.
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resentative for every thirty thousand persons . Subject to this , the
truest rule seems to be , that the apportionment ought to be the
nearest practical approximation to the terms o
f
the Constitution ;
and the rule ought to be such that it shall always work the same
way in regard to a
ll
the States , and be as little open to cavil or
controversy o
r
abuse a
s possible .
$679 . But it may be asked , what are the first steps to be taken
in order to arrive a
t
a constitutional apportionment ? Plainly , b
y
taking the aggregate o
f population in a
ll
the States , ( according to
the constitutional rule , ) and then ascertain the relative proportion
o
f
the population o
f
each State to the population o
f
the whole .
This is necessarily so in regard to direct taxes ; ? and there is no
reason to say that it can o
r ought to be otherwise in regard to
representatives ; for that would be to contravene the very injunc
tions o
f
the Constitution which require the like rule of apportion
ment in each case . In the one , the apportionment may be run
down below unity ; in the other , it cannot . But this does not
change the nature o
f
the rule , but only the extent of its applica
tion .
$ 680 . In 1790 , a bill was introduced into the House of Repre
sentatives , giving one representative fo
r
every thirty thousand ,
and leaving the fractions unrepresented ; thus producing an ine
quality which was greatly complained of . It passed the House ,
and was amended in the Senate b
y
allowing an additional repre
sentative to the States having the largest fractions . The House
finally concurred in the amendment , after a warm debate . The
history o
f
these proceedings is summarily stated b
y
the biogra
pher o
f Washington as follows : “ Construing , ” says he , “ the
Constitution to authorize a process b
y
which the whole number of
representatives should b
e
ascertained on the whole population o
f
1 “ By the Constitution , ” says Mr . Chief Justice Marshall , in delivering the opinion
o
f
the court , “ direct taxation , in its application to States , shall b
e apportioned to num
bers . Representation is not made the foundation o
f
taxation . If , under the enumera
tion o
f
a representative fo
r
every thirty thousand souls , one State had been found to
contain 5
9 ,000 and another 60 ,000 , the first would have been entitled to only one repre
sentative , and the last to two . Their taxes , however , would not have been a
s
one to
two ,but as fifty -nine to sixty . " Loughborough v . Blake , 5 Wheaton ' s R . 317 , 320 . This
is perfectly correct , because the Constitution probibits more than one representative for
every 3
0 ,000 . But if one State contain 100 ,000 souls , and another 200 ,000 , there is no
logic ,which , consistently with common -sense or justice , could , upon any constitutional
apportionment ,assign three representatives to one and seven to the other , any more than
it could o
f
a direct tax the proportion o
f
three to one and seven to the other .
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the United States, and afterwards apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers , the Senate applied
the number thirty thousand , as a divisor , to the total population ,
and taking the quotient , which was one hundred and twenty , as
the number of representatives given by the ratio which had been
adopted in the House, where the bill originated , they apportioned
that number among the several States by that ratio , until as many
representatives as it would give were allotted to each . The
residuary members were then distributed among the States hav
ing the highest fractions . Without professing the principle on
which this apportionment was made , the amendment of the Senate
merely allotted to the States respectively the number of members
which the process just mentioned would give. The result was a
more equitable apportionment of representatives to population , and
a still more exact accordance than was found in the original bill ,
with the prevailing sentiment which , both within doors and with
out , seemed to require that the popular branch of the legislature
should consist of asmany members as the fundamental laws of the
government would admit. If the rule of construing that instru
ment was correct, the amendment removed objections which were
certainly well founded , and was not easily assailable by the advo
cates of a numerous representative body . But the rule was novel ,
and overturned opinions which had been generally assumed , and
were supposed to be settled . In one branch of the legislature it
had been already rejected , and in the other the majority in its
favor was only one . ” ' 2
$ 681 . The debate in the two houses , however , was purely
political , and the division of the votes purely geographical ; the
Southern States voting against it , and the Northern in its favor . 3
The President returned the bill with two objections : “ 1 . That
the Constitution has prescribed that representatives shall be ap
portioned among th
e
several States according to their respective
numbers ; and there is no proportion or divisor which , applied to
the respective numbers of the States , will yield th
e
number and
i The words of the bill were , “ That from and after the third day of March , 1793 ,
the House o
f Representatives shall b
e composed o
f
one hundred and twenty -sevenmem
bers , elected within the several States according to the following apportionment , that is
to say ,within the State of New Hampshire five , within the State of Massachusetts six
teen , " & c . , & c . , enumerating all the States .
2 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , ch . 5 , p . 321 , 322 .
3 4 Jefferson ' s Correspondence , 466 .
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allotment o
f representatives proposed by the bill . 2 . The Con
stitution has also provided that the number o
f representatives
shall not exceed one for thirty thousand , which restriction is b
y
the context , and b
y
fair and obvious construction , to be applied to
the several and respective numbers o
f
the States , and the bill has
allotted to eight o
f
the States more than one for thirty thousand . ” 1
The bill was accordingly lost , two thirds of the House not being
in it
s favor . It is understood that the President ' s cabinet was
greatly divided on the question . 2
$ 682 . The second reason assigned b
y
the President against
the bill was well founded in fact , and entirely conclusive . The
other , to say the least of it , is as open to question as any one
which can well be imagined in a case of real difficulty of construc
tion . It assumes , as its basis , that a common ratio , o
r
divisor , is
to b
e taken and applied to each State , let the fractions and ine
qualities left be whatever they may . Now , this is a plain depart
ure from the terms of the Constitution . It is not there said
that any such ratio shall be taken . The language is , that the
representatives shall be apportioned among the scveral States ac
cording to their respective numbers , that is , according to the pro
portion o
f
the whole population o
f
each State to th
e
aggregate o
f
a
ll
the States . To apportion according to a ratio short of the
whole number in a State , is not an apportionment according to the
respective numbers o
f
the State . If it is said that it is imprac
ticable to follow the meaning of the terms literally , that may be
admitted ; but it does not follow that they are to be wholly dis
regarded , or language substituted essentially different in its import
and effect . If we must depart , wemust depart as little as prac
ticable . We are to act on the doctrine of cy pres , or come as
nearly a
s possible to the rule of the Constitution . If we are at
liberty to adopt a rule varying from the terms of the Constitution ,
arguing ab inconvenienti , then it is clearly just as open to others
to reason on the other side from opposing inconvenience and in
justice .
§ 683 . This question , which a learned commentator has sup
posed to b
e
now finally a
t
rest , has been ( as has been already
intimated ) recently revived and discussed with great ability . In
15 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , ch . 5 , p . 324 , note .
2 Id . p . 323 ; 4 Jefferson ' s Correspondence , 466 .
8 Rawle o
n
Constitution , 43 ; 5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , 324 .
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stead of pursuing my own reasoning upon this subject, it will be
far more satisfactory to give to the reader , in a note , the argu
ments on each side , as they are found collected in the leading
reports and documents now forming a portion of contemporary
history ,
$ 684 . The next clause of the second section of the first article
is : “ When vacancies happen in the representation of any State ,
the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill
such vacancies."
$ 685 . The propriety of adopting this clause does not seem to
have furnished any matter of discussion , either in or out of the
1Mr. Jefferson 's opinion , given on the apportionment bill in 1792, presents al
l
th
e
leading reasons against the doctrine o
f apportioning the representatives in any other
manner than b
y
a ratio without regard to fractions . It is as follows :
“ The Constitution has declared that representatives and direct taxes shall b
e appor
tioned among theseveral States according to their respective numbers ' ; that ' the num
ber o
f representatives shall not exceed one for every 30 , 000 , but each State shall have ,
a
t
least , one representative ; and , until such enumeration shall b
e
made , the State o
f
New Hampshire shall b
e
entitled to choose three ,Massachusetts , ' & c .
“ The bill for apportioning representatives among the several States ,without explain .
ing any principle a
t
a
ll
which may show it
s conformity with the Constitution or guide
future apportionments , says , that New Hampshire shall have three members , Massa
chusetts si
x
teen , & c . We are , therefore , to find b
y
experiment what has been the prin
ciple o
f
the bill ; to do which , it is proper to state the Federal or representable numbers
o
f
each State , and the members allotted to them b
y
the bill . They are as follows :
Vermont ,
New Hampshire ,
Massachusetts ,
Rhode Island ,
Connecticut ,
New York ,
New Jersey ,
Pennsylvania ,
Delaware ,
Maryland ,
Virginia ,
Kentucky ,
North Carolina ,
South Carolina ,
Georgia ,
8
5 ,532
141 ,823
475 ,327
68 ,444
235 ,941
352 ,915
179 ,556
432 ,880
5
5 ,538
278 ,513
630 ,558
68 ,705
353 ,521
206 ,236
7
0 ,843
   
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
  
It happens that this representation ,
whether tried a
s
between great and
small States , o
r
a
s
between North
and South , yields , in thepresent in
stance , a tolerably just result , and
consequently could not b
e objected
to o
n
that ground , if it were ob
tained b
y
the process prescribed in
the Constitution ; but , if obtained
b
y
any process out o
f
that , it be
comes inadmissible .
3 ,636 ,312 120
“ The first member o
f
the clause o
f
th
e
Constitution above cited is express , – that
representatives shall b
e apportioned among the several States according to their respec
tive numbers ; that is to say , they shall b
e apportioned b
y
some common ratio , for pro
portion and ratio are equivalent words ; and it is the definition o
f proportion among num
bers , that they have a rutio common to a
ll , o
r , in other words , a commondivisor . Now ,
trial will show that there is no commonratio or divisor which , applied to the numbers
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convention . It was obvious that the power ought to reside some
where ; and must be exercised either by the State or national
government , or by some department thereof. The friends of State
powers would naturally rest satisfied with leaving it with the State
executive ; and the friends of the national government would ac
quiesce in that arrangement , if other constitutional provisions
existed sufficient to preserve it
s
due execution . The provision , as
it stands , has the strong recommendation of public convenience ,
and facile adaptation to the particular local circumstances of each
State . Any general regulation would have worked with some in - .
equality .
o
f
each State , will give to them the number o
f representatives allotted in this bill ; for ,
trying th
e
several ratios o
f
2
9 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , the allotments would be as follows :
30 3
1 | 32 Thebill .
3
1
6
Vermont ,
New Hampshire ,
Massachusetts ,
Rhode Island ,
Connecticut ,
New York ,
New Jersey ,
Pennsylvania ,
Delaware ,
Maryland ,
Virginia ,
Kentucky ,
North Carolina ,
South Carolina ,
Georgia ,
    
 
 
 
 
 .  
 
 
 
 
  Non
co
m
o
u
n
C
A
N
Then the bill reverses the
constitutional precept ;
because , by it , repre
sentatives are not a
p
portioned among the
several States accord
ing to their respective
numbers .
N
a
o
n
o c
o
m
o
o ov
o
w
w
Don
D
o
n
B
o
sc
o
w
| 112 | 109 | 107 | 105 120
“ It will be said , that , though fo
r
tares there may always b
e
found a divisor which
will apportion them among the States according to numbers exactly ,without leaving
any remainder ; yet fo
r
representatives there can b
e
n
o
such common ratio , or divisor ,
which , applied to the several numbers , will divide them exactly , without a remainder
o
r
fraction . I answer , then , that taxes must be divided exactly , and representatives as
nearly a
s
the nearest ratio will admit , and the fractions must be neglected ; because the
Constitution wills , absolutely , that there be an apportionment , or commonratio ; and if
any fractions result from th
e
operation , it has left them unprovided fo
r
. In fact , it could
not but foreseethat such fractions would result , and itmeant to submit to them . It knew
they would b
e
in favor o
f
one part o
f
the Union a
t
one time and o
f
another part o
f
it
a
t
another , so as , in the end , to balance occasional inequalities . But , instead o
f
such a
single common ratio , o
r
uniform divisor , as prescribed b
y
the Constitution , the bill has
applied two ratios , a
t
least , to the different States , to wit , that of 30 ,026 to the seven
following : Rhode Island , New York , Pennsylvania , Maryland , Virginia , Kentucky ,
1 Journal of Convention , 217 , 237 , 352 .
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§ 686 . The next clause is, that “ the House of Representatives
shall choose their speaker and other officers, and shall have the
sole power of impeachment ."
and Georgia ; and that of 27,770 to the eight others ; namely , Vermont , New Hamp
shire , Massachusetts , Connecticut ,New Jersey, Delaware , North Carolina , and South
Carolina . As follows :
Rhode Island ,
New York ,
Pennsylvania ,
Maryland ,
Virginia ,
Kentucky ,
Georgia ,
68,444
352,915
432,880
278,513
630,558
68,705
70,843
D
iv
id
e
d
by
30
,
026
, give
N
ã
o
And
Vermont ,
New Hampshire ,
Massachusetts ,
Connecticut ,
New Jersey ,
Delaware ,
North Carolina ,
South Carolina ,
8
5 ,532
141 ,823
475 ,327
235 , 941
179 ,556
5
5 ,538
353 ,521
206 ,236
co
m
e
rc
io
D
iv
id
e
d
by
27
,
770
, give
v
o
n
“ And if two ratios may b
e applied , then fifteen may , and th
e
distribution become
arbitrary , instead of being apportioned to numbers .
“ Another member o
f
the clause o
f
the Constitution , which has been cited , says , “ the
number o
f representatives shall not exceed one for every 3
0 ,000 , but each State shall
have a
t
least one representative . ' This last phrase proves that it had in contempla
tion , that a
ll
fractions , o
r
numbersbelowthe commonratio , were to b
e unrepresented ; and
it provides specially that , in the case of a State whose whole number shall be below the
common ratio , one representative shall be given to it . This is the single instancewhere
it allows representation to any smaller number than the common ratio , and b
y
provid .
ing specially for it in this , shows it was understood that , without special provision , the
smaller number would , in this case , be involved in the general principle .
“ The first phrase o
f
the above citation , that the number of representatives shall not
exceed one for every 3
0 ,000 , ' is violated b
y
this bill ,which has given to eight States &
number exceeding one for every 3
0 ,000 , to wit , one for every 27 ,770 .
" In answer to this , it is said that this phrase may mean either the thirty thousands
in each State , or the thirty thousands in th
e
whole Union ; and that , in the latter case , it
serves only to find the amount o
f
the whole representation , which , in the present state
o
f population , is one hundred and twenty members . Suppose the phrase might bear
both meanings , which will common -sense apply to it ? Which did the universal under
standing o
f
our country apply to it ? Which did the Senate and Representatives apply
to it during the pendency o
f
the first bill , and even till an advanced stage of this second
bill , when an ingenious gentleman found out the doctrine of fractions , - a doctrine so
difficult and inobvious a
s
to b
e rejected a
t
first sight b
y
the very persons who after
wards became it
s most zealous advocates ? The phrase stands in the midst of a number
o
f
others , every one of which relates to States in their separate capacity . Will not plain
common -sense , then , understand it , like the rest of its context , to relate to States in their
separate capacities ?
“ But if the phrase of one for 30 ,000 is only meant to give the aggregate of repre
sentatives , and not a
t all to influence their apportionment among the States , then the
one hundred and twenty being once found , in order to apportion them wemust recur
to the former rule ,which does it according to th
e
numbers o
f
th
e
respective States ; and we
must take the nearest commondivisor a
s
the ratio o
f
distribution , that is to say , that divi .
sor which , applied to every State , gives to them such numbers a
s , added together , come
VOL . I . 31
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$ 687 . Each of these privileges is of great practical value and
importance . In Great Britain the house of commons elect their
nearest to 120 . This nearest common ratio will be found to be 28 ,858 , and will distrib
ute 119 o
f
the 120 members , leaving only a single residuary one . It will be found ,
too , to place 9
6 ,648 fractional numbers in the eight northernmost States , and 105 ,582 in
the southernmost . The following table shows it :
Ratio o
f
2
8 , 85
8
. Fractions .
8
5 ,532
141 ,823
475 ,327
68 ,444
235 ,941
352 ,915
179 ,556
432 ,880
2
7 ,816
2
6 , 391
1
3 ,599
1
0 ,728
5 ,077
6 ,619
6 ,408
.
co
m
o
Vermont , .
New Hampshire , . .
Massachusetts ,
Rhode Island ,
Connecticut , .
New York , . .
New Jersey , .
Pennsylvania ,
Delaware , ·
Maryland , .
Virginia , . .
Kentucky , .
North Carolina ,
South Carolina , .
Georgia , · ·
1
0
9
6 ,648
5
5 ,538
278 ,513
630 ,558
6
8 ,705
353 ,521
206 , 236
7
0 ,843
2
6 ,680
1
8 ,791
2
4 ,540
1
0 ,989
7 ,225
4 ,230
1
3 ,127 105,582
3 ,636 ,312 119 202 ,230 202 ,230
“ Whatever may have been the intention , the effect o
f rejecting the nearest divisor ,
(which leaves but one residuary member , ) and adopting a distant one , (which leaves
eight , ) is merely to take a member from New York and Pennsylvania each , and give
them to Vermont and New Hampshire . But it will be said , “ This is giving more than
one for 3
0 ,000 . ' True ; but has it not been just said , that the one for 30 ,000 is pre
scribed only to fi
x
the aggregate number , and that we are not tomind it when we come
to apportion them among the States ; that for this wemust recur to the former rule ,
which distributes them according to the numbers in each State ? Besides , does not the
bill itself apportion among seven o
f
the States b
y
the ratio o
f
2
7 ,770 ,which is much
more than one for 3
0 ,000 ?
“ Where a phrase is susceptible o
f
two meanings , weought certainly to adopt that
which will bring upon us the fewest inconveniences . Let u
s weigh those resulting from
both constructions .
“ From that giving to each State a member for every 3
0 ,000 in that State , results the
single inconvenience , that theremay b
e large fractions unrepresented . But it being a
· mere hazard o
n
which States this will fall , hazard will equalize it in the long run .
“ From the other results exactly the same inconvenience . A thousand casesmay b
e
imagined to prove it . Take one ; suppose eight o
f the States had 4
5 ,000 inhabitants
each , and the other seven 44 ,999 each , that is to say , each one less than each o
f
the
others , the aggregate would be 674 ,993 , and the number of representatives , at one fo
r
3
0 ,000 of the aggregate , would b
e
2
2 . Then , after giving one member to each State ,
distribute the seven residuary members among the seven highest fractions ; and though
the difference o
f population b
e only a
n
unit , the representation would be the double .
Here a single inhabitant the more would count a
s 3
0 ,000 . Nor is this case imaginable
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own speaker ; but he must be approved by the king . This ap
proval is now altogether a matter of course ; but anciently , it
only ; it will resemble th
e
real one , whenever th
e
fractions happen to b
e pretty equal
through the whole States . The numbers o
f
our census happen , b
y
accident , to give
the fractions a
ll very small o
r very great , so as to produce the strongest case o
f
in
equality that could possibly have occurred , and which may never occur again . The
probability is , that the fractions will generally descend gradually from 39 ,999 to 1 .
The inconvenience , then , of large unrepresented fractions attends both constructions ;
and ,while the most obvious construction is liable to no other , that of the bi
ll
incurs
many and grievous ones .
Fractions.
1st
2
d . l .
.
. . . .
. . . . .
3d
. . . . .
. . . . .
.
. .
.. . . . .
, , ,
45 ,000
4
5 ,000
4
5 , 000
4
5 , 000
4
5 , 000
4
5 ,000
45 ,000
4
5 ,000
4
4 ,999
44 ,999
44 ,999
44 ,999
44 ,999
4
4 ,999
44 , 999
d
a
d
a
d
a
d
d
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
1
5 ,000
1
5 ,000
1
5 , 000
1
5 ,000
1
5 ,000
1
5 ,000
1
5 ,000
1
5 ,000
1
4 ,999
1
4 ,999
1
4 ,999
1
4 ,999
1
4 ,999
1
4 , 999
1
4 ,999
.
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
Ilth
12th
13th
14th
15th
. . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
674 ,993
" 1 . If you permit the large fraction in one State to choose a representative for one o
f
the small fractions in another State , you take from the latter its election ,which consti
tutes real representation , and substitute a virtual representation o
f
the disfranchised
fractions ; and th
e
tendency o
f
the doctrine o
f virtual representation has been too well
discussed and appreciated b
y
reasoning and resistance , on a former great occasion , to
need development now .
“ 2 . The bill does not say that it has given th
e
residuary representatives to th
e
great
e
st
fractions ; though , in fact , it has done so . It seems to have avoided establishing
that into a rule , lest it might not suit on another occasion . Perhaps it may be
found the next time more convenient to distribute them among the smaller States ; a
t
another time among the larger States ; a
t
other times according to any other crotchet
which ingenuity may invent , and the combination o
f
the day give strength to carry ; o
r
they may d
o it arbitrarily , b
y
open bargain and cabal . In short , this construction in
troduces into Congress a scramble o
r
a vendue for the surplus members . It generates
waste o
f
time ,hot blood , and may at some time , when the passions are high , extend
a disagreement between the two houses , to the perpetual loss of the thing , as happens
now in Pennsylvania assembly ; whereas the other construction reduces th
e
appor .
tionment always to a
n
arithmetical operation , about which no two men ca
n
possibly
differ .
" 3 . It leaves in full force the violation of the precept which declares that representa
11 Black . Comm . 181 .
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seems , the king intimated his wish previously , in order to avoid
the necessity of a refusal ; and it was acceded to . The very
tives shall b
e apportioned among the States according to their numbers , that is , by some
common ratio .
“ Viewing this bill either as a violation of the Constitution o
r
a
s giving a
n
inconrenient
exposition to it
s
words , is it a case wherein the President ought to interpose hi
s
negative ?
I think it is .
" 1 . The non -user of hi
s
negative begins already to excite a belief that n
o
President
will ever venture to use it ; and , consequently , has begotten a desire to raise u
p
barriers
in the State legislatures against Congress throwing o
ff
the control o
f
the Constitution .
“ 2 . It can never be used more pleasingly to the public than in the protection of the
Constitution .
“ 3 . No invasions of the Constitution are so fundamentally dangerous as the tricks
played o
n
their own numbers , apportionment , and other circumstances respecting them
selves , and affecting their legal qualifications to legislate for the Union .
“ 4 . The majorities b
y
which this bill has been carried ( to wit , of one in the Senate
and two in theHouse o
f Representatives ) show how divided the opinions were there .
“ 5 . The whole of both houses admit the Constitution will bear the other exposition ;
whereas theminorities in both deny itwill bear that of the bill .
“ 6 . The application of any one ratio is intelligible to the people , and will , therefore ,
b
e approved ; whereas the complex operations of this bill will never be comprehended
b
y
them ; and , though they may acquiesce , they cannot approve what they d
o not un
derstand . ”
Mr . Webster ' s report on the same subject , in the Senate in April , 1832 , presents the
leading arguments o
n
the other side .
“ This bill , like al
l
laws on the same subject , must be regarded a
s
o
f
a
n interesting
and delicate nature . It respects the distribution of political power among th
e
States o
f
the Union . It is to determine the number of voices which , for ten years to come , each
State is to possess in the popular branch o
f
the legislature . In the opinion of the com
mittee , there can be fe
w
o
r
n
o questions which it is more desirable should be settled on
just , fair , and satisfactory principles than this ; and , availing themselves of the benefit
o
f
the discussion which the bill has already undergone in the Senate , they have given to
it a renewed and anxious consideration . The result is , that , in their opinion , the bill
ought to be amended . Seeing the difficulties which belong to the whole subject , they
are fully convinced that the bill has been framed and passed in the other house , with
the sincerest desire to overcome those difficulties , and to enact a law which should do as
much justice a
s possible to all the States . But the committee are constrained to say ,
that this object appears to them not to have been attained . The unequal operation of
the bill o
n some o
f
the States , should it become a law , seems to the committee most
manifest ; and they cannot but express a doubt ,whether its actual apportionment of the
representative power among the several States can b
e
considered a
s
conformable to the
spirit o
f
the Constitution . The bill provides that , from and after the 3
d o
f
March ,
1833 , the House of Representatives shall be composed of members , elected agreeably to
a ratio o
f
one representative for every forty -seven thousand and seven hundred persons
in cach State , computed according to the rule prescribed b
y
the Constitution . The
addition o
f
the seven hundred to the forty -seven thousand , in the composition of this
ratio , produces no effectwhatever in regard to the constitution o
f
the House . It neither
adds to , nor takes from , the number o
f
members assigned to any State . Its only effect
is a reduction o
f
the apparent amount o
f
the fractions , as they are usually called , or
1 C
o
m
. Dig . Parliament , E . 5 ; 4 Instit . 8 , Lex . Parl . ch . 12 , p . 74 .
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language used by the speakers in former times , in order to pro
cure the approval of the crown , was such as would not now be
residuary members , after the application of the ratio . For al
l
other purposes , the result
is precisely the same a
s if the ratio had been 47 ,000 .
“ As it seems generally admitted that inequalities d
o
exist in this bill , and that inju
rious consequences will arise from its operation which it would be desirable to avert , if
any proper means o
f averting them without producing others equally injurious could
b
e
found , the committee do not think it necessary to g
o
into a full and particular state
ment o
f
these consequences . They will content themselves with presenting a few ex
amples only o
f
these results , and such as they find it most difficult to reconcile with
justice and the spirit o
f
the Constitution .
“ In exhibiting these examples , the committee must necessarily speak of particular
States ; but it is hardly necessary to say , that they speak o
f
them a
s examples only , and
with themost perfect respect , not only for the States themselves , but for all those who
represent them here .
“ Although the bill does not commence b
y
fixing the whole number o
f
the proposed
House o
f Representatives , yet the process adopted b
y
it brings out the number of two
hundred and forty members . Of these two hundred and forty members , forty are
assigned to the State o
f
New York , that is to say , precisely one sixth part of the whole .
This assignment would seem to require that New York should contain one sixth part
the whole population o
f
the United States , and would be bound to pay one sixth part
o
f
all her direct taxes . Yet neither of these is the case . The whole representative
population o
f
the United States is 1
1 ,929 ,005 ; that of New York is 1 ,918 ,623 , which is
less than one sixth o
f
the whole b
y
nearly 7
0 ,000 . Of a direct tax of two hundred and
forty thousand dollars , New York would pay only $ 38 . 59 . But if , instead of compar
ing the numbers assigned to New York with the whole numbers o
f
the house , we com
pare her with other States , the inequality is still more evident and striking .
“ T
o
the State o
f
Vermont the bill assigns five members . It gives , therefore , eight
times a
smany representatives to New York as to Vermont ; but the population of New
York is not equal to eight times the population o
f
Vermont b
y
more than three hun
dred thousand . Vermont has five members only for 280 ,657 persons . If the same pro
portion were to b
e applied to New York , it would reduce the number o
f
her members
from forty to thirty -four , making a difference more than equal to the whole representa
tion o
f
Vermont , and more than sufficient to overcome her whole power in the House of
Representatives .
“ A disproportion almost equally striking is manifested , if we compare New York
with Alabama . The population of Alabama is 262 ,208 ; fo
r
this , she is allowed five
members . The rule of proportion which gives to her but five members for her number
would give to New York but thirty - si
x
for her number . Yet New York receives forty .
As compared with Alabama , then , New York has an excess of representation equal to
four fifths o
f
thewhole representation of Alabama ; and this excess itself will give her ,
o
f
course , asmuch weight in the House as the whole delegation of Alabama , within a
single vote . Can it be said , then , that representatives are apportioned to these States
according to their respectivenumbers ?
“ The ratio assumed b
y
the bill , itwill be perceived , leaves large fractions , so called ,
o
r residuary numbers , in several of the small States , to the manifest loss of a part o
f
their just proportion o
f representative power . Such is the operation of the ratio in this
respect , that New York , with a population less than that of New England b
y
thirty o
r
thirty -five thousand , has y
e
t
two more members than a
ll
the New England States ; and
there are seven States in the Union whose members amount to the number o
f
123 ,
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tolerated ; and indicated at least a disposition to undue subser
viency . A similar power of approval existed in the royal gov
being a clear majority o
f
the whole House ,whose aggregate fractions altogether amount
only to fifty -three thousand ; while Vermont and New Jersey , having together but
eleven members , have a joint fraction o
f seventy - five thousand .
" Pennsylvania b
y
the bill will have , as it happens , just as many members as Ver
mont , New Hampshire , Massachusetts , and New Jersey ; but her population is not
equal to theirs b
y
a hundred and thirty thousand ; and the reason of this advantage ,
derived to her from the provisions o
f
the bill , is , that her fraction , or residuum , is twelve
thousand only ,while theirs is a hundred and forty - four .
“ But the subject is capable of being presented in a more exact and mathematical
form . The House is to consist of two hundred and forty members . Now , the precise
proportion o
f power , out o
f
the whole mass represented b
y
the numbers two hundred
and forty , which New York would b
e
entitled to according to her population , is 3
8
. 5
9 ;
that is to say , she would be entitled to thirty -eight members , and would have a resid
uum , o
r
fraction ; and , even if a member were given her for that fraction , she would
still have but thirty -nine ; but the bill gives her forty .
“ These are a part , and but a part , of those results produced b
y
the bill in its present
form , which the committee cannot bring themselves to approve . While it is not to be
denied that , under any rule of apportionment , some degree of relative inequality must
always exist , the committee cannot believe that the Senate will sanction inequality and
injustice to the extent in which they exist in this bill , if they can be avoided . But
recollecting the opinions which had been expressed in the discussions o
f
the Senate , the
committee have diligently sought to learn whether there was not some other number
which might be taken for a ratio , the application o
f
which would work outmore justice
and equality . In this pursuit the committee have not been successful . There are , it is
true , other numbers , the adoption o
f
which would relieve many o
f
the States which
suffer under the present ; but this relief .would be obtained only b
y
shifting the pressure
o
n
to other States , thus creating new grounds o
f complaint in other quarters . The
number forty -four thousand has been generally spoken of as the most acceptable substi
tute for forty -seven thousand seven hundred ; but , should this b
e adopted , great relative
inequality would fall o
n
several States , and , among them , on some of the new and grow
ing States ,whose relative disproportion , thus already great ,would b
e constantly increas
ing . The committee , therefore , are of opinion that th
e
bill , should be altered in the
mode o
f apportionment . They think that the process which begins by assuming a
ratio , should be abandoned , and that the bill ought to be framed on the principle of the
amendment , which has been themain subject o
f
discussion before the Senate . The
fairness o
f
the principle o
f
this amendment , and the general equity of its results , com
pared with those which flow from the other process , seem plain and undeniable . The
main question has been ,whether the principle itself be constitutional ; and this question
the committee proceeded to examine , respectfully asking o
f
those who have doubted it
s
constitutional propriety , to deem the question of so much importance a
s
to justify a
second reflection .
“ The words o
f
the Constitution are , representatives and direct taxes shall be appor .
tioned among the several States which may b
e
included within this Union , according to
their respective numbers ,which shall be determined b
y
adding to the whole number o
f
free persons , including those bound to service for a term of years , and excluding In
dians , three fifths o
f
a
ll
other persons . The actual enumeration shall b
e
made within
1 See Christian ' s Note to i Black . Comm . 181 ; Comm . Dig . Parliament , E . 5 ; 1
Wilson ' s Law Lect . 159 , 160 ; 4 Co . Inst . 8 .
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ernors in many of the colonies before the Revolution . The ex
clusive right of choosing a speaker , without any appeal to , or
three years after th
e
first meeting o
f
the Congress o
f
the United States , and within
every subsequent term o
f
te
n
years , in such manner as they shall b
y
law direct . The
number o
f representatives shall not exceed one fo
r
every thirty thousand , but each State
shall have a
t
least one representative . '
“ There would seem to b
e
little difficulty in understanding these provisions . The
terms used are designed , doubtless , to be received in no peculiar or technical sense , but
according to their common and popular acceptation . To apportion is to distribute b
y
right measure , to set of
f
in just parts , to assign in due and proper proportion . These
clauses o
f
the Constitution respect not only the portions o
f power , but the portions o
f
the public burden , also , which should fall to the several States ; and the same language
is applied to both . Representatives are to b
e apportioned among the States according
to their respective numbers , and direct taxes are to b
e apportioned by the same rule .
The end aimed a
t
is , that representation and taxation should g
o
hand in hand ; that
each State should b
e represented in the same extent to which it is made subject to the
public charges b
y
direct taxation . But , between the apportionment of representatives
and the apportionment o
f
taxes there necessarily exists one essential difference . Rep
resentation , founded : on numbers ,must have some limit ; and , being from its nature a
thing not capable o
f
indefinite subdivision , it cannot be made precisely equal . A ta
x ,
indeed , cannot always o
r
often b
e apportioned with perfect exactness ; a
s , in othermat
ters o
f
account , there will be fractional parts o
f
the smallest coins and the smallest de
nomination o
f money o
f
account , yet , by the usual subdivisions o
f
the coin and o
f
the
denomination o
f money , the apportionment of taxes is capable o
f being made so exact
that the inequality becomes minute and invisible . But representation cannot be thus
divided . Of representation , there can be nothing less than one representative ; nor , b
y
our Constitution , more representatives than one for every thirty thousand . It is quite
obvious , therefore , that the apportionment of representative power can never be precise
and perfect . There must always exist some degree of inequality . Those who framed
and those who adopted the Constitution were , of course , fully acquainted with this ne
cessary operation o
f
the provision . In the Senate , the States are entitled to a fixed
number o
f
senators ; and , therefore , in regard to their representation in that body
there is no consequential or incidental inequality arising . But , being represented in
the House o
f Representatives according to their respective numbers o
f people , it is
unavoidable that , in assigning to each State its number o
f
members , the exact propor
tion o
f
each , out of a given number , cannot always or often be expressed in whole
numbers ; that is to say , it will not often be found that there belongs to a State exactly
one tenth o
r
one twentieth o
r
one thirtieth o
f
the whole House ; and , therefore , no
number o
f representatives will exactly correspond with the right o
f
such State , or the
precise share o
f representation which belongs to it , according to its population .
“ The Constitution , therefore ,must be understood , not as enjoining an absolute rel .
ative equality , - because that would be demanding an impossibility , - but as requiring
o
f Congress to make the apportionment o
f representatives among the several States ,
according to their respective numbers , as near as may b
e . That which cannot be done
perfectly must be done in a manner a
s
near perfection a
s
can b
e . If exactness can
not , from the nature o
f things , be attained , then the greatest practicable approach to
exactness ought to be made .
“ Congress is not absolved from all rule ,merely because the rule of perfect justice
cannot b
e applied . In such a case , approximation becomes a rule ; it takes the place
o
f
that other rule ,which would be preferable , but which is found inapplicable , and
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approval by , any other department of the government , is an
improvement upon the British system . It secures a more in
becomes , itself , an obligation of binding force . The nearest approximation to exact
truth o
r
exact right , when that exact truth or that exact right cannot itself be reached ,
prevails in other cases , not as matter of discretion , but as an intelligible and definite
rule , dictated b
y
justice , and conforming to the common -sense of mankind ; a rule of
no less binding force in cases to which it is applicable , and no more to b
e departed
from , than any other rule or obligation .
“ The committee understand the Constitution a
s they would have understood it , if
it had said , in so many words , that representatives should be apportioned among the
States , according to their respective numbers , a
s
near a
s may b
e
. If this be not its true
meaning , then it has either given , on this most delicate and important subject , a rule
which is always impracticable , o
r
else it has given n
o
rule a
t
a
ll ; because , if the rule
b
e
that representatives shall b
e apportioned exactly according to numbers , it is imprac
ticable in every case ; and if , for this reason , that cannot be the rule , then there is no
rule whatever , unless the rule b
e
that they shall b
e apportioned a
s
near a
smay b
e
.
“ This construction , indeed , which the committee adopt , has not , to their knowl
edge , been denied ; and they proceed in the discussion of the question before the Sen
ate , taking for granted that such is the true and undeniable meaning of the Constitu
tion .
“ The next thing to be observed is , that the Constitution prescribes no particular
process b
y
which this apportionment is to b
e wrought out . It has plainly described the
end to be accomplished , namely , the nearest approach to relative equality o
f represen
tation among the States ; and whatever accomplishes this end , and nothing else , is the
true process . In truth , if without any process whatever , whether elaborate or easy ,
Congress could perceive the exact proportion o
f representative power rightfully belong
ing to each State , it would perfectly fulfil its duty b
y
conferring that portion o
n
each ,
without reference to any process whatever . It would be enough , that the proper end
had been attained . And it is to be remarked further , that , whether this end be attained
best b
y
one process o
r b
y
another , becomes , when each process has been carried
through ,not matter of opinion , but matter ofmathematical certainty . If th
e
whole
population o
f
the United States , the population of each State , and the proposed number
o
f
the House o
f Representatives be a
ll given , then , between two bills apportioning
the members among the several States , it can be told ,with absolute certainty ,which
bill assigns to any and every State the number nearest to the exact proportion of that
State ; in other words , which o
f
the two bills , if either , apportions the representatives
according to the numbers in the States , respectively , as near a
smay be . If , therefore ,
a particular process o
f apportionment b
e adopted , and objection be made to the injus
tice o
r inequality o
f
it
s
result , it is , surely , no answer to such objection to say that the
inequality necessarily results from the nature o
f
the process . Before such answer could
avail , itwould be necessary to show , either that the Constitution prescribes such pro
cess , and makes it necessary , or that there is no other mode of proceeding which would
produce less inequality and less injustice . If inequality which might have otherwise
been avoided b
e produced b
y
a given process , then that process is a wrong one . It is
not suited to the case , and should be rejected .
“ Nor d
o
the committee perceive how it can b
e
matter o
f
constitutional propriety o
r
validity , o
r
in any way a constitutional question , whether the process which may b
e
applied to the case b
e simple o
r compound , one process or many processes ; since , in
the end , it may always be seen whether the result be that which has been aimed a
t ,
namely , the nearest practicable approach to precise justice and relative equality . The
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dependent and unlimited choice on th
e
part o
f
the House , ac
cording to the merits of the individual , and their own sense of
committee , indeed , are o
f opinion , in this case , that the simplest and most obvious way
o
f proceeding is also the true and constitutional way . To them it appears , that , in
carrying into effect this part o
f
the Constitution , the first thing naturally to be done is ,
to decide o
n
th
e
whole number o
f
which the House is to b
e composed ; as when , under
the same clause o
f
the Constitution , a tax is to be apportioned among the States , the
amount o
f
the avhole tax is , in the first place , to be settled .
“ When the whole number o
f
the proposed House is thus ascertained and fixed , it
becomes the entire representative power o
f
a
ll
the people in the Union . It is then a very
simple matter to ascertain how much o
f
this representative power each State is entitled
to b
y
it
s
numbers . If , for example , the House is to contain two hundred and forty
members , then the number two hundred and forty expresses the representative power o
f
a
ll
the States ; and a plain calculation readily shows how much of this power belongs
to each State . This portion , it is true , will not always , nor often , be expressed in
whole numbers , but it may always be precisely exhibited b
y
a decimal form o
f
expression .
If the portion of any State be seldom , or never , one exact tenth , one exact fifteenth , or
one exact twentieth , itwill still always be capable of precise decimal expression , as one
tenth and two hundredths , one twelfth and four hundredths , one fifteenth and si
x
hun
dredths , and so on ; and the exact portion of the State ,being thus decimally expressed ,
will always show , to mathematical certainty , what integral number comes nearest to
such exact portion . For example , in a House consisting o
f
two hundred and forty
members , the exact mathematical proportion to which her numbers entitle the State o
f
New York is 3
8 . 59 ; it is certain , therefore , that thirty -nine is th
e
integral o
r
whole
number nearest to her exact proportion o
f
the representative power o
f the Union .
Why , then , should she not have thirty -nine ? and why should she have forty ? She is
not quite entitled to thirty -nine ; that number is something more than her right . But
allowing her thirty -nine , from the necessity of giving her whole numbers , and because
that is the nearest whole number , is not the Constitution fully obeyed , when she has
received the thirty -ninth number ? Is not her proper number of representatives then
apportioned to her , as near as may be ? And is not the Constitution disregarded ,when
the bill goes further , and gives her a fortieth member ? For what is such a fortieth
member given ? Not for her absolute numbers ; for her absolute numbers do not enti
tl
e
her to thirty -nine . Not for the sake of apportioning her members to her numbers ,
a
s
near a
s may b
e ; because thirty -nine is a nearer apportionment o
f
members to num
bers than forty . But it is given , say the advocates o
f
the bill , because the process which
has been adopted gives it . The answer is , no such process is enjoined by the Constitu
tion .
“ The case o
f
New York may b
e compared o
r
contrasted with that o
f
Missouri .
The exact proportion o
f
Missouri , in a general representation of two hundred and forty ,
is two and si
x
tenths ; that is to say , it comes nearer to threemembers than to two , yet
it is confined to two . But why is not Missouri entitled to that number of representa
tives which comes nearest to her exact proportion ? Is the Constitution fulfilled a
s
to
her , while that number is with held , and while at the same time in another State ,not
only is that nearest number given , but an additional member given also ? Is it an
answer with which the people o
fMissouri ought to be satisfied , when it is said that this
obvious injustice is the necessary result o
f
the process adopted by the bill ? May they
not s
a
y
with propriety , that , since three is the nearest whole number to their exact right ,
to that number they are entitled , and the process which deprives them o
f
it must b
e
a
wrong process ? A smilar comparison might b
e
made between New York and Vermont .
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duty . It avoids those inconveniences and collisions which
might arise from the interposition of a negative in times of
The exact proportion to which Vermont is entitled , in a representation of two hundred
and forty , is 5 .646 . Her nearest whole number , therefore , would be six . Now , two
things are undeniably true : first , that to take away the fortieth member from New York
would bring her representation nearer to her exact proportion than it stands b
y
leaving
her that fortieth member . Secondly , that giving tho member thus taken from New
York to Vermont would bring her representation nearer to her exact right than it is
b
y
the bill . And both these propositions are equally true of a transfer of the twenty
eighth member assigned b
y
the bill to Pennsylvania , to Delaware , and o
f
the thirteenth
member assigned to Kentucky , to Missouri ; in other words , Vermont has , b
y
her num
bers , more right to six members than New York has to forty . Delaware , b
y
her num
bers , has more right to two members than Pennsylvania has to twenty -eight ; and Mis
souri , b
y
her numbers , has more right to three members than Kentucky has to thirteen .
Without disturbing the proposed number o
f
the House , themere changing o
f
these three
members , from and to the si
x
States respectively , would bring th
e
representation o
f
the whole six nearer to their due proportion according to their respective numbers than
the bill , in it
s present form , makes it . In the face o
f
this indisputable truth , how can
it be said that the bill apportions members of Congress among those States , according
to their respective number , a
s
near a
s may b
e
?
“ The principle o
n
which the proposed amendment is founded is a
n
effectual correc
tive for these and all other equally great inequalities . Itmay be applied at all times
and in all cases , and it
s
results will always be the nearest approach to perfect justice .
It is equally simple and impartial . As a rule o
f apportionment , it is little other than a
transcript o
f
the words o
f
the Constitution , and its results are mathematically certain .
The Constitution , as the committee understand it , says , representatives shall be appor
tioned among the States , according to their respective numbers o
f people , a
s
near a
s
may b
e . The rule adopted b
y
the committee says , out of the whole number of the
House , that number shall be apportioned to each State which comes nearest to its exact
right , according to its number of people .
“ Where is the repugnancy between the Constitution and the rule ? The arguments
against the rule seem to assume that there is a necessity o
f instituting some process
adopting some number a
s
the ratio , or as that number of people which eachmember
shall b
e
understood to represent ; but the committee see no occasion for any other pro
cess whatever than simply the ascertainment o
f that quantum , out o
f
thewhole mass o
f
the representative power , which each State may claim .
“ But it is said , that although a State may receive a number of representatives which
is something less than it
s
exact proportion o
f representation , yet that it can in no case
constitutionally receive more . How is this proposition proved ? How is it shown that
the Constitution is less perfectly fulfilled b
y
allowing a State a small excess , than by
subjecting her to a large deficiency ? What the Constitution requires , is the nearest
practicable approach to precise justice . The rule is approximation ; and w
e
ought to
approach , therefore , on whichever side we can approach nearest .
“ But there is still a more conclusive answer to be given to this suggestion . The
whole number o
f representatives of which the House is to be composed is , of necessity ,
limited . This number , whatever it is , is that which is to be apportioned , and nothing
else can b
e apportioned . This is the whole sum to be distributed . If , therefore , in
making the apportionment , some States receive less than their just share , itmust neces
sarily follow that some other States have received more than their just share . If there
b
e
one State in the Union with less than it
s right , some other State has more than its
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high party excitement . It extinguishes a constant source of
jealousy and heartburning ; and a disposition on one side to
right, so that the argument ,whatever be its force , applies to the bill in its present form
a
s strongly as it can ever apply to any bill .
“ But the objection most usually urged against the principle of the proposed amend
ment is , that it provides fo
r
the representation o
f
fractions . Let this objection be ex
amined and considered . Let it be ascertained , in the first place , what these fractions , o
r
fractional numbers , or residuary numbers really are ,which , it is said , will be repre
sented should the amendment prevail .
“ A fraction is the broken part o
f
some integral number . It is , therefore , a relative
o
r
derivative idea . It implies the previous existence of some fixed number of which it
is but a part o
r
remainder . If there be no necessity for fixing or establishing such pre
vious number , then the fraction resulting from it is itself not matter of necessity , but
matter o
f
choice o
r
accident . Now , the argument which considers the plan proposed
in the amendment a
s
a representation o
f
fractions , and therefore unconstitutional ,
assumes a
s
it
s
basis that , according to the Constitution , everymember of the House of
Representatives represents , or ought to represent , the same , or nearly the same number
o
f
constituents ; that this number is to be regarded as an integer ; and anything less
than this is , therefore , called a fraction or a residuum , and cannot be entitled to a repre
sentative . But nothing of this is prescribed by the Constitution o
f
the United States .
That Constitution contemplates n
o integer o
r any common number for the constituents
o
f
a member o
f
the House o
f Representatives . It goes not at al
l
into these subdivisions
o
f
the population o
f
a State . It provides fo
r
th
e
apportionment o
f representatives among
theseveral States, according to their respective numbers , and stops there . It makes no
provision for the representation o
f
districts , of States , o
r
fo
r
the representation o
f any
portion o
f
the people o
f
a State , less than th
e
whole . It says nothing of ratios or of
constituent numbers . All these things it leaves to State legislation . The rightwhich
each State possesses to it
s
own due portion o
f
the representative power is a State right ,
strictly ; it belongs to the State , as a State , and it is to be used and exercised as the
State may see fi
t , subject only to the constitutional qualifications o
f
electors . In fact ,
the States d
o
make , and always have made , different provisions fo
r
th
e
exercise o
f
this
power . In some , a single member is chosen fo
r
a certain defined district ; in others ,
two o
r
three members are chosen fo
r
th
e
same district ; and in some , again , as New
Hampshire , Rhode Island , Connecticut , New Jersey , and Georgia , the entire represen
tation o
f
the State is a joint , undivided representation . In these last -mentioned States ,
every member o
f
the House o
f Representatives has for his constituents all the people o
f
the State ; and all the people of those States are consequently representedin that branch
o
f Congress . If the bill before the Senate should pass into a law , in its present form ,
whatever injustice it might d
o
to any o
f
those States , it wonld not be correct to say
o
f
them , nevertheless , that any portion o
f
their people was unrepresented . The well
founded objection would b
e , as to some of them at least , that they were not adequately ,
competently , fairly represented ; that they had not as many voices and as many votes
in the House o
f Representatives a
s they were entitled to . This would be the objection .
There would b
e
n
o unrepresented fractions ; but the State , as a State , as a whole , would
b
e deprived o
f
some part o
f
it
s just rights .
“ On the other hand , if the bill should pass , as it is now proposed to be amended ,
there would b
e
n
o representation o
f
fractions in any State ; for a fraction supposes &
division and a remainder . All that could justly be said would be that some of these
States , as States , possessed a portion o
f legislative power , a little larger than their exact
right ; a
s
it must be admitted that , should the bill pass unamended , they would possess
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exert an undue influence , and on the other to assume a hostile
opposition . It relieves the executive department from al
l
the
o
f
that power much less than that exact right . The same remarks are substantially
true , if applied to those States which adopt the district system , a
s
most o
f
them d
o
. In
Missouri , for example , there will b
e
n
o
fraction unrepresented , should the bill become a
law in its present form ; nor any member for a fraction , should the amendment prevail ;
because the mode o
f apportionment , which assigns to each State that number which is
nearest to it
s
exact right , applies no assumed ratios ,makes no subdivisions , and , of
course , produces no fractions . In the one case or in the other , the State , as a State ,will
have something more o
r something less than it
s
exact proportion o
f representative
power ; but she will part out this power among her own people , in either case , in such
mode a
s
she may choose , or exercise it altogether as an entire representation of the
people o
f
the State .
" Whether the subdivision o
f
the representative power within any State , if there be a
subdivision , be equal or unequal , or fairly or unfairly made , Congress cannot know ,and
has n
o authority to inquire . It is enough that the State presents her own representa
tion o
n
the floor o
f Congress in themode she chooses to present it . If a State were to
give to one portion o
f
her territory a representative fo
r
every twenty - five thousand per
sons ,and to the rest a representative only for every fifty thousand , it would be an act of
unjust legislation , doubtless , but it would be wholly beyond redress b
y
any power in
Congress ; because the Constitution has left all this to the State itself .
“ These considerations , it is thought ,may show that th
e
Constitution has not , b
y
any
implication o
r necessary construction , enjoined that which it certainly has not ordained
in terms , viz . , that every member o
f
the House shall be supposed to represent the same
number o
f
constituents ; and therefore , that the assumption o
f
a ratio , a
s representing
the common number o
f
constituents , is not called for b
y
the Constitution . All that Con
gress is a
t liberty to do , a
s
it would seem , is to divide the whole representative power o
f
the Union into twenty -four parts , assigning onepart to each State , as near as practicable
according to it
s right , and leaving all subsequent arrangement and all subdivisions to
the State itself .
“ If the view thus taken of the rights of the States and the duties of Congress be the
correct view , then the plan proposed in the amendment is in no just sense a represen
tation o
f
fractions . But suppose it was otherwise ; suppose a direct division were
made for allowing a representative to every State , in whose population , it being first
divided by a common ratio , there should be found a fraction exceeding half the amount
o
f
that ratio , what constitutional objection could be fairly urged against such a provis
io
n
? Let it b
e always remembered that th
e
case here supposed provides only fo
r
a frac
tion exceeding themoiety o
f
the ratio ; fo
r
the committee admit a
t
once that the repre
sentation o
f
fractions , less than a moiety , is unconstitutional ; because , should a mem
ber b
e
allowed to a State for such a fraction , it would be certain that her representation
would not b
e
so near her exact right a
s
it was before . But the allowance o
f
a member
for a major fraction is a direct approximation towards justice and equality . There
appears to the committee to b
e nothing , either in the letter or the spirit of the Consti
tution , opposed to such a mode of apportionment . On the contrary , it seems entirely
consistent with the very object which the Constitution contemplated , and well calculated
to accomplish it . The argument commonly urged against it is , that it is necessary to
apply some one common divisor , and to abide b
y
it
s
results .
“ If b
y
this it be meant that there must be some common rule , or common measure ,
applicable , and applied impartially to all the States , it is quite true . But , if that which
is intended b
e , that the population o
f
each State must b
e
divided b
y
a fixed ratio , and
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embarrassments of opposing the popular will ; and the House from
all the irritation of not consulting the cabinet wishes .
a
ll resulting fractions , great or small , disregarded , this is but to take fo
r
granted the
very thing in controversy . The question is , whether it be unconstitutional to make
approximation to equality b
y
allowing representatives for major fractions . The affirm
ative o
f
this question is , indeed , denied ; but it is not disproved b
y
saying that w
e
must
abide b
y
the operation o
f
division , by an assumed ratio , and disregard fractions . The
question still remains a
s it was before ; and it is still to be shown what there is in the
Constitution which rejects approximation a
s
the rule o
f apportionment . But suppose
it be necessary to find a divisor , and to abide its results . What is a divisor ? Not ne
cessarily a simple number . It may b
e composed o
f
a whole number and a fraction ; it
may itself b
e
the result o
f
a previous process ; itmay be anything , in short , which pro
duces accurate and uniform division ; whatever does this is a common rule , a common
standard , o
r , if the word be important , a common divisor . The committee refer , on this
part o
f
the case , to some observations b
y
Professor Dean , with a table , both of which
accompany this report .
“ As it is not improbable that opinion has been a good deal influenced on this sub
ject b
y
what took place o
n
the passing o
f
th
e
first act making a
n apportionment o
f rep
resentatives among the States , the committee have examined and considered that prece
dent . If it be in point to the present case , it is certainly entitled to very great weight ;
but if it be of questionable application , the text of the Constitution , even if it were
doubtful , could not be explained b
y
a doubtful commentary . In the opinion of the
committee , it is only necessary that what was said on that occasion should be under
stood in connection with the subject matter then under consideration ; and in order to
see what that subject matter really was , the committee think it necessary to state ,
shortly , the case .
“ The two houses o
f Congress passed a bill , after the first enumeration o
f
the people ,
providing for a House o
f Representatives which should consist of one hundred and
twenty members . The bill expressed no rule o
r principle by which these members
were assigned to the several States . Itmerely said , that New Hampshire should have
five members , Massachusetts te
n , and so on ; going through all the States , and assign
ing th
e
whole number o
f
one hundred and twenty . Now , by the census , then recently
taken , it appeared that the whole representative population of the United States was
3 ,615 ,920 ; and it was evidently the wish of Congress to make the House as numerous
a
s
the Constitution would allow . But the Constitution has said that there should not
b
e
more than one member for every thirty thousand persons . This prohibition was , o
f
course , to be obeyed ; but did the Constitution mean that no States should have more
than one member for every thirty thousand persons ? o
r
did it only mean that the whole
House , as compared with the whole population of the United States , should not contain
more than one member for every thirty thousand persons ? If this last were the true
construction , then the bill , in that particular , was right ; if the first were the true con
struction , then it was wrong ; because so many members could not be assigned to the
States without giving to some o
f
them more members than one for every thirty thou
sand . In fact , the bill did propose to do this in regard to several States .
“ President Washington adopted that construction o
f
the Constitution which applied
it
s prohibition to each State individually . He thought that no State could , constitution
ally , receive more than one member fo
r
every thirty thousand o
f
her own population .
On this , therefore , his main objection to the bill was founded . That objection he states
in thesewords : -
" The Constitution has also provided that the number o
f representatives shall not
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$ 688 . The other power, the sole power of impeachment , has a
far wider scope and operation . An impeachment , as described
exceed one for every thirty thousand ; which restriction is, by the context , and by fair
and obvious construction , to be applied to the separate and respective numbers of the
States ; and the bill has allotted to eight of the States more than one for every thirty
thousand .'
“ It is now necessary to se
e
what there was further objectionable in this b
ill . The
number o
f
one hundred and twelve members was a
ll
that could b
e
divided among the
States without giving to some o
f
them more than one member for thirty thousand in
habitants . Therefore , having allotted these one hundred and twelve , there still remained
eight o
f
the one hundred and twenty to b
e assigned ; and these eight the bill assigned
to the States having the largest fractions . Some of these fractions were large , and
some were small . No regard was paid to fractions over a moiety of the ratio , any
more than to fractions under it . There was n
o
rule laid down , stating what fractions
should entitle the States , to whom theymight happen to fall , or in whose population
they might happen to be found , to a representative therefor . The assignment was not
made o
n
the principle that each State should have a member for a fraction greater than
half the ratio ; or that all the States should have a member fo
r
a fraction , in all cases
where the allowance o
f
such member would bring her representation nearer to it
s
exact
proportion than it
s
disallowance . There was no common measure or common rule
adopted , but the assignment was matter of arbitrary discretion . A member was
allowed to New Hampshire fo
r
example , for a fraction of less than one half the ratio ,
thus placing her representation further from her exact proportion than it was without
such additional member ; while a member was refused to Georgia , whose case closely
resembled that o
f
New Hampshire , both having what were thought large fractions , but
both still under a moiety o
f
the ratio , and distinguished from each other only b
y
a very
slight difference o
f
absolute numbers . The committee have already fully expressed
their opinion o
n
such a mode o
f apportionment .
“ In regard to this character o
f
the bill , President Washington said : “ The Constitu
tion has prescribed that representatives shall b
e apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers ; and there is no one proportion , or divisor ,
which , applied to the respective numbers o
f
the States , will yield the number and allot
ment o
f representatives proposed b
y
the bill . '
“ This was a
ll undoubtedly true , and was , in the judgment of the committee , a deci
sive objection against the bill . It is nevertheless to be observed , that the other objec
tion completely covered the whole ground . There could , in that bill , be no allowance
fo
r
a fraction , great or small ; because Congress had taken for the ratio th
e
lowest num
ber allowed by the Constitution , viz . , thirty thousand . Whatever fraction a State might
have less than that ratio , n
o
member could b
e
allowed for it . It is scarcely necessary
to observe that n
o
such objection applies to the amendment now proposed . No State ,
should the amendment prevail , will have a greater number of members than one fo
r
every thirty thousand ; nor is it likely that that objection will ever again occur . The
whole force o
f
the precedent , whatever it be , in its application to the present case , is
drawn from the other objection . And what is the true import of that objection ? Does
it mean anything more than that the apportionment was not made o
n
a common rule
o
r principle , applicable and applied alike to all the States ?
“ President Washington ' s words are , there is no one proportion or divisor , which ,
applied to the respective numbers o
f
the States , will yield the number and allotment of
representatives proposed b
y
the bill . '
“ If , then , he could have found a common proportion , it would have removed this
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in the common la
w
o
f England , is a presentment b
y
the house
o
f
commons , the most solemn grand inquest of the whole king
objection . He required a proportion , or divisor . These words he evidently uses as
explanatory o
f
each other . He meant b
y
divisor , therefore , no more than b
y
proportion .
What he sought was , some common and equal rule b
y
which the allotment had been
made among the several States ; he did not find such common rule ; and on that
ground h
e thought the bill objectionable .
" In the opinion o
f
the committee , no such objection applies to the amendment
recommended b
y
them . That amendment gives a rule ,plain , simple , just , uniform , and
o
f
universal application . The rule has been frequently stated . It may be clearly
expressed in either o
f
two ways . Let the rule be , that the whole number of the pro
posed House shall b
e apportioned among the several States according to their respec
tive numbers , giving to each State that number o
f
members which comes nearest to
her exact mathematical part , o
r proportion ; or , le
t
the rule b
e , that the population o
f
each State shall b
e
divided b
y
a common divisor , and that , in addition to the number
o
f
members resulting from such division , a member shall be allowed to each State
whose fraction exceeds a moiety o
f
the divisor .
“ Either of these is , it seems to the committee , a fair and just rule , capable of uni
form application , and operating with entire impartiality . There is no want of a com
mon proportion o
r
a common divisor ; there is nothing left to arbitrary discretion .
If the rule , in either of these forms , be adopted , it can never be doubtful how every
member o
f any proposed number for a House o
f
Representatives ought to b
e assigned .
Nothing will be left in the discretion of Congress ; the right of each State will be a
mathematical right , easily ascertained , about which there can be neither doubt nor
difficulty ; and , in the application of the rule , there will be no room fo
r
preference ,
partiality , or injustice . In any case , in all time to come it will d
o a
ll
that human
means can d
o , to allot to every State in th
e
Union it
s proper and just proportion o
f
representative power . And it is because of this , its capability of constant application ,
a
s
well a
s
because o
f
it
s impartiality and justice , that the committee are earnest in
recommending it
s adoption to Congress . If it shall b
e adopted , they believe it will
remove a cause o
f
uneasiness and dissatisfaction recurring , or liable to recur , with
every new census , and place the rights of the States , in this respect , on a fixed basis ,
o
f
which none can with reason complain . It is true , that there may be some numbers
assumed for the composition o
f
the House o
f Representatives , to which , if the rule were
applied , the result might give a member to the House more than was proposed . But it
will be always easy to correct this , b
y
altering the proposed number b
y
adding one to it
o
r taking one from it ; so that this can b
e
considered n
o objection to the rule .
“ The committee , in conclusion , cannot admit that it is sufficient reason for rejecting
this mode o
f apportionment , that a different process has heretofore prevailed . The
truth is , the errors and inequalities of that process were at first not obvious and start
ling . But they have gone on increasing ; they are greatly augmented and accumu
lated every new census ; and it is o
f
the very nature o
f the process itself , that its unjust
results must grow greater and greater in proportion a
s
the population o
f the country
enlarges . What was objectionable , though tolerable yesterday , becomes intolerable to
morrow . A change , the committee are persuaded , must come , o
r
the whole just
balance and proportion o
f representative power among the States will be disturbed and
broken u
p
. "
Mr . Everett also made a very able speech on the same subject , in which he pressed
some additional arguments with great force o
n
the same side . See his printed speech
o
f
17th May , 1832 . (Although this report did not become the basis o
f
the apportion
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dom , to th
e
house o
f
lords , the most high and supreme court of
criminal jurisdiction of the kingdom . The articles o
f impeach
ment are a kind o
f bill of indictment found b
y
the commons , and
tried b
y
the lords , who are , in cases of misdemeanors , considered ,
not only as their own peers , but as the peers of the whole nation .
The origin and history o
f
the jurisdiction of Parliament , in cases
o
f impeachment , are summarily given b
y
Mr . Woodeson ; but lit
tl
e
can be gathered therefrom which is now o
f
much interest , and ,
like most other legal antiquities , they are involved in great ob
scurity . To what classes o
f
offenders this applies , will be more
properly an inquiry hereafter . In the Constitution of the United
States , the House of Representatives exercises the functions o
f
the
ment in 1832 , yet it was actually adopted as the basis , in the apportionment in 1842 ,
under the new census . By the Act of 22d of June , 1842 , the ratio was adopted of
7
0 ,680 , and each State was declared entitled to a
s many representatives a
s
it
s
Federal
population would give divided b
y
that number , and also to one additional member
upon the remaining fraction , if it
s population exceeded half of that number . - E . H . B .
[ The apportionment fo
r
the ten years following the census o
f
1870 was not provided for
until after the census had been made and returned , and was not then made on any basis
which was declared o
r
indicated therein . The apportionment fixed the whole num
ber o
f representatives a
t
two hundred and eighty -three , and then proceeded to appor
tion them a
s
follows : To Maine , five ; New Hampshire , two ; Vermont , (wo ; Massa
chusetts , eleven ; Rhode Island , two ; Connecticut , four ; New York , thirty -two ; New
Jersey , seven ; Pennsylvania , twenty - six ; Delaware , one ; Maryland , six ; Virginia ,
nine ; North Carolina , eight ; South Carolina , five ; Georgia , nine ; Alabama , seven ;
Mississippi , si
x ; Louisiana , five ; Ohio , twenty ; Kentucky , te
n
; Tennessee , nine ;
Indiana , twelve ; Illinois , nineteen ; Missouri , thirteen ; Arkansas , four ; Michigan ,
nine ; Florida , one ; Texas , six ; Iowa , nine ; Wisconsin , eight ; California , four ; Min
nesota , three ; Oregon , one ; Kansas , three ; West Virginia , three ; Nevada , one ;
Nebraska , one . The States dissatisfied with this apportionment afterwards procured a
supplementary act , which gave an additional representative to the following States
respectively : New Hampshire , Vermont , New York , Pennsylvania , Indiana , Tennes
see , Louisiana , Alabama , and Florida ,making a total o
f
two hundred and ninety -two
representatives for a representative population o
f
3
8 ,113 , 253 . Any test applied to this
apportionment will show that it is made in disregard o
f
the rule alike o
f Mr . Jefferson
and o
f Mr . Webster , and that the inequalities under it are very serious .
The Act first named provided that in 1876 and thereafter elections throughout the
Union for representatives should be held uniformly o
n
the Tuesday next after the first
Monday o
f
November . It also declared that no State shall hereafter be admitted to
the Union without having the necessary population to entitle it to at least one represent
ative " according to the ratio o
f representation fixed b
y
this bill . ” This is a prohibi
tion which any subsequent Congress will obey or not at its option ; but if an attempt
should b
e
made to conform to it , there might be room for serious difference o
f opinion
regarding it
s
construction . Does it mean that the new State must have at least
130 ,000 representative population , which is abont th
e
average fo
r
the whole Union ,
o
r
would 9
3 ,824 , which is the number for each representative in Florida , be sufficient ? ]
1 2 Hale ' s P
l
. C
r
. 150 ; 4 Black . Comm . 259 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 165 , 166 .
2 4 Black . Comm . 260 . 3 2 Woodeson ' s Lect . 40 , p . 596 , & c .
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house of commons in regard to impeachments ; and the Senate
(as we shall hereafter see ) the functions of the house of lords in
relation to the trial of the party accused . The principles of the
common la
w , so fa
r
a
s the jurisdiction is to b
e
exercised , are
deemed o
f primary obligation and government . The object of pros
ecutions o
f
this sort in both countries is to reach high and potent
offenders , such as might be presumed to escape punishment in the
ordinary tribunals , either from their own extraordinary influence ,
o
r
from the imperfect organization and powers o
f
those tribunals . 1
These prosecutions are , therefore , conducted b
y
the representatives
o
f
the nation , in their public capacity , in the face of the nation ,
and upon a responsibility which is a
t
once felt and reverenced
b
y
the whole community . The notoriety of the proceedings , the
solemn manner in which they are conducted , the deep extent to
which they affect the reputations o
f
the accused , the ignominy of a
conviction which is to be known through all time , and the glory
o
f
a
n acquittal which ascertains and confirms innocence , — these
are all calculated to produce a vivid and lasting interest in the pub
lic mind , and to give to such prosecutions , when necessary , a vast
importance , both as a check to crime and an incitement to virtue .
$ 689 . This subject will be resumed hereafter , when the other
provisions o
f
the Constitution , in regard to impeachments , come
under review . It does not appear that the vesting of the power of
impeachment in the House o
f Representatives was deemed a mat
ter o
f
serious doubt or question , either in the convention or with
the people . If the true spirit of the Constitution is consulted , it
would seem difficult to arrive at any other conclusion than of its
fitness . It is designed as a method o
f
national inquest into the
conduct of public men . If such is the design , who can so properly
b
e the inquisitors fo
r
the nation as the representatives o
f
the peo
ple themselves ? They must be presumed to be watehful o
f
the
interests , alive to the sympathies , and ready to redress the griev
ances , of the people . If it is made their duty to bring official
delinquents to justice , they can scarcely fail of performing it with
out public denunciation and political desertion on the part of their
constituents .
1 4 Black . Comm . 26
0
; Rawle on the Constitution , ch . 22 , p . 210 , 21
1
; 2 Woode
son ' s Lect . 40 , p . 596 , & c .
2 Rawle o
n
the Constitution , ch . 22 , p . 209 .
8 Journal of Convention , p . 69 , 121 , 137 , 225 , 226 , 236 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 43 , 44
45 , 4
6
.
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CHAPTER X .
THE SENATE .
$ 690 . The third section o
f
the first article relates to the organ
ization and powers o
f
the Senate .
$691 . In considering the organization of the Senate , our in
quiries naturally lead u
s
to ascertain , first , the nature of the rep
resentation and vote o
f
the States therein ; secondly , the mode o
f
appointment ; thirdly , the number o
f
the senators ; fourthly , their
term o
f
service ; and , fifthly , their qualifications .
$692 . The first clause of the third section is in th
e
following
words : “ The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two senators from each State , chosen b
y
the legislature thereof fo
r
six years ; and each senator shall have one vote . ”
$ 693 . In the first place , the nature of th
e
representation and
vote in the Senate . Each State is entitled to two senators ; and
each senator is entitled to one vote . This , of course , involves in
the very constitution o
f
this branch of the legislature a perfect
equality among all the States , without any reference to their
respective size , population , wealth , or power . In this respect
there is a marked contrast between the Senate and the House of
Representatives . In the latter , there is a representation of the
people according to the relative population o
f
each State upon a
given basis ; in the former , each State in its political capacity is
represented upon a footing o
f perfect equality , like a congress of
sovereigns or ambassadors , or like an assembly of peers . The
only difference between it and the continental congress under the
old confederation is , that in this the vote was b
y
States ; in the
Senate each senator has a single vote . So that , though they rep
resent States , they vote as individuals . The vote of the Senate
thus may , and often does , become a mixed vote , embracing a part
o
f
the senators from some o
f
the States on one side , and another
part on the other .
$ 694 . It is obvious that this arrangement could only arise
from a compromise between independent States ; and it must have
been less the result o
f theory than “ o
f
a spirit of amity , and of
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mutual deference and concession ,which the peculiarity of the si
t
uation o
f
the United States rendered indispensable . " i It consti
tuted one o
f
the great struggles between the large and the small
States ,which was constantly renewed in th
e
convention , and im
peded it in every step o
f
it
s progress in the formation o
f
the Con
stitution . The struggle applied to the organization of each branch
o
f
the legislature . The small States insisted upon an equality of
vote and representation in each branch ; and the large States upon
a vote in proportion to their relative importance and population .
Upon this vital question there was so near a balance o
f
the States
that a Union in any form o
f government which provided either
fo
r
a perfect equality or inequality o
f
the States in both branches
o
f
the legislature became utterly hopeless . If the basis of the
Senate was an equality o
f representation , the basis of the House
must b
e
in proportion to the relative population o
f
the States . A
compromise was , therefore , indispensable , o
r
the convention must
b
e
dissolved . The small States at length yielded th
e
point as to
a
n equality o
f representation in the House , and acceded to a rep
resentation proportionate to the federal numbers . But they in
sisted upon an equality in the Senate . To this the large States
were unwilling to assent ; and for a time the States were , on this
point , equally divided . Finally , the subject was referred to a
committee , who reported a scheme which became , with some
amendments , the basis of the representation as it now stands .
$ 695 . The reasoning b
y
which each party in the convention
supported it
s
own project naturally grew out o
f
the relative situa
tion and interests o
f
their respective States . On the side of the
small States it was urged that the general government ought to
b
e partly federal and partly national , in order to secure a just
balance o
f power and sovereignty and influence among the
States . This is the only means to preserve small communities ,
when associating with larger , from being overwhelmed and anni
1 Letter o
f
th
e
Convention , 17th of Sept . 1787 ; 1 Kent , Comm . $ 11 , p . 21
0
, 211 .
2 2 Pitkin ' s Hist . 233 , 245 , 247 , 248 ; Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 68 , 74 , 75 ,
8
1 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 92 ; Id . 99 , 100 , 101 ; Id . 107 , 108 , 112 to 124 ; Id . 125 , 126 , 127 ; 1
Elliot ' s Debates , 66 .
3 2 Pitkin ' s Hist . 233 , 245 ; Journal o
f
the Convention , 112 .
4 On this subject see the Journal o
f
the Convention , 111 , 112 , 153 to 158 , 162 , 178 ,
180 , 235 , 236 , 237 , 238 ; Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , from 68 to 127 .
52 Pitkin ' s Hist . 245 ; Journal of Convention , 2d July , p . 156 , 158 ; Id . 162 , 175 ,
178 , 180 , 211 ; Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 124 to 127 ; 2 Amer . Museum , 379 .
6 i Elliot ' s Debates , 67 ; Journal of Convention , 157 .
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hilated . The large States , under other circumstances , would nat
urally pursue their own interests , and b
y
combinations usurp the
prerogatives , or disregard the rights , o
f
the smaller . Hitherto all
th
e
States had held a footing of equality ; and no one would now
b
e willing to surrender it . The course now proposed would allay
jealousies and produce tranquillity . Any other would only per
petuate discontents and lead to disunion . There never was a
confederacy formed where an equality of voice was not a funda
mental principle . It would be a novel thing in politics , in such
cases , to permit the few to control the many . The large States ,
upon the present plan , have a full security . The small States
must possess the power o
f
self -defence , or they are ruined .
$ 696 . On the other hand , it was urged that to give an equality
o
f
vote to a
ll
the States was adopting a principle o
f gross injustice
and inequality . It is not true that al
l
confederacies have been
founded upon the principle of equality . It was not so in the
Lycian confederacy . Experience has shown that the old confed
eration is radically defective , and a national government is indis
pensable . The present plan will defeat that object . Suppose the
first branch grants money ; the other branch ( the Senate ) might ,
from mere State views , counteract it . In Congress , the single
State o
f
Delaware prevented an embargo a
t
the time when a
ll
the
other States thought it absolutely necessary for the support of the
army . In short , the Senate will have the power b
y
it
s negative o
f
defeating a
ll
laws . If this plan prevails , seven States will control
the whole ; and yet these seven States are , in point o
f population
and strength , less than one third of the Union . So that two thirds
are compellable to yield to one third . There is no danger to the
small States from the combination of the large ones . A rivalry ,
rather than a confederacy ,will exist among them . There ca
n
b
e
n
o monarchy ; and an aristocracy is more likely to arise from a
combination o
f
the small States . There are two kinds of bad
governments ; the one which does to
o
much , and is therefore
oppressive , and the other which does to
o
little , and is therefore
weak . The present plan will fasten the latter upon the country .
The only reasonable principle on which to found a general govern
ment is , that the decision shall be by a majority of members , and
not o
f
States . No advantage can possibly be proposed b
y
the large
States b
y
swallowing u
p
the smaller . The like fear existed in
Scotland a
t
the time o
f tl . e union with England ; but it has turned
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out to be wholly without foundation . Upon the present plan , the
smaller States may swallow up the larger . It was added by one
most distinguished statesman , (what hashitherto proved prophet
ically too true,) that the danger was not between the small and the
large States . “ The great danger to our general government is,
the great southern and northern interests of this continent being
opposed to each other . Look to the votes in Congress , and most
of them stand divided by the geography of the country ,not accord
ing to the size of the States .” 2
$697 . Whatever may now be thought of the reasoning of the
contending parties, no person who possesses a sincere love of
country , and wishes fo
r
the permanent union o
f
the States , can
doubt that the compromise actually made was well founded in
policy , and may now be fully vindicated upon the highest princi
ples o
f political wisdom , and the true nature of the government
which was intended to be established .
$ 698 . It may not be unprofitable to review a few of the
grounds upon which this opinion is hazarded . In the first place ,
the very structure of the general government contemplated one
partly federal and partly national . It not only recognized the
existence o
f
the State governments ,but perpetuated them , leaving
them in the enjoyment o
f
a large portion o
f
the rights o
f sov
ereignty , and giving to the general government a few powers , and
those only which were necessary fo
r
national purposes . The gen
eral government was , therefore , upon the acknowledged basis , one
o
f limited and circumscribed powers ; the States were to possess
the residuary powers . Admitting , then , that it is right , among
a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation , that every dis
trict o
f territory ought to have a proportional share of th
e
govern
ent ; and that among independent States , bound together by a
simple league , there ought , on the other hand , to be an equal
share in the common councils , whatever might be their relative
size o
r strength , ( both o
f
which propositions are not easily con
troverted , ) it would follow that a compound republic , partaking
o
f
the character o
f
each , ought to be founded on a mixture of pro
1 Mr . Madison . (See also Life and Writings of James Iredell , 11 . 25
8
, 285 . )
2 This summary is abstracted principally from Yates ' s Minutes o
f
the Debates , and
Luther Martin ' s Letter and Speech , January 27 , 1788 . SeeMartin ' s Letter in 4 Elliot ' s
Debates , 1 to 55 . See Yates ' s Minutes in 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 68 ; Id . 74 , 75 , 81 , 89 to
9
2 , 99 to 102 , 107 , 108 , 112 to 127 ; 2 Pitkin ' s Hist . 233 to 248 . See also The Fed .
eralist , No . 22 .
502 [BOOK II .CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
portional and of equal representation . The legislative power
being that which is predominant in all governments ought to be ,
above all, of this character ; because there can be no security for
the general government or the State governments , without an
adequate representation , and an adequate check of each in the
functions of legislation . Whatever basis , therefore, is assumed
fo
r
one branch o
f
the legislature , the antagonist basis should be
assumed for the other . If the House is to be proportional to the
relative size and wealth and population o
f
the States , the Senate
should be fixed upon an absolute equality as the representative o
f
State sovereignty . There is so much reason and justice and
security in such a course , that it ca
n
with difficulty be overlooked
b
y
those who sincerely consult the public good , without being
biassed b
y
the interests o
r prejudices o
f
their peculiar local posi
tion . The equal vote allowed in the Senate is , in this view , at
once a constitutional recognition o
f
the sovereignty remaining in
the States and an instrument fo
r
the preservation o
f
it . It guards
them against (what theymeant to resist , as improper ) a consoli
dation o
f
the States into one simple republic ; 2 and , on the other
hand , the weight of the other branch counterbalances an undue
preponderance o
f
State interests , tending to disunion .
$699 . Another and most important advantage arising from this
ingredient is the great difference which it creates in the elements
o
f
the two branches o
f
the legislature , which constitutes a great
desideratum in every practical division o
f
the legislative power . 3
In fact , this division ( as has been already intimated ) is of little or
no intrinsic value , unless it is so organized that each can operate
a
s
a real check upon undue and rash legislation . If each branch
is substantially framed upon the same plan , the advantages o
f
the
division are shadowy and imaginative ; the visions and specula
tions o
f
the brain , and not the waking thoughts of statesmen or
patriots . It may be safely asserted that , fo
r
a
ll
the purposes of
liberty , and security , of stable laws and of solid institutions , of
personal rights , and of the protection of property , a single branch
is quite a
s good a
s
two , if their composition is the same and their
spirits and impulses the same . Each will ac
t
a
s
the other does ;
1 The Federalist , No . 62 ; 2 Amer .Museum , 376 , 379 .
The Federalist , No . 62 ; Rawle o
n
Constit . 36 , 37 ; 1 Kent , Comm . Lect . 1
1 , p .
210 , 211 ; 2 Amer . Museum , 376 , 379 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 195 .
8 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 146 , 147 , 148 .
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and each will be le
d b
y
the same common influence o
f
ambition
o
r intrigue or passion to the same disregard o
f
th
e
public inter
ests , and the same indifference to , and prostration of , private
rights . It will only be a duplication of the evils of oppression
and rashness , with a duplication of obstructions to effective re
dress . In this view , the organization of the Senate becomes of
inestimable value . It represents the voice , not of a district , but
o
f
a State ; not of one State , but of al
l ; not of the interest of one
State , but of al
l
; not o
f
the chosen 'pursuits of a predominant
population in one State , but of al
l
the pursuits in all the States .
$ 700 . It is a misfortune incident to a republican government ,
though in a less degree than to other governments , that those who
administer itmay forget their obligations to their constituents ,
and prove unfaithful to their trusts . In this point of view , a
senate , as a second branch of legislative power distinct from , and
dividing power with , the first ,must always operate as a salutary
check . It doubles the security to the people , b
y
requiring the
concurrence o
f
two distinct bodies in any scheme o
f usurpation o
r
perfidy , where otherwise the ambition of a single body would be
sufficient . The improbability o
f
sinister combinations will always
b
e
in proportion to th
e
dissimilarity o
f
th
e
genius of the two
bodies ; and therefore every circumstance consistent with harmony
in a
ll proper measures ,which points out a distinct organization of
the component materials o
f
each , is desirable . ?
$ 701 . No system could , in this respect , be more admirably
contrived to insure due deliberation and inquiry , and just results
in a
ll
matters o
f legislation . No law or resolution can be passed
without the concurrence first , of a majority of the people , and then
o
f
a majority of the States . The interest and passions and preju
dices o
f
a district are thus checked b
y
the influence of a whole
State ; the like interests and passions and prejudices of a State ,
o
r
o
f
a majority o
f
the States , are met and controlled b
y
th
e
voice
o
f
the people o
f
the nation . Itmay be thought that this compli
cated system o
f
checks may operate , in some instances , inju
riously as well a
s beneficially . But if it should occasionally work
unequally o
r injuriously , its general operation will be salutary and
useful . 3 The disease most incident to free governments is the
i The Federalist , No . 62 .
3 Id . No . 27 .
8 The Federalist , No . 69 ; Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 63 , 64 ; 2 Wilson ' s
Law Lect . 146 , 147 , 148 .
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facility and excess of lawmaking ; ? and while it never can be the
permanent interest of either branch to interpose any undue re
straint upon th
e
exercise of a
ll
fi
t legislation , a good law had
better occasionally fail , rather than bad laws be multiplied with a
heedless and mischievous frequency . Even reforms , to be safe ,
must , in general , be slow ; and there can be little danger that
public opinion will not sufficiently stimulate a
ll public bodies to
changes which are a
t
once desirable and politic . All experience
proves that the human mind ismore eager and restless for changes
than tranquil and satisfied with existing institutions . Besides , the
large States will always be able , b
y
their power over the supplies ,
to defeat any unreasonable exertions o
f
this prerogative b
y
the
smaller States .
$ 702 . This reasoning , which theoretically seems entitled to
great weight , has , in the progress of the government , been fully
realized . It has not only been demonstrated that the Senate , in
it
s
actual organization , is well adapted to the exigencies of the
nation , but that it is a most important and valuable part of the
system , and the real balance -wheel which adjusts and regulates its
movements . The other auxiliary provisions in the same clause ,
a
s to the mode o
f appointment and duration of office , will be
found to conduce very largely to the same beneficial end . 3
$ 703 . Secondly , the mode of appointment of the senators .
They are to b
e
chosen b
y
the legislature o
f
each State . Three
schemes presented themselves a
s
to the mode of appointment :
one was b
y
the legislature of each State ; another was b
y
the
people thereof ; and a third was b
y
the other branch of the na
tional legislature , either directly or out o
f
a select nomination .
The last scheme was proposed in the convention , in what was
called the Virginia scheme , one of the resolutions declaring “ that
the members o
f
the second branch (the Senate ) ought to be elected
b
y
those o
f the first ( the House o
f Representatives ) out o
f
a
proper number nominated b
y
the individual legislatures ” ( o
f
the
States ) . It met , however , with no decided support , and was
negatived , no State voting in its favor , nine States voting against
it , and one being divided . The second scheme , of an election by
1 The Federalist , No . 62 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 212 , 21
3
.
3 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 148 .
8 The Federalist , No . 62 .
4 SeeMr . Randolph ' s fifth Resolution , Journ . of Convention , 67 , 86 ; Yates ' s Min
ates , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 58 , 5
9 .
CH. X.] 505THE SENATE .
the people in districts or otherwise , seems to have met with as
little favor . The first scheme, that of an election by the legis
lature , finally prevailed by an unanimous vote.
$ 704 . The reasoning by which this mode of appointment was
supported does not appear at large in any contemporary debates.
But it may be gathered from th
e
imperfect lights left u
s , that the
main grounds were that it would immediately connect the State
governments with the national government , and thus harmonize
the whole into one universal system ; that it would introduce a
powerful check upon rash legislation in a manner not unlike that
created by the different organizations of the house of commons
and the house o
f
lords in Great Britain ; and that itwould increase
public confidence b
y
securing the national government from undue
encroachments on the powers o
f
the States . The Federalist no
tices th
e
subject in the following brief and summary manner ,
which a
t
once establishes the general consent to the arrangement ,
and the few objections to which it was supposed to be obnoxious :
“ It is unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by
the State legislatures . Among the various modes which might
have been devised fo
r
constituting this branch o
f
the government ,
that which has been proposed b
y
the convention is probably the
most congenial with the public opinion . It is recommended b
y
the double advantage o
f favoring a select appointment and o
f
giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation
o
f
the Federal government as must secure the authority o
f
the
former , and may form a convenient link between the two sys
tems . " 4 This is very subdued praise , and indicates more doubts
than experience has a
s yet justified . 5
$ 705 . The Constitution has not provided fo
r
the manner in
which the choice shall be made b
y
the State legislatures , whether
b
y
a joint or b
y
a concurrent vote ; the latter iswhereboth branches
form one assembly and give a united vote numerically , the former
is where each branch gives a separate and independent vote . As
1 Journal o
f
Convention , 105 , 106 , 130 ; Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 58 , 59 ,
63 , 6
4 , 9
9
to 103 .
2 Journ . of Convention , 105 , 106 , 147 , 207 , 217 , 238 ; Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s
Debates , 6
3 , 6
4
.
8 Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 62 , 63 ,64 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 49 .
4 The Federalist , Nos . 62 , 27 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 211 .
6 See also The Federalist ,No . 27 .
6 Rawle o
n
Constit . 37 ; Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 211 , 212 .
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each o
f
the State legislatures now consists o
f
two branches , this
is a very important practical question . Generally , but not univer
sally , the choice of senators ismade b
y
a concurrent vote . 1 An
other question might b
e suggested , whether the executive consti
tutes a part o
f
the legislature for such a purpose in cases where
the State constitution gives him a qualified negative upon the laws .
But this has been silently and universally settled against the
executive participation in the appointment .
$ 7
0
6
. Thirdly , the number of senators . Each State is entitled
to two senators . It is obvious that to insure competent knowl
edge and ability to discharge all the functions intrusted to the
senate , ( of which more will be said hereafter , ) it is indispensable
that it should consist of a number sufficiently large to insure a
sufficient variety o
f
talents , experience , and practical skill fo
r
the
discharge o
f
a
ll
their duties . The legislative power alone , for its
enlightened and prudent exercise , requires ( as has been already
shown ) no small share of patriotism and knowledge and ability .
In proportion to the extent and variety o
f
the labors o
f legislation ,
there should b
e
members who should share them in order that
there may b
e
a punctual and perfect performance o
f
them . If
the number be very small , there is danger that some of the proper
duties will be overlooked or neglected or imperfectly attended to .
No human genius or industry is adequate to al
l
the vast concerns
o
f government , if it be not aided b
y
the power and skill of num
bers . The Senate ought , therefore , on this account alone , to be
somewhat numerous , though it need not and indeed ought not , for
other reasons , to be as numerous as the House . Besides , numbers
are important to give to the body a sufficient firmness to resist the
influence which the popular branch will ever be solicitous to exert
over them . A very small body is more easy to be overawed and
intimidated and controlled b
y
external influences than one o
f
a reasonable size embracing weight o
f
character and dignity o
f
talents . Numbers alone in many cases confer power ; and ,
what is of not less importance , they present more resistance
to corruption and intrigue . A body of five may be bribed or orer
borne , when a body of fifty would be an irresistible barrier to
usurpation .
11 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 211 , 212 . Mr . Chancellor Kent says , in his Com .
mentaries , ( 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 212 , ) that in New York the senators are elect
e
d b
y
a joint vote , if the two houses do not separately concur . But his own opinion
is , that the true construction of the Constitution upon principle is , that it should be b
y
a concurrent vote . ( It is now regulated b
y
act o
f Congress o
f July 25 , 1866 . ]
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$ 707 . In addition to this consideration , it is desirable that a
State should not be wholly unrepresented in the national councils
by mere accident , or by the temporary absence of its representa
tive . If there be but a single representative , sickness or casualty
may deprive the State o
f
it
s
vote on the most important occasions .
It was on this account ( a
s
well as others ) that the confederation
entitled each State to send not less than two nor more than seven
delegates . In critical cases , too , it might be of great importance
to have an opportunity o
f consulting with a colleague or colleagues
having a common interest and feeling for the State . And if it be
not always in the strictest sénse true that in the multitude of
counsel there is safety , there is a sufficient foundation in the
infirmity o
f
human nature to make it desirable to gain the advan
tage of the wisdom and information and reflection o
f
other inde
pendent minds not laboring under the suspicion o
f
any unfavor
able bias . These reasons may be presumed to have had their
appropriate weight in the deliberations of th
e
convention . If
more than one representative of a State was to be admitted into
the Senate , the least practicable ascending number was that
adopted . At that time a single representative of each State
would have made the body too small for all the purposes o
f
its
institution and a
ll
the objects before explained . It would have
been composed but o
f
thirteen , and , supposing no absences , which
could not ordinarily be calculated upon , seven would constitute a
majority to decide all the measures . Twenty - six was not at that
period too large a number for dignity , independence , wisdom ,
experience , and efficiency . And at the present moment ,when the
States have grown to twenty -four , it is found that forty -eight is a
number quite small enough to perform the great national functions
confided to it , and to embody the requisite skill and ability to
ineet the increased exigencies and multiplied duties o
f
the office .
There is probably n
o legislative body on earth whose duties are
more various and interesting and important to the public welfare ,
and none which calls fo
r
higher talents and more comprehensive
attainments and more untiring industry and integrity .
$ 708 . In the convention there was a considerable diversity of
1 Mr . Tucker , (the learned Commentator on Blackstone , ) in 1803 , said : “ The whole
number o
f
senators is a
t present limited to thirty -two . It is not probable that it will
ever exceed fifty . ” ( 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 223 . ) How strangely has our na
tional growth already outstripped a
ll
human calculation !
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opinion a
s
to the number o
f
which the Senate should consist , and
the apportionment o
f
the number among the States . When the
principle o
f
a
n equality o
f representation was decided , the only
question seems to have been whether each State should have three
o
r
two members . Three was rejected by a vote of nine States
against one ; and two inserted b
y
a vote o
f nine States against
one . It does not appear that any proposition was ever enter
tained for a less number than two ; and the silence of a
ll public
discussion on this subject seems to indicate that the public opinion
decidedly adopted the lowest number under the confederation to
be the proper number , if an equality of representation was to be
admitted into the Senate . Whatever may be the future increase
o
f
States in the Union , it is scarcely probable that the number
will ever exceed that which will fit the Senate for the best per
formance of a
ll
its exalted functions . The British house of lords
a
t
this moment probably exceeds any number which will ever
belong to the American Senate ; and yet ,notwithstanding the exag
gerated declamation o
f
a few ardent minds , the sober sense of the
nation has never felt that its number was either a burden or an
infirmity inherent in the Constitution . 2
$ 709 . Fourthly , the term of service of the senators . It is for
si
x years , although , as will be presently seen , another element in
th
e
composition o
f
that body is , that one third of it is changed
every two years .
What would be the most proper period of office for senators
was an inquiry admitting o
f
a still wider range of argument and
opinion than what would be the most proper fo
r
the members o
f
the House o
f Representatives . The subject was confessedly one
full of intricacy and doubt upon which the wisest statesmen might
well entertain very different views , and the best patriots might
well ask for more information , without in the slightest degree
bringing into question their integrity , their love of liberty , or their
1 Journal of Convention , 23d July , 189 . See also Id . 156 , 162 , 175 , 178 , 180 , 198 .
? See the remarks quoted in 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 223 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law
Lect . 150 . In 1803 the house of lords was said to be composed of about 220 ; it now
probably exceeds 350 . [ In 1872 , including eleven minors , it contained four princes of
the blood , two archbishops , twenty dukes , nineteen marquises , one hundred and te
n
earls , twenty -three viscounts , twenty -four bishops , two hundred and thirty -two barons ,
nineteen Scottish representative peers , and twenty -eight Irish representative peers .
Total , four hundred and eighty -nine , or , deducting theminors , four hundred and seventy
eight . ]
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devotion to a republican government . If, in the present day, the
progress of public opinion and the lights of experience furnish us
with materials fo
r
a decided judgment , w
e
ought to remember that
the question was then free to debate , and th
e
fi
t
conclusion was
not easily to b
e
seen o
r justly to b
e
measured . The problem to
b
e
solved b
y
the great men o
f
that day was , what organization o
f
the legislative power in a republican government is best adapted
to give permanency to the Union and security to public liberty .
In the convention , a great diversity of judgment was apparent
among those whose purity and patriotism were above all suspi
cion , and whose talents and public services were equally unques
tionable . Various propositions were entertained ; that the period
o
f
service o
f
senators should b
e during good behavior , for nine
years , fo
r
seven years , fo
r
si
x years , for five years , fo
r
four years ,
fo
r
three years . All these propositions successively failed , except
that for seven years , which was eventually abandoned for si
x
years , with the additional limitation that one third should g
o
out
biennially . 2
$ 710 . No inconsiderable array of objections was brought to
bear against this prolonged term o
f
service o
f
the senators beyond
that fixed fo
r
th
e
members o
f
the House o
f Representatives , both
in the convention and before the people , when the Constitution
1 Journ . of Convention , 11
8 , 13
0 , 147 , 14
8 ; Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 70 ,
71 , 103 , 104 , 105 , 106 .
? Journ . of Convention , 67 , 72 , 118 , 130 , 147 , 148 , 149 , 207 , 217 , 238 , 35
3
, 373 ;
Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 70 , 71 , 103 , 104 , 105 , 10
6
. Montesquieu seems to
have been decidedly o
f opinion that a senate ought to be chosen for life , as was the
custom a
t
Rome , a
t Sparta , and even a
t
Athens . (Montesquieu ' s Spirit o
f
Laws , B . 5 ,
ch . 7 . ) It is well known that this was Gen . Hamilton ' s opinion ; or rather his proposi
tion was , that the senators should be chosen to serve during good behavior . ( Journ . of
Convention , p . 130 ; North American Review , Oct . 1827 , 266 . ) It appears to have
been that o
f Mr . Jay . (North American Review , Oct . 1827 , p . 263 . ) Mr . Madison ' s
original opinion seems to have been , to have a Senate chosen for a longer term than the
House o
f Representatives . (North American Review , Oct . 1827 , p . 265 . ) But in the
convention , it is said that he was favorably inclined to Mr . Hamilton ' s plan . ( 2 Pit
kin ' s Hist . 259 , note . ) In a question o
f
so much difficulty and delicacy a
s
the due
formation o
f
a government , it is not at all surprising that such opinions should have
been held b
y
them and many others o
f
the purest and most enlightened patriots .
They wished durability and success to a republican government , and were , therefore ,
urgent to secure it against the imbecility resulting from what they deemed to
o
frequent
changes in the administration o
f
it
s powers . To hold such opinions was not then
deemed a just matter o
f reproach , though from the practical operations of the Constitu
tion they may now b
e
deemed unsound . (For Hamilton ' s views see , further , 2 Hamil
to
n
' s Works , 398 ; 5 Elliot ' s Debates , 203 – 205 ; Curtis , Hist . of Const . Vol . 2 , 100 ;
and fo
r
Madison ' s , Life of Madison by Rives , Vol . 2 , 367 . )
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nder their
advisen o
f
manywho easily
persuade
was under their advisement . Perhaps some of those objections
still linger in the minds o
fmany who entertain a general jealousy
o
f
the powers o
f
the Union ; and who e ily persuade themselves ,
o
n that account , that power should frequently change hands in
order to prevent corruption and tyranny . The perpetuity of a
body ( it has been said ) is favorable to every stride it may be dis
posed to make towards extending its own power and influence in
the government . Such a tendency is to be discovered in all
bodies , however constituted , and to which no effectual check can
b
e opposed but frequent dissolutions and elections . The truth
o
f
this remark may be admitted ; but there are many circum
stances which may justly vary it
s
force and application . While ,
o
n the one hand , perpetuity in a body may be objectionable , on
the other hand , continual fluctuations may be no less so ,with ref
erence to it
s
duties and functions , its powers and its efficiency .
There are dangers arising from to
o great frequency in elections , as
well as from to
o
small . The path of true wisdom is probably best
attained b
y
a moderation which avoids either extreme . Itmay be
said o
f
too much jealousy and of to
o
much confidence , that ,when
either is to
o
freely admitted into public councils , it betrays like
treason .
$ 711 . It seems paradoxical to assert , ( as has been already in
timated , ) but it is theoretically aswell as practically true , that a
deep -felt responsibility is incompatible with great frequency of
elections . Men can feel little interest in power which slips away
almost as soon a
s it is grasped ; and in measures which they can
scarcely do more than begin , without hoping to perfect . Few
measures have an immediate and sensible operation exactly
according to their wisdom o
r policy . For the most part , they
are dependent upon other measures , or upon time , and gradual
intermixtures with the business o
f
life and the general institu
tions o
f society . The first superficial view may shock popular
prejudices o
r
errors ,while the ultimate results may be as admi
rable and excellent as they are profound and distant . Who can
take much interest in weaving a single thread into a measure
which becomes an evanescent quantity in the main fabric , whose
texture requires constant skill , and many adaptations from the same
hand , before its perfection can be secured , or even be prophesied ?
1 2 American Museum , 547 . ? 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm .App . 196 .
3 S
e
e
ante , $ 589 , & c . on the same point . - The Federalist , N
o . 63 .
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$ 712 . The objections to the senatorial term of office all resolve
themselves into a single argument , however varied in its forms or
illustrations . That argument is , that political power is liable to be
abused , and that the great security for public liberty consists in
bringing home responsibility and dependence in those who are
intrusted with office ; and these are best attained b
y
short periods
o
f
office ,and frequent expressions of public opinion in the choice of
officers . If the argument is admitted in its most ample scope , it
still leaves the question open to much discussion , what is the
proper period o
f
office , and how frequent the elections should be .
This question must , in its nature , be complicated , and may admit ,
if it does not absolutely require , different answers , as applicable to
different functionaries . Without wandering into ingenious specu
lations upon the topic in it
s
most general form , our object will be
to present the reasons which have been , or may be , relied on , to
establish the sound policy and wisdom o
f
the duration o
f
office o
f
the senators a
s
fixed b
y
the Constitution . In so doing , it will
become necessary to glance a
t
some suggestions which have
already occurred in considering the organization o
f
the other
branch o
f
the legislature . It may be proper , however , to pre
mise that the whole reasoning applies to a moderate duration
only in office ; and that it assumes , as its basis , the absolute
necessity of short limitations o
f
office , as constituting indispen
sable checks to power in a
ll republican governments . It would
almost be useless to descant upon such a basis , because it is univer
sally admitted in the United States as a fundamental principle of
a
ll
their constitutions of government .
$ 713 . In the first place , then , al
l
the reasons which apply to
the duration o
f
the legislative office generally , founded upon the
advantages o
f
various knowledge and experience in the principles
and duties o
f legislation , may be urged with increased force in
regard to the Senate . A good government implies two things :
first , fidelity to the object of government ,which is th
e
happiness
o
f
th
e
people ; secondly , a knowledge of the means by which that
object is to be attained . Some governments are deficient in both
these qualities ; most ar
e
deficient in th
e
first . Some of our
wisest statesmen have not scrupled to assert , that in the American
governments too little attention has been paid to the latter . It is
utterly impossible for any assembly o
f
men , called for the most
1 The Federalist , No . 62 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 146 , 147 , 148 .
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part from the pursuits o
f private life , continued in appointment for
å short time , and led b
y
n
o permanent motive to devote the inter
vals o
f public occupation to th
e
study o
f
the nature and operations
o
f government , to escape from the commission of many errors in
the discharge of their legislative functions . In proportion to the
extent and variety of these functions , the national interests which
they involve , and the national duties which they imply , ought to
rise the intellectual qualifications and solid attainments o
f
the
members . Even in our domestic concerns ,what are our volumi
nous and ever -changing codes , but monuments of deficient wis
dom , hasty resolves , and still more hasty repeals ? What are
they ,but admonitions to the people of th
e
dangers of rash and
premature legislation , of ignorance that knows not its own mis
takes , or of overweening confidence which heeds not its own
follies ?
$ 714 . A well -constituted Senate , then , which should interpose
some restraints upon the sudden impulses o
f
a more numerous
branch , would , on this account , be of great value . But its value
would be incalculably increased b
y
making it
s
term o
f
office such
that , with moderate industry , talents , and devotion to the public
service , itsmembers could scarcely fail of having the reasonable
information which would guard them against gross errors ,and the
reasonable firmness which would enable them to resist visionary
speculations and popular excitements . If public men know that
they may safely wait fo
r
the gradual action o
f
a sound public
opinion to decide upon the merit of their actions and measures
before they can he struck down , they will be more ready to as
sume responsibility , and pretermit present popularity for future
solid reputation . If they are designed , b
y
the very structure of
the government , to secure the States against encroachments upon
their rights and liberties , this very permanence of office adds new
means to effectuate the object . Popular opinion may , perhaps , in
it
s
occasional extravagant sallies , a
t
the instance o
f
a fawning
demagogue o
r
a favorite chief , incline to overleap the constitu
tional barriers , in order to aid their advancement or gratify their
1 The Federalist , No . 62 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 65 , 66 ; Id . 269 to 284 ; 3 Elliot ' s
Debates , 50 , 51 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 152 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 212 .
? The Federalist , No . 62 .
8 The Federalist , No . 63 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 259 , 260 , 261 , 269 to 284 ; 2 Wilson ' s
Law Lect . 146 , 147 , 148 , 152 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 212 .
4 See 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 263 , 264 , 269 to 278 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 48 to 51 .
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ambition . But the solid judgment of a senate may stay the evil ,
if its own duration of power exceeds that of the other branches of
the government , or if it combines the joint durability of both . In
point of fact the Senate has this desirable limit . It combines the
period o
f
office o
f
the executive with that o
f
the members o
f
the
House ; while a
t
the same time , from its own biennial changes , ( as
we shall presently se
e , ) it is silently subjected to the deliberate
voice o
f
the States .
§ 715 . In the next place ,mutability in the public councils aris
ing from a rapid succession o
f
new members is found b
y experi
ence to work , even in domestic concerns , serious mischiefs . It is
a known fact in the history o
f
the States that every new election
changes nearly or quite one half of it
s representatives , and in
the national government changes less frequent or less numerous
can scarcely be expected . From this change of men there must
unavoidably arise a change o
f opinions , and with this change of
opinions a correspondent change o
f
measures . Now experience
demonstrates that a continual change even o
f
good measures is
inconsistent with every rule o
f prudence and every prospect o
f
success . In all human affairs time is required to consolidate the
elements o
f
the best concerted measures and to adjust the little
interferences which are incident to a
ll legislation . Perpetual
changes in public institutions not only occasion intolerable con
troversies and sacrifices o
f
private interests , but check the growth
o
f
that steady industry and enterprise which b
y
wise forecast lay
u
p
the means o
f
future prosperity . Besides , the instability of
public councils gives an unreasonable advantage to the sagacious ,
the cunning , and the moneyed capitalists . Every new regulation
concerning commerce , or revenue , or manufactures , or agriculture ,
o
r
in any manner affecting the relative value o
f the different
species o
f property , presents a new harvest to those who watch the
change and can trace the consequences , - a harvest which is torn
from the hand o
f
the honest laborer o
r
the confiding artisan to
enrich those who coolly look on to reap profit where they have
sown nothing . In short , such a state of things generates the
worst passions of selfishness and the worst spirit of gaming .
However paradoxical it may seem , it is nevertheless true , that in
affairs of government the best measures to be safe must be slowly
i The Federalist , No . 62 . 2 Id . No . 62 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . 21
2
, 21
3
.
9 The Federalist , No .62 .
VOL . I . 33
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introduced ; and the wisest councils are those which proceed b
y
steps and reach circuitously their conclusion . It is then impor
tant in this general view that all the public functionaries should
not terminate their offices a
t
the same period . The gradual inſu
sion o
f
new elements which may mingle with the ol
d
secures a
gradual renovation and a permanent union o
f
the whole .
$ 716 . But the ill effects o
f
a mutable government are still more
strongly felt in the intercourse with foreign nations . It forfeits
the respect and confidence o
f foreign nations and al
l
the advan
tages connected with national character . It not only lays its
measures open to the silent operations o
f foreign intrigue and
management , but it subjects its whole policy to be counteracted
b
y
the wiser and more stable policy o
f
it
s foreign rivals and
adversaries . One nation is to another what one individual is to
another , with this melancholy distinction , perhaps , that nations
with fewer benevolent emotions than individuals are under fewer
restraints also from taking undue advantages of the indiscretions
o
f
each other . If a nation is perpetually fluctuating in its meas
ures a
s
to the protection o
f agriculture , commerce , and manufac
tures , it exposes al
l
it
s
infirmities o
f purpose to foreign nations ,
and the latter with a systematical sagacity will sap all the founda
tions of it
s prosperity . From this cause under the confederation
America suffered the most serious evils . “ She finds , " said the
Federalist , with unusual bolduess and freedom , “ that she is held
in n
o respect by her friends , that she is the derision of her ene
mies , and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest
in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed a
f
fairs . "
§ 717 . Further , foreign governments can never safely enter into
any permanent arrangements with one whose councils and govern
ment are perpetually fluctuating . It was not unreasonable , there
fore , fo
r
them to object to the continental congress that they could
not guarantee the fulfilment o
f any treaty , and therefore it was
useless to negotiate any . To secure the respect of foreign nations
there must be power to fulfil engagements , confidence to sustain
them , and durability to insure their execution on the part of the
i The Federalist , No . 62 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 268 , 269 .
2 The Federalist , No . 62 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 269 , 270 to 273 ; 1 Kent ' s Comp . 212 ,
8 The Federalist , N
o
. 62 .
213 .
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government . National character in cases of this sort is inesti
mable . It is not sufficient that there should be a sense of justice
and disposition to act right ,but there must be an enlightened per
manency in the policy of the government . Caprice is just as
mischievous as folly , and corruption scarcely worse than perpetual
indecision and fluctuation . In this view , independent of its legis
lative functions , the participation of the Senate in the functions o
f
the executive in appointing ambassadors and in forming treaties
with foreign nations gives additionalweight to the reasoning in
favor o
f
it
s prolonged term o
f
service . A more full survey of its
other functions will make that reasoning absolutely irresistible , if
th
e
object is that they should be performed with independence ,
with judgment , and with scrupulous integrity and dignity .
$ 718 . In answer to all reasoning of this sort , it has been
strenuously urged that a senate , constituted , not immediately b
y
the people , for six years ,may gradually acquire a dangerous pre
eminence in the government , and eventually transform itself into
a
n aristocracy . Certainly such a case is possible , but it is scarcely
within the range o
f probability , while the people or the govern
ment are worthy o
f
protection o
r
confidence . Liberty may be
endangered b
y
the abuses o
f liberty as well a
s by the abuses of
power . There are quite as numerous instances o
f
the former a
s
o
f
the latter . 3 Yet who would reason that there should be no lib
erty because it had been , or it might be , abused ? Tyranny itself
would not desire a more cogent argument than that the danger o
f
abuse was a ground for the denial o
f
a right .
$ 719 . But the irresistible reply to al
l
such reasoning is , that
before such a revolution can be effected the Senate must , in the
first place , corrupt itself ; it must next corrupt the State legisla
tures ; it must then corrupt the House of Representatives ; and ,
lastly , itmust corrupt the people at large . Unless al
l
these things
are done and continued , the usurpation of the Senate would be as
vain as it would be transient . The periodical change of its mem
bers would otherwise regenerate the whole body . And if such
universal corruption should prevail , it is quite idle to talk of
usurpation and aristocracy ; fo
r
the government would then be
exactly what the people would choose it to be . It would repre
sent exactly what they would deem fit . It would perpetuate
1 See 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 269 , 272 , 273 , 274 . ? See 2 Amer . Museum , 547 .
8 The Federalist , No . 63 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 269 , 272 .
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power in the very form which they would advise . No form of
government ever proposed to contrive a method by which the will
of the people should be at once represented and defeated ; by
which it should choose to be enslaved , and at the same time by
which it should be protected in its freedom . Private and public
virtue is the foundation o
f republics ; and it is folly , if it is not
madness , to expect that rulers will not buy what the people are
eager to sell . The people may guard themselves against the
oppressions o
f
their governors ; but who shall guard them against
their own oppression of themselves ?
$ 720 . But experience is , after al
l , the best test upon al
l
subjects
o
f
this sort . Time , which dissolves the frail fabrics of men ' s
opinions , serves but to confirm the judgments of nature . What
are the lessons which the history o
f
our own and other institutions
teaches u
s
? In Great Britain the house o
f
lords is hereditary ;
and yet it has never hitherto been able successfully to assail the
public liberties , and it has not unfrequently preserved or enforced
them . The house of commons is now chosen for seven years .
Is it now less an organ o
f
the popular opinion and less jealous o
f
the public rights than it was during annual or triennial Parlia
ments ? In Virginia , the house of delegates , before the Revolu
tion ,was chosen for seven years , and in some of the other colonies
for three years . Were they then subservient to the crown or
faithless to the people ? In the present constitutions o
f
the States
o
f
America there is a great diversity in the terms of office as well
a
s
the qualifications o
f
the State senates . In New York , Vir
ginia , Pennsylvania , and Kentucky , the senate is chosen for four
years ; 2 in Delaware , Mississippi , and Alabama , for three years ;
in South Carolina , Tennessee , Ohio , Missouri , and Louisiana ,
biennially ; in Maryland , for five years ; in the other States ,
annually . These diversities are as striking in the constitutions
which were framed a
s long ago a
s
the times o
f
the Revolution , as
in those which are the growth , as it were , of yesterday . No one
with any show o
f
reason o
r
fact can pretend that the liberties of
the people have not been quite a
s
safe , and the legislation quite as
enlightened and pure , in those States where the senate is chosen
for a long as for a short period .
11 Elliot ' s Debates , 272 . • The Federalist , No . 39 .
8 Dr . Lieber ' s Encycl . Americana , art . Constitutions of the States ; The Federalist ,
No . 39 . Many changes have been made in this regard since these Commenataries
were written , but they have generally been in the direction of shortening the term . )
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$ 721. If there were anything in the nature of the objections
which have been under consideration , or in general theory to
warrant any conclusion , it would be, that the circumstances
of the States being nearly equal, and the objects of legisla
tion the same, the same duration of office ought to be applied to
a
ll . . Yet this diversity has existed without any assignable incon
venience in it
s practical results . It is manifest , then , that the
different manners , habits , institutions , and other circumstances of
a society may admit , if they do not require ,many different modi
fications o
f
it
s legislative department , without danger to liberty on
the one hand or gross imbecility on the other . There are many
guards and checks which are silently in operation to fortify the
benefits o
r
to retard the mischiefs o
f
a
n imperfect system . In
the choice o
f organizations , it may be affirmed that that is on the
whole best which secures in practice th
e
most zeal , experience ,
skill , and fidelity in th
e
discharge o
f
th
e
legislative functions .
The example o
f Maryland is , perhaps , more striking and in
structive than any one which has been brought under review ;
for it is more at variance with all the objections raised against
the national Senate . In Maryland the senate is not only chosen
for five years , but it possesses the exclusive right to fill all vacan
cies in it
s
own body , and has no rotation during the term . What
a fruitful source might not this be of theoretical objections and
colorable alarms for the safety of the public liberties ! Yet
Maryland continues to enjoy a
ll
the blessings of good govern
ment and rational freedom without molestation and without
dread . If examples are sought from antiquity , the illustrations
are not less striking . In Sparta , the ephori , the annual repre
sentatives o
f
the people , were found an overmatch for a senate for
life ; the former continually gaining authority , and finally draw
ing all power into their own hands . The tribunes of Rome , who
were the representatives o
f
the people , prevailed , in almost every
contest ,with the senate for life ; and in the end gained a com
plete triumph over it , notwithstanding unanimity among the trib
unes was indispensable . This fact proves the irresistible force
possessed b
y
that branch of the government which represents the
popular will . 2
$ 722 . Considering , then , the various functions of the Senate ,
the qualifications o
f
skill , experience , and information which are
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 63 . 3 Id . No . 63 ; Id . No . 34 .
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required to discharge them , and the importance of interposing , not
a nominal but a real check , in order to guard the States from usur
pations upon their authority , and the people from becoming the
victims o
f
violent paroxysms in legislation ; the term of six years
would seem to h
it
the just medium between a duration o
f
office
which would too much resist , and a like duration which would too
much invite , those changes of policy , foreign and domestic , which
the best interests o
f
the country may require to be deliberately
weighed and gradually introduced . If the State governments are
found tranquil and prosperous and safe with a senate o
f
two ,
three , four , and five years ' duration , it would seem impossible for
the Union to be in danger from a term o
f
service o
f
si
x years .
§ 723 . But , as if to make assurance doubly sure ,and take a
bond o
f
fate in order to quiet the last lingering scruples o
f jeal
ousy , the succeeding clause o
f
the Constitution has interposed an in
termediate change in the elements o
f
the body , which would seem
to make it absolutely above exception , if reason ,and not fear , is to
prevail ; and if government is to be a reality , and not a vision .
§ 724 . It declares , “ Immediately after they (the senators )
shall be assembled , in consequence of the first election , they
shall be divided , as equally as may be , into three classes . The
seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated a
t
the expi
ration o
f
the second year ; of th
e
second class , at the expiration
o
f the fourth year ; and of the third class , at the expiration of
the sixth year , so that one third may be chosen every second
year . ” A proposition wasmade in the convention that the sen
ators should be chosen for nine years , one third to g
o
out bienni
ally , and was lost , three States voting in the affirmative and eight
in the negative ; and then the present limitation was adopted b
y
a
vote o
f
seven States against four . Here , then , is a clause which ,
without impairing the efficiency of the Senate fo
r
the discharge o
f
it
s high functions , gradually changes its members and introduces
a biennial appeal to the States which must forever prohibit any
permanent combination fo
r
sinister purposes . No person would
probably propose a less duration o
f
office fo
r
the Senate than
double the period of the House . In effect , this provision changes
the composition o
f
two thirds o
f
that body within that period . 3
11 Elliot ' s Debates , 64 to 66 ; Id . 91 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 212 ,213 . '
2 Journ . of Convention , 26th June , 1787 , p . 149 ; Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s
Debates , 103 to 106 .
8 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 64 to 66 ; Id . 91 , 92 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 213 , 21
4
. A
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§ 725 . And here , again , it is proper to remark that experience
has established the fact beyond all controversy , that the term of
the Senate is not to
o
long either for it
s
own security or that o
f
the
States . The reasoning of those exalted minds which framed the
Constitution has been fully realized in practice . While the House
o
f Representatives has gone on increasing and deepening its in
fluence with the people with an irresistible power , the Senate has
a
t
a
ll
times felt the impulses o
f
th
e
popular will , and has never
been found to resist any solid improvements . Let it be added
that it has given a dignity , a solidity , and an enlightened spirit to
the operations o
f
th
e
government which have maintained respect
abroad and confidence a
t
home .
$ 726 . At the first session of Congress under the Constitution
the division o
f
the senators into three classes was made in the
following manner . The senators present were divided into three
classes b
y
name , the first consisting of six persons , the second of
seven , and the third of six . Three papers of an equal size ,
numbered one , two , and three ,were b
y
the secretary rolled u
p
and
put into a box , and drawn b
y
a committee o
f
three persons chosen
for the purpose in behalf of the respective classes in which each
o
f
them was placed , and the classes were to vacate their seats in
the Senate according to the order o
f
the numbers drawn fo
r
them ,
beginning with number one . It was also provided that when sen
ators should take their seats from States which had not then
appointed senators , they should be placed b
y
lo
t
in the foregoing
classes , but in such a manner as should keep the classes as nearly
equal a
s possible . In arranging the original classes care was
taken that both senators from the same State should not be in the
same class , so that there never should be a vacancy at the same
time o
f
the seats o
f
both senators .
$ 727 . As vacancies might occur in the Senate during the recess
o
f
the State legislature , it became indispensable to provide fo
r
that
exigency . Accordingly , the same clause proceeds to declare :
“ And if vacancies happen b
y
resignation o
r
otherwise during
the recess o
f
the legislature of any State , the executive thereof
may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the
power to recall the senators was proposed a
s
a
n
amendment in some o
f
the State con .
ventions ; but it does not seem to have obtained general favor . 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 257 ,
258 to 264 , 265 to 272 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 303 . Many potent reasons might be urged
against it .
( 1 Journals o
f
the Senate , 15thMay , 1789 , p . 25 , 26 (edit . 1820 ) .
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legislature ,which shall then fil
l
such vacancies . " It does not
appear that any strong objection was urged in the convention
against this proposition , although itwas not adopted without some
opposition . There seem to have been three courses presented
for the consideration o
f
the convention , either to leave the vacan
cies unfilled until the meeting of the State legislature , or to allow
the State legislatures to provide a
t
their pleasure prospectively fo
r
the occurrence , or to confide a temporary appointment to some
select State functionary or body . The latter was deemed themost
satisfactory and convenient course . Confidence might justly be re
posed in the State executive , as representing at once the interests
and wishes of the State , and enjoying al
l
the proper means o
f
knowledge and responsibility to insure a judicious appointment . ?
$ 728 . Fifthly , the qualifications of senators . The Constitu
tion declares that “ No person shall be a senator who shall not
have attained the age o
f thirty years , and been nine years a cit
izen o
f
the United States , and who shall not , when elected , be an
inhabitant o
f that State for which he shall be chosen . ” As the
nature o
f
the duties o
f
a senator requires more experience , knowl
edge , and stability of character than those of a representative , th
e
qualification in point of age is raised . A person may be a repre
sentative a
t twenty - five ; but he cannot be a senator until thirty .
A similar qualification of age was required of the members of the
Roman senate . Itwould have been a somewhat singular anomaly
in the history o
f
free governments , to have found persons actually
exercising the highest functions of government , who , in some
enlightened and polished countries ,would not be deemed to have
arrived a
t
a
n age sufficiently mature to b
e
entitled to all the pri
vate and municipal privileges of manhood . In Rome persons
1 Journal o
f
Convention , 9t
h
Aug . 237 , 23
8
.
2 In the case o
f Mr . Lanman , a senator from Connecticut , a question occurred ,
whether the State executive could make a
n appointment in the recess o
f
the Stato legis
lature in anticipation o
f
the expiration o
f
the term o
f
office o
f
a
n existing senator . It
was decided b
y
the Senate that h
e
could not make such a
n appointment . The facts
were , that Mr . Lanman ' s term of service , as senator , expired on the third of March ,
1825 . The President had convoked the Senate to meet o
n
the fourth o
f
March . The
governor o
f
Connecticut , in the recess of the legislature , (whose session would b
e
in
May , ) on the ninth of the preceding February appointed Mr . Lanman , as senator , to
sit in the senate after the third of March . The Senate , b
y
a vote o
f
twenty -three to
eighteen , decided that the appointment could not b
e constitutionally made until after
the vacancy had actually occurred . See Gordon ' s Digest of the Laws of the United
States , 1827 , Appendix , Note 1 , B .
8 i Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 214 .
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were not deemed at full age until twenty - five ; and that con
tinues to be the rule in France and Holland and other civil
la
w
countries ; and in France , b
y
the old law , in regard to mar
riage , full age was not attained until thirty . It has since been
varied , and the term diminished .
$ 729 . The age of senators was fixed in the Constitution at first
b
y
a vote o
f
seren States against four , and finally by a unanimous
vote . Perhaps no one , in our day , is disposed to question the
propriety o
f
this limitation ; and it is , therefore , useless to discuss
a point which is so purely speculative . If counsels are to be wise ,
the ardor and impetuosity and confidence of youth must be chas
tened b
y
the sober lessons o
f experience ; and if knowledge and
solid judgment and tried integrity are to b
e
deemed indispen
sable qualifications for senatorial service , it would be rashness to
affirm that thirty years is too long a period for a due maturity
and probation . 4
$ 730 . The next qualification is citizenship . The propriety of
some limitation upon admissions to office , after naturalization ,
cannot well b
e
doubted . The Senate is to participate largely in
transactions with foreign governments ; and it seems indispen
sable that time should have elapsed sufficient to wean a senator
from a
ll prejudices , resentments , and partialities , in relation to
the land o
f
his nativity , before he should be intrusted with such
high and delicate functions . Besides , it can scarcely be pre
sumed that any foreigner can have acquired a thorough knowl
edge o
f
the institutions and interests o
f
a country until he has
been permanently incorporated into it
s society , and has acquired
b
y
the habits and intercourse o
f
life the feelings and the duties o
f
a citizen . And if he has acquired the requisite knowledge , he can
scarcely feel that devoted attachment to them which constitutes
the great security for fidelity and promptitude in the discharge o
f
official duties . If eminent exceptions could be stated , they would
furnish n
o
safe rule , and should rather teach us to fear our being
misled b
y
brilliancy o
f
talent , or disinterested patriotism , into a
confidence which might betray or an acquiescence which might
weaken , that jealousy of foreign influence which is one of the
1 | Black . Comm . 463 , 464 . 2 Code Civil , art . 388 .
8 Journ . o
f
Convention , 118 , 147 .
• Rawle on th
e
Constitution , 37 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 214 ; 1 Tuck . Black .
Comm . App . 223 .
6 The Federalist , No . 62 .
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main supports o
f republics . In the convention it was at first pro
posed that the limitation should be four years ; and it was finally
altered by a vote of si
x
States against four , one being divided ,
which was afterwards confirmed b
y
a vote o
f eight States to
three . This subject has been already somewhat considered in
another place ; and it may be concluded b
y adopting the lan
guage o
f the Federalist on the same clause : “ The term of nine
years appears to b
e
a prudent mediocrity between a total exclu
sion o
f adopted citizens , whose merit and talents may claim a
share in the public confidence , and an indiscriminate and hasty
admission o
f
them , which might create a channel for foreign influ
ence in the national councils . " 2
$ 731 . The only other qualification is , that the senator shall ,
when elected , be an inhabitant of the State fo
r
which h
e
is chosen .
This scarcely requires any comment ; for it is manifestly proper
that a State should b
e represented b
y
one who , besides an inti
mate knowledge o
f
a
ll
it
s
wants and wishes and local pursuits ,
should have a personal and immediate interest in all measures
touching it
s sovereignty , its rights , or its influence . The only
surprise is , that provision was not made fo
r
his ceasing to repre
sent the State in the Senate as soon a
s
h
e
should cease to b
e
a
n
inhabitant . There does not seem to have been any debate in the
convention on the propriety of inserting the clause as it now
stands . 3
§ 732 . In concluding this topic , it is proper to remark that no
qualification whatsoever o
f property is established in regard to
senators , as none had been established in regard to represent
atives . Merit , therefore , and talent have the freest access open
to them into every department o
f
office under the national govern
ment . Under such circumstances , if the choice of the people is
but directed b
y
a suitable sobriety of judgment , the Senate cannot
fail o
f being distinguished fo
r
wisdom , fo
r
learning , fo
r
exalted
patriotism , for incorruptible integrity , and fo
r
inflexible indepen
dence .
$ 733 . The next clause o
f
the third section o
f
the first article
1 Journ . of Convention , 218 , 238 , 239 , 248 , 249 .
% The Federalist , No . 62 ; Rawle on the Constitution , 37 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 ,
p . 214 .
8 [ The States cannot add to these qualifications nor impose disabilities . See note ,
to § 629 , supra . )
· See The Federalist , No . 27 .
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respects the person who shall preside in the Senate . It declares
that “ the Vice -President of the United States shall be president
of the Senate , but shall have no vote , unless they be equally
divided ” ; and the succeeding clause , that “ the Senate shall
choose their other officers , and also a president pr
o
tempore , in
the absence o
f
the Vice -President , or when he shall exercise th
e
office o
f
President o
f
the United States . "
$ 734 . The original article , as first reported , authorized the
Senate to choose it
s
own president and other officers ; and this
was adopted in the convention . But the same draft authorized
the president o
f
the Senate , in case of the removal , death , resig
nation , or disability of the President , to discharge his duties .
When a
t
a late period o
f
the convention it was deemed advisable
that there should b
e
a Vice -President , the propriety of retaining
him a
s presiding officer o
f
the Senate seems to have met with
general favor , eight States voting in the affirmative and two only
in the negative . 3
$ 735 . Some objections have been taken to the appointment of
the Vice -President to preside in the Senate . It was suggested in
the State conventions that the officer was not only unnecessary ,
but dangerous ; that it is contrary to the usual course of parlia
mentary proceedings to have a presiding officer who is not a
member ; and that the State from which he comes may thus have
two votes instead o
f
one . It has also been coldly remarked by a
learned commentator that “ the necessity o
f providing for the case
o
f
a vacancy in th
e
office o
f President doubtless gave rise to the
creation o
f
that officer ; and for want of something else fo
r
him
to d
o whilst there is a President in office , he seems to have been
placed , with no very great propriety , in the chair o
f
the Senate . ” 5
$ 736 . The propriety of creating the office o
f
Vice -President
1 Journal of Convention , p . 218 , 240 .
? Journal o
f
Convention , 225 , 22
6
. 8 Journal of Convention , 325 , 339 .
4 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 359 , 361 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 37 , 39 .
61 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . Appx . 224 ; Id . 199 , 200 . It is a somewhat curious cir
cumstance in the history o
f Congress , that the exercise of the power of th
e
Vice -Presi
dent in defeating a bill for the apportionment o
f
representatives in 1792 has been cen
sured , because such a bill seemed ( if any ) almost exclusively fi
t
for the House o
fRepre
sentatives to decide upon ( 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 199 , 200 , 225 ) : and that a like
bill , to which the Senate interposed a strong opposition , in 1832 , has been deemed b
y
some o
f
the States so exceptionable , that this resistance has been thought worthy of
high praise . There is somedanger in drawing conclusions from a single exercise of any
power against it
s general utility o
r policy .
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will be reserved for future consideration , when , in the progress of
these commentaries , the constitution of the executive department
comes under review . The reasons why he was authorized to pre
side in the Senate belong appropriately to this place .
§ 737 . There is no novelty in the appointment of a person to
preside as speaker who is not a constituent member o
f
the body
over which h
e
is to preside . In the house of lords , in England , the
presiding officer is the lord chancellor or lord keeper o
f
the great
seal , or other person appointed b
y
the king ' s commission ; and if
none such b
e
so appointed ,then it is said that the lordsmay elect .
But it is b
y
n
o
means necessary that the person appointed b
y
the
king should be a peer of the realm or lord o
f
Parliament . Nor
has this appointment b
y
the king ever been complained o
f
a
s
a
grievance , nor has it operated with inconvenience o
r oppression in
practice . It is , on the contrary , deemed an important advantage
both to the officer and to the house of peers , adding dignity and
weight to the former , and securing great legal ability and talent
in aid o
f
the latter . This consideration alone might have had
some influence in the convention . The Vice -President being him
self chosen b
y
the States ,might well be deemed , in point o
f age ,
character , and dignity , worthy to preside over the deliberations of
the Senate , in which the States were al
l
assembled and repre
sented . His impartiality in the discharge of its duties might be
fairly presumed ; and the employment would not only bring his
character in review before the public , but enable him to justify the
public confidence , by performing his public functions with inde
pendence and firmness and sound discretion . A citizen who was
deemed worthy o
fbeing one o
f
the competitors fo
r
the Presidency ,
could scarcely fail of being distinguished b
y
private virtues , b
y
comprehensive acquirements , and by eminent services . In all
questions before the Senate he might safely be appealed to as a fit
arbiter upon an equal division , in which case alone he is intrusted
with a vote .
§ 738 . But the strong motive for this appointment was of an
other sort , founded upon State jealousy and State equality in the
Senate . If the speaker of the Senate was to be chosen from its
own members , the State upon whom the choice would fallmight
possess either more o
r
less than it
s
due share of influence . If the
1 See 2 Amer .Museum , 557 ; The Federalist , No . 68 .
2 1 Black . Comm . 181 ; 3 Black . Comm . 47 ; I Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 224 .
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speaker were not allowed to vote , except where there was an
equal division , independent of his own vote , then the State might
lose it
s
own voice ; if he were allowed to give his vote and also
a casting vote , then the State might , in effect , possess a double
rote . Either alternative would of itself present a predicament
sufficiently embarrassing . On the other hand , if no casting vote
were allowed in any case , then the indecision and inconvenience
might be very prejudicial to the public interests in case o
f
a
n
equality o
f
votes . It might give rise to dangerous feuds or
intrigues , and create sectional and State agitations . The smaller
States might well suppose that their interests were less secure and
less guarded than they ought to be . Under such circumstances ,
the Vice -President would seem to be the most fit arbiter to decide ,
because h
e
would b
e the representative , not of one State only , but
o
f all , and must be presumed to feel a lively interest in promoting
allmeasures for the public good . This reasoning appears to have
been decisive in the convention and satisfactory to the people . 3
It establishes that there was a manifest propriety in making the
arrangement conducive to the harmony o
f
the States and the dig
nity o
f
the general government . And as th
e
Senate possesses the
power tomake rules fo
r
it
s
own proceedings , there is little danger
that there can ever arise any abuse o
f
the presiding power . The
danger , if any , is rather the other way , that the presiding power
will be either silently weakened or openly surrendered , so as to
leave the office little more than the barren honor of a place , with
out influence and without action .
§ 739 . A question involving the authority o
f
the Vice -President ,
a
s presiding officer in the Senate , has been much discussed in con
sequence o
f
a decision recently made b
y
that officer . Hitherto
the power o
f preserving order during the deliberations o
f
the
Senate , in al
l
cases where the rules o
f
the Senate di
d
not specially
prescribe another mode , had been silently supposed to belong to
the Vice -President , as an incident of office . It had never been
doubted , much less denied , from the first organization o
f the
Senate ; and its existence had been assumed as an inherent qual
it
y , constitutionally delegated , subject only to such rules as the
Senate should from time to time prescribe . In the winter session
o
f
1826 , the Vice -President decided , in effect , that , as president
1 The Federalist , No . 68 . ? Id .
3 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 359 , 360 , 361 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 37 , 38 , 51 , 52 .
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of the Senate , he had no power of preserving order , or of calling
any member to order, for words spoken in the course of debate ,
upon his own authority , but only so far as it was given and regu
lated b
y
the rules of the Senate . This was a virtual surrender
o
f
the presiding power ( if not universally , at least in that case )
into the hands o
f
the Senate , and disarmed the officer even of the
power o
f
self -protection from insult or abuse , unless the Senate
should choose to make provision fo
r
it . If , therefore , the Senate
should decline to confer the power o
f preserving order , the Vice
President might become a mere pageant and cipher in that body .
If , indeed , the Vice -President had not this power virtute officii ,
there was nothing to prevent the Senate from confiding it to any
other officer chosen b
y
itself . Nay , if the power to preside had
not this incident , it was difficult to perceive what other incident
it had . The power to put questions or to declare votes might
just a
s well , upon similar reasoning , be denied , unless it was
expressly conferred . The power of the Senate to prescribe rules
could not be deemed omnipotent . It must be construed with
reference to , and in connection with , the power to preside ; and
the latter , according to the common -sense ofmankind and of pub
lic bodies , was always understood to include the power to keep
order , upon the clear ground that the grant o
f
a power includes
the authority to make it effectual , and also of self -preservation .
$ 740 . The subject at that time attracted a good deal of dis
cussion , and was finally , as a practical inquiry , put an end to in
1828 , b
y
a rule made b
y
the Senate , that “ every question of order
shall be decided b
y
the president without debate , subject to appeal
to the Senate . ” 2 But still the question , as one of constitutional
right and duty , liable to be regulated ,but not to be destroyed , by
the Senate , deserves and should receive the most profound investi
gation o
f every man solicitous fo
r
the permanent dignity and
independence o
f
the Vice -Presidency . 8
$ 741 . The propriety of intrusting the Senate with the choice
o
f
it
s
other officers , and also of a president pro tempore in the
absence o
f
the Vice -President , or when he exercises the office of
President , seems never to have been questioned , and indeed is so
obvious that it is wholly unnecessary to vindicate it . Confidence
11 American Annual Register , 86 , 87 ; 3 American Annual Register , 99 ; 4 Elliot ' s
Debates , 311 to 315 .
? 3 American Annual Register , 99 . 8 See Jefferson ' s Manual , $ 15 , 17 .
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between the Senate and it
s
officers , and the power to make a
suitable choice and to secure a suitable responsibility fo
r
the faith
ful discharge of the duties of office , are so indispensable for the
public good that the provision will command universal assent as
soon as it is mentioned . It has grown into a general practice for
the Vice -President to vacate the senatorial chair a short time
before the termination o
f
each session , in order to enable the
Senate to choose a president pro tempore , who might already be
in office if the Vice -President in the recess should be called to the
chair of state . The practice is founded in wisdom and sound
policy , as it immediately provides for an exigency , which may well
b
e expected to occur a
t any time ,and prevents the choice from
being influenced b
y
temporary excitements o
r intrigues arising
from the actual existence o
f
a vacancy . As it is useful in peace
to provide for war , so it is likewise useful in times of profound
tranquillity to provide for political agitations which may disturb
the public harmony .
$ 742 . The next clause of the third section of the first article
respects the subject of impeachment . It is as follows : “ The
Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments . When
sitting for that purpose , they shall be on oath or affirmation .
When the President o
f
the United States is tried , the chief justice
shall preside . And no person shall be convicted without the con
currence o
f
two thirds o
f
themembers present . "
$ 743 . Upon the subject o
f impeachments something has already
been said , in treating o
f
that branch of the Constitution which
delegates to the House o
f Representatives the sole power o
f im
peachment . Upon the propriety of delegating the power it is
unnecessary to enlarge . But the next inquiry naturally presented
is , b
y
what tribunal shall an impeachment be tried ? It is obvi
ously incorrect in theory , and against the general principles of
justice , that the same tribunal should at once be the accusers and
the judges ; that they should first decide upon the verity of the
accusation and then try the offenders . The first object in the
administration o
f justice is , or ought to be , to secure an impartial
trial . This is so fundamental a rule in al
l
republican govern
ments that it can require little reasoning to support it ; and the
only surprise is , that it could ever have been overlooked .
$ 744 . The practice of impeachments seems to have been
1 Rawle o
n
Const . ch . 22 , p . 209 , 210 .
528 [BOOK II
I
.CONSTITUTION O
F
THE UNITED STATES .
originally derived into the common law from the Germans , who ,
in their great councils , sometimes tried capital accusations relating
to the public . Licet apud concilium accusare , quoque et discrimen
capitis intendere . When it was adopted in England it received
material improvements . In Germany , and also in the Grecian
and Roman republics , the people were at the same time the ac
cusers and the judges ; thus trampling down at the outset the
best safeguards o
f
the rights and lives o
f
the citizens . But in
England , the house of commons is invested with the sole power
o
f impeachment , and the house of lords with the sole power o
f
trial . Thus , a tribunal of high dignity , independence , and intelli
gence , and not likely to be unduly swayed b
y
the influence o
f
popular opinion , is established to protect the accused and secure
to him a favorable hearing 3 Montesquieu has deemed such a
tribunal worthy o
f
the highest praise . Machiavel has ascribed
the ruin o
f
th
e
republic of Florence to th
e
want o
f
a mode o
f pro
viding b
y
impeachment against those who offended against the
state . An American commentator has hazarded the extraordinary
remark that , “ If the want of a proper tribunal fo
r
the trial o
f
impeachments can endanger the liberties o
f
the United States ,
some future Machiavel may perhaps trace their destruction to the
same source . " 5 Themodel from which the national court of im
peachments is borrowed is , doubtless , that of Great Britain ; and
a similar constitutional distribution o
f
the power exists in many
o
f
the State governments .
$ 745 . The great objects to be attained in the selection of a
tribunal fo
r
the trial o
f impeachments are impartiality , integrity ,
intelligence , and independence . If either of these is wanting , the
trial must be radically imperfect . To insure impartiality , the
body must be in some degree removed from popular power and
passions , from the influence of sectional prejudice , and from the
more dangerous influence o
f
mere party spirit . To secure integ
rity , theremust be a lofty sense of duty and a deep responsibility
to future times as well as to God . To secure intelligence , there
must be age , experience , and high intellectual powers as well as
14 Black . Comm . 260 ; Tacit . de Morib . Germ . 12 .
2 4 Black . Comm . 261 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 164 , 165 , 166 .
8 4 Black . Comm . 261 ; but se
e
Paley ' s Moral Philosophy , B . 6 , ch . 8 ; 1 Wilson ' s
Law Lect . 450 , 451 .
4 Montesq . Spirit of Laws , B . 11 , ch . 6 .
5 i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 348 . 6 The Federalist , Nos . 65 , 66 .
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attainments . To secure independence , there must be numbers
as well as talents , and a confidence resulting at once from per
manency of place and dignity of station and enlightened patri
otism . Does the Senate combine in a suitable degree al
l
these
qualifications ? Does it combine them more perfectly than any
other tribunal which could b
e
constituted ? What other tribunal
could be intrusted with the authority ? These are questions o
f
the
highest importance and o
f
the most frequent occurrence . They
arose in the convention , and underwent a full discussion there .
They were again deliberately debated in the State conventions ;
and they have been a
t
various times since agitated b
y jurists and
statesmen and political bodies . Few parts of the Constitution
have been assailed with more vigor , and few have been defended
with more ability . A learned commentator , at a considerable
distance of time after the adoption of the Constitution , did not
scruple to declare that it was a most inordinate power , and in
some instances utterly incompatible with the other functions o
f
the Senate ; and a similar opinion has often been propagated
with an abundance o
f
zeal . The journal of the convention bears
testimony also to no inconsiderable diversity o
f judgment on the
subject in that body .
$ 746 . The subject is itself full of intrinsic difficulty in a gov
ernment purely elective . The jurisdiction is to be exercised over
offences which are committed b
y
public men in violation of their
public trust and duties . Those duties are in many cases political ;
and , indeed , in other cases , to which the power of impeachment
will probably b
e applied , they will respect functionaries of a high
character , where the remedy would otherwise be wholly inade
quate , and the grievance be incapable of redress . Strictly speak
ing , then , the power partakes of a political character , as it respects
injuries to the society in it
s political character ; and , on this
account , it requires to be guarded in its exercise against the spirit
o
f
faction , the intolerance of party , and the sudden movements of
popular feeling . The prosecution will seldom fa
il
to agitate the
passions o
f
the whole community , and to divide it into parties ,
more o
r
less friendly o
r
hostile to the accused . The press , with
it
s unsparing vigilance , will arrange itself on either side to con
11 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 20
0
; Id . 335 , 33
6
, 337 .
? 2 Amer .Museum ,549 ; 3 Amer .Museum , 71 ; The Federalist ,Nos . 65 , 66 ; 1 Tuck .
Black . Comm . App . 337 ; Jour . of Convention , Supplement , p . 425 , 437 .
VOL . I . 34
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trol and influence public opinion ; and there will always be some
danger that the decision will b
e regulated more b
y
the comparative
strength o
f parties than b
y
the real proofs o
f
innocence or guilt .
§ 747 . On the other hand , the delicacy and magnitude o
f
a trust
which so deeply concerns the political existence and reputation o
f
every man engaged in the administration o
f public affairs cannot
b
e
overlooked . It ought not to be a power so operative and
instant that itmay intimidate a modest and conscientious states
man or other functionary from accepting office ; nor so weak and
torpid as to b
e capable o
f lulling offenders into a general security
and indifference . The difficulty of placing it rightly in a govern
ment resting entirely on the basis o
f periodical elections will be
more strikingly perceived when it is considered that the ambitious
and the cunning will often make strong accusations against public
men the means o
f
their own elevation to office , and thus give an
impulse to the power o
f impeachment b
y
preoccupying the public
opinion . The convention appears to have been very strongly
impressed with the difficulty of constituting a suitable tribunal ,
and finally came to the result that the Senate was the most fit
depositary o
f
this exalted trust . In so doing they had the exam
p
le
before them o
f
several of the best considered State constitu
tions ; and the example , in some measure , of Great Britain . The
most strenuous opponent cannot , therefore , allege that it was a
rash and novel experiment ; the most unequivocal friend must , at
the same time , admit that it is not free from al
l
plausible objec
tions . 3
$ 748 . Itwill be well , therefore , to review the ground , and as
certain how far the objections are well founded , and whether any
other scheme would have been more unexceptionable . The prin
cipal objections were as follows : 1 . That the provision confounds
the legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body , in vio
lation o
f
the well -known maxim which requires a separation of
them . 2 . That it accumulates an undue proportion of power in
the Senate , which has a tendency to make it to
o
aristocratic .
3 . That the efficiency of the court will be impaired by the ci
r
cumstance that the Senate has an agency in appointment to office .
4 . That its efficiency is still further impaired by its participa
tion in the functions o
f
the treaty -making power . 4
1 The Federalist , No . 65 .
8 The Federalist , Nos . 65 , 66 .
2 Id . No . 65 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 165 .
4 The Federalist , No . 66 .
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$ 749 . The first objection , which relates to the supposed neces
sity of an entire separation of the legislative and judicial powers ,
has been already discussed in it
s
most general form in another
place . It has been shown that the maxim does not apply to par
tial intermixtures of these powers ; and that such an intermixture
is not only unobjectionable , but is , in many cases , indispensable for
the purpose o
f preserving the due independence of the different
departments o
f government , and their harmony and healthy oper
ation in the advancement o
f
the public interests and the preserva
tion o
f
the public liberties . The question is not so much whether
any intermixture is allowable , as whether the intermixture o
f
the
authority to tr
y
impeachments with the other functions of the
Senate is salutary and useful . Now , some o
f
these functions con
stitute a sound reason for the investment o
f
th
e
power in this branch .
The offences which th
e
power o
f impeachment is designed prin
cipally to reach are those o
f
a political or of a judicial character .
They are not those which lie within the scope o
f
the ordinary
municipal jurisprudence o
f
a country . They are founded on dif
ferent principles , are governed by different maxims , are directed
to different objects , and require different remedies from those
which ordinarily apply to crimes . So fa
r
a
s they are o
f
a judi
cial character , it is obviously more safe to the public to confide
them to the Senate than to a mere court o
f
la
w . The Senate may
be presumed always to contain a number of distinguished lawyers ,
and probably some persons who have held judicial stations . A
t
the same time they will not have any undue and immediate sym
pathy with the accused from that common professional or corpo
ration spirit , which is apt to pervade those who are engaged in
similar pursuits and duties .
$ 750 . In regard to political offences , the selection of the sena
tors has some positive advantages . In the first place , they may
b
e fairly presumed to have a more enlarged knowledge than per
sons in other situations , of political functions and their difficulties
and embarrassments ; of the nature of diplomatic rights and
duties ; of the extent , limits , and variety of executive powers and
operations ; and of the sources of involuntary error and unde
signed excess , as contradistinguished from those ofmeditated and
violent disregard o
f duty and right . On the one hand , this very
i Ante , Vol . 2 , $ 524 to 540 ; Rawle on Constitution , ch . 22 , p . 212 .
3 1 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 451 , 452 .
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experience and knowledge will bring them to the trial with a
spirit of candor and intelligence , and an ability to comprehend
and scrutinize the charges against the accused ; and , on the other
hand , their connection with , and dependence on , the States , will
make them feel a just regard for the defence of the rights and the
interests of the States and the people . And this may properly
lead to another remark ; that the power of impeachment is pecu
liarly well fitted to be left to the final decision of a tribunal com
posed of representatives of al
l
the States , having a common
interest to maintain the rights of all , and yet beyond the reach
o
f
local and sectional prejudices . Surely , it will not readily be
admitted b
y
the zealous defenders o
f
State rights and State jeal
ousies , that the power is not safe in the hands o
f
a
ll
the States , to
b
e
used for their own protection and honor .
$ 751 . The next objection regards the undue accumulation o
f
power in the Senate from this source connected with other sources .
S
o
fa
r
a
s any other powers are incompatible with and obstructive
o
f
the proper exercise o
f
the power o
f impeachment , they will fall
under consideration under another head . But it is not easy to
perceive what the precise nature and extent o
f
the objection is .
What is the due measure or criterion of power to be given to the
Senate ? What is the standard which is to be assumed ? If we
are to regard theory , no power in any department of government
is undue , which is safe and useful in its actual operations , which is
not dangerous in it
s
form , or too wide in its extent . It is incum
bent , then , on those who press the objection , to establish by some
sound reasoning that the power is not safe , but mischievous or
dangerous . Now , the power o
f impeachment is not one expected
in any government to be in constant or frequent exercise . It is
rather intended fo
r
occasional and extraordinary cases , where a
superior power , acting fo
r
the whole people , is put into operation
to protect their rights , and to rescue their liberties from violation .
Such a power cannot , if its actual exercise is properly guarded , in
the hands o
f
functionaries responsible and wise , be justly said to
b
e
unsafe or dangerous ; unless we are to sa
y
that n
o power which
is liable to abuse should be , under any circumstances , delegated .
The senators cannot be presumed , in ordianary decency , not to be
a body o
f
sufficient wisdom to be capable of executing the power ;
and their responsibility arises from the moderate duration o
f
their
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 66 .
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office , and their general stake in the interests of the community ,
as well as their own sense of duty and reputation . If, passing
from theory , resort is had to the history of other governments ,
there is no reason to suppose that th
e
possession o
f
the power o
f
trying impeachments has ever been a source of undue aristocratical
authority o
r
o
f dangerous influence . The history of Great Britain
has not established that the house of lords has become a dan
gerous depositary o
f
influence o
f any sort from it
s being a high
court o
f impeachments . If the power of impeachment has ever
been abused , it has not trampled upon popular rights . If it has
struck down high victims , it has followed , rather than led , the
popular opinion . If it has been an instrument of injustice , it has
been from yielding to
o
much , and not too little . If it has some
times suffered an offender to escape , it has fa
r
more frequently
purified the fountains o
f justice , and brought down the favorite of
courts and the perverter o
f patronage to public humiliation and
disgrace . And , to bring the case home to our own State govern
ments , the power in our State senates has hitherto been without
danger , though certainly not without efficiency .
$ 752 . The next objection is , that the power is not efficient or
safe in connection with the agency o
f
the Senate in appointments .
The argument is , that senators who have concurred in an appoint
ment will be too indulgent judges of the conduct of the men in
whose efficient creation they have participated . The same objec
tion lies with equal force against all governments which intrust .
the power of appointment to any persons who have a right to
remove them a
t pleasure . It might in such cases be urged that
the favoritism o
f
the appointor would always screen the misbe
havior of the appointees . Yet no one doubts the fitness of in
trusting such a power ; and confidence is reposed , and properly
reposed , in the character and responsibility of those who make the
appointment . The objection is greatly diminished in its force by
the consideration that the Senate has but a slight participation in
the appointments to office . The President is to nominate and
appoint ; and the Senate are called upon merely to confirm or
reject th
e
nomination . They have no right of choice , and there
fore must feel less solicitude as to the individual who is appointed . 3
But , in fact , the objection is itself not well founded ; fo
r
it will
i The Federalist , No . 66 .
The Federalist , No . 66 . 3 Id . No . 66 .
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rarely occur that the persons who have concurred in the appoint
ment will b
e
members o
f
the Senate a
t
th
e
time o
f
th
e
trial . As
one third is , or may be , changed every two years , the case is
highly improbable ; and still more rarely can the fact of the
appointment operate upon the minds o
f any considerable number
o
f
the senators . What possible operation could it have upon the
judgment o
f
a man o
f
reasonable intelligence and integrity , that
h
e
had assented to th
e
appointment o
f
any individual o
f
whom h
e
ordinarily could have little or no personal knowledge , and in
whose appointment h
e
had concurred upon the judgment and
recommendation of others ? Such an influence is too remote to be
o
f
much weight in human affairs ; and , if it exists at al
l
, it is too
common to form a just exception to the competency o
f any forum .
$ 753 . The next objection is to the inconvenience of the union
o
f
the power with that o
fmaking treaties . It has been strongly
urged that ambassadors are appointed b
y
the President , with the
concurrence o
f
the Senate ; and if he makes a treaty which is rati
fied b
y
two thirds o
f
the Senate , however corrupt or exceptionable
his conduct may have been , there ca
n
b
e
little chance of redress
b
y
a
n impeachment . If the treaty be ratified , and theminister be
impeached for concluding it because it is derogatory to the honor ,
th
e
interest , or perhaps to th
e
sovereignty o
f
th
e
nation ,who ( it is
said ) are to be hi
s
judges ? The Senate , b
y
whom it has been
approved and ratified ? If the President be impeached fo
r
giving
improper instructions to the minister , and fo
r
ratifying the treaty
pursuant to his instructions , who are to be his judges ? The
Senate , to whom the treaty has been submitted , and b
y
whom it
has been approved and ratified ? 1 This would be to constitute the
senators their own judges in every case of a corrupt or perfidious
execution o
f
their trust .
$ 754 . Such is the objection pressed with unusual earnestness ,
and certainly having a more plausible foundation than either o
f
the preceding . It presupposes , however , a state of facts of a
very extraordinary character , and , having put an extreme case ,
argues from it against the propriety of any delegation of the
power which in such a case might be abused . This is not just
reasoning in any case , and least of al
l
in cases respecting the
polity and organization o
f governments ; for in all such cases
there must b
e power reposed in some person or body , and wher
1 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 33
5 , 336 . Th
e
Federalist , No . 66 .
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ever it is reposed itmay be abused . Now , the case put is either
one where the Senate has ratified an appointment or treaty , inno
cently believing it to be unexceptionable , and beneficial to the
country , or where the Senate has corruptly ratified it, and basely
betrayed their trust . In the former case , the Senate having acted
with fidelity , according to their best sense of duty , would feel no
sympathy fo
r
a corrupt executive o
r
minister who had acted with
fraud o
r
dishonor unknown to them . If the treaty were good ,
they might still desire to punish those who had acted basely or
corruptly in negotiating it . If bad , they would feel indignation
for the imposition practised upon them b
y
a
n
executive o
r min
ister in whom they placed confidence , instead of sympathy fo
r
h
is
misconduct . They would feel that they had been betrayed into an
error , and would rather have a bias against than in favor of the
deceiver .
$ 755 . If , on the other hand , the Senate had corruptly assented
to the appointment and treaty , it is certain that there would be no
effectual remedy b
y
impeachment so long as the same persons re
mained members o
f
the Senate . But even here two years might
remove a large number o
f
the guilty conspirators , and public in
dignation would probably compel the resignation o
f
a
ll . But is
such a case supposable ? If it be , then there are others quite
within the same range o
f supposition , and equally mischievous , for
which there can be no remedy . Suppose a majority of the Senate
o
r
House o
f Representatives corruptly pass any la
w , or violate the
Constitution , where is the remedy ? Suppose the House of Repre
sentatives carry into effect and appropriate money corruptly in aid
o
f
such a corrupt treaty , where is the remedy ? Why might it not
b
e
a
s well urged that the House of Representatives ought not to
b
e intrusted with the power o
f impeachment , because they might
corruptly concur with the executive in an injurious o
r
unconstitu
tionalmeasure ? or might corruptly aid the executive in negotiat
in
g
a treaty b
y public resolves o
r
secret instructions ? The truth
is , that al
l
arguments of this sort ,which suppose a combination
o
f
the public functionaries to destroy the liberty o
f
the people and
the powers o
f
the government , are so extravagant that they go to
'the overthrow of al
l
delegated power ; or they are so rare , and
remote in practice , that they ought not to enter as elements into
any structure of a free government . The Constitution supposes
that men may be trusted with power under reasonable guards . It
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presumes that the Senate and the executive will no more con
spire to overthrow the government than the House o
f Representa
tives . It supposes the best pledges for fidelity to be in the char
acter of the individuals , and in the collective wisdom of the people
in the choice o
f agents . It does not in decency presume that the
two thirds of the Senate representing the States will corruptly
unite with the executive , or abuse their power . Neither does it
suppose that a majority o
f
the House of Representatives will cor
ruptly refuse to impeach , o
r corruptly pass a law . 1
$ 756 . But , passing b
y , for the present , this general reasoning
o
n the objections stated , let us see if any other and better practical
scheme for the trial of impeachments can be devised . One scheme
might be to intrust it to the Supreme Court o
f
the United States ;
another , to intrust it to that Court and the Senate jointly ; a third ,
to intrust it to a special tribunal , appointed permanently or tem
porarily fo
r
the purpose . If it shall appear that to all of these
schemes equally strong objections may be made , (and probably
none more unexceptionable could be suggested , ) argument in
favor of the Senate will acquire more persuasive cogency .
$ 757 . First , the intrusting of the trial of impeachments to the
Supreme Court . This was , in fact , the original project in the con
vention . It was at first agreed that the jurisdiction of the na
tional judiciary should extend to impeachments o
f national offi
cers . Afterwards this clause was struck out , and the power to
impeach was given to the House of Representatives ; 5 and the
jurisdiction of the trial of impeachments was also given to the
Supreme Court . 6 Ultimately , the same jurisdiction was assigned
to the Senate b
y
the vote of nine States against two . ?
$ 758 . The principal reasons which prevailed in the convention
in favor o
f
the final decision , and against vesting the jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court ,may fairly be presumed to have been those
which are stated in the Federalist . Its language is as follows :
“ Where else , than in the Senate , could have been found a tr
i
bunal sufficiently dignified or sufficiently independent ? What
other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in it
s
own
situation to preserve , unawed and influenced , the necessary
1 The Federalist , No . 66 .
? Journal o
f
Convention , p . 69 , 121 , 137 , 189 , 217 , 226 , 324 , 325 , 326 , 344 , 346 .
8 Journal of Convention , p . 69 , 121 , 137 . * Id . 189 .
6 Id . 217 , 236 . 6 Id . 226 .
7 Id . 324 , 326 , 346 .
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impartiality between an individual accused and the representa
tives of the people , his accusers ? Could the Supreme Court have
been relied upon as answering this description ? It is much to be
doubted whether the members of that tribunalwould , at al
l
times ,
b
e endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude a
s
would be
called for in the exercise o
f
so difficult a task . And it is still
more to be doubted whether they would possess a degree o
f
credit
and authority which might , on certain occasions , be indispensable
towards reconciling the people to a decision which should happen
to clash with an accusation brought b
y
their immediate representa
tives . A deficiency in the first would be fatal to the accused ; in
the last , dangerous to the public tranquillity . The hazard in both
these respects could only be avoided b
y
rendering that tribunal
more numerous than would consist with a reasonable attention to
economy . The necessity of a numerous court fo
r
the trial of im
peachments is equally dictated b
y
the nature o
f
th
e
proceeding .
This can never be tied down to such strict rules , either in the
delineation o
f
the offence b
y
the prosecutors or in the construc
tion o
f it b
y
the judges , as in common cases serve to limit the dis
cretion o
f
courts in favor o
f personal security . There will be no
jury to stand between the judges who are to pronounce the sen
tence of the law and the party who is to receive o
r
suffer it . The
awful discretion which a court o
f impeachments must necessarily
have , to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the
most distinguished characters of the community , forbids the com
mitment o
f
the trust to a small number o
f persons . These con
siderations seem alone to authorize a conclusion that the Supreme
Court would have been an improper substitute for the Senate as a
court o
f impeachments .
$ 759 . “ There remains a further consideration , which will not
a little strengthen this conclusion . It is this . The punishment ,
which may be the consequence o
f
conviction upon impeachment ,
is not to terminate the chastisement o
f
the offender . After having
been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem , and con
fidence , and honors , and emoluments of his country , he will still
b
e
liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course o
f
la
w . Would it be proper that the persons who had disposed of
his fame and hi
s
most valuable rights a
s
a citizen in one trial
should , in another trial , fo
r
the same offence , be also the disposers
o
f
his life and fortune ? Would there not be the greatest reason
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his life
. Qecision o
fPecialvero
to apprehend that error in the first sentence would be the parent
o
f
error in the second sentence ? That the strong bias of one de
cision would be apt to overrule the influence o
f any new lights
which might be brought to vary the complexion of another de
cision ? Those who know anything o
f
human nature will not
hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative , and will be
a
t
n
o loss to perceive that b
y making the same persons judges in
both cases , those who might happen to be the objects of prosecu
tion would , in a great measure , be deprived of the double security
intended them b
y
a double trial . The loss o
f
life and estate
would often be virtually included in a sentence which in its terms
imported nothing more than dismission from a present , and dis
qualification fo
r
a future office . It may be said that the interven
tion o
f
a jury in the second instance would obviate the danger .
But juries ar
e
frequently influenced b
y
the opinions o
f
judges .
They are sometimes induced to find special dicts , which refer
the main question to the decision o
f
the court . Who would be
willing to stake his lif and his estate upon a verdict of a jury
acting under the auspices o
f judges who had predetermined his
guilt ? " 1
$ 760 . That there is great force in this reasoning al
l
persons
o
f
common candor must allow ; that it is in every respect satis
factory and unanswerable has been denied , and may be fairly
questioned . That part of it which is addressed to the trial a
t
law
b
y
the same judges might have been in some degree obviated by
confiding the jurisdiction at law over the offence ( as in fact it is
now confided ) to an inferior tribunal , and excluding any judge
who sat a
t
the impeachment from sitting in the court o
f trial .
Still , however , it cannot be denied that even in such a case the
prior judgment o
f
the Supreme Court , if an appeal to it were not
allowable , would have very great weight upon the minds of infe
rior judges . But that part of the reasoning which is addressed to
the importance o
f
numbers in giving weight to the decision , and
especially that which is addressed to the public confidence and re
spect which ought to follow upon a decision , is entitled to very
great weight . It is fit , however , to give the answer to the whole
reasoning by th
e
other side in the words o
f
a learned commenta
tor , who has embodied it with no small share of ability and skill .
The reasoning “ seems , ” says he , “ to have forgotten that senators
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 65 . But se
e
Rawle o
n
th
e
Constitution , ch . 22 , p . 211 , 212 .
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may be discontinued from their seats merely from the effect or
popular disapprobation , but that the judges of the Supreme Court
cannot . It seems also to have forgotten that ,whenever the Presi
dent of the United States is impeached , the Constitution expressly
requires that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside
at the trial. Are all the confidence , al
l
the firmness , and al
l
the
impartiality o
f
that court supposed to b
e
concentred in the Chief
Justice , and to reside in his breast only ? If that court could not
b
e relied on fo
r
the trial o
f impeachments , much less would it
seem worthy o
f
reliance fo
r
the determination o
f any question be
tween the United States and a particular State ; much less to de
cide upon the life and death o
f
a person whose crimes might sub
ject hi
m
to impeachment , but whose influence might avert a con
viction . Yet the courts of the United States are by the Constitu
tion regarded as the proper tribunals where a party convicted upon
a
n impeachment may receive that condign punishment which the
nature of his crimes may require ; fo
r
it must not be forgotten
that a person convicted upon an impeachment will nevertheless be
liable to indictment , trial , judgment , and punishment according to
law , etc . The question , then , might be retorted ; can it be sup
posed that the Senate , a part of whom must have been either
particeps criminis with the person impeached , b
y
advising the
measure for which he is to be tried , or must have joined the
opposition to that measure , when proposed and debated in th
e
Senate , would be a more independent or a more unprejudiced
tribunal than a court composed o
f judges holding their offices
during good behavior , and who could neither be presumed to
have participated in the crime , nor to have prejudged the crim
inal ? ” 1
$ 761 . This reasoning also has much force in it ; but in candor
also it must be admitted to be not wholly unexceptionable . That
part which is addressed to the circumstance o
f
the Chief Justice ' s
presiding a
t
the trial o
f
the President of the United States was
( aswe shall hereafter se
e
) not founded on any supposition that
the Chief Justice would be superior in confidence and firmness
and impartiality to the residue o
f
the judges , (though in talents
and public respect and acquirements he might fairly be presumed
their superior , ) but on the necessity of excluding the Vice -Presi
dent from the chair when h
emight have amanifest interest which
11 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 23
7
.
540 BOOK II
I
.CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES .
would destroy his impartiality . That part which is addressed to
the supposition o
f
the senators being participes criminis is still
more exceptionable ; fo
r
it is not only incorrect to affirm that the
senators must b
e
in such a predicament , but in al
l
probability the
senators would , in almost al
l
cases , be without any participation
in th
e
offence . The offences which would be generally prosecuted
b
y
impeachment would be those only o
f
a high character , and
belonging to persons in eminent stations , — such as a head of de
partment , a foreign minister , a judge , a vice -president , or a presi
dent . Over the conduct of such persons the Senate could ordi
narily have n
o
control ; and a corrupt combination with them
in the discharge of the duties of their respective offices could
scarcely b
e presumed . Any of these officers might be bribed , or
commit gross misdemeanors , without a single senator having the
least knowledge or participation in the offence . And , indeed , very
few o
f
the senators could a
t any time be presumed to be in habits
o
f
intimate personal confidence o
r
connection with many o
f
these
officers . And , so far as public responsibility is concerned or pub
lic confidence is required , the tenure o
f
office o
f
the judges would
have no strong tendency to secure the former , or to assuage public
jealousies so a
s peculiarly to encourage the latter . It is , perhaps ,
one o
f
the circumstances most important in the discharge o
f judi
cial duties , that they rarely carry with them any strong popular
favor or popular influence . The influence , if any , is of a different
sort , arising from dignity of life and conduct , abstinence from
political contests , exclusive devotion to the advancement of the
la
w , and a firm administration of justice ; circumstances which
are felt more b
y
the profession than they can be expected to be
praised b
y
the public .
$ 762 . Besides , it ought not to be overlooked that such an addi
tional accumulation of power in the judicial department would not
only furnish pretexts fo
r
clamor against it , but might create a
general dread of it
s
influence , which could hardly fail to disturb
the salutary effects o
f
it
s ordinary functions . There is nothing
o
f
which a free people are so apt to b
e jealous as o
f
the existence
o
f political functions and political checks in those who ar
e
not
appointed b
y
and made directly responsible - to themselves . The
judicial tenure o
f
office during good behavior , though in some
respects most favorable for an independent discharge o
f
these
1 The Federalist , No . 65 .
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functions and checks , is at the same time obnoxious to some
strong objections as a remedy for impeachable offences .
$ 763 . There are , however, reasons of great weight besides
those which have been already alluded to , which fully justify the
conclusion that the Supreme Court is not the most appropriate
ribunal to be invested with authority to tr
y
impeachments .
$ 764 . In the first place , the nature of the functions to be per
formed . The offences to which the power of impeachment has
been and is ordinarily applied a
s
a remedy are o
f
a political char
acter . Not but that crimes of a strictly legal character fall within
the scope o
f
the power ( fo
r , as we shall presently see , treason ,
bribery , and other high crimes and misdemeanors are expressly
within it ) ; but that it has a more enlarged operation , and reaches
what are aptly termed political offences , growing out of personal
misconduct o
r gross neglect , o
r usurpation , o
r
habitual disregard
o
f
the public interests , in the discharge of the duties of political
office . These are so various in their character , and so indefinable
in their actual involutions , that it is almost impossible to provide
systematically for them b
y positive law . They must be examined
upon very broad and comprehensive principles o
f public policy and
duty . They must be judged of b
y
the habits and rules and prin
ciples o
f diplomacy o
f departmental operations and arrangements ,
o
f parliamentary practice , of executive customs and negotiations ,
o
f foreign as well as domestic political movements ; and , in short ,
b
y
a great variety o
f
circumstances , as well those which aggravate
a
s
those which extenuate o
r justify the offensive acts which do not
properly belong to the judicial character in th
e
ordinary adminis
tration o
f justice , and are far removed from the reach ofmunicipal
jurisprudence . They are duties which are easily understood by
statesmen , and are rarely known to judges . A tribunal composed
o
f
the former would therefore b
e
fa
r
more competent in point o
f
intelligence and ability than the latter for the discharge o
f
the
functions , al
l
other circumstances being equal . And , surely , in
such grave affairs , the competency of the tribunal to discharge the
duties in th
e
best manner is an indispensable qualification .
$ 765 . In the next place , it is obvious that the strictness of the
forms o
f proceeding in cases o
f
offences a
t
cominon la
w
is ill
adapted to impeachments . The very habits growing out of judi
cial employments , the rigid manner in which the discretion of
judges is limited and fenced in on a
ll
sides , in order to protect
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persons accused of crimes by rules and precedents , and the ad
herence to technical principles , which , perhaps, distinguishes this
branch of the law more than any other , are all ill adapted to the
trial of political offences in the broad course of impeachments .
And it has been observed , with great propriety , that a tribunal of
a liberal and comprehensive character , confined as little as possi
ble to strict forms , enabled to continue its session as long as the
nature o
f
the law may require , qualified to view the charge in al
l
it
s bearings and dependencies , and to appropriate on sound princi
ples o
f public policy the defence o
f
the accused , seems indispen
sable to the value o
f
the trial . The history of impeachments ,
both in England and America , justifies the remark . There is
little technical in the mode of proceeding ; the charges are suffi
ciently clear , and yet in a general form ; there are few excep
tions ,which arise in the application of the evidence , which grow
out o
f
mere technical rules and quibbles . And it has repeatedly
been seen that the functions have been better understood , and
more liberally and justly expounded , b
y
statesmen than b
y
mere
lawyers . An illustrious instance of this sort is upon record in the
case o
f
th
e
trial of Warren Hastings , where the question whether
a
n impeachment was abated b
y
a dissolution o
f
Parliament was
decided in the negative b
y
the house o
f
lords , as well as the house
o
f
commons , against what seemed to be the weight o
f professional
opinion .
$ 766 . In the next place , the very functions involving political
interests and connections ar
e
precisely those which it seems most
important to exclude from the cognizance and participation of the
judges o
f
the Supreme Court . Much of the reverence and respect
belonging to the judicial character arise from the belief that the
tribunal is impartial , as well as enlightened ; just , as well as
searching . It is of very great consequence that judges should not
only be , in fact , above al
l
exception in this respect , but that they
should be generally believed to be so . They should not only be
pure , but , if possible , above suspicion . Many of the offences
which will be charged against public men will be generated b
y
the heats and animosities o
f party , and the very circumstance
that judges should be called to si
t , as umpires , in the contro
versies o
f party , would inevitably involve them in the common
i Rawle on the Constitution , ch . 22 , p . 212 .
2 4 Black . Comm . 400 , Christian ' s Note .
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odium of partisans , and place them in public opinion , if not in
fact, at least in form , in the array on one side or the other.
The habits , to
o , arising from such functions , will lead them to
take a more ardent part in public discussions , and in the vindica
tion o
f
their own political decisions , than seems desirable fo
r
those
who are daily called upon to decide upon the private rights and
claims o
f
men distinguished for their political consequence , zeal ,
o
r activity in the ranks of party . In a free government like ours
there is a peculiar propriety in withdrawing a
s
much as possible
a
ll judicial functionaries from the contests of mere party strife .
With a
ll
their efforts to avoid them , from the free intercourse ,
and constant changes in a republican government both o
f
men
and measures , there is at al
l
times th
e
most imminent danger that
a
ll
classes o
f
society will be drawn into the vortex of politics .
Whatever shall have a tendency to secure in tribunals of justice a
spirit of moderation and exclusive devotion to juridical duties is
o
f
inestimable value . What can more surely advance this object
than the exemption o
f
them from all participation in , and control
over , the acts of political men in their official duties ? Where ,
indeed , those acts fall within the character of known crimes a
t
common la
w , or by positive statute , there is little difficulty in th
e
duty , because the rule is known , and equally applies to al
l
per
sons , in and out of office ; and the facts are to be tried b
y
a jury ,
according to the habitual course o
f investigation in common cases .
The remark o
f Mr . Woodeson on this subject is equally just and
appropriate . After having enumerated some of the cases in which
impeachments have been tried fo
r
political offences , he adds that
from these “ it is apparent how little the ordinary tribunals are
calculated to take cognizance o
f
such offences , or to investigate .
and reform the general polity o
f
the state . ” 1
$ 767 . In the next place , the judges of the Supreme Court are
appointed b
y
the executive , and will naturally feel some sympathy
and attachment fo
r
the person to whom they owe this honor , and
fo
r
those whom he selects a
s
his confidential advisers in th
e
de
partments . Yet the President himself and those confidential
advisers are the very persons who are eminently the objects to be
reached b
y
the power o
f impeachment . The very circumstance
that some , perhaps amajority , of the Court , owe their elevation to
the same chief magistrate whose acts , or those of his confidential
1 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 602 .
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advisers , are on trial , would have some tendency to diminish the
public confidence in the impartiality and independence of the tri
bunal .
$ 768 . But , in the next place , a far more weighty consideration
is , that some of the members of the judicial department may be
impeached for malconduct in office ; and thus that spirit which ,
for want o
f
a better term , has been called the corporation spirit of
organized tribunals and societies , will naturally be brought into
play . Suppose a judge of the Supreme Court should himself be
impeached ; thenumber o
f
his triers would not only be diminished ,
but all the attachments and partialities , or it may be the rivalries
and jealousies , of peers on the same bench ,may be , or (what is
practically almost as mischievous ) may be suspected to be , put in
operation to screen o
r exaggerate the offence . Would any person
soberly decide that the judges o
f
the Supreme Court would b
e
the
safest and the best o
f
a
ll
tribunals fo
r
the trial of a brother judge ,
taking human feelings a
s they are and human infirmity a
s it is ?
If not , would there not be , even in relation to inferior judges , a
sense o
f indulgence , or a bias of pinion upon certain judicial acts
and practices , which might incline their minds to undue extenua
tion o
r
to undue harshness ? And if there should be , in fact , no
danger from such a source , is there not some danger , under such
circumstances , that a jealousy of the operatious of judicial tri
bunals over judicial offences would create in the minds of the
community a broad distinction in regard to convictions and pun
ishments between them and merely political offences ? Would
not the power o
f impeachment cease to possess its just reverence
and authority if such a distinction should prevail ; and especially
if political victims rarely escaped , and judicial officers as rarely
suffered ? Can it be desirable thus to create any tendency in the
public mind towards the judicial department which may impair it
s
general respect and daily utility ? 1
$ 769 . Considerations of this sort cannot be overlooked in in
quiries o
f
this nature ; and if to some minds they may not seem
wholly satisfactory , they at least establish that the Supreme Court
is not a tribunal for the trial of impeachment wholly above al
l
rea
sonable exceptions . But if to considerations of this sort it is
added that the common practice of free governments , and espe
cially of England and o
f
the States composing the Union , has been
1 But see Rawle o
n
th
e
Constitution , ch . 22 , p . 214 .
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to confide this power to one department of the legislative body
upon the accusation of another ; and that this has been found to
work well , and to adjust itself to the public feelings and prejudices ,
to the dignity of the legislature , and to the tranquillity of the State ,
the inference in it
s
favor cannot but be greatly strengthened and
confirmed .
$ 770 . To those who felt difficulties in confiding to the Supreme
Court alone the trial o
f impeachments , the scheme might present
itself o
f uniting that court with the Senate jointly fo
r
this purpose .
T
o this union many o
f
the objections already stated ,and especially
those founded on the peculiar functions of the judicial department ,
would apply with the same force as they do to vesting the Supreme
Court with the exclusive jurisdiction . In some other respects
there would result advantages from the union ; but they would
scarcely overbalance the disadvantages . If the judges , compared
with th
e
whole body o
f
the Senate , were few in number , their
weight would scarcely be felt in that body . The habits of co -oper
ation in common daily duties would create among the senators a
n
habitual confidence and sympathy with each other , and the same
habits would produce a correspondent influence among the judges .
There would , therefore , be two distinct bodies acting together pro
re nata , which were in a great measure strangers to each other ,
and with feelings , pursuits , and modes of reasoning wholly dis
tinct from each other . Great contrariety of opinion might natu
rally b
e presumed under such circumstances to spring u
p , and , in
a
ll probability , would become quite marked in the action of the
two bodies . Suppose , upon an impeachment , the senators should
b
e
o
n
one side and the judges on the other ; suppose a minority
composed o
f all the judges and a considerable number of the sen
ators ; or suppose a majority made b
y
th
e
co -operation o
f
a
ll
the
judges ; in these , and many other cases , there might be no incon
siderable difficulty in satisfying the public mind a
s
to the result o
f
the impeachment . Judicial opinion might g
o
urgently one way ,
and political character and opinion as urgently another way .
Such a state o
f things would have little tendency to add weight
o
r dignity to the court in the opinion o
f
the community . And
perhaps a lurking suspicion might pervade many minds , that one
body o
r
the other had possessed an undue preponderance o
f influ
ence in the actual decision . Even jealousies and discontents
i The Federalist , No . 65 .
VOL . I . 35
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might grow up in the bosoms of the component bodies themselves ,
from their own difference o
f
structure and habits and occupa
tions and duties . The practice of governments has not bitherto
established any great value as attached to the intermixture o
f dif
ferent bodies for single occasions o
r temporary objects .
$ 771 . A third schememight be to intrust the trial of impeach
ments to a special tribunal , constituted fo
r
that sole purpose . But
whatever arguments may be found in favor of such a plan , there
will be found to be correspondent objections and difficulties . It
would tend to increase the complexity of the political machine ,
and add a new spring to the operations of the government , the
utility of which would be at least questionable , andmight clog its
just movements . A court of this nature would be attended with
heavy expenses ,and might , in practice , be subject tomany casual
ties and inconveniences . It must consist either of permanent offi
cers , stationary at the seat of government , and of course entitled
to fixed and regular stipends , or o
f
national officers , called to the
duties fo
r
the occasion , though previously designated b
y
office o
r
rank ; or of officers of the State governments , selected when the
impeachment was actually depending . Now , either of these alter
natives would be found full of embarrassment and intricacy , when
a
n attempt should bemade to give it a definite form and organiza
tion . The court , in order to be efficient and independent , ought
to be numerous . It ought to possess talents , experience , dignity ,
and weight o
f
character , in order to obtain , or to hold , the confi
dence o
f
the nation . What national officers , not belonging to
either o
f
the great departments o
f
the government , legislative ,
executive , o
r judicial , could be found embracing all these requisite
qualifications ? And if they could be ,what compensation is to be
made to them in order to maintain their characters and impor
tance , and to secure their services ? If the court is to be selected
from the State functionaries , in whatmanner is this to be accom
plished ? How can their acceptance , or performance of the du
ties , be either secured or compelled ? Does it not at once submit
the whole power o
f impeachment to the control o
f
the State gov
ernments , and thus surrender into their hands al
l
the means o
f
making it efficient and satisfactory ? In political contests it can
not b
e supposed that either the States o
r
the State functionaries will
not become partisans , and deeply interested in the success or de
i The Federalist , No . 64 . 2 The Federalist , No . 65 .
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feat ofmeasures , in the triumph or the ruin of rivals or opponents .
Parties will naturally desire to screen a friend or overwhelm an
adversary , to secure th
e
predominance of a local policy o
r
a State
party ; and if so , what guaranty is there for any extraordinary
fidelity , independence , o
r impartiality , in a tribunal so composed ,
beyond a
ll
others ? Descending from such general inquiries to
more practical considerations , it may be asked , how shall such a
tribunal be composed ? Shall it be composed of State executives ,
o
r
State legislators , or State judges , o
r o
f
a mixture o
f
a
ll , o
r
a
selection from a
ll
? If the body is very large , it will become
unwieldy and feeble from it
s
own weight . If it be a mixture of
all , it will possess too many elements of discord and diversities of
judgment , and local and professional opinion . If it be homogene
ous in it
s
character , as if it consist altogether of one class of men ,
a
s o
f
the executives o
f
a
ll
the States , or the judges of the supreme
courts o
f all the States , can it be supposed (even if an equality
in a
ll
other respects could be certainly obtained ) that persons ,
selected mainly b
y
the States fo
r
local and peculiar objects , could
best administer the highest and most difficult functions o
f
the na
tional government ?
$ 772 . The Federalist has spoken with unusual freedom and
directness on this subject . “ The first scheme ” (that is , of vest
ing the power in some permanent national officers ) “ will be rep
robated b
y
every man who can compare the extent o
f
the public
wants with the means o
f supplying them . The second ” (that is ,
o
f
vesting it in State officers ) “ will be espoused with caution b
y
those who will seriously consider the difficulties o
f collecting men
dispersed over the whole Union ; the injury to the innocent from
the procrastinated determination o
f
the charges which might be
brought against them ; the advantage to the guilty from the
opportunities which delay would afford for intrigue and corrup
tion ; and in some cases the detriment to the State from the pro
longed inaction o
f
men whose firm and faithful execution of their
duty might have exposed them to the persecution of an intemper
a
te o
r designing majority in the House of Representatives . Though
this latter supposition may seem harsh , and might not be likely
often to b
e
verified , ye
t
it ought not to be forgotten that th
e
d
e
mon o
f
faction will , at certain seasons , extend his sceptre over al
l
numerous bodies o
f
men . ” And the subject is concluded with the
following reflection : “ Ifmankind were to resolve to agree in no
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institution of government until every part o
f it had been adjusted
to the most exact standard o
f perfection , society would soon be
come a general scene o
f anarchy , and the world a desert . ” 1
$ 773 . A scheme somewhat different from either of the foregoing
has been recommended b
y
a learned commentator , drawn from the
Virginia constitution , b
y
which , in that State , all impeachments
are to be tried in the courts o
f
law , “ according to the laws of the
land ” ; and b
y
the State laws the facts , as in other cases , are to
be tried b
y
a jury . But the objections to this course would be
very serious , not only from the considerations already urged ,but
from the difficulty of impanelling a suitable jury fo
r
such pur
poses . From what State or States is such a jury to be drawn ?
How is it to be selected or composed ? What are to be the quali
fications o
f
the jurors ? Would it be safe to intrust the political
interests o
f
a whole people to a common panel ? Would any jury
in times o
f party excitement b
e
found sufficiently firm to give a
true verdict , unaffected by the popularity or odium of the measure ,
when the nation was the accuser ? These questions are more
easily put than they can b
e satisfactorily answered . And , indeed ,
the very circumstance that the example o
f Virginia has found
little favor in other States , furnishes decisive proof that it is not
deemed better than others to which the national Constitution bears
the closest analogy .
$ 774 . When the subject was before the State conventions ,
although here and there an objection was started against the plan ,
three States only formally proposed any amendment . Virginia
and North Carolina recommended “ that some tribunal other than
the Senate b
e provided for trying impeachments o
f
senators , ” 3
leaving the provision in all other respects as it stood . New York
alone recommended an amendment , that the Senate , the judges of
the Supreme Court , and the first or senior judge of the highest
State court o
f general o
r ordinary common -law jurisdiction in
each State should constitute a court fo
r
the trial o
f impeachments .
This recommendation does not change the posture o
f
a single
objection . It received no support elsewhere , and the subject has
since silently slept without any effort to revive it .
$ 775 . The conclusion to which , upon a large survey of the
whole subject , our judgments ar
e
naturally led is , that th
e
power
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 65 . ? 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 337 , 33
8
.
9 Journ . of Convention , Supp . 425 , 448 . * Id . 437 .
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has been wisely deposited with the Senate. In the language of a
learned commentator , it may be said that, of all the departments of
the government , “ none will be found more suitable to exercise this
peculiar jurisdiction than the Senate . Although , like their ac
cusers , they are representatives of the people , yet they are by a
degree more removed , and hold their stations for a longer term .
They are , therefore , more independent of the people , and being
chosen with the knowledge that they may , while in office , be
called upon to exercise this high function , they bring with them
the confidence of their constituents , that they will faithfully exe
cute it, and the implied compact , on their own part , that it shall
be honestly discharged . Precluded from ever becoming accusers
themselves , it is their duty not to lend themselves to the animosi
ties of party or the prejudices against individuals , which may
sometimes unconsciously induce the House of Representatives to
the acts of accusation . Habituated to comprehensive views of the
great political relations of the country , they are naturally the best
qualified to decide on those charges which may have any con
nection with transactions abroad or great political interests at
home . And although we cannot say that, like the English house
of lords , they form a distinct body, wholly uninfluenced by the
passions and remote from the interests of the people, yet we can
discover in no other division of the government a greater proba
bility of impartiality and independence .” 2
$ 776 . The remaining parts of the clause of the Constitution
now under consideration will not require an elaborate commen
tary . The first is , that the Senate, when sitting as a court of
impeachment , “ shall be on oath or affirmation " ; a provision
which , as it appeals to the conscience and integrity of the mem
bers by the same sanctions which apply to judges and jurors who
si
t
in other trials , will commend itself to all persons who deem the
highest trusts , rights , and duties worthy o
f
the same protection
and security , at least , as those of the humblest order . It would ,
indeed , be a monstrous anomaly , that the highest officers might
be convicted of the worst crimes without any sanction being inter
posed against the exercise o
f themost vindictive passions , while
the humblest individual has a right to demand an oath of fidelity
from those who ar
e
h
is peers and hi
s
triors . In England , how
ever , upon the trial of impeachments , the house of lords are not
1 The Federalist , No . 65 . 2 Rawle on th
e
Const . ch . 22 , p . 21
2 , 21
3
.
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under oath , but only make a declaration upon their honor . This
is a strange anomaly , as in all civil and criminal trials b
y
a jury
the jurors are under oath ; and there seems no reason why a sanc
tion equally obligatory upon the consciences o
f
the triors should not
exist in trials for capital or other offences before every other tribu
nal . What is there in th
e
honor of a peer which necessarily
raises it above the honor o
f
a commoner ? The anomaly is
rendered still more glaring b
y
the fact that a peer cannot give
testimony , as a witness , except on oath ; for here his honor is not
trusted . The maxim of the law in such a case is , in judicio non
creditur , nisi juratis . Why should the obligation of a judge be
less solemn than the obligation o
f
a witness ? The truth is , that
it is a privilege of power conceded in barbarous times , and founded
o
n feudal sovereignty more than on justice o
r principle .
$ 777 . The next provision is : “ When th
e
President o
f
the
United States is tried , the Chief Justice shall preside . ” The
reason o
f
this clause has been already adverted to . It was to
preclude the Vice -President ,who might be supposed to have a
natural desire to succeed to the office , from being instrumental in
procuring the conviction o
f
th
e
Chief Magistrate . 3 Under such
circumstances , who could be deemed more suitable to preside than
the highest judicial magistrate of the Union ? His impartiality
and independence could be a
s
little suspected a
s
those o
f
any per
son in th
e
country . And th
e
dignity of his station might well be
deemed a
n adequate pledge for the possession o
f
the highest
accomplishments .
$ 778 . It is added , “ And no person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two thirds o
f
themembers present . " Although
very numerous objections were taken to the Constitution , none
seems to have presented itself against this particular quorum re
quired fo
r
a conviction ; and yet itmight have been fairly thought to
b
e open to attack on various sides , from its supposed theoretical in
convenience and incongruity . It might have been said , with some
plausibility , that it deserted the general principles even of courts
o
f justice , where a mere majority make the decision , and of al
l
legislative bodies , where a similar rule is adopted , and that the
requisition o
f
two thirds would reduce the power o
f impeachment
11 Black . Comm . 402 ; 4 Inst . 49 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 53 .
? i Black . Comm . 402 .
3 Rawle o
n
Const . ch . 22 , p . 216 .
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to amere nullity . Besides, upon the trial of impeachments in the
house of lords, the conviction or acquittal is by a mere majority ; 1
so that there is a failure of any analogy to support the precedent.
$779. It does not appear from any authentic memorials what
were the precise grounds upon which this limitation was inter
posed . But it may well be conjectured that the real grounds
were to secure an impartial trial , and to guard public men from
being sacrificed to the immediate impulses of popular resentment
or party predominance . In England , the house of lords , from its
very structure and hereditary independence , furnishes a sufficient
barrier against such oppression and injustice . Mr . Justice Black
stone has remarked , with manifest satisfaction , that the nobility
“ have neither the same interests nor the same passions a
s popu
lar assemblies ” ; and that “ it is proper that the nobility should
judge , to insure justice to the accused ; as it is proper that th
e
people should accuse , to insure justice to the commonwealth . ” 2
Our Senate is , from the very theory of the Constitution , founded
upon a more popular basis ; and it was desirable to prevent any
combination o
f
a mere majority o
f
the States to displace or to de
stroy a meritorious public officer . If a mere majority were suffi
cient to convict , there would be danger in times of high popular
commotion or party spirit , that the influence of the House of Rep
resentatives would be found irresistible . The only practicable
check seemed to b
e
the introduction o
f
the clause o
f
two thirds ,
which would thus require an union o
f opinion and interest , rare ,
except in cases where guilt was manifest and innocence scarcely pre
sumable . Nor could the limitation be justly complained of ; for , in
common cases , the law not only presumes every man innocent
until he is proved guilty , but unanimity in the verdict of the jury
is indispensable . Here an intermediate scale is adopted between
unanimity and a mere majority . And if the guilt o
f
a public offi
cer cannot be established to the satisfaction o
f
two thirds o
f
a body
o
f high talents and acquirements , which sympathizes with the
people and represents the States , after a full investigation o
f the
facts , it must be that the evidence is too infirm and to
o
loose to
justify a conviction . Under such circumstances , it would b
e
far
1 Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 16 , 17 ; 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 612 . [ A judgment of
impeachment in the house o
f
lords requires , however , that a
t
least twelve o
f
the mem
bers should concur in it . And “ a verdict b
y
less than twelve would not b
e good . ”
Comyn ' s Digest , L . 17 . — E . H . B . )
2 4 Black . Comm . 261 .
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more consonant to the notions o
f justice in a republic that a guilty
person should escape , than that an innocent person should become
the victim o
f injustice from popular odium or party combinations .
$ 780 . A
t
the distance of forty years , w
e
may look back upon
this reasoning with entire satisfaction . The Senate has been
found a safe and effective depositary of the trial o
f impeachments .
During that period but four cases have occurred requiring this high
remedy . In three there have been acquittals , and in one a con
viction . Whatever may have been th
e
opinions o
f
zealous par
tisans a
t
the times o
f
their occurrence , the sober judgment of the
nation sanctioned these results , at least on the side of the acquit
tals , as soon as they became matters of history , removed from the
immediate influences o
f
the prosecutions . The unanimity of the
awards of public opinion , in its final action on these controversies ,
has been as great and a
s satisfactory a
s
can b
e
attributed to any
which involve real doubt or enlist warm prejudices and predilec
tions on either side . No reproach has ever reached the Senate
for it
s
unfaithful discharge of these high functions ; and the voice
o
f
a State has rarely , if ever , displaced a single senator for his
vote on such an occasion . What more could be asked in the pro
gress o
f any government ? What more could experience produce
to justify confidence in the institution ?
$ 781 . The next clause is , that “ Judgment in cases of impeach
ment shall not extend further than to removal from office and dis
qualification to hold and enjoy any office o
f
honor , trust , or profit
under the United States . But the party convicted shall neverthe
i The trials , here alluded to , were of William Blount in 1799 , of Samuel Chase in
1805 , of John Pickering in 1803 , and of James H . Peck in 1831 . The three former
are alluded to in Rawle o
n
the Const . ch . 2
2 , p . 215 . See also 4 Tuck . Black . Comm .
261 , note ; Id . App . 5
7 , and Senate Journals o
f
the respective years . Rawle o
n
Const .
ch . 2
2 , p . 215 ; Sergeant o
n
Constitutional Law , ch . 2
9 , p . 363 , 364 . [ The danger that
senators , chosen as representatives of political parties , will be swayed , consciously or
unconsciously , by considerations that should not influence them , is much greater on the
trial of a political officer from whose removal o
r
retention party advantage might be
expected , than on that of a judge . This was forcibly illustrated b
y
the case o
f
Presi .
dent Johnson , in which ,with a fe
w
exceptions , senators divided on the question of guilt
strictly according to their political affinities . The State of New York seeks to prevent
such results b
y
providing that the judges o
f
th
e
court o
f appeals — a body o
f
men
removed b
y
their position from the sphere o
f party politics , and likely to b
e
little
influenced b
y
the passions o
f
the hour — shall constitute a part o
f
the court o
f
im
peachment . In some cases such an elementmight be of incalculable value . It would
b
e
a calamity o
f
the highest moment if the precedent should be set of the conviction
and removal o
f
the President o
n
a partisan vote , and on grounds not sanctioned b
y
the
sober sense and mature reflection o
f
the people . )
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less be liable and subject to indictment , trial, judgment , and pun
ishment , according to law .”
$ 782 . It is obvious that, upon trials on impeachments , one of
two courses must be adopted 'in case of a conviction ; either for
the court to proceed to pronounce a full and complete sentence
of punishment fo
r
the offence , according to the law of the land in
like cases pending in the common tribunals o
f justice , superadding
the removal from office and the consequent disabilities ; or to con
fine it
s
sentence to the removal from office and other disabilities .
If the former duty be a part o
f
the constitutional functions o
f
the
court , then , in case of an acquittal , there cannot be another trial
o
f
the party for the same offence in the common tribunals o
f jus
tice , because it is repugnant to the whole theory of the common
law that a man should be brought into jeopardy of life o
r
limb
more than once fo
r
the same offence . A plea of acquittal is ,
therefore , an absolute bar against any second prosecution fo
r
the
same offence . If the court of impeachments is merely to pronounce
a sentence o
f
removal from office and th
e
other disabilities , then it
is indispensable that provision should be made that the common
tribunals o
f
justice should be a
t liberty to entertain jurisdiction o
f
the offence fo
r
the purpose o
f inflicting the common punishment
applicable to unofficial offenders . Otherwise , itmight be matter
o
f
extreme doubt whether , consistently with the great maxim
above mentioned , established fo
r
the security o
f
the life and limbs
and liberty o
f
the citizen , a second trial for the same offence could
b
e had , either after an acquittal or a conviction , in the court of
impeachments . And if no such second trial could be had , then
the grossest official offenders might escape without any substantial
punishment , even for crimes which would subject their fellow
citizens to capital punishment .
$ 783 . The Constitution , then , having provided that judgment
upon impeachments shall not extend further than to removal from
office and disqualification to hold office (which , however afflictive
to a
n ambitious and elevated mind ,would be scarcely felt as a
punishment b
y
the profligate and the base ) , has wisely subjected
the party to trial in the common criminal tribunals , fo
r
the pur
pose o
f receiving such punishment as ordinarily belongs to the
offence . Thus , fo
r
instance , treason , which b
y
our laws is a
capital offence ,may receive its appropriate punishment ; and bri
1 4 Black . Comm . 33
5 , 361 ; Hawk . P . C . , B . 2 , ch . 35 .
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bery in high officers , which otherwise would be a mere disqualifi
cation from office ,may have the measure of its infamy dealt out
to it with the same unsparing severity which attends upon other
and humbler offenders .
$ 784 . In England , the judgment upon impeachments is not
confined to mere removal from office ,but extends to the whole
punishment attached b
y
law to the offence . The house of lords ,
therefore , upon a conviction , may b
y
it
s
sentence inflict capital
punishment , or perpetual banishment , or forfeiture of goods and
lands , or fine and ransom , or imprisonment , as well as removal
from office and incapacity to hold office , according to the nature
and aggravation o
f
the offence .
$ 785 . As the offences to which the remedy of impeachment has
been , and will continue to be , principally applied are of a political
nature , ? it is natural to suppose that they will be often exaggerated
b
y
party spirit , and the prosecutions be sometimes dictated b
y
party resentments , as well as b
y
a sense o
f
the public good . There
is danger , therefore , that in cases of conviction the punishment
may be wholly out o
f proportion to the offence , and pressed as
much b
y popular odium as b
y
aggravated crime . From the nature
o
f
such offences , it is impossible to fix any exact grade or meas
ure , either in the offences or the punishments ; and a very large
discretion must unavoidably be vested in the court o
f impeach
ments as to both . Any attempt to define the offences , or to affix
to every grade o
f
distinction it
s appropriate measure of punish
ment ,would probably tend to more injustice and inconvenience
than it would correct , and perhaps would render the power at once
inefficient and unwieldy . The discretion , then , if confided at al
l ,
being peculiarly subject to abuse , and connecting itself with State
parties and State contentions and State animosities , it was deemed
most advisable b
y
the convention that the power of the Senate to
inflict punishment should merely reach the right and qualifications
to office , and thus take away the temptation in factious times to
sacrifice good and great men upon the altar o
f party . History had
sufficiently admonished them that the power o
f impeachment had
been thus mischievously and inordinately applied in other ages ;
and it was not safe to disregard those lessons which it had left fo
r
our instruction ,written not unfrequently in blood . Lord Strafford ,
1 Com . D
ig
. Parliament , L . 44 ; 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p .611 to 614 .
? 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 601 , 604 .
CH. X.] 555THE SENATE .
in the reign of Charles the First , and Lord Stafford , in the reign
of Charles the Second , were both convicted and punished capitally
by the house of lords ; and both have been supposed to have been
rather victims to the spirit of the times than offenders meriting
such high punishments .' And other cases have occurred , in which ,
whatever may have been the demerits of the accused , his final
overthrow has been the result of political resentments and hatreds ,
far more than of any desire to promote public justice .2
$ 786 . There is wisdom and sound policy and intrinsic justice
in this separation of the offence , at least so far as the jurisdiction
and trial are concerned , into its proper elements , bringing the
political part under the power o
f
the political department of the
government , and retaining the civil part for presentment and trial
in the ordinary forum . A jury might well be intrusted with the
latter , while the former should meet its appropriate trial and pun
ishment before th
e
Senate . If it should be asked why separate
trials should thus be successively had , and why , if a conviction
should take place in a court of law , that court might not be in
trusted with the power to pronounce a removal from office and
the disqualification to office as a part o
f
it
s
sentence , the an
swer has been already given in the reasoning against vesting any
court o
f
law with merely political functions . In the ordinary
course o
f
the administration o
f
criminal justice , no court is author
ized to remove o
r disqualify an offender a
s
a part o
f
it
s regular
judgment . If it results at all , it results as a consequence ,and not
a
s
a part o
f
the sentence . But it may be properly urged , that the
vesting o
f
such a high and delicate power to be exercised b
y
a
court of law at it
s
discretion ,would , in relation to the distinguished
functionaries o
f
the government , be peculiarly unfit and inexpe
dient . What could be more embarrassing than fo
r
a court o
f
law
to pronounce for a removal upon the mere ground o
f political
usurpation or malversation in office , admitting of endless varieties ,
from the slightest guilt u
p
to the most flagrant corruption ? Ought
a President to be removed from office a
t
th
e
mere will of a court
for political misdemeanors ? Is not a political body , like the Sen
ate , from its superior information in regard to executive functions ,
far better qualified to judge how fa
r
the public weal might be pro
moted b
y
such a punishment , in a given case , than a mere juridi
1 Rawle o
n
the Constitution , ch . 22 , p . 21
7
; 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 608 , 609 .
? Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 28 to 39 ; 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 619 , 62
0
.
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cal tribunal ? Suppose the Senate should still deem the judgment
irregular or unjustifiable , how is the removal to take effect , and
how is it to be enforced ? A separation of the removing power
altogether from the appointing power might create many practical
difficulties ,which ought not , except upon the most urgent reasons ,
to be introduced into matters of government . Without attempting
to maintain that the difficulties would be insuperable , it is suffi
cient to show that they might be highly inconvenient in practice .
$ 787 . It does not appear from the Journal of th
e
Convention
that the provision thus limiting the sentence upon impeachments
to removal and disqualification from office attracted much atten
tion until a late period o
f
it
s
deliberations . The adoption of it
was not ,however , without some difference of opinion , for it passed
only by the vote o
f
seven States against three . The reasons on
which this opposition was founded d
o not appear ; and in the State
conventions no doubt o
f
the propriety o
f
the provision scems to
have been seriously entertained .
$ 788 . In order to complete our review of th
e
constitutional
provisions on the subject of impeachments , it is necesary to ascer
tain who are the persons liable to be impeached , and what are
impeachable offences . B
y
some strange inadvertence , this part of
the Constitution has been taken from it
s natural connection , and
with n
o great propriety arranged under that head which embraces
the organization and rights and duties o
f
the executive depart
ment . To prevent the necessity of again recurring to this subject ,
the general method prescribed in these commentaries will in this
instance be departed from , and the only remaining provision on
impeachments b
e
here introduced .
$ 789 . The fourth section of the second article is as follows :
“ The President , Vice -President , and all civil officers of the
United States , shall be removed from office on impeachment fo
r ,
and conviction of , treason , bribery , o
r
other high crimes and mis
demeanors . " 3
$ 790 . From this clause it appears that the remedy b
y impeach
ment is strictly confined to civil officers of the United States , in
1 Journal o
f
the Convention , p . 227 , 302 , 353 .
? Journal o
f
the Convention , p . 227 , 302 . See 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 43 to 46 ; Id . 53
to 5
7 ; Id . 107 , 108 .
3 In the convention , the clause making the President liable to removal from office o
n
impeachment and conviction was not unanimously agreed to ; but passed b
y
a vote o
f
eight States against two . Journal o
f
Convention , p , 94 , 194 , 211 .
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cluding the President and Vice-President . In this respect it dif
fers materially from the la
w
and practice o
f Great Britain . In that
kingdom , al
l
th
e
king ' s subjects , whether peers or commoners ,
are impeachable in Parliament ; though it is asserted that com
moners cannot now b
e impeached fo
r
capital offences , but for mis
demeanors only . ' Such kind of misdeeds , however , as peculiarly
injure the commonwealth b
y
the abuse o
f
high offices o
f
trust are
the most proper , and have been the most usual grounds for this
kind of prosecution in Parliament . There seems a peculiar pro
priety , in a republican government at least , in confining the im
peaching power to persons holding office . In such a government
all the citizens are equal , and ought to have the same security of
a trial b
y
a jury for all crimes and offences laid to their charge ,
when not holding any official character . To subject them to im
peachment would not only be extremely oppressive and expensive ,
but would endanger their lives and liberties b
y exposing them
against their wills to persecution for their conduct in exercising
their political rights and privileges . Dear as the trial by jury
justly is in civil cases , its value as a protection against the resent
ment and violence o
f
rulers and factions in criminal prosecutions
makes it inestimable . It is there , and there only , that a citizen ,
in the sympathy , the impartiality , the intelligence , and incorrupt
ible integrity o
f
his fellows , impanelled to try the accusation ,may
indulge a well -founded confidence to sustain and cheer him . If
h
e
should choose to accept office , he would voluntarily incur all
the additional responsibility growing out of it . If impeached for
his conduct while in office , he could not justly complain , since he
was placed in that predicament b
y
his own choice ; and in accept
ing office h
e
submitted to all the consequences . Indeed , the mo
ment it was decided that the judgment upon impeachments should
be limited to removal and disqualification from office , it followed ,
a
s
a natural result , that it ought not to reach any but officers of
the United States . It seems to have been the original object of
the friends o
f
the national government to confine it to these limits ;
for in the original resolutions proposed to the convention , and in
all the subsequent proceedings , the power was expressly limited to
national officers .
1 4 Black . Comm . 26
0
, and Christian ' s note ; 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 601 , & c . ;
Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 28 to 40 .
? 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 601 , 602 . 3 Journal of Convention , 69 , 121 , 137 , 22
6
.
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$ 791 . Who are “ civil officers , ” within the meaning of this
constitutional provision , is an inquiry which naturally presents
itself ; and the answer cannot , perhaps , be deemed settled b
y
any
solemn adjudication . The term “ civil ” has various significa
tions . It is sometimes used in contradistinction to barbarous , or
savage , to indicate a state of society reduced to order and regular
government . Thus , we speak of civil life , civil society , civil gov
ernment , and civil liberty , in which it is nearly equivalent in
meaning to political . ' It is sometimes used in contradistinction to
criminal , to indicate the private rights and remedies o
f
men a
s
members of the community , in contrast to those which are public ,
and relate to the government . Thus , we speak o
f
civil process and
criminal process , civil jurisdiction and criminal jurisdiction . It
is sometimes used in contradistinction to military or ecclesiastical ,
to natural or foreign . Thus , we speak of a civil station as opposed
to a military or ecclesiastical station ; a civil death as opposed to
a natural death ; a civil war as opposed to a foreign war . The
sense in which the term is used in the Constitution seems to be in
contradistinction to military , to indicate the rights and duties re
lating to citizens generally , in contradistinction to those of persons
engaged in the land o
r
naval service o
f
the government . It is in
this sense that Blackstone speaks o
f
the laity in England as
divided into three distinct states ; the civil , the military , and the
maritime ; the two latter embracing the land and naval forces of
the government . And in the same sense the expenses of the
civil list of officers are spoken of in contradistinction to those of
the army and navy . 3
$ 792 . All officers of the United States , therefore , who hold
their appointments under the national government , whether their
duties are executive or judicial , in the highest or in the lowest
departments o
f
the government , with the exception o
f
officers in
the army and navy , are properly civil officers within the meaning
o
f
the Constitution , and liable to impeachment . The reason for
excepting military and naval officers is , that they are subject to
trial and punishment according to a peculiar military code , the
1 Johnson ' s Dictionary , Civil ; 1 Black . Comm . 6 , 125 , 251 ; Montesq . Spirit of
Laws , B . 1 , ch . 3 ; Rutherforth ' s Inst . B . 2 , ch . 2 , p . 23 ; Id . ch . 3 , p . 52 ; Id . ch . 8 ,
p . 359 ; Heinec . Elem . Juris . Nat . B . 2 , ch . 6 .
2 1 Black . Comm . 39
6
, 408 , 417 ; De Lolme , B . 2 , ch . 17 , p . 446 .
8 1 Black . Comm . 332 .
4 Rawle o
n
the Constitution , ch . 22 , p . 213 .
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laws, rules , and usages of war. The very nature and efficiency
ofmilitary duties and discipline require this summary and exclu
sive jurisdiction ; and the promptitude of its operations is not only
better suited to the notions o
f military men ,but they deem their
honor and their reputation more safe in the hands of their brother
officers than in any merely civil tribunal . Indeed , in military
and naval affairs , it is quite clear that the Senate could scarcely
possess competent knowledge o
r experience to decide upon the
acts o
f military men ; somuch are these acts to be governed by
mere usage and custom , b
y military discipline and military dis
cretion , that the Constitution has wisely committed the whole
trust to the decision of courts -martial .
$ 793 . A question arose upon an impeachment before the Senate
in 1799 , whether a senator was a civil officer of the United States ,
within the purview o
f
the Constitution ; and it was decided b
y
the
Senate that h
e
was not ; 1 and the like principle must apply to the
members o
f
the House o
f Representatives . This decision , upon
which the Senate itself was greatly divided , seems not to have
been quite satisfactory ( as it may be gathered ) to the minds of
some learned commentators . The reasoning b
y
which it was
sustained in the Senate does not appear , their deliberations having
been private . But it was probably held that " civil officers of the
United States ” meant such a
s
derived their appointment from
and under the national government , and not those persons who ,
though members o
f
the government , derived their appointment
from th
e
States , or th
e
people o
f
the States . In this view , the
enumeration o
f
the President and Vice -President , as impeachable
officers , was indispensable ; fo
r
they derive , or may derive , their
office from a source paramount to the national government . And
the clause o
f
the Constitution now under consideration does not
even affect to consider them officers of the United States . It
says , “ the President , Vice -President , and all civil officers ( not all
other civil officers ) shall be removed , ” & c . The language of the
clause , therefore , would rather lead to the conclusion that they
were enumerated , as contradistinguished from , rather than as
included in the description o
f civil officers o
f
the United States .
i The deeision was made by a vote of 14 against 11 . See Senate Journal , 10th Janu
ary , 1799 ; 4 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 57 , 58 ; Rawle on Const . ch . 22 , p . 213 ,
214 .
2 4 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 57 , 58 ; Rawle on Const . ch . 22 , p . 213 , 21
4
, 21
8
,
219 .
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AU.
Other clauses of the Constitution would seem to favor the same
result , particularly the clause respecting appointment of officers
of the United States by the executive , who is to “ commission
a
ll
the officers o
f
the United States " ; and the sixth section
o
f
the first article , which declares that “ no person holding any
office under the United States shall be a member o
f
either house
during his continuance in office ; and the first section of the second
article , which declares that “ no senator or representative , or
person holding an office o
f
trust o
r profit under the United States ,
shall b
e appointed an elector . " 1 It is fa
r
from being certain that
the convention itself ever contemplated that senators o
r represent
atives should be subjected to impeachment ; ? and it is very fa
r
from being clear that such a subjection would have been either
politic o
r
desirable .
$ 794 . The reasoning of the Federalist on this subject , in an
swer to some objections to vesting the trial of impeachments in
the Senate , does not lead to the conclusion that the learned author
thought the senators liable to impeachment . Some parts o
f
it
would rather incline the other way . “ The convention might with
propriety , ” it is said , “ have meditated the punishment of the ex
ecutive for a deviation from the instructions o
f
the . Senate , o
r
a
want of integrity in the conduct of the negotiations committed
to him . They might also have had in view the punishment of a
few leading individuals in the Senate , who should have prostituted
their influence in that body a
s
the mercenary instruments o
f
for
eign corruption . But they could not with more , or with equal
propriety , have contemplated th
e
impeachment and punishment
o
f
two thirds o
f
the Senate consenting to an improper treaty , than
o
f
a majority of that or of the other branch o
f
the legislature consent
ing to a pernicious o
r
unconstitutional la
w , a principle which , I be
lieve , has never been admitted into any government , ” etc . “ And yet ,
what reason is there that a majority of the House of Representa
tives ,sacrificing the interests o
f
the society b
y
a
n unjust and tyranni
cal act of legislation , should escape with impunity ,more than two
thirds o
f
the Senate sacrificing the same interests in an injurious
treaty with a foreign power ? The truth is , that , in al
l
such cases ,
it is essential to th
e
freedom and to the necessary independence of
i See Blount ' s Trial , p . 34 , 35 ; Id . 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 .
2 But see South Carolina Debates on the Constitution , January , 1788 , (printed in
Charleston , 1831 , ) p . 11 , 12 , 13 .
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the deliberations of the body, that the members of it should be ex
empt from punishment fo
r
act : done in a collective capacity ; and th
e
security to the society must depend on the care which is taken to
confide the trust to proper hands , to make it their interest to exe
cute it with fidelity , and to make it as difficult as possible for them
to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good . ” 1
And it is certain that , in some of the State conventions , themem
bers o
f Congress were admitted b
y
the friends of the Constitution
not to be objects of the impeaching power . 2
$ 795 . Itmay be admitted that a breach of duty is as repre
hensible in a legislator a
s
in a
n executive o
r judicial officer ; but it
does not follow that the same remedy should b
e applied in each case ,
o
r
that a remedy applicable to the one may not be unfit or incon
venient in the other . Senators and representatives are at short
periods made responsible to the people , and may be rejected b
y
them . And for personal offences not purely political , they are
responsible to the common tribunals o
f justice and the laws o
f
the
land . If a member of Congress were liable to be impeached fo
r
conduct in his legislative capacity a
t
the will of a majority , it might
furnish many pretexts fo
r
a
n irritated and predominant faction to
destroy the character and intercept the influence of the wisest and
most exalted patriots , who were resisting their oppressions or de
veloping their profligacy . It is , therefore , with great reason urged
that a legislator should be above a
ll
fear and influence o
f
this sort
in his public conduct . The impeachment of a legislator fo
r
his
official acts has hitherto been unacknowledged , as matter of right ,
in th
e
annals o
f England and America . A silence of this sort is
conclusive a
s
to the state o
f public opinion in relation to the im
policy and danger o
f conferring the power . 3
$ 796 . The next inquiry is , what are impeachable offences ?
They are “ treason , bribery , or other high crimes andmisdemean
ors . ” For the definition of treason , resort may be had to the Con
stitution itself ; but for the definition of bribery ,resort is naturally
and necessarily lad to the common law ; for that , as the common
basis o
f
our jurisprudence , can alone furnish the proper exposition
o
f
the nature and limits of this offence . The only practical ques
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 66 .
2 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 56 , 57 .
8 The arguments o
f
counsel , fo
r
and against a senator ' s being an impeachable officer ,
will be found at large in the printed trial of William Blount , on his impeachment
(Philad . 1799 ) .
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tion is , what are to be deemed high crimes and misdemeanors ?
Now , neither the Constitution nor any statute o
f
the United States
has in anymanner defined any crimes , except treason and bribery ,
to b
e high crimes and misdemeanors , and as such impeachable .
In what manner , then , are they to be ascertained ? Is the silence
o
f
the statute -book to be deemed conclusive in favor of the party
until Congress have made a legislative declaration and enumera
tion o
f
the offences which shall be deemed high crimes and mis
demeanors ? If so , then , as has been truly remarked , th
e
power
o
f impeachment , except as to the two expressed cases , is a com
plete nullity , and the party is wholly dispunishable , however enor
mous may be his corruption o
r criminality . It will not be suffi
cient to say that , in the cases where any offence is punished b
y
any
statute o
f
the United States , it may and ought to be deemed an
impeachable offence . It is not every offence that b
y
the Constitution
is so impeachable . It must not only be an offence ,but a high crime
and misdemeanor . Besides , there are many most flagrant offences
which , b
y
the statutes of the United States , are punishable only
when committed in special places and within peculiar jurisdictions ,
a
s , for instance , on the high seas , or in forts , navy -yards , and arse
nals ceded to the United States . Suppose the offence is committed
in some other than these privileged places , or under circumstances
not reached b
y any statute of the United States , would it be im
peachable ?
$ 797 . Again , there are many offences purely political , which
have been held to be within the reach of parliamentary impeach
ments , not one of which is in the slightest manner alluded to in
our statute -book . And , indeed , political offences are of so various
and complex a character , so utterly incapable of being defined or
classified , that the task of positive legislation would be impracti .
cable , if it were not almost absurd to attempt it . What , fo
r
in
stance , could positive legislation do in cases of impeachment like
1 Rawle o
n
th
e
Constitution , ch . 29 , p . 27
3
.
2 Upon the trial ofMr . Justice Chase , in 1805 , it was contended in his answer and
defence , that no civil officer was impeachable , but “ for treason , bribery , corruption , or
some high crime o
r
misdemeanor consisting in some act done o
r
omitted in violation o
f
law forbidding o
r commanding it . ” “ Hence it clearly results , that no civil officer of
the United States can b
e impeached , except for some offence for which he may be
indicted a
t
la
w ; and that no evidence ca
n
b
e
received o
n
a
n impeachment , except such ,
a
s , on an indictment a
t
law for the same offence , would be admissible . " ( 1 Chase ' s
Trial , p . 47 , 48 . ) The same doctrine was insisted on b
y
his counsel . ( 2 Chase ' s
Trial , p . 9 to 18 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 262 . )
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the charges against Warren Hastings in 1788 ? Resort , then ,
must be had either to parliamentary practice and the common
law , in order to ascertain what are high crimes and misdemean
ors, or the whole subject must be left to the arbitrary discretion
of the Senate fo
r
the time being . The latter is so incompatible
with the genius o
f
our institutions , that no lawyer or statesman
would be inclined to countenance so absolute a despotism of opin
ion and practice , which might make that a crime at one time , or
in one person , which would be deemed innocent a
t
another time ,
o
r
in another person . The only safe guide in such cases must be
the common law , which is the guardian at once of private rights
and public liberties . And , however much it may fall in with the
political theories o
f
certain statesmen and jurists to deny the exist
ence o
f
a common law belonging to and applicable to th
e
nation in
ordinary cases , no one has as yet been bold enough to assert that
the power o
f impeachment is limited to offences positively defined
in the statute -book o
f
the Union as impeachable high crimes and
misdemeanors .
$ 798 . The doctrine , indeed ,would be truly alarming , that the
common law did not regulate , interpret , and control the powers
and duties o
f
the court o
f impeachment . What , otherwise , would
become o
f
the rules o
f
evidence , the legal notions of crimes , and
the application o
f principles of public or municipal jurisprudence
to the charges against the accused ? It would be a most extraor
dinary anomaly , that while every citizen of every State originally
composing the Union would be entitled to the common law as his
birthright , and at once his protector and guide , as a citizen of
the Union , or an officer o
f
the Union , he would be subjected to
n
o
la
w , to no principles , to no rules of evidence . It is the boast
o
f English jurisprudence , and without it the power of impeachment
would be an intolerable grievance , that in trials b
y
impeachment
the law differs not in essentials from criminal prosecutions before
inferior courts . The same rules of evidence , the same legal no
tions o
f
crimes and punishments , prevail . For impeachments are
not framed to alter the law , but to carry it into more effectual
execution , where it might be obstructed b
y
the influence of too
powerful delinquents , or not easily discerned in the ordinary course
o
f jurisdiction , by reason of the peculiar quality of the alleged
crimes . Those who believe that the common law , so fa
r
a
s it is
1 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 61
1 ,612 ; 4 Black . Comm . 26
1 , Christian ' s Note ( 2 ) .
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applicable , constitutes a part of the law of the United States in
their sovereign character a
s
a nation , not as a source of jurisdic
tion , but as a guide and check and expositor in the administration
o
f
th
e
rights ,duties , and jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution
and laws , will find no difficulty in affirming the same doctrines to
be applicable to the Senate as a court of impeachments . Those
who denounce the common law as having any application or exist
ence in regard to the national government must be necessarily
driven to maintain that the power of impeachment is , until Con
gress shall legislate , a mere nullity , or that it is despotic , both in
it
s
reach and in it
s proceedings . It is remarkable that the first
Congress , assembled in October , 1774 , in their famous declaration
o
f
the rights o
f
the colonies , asserted “ that the respective colonies
are entitled to the common law o
f England , and that they are
entitled to the benefit of such o
f
the English statutes as existed
a
t
th
e
time of their colonization , and which they have b
y
experi
ence respectively found to be applicable to their several local and
other circumstances . ” 2 It would be singular enough if , in fram
ing a national government , that common law , so justly dear to the
colonies a
s
their guide and protection , should cease to have any
existence , as applicable to the powers , rights , and privileges of the
people , or the obligations and duties and powers of the depart
ments o
f
the national government . If the cominon law has no
existence a
s
to the Union a
s
a rule or guide , the whole proceed
ings are completely a
t
the arbitrary pleasure o
f
the government
and its functionaries in all its departments .
$ 799 . Congress have unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion
that no previous statute is necessary to authorize an impeachment
for any official misconduct ; and the rules of proceeding , and the
rules of evidence , as well as the principles o
f
decision , have been
uniformly regulated by the known doctrines of the common law
and parliamentary usage . In the few cases o
f impeachment which
have hitherto been tried , no one of the charges has rested upon
1 It is notmy design in this place to enter upon the discussion of the much -contro
verted question , whether the common law constitutes a part of the national jurispru
dence , in contradistinction to that of the States . The learned reader will find the sub
ject amply discussed in the works to which h
e
has been already referred , namely , I
Tuck . Black . Comm . App . Note E , p . 378 , etc . ; in the report of the Virginia legisla
ture o
f
1799 , 1800 ; in Rawle on the Constit . ch . 30 , p . 258 , etc . ; and in Duponceau on
Jurisdiction , and the authorities there cited . 1 Kent , Comm . Lect . 16 , p . 311 , et se
q
. ;
North American Review , July , 1825 ; Mr . Bayard ' s speech , Debate on the Judiciary in
1802 , p . 372 . (Wheaton v . Peters , 8 Pet . 591 ; Kendall v . U . S . , 12 Pet . 524 . )
2 1 Journal o
f Congress , Oct . 1774 , p . 29 .
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rthe
10
misly
dem
any statutable misdemeanors .1 It seems, then , to be the settled
doctrine of the high court of impeachment that , though the com
mon la
w
cannot b
e
a foundation o
f
a jurisdiction not given b
y
the
Constitution o
r
laws , that jurisdiction , when given , attaches , and
is to b
e
exercised according to the rules o
f
the common la
w ; and
that what are and what are not high crimes and misdemeanors
is to be ascertained b
y
a recurrence to that great basis o
f Ameri
can jurisprudence . The reasoning b
y
which the power o
f
the
House o
f Representatives to punish fo
r
contempts (which are
breaches o
f privileges , and offences not defined by any positive
laws ) has been upheld b
y
the Supreme Court , stands upon similar
grounds ; fo
r
if the House had n
o jurisdiction to punish fo
r
con
tempts until the acts had been previously defined and ascertained
b
y
positive law , it is clear that the process of arrest would be
illegal . 3
$ 800 . In examining the parliamentary history of impeachments ,
it will be found that many offences , not easily definable b
y
law ,
and many o
f
a purely political character , have been deemed high
crimes and misdemeanors worthy of this extraordinary remedy .
Thus , lord chancellors and judges and other magistrates have
not only been impeached fo
r
bribery , and acting grossly contrary
to the duties o
f
their office ,but fo
r
misleading their sovereign b
y
unconstitutional opinions , and fo
r
attempts to subvert the funda
mental laws , and introduce arbitrary power . So , where a lord
chancellor has been thought to have put the great seal to an ig
nominous treaty , a lord admiral to have neglected the safeguard
o
f
the sea , an ambassador to have betrayed his trust , a privy
councillor to have propounded o
r supported pernicious and dishon
orable measures , or a confidential adviser of his sovereign to
Itmay be supposed that the first charge in the articles of impeachment against
William Blount was a statutable offence ; but on an accurate examination o
f
the act o
f
Congress o
f
1794 , it will be found not to have been so .
2 Sce Jefferson ' s Manual , $ 53 , title , Impeachment ; Blount ' s Trial on Impeachment ,
p . 29 to 31 ; Jd . 75 to 80 (Philadelphia , 1799 ) . But see Id . p . 42 to 46 . In another
clause o
f
the Constitution , power is given to the President to grant reprieres and par .
dons fo
r
offences against the United States , except in cases of impeachinent ; thus show
ing that impeachable offences are deemed offences against the United States . If the
Senate may then declare what are offences against the United States b
y
recurrence to
the common la
w ,why may not the courts of the United States , under the express del
egation o
f jurisdiction over “ all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of
the United States , ” b
y
the act o
f
1789 , ch . 2
0 , § 1
1 , act in the samemanner ?
3 Dunn v . Anderson , 6 Wheat . R . 204 ; Rawle on Constit . ch . 29 , p . 271 , 272 .
4 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 602 ; Com . Dig . title Parliament , L . 28 to 40 .
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have obtained exorbitant grants o
r incompatible employments , -
these have been a
ll
deemed impeachable offences . Some of the
offences , indeed , for which persons were impeached in the early
ages o
f
British jurisprudence , would now seem harsh and severe ;
but perhaps they were rendered necessary b
y existing corruptions ,
and the importance o
f suppressing a spirit o
f
favoritism and court
intrigue . Thus , persons have been impeached for giving bad
counsel to the king , advising a prejudicial peace , enticing the
king to act against the advice of Parliament , purchasing offices ,
giving medicine to the king without advice of physicians , pre
venting other persons from giving counsel to the king except in
their presence , and procuring exorbitant personal grants from
the king . But others , again ,were founded in the most salutary
public justice ; such as impeachments for malversations and neg
lects in office , fo
r
encouraging pirates , for official oppression , ex
tortions , and deceits , and especially fo
r
putting good magistrates
out o
f
office and advancing bad . 3 One cannot but be struck , in
this slight enumeration ,with th
e
utter unfitness of the common
tribunals o
f justice to take cognizance o
f
such offences , and with
the entire propriety o
f confiding the jurisdiction over them to a
tribunal capable of understanding and reforming and scrutiniz
ing the polity o
f
the state , 4 and of sufficient dignity to maintain
the independence and reputation o
f worthy public officers .
$ 801 . Another inquiry growing out of this subject is , whether ,
under the Constitution , any acts are impeachable except such as
are committed under color o
f
office , and whether the party ca
n
b
e impeached therefor after h
e
has ceased to hold office . A
learned commentator seems to have taken it for granted that the
liability to impeachment extends to al
l
who have been , as well as
to a
ll
who are , in public office . Upon the other point his lan
guage is a
s
follows : “ The legitimate causes o
f impeachment have
been already briefly noticed . They can have reference only to
public character and official duty . The words of the text are ,
• treason , bribery , and other high crimes and misdemeanors . '
The treason contemplated must be against the United States .
In general , those offences which may be committed equally by a
1 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 602 ; Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 28 to 40 .
2 Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 28 to 40 .
8 Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 28 to 40 .
4 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 602 .
6 Rawle o
n
Const . ch . 22 , p . 213 ; Blount ' s Trial , p . 49 , 50 ( Philad . 1799 ) .
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private person as a public officer are not the subjects of impeach
ment. Murder, burglary , robbery , and indeed all offences not im
mediately connected with office , except the two expressly men
tioned , are left to the ordinary course of judicial proceeding , and
neither house can regularly inquire into them , except for the pur
pose of expelling a member .” 1
$ 802 . It does not appear that either of these points has been
judicially settled by the court having properly cognizance of them .
In the case ofWilliam Blount , the plea of the defendant expressly
put both of them as exceptions to the jurisdiction , alleging that
at the time of the impeachment he , Blount, was not a senator ,
(though he was at the time of the charges laid against him ,) and
that he was not charged by the articles of impeachment with hav
ing committed any crime or misdemeanor in the execution of any
civil office held under the United States, nor with any malconduct
in a civil office , or abuse of any public trust in the execution
thereof . The decision , however , turned upon another point , viz . ,
that a senator was not an impeachable officer . 3
$ 803 . As it is declared in one clause of the Constitution that
“ judgment in cases o
f impeachment shall not extend further than
a removal from office , and disqualification to hold any office of
honor , trust , or profit under the United States , " and in another
clause , that the “ President , Vice -President , and al
l
civil officers o
f
the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment
fo
r , and conviction of , treason , bribery , or other high crimes or
misdemeanors , " it would seem to follow that the Senate , on the
conviction , were bound in all cases to enter a judgment of re
moval from office , though it has a discretion as to inflictivg the
punishment o
f disqualification . If , then , there must be a judg
ment o
f
removal from office , it would seem to follow that the Con
stitution contemplated that the party was still in office at the time
o
f impeachment . If he was not , his offence was still liable to be
tried and punished in the ordinary tribunals o
f justice . And it
might be argued , with some force , that it would be a vain exercise
1 Rawle o
n
Constitution , ch . 22 , p . 215 .
2 See Senate Journal , 14th Jan . 1799 ; 4 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 57 , 58 .
8 Sergeant o
n
Const . Law , ch . 2
9 , p . 363 .
* Upon th
e
impeachment and conviction o
f
John Pickering , ( 12th of March , 1804 , )
the only punishment awarded b
y
the Senate was a removal from office . See also
Blount ' s Trial , 64 to 66 ; Id . 79 , 82 , 83 (Philad . 1799 ) ; Sergeant on Const . Law , ch .
2
9 , p . 364 .
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o
f authority to try a delinquent fo
r
a
n impeachable offence , when
the most important object for which the remedy was given was no
longer necessary or attainable . And although a judgment of dis
qualification might still be pronounced , the language of th
e
Con
stitution may create some doubt whether it can be pronounced
without being coupled with a removal from office . There is also
much force in the remark that an impeachment is a proceeding
purely o
f
a political nature . It is not so much designed to punish
a
n
offender a
s
to secure the state against gross official misde
meanors . It touches neither hi
s
person nor his property , but
simply divests him o
f his political capacity . 2
$ 804 . The other point is one of more difficulty . In the argu
ment upon Blount ' s impeachment , it was pressed with great ear
nestness that there is not a syllable in the Constitution which
confines impeachments to official acts , and it is against the plain
est dictates o
f
common -sense that such restraint should be imposed
upon it . Suppose a judge should countenance or aid insurgents
in a meditated conspiracy o
r
insurrection against the government .
This is not a judicial act , and yet it ought certainly to be impeach
able . He may be called upon to tr
y
the very persons whom h
e
has aided . Suppose a judge or other officer to receive a bribe not
connected with his judicial office , could he be entitled to any pub
lic confidence ? Would not these reasons fo
r
his removal be just
a
s strong a
s if it were a case of an official bribe ? The argument
o
n the other side was , that the power of impeachment was strictly
confined to civil officers of the United States , and this necessarily
implied that it must be limited to malconduct in office . 4
$ 805 . It is not intended to express any opinion in these com
mentaries as to which is the true exposition o
f
the Constitution
o
n
th
e
points above stated . They are brought before the learned
i See Blount ' s Trial , 47 , 48 ; Id . 64 to 68 (Philad . 1799 ) ; Id . 82 .
2 Mr . Bayard . Blount ' s Trial , 28 (Philad . 1799 ) ; Id . 80 , 81 .
8 Blount ' s Trial , 39 , 40 (Philad . 1799 ) ; Id . 80 .
4 Blount ' s Trial , 46 to 49 ; Id . 62 , 64 to 68 (Philadelphia , 1799 ) . William Blount
was expelled from the Senate a fe
w
days before this impeachment , (being then a mem
ber , ) and on that occasion he was , b
y
a resolution o
f
the Senate , ( Ycas , 25 ; Nay , 1 , ]
declared to b
e
" guilty o
f
a high misdemeanor entirely inconsistent with his public trust
and duty a
s
a senator . ” The offence charged was not defined b
y
any statute o
f
th
e
United States . It was for a
n attempt to seduce a
n
United States Indian interpreter
from his duty , and to alienate the affections and confidence o
f
the Indians from the
public officers residing among them , & c . Journ , of Senate , 8th July , 1797 ; Sergeaut
o
n
Const . ' Law , ch . 28 , p . 286 , 287 .
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reader as matters still sub judice , the final decision of which may
be reasonably left to the high tribunal constituting the court of
impeachment when the occasion shall arise .
$ 806 . This subject may be concluded by a summary statement
of the mode of proceeding in the institution and trial of impeach
ments , as it is of rare occurrence , and not governed by the formal
ities of the ordinary prosecutions in courts at law .
$ 807 . When , then , an officer is known or suspected to be
guilty of malversation in office , some member of the House of
Representatives usually brings forward a resolution to accuse the
party , or for the appointment of a committee to consider and report
upon the charges laid against him . The latter is the ordinary
course , and the report of the committee usually contains , if adverse
to the party , a statement of the charges , and recommends a reso
lution that he be impeached therefor . If th
e
resolution is adopted
b
y
the House , a committee is then appointed to impeach the party
a
t the bar of the Senate , and to state that the articles against him
will be exhibited in due time , and made good before the Senate ,
and to demand that the Senate take order for the appearance o
f
the party to answer to the impeachment . This being accordingly
done , the Senate signify their willingness to take such order ; and
articles are then prepared b
y
a committee , under the direction of
the House o
f Representatives , which , when reported to and ap
proved by the House , are then presented in the like manner to the
Senate , and a committee of managers are appointed to conduct the
impeachment . As soon as the articles are thus presented , the Sen
ate issue a process , summoning the party to appear a
t
a given day
before them to answer the articles . The process is served b
y
the
sergeant - at - rms o
f
the Senate , and due return is made thereof
under oath .
$ 808 . The articles thus exhibited need not , and indeed do
not , pursue the strict form and accuracy of an indictment . They
are sometimes quite general in the form o
f
the allegations , but a
l
i Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 20 ; 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 60
3
, 604 ; Jefferson ' s
Manual , scct . 53 .
2 C
o
m
. Dig . Parliament , L . 20 ; 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 603 , 60
4
; Jefferson ' s
Manual , sect . 53 .
3 Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 21 ; Jefferson ' s Manual , sect . 53 .
4 Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 14 , 18 , 19 , 20 ; Jefferson ' s Manual , sect . 53 .
62 Woodeson ' s Lect . 40 , p . 605 , 606 ; Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 21 ; Foster on
Crown Law , 389 , 390 .
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ways contain , or ought to contain , so much certainty as to enable
the party to put himself upon the proper defence , and also , in case
o
f
a
n acquittal , to avail himself of it as a bar to another impeach
ment . Additional articles may be exhibited ,perhaps , at any stage
o
f
the prosecution .
$ 809 . When the return day of the process fo
r
appearance has
arrived , the Senate resolve themselves into a court of impeachment ,
and the senators are a
t
that time , or before , solemnly sworn or
affirmed to do impartial justice upon the impeachment , according
to the Constitution and laws o
f
the United States . The person
impeached is then called to appear and answer the articles . If he
does not appear in person o
r b
y
attorney , his default is recorded ,
and the Senate may proceed ex parte to the trial of the impeach
ment . Ifhe does appear in person or by attorney , his appearance
is recorded . Counsel fo
r
the parties ar
e
admitted to appear and
to b
e heard upon an impeachment .
$ 810 . When the party appears , he is entitled to be furnished
with a copy o
f
the articles of impeachment , and time is allowed
him to prepare his answer thereto . The answer , like the articles ,
is exempted from the necessity of observing great strictness o
f
form . The party may plead that he is not guilty as to part , and
make a further defence as to the residue ; or he may , in a few
words , saving al
l
exceptions , deny the whole charge or charges ; 3
o
r
h
e may plead specially , in justification o
r
excuse o
f
the sup
posed offences , all the circumstances attendant upon the case .
And he is also indulged with the liberty of offering argumentative
reasons , as well as facts , against the charges , in support and as
part o
f
his answer to repel them . It is usual to give a full and
particular answer separately to each article of the accusation .
$ 811 . When the answer is prepared and given in the next reg
ular proceeding is for the House of Representatives to file a replica
tion to the answer in writing , in substance denying the truth and
validity o
f
the defence stated in the answer ,and averring the truth
and sufficiency o
f
the charges , and the readiness of the House to
prove them at such convenient time and place a
s
shall be appointed
for that purpose b
y
the Senate . A time is then assigned for th
e
1 Rawle on Const . ch . 22 , p .216 .
2 Jefferson ' s Manual , sect . 53 .
3 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p .606 , 607 ; Com . D
ig
. Parliament , L . 23 .
* 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 607 ; Jefferson ' s Manual , sect . 53 .
6 See 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 607 ; Com . Dig . Parliament , L . 24 .
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trial, and the Senate , at that period or before, adjust th
e
prelimi
naries and other proceedings proper to be had before and at the
trial , b
y
fixed regulations , which are made known to the House of
Representatives and to the party accused . On the day appointed
fo
r
the trial , the House of Representatives appear at the bar of th
e
Senate , either in a body or by the managers selected for that pur
pose , to proceed with the trial . ? Process to compel the attendance
o
f
witnesses is previously issued a
t
the request of either party , by
order o
f
the Senate , and at the time and place appointed they are
bound to appear and give testimony . On the day of trial , the
parties being ready , the managers to conduct the prosecution open
it on behalf of the House of Representatives , one or more of them
delivering an explanatory speech , either of the whole charges or
o
f
one o
r
more o
f
them . The proceedings ar
e
then conducted
substantially a
s they are upon common judicial trials , as to the
admission o
r rejection o
f testimony , the examination and cross
examination o
f
witnesses , the rules of evidence , and the legal doc
trines a
s
to crimes and misdemeanors . When the whole evidence
has been gone through , and parties on each side have been fully
heard , the Senate then proceed to the consideration of the case .
If any debates arise , they are conducted in secret ; if none arise ,
o
r
after they are ended , a day is assigned fo
r
a final public deci
sion b
y yeas and nays upon each separate charge in the articles o
f
impeachment . When the court is assembled fo
r
this purpose , the
question is propounded to each member o
f
the Senate b
y
name ,
b
y
the president o
f
the Senate , in the following manner upon each
article , the same being first read b
y
the secretary o
f
the Senate :
“ Mr . — , how sa
y
you , is the respondent guilty or not guilty of
a high crime and misdemeanor , as charged in the article of
impeachment ? ” Whereupon the member rises in his place , and
answers guilty or not guilty , as his opinion is . If upon no article
two thirds o
f
the Senate decide that the party is guilty , he is then
entitled to an acquittal , and is declared accordingly to be acquitted
b
y
the president o
f
the Senate . If he is convicted of al
l
o
r
any o
f
the articles , the Senate then proceed to fix and declare the proper
punishment . The pardoning power of the President does not , as
1 See 2 Woodeson , Lect . 40 , p . 610 . 2 Jefferson ' sManual , sect . 53 .
8 2 Woodeson , Lect . 611 ; Jefferson ' s Manual , sect . 53 .
• This summary , when no other authority is cited , has been drawn u
p
from the prac
tice , in the cases of impeachment already tried b
y
the Senate o
f
th
e
United States ,
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will be presently seen , extend to judgments upon impeachment ;
and hence , when once pronounced , they become absolute and irre
versible . 1
§ 812 . Having thus gone through the whole subject of impeach
ments , it only remains to observe that a close survey of the system ,
unless we are egregiously deceived , will completely demonstrate
the wisdom o
f
the arrangements made in every part o
f it . The
jurisdiction to impeach is placed , where it should be , in the pos
session and power o
f
the immediate representatives o
f
the people .
The trial is before a body o
f great dignity and ability and inde
pendence , possessing the requisite knowledge and firmness to act
with vigor and to decide with impartiality upon the charges . The
persons subjected to the trial are officers of the national govern
ment , and the offences are such as may affect the rights , duties ,
and relations o
f
the party accused to the public in his political o
r
official character , either directly or remotely . The general rules
o
f
law and evidence applicable to common trials are interposed to
protect the party against the exercise o
f
wanton oppression and
arbitrary power . And the final judgment is confined to a removal
from and disqualification for office , thus limiting the punishment
to such modes of redress a
s
are peculiarly fit for a political tr
i
.
bunal to administer , and as will secure the public against political
injuries . In other respects , the offence is left to be disposed of b
y
the common tribunals o
f justice , according to the laws of the land ,
upon an indictment found b
y
a grand jury , and a trial by a jury of
peers , before whom the party is to stand fo
r
his final deliverance ,
like his fellow -citizens .
$ 813 . In respect to the impeachment of the President and Vice
President , it may be remarked that they are ,upon motives of high
state policy , made liable to impeachment while they yet remain
in office . In England , the constitutional maxim is that th
e
king
can d
o
n
o wrong . His ministers and advisers may be impeached
and punished ; but he is , b
y
his prerogative , placed above al
l
per
sonal amenability to the laws fo
r
his acts . In some of the State
constitutions , no explicit provision is made for the impeachment
o
f the chief magistrate ; and in Delaware and Virginia he was
namely , of William Blount , in 1798 ; of John Pickering , in 1804 ; of Samuel Chase , in
1804 ; and of James H . Peck , in 1831 . See the Senate Journals of those Trials . See
also Jefferson ' s Manual , sect . 202 .
1 Art . 2 , sect . 2 , clause 1 . 9 | Black . Comm . 246 , 247 .
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not (under their ol
d
constitutions ) impeachable until he was out
o
f
office . So that no immediate remedy in those States was pro
vided for gross malversations and corruptions in office , and the
only redress lay in the elective power , followed u
p b
y
prosecu
tions after the party had ceased to hold his office . Yet cases
may be imagined where a momentary delusion might induce a ma
jority o
f
the people to re -elect a corrupt chief magistrate , and thus
the remedy would be at once distant and uncertain . The provi
sion in the Constitution of the United States , on the other hand ,
holds out a deep and immediate responsibility , as a check upon
arbitrary power ; and compels the chief magistrate , as well as the
humblest citizen , to bend to the majesty of the laws .
1 The Federalist , No . 39 . [ The whole subject of impeachment and impeachable
offences has recently received so exhaustive a
n
examination in this country ( o
n
the
trial o
f
President Johnson ) that wemight content ourselves in this place with making
a simple reference to that case . The times , however , were prolific in impeachments .
Three governors were impeached , two o
f
whom were convicted and removed ; a fourth
vacated his office on serious charges being preferred ; and a judge o
f
the Supreme Court
o
f
New York was found guilty o
f
the most scandalous misconduct . These were only
the most notable cases . Truly , the time was “ out o
f joint . " )
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CHAPTER XI.
ELECTIONS AND MEETINGS OF CONGRESS . .
$ 814 . The first clause of the fourth section of the first article
is as follows : “ The times , places , and manner of holding elections
for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State
by the legislature thereof. But the Congress may ,at any time, by
law , make or alter such regulations , except as to the place of
choosing senators . ” 1
1 (An act regulating th
e
election o
f
senators has recently been passed , and is as fo
l
lows :
“ An act to regulate the times and manner o
f
holding elections for senators in Con
gress .
“ B
e
it enacted , & c . , that the legislature of each State which shall be chosen next pre
ceding the expiration o
f
the time for which any senator was elected to represent said
State in Congress , shall , o
n
the second Tuesday after the meeting and organization
thereof , proceed to elect a senator in Congress , in the place of such senator so going
out o
f
office , in th
e
following manner : Each house shall openly , b
y
a viva voce vote
o
f
eachmember present ,name one person for senator in Congress from said State ; and
the name o
f
th
e
person so voted for ,who shall have a majority of thewhole number of
votes cast in each house , shall b
e
entered o
n
the journal of each house b
y
the clerk
o
r secretary thereof ; but if either house shall fail to give such majority to any person
o
n
said day , that fact shall be entered on the journal . At twelve o 'clock meridian of the
day following that o
n
which proceedings are required to take place a
s
aforesaid , the
members o
f
th
e
two bouses shall convene in joint assembly , and the journal of each
house shall then b
e
read ; and if the same person shall have received a majority o
f
all the
votes in each house , such person shall be declared duly elected senator to represent said
State in the Congress o
f
the United States ; but if the same person shall not have received
a majority o
f
the votes in each house , o
r
if either house shall have failed to take proceed
ings a
s required b
y
this act , the joint assembly shall then proceed to choose , b
y
a vira roce
vote o
f
each member present , a person for the purpose aforesaid ; and the person having
a majority o
f
a
ll
the votes o
f
the said joint assembly , a majority of al
l
themembers elected
to both houses being present and voting , shall be declared duly elected ; and in case no
person shall receive suchmajority o
n
the first day , the joint assembly shall meet a
t
twelve
o 'clock meridian of each succeeding day during the session of the legislature , and take
a
t
least one vote , until a senator shall be elected ,
“ Sec . 2 . That ,whenever on the meeting of the legislature of any State , a vacancy
shall exist in the representation o
f
such State in the Senate o
f
the United States , said
legislature shall proceed , o
n
the second Tuesday after the commencement and organiza
tion o
f
it
s
session , to elect a person to fill such vacancy , in themanner herein before pro
vided fo
r
the election o
f
a senator for the full terin ; and if a vacancy shall happen
during the session o
f
the legislature , then on the second Tuesday after the legislature
shall have been organized and shall have notice of such vacancy .
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$ 815 . This clause does not appear to have attracted much at
tention ,or to have encountered much opposition in the convention ,
at least so far as can be gathered from the journal of that body .
But it was afterwards assailed by the opponents of the Constitu
tion , both in and out of the State conventions ,with uncommon
zeal and virulence . The objection was not to that part of the
clause which vests in the State legislatures the power of prescrib
ing the times, places , and manner of holding elections ; fo
r
so far
it was a surrender of power to the State governments . But it was
to the superintending power o
f Congress to make o
r
alter such
regulations . It was said that such a superintending power would
b
e dangerous to the liberties o
f
the people and to a just exercise
o
f
their privileges in elections . Congress might prescribe the
times o
f
elections so unreasonably as to prevent the attendance o
f
the electors , or the place at so inconvenient a distance from the
body o
f
the electors as to prevent a due exercise o
f
the right o
f
choice . And Congress might contrive themanner o
f holding elec
tions so as to exclude all but their own favorites from office . They
might modify the right o
f
election a
s they should please ; they
might regulate the number o
f
votes b
y
the quantity o
f property ,
without involving any repugnancy to the Constitution . These
and other suggestions o
f
a similar nature , calculated to spread
terror and alarm among the people ,were dwelt on with peculiar
emphasis .
§ 816 . In answer to all such reasoning , it was urged that there
was not a single article in the whole system more completely de
fensible . Its propriety rested upon this plain proposition , that
every government ought to contain in itself the means o
f
it
s
own preservation . If , in the Constitution , there were some
“ Sec . 3 . That it shall be the duty of the governor of the State from which any sen
ator shall have been chosen a
s
aforesaid , to certify his election , under the seal of the
State , to the president o
f the Senate o
f
the United States , which certificate shall b
e
countersigned b
y
the secretary o
f
state o
f
the State . " Approved July 25 , 1866 .
The election o
f representatives after 1874 is provided for b
y
the Act of Congress of
February 2 , 1872 ,which requires the elections to be in districts of contiguous territory ,
and to b
e
held o
n
the Tuesday next after th
e
first Monday in November in the year
1876 , and every two years thereafter . )
1 Journal of Convention , p . 218 , 240 ; Id . 354 , 374 .
3 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 43 to 50 ; Id . 53 to 68 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 38 , 39 , 72 , 149 , 150 ;
3 Elliot ' s Debates , 57 to 74 ; 2 American Museum , 438 ; Id . 435 ; Id .545 ; 3 American
Muscum , 423 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 277 .
3 The Federalist , No . 59 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 276 , 277 .
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departures from this principle , ( as it might be admitted there
were , ) they were matters of regret , and dictated by a controlling
moral or political necessity , and they ought not to be extended .
It was obviously impracticable to frame and insert in the Consti
tution an election la
w
which would be applicable to a
ll possible
changes in the situation o
f
the country , and convenient for all the
States . A discretionary power over elections must be vested
somewhere . There seemed but three ways in which it could be
reasonably organized . It might be lodged either wholly in the
national legislature , or wholly in the State legislatures , or prima
rily in the latter and ultimately in the former . The last was the
mode adopted b
y
the convention . The regulation of elections is
submitted , in the first instance , to the local governments , which ,
in ordinary cases and when n
o improper views prevail ,may both
conveniently and satisfactorily b
e b
y
them exercised . But in
extraordinary circumstances , the power is reserved to the national
government , so that it may not be abused , and thus hazard the
safety and permanence o
f the Union . Nor le
t
it b
e thought that
such an occurrence is wholly imaginary . It is a known fact that ,
under the confederation , Rhode Island , at a very critical period ,
withdrew her delegates from Congress , and thus prevented some
importantmeasures from being carried . ? .
§ 817 . Nothing can be more evident than that a
n exclusive
power in the State legislatures to regulate elections fo
r
th
e
na
tional government would leave the existence o
f
the Union entirely
a
t
their mercy . They could , at any time , annihilate it by neglect
ing to provide fo
r
the choice of persons to administer it
s
affairs .
It is no sufficient answer that such an abuse of power is not prob
able . Its possibility is , in a constitutional view , decisive against
taking such a risk ; and there is no reason fo
r
taking it . The
Constitution ought to be safe against fears o
f
this sort , and against
temptations to undertake such a project . It is true that the State
legislatures may , by refusing to choose senators , interrupt the op
erations o
f
the national government , and thus involve the country
in general ruint . But because , with a view to the establishment of
the Constitution , this risk was necessarily taken when the appoint
ment o
f
senators was vested in the State legislatures , still it did
not follow that a power so dangerous ought to be conceded in cases
1 The Federalist , No . 59 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 38 , 39 ; Id . 276 , 277 ,
2 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 44 , 45 ; the Federalist , No . 22 .
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where the same necessity di
d
not exist . On the contrary , it
became the duty of the convention , on this very account , not to
multiply the chances o
f
mischievous attempts o
f
this sort . The
risk , too , would be much greater in regard to an exclusive power
over the elections of representatives than over the appointment of
senators . The latter are chosen for si
x years , the representatives
for two years . There is a gradual rotation of office in the Senate ,
every two years , of one third of the body , and a quorum is to con
sist o
f
a mere majority . The result of these circumstances would
naturally be ,that a combination of a few States , fo
r
a short period ,
to intermit the appointment o
f
senators , would not interrupt the
operations o
r
annihilate the existence o
f
that body . And it is not
against permanent , but against temporary combinations of the
States , that there is any necessity to provide . A temporary com
bination might proceed altogether from the sinister designs and
intrigues o
f
a few leading members o
f
the State legislatures . A
permanent combination could only arise from the deep -rooted
disaffection o
f
a great majority o
f
the people ; and , under such
circumstances , the existence of such a national government would
neither be desirable nor practicable . 1 The very shortness of the
period o
f
the elections o
f
the House o
f Representatives might , on
the other hand , furnish means and motives to temporary combina
tions to destroy the national government ; and every returning
election might produce a delicate crisis in our national affairs ,
subversive o
f
the public tranquillity , and encouraging to every sort
o
f
faction . 2
$ 818 . There is a great distinction between the objects and in
terests o
f
the people and the political objects and interests of their
rulers . The people may be warmly attached to the Union and its
powers and it
s operations , while their representatives , stimulated
b
y
the natural rivalship of power and the hopes of personal ag
grandizement , may be in a very opposite temper , and artfully
using all their influence to cripple or destroy the national govern
ment . Their motives and objects may not at first be clearly dis
cerned ; but time and reflection will enable the people to under
stand their own true interests , and to guard themselves against
insidious factions . Besides , there will be occasions in which the
2 Id .1 The Federalist , No . 59 .
8 The Federalist , No . 59 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 43 to 55 ; Id . 67 , 68 ; 3 Elliot ' s De
bates , 65 .
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people will be excited to undue resentments against the national
government . With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the
exclusive power o
f regulating elections for the national govern
ment , the combination of a few men in some of the large States
might , by seizing the opportunity of some casual disaffection
among the people , accomplish the destruction of the Union .
And it ought not to be overlooked that , as a solid government
will make us more and more an object of jealousy to the nations
o
f Europe , so there will be a perpetual temptation on their part to
generate intrigues o
f
this sort for the purpose of subverting it .
§ 819 . There is , too , in the nature of such a provision , some
thing incongruous , if not absurd . What would be said of a clause
introduced into the national Constitution to regulate the State
elections o
f
the members o
f
the State legislatures ? It would be
deemed a most unwarrantable transfer of power , indicating a pre
meditated design to destroy the State governments . It would be
deemed so flagrant a violation o
f principle as to require no com
ment . It would be said , and justly , that the State governments
ought to possess the power o
f
self -existence and self -organization ,
independent o
f
the pleasure o
f
the national government . Why
does not the same reasoning apply to the national government ?
What reason is there to suppose that the State governments will
b
e
more true to the Union than the national government will be
to the State governments ?
$ 820 . If , then , there is no peculiar fitness in delegating such
a power to the State legislatures , if itmight be hazardous and in
convenient , le
t
u
s
see whether there are any solid dangers from
confiding the superintending and ultimate power over elections to
the national government . There is no pretence to say that the
power in the national government can be used so as to exclude
any State from its share in the representation in Congress . Nor
can it b
e
said ,with correctness , that Congress can , in any way ,
alter the rights o
r qualifications of voters . The most that can be
urged , with any show of argument , is , that the power might , in a
given case , be employed in such a manner as to promote the
election o
f
some favorite candidate o
r
favorite class o
f
men , in
exclusion o
f
others , b
y
confining the places o
f
election to particu
lar districts , and rendering it impracticable fo
r
the citizens a
t large
to partake in the choice . The whole argument proceeds upon a
i The Federalist ,No . 59 . 3 Id .
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supposition the most chimerical . There are no rational calcula
tions on which it can rest, and every probability is against it.
Who are to pass the laws for regulating elections ? The Con
gress of the United States, composed of a Senate chosen by the
State legislatures , and of representatives chosen by the people of
the States . Can it be imagined that these persons will combine
to defraud their constituents of their rights , or to overthrow the
State authorities or the State influence ? The very attempt would
rouse universal indignation , and produce an immediate revolt
among the great mass of the people , headed and directed by the
State governments . And what motive could there be in Con
gress to produce such results ? The very dissimilarity in the
ingredients composing the national government forbids even the
supposition of any effectual combination for such a purpose . The
interests , the habits , the institutions , the local employments , the
state of property , the genius , and the manners of the people of the
different States are so various , and even opposite , that it would be
impossible to bring a majority of either House to agree upon any
plan of elections which should favor any particular man , or class
of men , in any State . In some States commerce is, or may be,
th
e
predominant interest ; in others ,manufactures ; in others ,agri
culture . Physical as well asmoral causes will necessarily nourish
in different States different inclinations and propensities on all
subjects o
f
this sort . If there is any class which is likely to have
a predominant influence , it must be either the commercial or the
landed class . If either of these could acquire such an influence ,
it is infinitely more probable that it would be acquired in the State
than in the national councils . 2 In the latter there will be such a
mixture of a
ll
interests that it will be impracticable to adopt any
rule for a
ll
the States giving any preference to classes or interests
founded upon sectional o
r personal considerations . What might
suit a fe
w
States well would find a general resistance from all the
other States .
§ 821 . If it is said that the elections might be so managed as to
give a predominant influence to the wealthy and th
e
well -born ,
( a
s
they are insidiously called , ) the supposition is not less vision
ary . What possible mode is there to accomplish such a purpose ?
The wealthy and the well -born are not confined to any particular
spots in any State ; nor are their interests permanently fixed any
1 T
h
e
Federalist , No . 60 . 3 Id .
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where . Their property may consist of stock or other personal
property , as well as of land , of manufactories on great streams or
on narrow rivulets or in sequestered dells . Their wealth may con
sist of large plantations in the bosom of the country , or farms on
the borders of the ocean . How vain must it be to legislate upon
the regulation of elections with reference to circumstances so in
finitely varied and so infinitely variable ! The very suggestion is
preposterous . No possible method of regulating the time,mode , or
place of elections could give to the rich or elevated a general or
permanent advantage in the elections . The only practical mode
of accomplishing it ( that of a property qualification of voters or
candidates ) is excluded in the scheme of the national govern
ment. And if it were possible that such a design could be ac
complished to the injury of the people at a single election , it is
certain that the unpopularity of the measure would immediately
drive the members from office who aided in it , and they would be
succeeded by others who would more justly represent the public
will and the public interests . A cunning so shallow would be
easily detected , and would be as contemptible from its folly as it
would be difficult in it
s operations .
$ 822 . Other considerations are entitled to great weight . The
Constitution gives to the State legislatures the power to regulate
the time , place , and manner of holding elections , and this will be
so desirable a boon in their possession on account o
f
their ability
to adapt the regulation from time to time to the peculiar local or
political convenience o
f
the States , that its representatives in
Congress will not be brought to assent to any general system b
y
Congress , unless from an extreme necessity or a very urgent exi
gency . Indeed , the danger rather is , that when such necessity o
r
exigency actually arises , the measure will be postponed and per
haps defeated b
y
the unpopularity of the exercise o
f
the power .
All the States will , under common circumstances , have a local
interest and local pride in preventing any interference b
y
Con
gress , and it is incredible that this influence should not be felt as
well in the Senate as in the House . It is not to
o
much , therefore ,
to presume that it will not be resorted to b
y
Congress until there
has been some extraordinary abuse o
r danger in leaving it to the
discretion o
f
the States respectively . And it is no small recom
mendation of this supervising power , that it will naturally operate
1 The Federalist , No . 60 .
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as a check upon undue State legislation , since the latter might
precipitate the very evil which the popular opinion would be most
solicitous to avoid . A preventive of this sort , addressed a priori
to State jealousy and State interest ,would become a most salutary
remedy , not from its actual application , but from its moral influ
ence .
§ 823 . It was said that the Constitution might have provided
that the elections should be in counties . This was true ; but it
would , as a general rule , afford very little relief against a possible
abuse , fo
r
counties differ greatly in size , in roads , and in accom
modations fo
r
elections ,and the argument from possible abuse is
just a
s strong even after such a provision should be made a
s
before .
If an elector were compellable to go thirty or fifty miles , it would
discourage his vote a
s
much a
s if it were one hundred or five
hundred miles . The truth is , that Congress could never resort
to a measure o
f
this sort fo
r
purposes o
f
oppression o
r party tri
umph until that body had ceased to represent the will of the States
and the people ; and if , under such circumstances , the members
could still hold office , it would be because a general and irreme
diable corruption or indifference pervaded the whole community .
No republican constitution could pretend to afford any remedy for
such a state o
f things . 2
$ 824 . But why did not a similar objection occur against the
State constitutions ? The subject of elections , the time , place , and
manner o
f holding them , is in many cases left entirely to legis
lative discretion . In New York the senators are chosen from
four districts o
f great territorial extent , each comprehending sev
eral counties ; and it is not defined where the elections shall be
had . Suppose the legislature should compel al
l
the electors to
come to one spot in the district , as , for instance , to Albany ; the
evil would be great , but the measure would not be unconstitu
tional . Yet no one practically entertains the slightest dread of
such legislation . In truth , all reasoning from such extreme pos
sible cases is ill adapted to convince the judgment , though itmay
1 The Federalist , No . 61 . The full force of this reasoning will not be perceived
without adverting to the fact that , though in New England the voters generally give
their votes in the townships where they reside , in the Southern and Western States
there are fe
w
towns , and the elections are held in the counties , where the population is
sparse , and spread over large plantation districts . 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 6
8 .
2 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 38 , 39 .
8 The Federalist ,No . 61 .
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alarm our prejudices . Such a legislative discretion is not deemed
a
n infirmity in the delegation o
f
constitutional power . It is
deemed safe , because it can never be used oppressively for any
length of time , unless the people themselves choose to aid in their
own degradation .
$ 825 . The objections , then , to th
e
provision are not sound o
r
tenable . The reasons in its favor are , on the other hand , of great
force and importance . In the first place , the power may be ap
plied b
y
Congress to correct any negligence in a State in regard
to elections , as well as to prevent a dissolution of the government
b
y
designing and refractory States , urged on b
y
some temporary
excitements . In the next place , itwill operate as a check in favor
o
f
the people against any designs o
f
a Federal Senate and their
constituents , to deprive the people o
f
the State o
f
their right to
choose representatives . In the next place , it provides a remedy
fo
r
the evil , if any State , b
y
reason o
f
invasion o
r
other cause ,
cannot have it in its power to appoint a place where the citizens
can safely meet to choose representatives . In the last place , ( as
the plan is but an experiment , ) itmay hereafter become important ,
with a view to the regular operations o
f
the general government ,
that there should be a uniformity in th
e
time and manner o
f
elect
ing representatives and senators , so as to prevent vacancies when
there may b
e
calls for extraordinary sessions o
f Congress . If such
a time should occur , or such a uniformity be hereafter desirable ,
Congress is the only body possessing the means to produce it . ?
§ 826 . Such were the objections , and such was the reasoning ,
b
y
which they were met at the time of the adoption o
f
the Con
stitution . A period of forty years has since passed b
y
without
any attempt b
y
Congress to make any regulations , or interfere in
the sightest degree with the elections o
f
members o
f Congress . 3
If , therefore , experience can demonstrate anything , it is the entire
safety o
f
the power in Congress , which it is scarcely possible
( reasoning from the past ) should be exerted , unless upon very
urgent occasions . The States now regulate the time , the place ,
and the manner of elections , in a practical sense , exclusively .
The manner is very various , and perhaps the power has been ex
i See 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 44 , 47 , 48 , 49 ; Id . 55 ; Id . 6
7 .
2 The Federalist , No . 61 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 38 , 39 .
3 But since these commentaries were written , it has been done b
y
several acts , th
e
last o
f
which is referred to in note 1 to 8 814 , ante . )
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erted , in some instances, under the influence of local or party
feelings , to an extent which is indefensible in principle and policy .
There is no uniformity in the choice or in the mode of election .
In some States the representatives are chosen by a general ticket
fo
r
the whole State ; in others they are chosen singly in districts ;
in others they are chosen in districts composed o
f
a population
sufficient to elect two or three representatives ; and in others the
districts are sometimes single ,and sometimes united in the choice .
In some States the candidate must have a majority of al
l
the
votes to entitle him to be deemed elected ; in others ( as it is in
England ) it is sufficient if he has a plurality of votes . In some
o
f
the States the choice is b
y
the voters viva voce ( as it is in Eng
land ) ; in others it is b
y
ballot . The times of the elections are
quite a
s
various ; sometimes before ,and sometimes after the regu
lar period at which the office becomes vacant . That this want o
f
uniformity as to the time and mode o
f
election has been produc
tive o
f
some inconveniences to the public service cannot be doubted ;
fo
r
it has sometimes occurred that a
t
a
n extra session a whole
State has been deprived o
f
it
s
vote , and at the regular sessions
some districts have failed o
f being represented upon questions
vital to their interests . Still , so strong has been the sense of
Congress of the importance o
f leaving these matters to State regu
lation , that no effort has been hitherto made to cure these evils ;
and public opinion has almost irresistibly settled down in favor
o
f
the existing system . 2
$ 827 . Several of the States , a
t
the time of adopting the Con
stitution , proposed amendments on this subject ; but none were
ever subsequently proposed b
y Congress to the people , so that th
e
public mind ultimately acquiesced in the reasonableness of the
existing provision . It is remarkable , however , that none of the
amendments proposed in the State conventions purported to take
away entirely the superintending power of Congress , but only re
stricted it to cases where a State neglected , refused , or was dis
abled to exercise the power o
f regulating elections . 3
$ 828 . It remains only to notice an exception to the power o
f
Congress in this clause . It is , that Congress cannot alter o
r
make
regulations “ a
s
to the place o
f choosing senators . ” This excep
11 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 192 .
2 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 191 , 192 .
8 See Journal o
f
Convention , Supplement , p . 402 , 411 , 418 , 425 , 433 , 447 , 454 .
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tion is highly reasonable . The choice is to be made b
y
the State
legislature , and it would not be either necessary or becoming in
Congress to prescribe the place where it should si
t . This excep
tion was not in the revised draft of the Constitution , and was
adopted almost a
t
the close o
f
the convention ; not , however , with
out some opposition , fo
r
nine States were in it
s
favor , one against
it , and one was divided . )
§ 829 . The second clause of the fourth section of the first arti
cle is a
s
follows : “ The Congress shall assemble a
t
least once in
every year ; and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in
December , unless they shall b
y
law appoint a different day . "
This clause , fo
r
the first time ,made its appearance in the revised
draft o
f
the Constitution , near the close of the convention , and
was silently adopted , and , so far as can be perceived , without op
position . Annual parliaments had been long a favorite opinion
and practice with the people o
f England ; and in America , under
the colonial governments , they were justly deemed a great secu
rity to public liberty . The present provision could hardly be over
looked by a free people , jealous of their rights ; and therefore the
Constitution fixed a constitutional period a
t
which Congress should
assemble in every year , unless some other day was specially pre
scribed . Thus the legislative discretion was necessarily bounded ,
and annual sessions were placed equally beyond the power o
f
faction and o
f party , of power and of corruption . In two of th
e
States a more frequent assemblage o
f
the legislature was known
to exist . But it was obvious that , from the nature of their duties
and the distance of their abodes , the members of Congress ought
not to be brought together at shorter periods , unless upon the
most pressing exigencies . A provision so universally acceptable
requires n
o
vindication o
r commentary .
$ 830 . Under the British constitution the king has the sole
right to convene and prorogue and dissolve Parliament . And a
l
though it is now usual fo
r
Parliament to assemble annually , the
power o
f prorogation may be applied at the king ' s pleasure , so as
to prevent any business from being done . And it is usual fo
r
the
king , when hemeans that Parliament should assemble to do busi
ness , to give notice by proclamation accordingly ; otherwise a pro
rogation is , of course , on the first day of the session . 3
1 Journal o
f
Convention , 35
4
, 374 . ? The Federalist , No . 52 .
8 1 Black . Comm , 187 , 188 , and Christian ' s Note ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 154 , 155 .
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$ 831 . The fifth section of the first article embraces provisions
principally applicable to the powers , rights , and duties of each
house in it
s separate corporate character . These will not require
much illustration o
r commentary , as they are such as are usually
delegated to a
ll legislative bodies in free governments , and were
in practice in Great Britain at the time of the emigration of our
ancestors , and were exercised under the colonial governments ,
and have been secured and recognized in the present State consti
tutions .
$ 832 . The first clause declares that “ each house shall be the
judge o
f
the elections , returns , and qualifications of its own mem
bers , and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do busi
ness ; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day , and
may be authorized to compel the attendance o
f
absent members ,
in such manner and under such penalties a
s
each house may pro
vide . ” 1
$ 833 . It is obvious that a power must be lodged somewhere to
judge of the elections , returns , and qualifications of the members
o
f
each house composing the legislature ; for otherwise there could
b
e
n
o certainty a
s
to who were legitimately chosen members , and
any intruder o
r usurper might claim a seat , and thus trample
upon th
e
rights and privileges and liberties of th
e
people . Indeed ,
elections would become , under such circumstances , a mere mock
ery , and legislation the exercise of sovereignty b
y
any self -consti
tuted body . The only possible question on such a subject is as to
the body in which such a power shall be lodged . If lodged in
any other than the legislative body itself , its independence , its
purity , and even its existence and action may be destroyed or put
into imminent danger . No other body but itself can have the
same motives to preserve and perpetuate these attributes ; no other
body can b
e
so perpetually watchful to guard it
s
own rights and
privileges from infringement , to purify and vindicate its own char
acter , and to preserve the rights and sustain the free choice o
f
it
s
constituents . Accordingly , the power has always been lodged in
the legislative body b
y
the uniform practice o
f England and
America .
1 See the New Jersey Elections fo
r
1841 – 1843 , where the house refused th
e
govern
o
r ' s certificate of election under the State seal as prima facie evidence of election , and
the subsequent proceedings . (Quincy ' sMemoir of John Quincy Adams , 295 . ]
2 1 Black . Comm . 163 , 178 , 179 ; Rawle on the Constitution , ch . 4 , p . 46 ; 1 Kent ,
Comm . 220 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 153 , 154 .
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$ 834 . The propriety of establishing a rule fo
r
a quorum fo
r
the despatch o
f
business is equally clear , since otherwise the con
cerns o
f
the nation might be decided b
y
a very small number o
f
th
e
members o
f
each body . In England ,where the house of com
mons consists o
f nearly si
x
hundred members , the number of
forty -five constitutes à quorum to do business . In some of the
State constitutions a particular number o
f
the members constitutes
a quorum to do business ; in others a majority is required . The
Constitution o
f
the United States has wisely adopted the latter
course ; and thus , b
y
requiring a majority fo
r
a quorum , has se
cured the public from any hazard o
f passing laws b
y surprise , or
against the deliberate opinion o
f
a majority of the representative
body .
$ 835 . It may seem strange ,but it is only one of many proofs
o
f
the extreme jealousy with which every provision in the Consti
tution of the United States was watched and scanned , that though
th
e
ordinary quorum in th
e
State legislatures is sometimes less ,
and rarely more , than a majority , yet it was said that in the Con
gress o
f
the United States more than a majority ought to have
been required ; and in particular cases , if not in al
l ,more than a
majority o
f
a quorum should b
e necessary for a decision . Traces
o
f
this opinion , though very obscure ,may perhaps be found in the
convention itself . To require such an extraordinary quorum fo
r
the decision o
f questions would , in effect , be to give the rule to
the minority instead of the majority , and thus to subvert the fun
damental principle of a republican government . If such a course
were generally allowed , it might be extremely prejudicial to the
public interest in cases which required new laws to be passed , or
old ones modified , to preserve the general , in contradistinction to
local or special interests . If it were even confined to particular
cases , the privilege might enable an interested minority to screen
themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal , or , in
particular cases , to extort undue indulgences . It would also have
a tendency to foster and facilitate the baneful practice o
f
secession ,
a practice which has shown itself even in States where a majority
i i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 201 , 202 , 203 , 229 . I have not been able to find ,
in any books within my reach ,whether any particular quorum is required in the house
o
f
lords . ( Three lords constitute a quorum ; see 2 English Jurist , 1829 , p . 261 , 262 ;
Cooper ' s Lettres sur le Chancellerie , Letter 18 , p . 134 ; Macqueen ' s Practice of House
o
f
Lords , p . 19 . - E . H . B . ) (See also Cooley ' s Blackstone , Vol . 3 , p . 56 note . )
% The Federalist , No . 58 ; Journal of Convention , 218 , 242 .
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only is required ,which is subversive of al
l
th
e
principles o
f
order
and regular government , and which leads directly to public con
vulsions and the ruin o
f republican institutions . 1
$ 836 . But as a danger of an opposite sort required equally to
b
e guarded against , a smaller number is authorized to adjourn
from day to day , thus to prevent a legal dissolution of the body ,
and also to compel the attendance o
f
absent members . 2 Thus , the
interests of the nation and the despatch of business are not subject
to the caprice o
r perversity or negligence o
f
the minority . It
was a defect in the articles o
f
confederation , sometimes productive
o
f great public mischief , that no vote , except for an adjournment ,
could b
e determined , unless b
y
the votes o
f
a majority o
f
the
States ; 3 and no power of compelling th
e
attendance o
f
the requi
site number existed .
1 The Federalist ,Nos . 22 , 58 .
? Journal o
f
Convention , 218 , 242 ; 4 Instit . 4
3 , 4
9
.
8 Confederation , art , 9 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 44 , 45 ; the Federalist , No . 22 .
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CHAPTER XII .
PRIVILEGES AND POWERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS .
$ 837 . The next clause is , weach house may determine the
rules of its proceedings , punish itsmembers for disorderly behav
io
r , and , with th
e
concurrence o
f
two thirds , expel a member . ”
No person can doubt the propriety of the provision authorizing
each house to determine the rules o
f
it
s
own proceedings . If the
power did not exist , it would be utterly impracticable to transact
the business o
f
the nation , either at al
l , or at least with decency ,
deliberation , and order . The humblest assembly ofmen is under
stood to possess this power , and it would be absurd to deprive the
councils o
f
the nation o
f
a like authority . But the power to make
rules would b
e nugatory , unless it was coupled with a power to
punish fo
r
disorderly behavior o
r
disobedience to those rules . And
a
s
a member might be so lost to a
ll
sense o
f dignity and duty a
s
to disgrace the house b
y
the grossness o
f his conduct , or interrupt
it
s
deliberations b
y perpetual violence o
r
clamor , the power to expel
for very aggravated misconduct was also indispensable , not as a
common , but as an ultimate redress fo
r
the grievance . But such
a power , so summary , and at the same time so subversive of the
rights o
f
the people , it was foreseen ,might be exerted fo
r
mere
purposes of faction o
r party , to remove a patriot or to aid a corrupt
measure ; and it has therefore been wisely guarded by the restric
tion , that there shall be a concurrence o
f
two thirds o
f
the mem
bers to justify an expulsion . This clause , requiring a concurrence
o
f
two thirds , was not in the original draft of the Constitution , but
it was inserted b
y
a vote o
f
te
n
States , one being divided . A like
general authority to expel exists in the British house o
f
commons ,
and in the legislative bodies o
f many o
f
the States composing the
Union .
$ 838 . What must be the disorderly behavior which th
e
house
may punish , and what punishment , other than expulsion , may be
1 Mr . J . Q . Adams ' s Report to the Senate in the case of John Smith , 31 Dec . 1807 ;
I Hall ' s Law Journ . 459 ; Sergeant on Const . Law . ch . 28 , p . 287 , 288 .
? Journal of Convention , 218 , 243 .
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inflicted , do not appear to have been settled b
y
any authoritative
adjudication of either house of Congress . A learned commentator
supposes that members can only be punished for misbehavior com
mitted during the session o
f Congress , either within or without the
walls of th
e
house , though he is also of opinion that expulsion may
b
e
inflicted fo
r
criminal conduct committed in any place . He does
not say whether it must be committed during the session o
f
Con
gress o
r
otherwise . In July , 1797 , William Blount was expelled
from the Senate fo
r
“ a high misdemeanor , entirely inconsistent
with his public trust and duty a
s
a senator . ” The offence charged
against him was an attempt to seduce an American agent among
the Indians from h
is duty , and to alienate the affections and confi
dence o
f
the Indians from the public authorities of the United
States , and a negotiation fo
r
services in behalf o
f
the British gov
ernment among the Indians . It was not a statutable offence , nor
was it committed in his official character ; nor was it committed
during the session o
f Congress ,nor at the seat of government .
Yet , by an almost unanimous vote 2 he was expelled from that
body ; and he was afterwards impeached ( as has been already
stated ) fo
r
this , among other charges . It seems , therefore , to
b
e settled b
y
the Senate , upon full deliberation , that expulsion
may be fo
r
any misdemeanor which , though not punishable by
any statute , is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a senator .
In the case o
f
John Smith , ( a senator , ) in April , 1808 , the charge
against him was for participation in the supposed treasonable con
spiracy o
f
Colonel Burr . But the motion to expel him was lost
b
y
a want of the constitutional majority of two thirds of the mem
bers o
f
the Senate . 4 . The precise ground of the failure of themo
tion does not appear ; but itmay be gathered from the arguments
o
f
his counsel , that it did not turn upon any doubt that th
e
power
o
f
the Senate extended to cases of misdemeanor not done in the
presence o
r
view o
f the body ; but most probably it was decided
upon some doubt a
s
to the facts . It may be thought difficult to
1 .Rawle on the Constitution , ch . 4 . p . 47 . 2 Yeas 25 , nay 1 .
8 See Journal of Senate , 8 July , 1797 ; Sergeant ' s Const . Law , ch . 28 , p . 286 ; 1
Hall ' s Law Journ . 459 , 471 . [March 1 , 1861 , th
e
Senate expelled a member fo
r
alleged
treasonable correspondence with the enemy . )
4 Yeas 1
9 , nays 10 .
5 1 Hall ' s Law Journ .459 , 471 ; Journ . of Senate , 9 April , 1808 ; Sergeant ' s Const .
Law , ch . 28 , p . 287 , 288 . See also proceedings of the Senate in the case of Humphrey
Marshall , 22 March , 1796 ; Sergeant ' s Const . Law , ch . 28 , p . 285 . (Also the proceed
ings in Houston ' s case , Benton ' s Abridgment of Debates , Vol . 2 , p . 658 . ]
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draw a clear line o
f
distinction between the right to inflict the
punishment o
f expulsion and any other punishment upon a mem
ber , founded on the time , place , or nature of the offence . The
power to expel a member is not , in the British house of commons ,
confined to offences committed b
y
the party a
s
a member , or dur
ing the session of Parliament ; but it extends to all cases where
the offence is such a
s , in the judgment of the house , unfits him
for parliamentary duties . 1
$ 839 . The next clause is , “ each house shall keep a journal of
it
s proceedings , and from time to time publish the same , except
such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy . And the
yeas and nays of the members o
f
either house on any question
· shall , at the desire of one fifth of those present , be entered on the
journal . ” 2
$ 840 . This clause in its actual form did not pass in the con
vention without some struggle and some propositions o
f amend
ment . The first part finally passed b
y
a unanimous vote ; the
exception was carried b
y
a close vote o
f
six States against four ,
one being divided ; and the remaining clause , after an ineffectual
effort to strike out “ one fifth , and insert in it
s
stead “ if every
member present , ” was finally adopted by a unanimous vote . 3
1 1 Black . Comm . 163 , and Christian ' s Note ; Id . 167 and note . See also Rex v .
Wilkes , 2 Wilson ' s R . 251 ; Com . Dig . Parliament , G . 5 . See 1 Hall ' s Law Term ,
459 , 466 . (See Cushing , Law and Praetice of Legislative Assemblies , $ 84 , 192 . Re
cently a member was expelled fo
r
having received money from those h
e
had recom
mended to the President for appointments to office .
2 [ This clause was much relied upon when , in 1837 , a resolution to expunge from the
journal o
f
the Senate a previous resolution o
f
censure upon President Jackson was
under discussion . Mr . Webster , among others , strongly insisted that the action pro
posed would b
e
a manifest violation o
f
this instrument . Webster ' s Works , IV . 292 .
And see Clay ' s Works , VI . 45 . The opposite view was forcibly presented by Mr . Ben
to
n
. Thirty Years in the Senate , I , 717 . For some notice of the final debate , see Ibid .
727 . And for a more complete abridgment o
f
it , see Benton ' s Abridgment o
f
Debates ,
Vol . 13 . A similar instance of an expunging resolution occurs in the history o
f
Massa
chusetts . In 1813 a vote of thanks to Captain Lawrence fo
r
the capture o
f
the Peacock
coming u
p
in the State senate , Mr . Josiah Quincy offered his celebrated resolution ,
which was adopted : “ Resolved , That in a war like the present , waged without justi
fiable cause , and prosecuted in a manner indicating that conquest and ambition are its
real motives , it is not becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation
o
f
military and naval exploits not immediately connected with the defence o
f
our sea
coast and soil . " In 1824 , when the opposing party had obtained control of the State ,
this resolution , b
y
a party vote , was ordered to be erased from the journal of the senate .
Life o
f
Josiah Quincy , 324 . Other precedents will be found referred to in the Congres
sional Debates in 1837 . See that in Wilkes ' s Case , 7 Mahon ' s England , 163 . )
8 Journal of the Convention , p . 219 , 243 , 244 , 245 , 354 , 373 .
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The object of the whole clause is to insure publicity to the pro
ceedings of the legislature , and a correspondent responsibility of
the members to their respective constituents . And it is founded
in sound policy and deep political foresight . Intrigue and cabal
are thus deprived of some of their main resources , by plotting and
devising measures in secrecy . The public mind is enlightened by
an attentive examination of the public measures ; patriotism and
integrity and wisdom obtain their due reward ; and votes are
ascertained , not by vague conjecture , but by positive facts . Mr.
Justice Blackstone seems, indeed , to suppose that votes openly
and publicly given aremore liable to intrigue and combination than
those given privately and by ballot . “ This latter method ," says
he, “ may be serviceable to prevent intrigues and unconstitutional
combinations . But it is impossible to be practised with us, at
least in the house of commons , where every member 's conduct
is subject to the future censure of his constituents , and therefore
should be openly submitted to their inspection .” 2
$ 841 . The history of public assemblies or of private votes does
not seem to confirm the former suggestion of the learned author .
Intrigue and combination are more commonly found connected
with secret sessions than with public debates ; with the workings
of the ballot -box than with themanliness of viva voce votes. At
least , it may be questioned if th
e
vote b
y
ballot has , in th
e
opinion
o
f
a majority o
f
the American people , obtained any decisive prefer
ence over viva voce voting , even at elections . The practice in New
England is one way , and in some of the States in the South and
West 3 another way . And as to the votes of representatives and
senators in Congress , no man has yet been bold enough to vindi
cate a secret o
r
ballot vote , as either more safe o
r
more wise ,more
promotive o
f independence in the members , o
r
more beneficial to
their constituents . So long as known and open responsibility is
valuable a
s
a check o
r
a
n incentive among the representatives o
f
i i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 204 , 205 ; 2 Wilson ' s Lect . 157 , 158 .
2 1 Black . Comm . 181 , 182 .
8 [Voting b
y
ballot is now nearly universal in the United States , except in legislative
bodies , and its introduction into England was effected in 1872 . See New American
Cyclopædia , ed . 1872 , art . “ Ballot . ” The frauds practised under this system , how
ever , have been very great and dangerous , and have le
d
to stringent registration laws ;
but even these in some cases have seemed to facilitate fraud rather than prevent it .
The whole subject is beset with difficulties , and no one as yet has succeeded in devising
such checks a
s
shall invariably secure a free expression o
f
the will of the electors , and
a truthful declaration o
f
the result . ]
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a free people , so long á journal of their proceedings and their
votes , published in the face of the world , will continue to enjoy
public favor and be demanded by public opinion . When the peo
ple become indifferent to the acts of their representatives , they
will have ceased to take much interest in the preservation of their
liberties . When the journals shall excite no public interest , it will
not be matter of surprise if the Constitution itself is silently for
gotten or deliberately violated .
$ 842 . The restriction of calls of the yeas and nays to one fifth
is founded upon the necessity of preventing too frequent a recur
rence to this mode of ascertaining the votes at the mere caprice
of an individual . A call consumes a great deal of time, and often
embarrasses the just progress of beneficial measures . It is said
to have been often used to excess in the Congress under the con
federation , and even under the present Constitution it is notori
ously used as an occasional annoyance , by a dissatisfied minority ,
to retard the passage of measures which are sanctioned by the ap
probation of a strong majority . The check , therefore , isnotmerely
theoretical ; and experience shows that it has been resorted to , at
once to admonish and to control members in this abuse of the
public patience and the public indulgence .
§ 843 . The next clause is , “ neither house , during the session
of Congress , shall , without the consent of the other , adjourn for
more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which
the two houses shall be sitting .” 2 It is observable that the dura
tion of each session of Congress ( subject to the constitutional
termination of their official agency ) depends solely upon their
own will and pleasure, with the single exception , as will be pres
ently seen , of cases in which the two houses disagree in respect
to the time of adjournment . In no other case is the President
allowed to interfere with the time and extent of their delibera
tions . And thus their independence is effectually guarded against
any encroachment on the part of the executive . Very different
is the situation of Parliament under the British constitution ; fo
r
the king may , at any time , put an end to a session by a proroga
tion o
f Parliament , o
r
terminate the existence of Parliament by a
dissolution and a call o
f
a new Parliament . It is true , that each
11 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 205 , 206 .
2 See Journ . of Convention , 219 , 246 . See also 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 276 , 277 .
3 | Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 206 , 207 .
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house has authority to adjourn itself separately , and this is com
monly done from day to day , and sometimes for a week or a month
together , as at Christmas and Easter , or upon other particular
occasions . But the adjournment of one house is not the adjourn
ment of the other . And it is usual ,when the king signifies his
pleasure , that both , or either of the houses should adjourn them
selves to a certain day , to obey the king 's pleasure , and adjourn
accordingly , fo
r
otherwise a prorogation would certainly follow . "
$ 844 . Under the colonial governments , the undue exercise of
the same power b
y
th
e
royal governors constituted a great public
grievance , and was one of the numerous cases of misrule upon
which the Declaration of Independence strenuously relied . It was
there solemnly charged against the king , that he had called to
gether legislative [colonial ] bodies a
t places unusual , uncomforta
ble , and distant from the repository of the public records ; that
h
e
had dissolved representative bodies fo
r
opposing his invasions
o
f
the rights o
f
the people , and after such dissolutions he had re
fused to reassemble them fo
r
a long period o
f
time . It was natu
ral , therefore , that the people of the United States should entertain
a strong jealousy on this subject , and should interpose a constitu
tional barrier against any such abuse b
y
the prerogative of the
executive . The State constitutions generally contain some pro
vision on the same subject a
s
a security to the independence o
f
the legislature .
$ 845 . These are all the powers and privileges which are ex
pressly vested in each house of Congress b
y
the Constitution .
What further powers and privileges they incidentally possess has
been a question much discussed ,andmay hereafter be open , as new
cases arise , to still further discussion . It is remarkable that no
power is conferred to punish for any contempts committed against
either house , and yet it is obvious that unless such a power , to
some extent , exists b
y
implication , it is utterly impossible for
either house to perform it
s
constitutional functions . For instance ,
how is either house to conduct it
s
own deliberations if it may not
keep out o
r expel intruders ? If it may not require and enforce
upon strangers silence and decorum in it
s presence ? If it may
not enable its own members to have free ingress , egress , and re
gress to it
s
own hall of legislation ? And if the power exists , b
y
1 1 Black . Comm . 185 to 190 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 15
4
, 155 ; Com . Dig . Parlia
ment , L . M . N . 0 . P .
3
8
,
VOL . I .
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implication , to require the duty , it is wholly nugatory , unless it
draws after it the incidental authority to compel obedience and to
punish violations of it . It has been suggested by a learned com
mentator , quoting the language of Lord Bacon , that, as exception
strengthens the force of a law in cases not excepted , so enumera
tion weakens it in cases not enumerated , and hence he deduces
the conclusion that, as the power to punish contempts is not
among those enumerated as belonging to either house, it does not
exist.? Now , however wise or correct the maxim of Lord Bacon
is in a general sense, as a means of interpretation it is not the
sole rule . It is no more true than another maxim of a directly
opposite character , that where the end is required themeans are ,
by implication , given . Congress ar
e
required to exercise the
powers o
f legislation and deliberation . The safety of the rights of
the nation requires this ; and ye
t
, because it is not expressly said
that Congress shall possess the appropriate means to accomplish
this end , the means are denied and the end may be defeated .
Does not this show that rules o
f interpretation , however correct
in a general sense , must admit of many qualifications and modifi .
cations in their application to the actual business o
f
human life
and human laws ? Men do not frame constitutions o
f government
to suspend it
s
vital interests and powers and duties upon meta
physical doubts or ingenious refinements . Such instruments must
b
e
construed reasonably and fairly , according to the scope of their
purposes , and to give them effect and operation , not to cripple
and destroy them . They must be construed according to the
common sense applied to instruments of a like nature , and in
furtherance o
f
the fundamental objects proposed to be attained ,
and according to the known practice and incidents o
f
bodies o
f
a
like nature .
§ 846 . We may resort to the common law to aid us in inter
preting such instruments and their powers , for that law is the
common rule b
y
which a
ll
our legislation is interpreted . It is
known and acted upon and revered b
y
the people . It furnishes
principles equally for civil and criminal justice , for public privi
leges and private rights . Now , b
y
the common la
w , the power to
punish contempts o
f
this nature belongs incidentally to courts o
f
justice and to each house o
f
Parliament . No man ever doubted
1 Advancement o
f Learning ; 1 Tuck . Black . App . 20
0
, note .
? | Tucker ' s Black . 200 .
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o
r
denied it
s
existence as to our colonial assemblies in general ,
whatever may have been thought as to particular exercises of it . ?
Nor is this power to be viewed in an unfavorable light . It is a
privilege ,not of the members of either house , but , like al
l
other
privileges o
f
Congress ,mainly intended as a privilege of th
e
people ,
and fo
r
their benefit . Mr . Justice Blackstone has , with great
force , said that “ laws , without a competent authority to secure
their administration from disobedience and contempt , would be
vain and nugatory . A power , therefore , in the supreme courts of
justice to suppress such contempts , etc . , results from the first
principles o
f judicial establishments , and must be an inseparable
attendant upon every superior tribunal . ” 3 And th
e
same reason
ing has been applied with equal force , by another learned com
mentator to legislative bodies . " It would , ” says he , “ be incon
sistent with the nature of such a body to deny it the power of
protecting itself from injury or insult . If its deliberations are not
perfectly free , its constituents are eventually injured . This power
has never been denied in any country , and is incidental to the
nature of all legislative bodies . If it possesses such a power in
the case o
f
a
n immediate insult or disturbance , preventing the
exercise o
f
it
s ordinary functions , it is impossible to deny it in
other cases which , although less immediate or violent , partake of
the same character b
y
having a tendency to impair the firm and
honest discharge o
f public duties . " 4
§ 847 . This subject has of late undergone a great deal of dis
cussion both in England and America , and has finally received
the adjudication o
f
the highest judicial tribunals in each country .
In each country , upon the fullest consideration , the result was the
same , namely , that the power did exist , and that the legislative
body was the proper and exclusive forum to decide when the con
tempt existed , and when there was a breach of its privileges ; and
that the power to punish followed , as a necessary incident to the
power to take cognizance of the offence . The judgment of the
1 4 Black . Comm . 283 , 28
4
, 285 , 28
6
; 1 Black . Comm . 16
4
, 165 ; Com . Dig . Parlia
ment , G . 2 , 5 ; Burdett v . Abbott , 14 East , R . 1 ; Burdett v . Colman , 14 East , R . 163 ; 8 .
c . 5 Dow . Parl . Cases , 165 , 199 .
2 Christian ' s Note , 1 Black . Comm . 164 .
8 4 Black . Comm . 286 .
4 Rawle o
n
the Constitution , ch . 4 , p . 48 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . ( 2d edit . ) Lect . 11 , p .
221 , 235 .
The learned reader is referred to Burdett v . Abbott , 14 East , R . 1 ; Burdett v . Colman ,
1
4 East , R . 163 ; 8 . c . 5 Dow . Parl . R . 165 , 199 ; and Anderson v . Dunn , 6 Wheat . R .
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supreme court of the United States , in the case alluded to , contains
so elaborate and exact a consideration of thewhole argument on
204. The question is also much discussed in Jefferson 's Manual , $ 3, and i Tuck.
Black . Comm . App. note , p. 200 to 205. See also 1 Black . Comm . 164, 165. Mr.
Jefferson , in his Manual , (8 3,) in commenting on the case of William Duane fo
r
a
political libel , has summed u
p
the reasoning o
n
each side with a manifest leaning against
the power . It presents the strength of the argument on that side , and , on that account ,
deserves to b
e
cited a
t large .
" In debating the legality o
f
this order , it was insisted in support of it , that everyman ,
b
y
the law o
f
nature , and every body of men , possesses the right o
f
self -defence ; that
all public functionaries are essentially invested with the powers o
f
self -preservation ; that
they have a
n
inherent right to do a
ll
cts necessary to keep themselves in a condition to
discharge th
e
trusts confided to them ; that whenever authorities are given , the means of
carrying them into execution are given b
y
necessary implication ; that thus we seethe
British Parliament exercise the right of punishing contempts ; al
l
the State legislatures
exercise the same power ; and every court does the same ; that , if we have it not , we s
it
a
t
the mercy o
f every intruder who may enter our doors o
r gallery , and , b
y
noise and
tumult , render proceeding in business impracticable ; that if our tranquillity is to be
perpetually disturbed b
y
newspaper defamation , it will not be possible to exercise our
functions with the requisite coolness and deliberation ; and that we must therefore have
a power to punish these disturbers o
f
our peace and proceedings . To this it was
answered , that the Parliament and courts of England have cognizance of contempts b
y
the express provisions o
f
their la
w ; that th
e
State legislatures have equal authority ,
because their powers are plenary ; they represent their constituents completely , and
possess all their powers , except such as their constitutions have expressly denied them ;
that the courts o
f
the several States have the same powers b
y
the laws o
f
their States ,
and those o
f
the Federal government b
y
the same State laws adopted in each State , b
y
&
law o
f Congress ; that none of these bodies , therefore , derive those powers from natural
o
r necessary right , but from express law ; that Congress have no such natural or neces
sary power o
r any powers , but such as are given them b
y
the Constitution ; that that
has given them , directly , exemption from personal arrest , exemption from question
elsewhere , fo
r
what is said in their house , and power over their own members and pro
ceedings ; for these no further law is necessary , the Constitution being the law ; that ,
moreover , b
y
that article o
f
the Constitution which authorizes them to make all laws
necessary and proper fo
r
carrying into execution the powers vested b
y
the Constitution
in them , ' they may provide by law for an undisturbed exercise of their fanctions , for
example , for the punishment o
f contempts , of affrays or tumult in their presence , & c . ;
but , till the law be made , it does not exist , and does not exist from their own neglect ;
that in the mean time , however , they are not unprotected , the ordinary magistrates and
courts o
f
law being open and competent to punish all unjustifiable disturbances or defa
mations ; and even their own sergeant ,who may appoint deputies ad libitum to aid him ,
is equal to small disturbances ; that in requiring a previous law , the Constitution had
regard to the inviolability o
f
the citizen , as well as of the member ; as , should one house
in the regular form o
f
a bill aim a
t
two broad privileges , it may b
e
checked by the other ,
and both b
y
the President ; and also a
s
the law being promulgated , the citizen will know
how to avoid offence . But if one branch may assume its own privileges without con
trol ; if itmay do it on the spur of the occassion , conceal the law in its own breast , and
after the fact committed make it
s
sentence both the law and the judgment o
n
that fact ;
if the offence is to be kept undefined , and to be declared only ex re nata , and according
to the passions o
f
the moment , and there b
e
no limitation either in the manner o
r
meas
ure o
f
the punishment , th
e
condition o
f
th
e
citizen will be perilous indeed . "
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each side , that it will be farmore satisfactory to give it in a note
a
s it stands in the printed opinion , than to hazard , b
y
any abridg
ment , impairing the just force of the reasoning . "
The reasoning o
f
Lord Chief Justice D
e
Grey . in Re
x
v . Brass Crosby , ( 3 Wilson ' s
R . 188 , ) and of Lord Ellenborough in Burdett v . Abbott , ( 14 East , R . 1 , ) is excecdingly
cogent and striking against that favored b
yMr . Jefferson . Itdeserves andwill requite an
attentive perusal . See also Burdett v . Abbott , 4 Taunt . R . 401 ; 4 Dows Parl .Rep . 165 .
1 It is necessary to premise that the suit was brought for false imprisonment b
y
a
party who had been arrested under a warrant o
f
the speaker o
f
theHouse o
f Representa
tives , b
y
the sergeant - a
t
-arms , fo
r
a
n alleged contempt o
f
the House , ( an attempt to bribe
a member , ) and the cause was decided upon a demurrer to the justification set u
p
b
y
the officer . After a preliminary remark upon the range of the argument b
y
the counsel ,
Mr . Justice Johnson , in delivering th
e
opinion o
f
th
e
court , proceeded as follows :
“ The pleadings have narrowed them down to the simple inquiry ,whether the House
o
f Representatives can take cognizance o
f contempts committed against themselves ,
under any circumstances ? The duress complained o
f
was sustained under a warrant
issued to compel the party ' s appearance , not for the actual infliction of punishment fo
r
a
n
offence committed . Yet it cannot be denied , that the power to institute a prosecu
tion must b
e dependent upon the power to punish . If the House of Representatives
possessed n
o authority to punish for contempt , the initiating process issued in the as
sertion o
f
that authority must have been illegal ; there was a want of jurisdiction to
justify it .
" It is certainly true , that there is no power given by the Constitution to either house
to punish for contempts except when committed b
y
their own members . Nor does the
judicial o
r criminal power given to the United States , in any part , expressly extend to
the infliction o
f punishment for contempt of either house , or any one co -ordinate branch
o
f
the government . Shall we , therefore , decide that no such power exists ?
" It is true , that such a power , if it exists , must be derived from implication , and the
genius and spirit o
f
our institutions are hostile to the exercise o
f implied powers . Had
the faculties o
f
man been competent to th
e
framing o
f
a system o
f government which
would have left nothing to implication , it cannot be doubted that the effort would have
been made b
y
the framers o
f
the Constitution . But what is the fact ? There is not in
the whole o
f
that admirable instrument a grant o
f powers which does not draw after it
others , not expressed , but vital to their exercise ; not substantive and independent , in
deed , but auxiliary and subordinate .
“ The idea is utopian , that government can exist without leaving the exercise of dis
cretion ' somewhere . Public security against the abuse of such discretion must rest on
responsibility , and stated appeals to public approbation . Where all power is derived
from the people , and public functionaries , at short intervals , deposit it at the feet of the
people , to b
e
resumed again only a
t
their will , individual fears may be alarmed b
y
the
monsters o
f imagination , but individual liberty can be in little danger .
“ No one is so visionary a
s
to dispute the assertion , that the sole end and aim o
f
all
our institutions is the safety and happiness o
f
the citizen . But the relation between the
action and the end is not always so direct and palpable a
s
to strike the eye o
f every
observer . The science of government is themost abstruse of all sciences ; if , indeed ,
that ca
n
b
e
called a science which has but few fixed principles , and practically consists
in little more than the exercise o
f
a sound discretion , applied to the exigencies o
f
the
state , as they arise . It is the science of experiment .
“ But if there is one maxim which necessarily rides over al
l
others , in the practical
application o
f government , it is that the public functionaries must be left at liberty to
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$ 848 . This is not the only case in which the House of Repre
sentatives has exerted the power to arrest and punish fo
r
a con
exercise th
e
powers which th
e
people have intrusted to them . The interest and dig
nity o
f
thosewho created them require the exertion o
f
the powers indispensable to the
attainment o
f
the ends o
f
their creation . Nor is a casual conflict with the rights of
particular individuals any reason to b
e urged against the exercise o
f
such powers .
The wretch beneath the gallows may repine a
t
the fate which awaits him ; and yet it
is n
o
less certain that the laws under which h
e
suffers were made for his security .
The unreasonable murmurs o
f
individuals against the restraints o
f society have a direct
tendency to produce that worst o
f a
ll despotisms ,which makes every individual the
tyrant over his neighbor ' s rights . .
“ That ' the safety of the people is the supreme law , ' not only comports with , but is
indispensable to , the exercise of those powers in their public functionaries , without
which that safety cannot b
e guarded . On this principle it is , that courts o
f justice are
universally acknowledged to b
e
vested , b
y
their very creation , with power to impose
silence , respect , and decorum in their presence , and submission to their lawful man
dates , and as a corollary to this proposition , to preserve themselves and their officers
from the approach o
f
insults o
r pollution .
“ It is true that the courts of justice in the United States are vested , b
y
express
statute provision , with power to fine and imprison for contempts ; but it does not
follow , from this circumstance , that they would not have exercised that power without
the aid o
f
the statute , o
r
not in cases , if such should occur , to which such statute pro
vision may not extend . On the contrary , it is a legislative assertion of this right , as
incidental to a grant o
f judicial power , and can only be considered either as an instance
o
f
abundant caution , or a legislative declaration , that the power of punishing for con
tempts shall not extend beyond its known and acknowledged limits of fine and impris
onment .
“ But it is contended , that if this power in th
e
House o
f Representatives is to be as
serted o
n the plea o
f necessity , the ground is too broad and the result too indefinite ;
that the executive , and every co -ordinate , and even subordinate , branch o
f the govern
ment may resort to the same justification , and thewhole assume to themselves , in the
exercise o
f
this power , themost tyrannical licentiousness .
“ This is unquestionably an evil to b
e guarded against , and if the doctrine may be
pushed to that extent , itmust be a bad doctrine , and is justly denounced .
“ But what is the alternative ? The argument obviously leads to the total annihila
tion o
f
th
e
power o
f
the House o
f Representatives to guard itself from contempts ; and
leaves it exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness , caprice , o
r
even
conspiracy may meditate against it . This result is fraught with too much absurdity
not to bring into doubt the soundness o
f any argument from which it is derived . That
a deliberative assembly , clothed with themajesty o
f the people , and charged with the
care o
f a
ll
that is dear to them ; composed o
f
the most distinguished citizens , selected
and drawn together from every quarter o
f
a great nation ; whose deliberations a
re
required b
y
public opinion to b
e
conducted under the eye o
f the pablic , and whose
decisions must b
e
clothed with all that sanctity which unlimited confidence in their
wisdom and purity can inspire , - that such a
n assembly should not possess the power
to suppress rudeness o
r repel insult is a supposition too wild to b
e suggested . And
accordingly , to avoid the pressure of these considerations , it has been argued , that the
right of the respective houses to exclude from their presence , and their absolute control
within their own walls , carry with them the right to punish contempts committed ia
their presence ; while the absolute legislative power given to Congress within this d
is
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tempt committed within the walls of the House . The power was
exerted 1 in the case of Robert Randall , in December , 1795 , for an
trict enables them to provide by la
w
against a
ll
other insults against which there is
any necessity for providing .
“ It is to b
e
observed that , so far a
s
the issue o
f
this cause is implicated , this argu
ment yields a
ll right of the plaintiff in error to a decision in his favor ; for , non constat ,
from the pleadings , but that this warrant issued for an offence committed in the imme
diate presence o
f
the House .
" Nor is it immaterial to notice what difficulties the negation o
f
this right in the
House o
f Representatives draws after it ,when it is considered , that the concession of the
power , if exercised within their walls , relinquishes the great grounds of the argument ,
to wit : the want of an express grant , and th
e
unrestricted and undefined nature o
f
the
power here set u
p
. For why should the House be a
t liberty to exercise an ungranted ,
a
n
unlimited , and undefined power within their walls any more than without them ?
If the analogy with individual right and power be resorted to , it will reach no further
than to exclusion ; and it requires no exuberance of imagination to exhibit the ridicu
lous consequenceswhich might result from such a restriction , imposed upon the conduct
o
f
a deliberative assembly .
“ Nor would their situation b
e materially relieved b
y
resorting to their legislative
power within the district . That power may , indeed , be applied to many purposes , and
was intended b
y
the Constitution to extend to many purposes indispensable to the
security and dignity o
f
the general government ; but there are purposes o
f
a more
grave and general character than th
e
offences which may b
e
denominated contempts ,
and which , from their very nature , admit of no precise definition . Judicial gravity
will not admit of the illustrations which this remark would admit of . It
s
correctness is
easily tested b
y
pursuing , in imagination , a legislative attempt a
t
defining the cases to
which the epithet contemptmight be reasonably applied .
“ But although the offence be held undefinable , it is justly contended , that th
e
punish
ment need not be indefinite . Nor is it so .
“ We are now considering the extent to which the punishing power of Congress , b
y
a legislative act ,may be carried . On that subject the bounds of their power are to be
found in the provisions o
f
the Constitution .
. “ The present question is ,what is the extent of the punishing power which the
deliberative assemblies o
f
the Union may assume , and exercise on the principle of self
preservation ?
“ Analogy and the nature o
f
the case furnish the answer , - ' the least possiblepower
adequate to the end proposed ' ; which is the power of imprisonment . Itmay , at first
view , and from the history of the practice of our legislative bodies , be thought to ex
tend to other inflictions . But every other will be found to be mere commutation for
confinement ; since commitment alone is the alternative , where the individual proves
contumacious . And even to the duration of imprisonment a period is imposed b
y
the
nature o
f things ; since the existence of the power that imprisons is indispensable to
it
s
continuance ; and although the legislative power continues perpetual , the legislative
body ceases to exist o
n
the moment o
f
it
s adjournment o
r periodical dissolution . It
follows that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment .
“ This view of the subject necessarily sets bounds to the exercise of a caprice ,which
has sometimes disgraced deliberative assemblies , when under the infuence o
f strong
passions o
r
wicked leaders , but the instances o
f
which have long since remained o
n
record only a
s
historical facts , not as precedents fo
r
imitation . In the present fixed
1 B
y
a vote o
f
7
8 yeas against 1
7 days .
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attempt to corrupt a member ; 1 in 1796 , in the case of — , a
challenge given to a member ,which was held a breach of privi
and settled state o
f English institutions , there is no more danger of their being revived ,
probably , than in our own .
“ But the American legislative bodies have never possessed , or pretended to , the
omnipotence which constitutes the leading feature in the legislative assembly o
f
Great
Britain , and which may have le
d
occasionally to the exercise o
f caprice , under the spe
cious appearance o
f
merited resentment .
“ If it be inquired what security is there , that with an officer avowing himself de
voted to their will , the House of Representatives will confine its punishing power to th
e
limits o
f imprisonment , and not push it to the infliction of corporeal punishment , or
even death , and exercise it in cases affecting the liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press ;
the reply is to b
e
found in the consideration , that the Constitution was formed in and
for a
n
advanced state o
f society , and rests at every point on received opinions and fixed
ideas . It is not a new creation , but a combination of existing materials ,whose prop
erties and attributes were familiarly understood , and had been determined b
y
reit
erated experiments . It is not , therefore , reasoning upon things a
s they are , to suppose
that any deliberative assembly constituted under it would ever assert any other rights
and powers than those which had been established b
y
long practice , and conceded b
y
public opinion . Melancholy , also , would be that state of distrust which rests not a
hope upon a moral influence . The most absolute tyranny could not subsist where men
could not b
e
trusted with power , because theymight abuse it ,much less a government ,
which has n
o
other basis than the sound morals ,moderation , and the good sense of those
who compose it . Unreasonable jealousies not only blight th
e
pleasures , but dissolve
the very texture o
f society .
“ But it is argued that th
e
inference , if any ,arising under the Constitution , is against
the exercise o
f
th
e
powers here asserted b
y
the House o
f Representatives ; that theex
press grant o
f power to punish their members respectively , and to expel them , b
y
the
application o
f
a familiar maxim , raises a
n implication against the power to punish any
other than their own members .
“ This argument proves to
o
much ; for its direct application would lead to the anni
hilation o
f
almost every power o
f Congress . To enforce its laws upon any subject ,
without the sanction of punishment , is obviously impossible . Yet there is an express
grant o
f power to punish in one class o
f
cases and one only ; and all the punishing
power exercised b
y
Congress in any cases , except those which relate to piracy and
offences against th
e
laws o
f
nations , is derived from implication . Nor did the idea ever
occur to any one that the express grant , in one class o
f
cases , repelled the assumption
o
f
the punishing power in any other .
“ The truth is , that the exercise of the powers given over their own members was of
snch a delicate nature that a constitutional provision became necessary to assert o
r
communicate it . Constituted , as that body is , of the delegates of confederated States ,
some such provision was necessary to guard against their mutual jealousy , since every
proceeding against a representative would indirectly affect the honor o
r
interests o
f
the
State which sent him .
" In reply to the suggestion that , on this same foundation of necessity ,might be
raised a superstructure o
f implied powers in the executive , and every other department ,
and even ministerial officer o
f
the government , it would be sufficient to observe , that
neither analogy nor precedent would support the assertion o
f
such powers in any
other than a legislative o
r judicial body . Even corruption anywhere else would not
i i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 200 to 20
5
, note ; Jefferson ' s Manual , $ 3 .
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lege ; 1 and in May , 1832 , in th
e
case o
f
Samuel Houston , fo
r
a
n
assault upon a member fo
r
words spoken in his place , and after
wards printed , reflecting on the character o
f
Houston . In the
former case , the House punished the offence by imprisonment ; in
the latter , by a reprimand b
y
the speaker . So , in 1800 , in the
case o
f William Duane , for a printed libel against the Senate , the
party was held guilty o
f
a contempt and punished b
y imprison
ment . Nor is there anything peculiar in the claim under the
Constitution of the United States . The same power has been
claimed and exercised repeatedly under the State governments ,
independent o
f any special constitutional provision , upon the
broad ground stated b
y Mr . Chief Justice Shippen , that the mem
bers o
f
the legislature are legally and inherently possessed o
f all
such privileges as are necessary to enable them , with freedom and
safety , to execute the great trust reposed in them by the body of
the people who elected them .
contaminate the source o
f political life . In the retirement of the cabinet , it is not e
x
pected that the executive can b
e approached b
y
indignity o
r insult ; nor can it ever be
necessary to the executive , or any other department , to hold a public deliberative assem
bly . These are not arguments ; they are visions ,which mar the enjoyment o
f
actual
blessings , with the attack o
r
feint o
f
the harpies o
f imagination .
“ As to theminor points made in this case , it is only necessary to observe that there
is nothing o
n
the face o
f
this record from which it can appear on what evidence this
warrantwas issued . And we are not to presume that the House o
f Representatives
would have issued it without duly establishing the fact charged o
n
the individual .
And , as to the distance to which the process might reach , it is very clear that there
exists n
o
reason for confining it
s operation to the limits o
f
the District of Columbia .
After passing those limits , we know no bounds that can be prescribed to its range but
those o
f
the Unied States . And why should it be restricted to other boundaries ? Such
are the limits o
f
the legislating powers o
f
that body ; and the inhabitant of Louisiana
o
r
Maine may a
s probably charge them with bribery and corruption o
r attempt , by
letter , to induce the commission o
f
either , a
s
the inhabitant o
f any other section o
f
the
Union . If the inconvenience be urged , the reply is obvious ; there is n
o difficulty in
observing that respectful deportment which will render al
l
apprehension chimerical . ”
See also Rex v . Brass Crosby , 3 Wilson , R . 188 . In the convention a proposition was
made and referred to the select committee appointed to draft the Constitution giving
authority to punish for contempts , and enumerating them . The committee made n
o
report o
n the subject . Journ . of Convention , 20th Aug . 263 , 264 .
1 Jefferson ' s Manual , $ 3 . [ The case was that of James Gunn . See Annals of Con
gress , 1st Sess . 4th Cong . p . 786 . ]
2 See the Speeches o
f Mr . Doddridge andMr . Burges on this occasion .
8 Journ . of Senate , 27th March , 1800 ; Jefferson ' s Manual , $ 3 . See also Burdett v .
Abbott , 14 East , 1 . ( In a case decided in November , 1872 , th
e
Supreme Court of Illi
nois punished a
s
for contempt the publisher o
f
a daily paper in whose columns had
appeared a
n
article reflecting severely upon the court . )
• Bolton v . Martin , 1 Dall . R . 286 . See also House of Delegates in 1784 , the case of
John Warden , 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 69 ; Coffin v . Coffin , 4 Mass . R . 1 , 34 , 35 . [See also
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$ 849. The power to punish for contempts , thus asserted both
in England and America , is confined to punishment during the
session of the legislative body, and cannot be extended beyond it.
It seems that the power of Congress to punish cannot , in its utmost
extent , proceed beyond imprisonment ; and then it terminates with
the adjournment or dissolution o
f
that body . Whether a fine may
not b
e imposed has been recently made a question in a case of
contempt before the house of lords ; upon which occasion Lord
Chancellor Brougham expressed himself in the negative , and the
other law lords , Eldon and Tenterden , in the affirmative ; but the
point was not then solemnly decided . It had , however , been
previously affirmed b
y
the house of lords , in the case of Rex v .
Flower , ( 8 T . R . 314 , ) in case of a libel upon one of the bishops .
Lord Kenyon then said , that in ascertaining and punishing for a
contempt o
f
it
s privileges , the house acted in a judicial capacity .
$ 850 . The sixth section of the first article contains an enumer
ation o
f
the rights , privileges , and disabilities of th
e
members of
each house in their personal and individual characters , as contra
distinguished from the rights , privileges , and disabilities of the
body o
f
which they are members . Itmay here again be remarked ,
that these rights and privileges are in truth the rights and privi
leges o
f their constituents , and for their benefit and security ,
rather than the rights and privileges o
f
th
e
member fo
r
his own
benefit and security . In like manner , the disabilities imposed are
founded upon the same comprehensive policy , to guard the powers
o
f
the representative from abuse , and to secure a wise , impartial ,
and uncorrupt administration of his duties .
the recent cases o
f
Hiss v . Bartlett , 3 Gray , 468 ; Burnham v . Morrissey , 14 Gray , 22
6
;
State v . Mathews , 37 N . H . 450 . The courts cannot inquire into the justice or propriety
o
f
a legislative punishment in the expulsion o
f
a member for misconduct . Hiss v .
Barllett , supra . )
i Dunn v . Anderson , 6 Wheat . R . 204 , 230 , 231 .
9 Dunn v . Anderson , 6 Wheat . R . 204 , 230 , 231 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . II , p . 221 .
8 In 1831 .
4 See a learned article o
n
this subject in the English Law Magazine fo
r
July , 1831 ,
p . I , et
c
. Parliamentary Debates , 1831 .
6 In Yates v . Lansing , ( 9 Johns . R . 417 , )Mr . Justice Platt said , that “ the right of
punishing for contempts b
y
summary conviction is inherent in a
ll
courts o
f justice and
legislative assemblies , and is essential to their protection and existence . It is a branch
o
f
the common law adopted and sanctioned b
y
our State constitution . The decision
involved in this power is in a great measure arbitrary and undefinable ; and yet the
experience o
f ages has demonstrated , that it is perfectly compatible with civil liberty ,
and auxiliary to the purest ends o
f justice . ” [ Se
e
also Hiss v . Bartlett , 3 Gray , 46
8
. ]
- 6 Com . Dig . Parliament , D . 17 . [Coffin v . Coffin , 4 Mass . 27 . )
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$ 851 . The first clause is as follows : “ The senators and repre
sentatives shall receive a compensation fo
r
their services , to be
ascertained by law and paid out o
f
the treasury of the United
States . They shall , in al
l
cases , except treason , felony , and
breach o
f
the peace , be privileged from arrest during their a
t
tendance a
t
the session o
f
their respective houses , and in going
to and returning from the same . And fo
r
any speech or debate
in either house they shall not be questioned in any other place . ”
$ 852 . In respect to compensation , there is at present a marked
distinction between the members o
f
th
e
British Parliament and
the members o
f Congress , the former not being a
t present entitled
to any pay . Formerly , indeed , the members of the house of com
mons were entitled to receive wages from their constituents , but
the last known case is that of Andrew Marvell ,who was a member
from Hull , in the first Parliament after the restoration of Charles
the Second . Four shillings sterling a day used to be allowed for
a knight o
f
the shire , and two shillings a day for a member of a
city or borough ; and this rate was established in the reign o
f
Edward the Third . And we are told that two shillings a day , the
allowance to a burgess ,was so considerable a sum in these ancient
times , that there are many instances where boroughs petitioned to
b
e
excused from sending members to Parliament , representing that
they were engaged in building bridges or other public works , and
therefore unable to bear so extraordinary an expense . It is be
lieved that the practice in America during its colonial state was ,
if not universally , at least generally , to allow a compensation to
b
e paid to members ; and the practice is believed to be absolutely
universal under the State constitutions . The members are not ,
however , always paid out of the public treasury ; but the practice
still exists , constitutionally or b
y
usage , in some of the States to
charge the amount o
f
the compensation fixed b
y
the legislature
upon the constituents , and levy it in the State ta
x
. That has cer
tainly been the general course in the State o
f
Massachusetts , and
it was probably adopted from the ancient practice in England .
$ 853 . Whether it is , on the whole , best to allow to members of
legislative bodies a compensation fo
r
their services , or whether
their services should be considered merely honorary , is a question
11 Black . Comm . 174 , and Christian ' s Note , 34 ; Id . Prynne on 4 Inst . 32 ; Com .
Dig . Parliament , D . 16 . ( The compensation to members of Congress is now $ 5 ,000
per annum , and to the speaker , $ 8 ,000 , with a
n
allowance for mileage o
f twenty
cents a mile b
y
th
e
nearest usually travelled route . 14 Stat . at Large , 323 . )
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admitting o
f
much argument on each side ; and it has accordingly
found strenuous advocates and opponents , not only in speculation
but in practice . It has been already seen , that in England none
is now allowed or claimed , and there can be little doubt that
public opinion is altogether in favor o
f
their present course . On
the other hand , in America an opposite opinion prevails among
those whose influence is most impressive with the people on such
subjects . It is not surprising that , under such circumstances ,
there should have been a considerable diversity o
f opinion mani
fested in the convention itself . The proposition to allow compen
sation out o
f
the public treasury to members o
f
the House o
f
Representatives was originally carried by a vote of eight States
against three ; 1 and to the senators b
y
a vote o
f
seven States
against three , one being divided . At a subsequent period , a mo
tion to strike out the payment out o
f
the public treasury was lost
b
y
a vote o
f
four States in the affirmative and five in the negative ,
two being divided ; 3 and the whole proposition as to representa
tives was ( a
s
amended ) lost , b
y
a vote o
f
five States for it and five
against it , one being divided . And as to senators , a motion was
made that they should be paid b
y
their respective States , which
was lost , five States voting for it and si
x against it ; and then the
proposition to pay them out o
f
the public treasury was lost b
y
a
similar vote . At a subsequent period , a proposition was reported
that the compensation o
f
the members o
f
both houses should be
made b
y
the State in which they were chosen , and ultimately the
present plan was agreed to b
y
a vote o
f
nine States against two . ?
Such a fluctuation of opinion exhibits in a strong light the embar
rassing considerations which surrounded the subject . 8
$ 854 . The principal reasons in favor of a compensation may
b
e
presumed to have been the following . In th
e
first place , the
advantage is secured o
f commanding the first talents o
f
the nation
in the public councils , b
y
removing a virtual disqualification , that
o
f poverty , from that large class of men who , though favored b
y
nature ,might not be favored by fortune . It could hardly be ex
pected that such men would make the necessary sacrifices in order
to gratify their ambition for a public station ; and if they did ,
there was a corresponding danger that they might be compelled
1 Journal of Convention , 67 , 116 , 117 . 2 Id . 119 .
8 Journ . of Convention , 142 . 4 Id . 144 .
6 Id . 150 , 151 . 6 Id . 219 , $ 10 .
7 Id . 251 . 8 See Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 92 to 99 .
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b
y
their necessities , or tempted by their wants , to yield up their
independence , and perhaps their integrity , to the allurements of
the corrupt o
r
the opulent . In the next place , it would , in a pro
portionate degree , gratify the popular feeling b
y
enlarging the circle
o
f
candidates from which members might be chosen , and bringing
the office within the reach o
f persons in themiddle ranks of soci
ety , although they might not possess shining talents , - a course
best suited to the equality found and promulgated in a republic .
In the next place , it would make a seat in the national councils
a
s
attractive , and perhaps more so , than in those of the State , b
y
the superior emoluments o
f
office . And in the last place , it would
b
e
in conformity to a long and well -settled practice , which embod
ie
d
public sentiment and had been sanctioned b
y
public approba
tion . 2
$ 855 . On the other hand , it might be , and it was probably ,
urged against it , that the practice of allowing compensation was
calculated tomake the office rather more a matter o
f bargain and
speculation than o
f high political ambition . It would operate as
a
n inducement to vulgar and groveling demagogues o
f
little talent
and narrow means to defeat the claims o
f higher candidates than
themselves , and , with a view to the compensation alone , to engage
in a
ll
sorts o
f corrupt intrigues to procure their own election . It
would thus degrade these high trusts from being deemed the reward
o
f distinguished merit , and strictly honorary , to a mere traffic fo
r
political office ,which would first corrupt th
e
people a
t
the polls ,
and then subject their liberties to be bartered b
y
their venal can
didate . Men of talents in this way would be compelled to degra
dation in order to acquire office , or would be excluded b
y
more
unworthy o
r
more cunning candidates , who would feel that the
laborer was worthy o
f
h
is
hire . There is no danger that the want
o
f
compensation would deter men of suitable talents and virtues ,
even in the humbler walks o
f
life , from becoming members , since
it could scarcely be presumed that the public gratitude would
not , by other means , aid them in their private business , and
increase their just patronage . And if , in a few cases , it should be
otherwise , it should not be forgotten that one of the most whole
some lessons to b
e taught in republics was , thatmen should learn
suitable economy and prudence in their private affairs , and that
1 Sec 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 279 , 28
0
; Yates ' s Minutes , 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 92 to 99 .
2 See Rawle o
n
the Constitution , ch . 18 , p . 179 .
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profusion and poverty were ,with a few splendid exceptions , equally
unsafe to be intrusted with the public rights and interests , since ,
if they did not betray , they would hardly be presumed willing to
protect them . The practice of England abundantly showed that
compensation was not necessary to bring into public life the best
talents and virtues of the nation . In looking over her list of dis
tinguished statesmen , of equal purity and patriotism , it would be
found that comparatively few had possessed opulence , and many
had struggled through life with the painful pressure of narrow
resources , the res angusta domi .
$ 856 . It does not become the commentator to say whether
experience has a
s yet given more weight to the former than to
the latter reasons . Certain it is , that the convention , in adopting
the rule o
f allowing a compensation , had principally in view the
importance of securing the highest dignity and independence in
the discharge o
f legislative functions , and the justice as well as
duty o
f
a free people possessing adequate means to indemnify those
who were employed in their service against all the sacrifices inci
dent to their station . It has been justly observed , that the princi
ple of compensation to those who render services to the public
runs through the whole Constitution . 2
$ 857 . If it be proper to allow a compensation fo
r
services to
the members o
f Congress , there seems the utmost propriety in its
being paid out o
f
the public treasury of the United States . The
labor is fo
r
the benefit of the nation , and it should properly be
remunerated b
y
the nation . Besides , if the compensation were
to b
e allowed b
y
the States , o
r
b
y
the constituents o
f
themembers ,
if left to their discretion , it might keep the latter in a state of
slavish dependence , andmight introduce great inequalities in the
allowance . And if it were to be ascertained by Congress and paid
b
y
the constituents , there would always be danger that the rule
would be fixed to suit those who were th
e
least enlightened and
th
e
most parsimonious , rather than those who acted upon a high
sense o
f the dignity and the duties o
f
the station . Fortunately ,
it is left for the decision of Congress . The compensation is “ to
b
e ascertained b
y
la
w , " and never addresses itself to the pride ,
o
r
the parsimony , the local prejudices , or local habits of any part
o
f the Union . It is fixed with a liberal view to the national du
i See Yates ' sMinutes , 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 92 to 99 .
? Rawle on the Constitution , ch . 18 , p . 179 .
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ties , and is paid from the national purse . If the compensation
had been left to b
e
fixed b
y
th
e
State legislature , the general gov
ernment would have become dependent upon the governments o
f
the States ; and the latter could almost , at their pleasure , have
dissolved it . " Serious evils were felt from this source under the
confederation , b
y
which each State was to maintain it
s
own dele
gates in Congress ; ? for it was found that the States to
o
often
were operated upon b
y
local considerations , as contradistinguished
from general and national interests .
$ 858 . The only practical question which seems to have been
further open upon this head is , whether the compensation should
have been ascertained b
y
the Constitution itself , or left ( as it now
is ) to be ascertained from time to time b
y Congress . If fixed b
y
the Constitution , it might , from the change of the value of money
and the modes o
f
life , become too low and utterly inadequate .
Or it might become too high , in consequence o
f
serious changes in
the prosperity of the nation . It is wisest , therefore , to have it
left where it is , to be decided by Congress from time to time ,
according to their own sense of justice and a large view of the
national resources . There is no danger that it will ever become
excessive without exciting general discontent , and then it will
soon be changed from the reaction o
f public opinion . . The danger
rather is , that public opinion will become too sensitive upon this
subject , and refuse to allow any addition to what may be at the
time a very moderate allowance . In the actual practice of the
government , this subject has rarely been stirred without produ
cing violent excitements a
t
the elections . This alone is sufficient
to establish the safety o
f
the actual exercise of the power b
y
the
bodies with which it is lodged , both in the State and national
legislatures . It is proper , however , to add that the omission to
provide some constitutional mode o
f fixing the pay o
f
members o
f
Congress ,without leaving the subject to their discretion , formed
in someminds a strong objection to th
e
Constitution . 7
$ 859 . The next part of the clause regards the privilege of the
1 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 279 .
? Articles o
f
Confederation , art . 5 .
8 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 279 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 70 , 71 .
4 See note , p . 603 , supra .
6 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 279 , 280 , 281 , 282 .
6 i Elliot ' s Debates , 70 , 71 .
7 SeeGov . Randolph ' s Letter ; 3 Amer . Mus . 62 , 70 .
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members from arrest, except for crimes , during their attendance
at the sessions of Congress , and their going to and returning from
them . This privilege is conceded by law to the humblest suitor
and witness in a court o
f justice ; and it would be strange indeed
if it were denied to the highest functionaries of the state in the
discharge o
f
their public duties . It belongs to Congress in com
mon with a
ll
other legislative bodies which exist , or have existed
in America since it
s
first settlement , under every variety of govern
ment , and it has immemorially constituted a privilege of both
houses o
f
the British Parliament . It seems absolutely indispen
sable for the just exercise o
f
the legislative power in every nation
purporting to possess a free constitution o
f government , and it
cannot be surrendered without endangering the public liberties a
s
well as the private independence o
f
the members . ?
$ 860 . This privilege from arrest privileges them of course
against a
ll
process , the disobedience to which is punishable by
attachment o
f
the person , such as a subpoena ad respondendum , aut
testificandum , or a summons to serve on a jury , and ( as has been
justly observed ) with reason , because a member has superior
duties to perform in another place . When a representative is
withdrawn from his seat b
y
a summons , the people whom he rep
resents lose their voice in debate and vote a
s
they d
o
in his volun
tary absence . When a senator is withdrawn by summons , hi
s
State loses half its voice in debate and vote , as it does in his vol
untary absence . The enormous disparity of the evil admits of no
comparison . The privilege , indeed , is deemed notmerely the priv
ilege o
f
the member o
r his constituents , but the privilege of th
e
House also . And every man must at his peril take notice who
are the members o
f
the House returned o
f
record . 5
$ 861 . The privilege of the peers of the British Parliament to be
free from arrest in civil cases is forever sacred and inviolable . For
other purposes , ( as fo
r
common process , ) it seems that their priv .
ilege did not extend , but from th
e
teste o
f
the summons to Parlia
1 1 Black . Comm . 164 , 165 ; Com . D
ig
. Parliament , D . 17 ; Jefferson ' sManual , $ 3 ,
Privilege ; Benyon v . Evelyn , Sir 0 . Bridg . R . 334 .
2 1 Kent . Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 221 ; Bolton v .Martin , 1 Dall . R . 29
6
; Coffin v . Coffin ,
4 Mass . R . 1 . (See also Cushing , Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies , $ 546 -
597 . Cooley , Const . Lim . 134 . )
8 (Exemption from arrest is not violated b
y
the service o
f
citations o
r
declarations in
civil cases . Gentry v . Griffith , 27 Texas , 461 ; Case v . Rorabacker , 15 Mich . 537 . )
• Jefferson ' s Manual , $ 3 . 6 Id . $ 3 .
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ment , and fo
r
twenty days before and after the session . But that
period has now , as to a
ll
common process but arrest , been taken
away b
y
statute . The privilege of the members of the house of
commons from arrest is fo
r
forty days after every prorogation , and
for forty days before the next appointed meeting ,which in effect is
a
s long a
s
the Parliament lasts , it seldom being prorogued fo
r
more than fourscore days a
t
a time . In case of a dissolution of
Parliament it does not appear that the privilege is confined to any
precise time , the rule being that the party is entitled to it for a
convenient time , redeundo . 3
$ 862 . The privilege of members of Parliament formerly ex
tended also to their servants and goods , so that they could not be
arrested . But so fa
r
a
s
it went to obstruct the ordinary course o
f
justice in th
e
British courts , it has since been restrained . In the
members o
f Congress the privilege is strictly personal , and does
not extend to their servants or property . It is also , in al
l
cases ,
confined to a reasonable time , eundo ,morando , et ad propria re
deundo , instead of being limited b
y
a precise number o
f days . It
was probably from a survey of the abuses o
f privilege which fo
r
a
long time defeated in England the purposes o
f
justice , that th
e
Con
stitution has thus marked it
s boundary with a sedulous caution . "
$ 863 . The effect of this privilege is , that the arrest of th
e
mem
ber is unlawful , and a trespass ab initio , fo
r
which h
e may main
tain an action , or proceed against the aggressor by way of indict
ment . Hemay also be discharged b
y
motion to a court o
f justice ,
o
r upon a writ of habeas corpus ; 6 and the arrest may also be pun
ished a
s
a contempt o
f
the House . 7
§ 864 . In respect to the time of going and returning , the law is
not so strict in point o
f
time as to require the party to set out im
mediately on hi
s
return , but allows him time to settle his private
affairs , and to prepare fo
r
his journey . Nor does it nicely scan
his road , nor is his protection forfeited b
y
a little deviation from
that which is most direct , fo
r
it is supposed that some superior
i Com . Dig . Parliament , D . 17 ; 1 Black . Comm . 165 , 166 ,
? 1 Black . Comm . 165 ; Com . Dig . Parliament , D . 17 .
8 Holiday v . Pitt , 2 Str . R . 985 ; 8 . C . Cas . Temp . Hard . 28 ; 1 Black . Comm . 165 ,
Christian ' s Note , 21 ; Barnard v . Mordaunt , i Kenyon , R . 125 .
• Com . Dig . Parliament , D . 17 ; 1 Black . Comm . 16
5
; Jefferson ' sManual , $ 3 .
6 Jefferson ' s Manual , $ 3 .
6 Jefferson ' sManual , $ 3 ; 2 Str . 990 ; 2 Wilson ' s R . 151 ; Cas . Temp . Hard . 28 .
71 Black . Comm . 164 , 165 , 166 ; Com . Dig . Parliament , D . 17 ; Jefferson ' s Manual ,
$ 3 .
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convenience o
r necessity directed it . The privilege from arrest
takes place b
y
force of the election , and before the member has
taken his seat o
r
is sworn .
$ 865 . The exception to the privilege is , that it shall not extend
to “ treason , felony , or breach of the peace . ” These words are
the same a
s
those in which the exception to the privilege of
Parliament is usually expressed at the common law , and were
doubtless borrowed from that source . Now , as all crimes ar
e
offences against the peace , the phrase “ breach of the peace ” would
seem to extend to all indictable offences , as well those which
are in fact attended with force and violence , as those which are only
constructive breaches o
f
the peace o
f
the government , inasmuch as
they violate it
s good order . And so , in truth , it was decided in
Parliament , in the case of a seditious libel published b
y
a mem
ber (Mr . Wilkes ) against the opinion of Lord Camden and the other
judges of the court o
f
common pleas , and , as it will probably
now b
e thought , since the party spirit of those times has subsided ,
with entire good sense and in furtherance of public justice . It
would bemonstrous that any member should protect himself from
arrest or punishment for a libel , often a crime of the deepest
malignity and mischief , while he would be liable to arrest
for the pettiest assault o
r
the most insignificant breach of the
peace .
$ 866 . The next great and vital privilege is the freedom of
speech and debate , without which al
l
other privileges would be
comparatively unimportant o
r
ineffectual . This privilege , also ,
is derived from the practice o
f
the British Parliament , and was in
full exercise in our colonial legislatures , and now belongs to the
legislature o
f every State in the Union a
s
matter o
f
constitu
tional right . In the British Parliament it is a claim of immemo
rial right , and is now further fortified b
y
a
n act o
f
Parliament ;
and it is always particularly demanded of the king in person b
y
the speaker o
f
the house o
f
commons a
t
the opening o
f
every new
Parliament . But this privilege is strictly confined to things done
1 Jefferson ' s Manual , $ 3 ; 2 Str . R . 986 , 987 .
% Jefferson ' s Manual , $ 3 ; but see Com . Dig . Parliament , D . 17 .
8 4 Inst . 25 ; 1 Black Comm . 165 ; Com . Dig . Parliament , D . 17 .
4 1 Black . Comm . 166 .
6 Rex v . Wilkes , 2 Wilson ' s R . 151 .
6 See 1 Black . Comm . 16
6
, 167 . . ? See 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 156 .
8 1 Black . Comm . 164 , 165 .
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in the course of parliamentary proceedings , and does not cover
things done beyond the place and limits of duty . Therefore , al
though a speech delivered in the house of commons is privileged ,
and themember cannot be questioned respecting it elsewhere, yet,
if he publishes his speech , and it contains libellous matter , he is lia
b
le
to a
n
action and prosecution therefor , as in common cases of
libel . And the same principles seem applicable to the privilege of
debate and speech in Congress . No man ought to have a right to
defame others under color o
f
a performance o
f
the duties o
f
his
office . And if he does so in the actual discharge o
f
his duties in
Congress , that furnishes no reason why he should be enabled , through
the medium o
f
the press , to destroy the reputation and invade the
repose o
f
other citizens . It is neither within the scope of his
duty nor in furtherance o
f public rights o
r public policy . Every
citizen has as good a right to be protected b
y
the laws from ma
lignant scandal and false charges and defamatory imputations , as
a member o
f Congress has to utter them in his seat . If it were
otherwise , a man ' s character might be taken away without the
possibility o
f
redress , either b
y
the malice , or indiscretion , o
r
over
weening self -conceit of a member of Congress . It is proper , how
ever , to apprise the learned reader that it has been recently
insisted in Congress b
y
very distinguished lawyers , that the privi
lege o
f speech and debate in Congress does extend to publication o
f
the speech o
f
the member . And they ground themselves upon an
important distinction arising from th
e
actual differences between
English and American legislation . In the former the publication
o
f
the debates is not strictly lawful , except b
y
license o
f
the house .
In the latter it is a common right , exercised and supported by the
1 Jefferson ' s Manual , $ 3 .
2 The King v . Creevy , 1 Maule and Selw . 273 . ( To the same effect is The Kiny v .
Lord Abingdon , 1 Esp . 226 . But th
e
bona fide publication b
y
a member o
f
his speech
for the information o
f
his constituents is protected . Lives of the Chief Justices b
y
Lord
Campbell , Vol . 3 , p . 167 ; Davison v . Duncan , 7 El . and BI . 223 , 229 ; Cooley , Const .
Lim , 459 , 460 ; Townsend on Slander and Libel , § 282 . In Stockdale v . Hausard , 9
Ad . and E
l
. 1 , it was decided that the order of the house of commons , that a report
made to that body should b
e published ,would not protect the printer from a recovery at
the suit o
f
a party who was libelled in the report . But this led to a statute making
such publications privileged ; and in the later case o
f
Wason v . Walter , L . R . 4 Q . B . 73 ,
while not questioning the case last referred to , it was unanimously held that a faithful
report in a public newspaper o
f
a debate in either house o
f
Parliament , containing mat
ter disparaging to a
n
individual , is privileged on the same grounds which protect public
cation o
f proceedings in courts o
f justice .
8 See the reasons in Coffin v . Coffin , 4 Mass . R . 1 .
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direct encouragement of the body . This reasoning deserves a
very attentive examination . 1
$ 867 . The next clause regards the disqualifications of members
o
f Congress , and is as follows : “ No senator or representative
shall , during the time for which he was elected , be appointed to
any civil office under the authority of the United States , which
shall have been created , or the emoluments whereof shall have
been increased , during such time . And no person , holding any
office under the United States , shall be a member of either house
o
f Congress during his continuance in office . ” This clause does
not appear to have met with any opposition in the convention , as
to the propriety o
f
some provision on the subject , the principal
question being as to the best mode o
f expressing the disqualifica
tions . It has been deemed by one commentator an admirable
provision against venality , though not , perhaps ,sufficiently guarded
to prevent evasion . And it has been elaborately vindicated by
another with uncommon earnestness . The reasons fo
r
excluding
persons from offices who have been concerned in creating them , or
increasing their emoluments , are to take away , as far as possible ,
any improper bias in the vote o
f
the representative , and to secure
to the constituents some solemn pledge o
f
h
is disinterestedness .
The actual provision , however , does not go to the extent of the
principle , fo
r
his appointment is restricted only “ during the time
fo
r
which h
e
was elected , ” thus leaving in full force every influ
ence upon his mind , if the period of his election is short or the
duration of it is approaching its natural termination . It has
sometimes been matter o
f regret that th
e
disqualification had not
been made coextensive with the supposed mischief , and thus have
forever excluded members from the possession o
f
offices created ,
o
r
rendered more lucrative , by themselves . Perhaps there is
quite a
s
much wisdom in leaving the provision where it now is .
$ 868 . It is not easy , by any constitutional or legislative enact
ments , to shut out all or even many of the avenues of undue or
corrupt influence upon the human mind . The great securities fo
r
society — those on which it must forever rest in a free government
1Mr . Doddridge ' s Speech in the case of Houston , in May , 1832 ; Mr . Burges ' s
Speech , Ibid .
2 Journ . o
f
Convention , 214 , 319 , 320 , 322 , 323 .
8 i Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 198 , 214 , 215 , 375 .
4 Rawle o
n
th
e
Const . ch . 19 , p . 184 , & c . ; I Wilson ' s Law Lect . 446 to 449 .
6 Rawle o
n
the Const . ch . 19 . See 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 375 .
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- are responsibility to the people through elections ,and personal
character and purity o
f principle . Where these are wanting there
never can be any solid confidence or any deep sense o
f duty .
Where these exist they become a sufficient guaranty against all
sinister influences , as well as al
l
gross offences . It has been re
marked with equal profoundness and sagacity , that , as there is a
degree o
f depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree
o
f circumspection and distrust , so there are other qualities in
human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confi
dence . Republican government presupposes the existence of these
qualities in a higher form than any other . It might well be
deemed harsh to disqualify an individual from any office , clearly
required by the exigencies o
f
the country , simply because he had
done hi
s
duty . And , on th
e
other hand , th
e
disqualification
might operate upon many persons who might find their way into
the national councils , as a strong inducement to postpone the cre
ation o
f necessary offices , lest they should become victims of their
high discharge o
f duty . The chances of receiving an appoint
ment to a new office are not so many or so enticing as to bewilder
many minds ; and if they are , the aberrations from duty are so
easily traced that they rarely or never escape the public reproaches .
And if influence is to be exerted b
y
the executive for improper
purposes , it will be quite as easy , and in its operation less seen
and less suspected , to give the stipulated patronage in another
form , either o
f
office o
r
o
f profitable employment , already existing .
And even a general disqualification might be evaded b
y suffering
the like patronage silently to fall into the hands o
f
a confidential
friend , or a favorite child or relative . A dishonorable traffic in
votes , if it should ever become the engine of party or of power in
our country , would never be restrained b
y
the slight network o
f
any constitutional provisions of this sort . It would seek and it
would find it
s
due rewards in the general patronage o
f
the gov
ernment , or in the possession of the offices conferred b
y
the people ,
which would bring emolument as well as influence , and secure
power b
y
gratifying favorites . The history of our State govern
ments ( to g
o
n
o
further ) will scarcely be thought b
y any ingenu
ousmind to afford any proofs that the absence of such a disquali
fication has rendered State legislation less pure or less intelligent ,
o
r
that the existence o
f
such a disqualification would have retarded
1 The Federalist , No . 55 . 2 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 279
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one rash measure , or introduced one salutary scruple into the
elements o
f popular or party strife . History , which teaches us
b
y examples , establishes the truth beyond al
l
reasonable question ,
that genuine patriotism is too lofty in it
s
honor , and to
o enlight
ened in it
s object , to need such checks ; and that weakness and
vice , the turbulence of faction and the meanness o
f
avarice , are
easily bought , notwithstanding al
l
the efforts to fetter or ensnare
them .
§ 869 . The other part o
f
the clause , which disqualifies persons
holding any office under the United States from being members of
either house during the continuance in office , has been still more
universally applauded , and has been vindicated upon the highest
grounds of public policy . It is doubtless founded in a deference
to State jealousy , and a sincere desire to obviate the fears , real or
imaginary , that the general government would obtain an undue
preference over the State governments . It has also the strong
recommendation that it prevents any undue influence from office ,
either upon the party himself o
r
those with whom h
e
is associ
ated in legislative deliberations . The universal exclusion of al
l
persons holding office is ( it must be admitted ) attended with
some inconveniences . The heads of the departments are , in fact ,
thus precluded from proposing or vindicating their own measures
in the face of the nation in the course o
f
debate , and are com
pelled to submit them to other men , who are either imperfectly
acquainted with the measures , or are indifferent to their success or
failure . Thus , that open and public responsibility for measures
which properly belongs to the executive in a
ll governments , and
especially in a republican government , as its greatest security and
strength , is completely done away . The executive is compelled
to resort to secret and unseen influence , to private interviews and
private arrangements , to accomplish its own appropriate purposes ,
instead o
f proposing and sustaining it
s
own duties and measures
by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face of its repre
sentatives . One consequence of this state of things is , that there
never can be traced home to the executive any responsibility fo
r
the measures which are planned and carried a
t
it
s suggestion .
Another consequence will be , ( if it has not yet been , ) thatmeas
ures will be adopted or defeated b
y
private intrigues , political
combinations , irresponsible recommendations , and al
l
the blan
1 S
e
e
Rawle o
n
th
e
Constitution , ch . 19 ; the Federalist , N
o
. 56 .
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dishments of office and a
ll the deadening weight of silent patron
age . The executive will never be compelled to avow or to support
any opinions . Its ministers may conceal or evade any expression
o
f
their opinions . It will seem to follow , when in fact it directs ,
the opinions o
f Congress . It will assume the air of a dependent
instrument , ready to adopt the acts of the legislature , when in
fact it
s spirit and it
s
wishes pervade the whole system o
f legisla
tion . If corruption ever eats its way silently into the vitals of
this republic , it will be because the people are unable to bring
responsibility home to the executive through his chosen ministers .
They will b
e betrayed , when their suspicions are most lulled by
the executive , under the disguise o
f
a
n obedience to the will of
Congress . If it would not have been safe to trust the heads of
departments , as representatives , to the choice o
f
the people , as
their constituents , it would have been at least some gain to have
allowed them a seat , like territorial delegates , in the House of Rep
resentatives ,where they might freely debate without a title to vote .
In such an event their influence , whatever it would be , would be
seen and felt and understood , and on that account would have in
volved little danger and more searching jealousy and opposition ,
whereas it is now secret and silent , and from that very cause may
become overwhelming .
$ 870 . One other reason in favor of such a right is , that itwould
compel the executive to make appointments fo
r
the high depart
ments of government ,not from personal or party favorites , but
from statesmen o
f high public character , talents , experience , and
elevated services ; from statesmen who had earned public favor
and could command public confidence . At present , gross inca
pacity may b
e
concealed under official forms ,and ignorance silently
escape by shifting the labors upon more intelligent subordinates in
office . The nation would be , on the other plan , better served ;
and the executive sustained b
y
more masculine eloquence , as well
a
s more liberal learning .
§ 871 . In th
e
British Parliament n
o
restrictions o
f
the former
sort exist , and few of the latter , except such as have been created
b
y
statute . It is true , that an acceptance of any office under the
crown is a vacation o
f
a seat in Parliament . This is wise , and
secures the people from being betrayed b
y
those who hold office
and whom they d
o not choose to trust . But generally they are
1 S
e
e
1 Black . Comm . 165 , 176 .
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re-eligible , and are entitled , if the people so choose , again to hold
a seat in the house of commons, notwithstanding their official
character . The consequence is, that the ministers of the crown
assume an open public responsibility ; and if the representation of
the people in the house of commons were , as it is under the na
tional government , founded upon a uniform rule by which th
e
people might obtain their full share of the government , it would
b
e impossible fo
r
the ministry to exercise a controlling influence ,
o
r
escape ( as in America they may ) a direct palpable responsibil
it
y
. There can be no danger that a free people will not be suffi
ciently watchful over their rulers , and their acts and opinions ,
when they are known and avowed ; or that they will not find rep
resentatives in Congress ready to oppose improper measures or
sound the alarm upon arbitrary encroachments . The real danger
is when th
e
influence o
f
the rulers is a
t
work in secret , and as
sumes n
o
definite shape ; when it guides with a silent and irre
sistible sway , and yet covers itself under the forms o
f popular
opinion o
r independent legislation ; when it does nothing , and yet
accomplishes everything .
$872 . Such is the reasoning by which many enlightened states
men have not only been le
d
to doubt ,but even to deny the value
o
f
this constitutional disqualification . And even the most strenu
ous advocates o
f
it are compelled so fa
r
to admit it
s
force as to
concede that the measures o
f
the executive government , so far as
they fall within the immediate department o
f
a particular officer ,
might be more directly and fully explained on the floor o
f
the
house . Still , however , the reasoning from the British practice
has not been deemed satisfactory b
y
the public ; and the guard
interposed b
y
the Constitution has been received with general
approbation , and has been thought to have worked well during
our experience under the national government . Indeed , the
strongly marked parties in the British Parliament , and their con
sequent dissensions , have been ascribed to the non -existence of
any such restraints ; and th
e
progress o
f
the influence o
f
the
crown , and the supposed corruptions of legislation , have been by
1 1 Black . Comm . 175 , 176 , Christian ' s Note , 39 .
2 Rawle o
n
the Const . ch . 19 , p . 187 .
8 Mr . Rawle ' s remarks in his treatise on Constitutional Law ( ch . 19 ) are as full on
this point a
s
can probably b
e
found . See also the Federalist , No . 55 ; 1 Tucker ' s
Black . Comm . App . 198 , 214 , 215 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 278 , 279 , 280 , 281 , 282 ; I Wil
son ' s Law Lect . 446 to 449 .
CH . X
II
. 617PRIVILEGES OF CONGRESS .
some writers traced back to the same original blemish . 1 Whether
these inferences are borne out b
y
historical facts is a matter upon
which different judgments may arrive a
t
different conclusions ;
and a work like the present is not the proper place to discuss
them .
11Wilson ' s Law Lect . 446 to 449 .
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CHAPTER XIII .
MODE O
F
PASSING LAWS . PRESIDENT ' S NEGATIVE .
-
-
--
-
-
---
§ 873 . The seventh section of the first article treats of two
important subjects , the right of originating revenue bills , and the
nature and extent of the President ' s negative upon the passing of
laws .
$ 874 . The first clause declares , “ All bills fo
r
raising revenue
shall originate in the House o
f Representatives , but the Senate
may propose o
r
concur with amendments as on other bills . ” This
provision , so far as it regards the right to originate what are tech
nically called “ money bills , ” is , beyond all question , borrowed
from the British house of commons , of which it is the ancient and
indisputable privilege and right that all grants of subsidies and
parliamentary aids shall begin in their house , and are first be
stowed b
y
them , although their grants ar
e
not effectual to al
l
intents and purposes until they have the assent o
f
the other two
branches o
f
the legislature . The general reason given fo
r
this
privilege o
f
the house o
f
commons is , that the supplies are raised
upon the body of the people , and therefore it is proper that they
alone should have the right of taxing themselves . And Mr . Jus
tice Blackstone has very correctly remarked , that this reason
would be unanswerable if the commons taxed none but themselves .
But it is notorious that a very large share of property is in posses
sion o
f
the lords ; that this property is equally taxed , as the prop
erty o
f
the commons ; and therefore the commons not being th
e
sole persons taxed , this cannot be the reason of their having th
e
sole right o
f raising and modelling the supply . The true reason
seems to be this . The lords being a permanent hereditary body ,
created a
t pleasure b
y
the king , are supposed more liable to be
influenced b
y
the crown , and when once influenced ,more likely
to continue so than the commons , who are a temporary elective
body , freely nominated by th
e
people . It would , therefore , be ex
tremely dangerous to give the lords any power o
f framing new
taxes fo
r
the subject . It is sufficient that they have a power of
11 Black . Comm . 169 .
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rejecting , if they think the commons too lavish or improvident in
their grants . ?
$ 875 . This seems a very just account of the matter with refer
ence to the spirit o
f
the British constitution , though a different
explanation has been deduced from a historical review of the
power . It has been asserted to have arisen from the instructions
from time to time given b
y
the constituents o
f
the coinmons
(whether county , city , or borough ) as to the rates and assess
ments which they were respectively willing to bear and assent
to , and from the aggregate it was easy fo
r
the commons to ascer
tain the whole amount which the commonalty o
f
the whole king
dom were willing to grant to the king . Be this as it may , so
jealous are the commons o
f
this valuable privilege , that herein
they will not suffer the other house to exert any power but that
o
f rejecting . They will not permit the least alteration or amend
ment to bemade b
y
the lords to the mode o
f taxing the people b
y
a money bill ; and under this appellation are included all bills
b
y
which money is directed to b
e
raised upon the subject for any
purpose , or in any shape whatsoever , either fo
r
the exigencies o
f
the government , and collected from the kingdom in general , as
the land tax , or fo
r
private benefit , and collected in any particular
district , as turnpikes , parish rates , and the like . It is obvious
that this power might be capable of great abuse , if other bills
were tacked to such money bills ; and accordingly it was found
that money bills were sometimes tacked to favorite measures of
the commons , with a view to insure their passage b
y
the lords .
This extraordinary use , or rather perversion of th
e
power would ;
if suffered to grow into a common practice , have completely de
stroyed the equilibrium o
f
the British constitution , and subjected
both the lords and the king to the power o
f
the commons . Resist
ance was made from time to time to this unconstitutional encroach
ment ; and at length the lords , with a view to give permanent
effect to their own rights , have made it a standing order to reject
upon sight all bills that are tacked to money bills . Thus , the
i i Black . Comm . 169 ; De Lolme on Constitution , ch . 4 , 8 , p . 66 , 84 , 85 , and note .
[At the present time it is not conceded that the house of lords may even reject a
money bill . SeeMay , Constitutional History , ch . 7 . )
2 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 161 , 162 , 163 , citing Millar on Constitution , 398 . But see 1
Wilson ' s Law Lect . 444 , 445 .
8 i Black . Comm . 170 , and Christian ' s Note ( 26 ) .
* De Lolme on the Constitution , ch . 17 , p . 381 , 382 ,
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privilege is maintained on one side and guarded against undue
abuse on the other.
§ 876 . It will be at once perceived that the same reasons do not
exist in the same extent for the sameexclusive right in our House
of Representatives in regard to money bills , as exist fo
r
such
right in the British house o
f
commons . It may be fit that it
should possess the exclusive right to originate money bills , since
itmay be presumed to possess more ample means of local infor
mation ,and it more directly represents the opinions , feelings , and
wishes o
f
the people ; and , being directly dependent upon them
fo
r
support , it will bemore watchful and cautious in the imposi
tion o
f taxes than a body which emanates exclusively from the
States in their sovereign political capacity . But , as the senators
are in a just sense equally representatives of the people , and do
not hold their offices b
y
a permanent o
r hereditary title , but peri
odically return to the common mass o
f
citizens ; ? and above al
l ,
a
s direct taxes are and must be apportioned among the States
according to their federal population , and as al
l
the States have a
distinct local interest , both as to the amount and nature of al
l
taxes o
f every sort which are to be levied , there seems a peculiar
fitness in giving to the Senate a power to alter and amend , as well
a
s
to concur with or reject a
ll money bills . The due influence of
all the States is thus preserved , for otherwise it might happen ,
from the overwhelming representation of some of the large States ,
that taxes might be levied which would bear with peculiar severity
upon the interests , either agricultural , commercial , or manufactur
ing , of others being the minor States , and thus the equilibrium
intended b
y
the Constitution , as well of power as of interest and
influence ,might be practically subverted .
$ 877 . There would also be no small inconvenience in exclud
ing the Senate from the exercise o
f
this power o
f
amendment and
alteration , since if any the slightest modification were required in
such a bill to make it either palatable or just , the Senate would be
compelled to reject it , although an amendment of a single line
might make it entirely acceptable to both houses . Such a prac
tical obstruction to the legislation o
f
a free government would far
1 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 163 , 16
4
; Rawle on Constitution , ch . 6 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates ,
141 .
? 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 215 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 163 , 164 ; Rawle on
Constitution , ch . 6 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 141 .
8 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 283 , 284 .
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a
might
wance bas te
gover
outweigh any supposed theoretical advantages from the possession
o
r
exercise o
f
a
n exclusive power b
y
the House o
f Representatives .
Infinite perplexities and misunderstandings and delays would clog
the most wholesome legislation . Even the annual appropriation
billsmight be in danger of a miscarriage on these accounts , and
themost painful dissensions might be introduced .
§ 878 . Indeed , of so little importance has the exclusive posses
sion o
f
such a power been thought in the State governments , that
some of the State constitutions make no difference as to the power
o
f
each branch of the legislature to originate money bills . Most
o
f
them contain a provision similar to that in the Constitution o
f
the United States ; and in those States where the exclusive power
formerly existed , as , for instance , in Virginia and South Carolina ,
it was a constant source o
f
difficulties and contentions . In the
revised constitution of South Carolina , ( in 1790 , ) the provision
was altered so a
s
to conform to the clause in the Constitution of
the United States .
$ 879 . The clause seems to have met with no serious opposition
in any o
f
the State conventions , and indeed could scarcely be ex
pected to meet with any opposition except in Virginia , since the
other States were well satisfied with the principle adopted in their
own State constitutions , and in Virginia the clause created but
little debate .
§ 880 . What bills are properly “ bills fo
r
raising revenue , ” in
the sense o
f
the Constitution , has been matter of some discussion .
A learned commentator supposes that every billwhich indirectly
o
r consequentially may raise revenue is , within the sense of the
Constitution , a revenue bill . He therefore thinks that the bills
for establishing the post -office and the mint , and regulating the
value o
f foreign coin , belong to this class , and ought not to have
originated ( as in fact they did ) in the Senate . But th
e
practical
construction o
f
the Constitution has been against his opinion .
And , indeed , the history of the origin of the power already sug
gested abundantly proves that it has been confined to bills to levy
taxes in the strict sense o
f
the words , and has not been under
stood to extend to bills fo
r
other purposes , which may incidentally
create revenue . No one supposes that a bill to sell any of the
1 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 283 , 284 . Id .
8 i Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 261 , and note .
. See Elliot ' s Debates , 283 , 284 . (Bills repealing duties , it has been claimed b
y
the
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public lands , or to sell public stock , is a bill to raise revenue , in
the sense of the Constitution . Much less would a bill be so
deemed which merely regulated the value of foreign or domestic
coins , or authorized a discharge of insolvent debtors upon assign
ments of their estates to the United States, giving a priority of
payment to the United States in cases of insolvency , although al
l
o
f
them might incidentally bring revenue into the treasury .
$ 881 . The next clause respects the power of the President to
approve and negative laws . In the convention there does not
seem to have been much diversity o
f opinion on the subject o
f
th
e
propriety o
f giving to the President a negative on the laws . The
principal points o
f
discussion seem to have been , whether the
negative should b
e
absolute o
r
qualified ; and if the latter , by
what number of each house the bill should subsequently be passed ,
in order to become a law ; and whether the negative should in
either case be exclusively vested in the President alone , or in him
jointly with some other department o
f
the government . The
proposition o
f
a qualified negative seems to have obtained general ,
but not universal support , having been carried b
y
the vote of
eight States against two . 1 This being settled , the question as to
the number was a
t
first unanimously carried in the affirmative in
favor o
f
two thirds o
f
each house ; at a subsequent period it was
altered to three fourths b
y
a vote o
f
si
x
States against four , one
being divided ; and it was ultimately restored to the two thirds ,
commons in Parliament , ar
e
money bills which the house o
f
lords must not originate ,
amend , or reject . SeeMay , Constitutional History , ch . 7 .
This general subject was somewhat discussed in Congress in the year 1872 .
The 42d Congress House passed a bill “ to repeal existing duties on tea and coffee . "
The Senate substituted fo
r
it a bill containing a general revision , reduction , and repeal
o
f
laws imposing import duties and internal taxes , and sent the substituted bill to the
House fo
r
concurrence . The House resolved that this substitution was “ in conflict with
the true intent and purpose o
f
that clause o
f
the Constitution which requires that a
ll
bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House o
f Representatives , " and therefore
ordered it to lie on the table . The Senate thereupon referred the subject to its Commit
tee o
n Privileges and Elections ,who reported that the House bill “ was not a bill fo
r
raising revenue within themeaning o
f
the Constitution , and therefore , while the Senate
might have amended it so a
s
to abolish duties altogether upon other articles , the Sen
atehad n
o right to ingraft upon it , as it did in substance , an amendment providing that
revenue should b
e
collected upon other articles , though at a less rate than previously
fixed b
y
la
w
. That amendment would have become a provision in the Act fo
r
raising
revenue , because revenue a
t
a certain rate would have been collected b
y
the operation
o
f
the Act . " This report was adopted b
y
the Senate , but the subject di
d
not again g
o
before the House so a
s
to afford opportunity fo
r
ascertaining whether it
s
views and those
o
f
the Senate were o
r
were not in all particulars entirely in accord . )
1 Journal o
f
the Convention , 97 .
CH. XIII. ] 623MODE OF PASSING LAWS .
without any apparent struggle .1 An effort was also made to unite
the supreme national judiciary with the executive in revising the
laws and exercising the negative . But it was constantly resisted ,
being at first overruled by a vote of four States against three , two
being divided , and finally rejected by the vote of eight States
against three.
§ 882 . Two points may properly arise upon this subject . First,
the propriety of vesting the power in the President ; and , sec
ondly , the extent of the legislative check to prevent an undue
exercise of it . The former also admits of a double aspect , namely ,
whether the negative should be absolute or should be qualified .
An absolute negative on the legislature appears , at first, to be the
natural defence with which the executive magistrate should be
armed . But in a free government it seemsnot altogether safe nor
of itself a sufficient defence . On ordinary occasions it may not be
exerted with the requisite firmness ; and on extraordinary occasions ,
it may be perfidiously abused . It is true , that the defect of such an
absolute negative has a tendency to weaken the executive depart
ment. But this may be obviated , or at least counterpoised , by
other arrangements in the government , such as a qualified con
nection with the Senate in making treaties and appointments , by
which the latter , being a stronger department ,may be led to sup
port th
e
constitutional rights o
f
the former , without being too
much detached from it
s
own legislative functions . And the .pat
ronage o
f
the executive has also some tendency to create a coun
teracting influence in ai
d
o
f
it
s independence . It is true that in
England an absolute negative is vested in the king , as a branch
o
f
the legislative power ; and he possesses the absolute power of
rejecting rather than o
f resolving . And this is thought b
y
Mr .
Justice Blackstone and others to be a most important , and indeed
indispensable part o
f
the royal prerogative , to guard against the
usurpations o
f
the legislative authority . Yet in point of fact this
negative of th
e
king has not been once exercised since th
e
year
1692 , 5 a fact which can only be accounted fo
r
upon one o
f
two sup
positions , either that the influence o
f
the crown has prevented
the passage o
f objectionable measures , or that the exercise of the
1 Journal o
f
the Convention , 195 , 253 , 254 , 355 .
2 Journal o
f
the Convention , 69 , 9
6 , 195 , 253 .
8 The Federalist , No . 51 . 4 1 Black . Comm . 154 .
5 D
e
Lolme on Constitution , ch . 17 , p . 390 , 391 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 226 .
[ Itwas once exercised b
y
Queen Anne in 1707 . ]
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prerogative has become so odious that it has not been deemed
safe to exercise it except upon the most pressing emergencies."
Probably both motives have alternately prevailed in regard to bills
which were disagreeable to the crown ; 2 though , for the last half
century , the latter has had the most uniform and decisive opera
tion . As the house of commons becomes more and more the rep
resentative of the popular opinion , the crown will have less and
less inducement to hazard it
s
own influence b
y
a rejection o
f
any
favorite measure o
f
the people . It will be more likely to take the
lead ,and thus guide and moderate , instead of resisting , the com
mons . And practically speaking , it is quite problematical whether
a qualified negative may not hereafter in England become a more
efficient protection of the crown than an absolute negative ,which
makes no appeal to the other legislative bodies , and consequently
compels the crown to bear the exclusive odium o
f
a rejection .
B
e
this a
s it may , th
e
example o
f England furnishes , on this
point , no sufficient authority fo
r
America . The whole structure
o
f
our government is so entirely different , and the elements of
which it is composed are so dissimilar from that of England , that
n
o argument can be drawn from the practice o
f
th
e
latter to assist
u
s
in a just arrangement o
f
the executive authority .
§ 883 . It has been observed b
y
Mr . Chancellor Kent , with pithy
elegance , that the peremptory veto of the Roman tribunes , who
were placed a
t the door o
f
the Roman senate ,would not be recon
11 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 448 , 449 ; The Federalist , No . 73 ; Id . No . 69 ; 1 Kent ' s
· Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 226 . Mr . Burke , in his letter to the sheriffs o
f
Bristol , ( in 1777, )
has treated this subject with his usual masterly power . “ The king ' s negative to
bills , " says h
e , “ is one o
f
the most undisputed o
f
the royal prerogatives ; and it extends
to all cases whatsoever . I am far from certain that if several laws , which I know , had
fallen under the stroke o
f
that sceptre , that the public would have had a very heavy
loss . But it is not the propriety o
f
the exercise which is in question . The exercise
itself is wisely forborne . It
s repose may b
e
the preservation o
f
it
s
existence ; and it
s
existence may b
e
the means o
f saving the Constitution itself , on an occasion worthy of
bringing it forth . ” [ Itmay be accounted for perhaps in another way . By the theory
o
f
the British constitution , as now settled , the ministry under whose advice the king
acts must be in accord with the majority in the house of commons , and possess its
confidence ; and whenever it
s
votes demonstrate that they have lost that confidence,
they must either resign or be dismissed , o
r theymust advise a dissolution o
f
the Par .
liament with a view to a
n appeal to the people . To attempt to retain power against
adverse votes in the commons would o
f
itself b
e regarded a
s
unconstitutional ; still
more must it b
e
so to attempt to control that majority through the royal veto . See
Todd . Parl . Gov . I . 40 ; Cooley ' s Blackstone , I . 246 , note . )
2 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 255 , 256 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 226 .
3 See the reasoning in the Federalist , No . 73 ; Id . No . 51 ; 1 Wilson ' s Law Lect .
448 , 449 .
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cilable with the spirit of deliberation and independence which dis
tinguishes the councils of modern times. The French constitution
of 1791, a labored and costly fabric on which the philosophers and
statesmen of France exhausted all their ingenuity , and which was
prostrated in the dust in the course of one year from it
s
existence ,
gave to the king a negative upon the acts of the legislature with
some feeble limitations . Every bill was to be presented to the
king , who might refuse his assent ; but if the two following legis
latures should successively present the same bill in the same
terms , it was then to become a law . The constitutional negative
given to the President of the United States appears to be more
wisely digested than any o
f
the examples which have been men
tioned . 1
$ 884 . The reasons why the President should possess a quali
fied negative , if they are not quite obvious , are at least , when
fairly expounded , entirely satisfactory . In the first place , there is
a natural tendency in the legislative department to intrude upon
the rights and to absorb the powers o
f
the other departments o
f
government . A mere parchment delineation of the boundaries
o
f
each , is wholly insufficient for the protection o
f
the weaker
branch , as the executive unquestionably is , and hence there arises
a constitutional necessity o
f arming it with powers for its own de
fence . If the executive di
d
not possess this qualified negative , it
might gradually be stripped of all its authority , and become , what
it is well known the governors of some States are , a mere pageant
and shadow o
f magistracy . 8
$ 885 . In thenext place , the power is important as an additional
security against the enactment o
f
rash , immature , and improper
laws . It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body ,
calculated to preserve the community against the effects of faction ,
precipitancy , unconstitutional legislation , and temporary excite
ments , as well as political hostility . It may indeed be said , that
a single man , even though he be President , cannot be presumed
to possess more wisdom or virtue or experience than what belongs
to a number o
f
men . But this furnishes no answer to the reason
ing . The question is not how much wisdom or virtue or experi
11Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 226 , 227 .
? 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 225 , 226 ; The Federalist ,No . 73 ; Id . No . 51 .
8 The Federalist , Nos . 51 , 73 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 225 , 329 ; 1 Wilson ' s
Law Lect . 448 , 449 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 225 , 226 .
4 The Federalist , No . 73 ; 1 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 448 , 449 , 450 .
VOL . I . 40
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ence is possessed b
y
either branch o
f
the government , ( though the
executive magistrate may well be presumed to be eminently dis
tinguished in all these respects , and therefore the choice of the
people , ) but whether the legislature may not be misled b
y
a love
o
f power , a spirit of faction , a political impulse , or a persuasive
influence , local or sectional ,which at the same time may not , from
the difference in the election and duties o
f
the executive , reach him
a
t all , or not reach him in the same degree . Hewill always have a
primary inducement to defend his own powers ; the legislature
may well be presumed to have no desire to favor them . He will
have an opportunity soberly to examine the acts and resolutions
passed b
y
the legislature , not having partaken of the feelings or
combinations which have procured their passage , and thus correct
what shall sometimes b
e wrong from haste and inadvertence aswell
a
s design . His view of them , if not more wise or more elevated ,
will at least be independent , and under an entirely different re
sponsibility to the nation from what belongs to them . He is the
representative o
f
the whole nation in the aggregate ; they are th
e
representatives only o
f
distinct parts ; and sometimes o
f
little more
than sectional o
r local interests .
§ 886 . Nor is there any solid objection to this qualified power . 2
If it should be objected that it may sometimes prevent the passage
o
f
good laws a
swell as of bad laws , the objection is entitled to but
little weight . In the first place , it ca
n
never be effectually exer
cised if two thirds o
f
both houses are in favor o
f
the law , and if
they are not it is not so easily demonstrable that the law is either
wise or salutary . The presumption would rather be th
e
other
way ; or at least that the utility of it was not unquestionable , or it
would receive the requisite support . In th
e
next place , the great
evil of a
ll
free governments is a tendency to over -legislation , and
the mischief of inconstancy and mutability in the laws forms a
great blemish in the character and genius o
f
a
ll
free govern
ments . The injury which may possibly arise from the post
ponement o
f
a salutary law is fa
r
less than from the passage o
f
a mischievous one , or from a redundant and vacillating legisla
tion . In the next place , there is no practical danger that this
power would b
e
much if any abused by the President . The supe
1 The Federalist ,No . 73 .
: 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . 225 , 324 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 225 , 226 .
8 The Federalist ,No . 73 . 4 Id .
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rior weight and influence of the legislative body in a free govern
ment, and the hazard to the weight and influence of the executive
in a trial of strength , afford a satisfactory security that th
e
power
will generally be employed with great caution , and that there will
b
e more often room for a charge o
f timidity than o
f
rashness in it
s
exercise . It has been already seen that the British king ,with al
l
his sovereign attributes , has rarely interposed this high preroga
tive , and that more than a century has elapsed since its actual
application . If from the offensive nature of the power a royal
hereditary executive thus indulges serious scruples in it
s actual
exercise , surely a republican president , chosen fo
r
four years ,may
b
e presumed to b
e
still more unwilling to exert it . ?
$ 887 . The truth is , as has been already hinted , that the real
danger is that the executive will use the power too rarely . He
will do it only on extraordinary occasions , when a just regard
to the public safety , or public interests , or a constitutional obli
gation , or a necessity of maintaining the appropriate rights and
prerogatives of his office compels him to the step ; 8 and then it
will be a solemn appeal to the people themselves from their own
representatives . Even within these narrow limits the power is
highly valuable , and it will silently operate as a preventive check ,
b
y
discouraging attempts to overawe o
r
to control the executive .
Indeed , one of the greatest benefits of such a power is , that its
influence is felt not so much in it
s
actual exercise as in its silent
and secret energy a
s
a preventive . · It checks the intention to
usurp before it has ripened into an act .
§ 888 . It has this additional recommendation , as a qualified
negative , that it does not , like an absolute negative , present a
categorical and harsh resistance to the legislative will , which is
so apt to engender strife and nourish hostility . . It assumes the
character o
f
a mere appeal to the legislature itself , and asks a re
vision o
f
it
s
own judgment . It is in the nature , then ,merely o
f
a rehearing o
r
a reconsideration , and involves nothing to provoke
resentment or rouse pride . A president who might hesitate to
defeat a law b
y
a
n absolute veto might feel little scruple to re
turn it fo
r
reconsideration upon reasons and arguments suggested
o
n the return . If these were satisfactory to the legislature , he
would have the cheering support of a respectable portion o
f
the
body in justification o
f
his conduct . If , on the other hand , they
1 The Federalist , No . 73 . ? Id . 8 Id . 4 Id .
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should not be satisfactory , the concurrence of two thirds would
secure the ultimate passage of the law without exposing him to
undue censure or reproach . Even in such cases his opposition
would not be without some benefit . His observations would be
calculated to excite public attention and discussion , to lay bare
the grounds and policy and constitutionality of measures , and
to create a continued watchfulness as to th
e
practical effect o
f
th
e
laws thus passed , so as that it might be ascertained by experience
whether his sagacity and judgment were safer than that o
f
th
e
legislature . Nothing but a gross abuse of the power upon frivo
lous or party pretences to secure a petty triumph o
r
to defeat a
wholesome restraint would bring it into contempt or odium ; and
then it would soon be followed b
y
that remedial justice from the
people in the exercise o
f
the right o
f
election ,which , first or last ,
will be found to follow with reproof or cheer with applause the
acts o
f
their rulers when passion and prejudice have removed th
e
temporary bandages which have blinded their judgment . Look
ing back upon the history o
f
the government fo
r
the last forty
years , it will be found that the President ' s negative has been
rarely exerted ; and whenever it has been , no instance ( it is
believed ) has occurred in which the act has been concurred in b
y
two thirds o
f
both houses . If th
e
public opinion has not in al
l
cases sustained this exercise o
f
the reto , itmay be affirmed that
it has rarely been found that the disapprobation has been violent
o
r unqualified .
§ 889 . The proposition to unite the Supreme Court with the
executive in the revision and qualified rejection o
f
laws failed , as
has been seen , in the convention . 3 Two reasons seem to have led
to this result , and probably were fe
lt b
y
the people also a
s o
f
deci
sive weight . The one was , that the judges , who are the interpret
ers o
f
the law ,might receive an improper bias from having given
a previous opinion in their revisory capacity . The other was ,
1 Rawle on the Constitution , ch . 6 , p . 61 , 62 .
2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 449 , 450 ; The Federalist ,No . 73 . The veto power was ased
very freely in the administrations o
f
Presidents Tyler and Johnson , and during the
whole o
f
the former important legislation was controlled b
y
means thereof . Some
attempt was made to abolish th
e
power under the feeling excited thereby , but it did not
meet with any very decided favor . Mr . Davis , during the existence of the Confederate
States government , is said to have employed the veto power with great freedom , and to
have exercised b
y
that means a controlling authority in the Congress o
n
a
ll important
measures . Foote ' s War of the Rebellion , 344 . )
3 Journal o
f
Convention , 195 , 253 .
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that the judges, by being often associated with the executive ,
might be induced to embark too fa
r
in the political views o
f that
magistrate ; and thus a dangerous combination might , b
y degrees ,
b
e
cemented between the executive and judiciary departments .
It is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from any other
avocation than that o
f expounding th
e
laws ; and it is peculiarly
dangerous to place them in a situation to be either corrupted or
influenced b
y
the executive . To these may be added another ,
which may almost b
e
deemed a corollary from them , that it
would have a tendency to take from the judges that public confi
dence in their impartiality , independence , and integrity which
seem indispensable to th
e
due administration o
f public justice .
Whatever has a tendency to create suspicion o
r provoke jealousy
is mischievous to the judicial department . Judges should not
only be pure , but be believed to be so . The moral influence of
their judgments is weakened , if not destroyed , whenever there is
a general , even though it be an unfounded , distrust that they are
guided b
y
other motives in the discharge o
f
their duties than the
law and the testimony . A free people have no security for their
liberties when a
n appeal to the judicial department becomes either
illusory or questionable .
$ 890 . The other point of inquiry is , as to the extent o
f
the
legislative check upon the negative o
f
the executive . It has been
seen that it was originally proposed that a concurrence of two
thirds of each house should be required , that this was subse
quently altered to three fourths , and was finally brought back
again to the original number . 3 One reason against the three
fourths seems to have been that it would afford little security fo
r
any effectual exercise o
f
the power . The larger the number re
quired to overrule the executive negative , the more easy it would
b
e
fo
r
him to exert a silent and secret influence to detach th
e
requisite number in order to carry his object . Another reason
1 The Federalist , No . 73 .
? It is a remarkable circumstance in the history o
f Mr . Jefferson ' s opinions , that he
was decidedly in favor o
f associating the judiciary with the executive in the exercise o
f
the negative o
n laws , o
r
o
f investing it separately with a similar power . 2 Jefferson ' s
Corresp . 274 ; 2 Pitk . 283 . At a subsequent period his opinion respecting the value
and importance seems to have undergone extraordinary changes . [ In the New York
council o
f
revision under the first constitution , the chancellor and justices o
f
the
supreme court were associated with the governor ; but it did not prove a satisfactory
arrangement . )
8 Journal o
f
the Convention , p . 22
0
, 253 , 254 ,256 .
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was, that, even supposing no such influence to be exerted , still , in
a great variety of cases of a political nature , and especially such
as touched local or sectional interests , the pride or the power of
States , it would be easy to defeat the most salutary measures , if
a combination of a few States could produce such a result . And
the executive himself might, from his local attachments or sec
tional feelings , partake of this common bias. In addition to this ,
the departure from the general rule of the right of a majority to
govern ought not to be allowed but upon the most urgent occa
sions ; and an expression of opinion by two thirds of both houses
in favor of a measure certainly afforded a
ll
the just securities
which any wise or prudent people ought to demand in the
ordinary course of legislation ; fo
r
all laws thus passed might , at
any time , be repealed at the mere will of the majority . It was
also no small recommendation o
f
the lesser number , that it
offered fewer inducements to improper combinations , either o
f
the great States or the small States , to accomplish particular ob
jects . There could be but one o
f
two rules adopted in all gov
ernments , either that th
e
majority should govern or the minority
should govern . The President might be chosen b
y
a bare
majority o
f
electoral votes , and this majority might be by th
e
combination o
f
a few large States and b
y
a minority of the
whole people . Under such circumstances , if a vote of three
fourths were required to pass a law , the voice of two thirds of
the States and two thirds of the people might be permanently
disregarded during a whole administration . The case put may
seem strong ; but it is not stronger than the supposition , that
two thirds o
f
both houses would b
e
found ready to betray the
solid interests o
f
their constituents b
y
the passage o
f injurious
o
r
unconstitutional laws . The provision , therefore , as it stands ,
affords all reasonable security ; and , pressed further , it would
endanger the very objects for which it is introduced into the
Constitution .
$ 891 . But the President might effectually defeat the whole
some restraint , thus intended , upon his qualified negative , if he
might silently decline to act after a bill was presented to him for
approval o
r rejection . The Constitution , therefore , has wisely
provided , that , “ if any bill shall not be returned b
y
the President
within ten days (Sundays excepted ) after it shall have been pre
sented to hi
m , it shall be a law , in like manner as if he had
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signed it ." i But if this clause stood alone, Congress might, in
likemanner, defeat the due exercise of his qualified negative by
a termination of the session , which would render it impossible
fo
r
the President to return the bill . It is therefore added , “ unless
the Congress , b
y
their adjournment , prevent its return , in which
case it shall not be a la
w . ”
$ 892 . The remaining clause merely applies to orders , resolu
tions , and votes , to which the concurrence of both houses may be
necessary ; and as to these , with a single exception , the same
rule is applied as is b
y
the preceding clause applied to bills .
If this provision had not been made , Congress , by adopting the
form o
f
a
n order or resolution , instead of a bill , might have
effectually defeated the President ' s qualified negative in al
l
the
most important portions o
f legislation .
$ 893 . It has been remarked b
y
De Lolme , that in most of
th
e
ancient free states , the share of the people in the business of
legislation was to approve o
r reject the propositions which were
made to them , and to give the final sanction to the laws . The
functions o
f
those persons , or in general those bodies who were
intrusted with the executive power , were to prepare and frame
the laws , and then to propose them to the people . In a word ,
they possessed that branch o
f
the legislative power which may
b
e
called the initiative , that is , the prerogative of putting that
power into action . In the first times of the Roman republic ,
this initiative power was constantly exercised b
y
the Roman
senate . Laws were made populi jussu , ex authoritate senati ;
and , even in elections , the candidates were subject to the pre
vious approbation o
f
the senate . In modern times , in the
republics of Venice , Berne , and Geneva , the same power is ,
1 The original proposition in the convention was ,that the bill should be returned b
y
the President in sevendays . It was subsequently altered to te
n
days b
y
a vote o
f nine
States against two . Journal o
f
Convention , 220 , 224 , 225 . [ It has been held that the
time specified will include days o
n
which the legislature is not in session , if it has not
finally adjourned . Opinions of Justices , 45 N . H . 607 . But the day of presenting the
bill fo
r
approval should b
e
excluded . Ibid . Where on the tenth day the governor sent
a bill with h
is objections to the house with which it originated , but the messenger , find
ing the house had adjourned for the day , returned it to the governor , who retained it , it
was held that , to prevent the bill becoming a law , it should have been left with the proper
officer o
f
the house instead o
f being retained b
y
the governor . Harpending v . Haight ,
3
9 Cal . 189 . A
s
to when a
n approval is to b
e
deemed complete , see People v . Hatch ,
1
9 Ill . 283 . ]
2 Journal of Convention , p . 220 , 255 .
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in fact , exercised by a select assembly before it ca
n
b
e
acted
upon b
y
the larger assembly o
f
the citizens , or their representa
tives . ' De Lolme has added that this power is very useful ,
and perhaps even necessary , in states of a republican form , fo
r
giving a permanence to the laws , as well as fo
r
preventing polit
ical disorders and struggles fo
r
power . A
t
the same time , he is
compelled to admit that this expedient is attended with incon
veniences o
f
little less magnitude than the evils it is meant to
remedy . The inconveniences are certainly great , but there ar
e
evils o
f
a deeper character belonging to such a system . The
natural , nay , necessary tendency of it is , ultimately to concen
trate a
ll power in the initiative body , and to leave to the approv
ing body but the shadow o
f authority . It is in fact , though not
in form , an oligarchy . And , so far from its being useful in a
republic , it is the surest means of sapping all its best institu
tions , and overthrowing the public liberties , by corrupting the
very fountains o
f legislation . De Lolme praises it as a peculiar
excellence o
f
the British monarchy . America , no less , vindi
cates it a
s
a fundamental principle in a
ll
her republican consti
tutions .
$ 894 . We have thus passed through al
l
the clauses o
f
th
e
Constitution respecting the structure and organization o
f
th
e
legislative department , and the rights , powers , and privileges of th
e
component branches severally , as well as in the aggregate . The
natural order o
f
the Constitution next leads us to the consider
ation o
f
the POWERS which are vested , b
y
the Constitution , in the
legislative department . Before , however , entering upon this
large and important inquiry , it may be useful to state , in a
summary manner , the ordinary course of proceedings at each
new session o
f Congress , and the mode in which the laws are
usually passed , according to th
e
settled usages in Congress ,
under the rules and orders o
f
the two houses . In substance , it
does not differ from the manner o
f conducting the like business
in the British Parliament . 8
$ 895 . On the day appointed for the assembling o
f
a new
Congress , the members of each house meet in their separate
i De Lolme , Eng . Const . B . 2 , ch . 4 , p . 22
4
, and note .
2 De Lolme , Eng . Const . B . 2 , ch . 4 , p . 224 , and note .
8 i Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 229 , note ; 1 Black . Comm . 181 ; Jefferson ' s Manual ,
passim ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 171 to 176 .
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apartments . The House of Representatives then proceed to the
choice of a speaker and clerk ; and any one member is author
ized then to administer the oath of office to the speaker,who
then administers the like oath to th
e
other members and to the
clerk . The like oath is admininistered by any member of the
Senate to the president o
f
the Senate , who then administers a
like oath to a
ll
the members and the secretary o
f
the Senate ;
and this proceeding is had , when and as often as a new presi
dent o
f
the Senate , o
r
member , or secretary , is chosen . As soon
a
s
these preliminaries are gone through ,and a quorum of each
house is present , notice is given thereof to the President , whọ
signifies his intention to address them . This was formerly
done b
y
way o
f speech , but is now done by a written message ,
transmitted to each house , containing a general exposition of
the affairs o
f
the nation , and a recommendation of such meas
ures a
s
the Presidentmay deem fit for the consideration of Con
gress . When the habit was for the President to make a speech ,
it was in the presence of both houses ; and a written answer
was prepared b
y
each house , which , when accepted , was pre
sented b
y
a committee . A
t present , no answer whatsoever is
given to the contents o
f
the message . And this change of pro
ceeding has been thought , by many statesmen , to be a change
fo
r
the worse ; since the answer of each house enabled each
party in the legislature to express it
s
own views a
s
to the
matters in the speech , and to propose b
y
way o
f
amendment
to the answer whatever was deemed more correct and more ex
pressive o
f public sentiment than was contained in either . The
consequence was , that the whole policy and conduot of the
administration came under solemn review ; and it was ani
madverted on , or defended , with equal zeal and independence ,
according to the different views o
f
the speakers in the debate ;
and the final vote showed the exact state o
f public opinion on
all leading measures . B
y
the present practice o
f messages , this
facile and concentrated opportunity o
f
attack o
r
defence is com
pletely taken away ; and the attack or defence of the adminis
tration is perpetually renewed , at distant intervals , as an inci
dental topic in all other discussions , to which it often bears very
slight , and , perhaps , no relation . The result is , that a great deal
o
f
time is lost in collateral debates , and that the administration
1 Act of 1789 , ch . 1 .
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is driven to defend itself in detail , on every leading motion or
measure of the session . "
$ 896 . A bill may be introduced by motion of a member and
leave o
f the house ; or it may be introduced b
y
order o
f
the
house , on the report of a committee ; or it may be reported b
y
a committee . In cases of a general nature , one day ' s notice is
given o
f
a .motion to bring in a bill . The bill , however intro
duced , is drawn out on paper , with a multitude of blanks , o
r
void spaces , where anything occurs that is dubious , or necessary
to b
e
settled b
y
the house ; such , especially , as dates o
f
times ,
sums o
f money , amount of penalties , and limitations of numbers .
It is then read a first time , for information ; and , if any opposi
tion is made to it , the question is then put , whether it shall b
e
rejected . If no opposition is made , or if the question to reject is
negatived , the bill goes to a second reading without a question ,
and it is accordingly read a second time at some convenient dis
tance of time . Every bill must receive three readings in the
house previous to it
s passage ; and these readings are on differ
ent days , unless upon a special order of the house to the contrary .
Upon the second reading of a bill , the speaker states it as ready
fo
r
commitment or engrossment . If committed , it is committed
either to a select or a standing committee , or to a committee o
f
the whole house . If to the latter , the house determine on what
day . If the bill is ordered to be engrossed , ( that is , copied out in
a fair , large , round hand , ) the house then appoint the day when
it shall b
e
read the third time . Most of the important bills
are committed to a committee o
f
the whole house ; and every
motion or proposition for a tax or charge upon the people , and
for a variation in the sum o
r quantum o
f
a tax o
r duty , and fo
r
a
n appropriation o
f money , is required first to be discussed in a
committee o
f
the whole house . The great object o
f referring
any matter to a committee o
f
the whole house is , to allow a
greater freedom o
f
discussion , and more times of speaking , than
is generally allowed b
y
the rules o
f the house . It seems , too ,
that the yeas and nays are not required to be taken upon votes
in committee , as they may be in votes in the house .
§ 897 . O
n
going into a committee o
f
the whole house the
1 Under President Washington and President John Adams the practice was to de
liver speeches . President Jefferson discontinued this course , and substituted messages ;
and this practice has been since invariably followed .
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speaker leaves the chair , and a chairman is appointed by him to
preside in committee . Amendments and other proceedings are
had in committee , much in the same way as occur in the regular
course of the business of the house . Select and standing com
mittees regulate their own times and modes of proceeding accord
in
g
to their own discretion and pleasure , unless otherwise ordered
b
y
the house . They make their reports in the same way , from
time to time , to the house , and secure the directions of the latter .
When a bill is committed to a committee , it is read in sections ;
paragraph after paragraph is debated ; blanks are filled u
p ; and
alterations and amendments , both in form and substance , are pro
posed and often made .
§ 898 . After the committee have gone through with the whole
bill , they report it , with all the alterations and amendments made
in it , to the house . It is then , or a
t
some suitable time afterwards ,
considered b
y
the latter , and the question separately put upon
every alteration , amendment , and clause . After commitment and
report to the house , and at any time before its passage , any bill
may be recommitted at the pleasure of the house . When a bill ,
either upon a report o
f
committee or after full discussion and
amendment in the house , stands for the next stage of its progress ,
the question then is , whether it shall be engrossed and read a
third time . And this is the proper time , commonly chosen by
those who are fundamentally opposed to it , to make their attack
upon it , it now being as perfect as its friends can shape it , and as
little exceptionable as it
s
enemies have been able to make it .
Attempts are , indeed , sometimes made at previous stages to defeat
it ,but they are usually disjointed efforts ; because many persons ,
who d
o not expect to be in favor of the bill untimately , are willing to
let it g
o
o
n
to it
s
most perfect state , to take time to examine it fo
r
themselves , and to hear what can be said in its favor .
$ 899 . The two last stages o
f
the bill , namely , on the questions ,
whether it shall have a third reading , and whether it shall pass ,
are the strong points o
f
resistance and defence . The first is
usually the most interesting contest , because the subject is more
new and engaging , and the trial of strength has not been made ;
so that the struggle fo
r
victory is yet wholly doubtful , and the
ardor o
f
debate is proportionally warm and earnest . If the bill is
ordered to b
e engrossed fo
r
a third reading , it is ,when engrossed ,
put upon it
s
final passage . Amendments are sometimes made to
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it a
t
this stage , though reluctantly ; and any new clause , thus
added , is called a rider . If the vote is that the bill shall pass , the
title is then settled , though a title is always reported with the bill ;
and that being agreed to , the day of its passage is noted at the foot
o
f it b
y
the clerk . It is then signed b
y
the speaker , and trans
mitted to the other house for concurrence therein .
$ 900 . The bill , when thus transmitted to the other house , goes
through similar forms . It is either rejected , committed , or con
curred in , with or without amendments . If a bill is amended by
the house to which it is transmitted , it is then returned to the
other house , in which it originated , for their assent to the amend
ment . If the amendment is agreed to , the fact is made known to
the other house . If not agreed to , the disagreement is in like
manner notified . And the like course is adopted , where the
amendment is agreed to with an amendment . In either of these
cases , the house proposing the amendment may recede from it , or
may adopt it with the amendment proposed b
y
the other house .
If neither is done , the house then vote to insist on the amendment
o
r
to adhere to it . A vote to insist keeps the question still open . But
a vote to adhere requires the other house either to insist o
r
to recede ;
for if , on their part , there is a vote to adhere , the bill usually falls
without further effort . But , upon a disagreement between the two
houses , a conference b
y
a committee o
f
each is usually asked ; and
in this manner the matters in controversy are generally adjusted
by adopting the course recommended b
y
the committees , or one o
f
them . When a bill has passed both houses , the house last acting
o
n it makes known its passage to the other , and it is delivered to
the joint committee o
f
enrolment ,who see that it is truly enrolled
in parchment , and , being signed b
y
the speaker o
f
the house and
the president of the senate , it is then sent to the President for his
signature . If he approves it , he signs it ; and it is then deposited
among the rolls in the office o
f
the department o
f
state . If he dis
approves of it , he returns it to the house in which it originated ,
with his objections . Here they are entered at large on the jour
nal , and afterwards the house proceed to a consideration o
f
them .
$ 901 . This review of the forms and modes of proceeding in the
1 This summary is abstracted from 1 Black . Comm . 181 , 182 ; | Tucker ' s Black .
Comm . App . 229 , 230 , note ; 1 Kent , Comm . Lect . 11 , p . 223 , 224 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law
Lect . 171 , 172 , 173 ; Rawle on the Constitution , ch . 6 , p . 60 , et
c
. ; and especially from
the rules o
f
both houses , and Jefferson ' s Manual (edition at Washington , 1828 ) .
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passing of laws cannot fail to impress upon every mind the cau
tious steps by which legislation is guarded , and the solicitude to
conduct business without precipitancy , rashness , or irregularity .
Frequent opportunites are afforded to each house to review their
own proceedings ; to amend their own errors ; to correct their own
inadvertencies ; to recover from the results of any passionate ex
citement ; and to reconsider the votes to which persuasive elo
quence or party spirit has occasionally misled their judgments .
Under such circumstances , if legislation be unwise or loose or
inaccurate, it belongs to the infirmity of human nature in general ,
or to thatpersonal carelessness and indifference which is sometimes
the foible of genius as well as the accompaniment of ignorance
and prejudice .
§ 902. The structure and organization of the several branches
composing the legislature have also (unless my judgment has
misled me) been shown by the past review to be admirably
adapted to preserve a wholesome and upright exercise of their
powers. All the checks which human ingenuity has been able to
devise (at least , all which , with reference to our habits , institu
tions , and local interests , seemed practicable or desirable ) to give
perfect operation to th
e
machinery o
f government , to adjust al
l
it
s
movements , to prevent its eccentricities , and to balance its
forces , — al
l
these have been introduced , with singular skill , in
genuity , and wisdom , into the structure of the Constitution .
§ 903 . Yet , after al
l , th
e
fabric may fall ; fo
r
the work of man
is perishable , and must forever have inherent elements of decay .
Nay , it must perish , if there be not that vital spirit in the people
which alone can nourish , sustain , and direct all its movements .
It is in vain that statesmen shall form plans of government in
which the beauty and harmony of a republic shall be embodied in
visible order , shall be built up on solid substructions , and adorned
b
y every useful ornament , if the inhabitants suffer the silent power
o
f
time to dilapidate it
s
walls , or crumble its massy supporters
into dust ; if the assaults from without are never resisted , and the
rottenness and mining from within are never guarded against .
Who can preserve the rights and liberties o
f
the people , when they
shall be abandoned b
y
themselves ? Who shall keep watch in the
temple , when the watchmen sleep at their posts ? Who shall call
upon th
e
people to redeem their possessions , and revive the repub
lic ,when their own hands have deliberately and corruptly surren
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dered them to the oppressor , and have built the prisons , or dug the
graves , of their own friends ? Aristotle , in ancient times , upon a
large survey of the republics of former days ,and of the facile man
ner in which they had been made the instruments of their own
destruction , felt himself compelled to the melancholy reflection ,
which has been painfully repeated by one of the greatest statesmen
ofmodern times, that a democracy has many striking points of re
semblance with a tyranny . “ The ethical character ,” says Edmund
Burke , “ is the same ; both exercise despotism over the better class
of citizens ; and the decrees are in th
e
one what ordinances and
arrêts are in the other . The demagogue , too , and the court favor
it
e are not unfrequently th
e
same identical men , and always bear a
close analogy . And these have the principal power , each in their
respective governments , favorites with th
e
absolute monarch , and
demagogues with the people , such a
s I have described . ” 1
§ 904 . This dark picture , it is to be hoped , will never be a
p
plicable to the republic o
f
America . And yet it affords a warn
ing which , like al
l
the lessons o
f past experience , we are not
permitted to disregard . America , free ,happy , and enlightened as
she is ,must rest the preservation of her rights and liberties upon
the virtue , independence , justice , and sagacity of the people . If
either fail , the republic is gone . Its shadow may remain with al
l
the pomp and circumstance and trickery o
f government , but its
vital power will have departed . In America , the demagogue may
arise , as well as elsewhere . He is the natural though spurious
growth of republics ; and like the courtier he may , b
y
his blan
dishments , delude the ears and blind the eyes of the people to
their own destruction . If ever the day shall arrive in which the
best talents and the best virtues shall be driven from office b
y
intrigue o
r corruption , by the ostracism of the press , or the still
more unrelenting persecution o
f party , legislation will cease to be
national . It will be wise by accident and bad b
y
system .
1 Burke on the French Revolution , note ; Aristotle , Polit . B . 4 , ch . 4 . See Montes
quieu ' s Spirit of Laws , B . 8 , passim .
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CHAPTER XIV .
POWERS OF CONGRESS .
§ 905 . We have now arrived , in the course of our inquiries , at
the eighth section o
f
the first article o
f
the Constitution , which
contains an enumeration o
f
the principal powers o
f legislation
confided to Congress . A consideration of this most important
subject will detain our attention for a considerable time ; as well
because of the variety o
f topics which it embraces , as of the con
troversies and discussions to which it has given rise . It has
been in the past time , it is in the present time , and it will
probably in a
ll
future time continue to b
e
the debatable ground o
f
the Constitution , signalized at once b
y
the victories and the de
feats o
f
the same parties . Here the advocates o
f
State rights
and the friends o
f
the Union will meet in hostile array . And
here those who have lost power willmaintain long and arduous
struggles to regain th
e
public confidence , and those who have
secured power will dispute every position which may be assumed
fo
r
attack , either of their policy or their principles . Nor ought
it at al
l
to surprise u
s
if that which has been true in the political
history o
f
other nations shall be true in regard to our own : that
the opposing parties shall occasionally be found to maintain the
same system , when in power , which they have obstinately resisted
when out o
f power . Without supposing any insincerity or depart
ure from principle in such cases , it will be easily imagined that
a very different course o
f
reasoning will force itself on the minds
o
f
those who are responsible fo
r
the measures of government ,
from that which the ardor o
f opposition and thë jealousy of
rivals might well foster in those who may desire to defeat what
they have n
o
interest to approve .
$ 9
0
6
. The first clause of the eighth section is in the following
words : “ The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes ,
duties , imposts ,and excises to pay the debts and provide fo
r
the
common defence and general welfare o
f
the United States ; but
all duties , imposts , and excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States . "
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$ 907 . Before proceeding to consider the nature and extent of
the power conferred by this clause , and the reasons on which it is
founded , it seems necessary to settle the grammatical construction
of the clause , and to ascertain its true reading . Do the words ,
“ to la
y
and collect taxes , duties , imposts , and excises , ” constitute
a distinct substantial power ; and the words , “ to pay the debts
and provide for the common defence and general welfare o
f
the
United States , ” constitute another distinct and substantial power ?
O
r
are the latter words connected with the former so a
s
to con
stitute a qualification upon them ? This has been a topic o
f polit
ical controversy , and has furnished abundant materials for popu
lar declamation and alarm . If the former be the true interpreta
tion , then it is obvious that under color of the generality of the
words , to “ provide fo
r
the common defence and general welfare , "
the government o
f
the United States is , in reality , a government
o
f general and unlimited powers , notwithstanding the subsequent
enumeration o
f specific powers ; if the latter be the true construc
tion , then the power of taxation only is given b
y
the clause , and
it is limited to objects of a national character , “ to pay the debts
and provide fo
r
the common defence and th
e
general welfare . ”
$ 908 . The former opinion has been maintained b
y
someminds
o
f great ingenuity and liberality of views . The latter has been
the generally received sense o
f
the nation , and seems supported
b
y
reasoning a
t
once solid and impregnable . The reading , there
fore , which will be maintained in these commentaries is that
which makes th
e
latter words a qualification of the former ; and
1 See 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 327 , 328 . See Dane ' s App . § 41 , p . 48 ; see also 1 Elliot ' s
Debates , 93 ; Id . 293 ; Id . 300 ; 2 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 178 , 180 , 181 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates ,
224 ; 2 U . S . Law Journal , April , 1826 , p . 251 , 264 , 270 to 282 . This last work con
tains in p . 270 et se
q
. a very elaborate exposition of th
e
doctrine . Mr . Jefferson has ,
upon more than one occasion , insisted that this was the Federal doctrine , that is , the
doctrine maintained b
y
the federalists a
s
a party ; and that the other doctrine was that
o
f
the republicans a
s
a party . 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 306 . The assertion is incorrect ;
for the latter opinion was constantly maintained b
y
some o
f
the most strenuous federal
ists a
t
the time o
f
the adoption o
f
the Constitution , and has since been maintained b
y
many of them . 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 170 , 183 , 195 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 262 ; 2 Amer .
Museum , 434 ; 3 Amer .Museum , 338 . It is remarkable that Mr . George Mason , one
o
f
the most decided opponents o
f
the Constitution in the Virginia convention , held the
opinion that the clause , to provide fo
r
the common defence and general welfare ,was a
substantive power . He added , “ That Congress should have power to provide for th
e
general welfare o
f
the Union , I grant . But I wish a clause in the Constitution in
respect to all powers , which are not granted , that they are retained b
y
the States ; other
wise , the power of providing fo
r
the general welfare may be perverted to its destruction . "
2 Elliot ' s Debates , 327 , 328 .
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this will be best illustrated by supplying the words which are ne
cessarily to be understood in this interpretation . They will then
stand thus : “ The Congress shall have power to la
y
and collect
taxes , duties , imposts , and excises , in order to pay the debts , and
to provide for the common defence and general welfare o
f the
United States " ; that is , fo
r
the purpose o
f paying the public
debts , and providing for the common defence and general welfare
o
f
the United States . In this sense , Congress has not an un
limited power o
f
taxation ; but it is limited to specific objects , –
the payment o
f
the public debts , and providing for the common
defence and general welfare . A tax , therefore , laid b
y Congress
fo
r
neither o
f
these objects , would be unconstitutional , as an ex
cess o
f
it
s legislative authority . In what manner this is to be as
certained o
r
decided will be considered hereafter . At present the
interpretation o
f
the words only is before u
s ; and the reasoning
b
y
which that already suggested has been vindicated will now be
reviewed .
$ 909 . The Constitution was , from its very origin , contemplated
to b
e
the frame o
f
a national government , of special and enu
merated powers , and not of general and unlimited powers . This
is apparent , as will be presently seen from th
e
history o
f
the pro
ceedings o
f
the convention which framed it ; and it has formed
th
e
admitted basis of all legislative and judicial reasoning upon
it ever since it was put into operation , by al
l
who have been it
s
open friends and advocates as well a
s by all who have been its
enemies and opponents . If the clause , “ to pay the debts and
provide for the common defence and general welfare o
f
the United
States , " is construed to be an independent and substantive grant
o
f power , it not only renders wholly unimportant and unnecessary
the subsequent enumeration o
f specific powers , but it plainly ex
tends far beyond them and creates a general authority in Congress
to pass a
ll
laws which they may deem fo
r
the common defence o
r
general welfare . Under such circumstances the Constitution
would practically create an unlimited national government . The
enumerated powers would tend to embarrassment and confusion ,
since they would only give rise to doubts as to the true extent o
f
the general power , or of the enumerated powers .
§ 910 . One of the most common maxims of interpretation is
( a
s
has been already stated ) , that , as an exception strengthens
i President Monroe ' s Message , 4t
h
May , 1822 , p . 32 , 33 .
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the force o
f
a law in cases not excepted , so enumeration weakens
it in cases not enumerated . But how could it be applied with
success to th
e
interpretation o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United
States , if the enumerated powers were neither exceptions from
nor additions to the general power to provide fo
r
the common d
e
fence and general welfare ? To give the enumeration o
f
the
specific powers any sensible place or operation in the Constitution ,
it is indispensable to construe them a
s not wholly and necessarily
embraced in the general power . The common principles o
f
inter
pretation would seem to instruct u
s
that the different parts of the
same instrument ought to be so expounded as to give meaning to
every part which will bear it . Shall one part of the same sen
tence b
e excluded altogether from a share in the meaning ; and
shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their
full extent , and the clear and precise expressions be denied any
signification ? For what purpose could the enumeration o
f par
ticular powers be inserted , if these and all others were meant to
b
e
included in the preceding general power ? Nothing is more
natural or common than first to use a general phrase , and then to
qualify it b
y
a recital o
f particulars . But the idea of an enumera
tion o
f particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general
meaning , and can have no other effect than to confound and mis
lead , is an absurdity which no one ought to charge on th
e
e
n
lightened authors o
f
the Constitution . It would be to charge
them either with premeditated folly or premeditated fraud .
§ 911 . On the other hand , construing this clause in connection
with and as a part o
f
the preceding clause giving the power to la
y
taxes , it becomes sensible and operative . It becomes a qualifica
tion o
f
that clause , and limits the taxing power to objects fo
r
th
e
common defence o
r general welfare . It then contains no grant of
any power whatsoever ; but it is a mere expression of the ends
and purposes to be effected b
y
the preceding power o
f
taxation . 2
§ 912 . An attempt has been sometimes made to treat this
clause a
s
distinct and independent , and yet as having no real sig .
nificancy per se , but ( if it may be so said ) as a mere prelude to
the succeeding enumerated powers . It is not improbable that this
1 The Federalist , No . 41 .
? See Debates o
n
the Judiciary in 1802 , p . 332 ; Dane ' s App . § 41 ; President Mon
roe ' s Message on Internal Improvements , 4th May , 1822 , p . 32 , 33 ; 1 Tuck . Black .
App . 231 .
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mode of explanation has been suggested by the fact , that in the
revised draft of the Constitution in the convention the clause was
separated from the preceding exactly in the same manner as every
succeeding clause was , namely , by a semicolon , and a break in the
paragraph ; and that it now stands in some copies, and it is said
that it stands in the official copy , with a semicolon interposed .
But this circumstance will be found of very little weight, when
the origin of the clause and it
s progress to it
s present state are
traced in the proceedings in the convention . It will then appear
that it was first introduced as an appendage to the power to lay
taxes . But there is a fundamental objection to the interpretation
thus attempted to be maintained , which is , that it robs the clause
o
f
all efficacy and meaning . No person has a right to assume
that any part of th
e
Constitution is useless , or is without a mean
ing ; and a fortiori no person has a right to rob any part of a
meaning , natural and appropriate to the language in th
e
con
nection in which it stands . Now , the words have such a natural
and appropriate meaning a
s
a qualification o
f
the preceding clause
to lay taxes . Why , then , should such a meaning be rejected ?
§ 913 . It is no sufficient answer to say that the clause ought to
b
e regarded merely a
s containing “ general terms explained and
limited b
y
the subjoined specifications , and therefore requiring no
critical attention or studied precaution , ” 4 because it is assuming
the very point in controversy to assert that the clause is connected
with any subsequent specifications . It is not said , to “ provide for
the common defence , and general welfare , in manner following ,
viz . , ” which would be the natural expression to indicate such an
intention . But it stands entirely disconnected from every subse
quent clause , both in sense and punctuation , and is no more a
part of them than they are o
f
the power to lay taxes . Besides ,
what suitable application , in such a sense , would there be o
f
the
last clause in the enumeration , viz . , the clause “ to make all laws
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
1 Journ . of Convention , p . 35
6
; Id . 494 ; 2 United States Law Journal , p . 264 , April ,
1826 , New York . In the Federalist , No . 41 , the circumstance that it is separated from
the succeeding clauses b
y
a semicolon is noticed . The printed Journal of the Conven
tion gives the revised draft from Mr . Brearly ' s copy , as above stated . See Journal of
Convention , p . 351 , 356 . See President Monroe ' s Message on Internal Improvements ,
4th May , 1822 , p . 16 , 32 , & c .
2 Journ . of Convention , p . 323 , 324 , 326 .
3 President Monroe ' s Message , 4thMay , 1822 , p . 32 , 33 .
4 President Madison ' s Letter to Mr . Stevenson , 27 Nov . 1830 .
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powers , & c.” ? Surely , this clause is as applicable to the power
to lay taxes as to any other , and no one would dream of its being a
mere specification under the power to provide fo
r
the common de
fence and general welfare .
$ 914 . It has been said , in support of this construction , that in
the articles o
f
confederation ( ar
t
. 8 ) it is provided , that “ al
l
charges of war , and al
l
other expenses that shall be incurred fo
r
the common defence o
r general welfare , and allowed b
y
the United
States in Congress assembled ,shall be defrayed out of the common
treasury , & c . ” ; and that “ the similarity in the use of these same
phrases in these two great federal chartersmay well be considered
a
s rendering their meaning less liable to misconstruction ; be
.cause it will scarcely be said that in the former they were ever
understood to be either a general grant or power , or to authorize
the requisition o
r application o
f money b
y
the ol
d Congress to the
common defence and [ or ] ' general welfare , except in the cases
afterwards enumerated ,which explained and limited their mean
ing ; and if such was the limited meaning attached to these
phrases in the very instrument revised and remodelled b
y
th
e
present Constitution , it can never be supposed that when copied
into this Constitution a different meaning ought to b
e
attached to
them . Without stopping to consider whether the Constitution
can in any just and critical sense be deemed a revision and re
modelling of the confederation , if the argument here stated b
e
o
f
any value it plainly establishes that the words ought to be con
strued as a qualification o
r
limitation o
f
the power to lay taxes .
B
y
the confederation , al
l
expenses incurred for the common d
e
fence o
r general welfare are to be defrayed out of a common
treasury , to be supplied by requisitions upon the States . Instead
o
f requisitions , the Constitution gives the right to the national
government directly to lay taxes . So that the only difference in
this view between the two clauses is , as to the mode of obtaining
the money , not as to the objects or purposes to which it is to be
applied . If , then , the Constitution were to be construed according
to the true bearing o
f
this argument , it would read thus : Con
gress shall have power to lay taxes fo
r
“ a
ll charges o
f
war , and
1 “ Or ” is the word in the article .
2 Virginia Report and Resolutions o
f
7 January , 1800 . Se
e
also the Federalist ,
No . 41 .
8 See the Federalist , No . 40 .
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a
ll
other expenses that shall be incurred fo
r
the common defence
o
r general welfare . ” This plainly makes it a qualification of the
taxing power , and not an independent provision or a general index
to the succeeding specifications o
f power . There is not , however ,
any solid ground upon which it can be fo
r
a moment maintained
that the language o
f
the Constitution is to be enlarged o
r
restricted
b
y
the language of the confederation . That would be to make it
speak what it
s
words do not import and its objects d
o
not justify .
It would be to append it as a codicil to an instrument which it
was designed wholly to supersede and vacate .
§ 915 . But the argument in it
s
other branch rests on a
n as
sumed basis which is not admitted . It supposes that in the con
federation n
o expenses not strictly incurred under some of the
subsequent specified powers given to the continental Congress
could b
e properly payable out o
f
the common treasury . Now ,
that is a proposition to b
e proved , and is not to be taken for
granted . The confederation was not finally ratified so as to be
come a binding instrument on any o
f
the States until March , 1781 .
Until that period there could be no practice or construction under
it ; and it is not shown that subsequently there was any exposi
tion to the effect now insisted on . Indeed , after the peace o
f
1783 , if there had been any such exposition , and it had been un
favorable to the broad exercise o
f
the power , it would have been
entitled to less weight than usually belongs to the proceedings o
f
public bodies in the administration of their powers ; since the de .
cline and fall o
f
the confederation were so obvious that it was o
f
little use to exert them . The States notoriously disregarded th
e
rights and prerogatives admitted to belong to the confederacy ,
and even the requisitions o
f Congress fo
r
objects most unquestion
ably within their constitutional authority were openly denied or
silently evaded . Under such circumstances Congress would have
little inclination to look closely to their powers , since , whether
great o
r
small , large or narrow , they were of little practical value
and o
f
n
o practical cogency .
§ 916 . But it does so happen , that , in point of fact , no such un
favorable o
r
restrictive interpretation o
r practice was ever adopted
b
y
the continental Congress . On the contrary , they construed
their power on the subject o
f requisitions and taxation exactly as
it is now contended for , as a power to make requisitions on the
States for a
ll expenses which they might deem proper to incur for
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the common defence and general welfare ; and to appropriate all
moneys in th
e
treasury to th
e
like purposes . This is admitted to
be o
f
such notoriety as to require no proof . 1 Surely , the practice
o
f
that body in questions o
f
this nature must be of far higher
value than the mere private interpretation o
f any persons in the
present times , however respectable . But the practice was con
formable to the constitutional authority o
f Congress under th
e
confederation . The ninth article expressly delegates to Congress
the power “ to ascertain the necessary sums to b
e
raised fo
r
the
service o
f
the United States , and to appropriate and apply the
same fo
r
defraying the public expenses " ; and then provides that
Congress shall not “ ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for
the defence and welfare of the United States , or any of them , & c . ,
unless nine States assent to the same . ” So that here we have , in
the eighth article , a declaration that “ al
l
charges o
f
war and all
other expenses that shall be incurred fo
r
the common defence or
general welfare , & c . , shall be defrayed out of a common treas
ury ” ; and in the ninth article an express power to ascertain the
necessary sums o
f
money to b
e raised fo
r
th
e
public service , and
i Mr . Madison himself , in his letter to Mr . Stevenson , Nov . 27 , 1830 , admits the force
o
f
these remarks in their full extent . His language is , “ If the practice of the revolu .
tionary Congress b
e pleaded in opposition to this view o
f
the case , " ( i . e . his view , that
the words have n
o
distinct meaning , ) “ the plea is met by the notoriety , that , on several
accounts , the practice of that body is not the expositor of the Articles of the Confed
eration . These articles were not in force until they were finally ratified b
y Maryland ,
in 1781 . Prior to that event , the power o
f Congress was measured by the exigencies
o
f
thewar ; and derived its sanction from the acquiescence of the States . After that
event , habit , and a continued expediency , amounting often to a real or an apparent
necessity , prolonged the exercise of an undefined authority , which was the more readily
overlooked , a
s
the members o
f
that body held their seats during pleasure ; a
s
it
s
acts ,
particularly after the failure o
f
the bills of credit , depended fo
r
their efficacy o
n
the will
o
f
the States , and as its general impotency became manifest . Examples of departure
from the prescribed rule are to
o
well known to require proof . ” So that it is admitted , that
the practice , under the confederation was notoriously such a
s
allowed appropriations
b
y
Congress for any objects which they deemed for the common defence and general
welfare . And yet we are now called upon to take a new and modern gloss o
f
that in
strument , directly a
t
variance with that practice . See also Mr . Wilson ' s pamphlet on
the Constitutionality o
f
the Bank o
f
North America , in 1785 . The reason why h
e
does
not allude to the terms “ common defence and general welfare , ” in that argument , prob
ably was , that there was no question respecting appropriations o
f
money involved in
that discussion . He strenuously contends that Congress had a right to charter the
bank ; and he alludes to the fifth article ,which , fo
r
the convenient management o
f
the
general interests o
f
the United States , provides for the appointment o
f delegates from the
States . He deduces th
e
power from it
s being essentially national , and vitally impor
tant to the government . 3 Wilson ' s Law Lect . 397 .
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then that the necessary sums fo
r
the defence and welfare o
f
the
United States (and not o
f
the United States alone , fo
r
th
e
words
are added ) , or of any of them , shall be ascertained b
y
the assent o
f
nine States . Clearly , therefore , upon the plain language of the
articles , the words “ common defence and general welfare ” in
one , and “ defence and welfare ” in another , and “ public service "
in another , were not idle words , but were descriptive of the very
intent and objects o
f
the power , and not confined even to the de
fence and welfare of a
ll
the States , but extending to the welfare
and defence o
f any o
f
them . The power then is , in this view ,
even larger than that conferred b
y
the Constitution .
$ 917 . But there is no ground whatsoever which authorizes
any resort to the confederation , to interpret the power of taxa
tion which is conferred on Congress b
y
the Constitution . The
clause has no reference whatsoever to the confederation , nor in
deed to any other clause o
f
the Constitution . It is , on its face ,
a distinct , substantive , and independent power . Who , then ,
is a
t liberty to say that it is to be limited by other clauses ,
rather than they to be enlarged b
y
it ; since there is no avowed
connection o
r
reference from the one to the others ? Interpre
tation would here desert it
s proper office , that which requires
that “ every part of the expression ought , if possible , to be
allowed some meaning , and be made to conspire to some
common end . ” 2
§ 918 . It has been further said , in support of the construction
now under consideration , that “ whether the phrases in question
are construed to authorize every measure relating to the common
defence and general welfare , as contended b
y
some , or every
measure only in which there might be an application of money ,
a
s suggested by th
e
caution o
f
others , the effect must substan
tially be the same , in destroying th
e
import and force o
f
the
particular enumeration of powers which follow these general
phrases in the Constitution . For it is evident that there is not
a single power whatsoever which may not have some reference
1 2 Elliot ' s Deb . 19
5
.
2 The Federalist , No . 40 . In the first draft , of Dr . Franklin , in 1775 , the clause was
a
s
follows : “ All charges of wars , and all other general expenses to be incurred fo
r
the
common welfare , shall b
e defrayed , ” & c . In Mr . Dickinson ' s draft , in July , 1776 , the
words were , “ All charges o
f
wars , and all other expenses , that shall be incurred for the
common defence o
r general welfare , ” & c . ; and these words were subsequently retained .
1 Secret Jour . of Congres (printed in 1821 ) , p . 285 , 294 , 307 , 323 to 325 , 354 .
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to the common defence o
r
the general welfare ; nor a power o
f
any magnitude , which , in its exercise , does not involve or admit
a
n application o
f money . The government , therefore , which
possesses power in either one o
r
the other of these extents , is
a government without limitations , formed by a particular enu
meration of powers ; and , consequently , the meaning and effect
o
f
this particular enumeration are destroyed b
y
the exposition
given to these general phrases . ” The conclusion deduced from
these premises is , that , under the confederation and the Constitu
tion , “ Congress is authorized to provide money fo
r
the common
defence and general welfare . In both is subjoined to this au
thority an enumeration o
f
the cases to which their powers shall
extend . Money cannot be applied to the general welfare , other
wise than b
y
a
n application o
f it to some particular measure ,
conducive to the general welfare . Whenever , therefore , money
has been raised b
y
the general authority , and is to be applied to
a particular measure , a question arises , whether the particular
measure be within the enumerated authorities vested in the
Congress . If it be , the money requisite for it may be applied to
it ; if it be not , no such application can be made . This fair and
obvious interpretation coincides with , and is enforced by , the
clause in the Constitution , which declares that no money shall
b
e drawn from the treasury but in consequence o
f appropria
tions b
y
law . An appropriation of money to the general welfare
would be deemed rather a mockery than an observance of this
constitutional injunction . ”
§ 919 . Stripped of the ingenious texture by which this argu
ment is disguised , it is neither more nor less than an attempt to
obliterate from th
e
Constitution the whole clause , “ to pay the
debts , and provide for the common defence and general welfare
o
f
the United States , " as entirely senseless , or inexpressive of
any intention whatsoever . 2 Strike them out , and the Constitu
tion is exactly what the argument contends fo
r
. It is , therefore ,
a
n argument that the words ought not to b
e
in the Constitution ;
because if they are , and have any meaning , they enlarge it be
yond the scope o
f
certain other enumerated powers , and this is
both mischievous and dangerous . Being in the Constitution ,
1 Virginia Resolutions o
f
8th January , 1800 . The same reasoning is in President
Madison ' s vetomessage , of 3d of March , 1817 . 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 280 , 281 .
2 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 236 .
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they are to be deemed , vox et preterea nihil, an empty sound
and vain phraseology , a finger-board pointing to other powers,
but having no use whatsoever , since these powers are suffi
ciently apparent without . Now , it is not too much to say ,
that in a constitution of government , framed and adopted by
the people , it is a most unjustifiable latitude of interpretation to
deny effect to any clause , if it is sensible in the language in
which it is expressed , and in the place in which it stands. If
words are inserted , we are bound to presume that they have
some definite object and intent ; and to reason them out of the
Constitution upon arguments ab inconvenienti , (which to one
mind may appear wholly unfounded , and to another wholly
satisfactory ,) is to make a new constitution , not to construe the
old one . It is to do the very thing which is so often com
plained of, to make a constitution to suit our own notions and
wishes , and not to administer or construe that which the peo
ple have given to the country .
$ 920 . But what is the argument , when it is thoroughly sifted ?
It reasons upon a supposed dilemma , upon which it suspends
the advocates of the two contrasted opinions . If the power to
provide fo
r
th
e
common defence and general welfare is an inde
pendent power , then it is said that the government is unlimited ,
and the subsequent enumeration o
f powers is unnecessary and
useless . If it is a mere appendage or qualification of the power
to lay taxes , still it involves a power of general appropriation of
the moneys so raised , which indirectly produces the same result . 2
Now , the former position may be safely admitted to be true b
y
those who d
o
not deem it an independent power ; but the latter
position is not a just conclusion from the premises , which it
states , that it is a qualified power . It is not a logical or a prac
tical sequence from the premises ; it is a non sequitur .
§ 921 . A dilemma , of a very different sort ,might be fairly put
to those who contend fo
r
the doctrine , that the words are not a
qualification o
f
the power to lay taxes , and , indeed , have no
meaning or use per se . The words are found in the clause re
1 In a Debate o
f
7
th o
f February , 1792 , ( 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 23
6
)Mr .Madison puts them
(manifestly a
s
his own construction ) " a
s
a sort o
f caption , o
r general description of
the specified powers , and as having no further meaning , and giving no further powers ,
than what is found in that specification . " See also Mr .Madison ' s veto message , on the
Bank Bonus Bill , 3d March , 1817 . 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 280 , 281 .
2 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 280 , 281 .
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specting taxation , and as a part of that clause . If the power to
tax extends simply to the payment o
f
the debts o
f
the United
States , then Congress has no power to lay any taxes for any other
purpose . If so , then Congress could not appropriate the money
raised to any other purposes ; since the restriction is to taxes
fo
r
payment o
f
the debts o
f
the United States , that is , of the
debts then existing . This would be almost absurd . If , on the
other hand , Congress have a right to lay taxes and appropriate
the money to any other objects , it must be because the words ,
“ to provide for the common defence and general welfare , " au
thorize it , b
y enlarging the power to those objects ; for there are
n
o other words which belong to the clause . All the powers
are in distinct clauses , and do not touch taxation . No advo
cate fo
r
the doctrine of a restrictive power will contend , that th
e
power to lay taxes to pay debts authorizes the payment o
f
a
ll
debts which the United States may choose to incur ,whether fo
r
national o
r
constitutional objects , or not . The words , “ to pay
debts , ” are therefore either antecedent debts , or debts to be in
curred “ fo
r
the common defence and general welfare , ” which
will justify Congress in incurring any debts for such purposes .
But the language is not confined to the payment of debts for the
common defence and general welfare . It is not to pay the debts ”
merely , but “ to provide for the common defence and general
welfare . ” That is , Congress may lay taxes to provide means fo
r
the common defence and general welfare . So that there is a diffi
culty in rejecting one part o
f
the qualifying clause without reject
ing the whole , or enlarging the words for some purposes and re
stricting them fo
r
others .
§ 922 . A power to la
y
taxes for any purposes whatsoever is a
general power ; a power to lay taxes for certain specified purposes
is a limited power . A power to lay taxes for the common defence
and general welfare o
f
the United States is not in common sense a
general power . It is limited to those objects . It cannot constitu
tionally transcend them . If the defence proposed by a tax be not
the common defence o
f
the United States , if the welfare be not
general , but special , or local , as contradistinguished from national ,
it is not within the scope of the Constitution . If the tax be not
proposed fo
r
the common defence , or general welfare ,but fo
r
other
objects ,wholly extraneous , ( as , for instance , for propagating Mahom
etanism among the Turks , or giving aids and subsidies to a foreign
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nation , to build palaces for its kings , or erect monuments to its
heroes , ) it would be wholly indefensible upon constitutional prin
ciples . The power , then , is , under such circumstances ,necessarily
a qualified power . If it is so , how then does it affect o
r
in the
slightest degree trench upon the other enumerated powers ? N
o
one will pretend that th
e
power to lay taxes would , in general ,
have superseded o
r
rendered unnecessary a
ll
the other enumerated
powers . It would neither enlarge nor qualify them . A power to
tax does not include them . Nor would they , ( as unhappily the
confederation to
o
clearly demonstrated , ) ' necessarily include a
power to ta
x
. Each has its appropriate office and objects ; each may
exist without necessarily interfering with orannihilating the other .
No one will pretend that the power to lay a ta
x
necessarily in
cludes the power to declare war , to pass naturalization and bank
rupt laws , to coin money , to establish post -offices , or to define
piracies and felonies on the high seas . Nor would either of these
b
e
deemed necessarily to include the power to ta
x
. It might be
convenient ; but it would not be absolutely indispensable .
§ 923 . The whole of the elaborate reasoning upon the propriety
o
f granting the power o
f
taxation , pressed with so much ability and
earnestness , both in and out of th
e
convention , as vital to th
e
operations of the national government , would have been useless ,
and almost absurd , if th
e
power was included in the subsequently
enumerated powers . If the power of taxing was to be granted ,
why should it not be qualified according to the intention of the
framers o
f
the Constitution ? But then , it is said , if Congress may
lay taxes for the common defence and general welfare , the money
may be appropriated for those purposes , although not within the
scope o
f
the other enumerated powers . Certainly , it may be so
appropriated ; for if Congress is authorized to lay taxes for such
purposes , it would be strange , if ,when raised , the money could
not b
e applied to them . That would be to give a power fo
r
a cer
tain end , and then deny the end intended by the power . It is
added , “ that there is not a single power whatsoever , which may
not have somereference to the common defence o
r general welfare ;
nor a power of any magnitude , which , in its exercise , does not in
volve o
r admit an application of money . ” If b
y
the former lan
guage is meant that there is not any power belonging or incident
1 See the Federalist , Nos . 21 , 22 , 30 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 318 .
2 See the Federalist , No . 30 to 37 .
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to any government which has not some reference to the common
defence o
r general welfare , th
e
proposition may be peremptorily de
nied . Many governments possess powers which have no applica
tion to either of these objects in a just sense ; and some possess
powers repugnant to both . If it is meant that there is no power
belonging o
r
incident to a good government , and especially to a
republican government , which may not have some reference to
those objects , that proposition may or may not be true ; but it has
nothing to do with the present inquiry . The only question is ,
whether a mere power to lay taxes , and appropriate money for the
common defence and general welfare , does include al
l
the other
powers o
f government ; or even does include th
e
other enumerated
powers ( limited as they are ) o
f
the national government . No
person can answer in the affirmative to either part of the inquiry
who has fully considered the subject . The power of taxation is
but one o
f
a multitude o
f powers belonging to governments ; to
the State governments a
s
well as the national government . Would
a power to tax authorize a State government to regulate the descent
and distribution o
f
estates ; to prescribe the form of conveyances ; to
establish courts o
f justice fo
r
general purposes ; to legislate respect
ing personal rights , or the general dominion of property ; or to pun
ish all offences against society ? Would it confide to Congress the
power to grant patent rights fo
r
invention ; to provide fo
r
counter
feiting th
e
public securities and coin ; to constitute judicial tribunals
with the powers confided b
y
the third article of the Constitution ; to
declare war , and raise armies and navies , and make regulations fo
r
their government ; to exercise exclusive legislation in the territories
o
f
the United States , or in other ceded places ; or to make all laws
necessary and proper to carry into effect a
ll
the powers given b
y
the Constitution ? The Constitution itself upon it
s
face refutes any
such notion . It gives the power to tax , as a substantive power ;
and gives others a
s equally substantive and independent .
$ 924 . That the samemeans may sometimes or often be resorted
to , to carry into effect the different powers , furnishes no objection ;
fo
r
that is common to all governments . That an appropriation of
money may be the usual or best mode o
f carrying into effect some
o
f
these powers , furnishes no objection ; for it is one of the pur
poses for which the argument itself admits that the power of tax
ation is given . That it is indispensable fo
r
the due exercise o
f all
the powers may admit of some doubt . The only real question is ,
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whether , even admitting the power to la
y
taxes is appropriate fo
r
some of the purposes o
f
other enumerated powers , ( fo
r
n
o
one will
contend that it will , of itself , reach or provide for them all , ) it is
limited to such appropriations a
s grow out o
f
the exercise o
f
those
powers . In other words ,whether it is an incident to those powers ,
o
r
a substantive power in other cases ,which may concern the com
mon defence and the general welfare . If there are no other cases
which concern the common defence and general welfare , except
those within the scope o
f
the other enumerated powers , the dis
cussion is merely nominal and frivolous . If there ar
e
such cases ,
who is a
t liberty to say that , being for the common defence and
general welfare , the Constitution did not intend to embrace them ?
The preamble of the Constitution declares one of the objects to be ,
to provide for the common defence and to promote the general
welfare ; and if the power to lay taxes is in express terms given to
provide fo
r
the common defence and general welfare ,what ground
can there b
e
to construe the power short of the object ? To s
a
y
that
it shall bemerely auxiliary to other enumerated powers , and not
coextensive with it
s
own terms and it
s
avowed objects ? One o
f
the
best established rules o
f interpretation , one wliich common -sense
and reason forbid us to overlook , is , that when the object of a
power is clearly defined b
y
it
s
terms , or avowed in the context , it
ought to be construed so as to obtain the object , and not to defeat
it . The circumstance that , so construed , the power may be abused ,
is n
o
answer . All powers may be abused ; but are they then to be
abridged b
y
those who are to administer them , or denied to have
any operation ? If the people frame a constitution , the rulers are
to obey it . Neither rulers nor any other functionaries ,much less
any private persons , have a right to cripple it , because it is , accord .
ing to their own views , inconvenient or dangerous , unwise or
impolitic , of narrow limits or o
f
wide influence .
§ 925 . Besides , the argument itself admits , that “ Congress is
authorized to provide money for the common defence and gen
eral welfare . ” It is not pretended that , when the tax is laid , the
specific objects for which it is laid are to be specified , o
r
that it
is to b
e solely applied to those objects . That would be to in
sert a limitation nowhere stated in the text . But it is said , that
itmust be applied to th
e
general welfare ; and that can only be
b
y
a
n application of it to some particular measure conducive to
the general welfare . This is admitted . But then , it is added ,
u ,
654 [ BOOK II
I
.CONSTITUTION O
F
THE UNITED STATES .
that this particular measure must be within th
e
enumerated au
thorities vested in Congress , (that is , within some of the powers
not embraced in the first clause , ) otherwise the application is not
authorized . Why not , since it is fo
r
the general welfare ? N
o
reason is assigned , except that , not being within the scope of
those enumerated powers , it is not given b
y
the Constitution .
Now , the premises may be true ,but the conclusion does not fol
low , unless the words common defence and general warfare are
limited to the specifications included in those powers . So that ,
after a
ll , we are led back to the same reasoning , which construes
the words as having n
o meaning per se , but as dependent upon ,
and an exponent o
f , the enumerated powers . Now , this conclu
sion is not justified b
y
the natural connection or collocation o
f
the words ; and it strips them of al
l
reasonable force and effi
cacy . And yet we are told that “ this fair and obvious interpre
tation coincides with , and is enforced b
y , the clause o
f
the Con
stitution which provides that n
o money shall be drawn from
the treasury , but in consequence of appropriations b
y
law ” ; as
if the clause did not equally apply , as a restraint upon drawing
money , whichever construction is adopted . Suppose Congress to
possess the most unlimited power to appropriate money for the
general welfare , would it not be still true that it could not be
drawn from the treasury , until an appropriation was made b
y
some
law passed b
y
Congress ? This last clause is a limitation , not upon
the powers o
f Congress , but upon the acts of the executive , and
other public officers , in regard to the public moneys in the treasury .
§ 926 . The argument in favor of the construction which
treats the clause a
s
a qualification of the power to lay taxes ,
has , perhaps , never been presented in a more concise or forcible
shape than in a
n official opinion deliberately given b
y
one of
our most distinguished statesmen . “ To la
y
taxes to provide
for the general welfare o
f
the United States is , " says he , “ to
lay taxes for the purpose o
f providing fo
r
the general welfare .
For the laying o
f
taxes is the power , and the general welfare the
purpose , fo
r
which the power is to be exercised . Congress are
not to la
y
taxes a
d
libitum , fo
r
any purpose they please ; but only
to pay the debts , or provide fo
r
the welfare o
f
th
e
Union . In
like manner they are not to do anything they please to provide
for the general welfare , but only to lay taxes for that purpose .
i Se
e
also 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 280 , 281 . 2 Mr . Jefferson .
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To consider the latter phrase not as describing the purpose of
the first , but as giving a distinct and independent power to do
any act they please which might be fo
r
the good o
f
the Union ,
would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations o
f
power completely useless . It would reduce the whole instru
ment to a single phrase , that of instituting a congress with
power to do whatever would b
e
fo
r
th
e
good o
f
th
e
United
States ; and , as they would be the sole judges of the good or
evil , it would also be a power to do whatever evil they pleased .
It is an established rule of construction ,where a phrase will bear
either o
f
two meanings , to give that which will allow some
meaning to the other parts of the instrument , and not that
which will render al
l
the others useless . Certainly , no such univer
sal power was meant to be given them . It was intended to lace
them u
p strictly within the enumerated powers , and those without
which , as means , those powers could not be carried into effect . ” 1
$ 927 . The same opinion has been maintained at different
and distant times b
y
many eminent statesmen . It was avowed
and apparently acquiesced in , in the stated conventions called
to ratify the Constitution ; 3 and it has been , on various occa
sions , adopted b
y
Congress , and may fairly be deemed that
1 Jefferson ' s opinion on the Bank of the United States , 15th February , 1791 ; 4 Je
f
ferson ' s Correspondence , 524 , 525 . This opinion was deliberately reasserted by Mr .
Jefferson o
n
other occasions . There may , perhaps , also be found traces of an opinion
still more restrictive in his later writings ; but they are very obscure and unsatisfactory .
See 4 Jefferson ' s Correspondence , 306 , 416 , 457 ; Message of President Jefferson , 2d
December , 1806 ; 5 Wait ' s State Papers , 453 , 458 , 459 .
2 It wasmaintained b
yMr . Hamilton , in his Treasury Report on Manufactures , (5th
Dec . 1791 , ) and in his argument on the constitutionality of a National Bank , 23d Feb .
1791 , p . 147 , 148 ; b
y
Mr . Gerry in the debate on the National Bank in Feb . 1791 ,
( 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 226 ; ) by Mr . Ellsworth in a speech in 1788 , ( 3 American
Museum , 338 ; ) and b
y
President Monroe in his Message of the 4th of May , 1822 , ( p .
3
3
to 3
8 , ) in an elaborate argument which well deserves to be studied . He contends ,
that the power to lay taxes is confined to purposes for the common defence and general
welfare . And that the power of appropriation of the moneys is coextensive , that is ,
that it may be applied to any purposes o
f
the common defence o
r general welfare .
Mr . Adams , in his Letter to Mr . Speaker Stevenson , 11th of July , 1832 , published since
the preparation o
f
these Commentaries , has given a masterly exposition of the clause ,
to which itmay be important hereafter again to recur .
3 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 170 , 183 , 195 , 328 , 344 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 262 ; 2 American
Museum , 434 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 311 ; Id . 81 , 82 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 262 , 290 ; 2
American Museum , 544 .
4 See cases referred to in President Monroe ' s Message , 4th of May , 1822 ; 1 Kent ' s
Comm . Lect . p . 250 , 251 ; 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 226 , 243 , 244 , 279 to 282 ; Id . 291 , 292 ; 2
United States Law Journal , April , 1826 , p . 263 to 280 ; Webster ' s Speeches , 389 to
401 , 411 , 412 , 426 .
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which the deliberate sense of a majority of the nation has at all
times supported . This , to
o , seems to be the construction main
tained b
y
the Supreme Court of the United States . In the case
o
f
Gibbons v . Ogden , Mr . Chief Justice Marshall , in delivering
the opinion o
f
the court , said , “ Congress is authorized to lay
and collect taxes , et
c
. , to pay the debts and provide fo
r
the com
mon defence and general welfare o
f
the United States . This
does not interfere with the power of the States to tax for the
support o
f
their own governments ; nor is the exercise of that
power b
y
the States an exercise o
f any portion o
f
the power that
is granted to the United States . In imposing taxes for State
purposes they are not doing what Congress is empowered to do .
Congress is not empowered to tax fo
r
those purposes which are
within the exclusive province of the States . When , then , each
government is exercising the power o
f
taxation , neither is exer
cising the power of the other . ” Under such circumstances it is
not , perhaps , too much to contend that it is the truest , the
safest ,and the most authoritative construction of the Constitution . ?
§ 928 . The view thus taken of this clause of the Constitution
will receive some confirmation ( if it should be thought b
y any
person necessary ) b
y
a
n historical examination of the proceedings
o
f
the convention . The first resolution adopted b
y
the conven
tion on this subject o
f
the powers o
f
the general government
was , “ that the national legislature ought to be empowered to
enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress b
y
the confedera
tion , and moreover to legislate in al
l
cases to which the sepa
rate States are incompetent , or in which the harmony of the
United States may b
e interrupted b
y
the exercise of individual
legislation . ” 3 A
t
a subsequent period , the latter clause was
altered , so as to read thus : “ And , moreover , to legislate in al
l
cases for th
e
general interests o
f
th
e
Union , and also in those to
which the States are separately incompetent , or in which the har
mony o
f
the United States may be interrupted b
y
the exercise o
f
individual legislation . " 4 When the first draft of the Constitu
tion was prepared , in pursuance of the resolutions o
f
the con
1 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 199 .
2 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . p . 251 ; Sergeant on Const . Law , ch . 28 , p . 311 to 315 ;
Rawle o
n the Constitution , ch . 9 , p . 104 ; 2 United States Law Journal , April , 1826 ,
p . 251 to 282 .
8 Journ . o
f
Convention , 6
8 , 8
6 , 8
7 , 135 , 136 .
4 Journ . of Convention , 181 , 182 , 208 .
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vention , the clause respecting taxation (being the first section of
the seventh article ) stood thus : “ The legislature of the United
States shall have the power to la
y
and collect taxes ,duties , imposts ,
and excises , " without any qualification or limitation whatsoever .
$ 929 . Afterwards a motion was made to refer certain propo
sitions , and among others a proposition to secure the payment of
the public debt , and to appropriate funds exclusively fo
r
that
purpose , and to secure the public creditors from a violation o
f
the public faith , when pledged b
y
the authority o
f
the legis
lature , to a select committee , ( of five , ) which was accordingly
done . Another committee ( of eleven ) was appointed at the
same time , to consider the necessity and expediency of the debts
o
f
the several States being assumed b
y
the United States . The
latter committee reported that “ the legislature o
f
the United
States shall have power to fulfil the engagements which have
been entered into b
y Congress , and to discharge , as well the
debts o
f
the United States as th
e
debts incurred b
y
the several
States during the late war , fo
r
th
e
common defence and general
welfare . ” This proposition ( it may be presumed ) has no refer
ence whatsoever to the clause in the draft o
f
the Constitution to
lay taxes . The former committee ( o
f
five ) a
t
a later day re
ported that there should be added to the first section o
f
the
seventh article ( the clause to lay taxes ) the following words , " for
the payment o
f
the debts and the necessary expenses o
f
the
United States , provided , that no law fo
r
raising any branch o
f
revenue , except what may be specially appropriated fo
r
the pay
ment of interest on debts or loans , shall continue in force for
more than — years . " 3 . It was then moved to amend the first
clause o
f
the report o
f
the other committee , ( on State debts , ) so
a
s
to read a
s
follows : “ The legislature shall fulfil the engage
ments and discharge the debts o
f
the United States , " which
(after an ineffectual attempt to amend b
y striking out the words ,
“ discharge th
e
debts , ” and inserting the words , “ liquidate the
claims " ) passed unanimously in the affirmative . So that the
provision in th
e
report , to assume the State debts , was struck
out . On a subsequent day it was moved to amend the first sec
tion o
f
the seventh article , so as to read : “ The legislature shall
fulfil the engagements , and discharge the debts of the United
1 Journ . of Convention , 261 . 3 Id .
8 Journ . of Convention , 277 . 4 Id . 279 , 280 .
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States , and shall have power to lay and collect taxes , duties ,
imposts , and excises , ” which passed in the affirmative ; ' thus
incorporating the amendment already stated with the clause re
specting taxes in the draft o
f
the Constitution . On a subse
quent day the following clause was proposed and agreed to :
“ All debts contracted and engagements entered into b
y
o
r
under the authority o
f Congress shall be as valid against the
United States under this Constitution as under the confedera
tion . ” On the same day , and after the adoption of this amend
ment , itwas proposed to add to the first clause of the first sec
tion o
f
the seventh article ( to lay taxes , etc . ) the following
words : “ for the payment o
f
said debts , and for the defraying
the expenses that shall be incurred fo
r
the common defence and
general welfare , " which passed in the negative b
y
the vote o
f
ten States against one . So that the whole clause stood without
any further amendment , giving the power of taxation in th
e
same unlimited terms as it was reported in the original draft
o
f the Constitution . This unlimited extent of the power of taxa
tion seems to have been unsatisfactory ; and at a later day another
committee reported that the clause respecting taxation should
read a
s
follows : “ The legislature shall have power to lay and
collect taxes , duties , imposts , and excises , to pay the debts and pro
vide for the common defence and general welfare o
f
the United
States ” ; and this passed in the affirmative without any division . 3
And in the final draft the whole clause now stands thus : “ The
Congress , etc . , shall have power to lay and collect taxes , duties ,
imposts , and excises , to pay the debts and provide fo
r
the com
mon defence and general welfare o
f
th
e
United States . " 4 From
this historical survey it is apparent that itwas first brought forward
in connection with the power to lay taxes ; that it was originally
adopted a
s
a qualification or limitation o
f
the objects o
f that pow
e
r ; and that it was not discussed as an independent power , or
a
s
a general phrase pointing to o
r
connected with the subsequent
enumerated powers . There was another amendment proposed ,
which would have created a general power to this effect ,but it
was never adopted , and seems silently to have been abandoned .
§ 930 . Besides , it is impracticable in grammatical propriety
to separate the different parts o
f
the latter clause . The words
1 Journ . of Convention , 284 .
* Id . 351 , 356 .
2 Id . 291 . 3 Journ . of Convention , 323 , 324 , 326 .
5 Journ . of Convention , 277 .
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are , “ to pay th
e
debts , and provide for the common defence , "
etc . “ To pay the debts ” cannot be construed as an indepen - .
dent power ; for it is connected with the other b
y
the copulative
6 and . " The payment of the antecedent debts of the United
States was already provided fo
r
b
y
a distinct article ; 1 and the
power to pay future debts must necessarily be implied to the
extent to which they could constitutionally be contracted ; and
would fall within the purview of the enumerated power to pass
a
ll
laws necessary and proper to carry the powers given b
y
the
Constitution into effect . If , then , these words were and ought to
b
e
read a
s
a part o
f
the preceding power to la
y
taxes , and in
connection with it , ( as this historical review establishes beyond
any reasonable controversy , ) they draw the other words , “ and
provide for the common defence , " et
c
. ,with them into the same
connection . On the other hand , if this connection be once
admitted , it would be almost absurd to contend , that “ to pay
the debts ” o
f
the United States was a general phrase , which
pointed to the subsequent enumerated powers ,and was qualified
b
y
them ; and yet , as a part of the very clause , we are not at lib
erty to disregard it . The truth is , ( as the historical review also
proves , ) that after it had been decided that a positive power to
pay th
e
public debts should be inserted in the Constitution , and
a desire had been evinced to introduce some restriction upon the
power to lay taxes , in order to allay jealousies and suppress
alarms , it was (keeping both objects in view ) deemed best to
append the power to pay the public debts to the power to la
y
taxes ; and then to add other terms , broad enough to embrace all
the other purposes contemplated b
y
the Constitution . Among
these none were more appropriate than the words “ common
defence and general welfare , ” found in the Articles of Confedera
tion , and subsequently with marked emphasis introduced into
the preamble o
f
the Constitution . To this course no opposition
was made , because it satisfied those who wished to provide pos
itively fo
r
th
e
public debts , and those who wished to have the
power o
f
taxation coextensive with a
ll
constitutional objects and
powers . In other words , it conformed to the spirit of that reso
lution o
f
the convention , which authorized Congress “ to legis
late , in all cases , fo
r
the general interests o
f
the Union . ” 2
1 Journ . of Convention , 291 . See also the Constitution , ar
t
. 6 .
2 Journal of Convention , 181 , 182 , 208 . The letter of Mr .Madison to Mr . Steven
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§ 931 . Having thus disposed of the question , what is the
true interpretation of the clause , as it stands in the text of th
e
son o
f
27th November , 1830 , contains an historical examination of the origin and pro
gress o
f
this clause , substantially the same as that given above . After perusing it , I
perceive n
o
reason to change the foregoing reasoning . In one respect ,Mr . Madison
seems to labor under a mistake , namely , in supposing that th
e
proposition o
f
the 25th
o
f
August , to add to the power to lay taxes , as previously amended o
n
the 23d o
f Au
gust , the words , “ for the payment of the debts and for defraying the expenses , that
shall be incurred for the common defence and general welfare , ” was rejected on account
o
f
the generality o
f
the phraseology . The known opinions o
f
some o
f the States ,
which voted in the negative , (Connecticut alone voted in the affirmative , ) shows that it
could not have been rejected o
n
this account . It is most probable , that , it was re
jected , because it contained a restriction upon the power to tax ; for this power appears
a
t
first to have passed without opposition in it
s general form . Journal o
f
Convention ,
p . 220 , 257 , 284 , 291 . Itmay be acceptable to the general reader to have the remarks
o
f
this venerable statesman in his own words , and therefore they are here inserted . After
giving a
n
historical review o
f
the origin and progress o
f
the whole clause , he says :
" A special provision in this mode could not have been necessary for the debts o
f
the
new Congress ; for a power to provide money , and a power to perform certain acts , o
f
which money is the ordinary and appropriate means ,must , of course , carry with them
a power to pay the expense o
f performing th
e
acts . Nor was any special provision for
debts proposed , till the case of the revolutionary debts was brought into view ; and it
is a fair presumption , from the course of the varied propositions which have been
noticed , that , but fo
r
the old debts , and their association with the terms , common de
fence and general welfare , ' the clause would have remained , as reported in the first
draft o
f
a constitution , expressing generally ' a power in Congress to lay and collect
taxes , duties , imposts , and excises ' ; without any addition of the phrase ' to provide
fo
r
the common defence and general welfare . With this addition , indeed , the language
o
f
the clause being in conformity with that o
f
the clause in the Articles o
f
Confederation ,
it would be qualified , as in those articles , b
y
the specification o
f powers subjoined to it .
But there is sufficient reason to suppose that the terms in question would not have been
introduced , but for the introduction of the old debts , with which they happened to stand
in a familiar though inoperative relation . Thus introduced , howerer , they pass undis
turbed through the subsequent stages o
f
the Constitution .
“ If it be asked , why the terms ' common defence and general welfare , if notmeant
to convey the comprehensive power , which , taken literally , they express , were not qual
ified and explained b
y
some reference to the particular power subjoined , the answer is
a
t
hand , that although it might easily have been done , and experience shows it might
b
e
well if it had been done , yet the omission is accounted fo
r
b
y
a
n
inattention to the
phraseology , occasioned , doubtless , b
y
identity with the harmless character attached to
it in the instrument from which itwas borrowed .
“ Butmay it not be asked with infinitely more propriety , and without the possibility
o
f
a satisfactory answer , why , if the terms were meant to embrace not only al
l
the pow
ers particularly expressed , but the indefinite power which has been claimed under them ,
the intention was not so declared ;why , o
n thatsupposition , so much critical labor was e
m
ployed in enumerating the particular powers , and in defining and limiting their extent ?
“ The variations and vicissitudes in themodification o
f
the clause in which the terms
' common defence and general welfare ' appear are remarkable ; and to be no otherwise
explained than b
y
differences o
f
opinion concerning the necessity o
r
the form o
f
a con
stitutional provision for the debts of the Revolution ; some o
f
the members apprehend .
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Constitution , and ascertained that the power of taxation , though
general as to the subjects to which it may be applied , is yet
ing improper claims fo
r
losses b
y
depreciated bills o
f
credit ; others , an evasion of
proper claims , if not positively brought within the authorized functions o
f
the new gov
ernment ; and others , again , considering the past debts of the United States as suffi
ciently secured by the principle that n
o change in the government could change the obli
gations o
f
the nation . Besides the indications in the Journal , the history o
f
the period
sanctions this explanation .
“ But it is to be emphatically remarked , that , in the multitude of motions , proposi
tions , and amendments , there is not a single one having reference to th
e
terms ' com
mon defence and general welfare , ' unless we were so to understand the proposition con
taining them ,made on August 25th ,which was disagreed to b
y
all the States except one .
“ The obvious conclusion to which we are brought is , that these terms , copied from
the Articles o
f
Confederation ,were regarded in the new , as in the old instrument ,merely
a
s general terms , explained and limited by the subjoined specifications , and therefore
requiring no critical attention o
r
studied precaution .
“ If the practice o
f
the revolutionary Congress b
e pleaded in opposition to this view
o
f
the case , th
e
plea is met b
y
th
e
notoriety , that , on several accounts , the practice of
that body is not the expositor of the ' Articles of Confederation . These articles were
not in force till they were finally ratified byMaryland in 1781 . Prior to that event the
power o
f Congress was measured b
y
the exigencies o
f
the war , and derived its sanction
from the acquiescence o
f
the States . After that event , habit , and a continued expe
diency , amounting often to a real o
r apparent necessity , prolonged the exercise o
f
a
n
undefined authority ,which was the more readily overlooked , as the members of the
body held their seats during pleasure , a
s
it
s
acts , particularly after the failure o
f
the
bills of credit , depended for their efficacy on thewill of the States , and as its general
impotency became manifest . Examples o
f departure from the prescribed rule are too
well known to require proof . The case of the old bank of North America might be
cited a
s
a memorable one . The incorporating ordinance grew out of the inferred neces
sity o
f
such a
n
institution to carry o
n
the war , b
y
aiding the finances , which were stary
ing under the neglect o
r inability o
f
the States to furnish their assessed quotas . Con
gress was a
t
th
e
time so much aware o
f
the deficient authority , that they recommended
it to the State legislatures to pass laws giving due effect to the ordinance , which was
done b
y
Pennsylvania and several other States .
“ Mr . Wilson , justly distinguished for his intellectual powers , being deeply impressed
with the importance o
f
a bank a
t
such a crisis , published a small pamphlet , entitled
Considerations o
n
the Bank o
f
North America , ' in which he endeavored to derive the
power from the nature o
f
the Union , in which the colonies were declared and became
independent States ; and also from the tenor of the ' Articles of Confederation ' them
selves . But what is particularly worthy o
f
notice is , that with all his anxious search in
those articles fo
r
such a power , he never glanced a
t
the terms , ' common defence and
general welfare , ' as a source of it . He rather chose to rest the claim on a recital in the
text , ' that , fo
r
themore convenient management o
f
th
e
general interests o
f
the United
States , delegates shall b
e annually appointed to meet in Congress , ' which he said im
plied that the United States had general rights , general powers , and general obligations ,
not derived from any particular State , nor from al
l
the particular States , taken separ
ately , but resulting from the union of the whole ' ; these general powers , not being
controlled b
y
the article declaring that each State retained a
ll powers not granted b
y
the articles , because the individual States never possessed and could not retain a gen
eral power over the others . '
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restrictive , as to the purposes for which it may be exercised ;
it next becomes matter o
f inquiry , what were the reasons for
“ The authority and argument here resorted to , if proving the ingenuity and patriotic
anxiety o
f
the author o
n
one hand , show sufficiently , o
n
the other , that the terms ' com
mon defence and general welfare ' could not , according to the known acceptance o
f
them , avail his object .
“ That the terms in question were not suspected in the convention which formed the
Constitution o
f any such meaning as has been constructively applied to them , may be
pronounced with entire confidence . For it exceeds the possibility of belief , that the
known advocates in the convention for a jealous grant , and cautious definition of Fed
eral powers , should have silently permitted the introduction o
f
words o
r phrases in a
sense rendering fruitless the restrictions and definitions elaborated by them .
“ Consider , for a moment , the immeasurable difference between the Constitution
limited in it
s powers to the enumerated objects , and expanded as it would be b
y
the
import claimed for the phraseology in question . The difference is equivalent to two
constitutions , of characters essentially contrasted with each other ; the one possessing
powers confined to certain specified cases , the other extended to al
l
caseswhatsoever .
For what is the case that would not be embraced b
y
a general power to raise money ,
a power to provide fo
r
the general welfare , and a power to pass all laws necessary and
proper to carry these powers into execution ; al
l
such provisions and laws superseding ,
a
t
the same time , all local laws and constitutions at variance with them ? Can less be
said with the evidence before u
s , furnished b
y
the Journal of the Convention itself , than
that it is impossible that such a constitution as the latter would have been recom
mended to the States b
y
a
ll
the members o
f
that body ,whose names were subscribed to
the instrument ?
“ Passing from this view o
f
the sense in which the terms ' common defence and gen
eral welfare 'were used by the framers o
f
the Constitution , let u
s
look for that in which
they must have been understood b
y
the conventions , o
r
rather b
y
the people ,who ,
through their conventions , accepted and ratified it . And here the evidence is , if possi
ble , still more irresistible , that the terms could have been regarded as giving a scope to
Federal legislation , infinitely more objectionable than any of the specified powers ,which
produced such strenuous opposition and calls for amendments , which might be safe
guards against the dangers apprehended from them .
“ Without recurring to the published debates of those conventions , which , as fa
r
a
s
they can b
e
relied o
n
fo
r
accuracy , would , it is believed , not impair the evidence fur
nished b
y
their recorded proceedings , it will suffice to consult the lists of amendments
proposed b
y
such o
f
the conventions a
s
considered the powers granted to the govern
ment too extensive or not safely defined .
“ Besides the restrictive and explanatory amendments to the text o
f
the Constitution ,
itmay be observed that a long list was premised under the name and in the nature of
* Declaration o
f Rights ' ; al
l
o
f
them indicating a jealousy o
f
the Federal powers , and
a
n anxiety to multiply securities against a constructive enlargement o
f
them . But th
e
appeal is more particularly made to the number and nature o
f
the amendments , pro
posed to b
e
made specific and integral parts o
f
the constitutional text .
“ No less than seven States , it appears , concurred in adding to their ratifications a
series o
f
amendments which they deemed requisite . Of these amendments , nine were
proposed b
y
the convention o
f
Massachusetts , five b
y
that o
f
South Carolina , twelve
b
y
that o
f
New Hampshire , twenty b
y
that o
f Virginia , thirty -three b
y
that o
f
New
York , twenty -six b
y
that o
f
North Carolina , and twenty -one b
y
that o
f
Rhode Island .
“ Here are a majority o
f
the States proposing amendments , in one instance thirty
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which this power was given , and what were the objections to
which it was deemed liable .
$ 932. That the power of taxation should be, to some extent,
vested in the national government , was admitted by al
l
persons
who sincerely desired to escape from the imbecilities a
s
well a
s
the inequalities of the confederation . Without such a power ,
three b
y
a single State ; al
l
o
f
them intended to circumscribe the power granted to the
general government , b
y
explanations , restrictions , o
r prohibitions , without including
a single proposition from a single State referring to the terms , common defence and
general welfare ' ; which , if understood to convey the asserted power , could not have
failed to b
e
the power most strenuously aimed at , because evidently more alarming in
it
s range than a
ll
the powers objected to put together . And that the terms should have
passed altogether unnoticed b
y
the many eyes which saw danger in terms and phrases
employed in some o
f
themost minute and limited o
f
the enumerated powers ,must be
regarded a
s
a demonstration that it was taken for granted that the terms were harm
less , because explained and limited as in the ‘ Articles o
f
Confederation , ' b
y
the enumer
ated powers which followed them .
“ A like demonstration , that these terms were not understood in any sense that could
invest Congress with powers not otherwise bestowed b
y
the constitutional charter ,may
be found in what passed in the first session o
f Congress , when the subject o
f
amend
ments was taken up , with the conciliatory view of freeing the Constitution from objec
tions which had beenmade to the extent o
f
it
s powers , or to the unguarded terms em
ployed in describing them . Not only were the terms , ' common defence and general
welfare , ' unnoticed in the long list of amendments brought forward in the outset , but
the Journals o
f
Congress show , that in the progress of the discussions , not a single
proposition was made in either branch o
f
the legislature which referred to the phrase , a
s
admitting a constructive enlargement o
f
the granted powers , and requiring an amend
ment guarding against it . Such a forbearance and silence on such an occasion , and
among so many members , who belonged to the part of the nation which called for e
x
planatory and restrictive amendments , and who had been elected a
s
known advocates
for them , cannot b
e
accounted for without supposing that the terms , ' common defence
and general welfare , 'were not , at that time , deemed susceptible of any such construc
tion a
s
has since been applied to them .
“ It may be thought , perhaps , due to the subject to advert to a letter of October 5 ,
1787 , to Samuel Adams , and another of October 16th , o
f
the same year , to the gov .
ernor o
f Virginia , from R . H .Lee , in both of which it is seen , that the terms had at
tracted his notice , and were apprehended b
y
h
im
to submit to Congress every object o
f
human legislation . ' But it is particularly worthy o
f
remark , that although a member
o
f
the Senate o
f
the United States , when amendments to the Constitution were before
that house , and sundry additions and alterations were there made to the list sent from
the other , n
o
notice was taken o
f
those terms , a
s pregnant with danger . It must be
inferred , that the opinion formed b
y
the distinguished member , at the first view o
f
the
Constitution , and before it had been fully discussed and elucidated , had been changed
into a conviction that the terms did not fairly admit the construction h
e
had originally
put on them ; and therefore needed no explanatory precaution against it . ”
Against the opinion o
f Mr .Madison there are the opinions ofmen of great eminence ,
and well entitled to the confidence of their country ; and among thesemay be enumer
ated Presidents Washington , Jefferson , and Monroe , and Mr . Hamilton . The opinion
o
f
the latter upon this very point will b
e given hereafter in h
is
own words .
i See the Federalist , Nos . 21 , 30 .
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it would not be possible to provide fo
r
the support o
f
the national
forces b
y
land o
r
se
a , or th
e
national civil list , or the ordinary
charges and expenses o
f government . For these purposes , at
least , there must be a constant and regular supply of revenue .
If there should be a deficiency , one of the two evils must inevi
tably ensue ; either the people must be subjected to continual
arbitrary plunder , or the government must sink into a fatal atro
phy . The former is the fate o
f Turkey under its sovereigns :
the latter was the fate o
f
America under the confederation . 3
$ 933 . If , then , there is to be a real , effective , national govern
ment , there must be a power of taxation coextensive with its
powers , wànts , and duties . The only inquiry properly remaining
is , whether tặe resources of taxation should be specified and
limited ; or whether the power in this respect should be general ,
leaving a full choice to the national legislature . The opponents
o
f
the Constitution strenuously contended that the power should
be restricted ; its friends as strenuously contended that it was
indispensable for the public safety , that it should be general .
$ 934 . The general reasoning , b
y
which a
n
unlimited power
was sustained , was to the following effect . Every government
ought to contain within itself every power requisite to the full
accomplishment o
f
the objects committed to it
s
care , and th
e
complete execution o
f
the trusts fo
r
which it is responsible , free
from every other control ,but a regard to the public good and to
the security o
f
the people . In other words , every power ought
to b
e proportionate to it
s object . The duties of superintending
the national defence , and of securing the public peace against
foreign o
r
domestic violence , involve a provision fo
r
casualties
and dangers to which no possible limits can be assigned ; and
therefore the power o
f making that provision ought to know
n
o
other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the re
sources of the community . Revenue is the essential engine b
y
which the means o
f answering the national exigencies must be
procured ; and therefore the power of procuring it must necessa
rily be comprehended in that o
f providing for those exigencies .
Theory a
s
well as practice , the past experience of other nations
a
s
well as our own sad experience under the confederation , con
spire to prove , that the power of procuring revenue is unavailing
i Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 235 et se
q
. ; Id . 24
4
, 24
5
.
% The Federalist , No . 30 . s Id .
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and a mere mockery , when exercised over States in their collec
tive capacities. If, therefore , the Federal government was to be
of any efficiency , and a bond of union , it ought to be invested
with an unqualified power of taxation for all national purposes .
In the history of mankind it has ordinarily been found , that in
the usual progress of things the necessities of a nation in every
state of it
s
existence are , at least , equal to its resources . But ,
if a more favorable state of things should exist in our own gov
ernment , still w
e
must expect reverses , and ought to provide
against them . It is impossible to foresee all the various changes
in th
e
posture , relations , and power of different nations , which
might affect the prosperity and safety of our own . ' We may
have formidable foreign enemies . We may have internal com
motions . Wemay suffer from physical as well as moral calam
ities ; from plagues , famine , and earthquakes ; from political
convulsions and rivalries ; from the gradual decline of particular
sources o
f industry ; and from the necessity of changing our own
habits and pursuits , in consequence of foreign improvements and
competitions , and the variable . nature of human wants and de
sires . A source o
f
revenue adequate in one age may wholly or
partially fa
il
in another . Commerce or manufactures or agri
culture may thrive under a tax in one age , which would destroy
them in another . The power of taxation , therefore , to be useful ,
must not only be adequate to al
l
the exigencies o
f
the nation ,
but it must be capable of reaching from time to time al
l
the
most productive sources . It has been observed with no less
truth than point , that " in political arithmetic two and two do
not always make four . ” 3 Constitutions o
f government are not
to b
e
framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies ; but upon
a combination o
f
these with the probable exigencies of ages , ac
cording to the natural and tried course o
f
human affairs . There
ought to be a capacity to provide for future contingencies , as
they may happen ; and as these are ( as has been already sug
gested ) illimitable in their nature , so it is impossible safely to
limit that capacity . 4
1 The Federalist , No . 31 ; Id . No . 30 ; Id . No . 21 .
2 The Federalist , No . 30 . 8 The Federalist , No . 21 .
4 The Federalist , No . 3
4 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 77 to 89 ; Id . 303 to 308 ; Id . 309 , 311
to 316 , 321 to 329 ; Id . 337 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 95 , 96 , 118 ; Id . 198 to 204 ; 3 Elliot ' s
Debates , 261 , 262 , 290° ; 3 Amer . Museum , 334 , 338 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . 234 ,
235 , 236 .
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$ 935 . In answer to this reasoning it was objected , that “ it is
not true , because the exigencies of the Union may not be suscep
tible o
f
limitation , that its power of taxation ought to be uncon
fined . Revenue is as requisite to the purposes of the local ad
ministrations as to those o
f
the Union ; and the former are at
least of equal importance with the latter to the happiness of the
people . It is , therefore , as necessary that the State governments
should be able to command the means o
f supplying their wants
a
s
that the national government should possess the like faculty
in respect to the wants of the Union . But an indefinite power
in th
e
latter might , and probably would in time , deprive th
e
for
mer o
f
the means o
f providing for their own necessities ; and
would subject them entirely to the mercy o
f
the national legisla
ture . As the laws of th
e
Union are to become the supreme la
w
o
f the land , and as it is to have power to pass all laws that may
b
e necessary fo
r
carrying into execution the authorities with
which it is proposed to vest the national government , it might at
any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects , upon the
pretence o
f
a
n interference with its own . It might allege a
necessity o
f doing this in order to give efficacy to the national
revenue ; and thus all the resources o
f
taxation might b
y
degrees
become the subjects o
f
Federal monopoly to the entire exclusion
and destruction o
f
the State governments . ” The difficulties
arising from this collision between the State and national govern
ments might b
e easily avoided b
y
a separation and distinction
a
s
to the subjects o
f
taxation , or by other methods which might
b
e easily devised . Thus , for instance , the general government
might be intrusted with the power of external taxation , such as
laying duties and imposts on goods imported , and the States re
main exclusively in possession of the power of internal taxation .
O
r
power might be given to the general government to lay taxes
exclusively upon certain specified subjects ; or to la
y
taxes if requi
sitions on the States were not complied with ; 2 or , if the specified
subjects failed to produce an adequate revenue , resort might be
had to requisitions or even to direct taxes to supply the deficiency . 3
i The Federalist , No . 31 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 77 , 78 to 89 ; Id . 91 , 105 , 112 ; Id .
293 , 294 to 296 ; Id . 301 , 302 , 303 ; Id . 329 to 333 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 52 , 53 , 208 ;
3 Elliot ' s Debates , 77 to 91 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 240 ; 2 Amer . Museum , 543 ,
544 .
? 3 Amer .Museum , 423 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 52 , 53 , 20
0
, 206 .
8 See the Federalist , No . 30 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 294 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm .
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$ 936 . In regard to these objections it was urged that it was
impossible to rely (as the history of the government under the
confederation abundantly proved ) upon requisitions upon the
States . Direct taxes were exceedingly unequal and difficult to
adjust ,? and could not safely be relied on as an adequate or sat
isfactory source of revenue , except as a final resort when others
more eligible failed . The distinction between external and inter
nal taxation was indeed capable of being reduced to practice .
But in many emergencies itmight leave the national government
without any adequate resources , and compel it to a course of
taxation ruinous to our trade and industry and the solid interests
of the country . No one of due reflection ca
n
contend that com
mercial imports are o
r
could b
e equal to a
ll
future exigencies o
f
the Union ; and , indeed , ordinarily they may not be found equal
to them . 3 Suppose they are equal to the ordinary expenses of
the Union ; yet , if war should come , the civil list must be entirely
overlooked , or the military left without any adequate supply . 4
How is it possible that a government half supplied and half ne
cessitous can fulfil the purposes o
f
it
s
institution , or can pro
vide fo
r
the security , advance the prosperity , or support the
reputation o
f
the commonwealth ? How can it ever possess
either energy or stability , dignity o
r
credit , confidence at home
o
r respectability abroad ? How can its administration be any
thing else than a succession o
f expedients , temporary , impo
tent , and disgraceful ? How will it be able to avoid a frequent
sacrifice o
f
its engagements to immediate necessity ? How can
it undertake o
r
execute any liberal or enlarged plans o
f public
App . 234 , 235 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 294 , 295 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 52 , 53 , 111 , 112 ; Id .
2
0
0
, 206 , 208 . It was moved in the convention , that ,whenever revenue was required
to b
e
raised b
y
direct taxation , it should be apportioned among the States , and then
requisitions made upon the States to pay the amount ; and in default only o
f
their com
pliance , Congress should be authorized to pass acts directing the mode of collecting it .
But this proposition was rejected b
y
a vote o
f
seven States against one , one State being
divided . Journal of the Convention , p . 274 .
1 The Federalist , No . 30 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 303 , 304 ; Id . 325 , 326 , 327 ; 2 Elliot ' s
Debates , 198 , 199 , 204 .
2 The Federalist , No . 21 ; 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 81 , 82 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 105 ; Id .
199 , 204 , 236 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 234 , 235 , 236 ; 3 Dall . R . 171 , 178 .
8 The Federalist , No . 41 . See 1 Elliot ' s Debates , 303 to 30
6
.
4 The Federalist , Nos . 30 , 34 . “ A government , ” ( said one of ourmost distinguished
statesmen , Mr . Ellsworth , o
f
Connecticut , speaking on this very subject , ) “ which can
command but half its resources , is like a man with but one arm to defend himself . ”
Speech in Connecticut Convention , 7th January , 1788 ; 3 Amer . Museum , 338 .
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good ? 1 Who would lend to a government incapable o
f pledg
ing any permanent resources to redeem it
s
debts ? It would be
the common case o
f needy individuals who must borrow upon
onerous conditions and usury , because they cannot promise a
punctilious discharge o
f
their engagements . It would , therefore ,
not only not be wise , but be the extreme of folly , to stop short of
adequate resources for a
ll emergencies , and to leave the govern
ment intrusted with the care of the national defence in a state
o
f total or partial incapacity to provide for the protection of the
community against future invasions o
f
the public peace b
y
for
eign war or domestic convulsions . If , indeed , we are to try
the novel , not to say absurd experiment in politics , of tying
up the hands of government from protective and offensive war
founded upon reasons o
f
state , we ought certainly to be able
to compel foreign nations to abstain from a
ll
measures which
shall injure or cripple us . We must be able to repress their
ambition and disarm their enmity ; to conquer their prejudices
and destroy their rivalries and jealousies . Who is so vis
ionary a
s
to dream o
f
such a moral influence in a republic
over the whole world ? It should never b
e forgotten that the
chief sources of -expense in every government have ever arisen
from wars and rebellions , from foreign ambition and enmity , or
from domestic insurrections and factions . And it may well be
presumed that what has been in th
e
past will continue to b
e
in
the future .
§ 937 . Besides , it is manifest , that , however adequate commer
cial imposts might be for the ordinary expenditures of peace , the
operations of warmight ,and indeed ordinarily would , if our adver
sary possessed a large naval force , greatly endanger , if they did
not wholly cut of
f , our supplies from this source . And if this
were th
e
sole reliance o
f
the national government , a naval warfare
upon our commerce would , on this very account , be at once th
e
most successful and the most irresistible means of subduing us , or
compelling us to sue fo
r
peace . What could Great Britain or
France do in a naval war , if they were compelled to rely on com
merce alone as a resource for taxation to raise armies o
r
maintain
navies ? What could America do , in a contest with a rival power
whose navy possessed a superiority sufficient to blockade a
ll
her
3 Id .1 The Federalist ; No . 30 .
8 The Federalist , No . 34 . 4 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 290 .
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principal ports ? 1 And , independent of any such exigencies , the
history of the world shows that nothing is more fluctuating and
capricious than trade . The proudest commercial nations in one
age have sunk down to comparative insignificance in another .
Look a
t
Venice , and Genoa , and the Hanse Towns , and Holland ,
and Portugal , and Spain ! What is their present commercial im
portance , compared with its glory and success in past times ?
Could either o
f
them now safely rely on imposts a
s
a
n
exclusive
source o
f
revenue ?
§ 938 . There is another very important view of this subject .
If th
e
power o
f
taxation o
f
the general government were confined
to duties on imports , it is evident that it might be compelled , for
want o
f
other adequate resources , to extend these duties to an in
jurious excess . Trade might become embarrassed , and perhaps
oppressed , so as to diminish the receipts , while the duty was
increased ; smuggling ,always facile , and always demoralizing in a
republic o
f
a widely extended seo -coast , would be most mischiev
ously encouraged . The first effect would be , that commerce
would thus gradually change it
s
channels ; and if other interests
should b
e
( as , indeed , they might be to some extent ) aided b
y
such exorbitant duties , the ultimate result would be a great dimi
nution o
f
the revenue , and the ruin o
f
a great branch o
f industry .
It can never be either politic or just , wise or patriotic , to found a
government upon principles , which in its ordinary , o
r
even ex
traordinary , operations must naturally , if not necessarily , lead to
such a result . This would be to create a government not for the
happiness o
r prosperity o
f
the whole people , but for oppressions and
inequalities arising from scanty means and inadequate powers .
§ 939 . In regard to the other part of the objection , founded on
the dangers to the State governments from this general power o
f
1 In the recentwar of 1812 , 1813 , between Great Britain and th
e
United States , we
had abundant proofs o
f
th
e
correctness o
f
this reasoning . Notwithstanding the duties
upon importations were doubled , from the naval superiority of our enemy our govern
ment were compelled to resort to direct and internal taxes , to land taxes , and excises ;
and , even with al
l
these advantages , it is notorious , that the credit o
f
the government
sunk exceedingly low during the contest ; and the public securities were bought and
sold , under the very eyes of th
e
administration , at a discount of nearly fifty per cent
from their nominal amount Nay , at one time it was impracticable to borrow any
money upon the government credit . This event ( le
t
it be remembered ) took place
after twenty years o
f unexampled prosperity of th
e
country . It is a sad but solemn
admonition .
9 The Federalist , No . 35 .
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taxation , it is wholly without any solid foundation . It assumes that
the national government will have an interest to oppress or destroy
the State governments ; a supposition wholly inadmissible in prin
ciple and unsupported b
y
fact . There is quite as much reason to
presume that there will be a disposition in the State governments
to encroach on that o
f
the Union . In truth , no reasoning , founded
exclusively on either ground , is safe or satisfactory . There ought
to b
e power in each government to maintain itself and execute it
s
own powers ; but it does not necessarily follow that either would
become dangerous to the other . The objection , indeed , is rather
aimed a
t the structure and organization o
f
the government than at
it
s powers ; since it is impossible , if the structure and organization be
reasonably skilful , that any usurpation or oppression can take place . ?
§ 940 . But , waving this consideration , it will at once be seen
that the State governments have complete means o
f
self -protection ;
a
s ,with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports , (which
the Constitution has taken from the States ,unless it is exercised by
th
e
consent of Congress , ) the power of taxation remains in th
e
States , concurrent and coextensive with that of Congress . The
slightest attention to the subject will demonstrate this beyond all
controversy . The language of the Constitution does not , in terms ,
make it an exclusive power in Congress ; the existence of a con
current power is not incompatible with the exercise o
f it b
y
Con
gress ; and the States are not expressly prohibited from using it
b
y
the Constitution . Under such circumstances the argument is
irresistible , that a concurrent power remains in the States , as a
part o
f
their original and unsurrendered sovereignty : 3
§ 941 . The remarks of the Federalist on this point are very full
and cogent . “ There is plainly , ” says that work , “ no expression
in the granting clause which makes that power exclusive in the
Union . There is no independent clause , or sentence , which pro
hibits the States from exercising it . So fa
r
is this from being th
e
1 The Federalist , No . 31 .
2 The Federalist , Nos . 3
1 , 3
2
.
8 The Federalist , No . 32 . See Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 199 to 202 . 1
Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 18 , p . 363 , 367 , 368 , 369 . This subject has been already consid
ered in these Commentaries , in th
e
rules o
f interpretation o
f
th
e
Constitution ; and a
very important illustration in the Federalist , No . 32 , on this very point of taxation , was
cited there . It seems , therefore , wholly unnecessary to repeat the reasoning . See also
4 Wheaton ' s R . 193 , 316 ; 5 Wheaton ' s R . 22 , 24 , 28 , 45 , 49 ; 9 Wheaton ' s R . 199 , 210 ,
238 ; 12 Wheaton ' s R . 448 . [Dobbins v . The Commissioners of Erie County , 16 Peters ,
S . C . R . 447 . ]
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case , that a plain and conclusive argument to the contrary is de
ducible from the restraint laid upon the States in relation to
duties on imports and exports . This restriction implies an ad
mission that, if it were not inserted , the States would possess the
power it excludes ; and it implies a further admission , that , as to
all other taxes , the authority of the States remains undimin
ished . In any other view it would be both unnecessary and dan
gerous. It would be unnecessary because , if the grant to the
Union of the power of laying such duties implied the exclusion of
the States , or even their subordination in this particular , there
would be no need of such a restriction . It would be dangerous ,
because the introduction of it leads directly to the conclusion which
has been mentioned , and which , if the reasoning of the objectors
be just , could not have been intended ; I mean that the States , in
all cases to which the restriction di
d
not apply , would have a con
current power o
f
taxation with the Union . The restriction in
question amounts to what lawyers call a negative pregnant , that is ,
a negation o
f
one thing and an affirmance o
f
another ; a negation of
the authority o
f
the States to impose taxes on imports and exports ,
and an affirmance o
f
their authority to impose them on other arti
cles . ” “ As to a supposition of repugnancy between th
e
power
o
f
taxation in the States and in the Union , it cannot be supported
in that sense which would be requisite to work an exclusion of the
States . It is , indeed , possible that a tax might be laid on a partic
ular article b
y
a State , which might render it inexpedient that a
further tax should b
e
laid on the same article b
y
the Union . But
it would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a further
tax . The quantity of the imposition , the expediency of an increase
o
n either side , would be mutually questions of prudence ; but
there would be involved n
o direct contradiction of power . The
particular policy o
f
the national and State system o
f
finance might ,
now and then , not exactly coincide , and might require reciprocal
forbearance . It is not , however , amere possibility o
f
inconvenience
in the exercise o
f powers , but an immediate constitutional repug
nancy , that can , b
y
implication , alienate and extinguish a pre
existing right of sovereignty . 1
1 The Federalist , Nos . 32 , 36 . Se
e
also 3 American Museum , 338 , 341 ; 1 Elliot ' s
Deb . 307 , 308 ; Id . 315 , 316 ; Id . 321 to 323 ; 2 Elliot ' s Deb . 198 to 204 ; McCulloch v .
State o
f Maryland , 4 Wheaton ' s R . 316 , 433 to 436 ; 9 Wheat . R . 199 , 200 , 201 ; 12
Wheaton ' s R . 448 . Whether a State can tax an instrument created b
y
the national
government , to accomplish national objects , will be hereafter considered . [As to con
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§ 942 . It is true that the laws of the Union are to be supreme .
But without this they would amount to nothing . It may be ad
mitted that a law laying a tax for the use of the United States
would be supreme in it
s
nature and legally uncontrollable . Yet a
law abrogating a State tax o
r preventing its collection would be
a
s clearly unconstitutional , and therefore not the supreme law .
As fa
r
a
s
a
n improper accumulation o
f
taxes on the same thing
might tend to render the collection difficult or precarious , it would
be a mutual inconvenience not arising from superiority or defect
o
f power on either side , but from an injudicious exercise of it . 1
$ 943 . The States with this concurrent power will be entirely
safe , and have ample resources to meet all their wants , whatever
they may b
e , although few public expenses , comparatively speak
ing , will fall to their lo
t
to provide fo
r
. They will be chiefly of a
domestic character , and affecting internal polity ; whereas , the re
sources of the Union will cover the vast expenditures occasioned
by foreign intercourse , wars , and other charges necessary fo
r
the
safety and prosperity of the Union . The mere civil list o
f any
country is always small ; the expenses of armies and navies and
foreign relations unavoidably great . There is no sound reason
why the States should possess any exclusive power over sources o
f
revenue not required b
y
their wants . But there is themost urgent
propriety in conceding to the Union al
l
which may be commen
surate to their wants . Any attempt to discriminate between the
sources o
f
revenue would leave too much o
r
too little to the
States . If the exclusive power of external taxation were given
to the Union , and of internal taxation to the States , it would , at
a rough calculation , probably give to the States a command o
f
two thirds o
f
the resources o
f
the community to defray from a
tenth to a twentieth of it
s expenses ; and to the Union , one third
o
f
the resources o
f
the community to defray from nine tenths to
nineteen twentieths o
f
it
s
expenses . Such an unequal distribution
is wholly indefensible ; and , it may be added , that the resources
o
f
the Union would o
r might be diminished exactly in proportion
to the increase o
f
demands upon it
s treasury ; for ( as has been
already seen ) war ,which brings the great expenditures , narrows ,
o
r
a
t
least may narrow , the resources of taxation from duties on
current power o
f
taxation in the States and the Federal government , se
e
United States
v . Benzon , 2 Cliff . 512 . )
1 The Federalist , Nos . 33 , 36 ; 1 Elliot ' s Deb . 307 , 308 ; Id . 321 , 322 .
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imports to a very alarming degree . If we enter any other line of
discrimination it will be equally difficult to adjust the proper pro
portions ; fo
r
the inquiry itself , in respect to the future wants , as
well of the States as of the Union , and their relative proportion ,
must involve elements forever changing and incapable o
f
any
precise ascertainment . Too much or to
o
little would forever be
found to belong to the States , and the States as well as the Union
might be endangered b
y
the very precautions to guard against
abuses o
f power . Any separation of the subjects o
f
revenue
which could have been fallen upon would have amounted to a
sacrifice o
f
the interests o
f
the Union to the power of th
e
indi
vidual States , or of a surrender of important functions b
y
the
latter , which would have removed them to a mean provincial
servitude and dependence . 2
§ 944 . Other objections of a specious character were urged
against confiding to Congress a general power o
f
taxation . Among
these none were insisted on with more frequency and earnestness
than the incapacity of Congress to judge o
f
the proper subjects o
f
taxation , considering the diversified interests and pursuits of the
States , and the impracticability of representing in that body all
their interests and pursuits . The principal pressure o
f
this argu
ment has been already examined in the survey already taken of
the structure and organization o
f
the Senate and House o
f Repre
sentatives . In truth , if it has any real force or efficacy , it is an
argument against any national government having any efficient
national powers , and it is not necessary to repeat the reasoning
o
n
which the expediency or necessity o
f
such a government has
been endeavored to be demonstrated . And , in respect to the par
ticular subject o
f
taxation , there is quite as much reason to sup
pose that there will be an adequate assemblage of experience ,
knowledge , skill ,and wisdom in Congress , and as adequate means
o
f ascertaining the proper bearing o
f
a
ll
taxes , whether direct or
indirect ,whether affecting agriculture , commerce , or manufactures ,
1 The Federalist , N
o
. 34 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm .App . 234 , 23
5
, 23
6
.
2 The Federalist calculated that the highest probable sum , required for the ordinary
permanent expenses o
f any State government , would not exceed a million o
f
dollars .
But that of the Union , it was supposed , could not be susceptible o
f any exact measure .
The Federalist , No . 34 .
8 The Federalist , Nos . 35 , 36 ; 1 Elliot ' s Deb . 297 to 300 ; Id . 309 to 313 . 1 Tuck .
e
r ' s Black . Comm . App . 237 , 238 ; 2 Elliot ' s Deb . 98 ; Id . 185 , 18
6
to 188 ; Id . 201 ,
202 , 203 ; Id . 232 , 236 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 77 to 91 .
VOL . I . 43
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a
s
to discharge any other functions delegated to Congress . To
suppose otherwise is to suppose the Union impracticable o
rmis
chievous .
$ 945 . Other objections were raised on the ground of themul
tiplied means of influence in th
e
national government , growing
out o
f
the appointments to office , necessary in the collection of
the revenues ; the host of officers which would swarm over the
land like locusts to devour its substance , and the terrific oppres
sions resulting from double taxes and harsh and arbitrary regula
tions . These objections were answered , as well might be sup
posed , b
y
appeals to common -sense and common experience ; and
they are the less necessary now to be refuted since , in the actual
practice o
f
th
e
government , they have been proved to be visionary
and fallacious , the dreams of speculative statesmen indulging
their love o
f ingenious paradoxes o
r
the suggestions of fear ,
stimulated b
y
discontent , or carried away b
y
phantoms o
f
the
imagination . 8
§ 946 . But another extraordinary objection which shows how
easily men may persuade themselves of the truth o
f
almost any
proposition which temporary interests o
r
excitements induce them
to believe , was urged from the North ; and it was , that the impost
would be a partial tax , and that the Southern States would pay
but little in comparison with the Northern . It was refuted b
y
un
answerable reasoning , 4 and would hardly deserve mention if the
opposite doctrine had not been recently revived and propagated
with abundant zeal a
t
the South , that duties on importations fall
with the most calamitous inequality on the Southern States . Nay ,
it has been seriously urged , that a single Southern State is bur
dened with the payment o
f
more than half o
f
the whole duties
levied on foreign goods throughout the Union .
8 947 . Again , it was objected that there was no certainty that
any duties would b
e
laid on importations , for the Southern States
might object to all imposts of this nature , as they have no manu
factures of their own , and consume more foreign goods than the
Northern States ,and , therefore , direct taxes would be the com
1 The Federalist , Nos . 35 , 36 , 41 , 45 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 244 , 245 .
2 The Federalist , No . 36 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 52 , 53 , 70 ; Id . 208 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates ,
262 , 263 ; 2 American Museum , 543 .
8 The Federalist , No . 36 ; 3 American Museum , 338 , 341 ; 1 Elliot ' s Deb . 81 , 293 ,
294 , 300 to 302 ; Id . 337 , 338 ; 2 Elliot ' s Deb . 98 ; Id . 198 to 204 .
4 See Mr . Ellsworth ' s Speech , 3 American Museum , 338 , 340 .
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mon resort to supply revenue . To which no other answer need
be given than that the rule of apportionment as well as the in
equalities of such taxes would , undoubtedly , produce a strong
disinclination in the nation , and especially in the Southern States,
to resort to them , unless under extraordinary circumstances . An
objection of a directly opposite character was also taken , namely ,
that the power of laying direct taxes was not proper to be granted
to the national government , because it was unnecessary , imprac
ticable , unsafe ,and accumulative of expense. This objection also
was shown to be unfounded , and , indeed , under certain exigencies
which have been already alluded to , the national government
might for want of it be utterly prostrated .4
Ş948 . Other objections were urged , which it seems unneces
sary to enumerate, as they were either temporary in their nature
or were mere auxiliaries to those already mentioned . The experi
ence of the national government has hitherto shown the entire
safety , practicability , and even necessity of its possessing the gen
eral power o
f
taxation . The States have exercised a concurrent
power without obstruction or inconvenience , and enjoy revenues
adequate to all their wants ; more adequate , indeed , than they could
possibly possess if the Union were abolished , or the national gov
ernment were not vested with a general power of taxation which
enables it to provide fo
r
a
ll objects o
f
common defence and general
welfare . The triumph of the friends of the Constitution , in secur
ing this great fundamental source o
f all real , effective national
sovereignty , was most signal ; and it is the noblest monument of
their wisdom , patriotism , and independence . Popular feelings ,
and popular prejudices , and local interests , and the pride of State
authority , and the jealousy of State sovereignty , were al
l
against
them . Yet they were not dismayed ; and b
y
steadfast appeals to
reason , to the calm sense of the people , and to the lessons of his
tory , they subdued opposition and won confidence . Without the
possession o
f
this power , the Constitution would have long since ,
like the confederation , have dwindled down to an empty pageant .
It would have become an unreal mockery , deluding our hopes and
exciting our fears . It would have flitted before us for a moment
1 ] Elliot ' s Debates , 90 , 91 .
? 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 234 to 238 ; The Federalist ,Nos . 12 , 21 , 36 ; 1 Elliot ' s
Debates , 61 , 62 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 105 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 77 to 91 ; 8 Journ . o
f
Continent . Congress , 16th Dec . 1782 , p . 203 .
8 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 197 to 204 ; Id . 208 , 232 , 235 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 77 , 91 .
4 Ibid .
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with a pale and ineffectual light , and then have departed forever
to the land o
f
shadows . There is so much candor and force in
the remarks o
f
the learned American commentator on Blackstone ,
o
n this subject , that they deserve to be cited in this place . “ A
candid review o
f
this part of the Federal Constitution cannot fail
to excite our just applause o
f
the principles upon which it is
founded . All the arguments against it appear to have been drawn
from the inexpediency o
f establishing such a form o
f government ,
rather than from any defect in this part o
f
the system , admitting
that a general government was necessary to the happiness and pros
perity o
f
the States individually . This great primary question
being once decided in the affirmative , it might be difficult to prove
that any part of the powers granted to Congress in this clause
ought to have been altogether withheld ; yet , being granted , rather
a
s
a
n ultimate provision in any possible case o
f emergency than
a
s
a means o
f ordinary revenue , it is to be wished that the exer
cise o
f powers , either oppressive in their operation , or inconsistent
with the genius o
f
the people , or irreconcilable to their preju
dices ,might be reserved for cogent occasions , which might justify
the temporary recourse to a lesser evil , as a means of avoiding
one more permanent and o
f greater magnitude . ”
§ 949 . The language of the Constitution is , “ Congress shall
have power to la
y
and collect taxes , duties , imposts , and excises , "
etc . “ But al
l
duties , imposts , and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States . ” A distinction is here taken be
tween taxes and duties , imposts and excises ; and , indeed , there
are other parts of the Constitution respecting the taxing power ,
( a
s will presently bemore fully seen , ) such as the regulations re
specting direct taxes , the prohibition of taxes or duties on exports
b
y
the United States , and the prohibition of imposts or duties by
the States on imports or exports , which require an attention to
this distinction .
$ 950 . In a general sense , a
ll
contributions imposed b
y
the
government upon individuals fo
r
the service o
f
the State are called
taxes , b
y
whatever name they may b
e
known , whether b
y
the
name of tribute , tythe , talliage , impost , duty , gabel , custom , sub
sidy , aid , supply , excise , or other name . In this sense they are
11 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 246 .
? See 2 Stuart ' s Polit . Econ . 485 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 232 ; 1 Black . Comm .
308 ; 3 Dall . R . 171 ; Smith ' s Wealth of Nations , B . 3 , ch . 3 , B . 5 , ch . 2 , P . 1 , P . 2 ,
art . 4 .
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usually divided into two great classes , those which are direct and
those which are indirect . Under the former denomination are
included taxes on land or real property ; and under the latter ,
taxes on articles of consumption . The Constitution , by giving
the power to lay and collect taxes in general terms, doubtless
meant to include al
l
sorts o
f
taxes , whether direct or indirect . 2
But it may be asked , if such was the intention , why were the sub
sequent words , duties , imposts , and excises , added in the clause ?
Two reasons may b
e
suggested ; the first , that it was done to
avoid all possibility of doubt in the construction of th
e
clause ,
since , in common parlance , the word taxes is sometimes applied in
contradistinction to duties , imposts , and excises , and , in the dele
gation o
f
so vital a power , it was desirable to avoid all possible
misconception o
f
this sort ; and accordingly we find , in the very
first draft o
f
the Constitution , these explanatory words are added . 3
Another reason was , that the Constitution prescribed different
rules o
f laying taxes in different cases , and therefore it was indis
pensable to make a discrimination between the classes to which
each rule was meant to apply .
$ 951 . The second section of the first article , which has been
already commented on for another purpose , declares that “ direct
taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union , according to their respective num
bers . ” The fourth clause of the ninth section of th
e
same article
(which would regularly be commented on in a future page ) de
clares that “ no capitation , o
r
other direct tax , shall be laid ,unless
in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed
to b
e
taken . ” And the clause now under consideration , that " all
duties , imposts , and excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States . ” Here , then , two rules are prescribed , the rule
o
f apportionment ( as it is called ) for direct taxes , and the rule of
uniformity for duties , imposts , and excises . If there are any other
kinds o
f
taxes not embraced in one o
r
the other o
f
these two classes ,
(and it is certainly difficult to give full effect to the words of the .
Constitution without supposing them to exist , ) it would seem that
Congress is left at full liberty to levy the same by either rule , or
1 The Federalist ,Nos . 21 , 36 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . 233 , 23
8
,239 ; Smith ' s Wealth
o
f Nations , B . 5 , ch . 2 , P
t
. 2 , art . 1 and 2 , and App .
2 Loughborough v . Blake , 5 Wheat . R . 317 , 318 , 319 .
8 Journal of Convention , 220 .
4 Hylton v . United States , 3 Dall . 171 , 174 .
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b
y
a mixture o
f
both rules , or perhaps by any other rule not in
consistent with the general purposes o
f
the Constitution . It is
evident that “ duties , imposts , and excises ” are indirect taxes in
the sense o
f
the Constitution . But the difficulty still remains , to
ascertain what taxes are comprehended under this description , and
what under the description of direct taxes . It has been remarked
b
y
Adam Smith , that th
e
private revenue of individuals arises ulti
mately from three different sources , - rent ,profit ,and wages ; and
that every public tax must be finally paid from some one or all of
these different sorts of revenue . He treats al
l
taxes upon land ,
o
r
the produce o
f
land , or upon houses , or parts , or appendages
thereof , (such as hearth taxes and window taxes , ) under the head
o
f
taxes upon rent ; all taxes upon stock and money at interest ,
upon other personal property yielding an income , and upon par
ticular employments or branches o
f
trade and business , under the
head o
f
taxes on profits ; and taxes upon salaries under the head
o
f wages . He treats capitation taxes , and taxes on consumable
articles , as mixed taxes , falling upon al
l
o
r any o
f
the different
species o
f
revenue . A full consideration of these different classi
fications o
f
taxes belongs more properly to a treatise upon politi
cal economy than upon constitutional law .
$ 952 . The word “ duties ” has not , perhaps , in al
l
cases , a
very exact signification , or rather it is used sometimes in a larger
and sometimes in a narrower sense . In its large sense , it is very
nearly an equivalent to taxes , embracing all impositions or charges
levied on persons or things . In its more restrained sense , it
is often used a
s equivalent to " customs , ” which appellation is
usually applied to those taxes which are payable upon goods and
merchandise imported o
r exported , and was probably given on
account o
f
the usual and constant demand o
f
them for the use
o
f kings , states , and governments . In this sense , it is nearly
synonymous with “ imposts , ” which is sometimes used in the large
sense o
f
taxes o
r
duties o
r impositions , and sometimes in the
more restrained sense of a duty on imported goods and merchan
1 Hylton v . United States , 3 Dall . R . 171 .
? Smith ' s Wealth of Nations , B . 5 , ch . 2 , P . 2 .
3 Smith ' s Wealth of Nations , B . 5 , ch . 2 , P . 2 , art . 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 .
4 See the Federalist , No . 36 .
6 Smith ' s Wealth of Nations , B . 4 , ch . 1 , P . 3 , B . 5 , ch . 2 , art . 4 ; Hale on Customs ,
Harg . Tracts , p . 115 , & c . ; 1 Black . Comm . 313 , 314 , 315 , 316 ; Com . Dig . Prerogative ,
D . 43 to D . 49 .
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dise . Perhaps it is not unreasonable to presume that this nar
rower sense mightbe in theminds of the framers of the Constitution
when this clause was adopted , since , in another clause , it is subse
quently provided that , “ No tax or duty shall be laid on articles
exported from any State , " and that “ No State shall , without the
consent o
f Congress , lay any imposts or duties on imports or ex
ports , except what may be absolutely necessary fo
r
executing it
s
inspection laws . ” 2 There is another provision , that “ No State
shall , without the consent of Congress , lay any duty of tonnage , ”
etc . , from which , perhaps , itmay be gathered that a tonnage duty .
( b
y
which is to b
e
understood ,not the ancient custom in England ,
so called , on wines imported , but a duty on the tonnage of ships
and vessels ) was not deemed an impost strictly , but a duty .
However , it must be admitted that little certainty can be arrived
a
t
from such slight changes o
f phraseology , where the words are
susceptible of various interpretations , and of more or less expan
sion . The most that can be done is to offer a probable conjecture
from the apparent use o
f
words in a connection where it is desir
able not to deem any one superfluous , or synonymous with the
others . A learned commentator has supposed that the words
“ duties and imposts ” in the Constitution were probably intended
to comprehend every species o
f
tax o
r
contribution not included
under the ordinary terms “ taxes and excises . ” 4 Another learned
judge has said , 5 « What is the natural and common , or technical
and appropriate meaning o
f
the words duty and excise , it is not
easy to ascertain . They present no clear or precise idea to the
mind . Different persons will annex different significations to the
terms . ” On the same occasion , another learned judge said , “ The
term duty is the most comprehensive , next to the generical term
tax ; and practically in Great Britain (whence we take our gen
eral ideas of taxes , duties , imposts , excises , customs , et
c
. ) em
braces taxes on stamps , tolls fo
r
passage , et
c
. , and is not confined
to taxes on importations only . " 6
1 The Federalist , No . 30 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 289 .
2 Mr . Madison is of opinion the terms imposts and duties , in these clauses , are used
a
s synonymous . There is much force in his suggestions . Mr .Madison ' s Letter to
Mr . Cabell , 18th Sept . 1828 .
8 1 Black . Comm . 315 ; Hale on Customs , Harg . Law Tracts , p . 3 , ch . 7 , ch . 14 ,
ch . 1
5
.
4 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm . App . 243 .
6 Mr . Justice Patterson in Hylton v . United States , 3 Dall . R . 171 , 177 .
6 Mr . Justice Chase , Ibid . 174 . See the Federalist , No . 36 .
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§ 953. “ Excises ” are generally deemed to be of an opposite
nature to “ imposts ," in the restrictive sense of the latter term ,
and are defined to be an inland imposition , paid sometimes upon
the consumption of the commodity , or frequently upon the retail
sale , which is the last stage before the consumption ."
§ 954 . But the more important inquiry is , what are direct taxes
in the sense of the Constitution , since they are required to be laid
by the rule of apportionment , and all indirect taxes ,whether they
fall under the head of “ duties , imposts , or excises ,” or under any
. other description ,may be laid by the rule of uniformity ? It is
clear that capitation taxes, or , as they are more commonly called ,
poll-taxes , that is , taxes upon the polls , heads , or persons of the
contributors , are direct taxes, fo
r
the Constitution has expressly
enumerated them as such . “ No capitation , or other direct tax ,
shall be laid , ” et
c
. , is the language of that instrument .
$ 955 . Taxes on lands , houses , and other permanent real estate ,
o
r
o
n parts o
r appurtenances thereof , have always been deemed of
the same character , that is , direct taxes . It has been seriously
doubted if , in the sense of the Constitution ,any taxes are direct
taxes , except those on polls or on lands . Mr . Justice Chase , in
Hylton v . United States , 4 said , “ I am inclined to think that the
direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution are only two , name
ly , a capitation o
r poll -tax simply , without regard to property ,
profession , or other circumstance , and a tax on land . I doubt
whether a tax b
y
a general assessment o
f personal property within
the United States is included within the term direct tax . ” Mr .
Justice Patterson , in the same case , said , “ It is not necessary to
determine whether a tax on the produce of land be a direct or an
indirect tax . Perhaps the immediate product of land , in its origi
nal and crude state , ought to be considered as a part of the land
itself . When the produce is converted into a manufacture , it as
sumes a new shape , etc . Whether direct taxes , ' in the sense of
the Constitution , comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax ,
o
r
a tax o
n land , is a questionable point , et
c
. I never entertained
il Black . Comm . 318 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 341 ; Smith ' s Wealth of Na
tions , B . 5 , ch . 2 , art . 4 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 209 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 289 , 290 .
? See 2 Smith ' s Wealth of Nations , B . 5 , ch . 2 , art . 4 ; The Federalist , No . 36 ; 2
Elliot ' s Debates , 209 .
31 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 232 , 233 ; Hylton v . United States , 3 Dall . R . 171 ;
The Federalist , No . 21 ; Loughborough v . Blake , 5 Wheat . R . 317 to 325 .
4 3 Dall . R . 171 . (See Pacific Insurance Co . v . Soule , 7 Wal . 444 . )
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a doubt that the principal , I will not say the only , objects that the
framers of the Constitution contemplated , as falling within the
rule of apportionment , were a capitation tax and a tax on land.”
And he proceeded to state that the rule of apportionment , both as
regards representatives and as regards direct taxes , was adopted
to guard the Southern States against undue impositions and op
pressions in the taxing of slaves . Mr. Justice Iredell , in the same
case , said , “ Perhaps a direct tax , in the sense of the Constitu
tion , can mean nothing but a tax on something inseparably an
nexed to the soil ; something capable of apportionment under all
such circumstances . A land or poll tax may be considered of this
description . The latter is to be considered so , particularly under
the present Constitution , on account of the slaves in the Southern
States, who give a ratio in the representation in the proportion of
three to five. Either of these is capable of an apportionment . In
regard to other articles , there may possibly be considerable doubt."
The reasoning of the Federalist seems to lead to the same
result .
$ 956 . In the year 1794 , Congress passed an act ” laying duties
upon carriages for the conveyance of persons which were kept by
or fo
r
any person for his own use , or to be le
t
out to hire , or for
the conveying o
f passengers , to wit , fo
r
every coach the yearly
sum o
f
ten dollars , et
c
. , etc . , and made the levy uniform through
out the United States . The constitutionality of the act was con
tested , in the case before stated , upon the ground that it was a
direct tax , and so ought to be apportioned among the States accord
ing to their numbers . After solemn argument , the Supreme
Court decided that it was not a direct tax within the meaning of
the Constitution . The grounds of this decision , as stated in the
various opinions o
f
the judges , were : first , the doubt whether any
taxes were direct in the sense of the Constitution , but capitation
and land taxes , as , has been already suggested ; secondly , that in
cases o
f
doubt the rule o
f apportionment ought not to be favored ,
because it wasmatter of compromise , and in itself radically inde
1 The Federalist , Nos . 31 , 36 . (Since the case of Hylton v . United States , there has
been little occasion to discuss the question what constitutes a direct tax in the constitu
tional sense . In Pacific Insurance Company v . Soule, 7 Wal . 444 , it was decided that a
tax imposed o
n
the income o
f
insurance companies was not a direct tax , but a duty or
excise . And in Veazie Bank v . Fenno , 8 Wal . 533 , a tax o
f
ten per centum upon the
circulation o
f
State banks was held not a direct ta
x
. )
? Act of 1794 , ch . 45 . 8 3 Dallas ' s Reports , 171 .
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fensible and wrong ; thirdly , the monstrous inequality and injus
tice of the carriage tax , if laid by the rule of apportionment ,
which would show that no tax of this sort could have been con
templated by the convention , as within the rule of apportionment ;
fourthly , that the terms of the Constitution were satisfied by con
fining the clause respecting direct taxes to capitation and land
taxes ; fifthly , that , accurately speaking , all taxes on expenses or
consumption are indirect taxes, and a tax on carriages is of this
kind ; and sixthly , (what is probably of most cogency and force ,
and of itself decisive ,) that no tax could be a direct one, in the
sense of the Constitution , which was not capable of apportionment
according to the rule laid down in the Constitution . Thus , sup
pose ten dollars were contemplated as a ta
x
o
n
each coach or post
chaise in the United States , and the number of such carriages in
the United States were one hundred and five , and the number o
f
representatives in Congress the same . This would produce te
n
hundred and fifty dollars . The share of Virginia would be u
parts , or $ 190 ; the share of Connecticut would be to parts , or
$ 7
0 . Suppose , then , in Virginia there are fifty carriages , the
sum o
f
$ 190 must be collected from the owners of these carriages ,
and apportioned among them , which would make each owner pay
$ 3 . 80 . And suppose in Connecticut there are but two carriages ,
the share of that State ( $ 70 ) must be paid b
y
the owners o
f
those
two carriages , namely , $ 35 each . Yet Congress , in such a case ,
intend to lay a tax o
f but ten dollars on each coach . And if in
any State there should b
e
n
o
coach o
r post -chaise owned , then
there could be n
o apportionment a
t all . The absurdity , there
fore , of such a mode of taxation demonstrates that such a tax
cannot be a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution . It is no
answer to this reasoning , that Congress , having determined to
raise such a sum o
f money as such a tax on carriages would pro
duce , might apportion the sum due b
y
the rule of apportionment ,
and then order it to be collected on different articles selected in
each State . That would be , not to lay and collect a tax on car
riages , but on the articles which were made contributory to the
payment . Thus , the tax might be called a tax on carriages , and
levied on horses . And the same objection would lie to an appor
tionment o
f
the sum , and then a general assessment of it b
y
Con
gress upon all articles . 1
13 Dallas ' s Reports , 171 ; Rawle on Const . ch . 9 ; 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 242 ; 1 Kent ' s
Comm . Lect . 12 , p . 239 , 240 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 29
4
.
CH. XIV .] 683POWERS OF CONGRESS — TAXES .
§ 957. Having endeavored to point out the leading distinctions
between direct and indirect taxes , and that duties , imposts, and
excises, in the sense of the Constitution , belong to the latter class ,
the order of the subject would naturally lead us to the inquiry ,
why direct taxes are required to be governed by the rule of ap
portionment , and why “ duties , imposts ,and excises ” are required
to be uniform throughout the United States . The answer to the
former will be given when we come to the further examination of
certain prohibitory and restrictive clauses of the Constitution on
the subject of taxation . The answer to the latter may be given
in a few words . It was to cut off all undue preferences of one
State over another in the regulation of subjects affecting their
common interests . Unless duties , imposts , and excises were uni
form , the grossest and most oppressive inequalities , vitally affect
ing the pursuits and employments of the people of different States ,
might exist . The agriculture , commerce , or manufactures of one
Statemight be built up on the ruins of those of another ; and a
combination of a few States in Congress might secure a monopoly
of certain branches of trade and business to themselves , to the
injury , if not to the destruction , of their less favored neighbors .
The Constitution , throughout all its provisions , is an instrument
o
f
checks and restraints , as well as of powers . It does not rely
o
n confidence in the general government to preserve the interests
o
f
a
ll
the States . It is founded in a wholesome and strenuous
jealousy ,which , foreseeing the possibility of mischief , guards with
solicitude against any exercise o
f power which may endanger the
States , as fa
r
a
s
it is practicable . If this provision as to uniform
it
y
o
f
duties had been omitted , although the power might never
have been abused to the injury o
f
the feebler States o
f
the Union ,
( a presumption which history does not justify u
s
in deeming quite
safe o
r
certain , ) yet it would , of itself , have been sufficient to de
molish , in a practical sense , the value ofmost o
f
the other restrict
ive clauses in the Constitution . New York and Pennsylvania
might , by an easy combination with the Southern States , have
destroyed the whole navigation o
f
New England . A combination
o
f
a different character , between the New England and the West
ern States ,might have borne down the agriculture of the South ;
and a combination o
f
a yet different character might have struck
a
t
the vital interests of manufactures . So that the general pro
priety o
f
this clause is established b
y
it
s
intrinsic political wis
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dom , as well as b
y
it
s tendency to quiet alarms and suppress
discontents .
$ 958 . Two practical questions of great importance have arisen
upon the construction of this clause , either standing alone , or in
connection with other clauses and incidental powers given b
y
the
Constitution . One is , whether the government has a right to
la
y
taxes fo
r
any other purpose than to raise revenue , however
much that purpose may be for the common defence o
r general
welfare . The other is , whether the money , when raised , can be
appropriated to any other purposes than such a
s
are pointed out
in the other enumerated powers o
f Congress . The former involves
the question whether Congress can lay taxes to protect and en
courage domestic manufactures ; the latter , whether Congress can
appropriate money to internal improvements . Each of these
questions has given rise to much animated controversy ; each has
been affirmed and denied , with great pertinacity , zeal , and elo
quent reasoning ; each has become prominent in the struggles of
party ; and defeat in each has not hitherto silenced opposition , o
r
given absolute security to victory . The contest is often renewed ;
and the attack and defence maintained with equal ardor . In dis
cussing this subject , we are treading upon the ashes of yet unes
tinguished fires , — incedimus per ignes suppositos cineri doloso ; —
and while the nature of these Commentaries requires that the
doctrine should b
e freely examined , as maintained on either side ,
the result will be left to the learned reader , without a desire to
influence his judgment , or dogmatically to announce that belong
ing to the commentator .
$ 959 . First , then , as to the question whether Congress can lay
taxes , except fo
r
the purposes o
f
revenue . This subject has
been already touched , in considering what is the true reading and
interpretation o
f
the clause conferring the power to lay taxes .
If the reading and interpretation there insisted on be correct , it
furnishes additional means to resolve the question now under con
sideration .
$ 960 . The argument against the constitutional authority is
understood to b
e
maintained on the following grounds , which ,
though applied to the protection o
f
manufactures , are equally ap
plicable to a
ll
other cases , where revenue is not the object . The
general government is one o
f
specific powers , and it can rightfully
1 See 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 235 , 236 .
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exercise only the powers expressly granted , and those which may
be “ necessary and proper " to carry them into effect, al
l
others
being reserved expressly to th
e
States o
r
to the people . It results ,
necessarily , that those who claim to exercise a power under the
Constitution are bound to show that it is expressly granted , or
that it is “ necessary and proper , ” as a means to execute some of
the granted powers . No such proof has been offered in regard to
the protection o
f
manufactures .
$ 961 . It is true that the eighth section of the first article of
the Constitution authorizes Congress to lay and collect an impost
duty ; but it is granted , as a tax -power , for the sole purpose of
revenue , - a power in it
s
nature essentially different from that
o
f imposing protective or prohibitory duties . The two are incom
patible ; for the prohibitory system must end in destroying the
revenue from imports . It has been said that the system is a vio
lation of the spirit , and not o
f
the letter , o
f
the Constitution . The
distinction is not material . The Constitution may be as grossly
violated b
y acting against itsmeaning as against its letter . The
Constitution grants to Congress the power o
f imposing a duty
o
n imports for revenue , which power is abused b
y
being con
verted into an instrument for rearing u
p
the industry o
f
one
section o
f
the country on the ruins of another . The violation ,
then , consists in using a power granted fo
r
one object to ad
vance another , and that b
y
a sacrifice o
f
the original object .
It is , in a word , a violation of perversion , the most danger
ous o
f
a
ll , because the most insidious and difficult to resist .
Such is the reasoning emanating from high legislative authority . '
On another interesting occasion , the argument has been put in the
following shape . It is admitted that Congress has power to lay
and collect such duties a
s they may deem necessary fo
r
the pur
poses o
f revenue , and within these limits so to arrange these duties ,
a
s incidentally , and to that extent to give protection to the manu
facturer . But the right is denied to convert what is here denom
inated the incidental into the principal power , and , transcending
the limits of revenue , to impose an additional duty substantially
and exclusively fo
r
the purpose o
f affording that protection . Con
1 See th
e
exposition and protest , reported b
y
a committee o
f
the house o
f representa
tives o
f
South Carolina , on 19th of December , 1829 , and adopted ; the draft o
f
which
has been attributed to Mr . Vice -President Calhoun . I have followed , as nearly as
practicable , th
e
very words o
f
the report .
686 [BOOK NI.CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES .
gress may countervail the regulations of a foreign power , which
may be hostile to our commerce ; but their authority is denied
permanently to prohibit a
ll importation , for the purpose of secur
ing the home market exclusively to the domestic manufacturer ,
thereby destroying the commerce they were entrusted to regulate ,
and fostering an interest with which they have no constitutional
power to interfere . To do so , therefore , is a palpable abuse of the
taxing power , which was conferred for the purpose of revenue ;
and if it is referred to the authority to regulate commerce , it is as
obvious a perversion o
f
that power , since it may be extended to an
utter annihilation o
f
the objects which it was intended to protect . 1
§ 962 . In furtherance of this reasoning , it has been admitted
that , under the power to regulate commerce , Congress is not lim
ited to the imposition o
f
duties upon imports fo
r
the sole purpose
o
f
revenue . It may impose retaliatory duties on foreign powers ;
but these retaliatory duties must be imposed for the regulation of
commerce , not fo
r
the encouragement o
f
manufactures . The
power to regulate manufactures not having been confided to Con
gress , they have no more right to ac
t
upon it than they have to
interfere with the systems o
f
education , the poor - laws , or the road
laws o
f
the States . Congress is empowered to lay taxes fo
r
rev
enue , it is true ; but there is no power to encourage , protect , or
meddle with manufactures .
§ 963 . It is unnecessary to consider the argument at present , so
far as it bears upon the constitutional authority o
f Congress to
protect or encourage manufactures ; because that subject will
more properly come under review , in al
l
it
s bearings , under an
other head , namely , the power to regulate commerce , to which it
is nearly allied , and from which it ismore usually derived . Strip
ping the argument , therefore , of this adventitious circumstance , it
resolves itself into this statement . The power to la
y
taxes
is a power exclusively given to raise revenue , and it can consti
tutionally be applied to no other purposes . The application for
other purposes is an abuse o
f
the power ; and , in fact , however it
may be in form disguised , it is a premeditated usurpation o
f
au
1 This is extracted from the address o
f
the Free - Trade Convention , at Philadelphia ,
in October , 1831 , p . 33 , 34 , attributed to the pen o
f Mr . Attorney -General Berrien .
Mr . Senator Hayne , in his Speech 9th January , 1832 , says that he does not know
where the constitutional objections to the tariff system are better summed u
p
than in
this address , p . 31 , . 32 .
2 Col . Drayton ' s Oration , at Charleston , 4th of July , 1831 , p . 13 , 14 .
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thority. Whenever money or revenue is wanted , fo
r
constitutional
purposes , the power to lay taxes may be applied to obtain it .
When money o
r
revenue is not so wanted , it is not a proper means
fo
r
any constitutional end .
$ 964 . The argument in favor of the constitutional authority is
grounded upon the terms and the intent o
f
the Constitution . It
seeks for the true meaning and objects o
f
the power , according to
the obvious sense o
f
the language and the nature o
f
the govern
ment proposed to be established by that instrument . It relies
upon n
o strained construction o
f
words ; but demands a fair and
reasonable interpretation o
f
the clause , without any restrictions
not naturally implied in it or in the context . It will not do to
assume that the clause was intended solely fo
r
the purposes o
f
raising revenue , and then argue that , being so , th
e
power cannot
b
e constitutionally applied to any other purposes . The very point in
controversy is ,whether it is restricted to purposes o
f
revenue . That
must be proved , and cannot be assumed , as the basis of reasoning .
$ 965 . The language of the Constitution is , “ Congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes , duties , imposts , and excises . ”
If the clause had stopped here , and remained in this absolute
form , ( as it was , in fact ,when reported in the first draft in the
convention , ) there could not have been the slightest doubt on the
subject . The absolute power to la
y
taxes includes the power in
every form in which it may be used , and fo
r
every purpose to
which the legislature may choose to apply it . This results from
the very nature o
f
such an unrestricted power . A fortiori it might
b
e applied by Congress to purposes fo
r
which nations have been
accustomed to apply it . Now , nothing is more clear , from the
history o
f
commercial nations , than the fact that the taxing power
is often , very often , applied fo
r
other purposes than revenue . It
is often applied a
s
a regulation of commerce . It is often applied
a
s
a virtual prohibition upon the importation of particular articles
fo
r
th
e
encouragement and protection o
f
domestic products and
industry ; for the support of agriculture , commerce , and manufac
tures ; 1 for retaliation upon foreign monopolies and injurious
restrictions ; ? for mere purposes of state policy and domestic
economy ; sometimes to banish a noxious article of consumption ;
i Hamilton ' s Report on Manufactures , in 1791 . .
? S
e
e
Mr . Jefferson ’ s Report on Commercial Restrictions , in 1793 ; 5 Marshall ' s Life
o
f Washington , ch . 7 , p . 482 to 487 ; 1 Wait ' s State Papers , 422 , 434 .
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sometimes as a bounty upon an infant manufacture or agricul
tural product ; sometimes as a temporary restraint of trade ; some
times a
s
a suppression o
f particular employments ; sometimes as
a prerogative power to destroy competition , and secure a monopoly
to the government ! 1
$ 966 . If , then , the power to lay taxes , being general ,may em
brace , and in the practice of nations does embrace , a
ll
these ob
jects , either separately or in combination , upon what foundation
does the argument rest which assumes one object only , to the
exclusion o
f
a
ll
the rest ? which insists , in effect , that because
revenuemay be one object , therefore it is the sole object of the
power ? which assumes it
s
own construction to b
e
correct , because
it suits it
s
own theory , and denies the same right to others enter
taining a different theory ? If the power is general in its terms ,
is it not an abuse o
f
a
ll
fair reasoning to insist that it is par
ticular ? to desert the import o
f
the language , and to substitute
other and different language ? Is this allowable in regard to any
instrument ? Is it allowable in an especial manner , as to consti
tutions o
f government , growing out of the rights , duties , and
exigencies o
f
nations , and looking to an infinite variety of cir
cumstances , which may require very different applications of a
given power ?
$ 967 . In the next place , then , is the power to lay taxes , given
b
y
the Constitution , a general power , or is it a limited power ? If
a limited power , to what objects is it limited b
y
the terms o
f
the
Constitution ?
§ 968 . Upon this subject , ( as has been already stated ) three
different opinions appear to have been held b
y
statesmen o
f
n
o
common sagacity and ability . The first is , that the power is un
limited ; and that the subsequent clause , “ to pay the debts and
provide for the common defence and general welfare , " is a sub
stantive , independent power . In the view of those who maintain
this opinion , the power , being general ,cannot with any consistency
b
e
restrained to purposes o
f
revenue .
§ 969 . The next is , that the power is restrained b
y
the subse
quent clause , so that it is a power to lay taxes in order to pay
debts , and to provide fo
r
the common defence and general wel
fare . Is raising revenue the only proper mode to provide for the
common defence and general welfare ? May not the general wel
1 S
e
e
Smith ' sWealth of Nations , B . 5 , ch . 2 , ar
t
. 4 .
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fare, in the judgment of Congress, be, in given circumstances , as
well provided fo
r , nay , better provided fo
r , by prohibitory duties ,
o
r b
y
encouragements to domestic industry o
f
a
ll
sorts ? If a
ta
x
o
f one sort , as on tonnage , or foreign vessels , will aid com
merce , and a tax on foreign raw materials will aid agriculture ,
and a tax on imported fabrics will aid domestic manufactures ,
and so promote the general welfare ; may they not be al
l
con
stitutionally united b
y
Congress in a law fo
r
this purpose ? If
Congress can unite them all ,may they not sustain them severally
in separate laws ? Is a tax to aid manufactures , or agriculture ,
o
r commerce , necessarily , or even naturally , against the general
welfare or the common defence ? Who is to decide upon such a
point ? Congress , to whom the authority is given to exercise
the power ? Or any other body , State or national , which may
choose to assume it ?
$ 970 . Besides , if a particular act of Congress , not for rev
enue , should be deemed an excess of the powers , does it follow
that a
ll
other acts are so ? If the common defence or general
welfare ca
n
b
e promoted by laying taxes in any other manner
than fo
r
revenue , who is at liberty to say that Congress cannot
constitutionally exercise the power fo
r
such a purpose ? No
one has a right to say that the common defence and general
welfare can never b
e promoted b
y
laying taxes , except fo
r
revenue . No one has ever yet been bold enough to assert such
a proposition . Different men have entertained opposite opinions
o
n subjects o
f
this nature . It is a matter of theory and specula
tion , of political economy and national policy , and not a matter
o
f power . It may be wise or unwise to lay taxes , except for
revenue ; but the wisdom o
r inexpediency o
f
a measure is no test
o
f
it
s constitutionality . Those , therefore , who hold the opinion
above stated must unavoidably maintain , that the power to lay
taxes is not confined to revenue , but extends to al
l
cases where
it is proper to be used for the common defence and general wel
fare . One of the most effectual means o
f
defence against the
injurious regulations and policy of foreign nations , and which
is most commonly resorted to , is to apply the power of taxation
to the products and manufactures of foreign nations b
y way of
retaliation ; and , short of war , this is found to be practically
i See Hamiliton ' s Report on Manufactures in 1791 ; 1 Hamilton ' s Works , (edit .
1810 , ) 230 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 344 .
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that which is felt most extensively , and produces the most im
mediate redress. How , then , can it be imagined for a moment,
that this was not contemplated by the framers of the Constitu
tion as a means to provide for the common defence and general
welfare ?
$ 971 . The third opinion is, (as has been already stated ,) that
th
e
power is restricted to such specific objects a
s
are contained
in the other enumerated powers . Now , if revenue be not the
sole and exclusive means o
f carrying into effect all these enumer
ated powers , the advocates o
f
this doctrine must maintain , with
those o
f
the second opinion , that the power is not limited to pur
poses o
f
revenue . No man will pretend to sa
y
that a
ll
those
enumerated powers have no other objects , or means to effectuate
them , than revenue . Revenue may be one mode ; but it is not
the sole mode . Take the power to “ regulate commerce . ” Is it
not clear , from the whole history of nations , that laying taxes is
one o
f
the most usual modes of regulating commerce ? Is it not ,
in many cases , the best means of preventing foreign monopolies
and mischievous commercial restrictions ? In such cases , then ,
the power to lay taxes is confessedly not for revenue . If so , is
not the argument irresistible , that it is not limited to purposes
o
f
revenue ? Take another power , th
e
power to coin money and
regulate it
s
value , and that of foreign coin ; might not a tax be
laid on certain foreign coin fo
r
the purpose o
f carrying this into
effect b
y suppressing the circulation of such coin , or regulating
it
s
value ? Take the power to promote the progress o
f
science
and useful arts ; might not a tax be laid on foreigners , and for
eign inventions , in aid of this power , so as to suppress foreign
competition , or encourage domestic science and arts ? Take an
other power , vital in the estimation of many statesmen to the
security o
f
a republic , — the power to provide for organizing ,
arming , and disciplining the militia ; may not a tax be laid on
foreign arms , to encourage the domestic manufacture of arms , so
a
s
to enhance our security , and give uniformity to our organiza
tion and discipline ? Take the power to declare war and its
auxiliary powers ; may not Congress , fo
r
the very object o
f pro
viding fo
r
the effectual exercise o
f
these powers , and securing a
permanent domestic manufacture and supply o
f powder , equip
ments , and other warlike apparatus , impose a prohibitory duty
upon foreign articles o
f
the same nature ? If Congress may , in
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any or all of these cases , lay taxes, then , as revenue constitutes ,
upon the very basis of the reasoning , no object of the taxes , is it
not clear that the enumerated powers require the power to lay
taxes to be more extensively construed than fo
r
purposes o
f
rev
enue ? It would be no answer to say that the power of taxation ,
though in it
s
nature only a power to raise revenue , may be re
sorted to , as an implied power to carry into effect these enumerated
powers in any effectual manner . That would be to contend , that
a
n express power to la
y
taxes is not coextensive with an implied
power to lay taxes ; that when the express power is given , it
means a power to raise revenue only ; but when it is implied , it
no longer has any regard to this object . How , then , is a case to
b
e
dealt with , of a mixed nature , where revenue is mixed up with
other objects in the framing of the law ?
§ 972 . If , then , the power to lay taxes were admitted to be re
stricted to cases within the enumerated powers , still the advocates
o
f
that doctrine are compelled to admit that the power must be
construed as not confined to revenue , but as extending to al
l
other objects within the scope of those powers . Where the power
is expressly given , we are not at liberty to say that it is to be
implied . Being given , it may certainly be resorted to as ameans
to effectuate a
ll
the powers to which it is appropriate ; not because
it is to be implied in the grant of those powers , but because it is
expressly granted , as a substantive power , and may be used , of
course , as an auxiliary to them .
§ 973 . So that , whichever construction of the power to lay
taxes is adopted , the same conclusion is sustained , that the power
to lay taxes is not b
y
the Constitution confined to purposes o
f
rev
enue . In point o
f
fact , it has never been limited to such purposes
b
y
Congress ; and al
l
the great functionaries o
f
the government
have constantly maintained the doctrine that it was not constitu
tionally so limited . 2
§ 974 . Such is a general summary of the reasoning on each
side , so far as it refers to the power of laying taxes . It will be
i See Mr .Madison ' s Letter to Mr . Cabell , 18th Sept . 1828 .
2 The present Commentaries were written before the appearance o
f Mr . John Q .
Adams ' s letter to Mr . Speaker Stevenson , in 1832 . That letter ( as has been already
intimated ) contains a very able and elaborate vindication o
f
the power to lay taxes , as
extending to all purposes o
f
the common defence and general welfare . It is the fullest
response to the letter o
fMr . Madison to Mr . Speaker Stevenson , 27th Nov . 1830 , which
has ever y
e
t
been given . ( Se
e
post , $ 1073 . )
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hereafter resumed in examining the nature and extent o
f
the power
to regulate commerce .
$ 975 . The other question is , whether Congress has any power
to appropriate money raised b
y
taxation , or otherwise , fo
r
any
other purposes than those pointed out in the enumerated powers
which follow the clause respecting taxation . It is said , “ raised
b
y
taxation o
r
otherwise " ; for theremay be , and in fact are , other
sources o
f
revenue , b
y
which money may and does come into the
treasury o
f
the United States , otherwise . than b
y
taxation ; as , for
instance , b
y
fines , penalties , and forfeitures ; b
y
sales o
f
the pub
lic lands , and interests and dividends on bank -stocks ; b
y
captures
and prize in times o
f
war ; and b
y
other incidental profits and
emoluments growing out of governmental transactions and pre
rogatives . But fo
r
a
ll
the common purposes o
f argument , the
question may be treated as one growing out o
f
levies b
y
taxation .
§ 976 . The reasoning , upon which th
e
opinion adverse to the
authority o
f Congress to make appropriations notwithin the scope
o
f
the enumerated powers , is maintained , has been already , in a
great measure , stated in the preceding examination of the gram
matical construction of the clause giving the power to lay taxes .
The controversy is virtually at an end if it is once admitted that
the words " to provide fo
r
the common defence and general wel
fare " ar
e
a part and qualification o
f
the power to lay taxes ; fo
r
then Congress has certainly a right to appropriate money to any
purposes , or in any manner , conducive to those ends . The whole
stress o
f
the argument is , therefore , to establish that the words
6 to provide for the common defence and general welfare ” d
o
not
form an independent power , nor any qualification o
f
the power to
lay taxes . And the argument is , that they are “ mere general
terms , explained and limited b
y
the subjoined specifications . ” It
is attempted to be fortified ( as has been already seen ) b
y
a recur
rence to the history o
f
the confederation ; to th
e
successive reports
and alterations o
f
the ta
x
clause in th
e
convention ; to the incon
veniences of such a large construction ; and to the supposed im
possibility that a power to make such appropriations fo
r
the com
mon defence and general welfare should not have been , at the
adoption o
f
the Constitution , a subject of great alarm and
1 S
e
e
Virginia Resolutions , 7t
h
Jan . 1800 ; Mr .Madison ' s Letter to Mr . Speaker
tevenson , 27th Nov . 1830 . See also 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 280 , 281 ; 2 Elliot ' s Deb . 344 .
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jealousy , and , as such , resisted in and out of the State con
ventions .
§ 977 . The argument in favor of the power is derived , in the
first place , from the language of the clause conferring the power
(which , it is admitted , in its literal terms , covers it ) ; 2 secondly ,
from the nature o
f
the power ,which renders it in the highest de
gree expedient , if not indispensable , for the due operations of the
national government ; thirdly , from the early , constant , and de
cided maintenance o
f
it b
y
the government and its functionaries ,
a
s well as b
y
many o
f
our ablest statesmen , from the very com
mencement of the Constitution . So , that it has the language and
intent of the text , and the practice of the government , to sustain
it against an artificial doctrine set up on the other side .
$ . 978 . The argument derived from the words and intent has
been so fully considered already that it cannot need repetition .
It is summed u
p
with great force in th
e
report o
f
the Secretary
1 The following summary , taken from President Madison ' s Veto Message on the
Bank Bonus Bill fo
r
Internal Improvements , 3d March , 1817 , ( 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 280 ,
281 , ) contains a very clear statement of the reasoning . “ To refer the power in ques
tion ” ( that is , o
f constructing roads , canals , and other internal improvements ) “ to
the clause , to provide fo
r
the common defence and general welfare , would , " says he ,
“ b
e contrary to the established rules o
f interpretation a
s rendering the special and
careful enumeration o
f powers , which follow the clause ,nugatory and improper . Such
a view o
f
the Constitution would have the effect o
f giving to Congress a general power
o
f legislation , instead of the defined and limited one , hitherto understood to belong to
them ; the terms , the common defence and general welfare , ' embracing every object
and act within the purview o
f
a legislative trust . It would have the effect of subjecting
both the constitution and laws o
f
the several States , in all cases not specifically ex
empted , to be superseded b
y
the laws o
f Congress ; it being expressly declared , that th
e
Constitution o
f
the United States , and the laws made in pursuance thereof , shall be the
supreme law o
f
the land , and the judges of every State shall be bound thereby , any
thing in the constitution o
r
laws o
f any State to the contrary notwithstanding . Such
a view o
f the Constitution , finally , would have the effect o
f
excluding th
e
judicial
authority o
f
the United States from it
s participation in guarding the boundary betweenthe
legislative powers o
f
thegeneral and State governments ; inasmuch a
s questions relating to
the general welfare , being questions of policy and expediency , are unsusceptible of ju
dicial cognizance and decision . A restriction of the power to provide fo
r
the common
defence and general welfare ' to cases which are to be provided for b
y
the expenditure
o
f money would still leave within the legislative power o
f Congress all the great and
most important measures o
f
government , money being the ordinary and necessary
means o
f
carrying them into execution . ” Itwill be perceived a
t
once , that this is the
same reasoning insisted o
n b
yMr .Madison in the Virginia Report and Resolutions of
7th Jan . 1800 ; and in his Letter to Mr . Speaker Stevenson , of 27th Nov . 1830 ; and b
y
the same gentleman in the Debate o
n
the Codfishery Bill in 1792 . 4 Elliot ' s Debates ,
236 .
2 Mr .Madison ' s Letter toMr . Speaker Stevenson , 27th Nov . 1830 .
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o
f
the Treasury i on manufactures , in 1791 . “ The national legis
lature , ” says he , " has express authority to lay and collect taxes ,
duties , imposts , and excises ; to pay th
e
debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare , with no other qualifications
than that all duties , imposts , and excises shall be uniform through
out the United States ; that no capitation or other direct tax shall
b
e
laid , unless in proportion to numbers ascertained by a census ,
o
r
enumeration taken o
n the principle prescribed in the Constitu
tion ; and that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any State . These three qualifications excepted , the power
to raise money is plenary and indefinite . And the objects to
which it may be appropriated are no less comprehensive than the
payment o
f
the public debts and the providing fo
r
the common
defence and general welfare . The terms ' general welfare ' were
doubtless intended to signify more than was expressed o
r imported
in those which preceded ; otherwise ,numerous exigencies , incident
to the affairs o
f
the nation , would have been left without a provi
sion . The phrase is as comprehensive as any that could have
been used , because it was not fit that the constitutional authority
o
f
the Union to appropriate it
s
revenues should have been re
stricted within narrower limits than th
e
general welfare , and be
cause this necessarily embraces a vast variety o
f particulars which
are susceptible neither of specification nor of definition . It is ,
therefore , of necessity left to the discretion of the national legis
lature to pronounce upon the objects which concern the general
welfare , and fo
r
which , under that description , an appropriation
o
f money is requisite and proper . And there seems no room for
a doubt that , whatever concerns the general interests of learning ,
o
f agriculture , of manufactures , and of commerce , are within the
sphere of the national councils , 80 fa
r
a
s regards a
n application o
f
money . The only qualification of the generality of the phrase in
question , which seems to be admissible , is this , that the object to
which an appropriation o
f money is to be made must be general
and not local , — its operation extending in fact , or by possibility ,
throughout the Union , and not being confined to a particular spot .
No objection ought to arise to this construction from a supposition
that it would imply a power to do whatever else should appear to
Congress conducive to the general welfare . A power to appropri
a
te money with this latitude ,which is granted in express terms ,
1 Mr . Hamilton .
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would not carry a power to do any other thing not authorized in
the Constitution , either expressly or by fair implication .!
$ 979. But the most thorough and elaborate view , which per
haps has ever been taken of the subject, will be found in the
exposition of President Monroe , which accompanied his message
respecting the bill for the repairs of the Cumberland Road (4th
of May , 1822 ) . The following passage contains what is most
direct to the present purpose ; and , though long, it will amply
reward a diligent perusal . After quoting the clause of the Con
stitution respecting the power to lay taxes and to provide fo
r
the
common defence and general welfare , he proceeds to say , -
$ 980 . “ That the second part of this grant gives a right to
appropriate the public money , and nothing more , is evident from
the following considerations : ( 1 . ) If the right of appropriation is
not given b
y
this clause , it is not given at al
l , there being no
other grant in the Constitution which gives it directly , or which
has any bearing on the subject , even b
y implication , except the
two following : first , the prohibition , which is contained in the
eleventh o
f
the enumerated powers , not to appropriate money fo
r
the support o
f
armies for a longer term than two years ; and ,
secondly , the declaration in the sixth member or clause of the
ninth section o
f
the first article , that no money shall be drawn
from th
e
treasury , but in consequence of appropriations made b
y
law . ( 2 . ) This part of the grant has none of the characteristics
o
f
a distinct and original power . It is manifestly incidental to
the great objects o
f
the first branch o
f
the grant ,which authorizes
Congress to lay and collect taxes , duties , imposts , and excises ;
a power o
f
vast extent , not granted by the confederation , the
grant of which formed one of the principal inducements to the
adoption o
f
this Constitution . If both parts of the grant are
taken togecher , as they must be , (for the one follows immedi
ately after the other in the same sentence , ) it seems to be impossi
ble to give to the latter any other construction than that contended
for . Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes , duties ,
imposts , and excises . For what purpose ? To pay the debts ,
1 There is n
o
doubt that President Washington fully concurred in this opinion , as
his repeated recommendations to Congress o
f objects o
f
this sort , especially of the en
couragement o
f
manufactures , of learning , of a university , o
f
new inventions , of agri
culture , of commerce and navigation , of a military academy , abundantly prove . See
5 Marshall ' s Life of Washington , ch . 4 , p . 231 , 232 ; 1 Wait ' s State Papers , 15 ; 2
Wait ' s State Papers , 10
9
, 110 , 11
1
.
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and provide fo
r
the .common defence and general welfare of the
United States ; an arrangement and phraseology which clearly
show that the latter part o
f
the clause was intended to enumerate
the purposes to which the money thus raised might be appro
priated . ( 3 . ) If this is not the real object and fair construction
o
f
the second part o
f
this grant , it follows , either that it has no
import or operation whatever , o
r
one o
f
much greater extent than
the first part . This presumption is evidently groundless in both
instances ; in the first , because no part o
f
the Constitution can
b
e
considered a
s
useless , no sentence or clause in it without a
meaning . In the second , because such a construction as would
make the second part o
f
the clause an original grant , embracing
the same objects with the first , but with much greater power than
it , would be in the highest degree absurd . The order generally
observed in grants , an order founded in common -sense , since it
promotes a clear understanding o
f
their import , is to grant the
power intended to be conveyed in the most full and explicit
manner ; and then to explain or qualify it , if explanation or
qualification should be necessary . This order has , it is believed ,
been invariably observed in a
ll
the grants contained in the Consti
tution . In the next place , because , if the clause in question is
not construed merely as an authority to appropriate the public
money , it must be obvious that it conveys a power of indefinite
and unlimited extent ; that there would have been no use for the
special powers to raise and support armies and a navy ; to regu
late commerce ; to call forth the militia ; or even to lay and col
lect taxes , duties , imposts , and excises . An unqualified power to
pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general
welfare , as the second part of this clause would be , if considered
a
s
a distinct and separate grant , would extend to every object in
which the public could be interested . A power to provide fo
r
the
common defence would give to Congress the command of the
whole force , and o
f
all the resources of the Union ; but a right
to provide for the general welfare would g
o
much further . It
would , in effect , break down al
l
the barriers between the States
and the general government , and consolidate the whole under the
latter .
$ 981 . “ The powers specifically granted to Congress are what
are called the enumerated powers , and are numbered in the order
in which they stand ; among which , that contained in the first
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clause holds the first place in point of importance . If the power
created by the latter part of the clause is considered an original
grant , unconnected with and independent of the first, as , in that
case , it must be, then the first part is entirely done away , as are
all the other grants in th
e
Constitution ,being completely absorbed
in the transcendent power granted in the latter part . But if the
clause b
e
construed in the sense contended fo
r
, then every part
has an important meaning and effect ; not a line or a word in it is
superfluous . A power to lay and collect taxes , duties , imposts ,
and excises , subjects to the call of Congress every branch of the
public revenue , internal and external ; and the addition to pay the
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare
gives the right o
f applying th
e
money raised , that is , of appro
priating it to the purposes specified , according to a proper con
struction o
f
the terms . Hence it follows , that it is the first part
o
f
the clause only which gives a power ,which affects in anyman
ner the power remaining to th
e
States ; as the power to raise
money from the people , whether it be b
y
taxes , duties , imposts , or
excises , though concurrent in the States , as to taxes and excises ,
must necessarily do . But the use o
r application of the money ,
after it is raised , is a power altogether o
f
a different character . It
imposes n
o
burden on the people ,nor can it act on them in a sense
to take power from the States ; or in any sense in which power
can b
e controverted , o
r
become a question between the two gov - .
ernments . The application of money raised under a lawful power
is a right or grant which may be abused . It may be applied
partially among the States , or to improper purposes in our foreign
and domestic concerns ; but still it is a power not felt in the
sense o
f
other powers , since the only complaint which any State
can make o
f
such partiality and abuse is , that some other State
o
r
States have obtained greater benefit from th
e
application than ,
b
y
a just rule o
f apportionment , they were entitled to . The
right o
f appropriation is , therefore , from its nature , secondary and
incidental to th
e
right o
f raising money ; and it was proper to
place it in the same grant and same clause with that right . By
finding them , then , in that order , we see a new proof of the sense
in which the grant was made , corresponding with the view herein
taken o
f
it .
§ 982 . “ The last part of this grant , which provides that all
duties , imposts , and excises shall be uniform throughout the .
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United States , furnishes another strong proof that it was not in
tended that the second part should constitute a distinct grant in
the sense above stated , or convey any other right than that of
appropriation . This provision operates exclusively on the power
granted in the first part of the clause . It recites three branches
o
f
that power , — duties , imposts , and excises , - those only on
which it could operate ; the rule b
y
which the fourth — that is ,
taxes — should be laid , being already provided for in another part
o
f
the Constitution . The object of this provision is to secure a
just equality among the States in the exercise o
f
that power by
Congress . By placing it after both the grants , that is , after that
to raise and that to appropriate the public money , and making it
apply to the first only , it shows that it was not intended that the
power granted in the second should be paramount to and destroy
that granted in the first . It shows , also , that no such formidable
power as that suggested had been granted in the second , or any
power against the abuse o
f
which it was thought necessary spe
cially to provide . Surely , if it was deemed proper to guard a
specific power o
f
limited extent and well -known import against
injustice and abuse , it would have been much more so to have
guarded against the abuse of a power o
f
such vast extent , and so
indefinite a
s
would have been granted b
y
the second part o
f
the
clause , if considered as a distinct and original grant .
$ 983 . “ With this construction al
l
the other enumerated grants ,
and indeed all the grants of power contained in the Constitution ,
have their full operation and effect . They al
l
stand well together ,
fulfilling the great purposes intended by them . Under it we be
hold a great scheme , consistent in al
l
it
s parts , a government insti
tuted for national purposes , vested with adequate powers for those
purposes , commencing with the most important of al
l , that of
revenue , and proceeding in regular order to the others with which
it was deemed proper to endow it ; all , too , drawn with the utmost
circumspection and care . How much more consistent is this con
struction with the great objects o
f
the institution , and with the
high character o
f
the enlightened and patriotic citizens who framed
it , as well as of those who ratified it , than one which subverts
every sound principle and rule of construction , and throws every
thing into confusion .
$ 984 . “ I have dwelt thus long on this part of the subject from
a
n earnest desire to fix , in a clear and satisfactory manner , the
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import o
f
the second part o
f
this grant , well knowing , from the
generality o
f
the terms used , their tendency to lead into error . I
indulge a strong hope that the view herein presented will not be
without effect , but will tend to satisfy the unprejudiced and impar
tial that nothing more was granted b
y
that part than a power to
appropriate the public money raised under the other part . To
what extent that power may be carried will be the next object of
inquiry .
$ 985 . “ It is contended on the one side that , as the national
government is a government o
f
limited powers , it has no right to
expend money , except in the performance of acts authorized by
the other specific grants , according to a strict construction o
f
their powers ; that this grant , in neither of its branches , gives to
Congress discretionary power o
f any kind , but is a mere instru
ment in its hands to carry into effect the powers contained in the
other grants . To this construction I was inclined in the more
early stage o
f
our government ; but , on further reflection and ob
servation ,my mind has undergone a change , fo
r
reasons which I
will frankly unfold .
$ 986 . « The grant consists , as heretofore observed , of a two
fold power : the first to raise , and the second to appropriate , the
public money ; and the terms used in both instances are general
and unqualified . Each branch was obviously drawn with a view
to the other , and the import of each tends to illustrate that of the
other . The grant to raise money gives a power over every subject
from which revenue may be drawn , and is made in the sameman
ner with th
e
grants to declare war , to raise and support armies
and a navy , to regulate commerce , to establish post -offices and
post -roads , and with al
l
the other specific grants to the general
government . In the discharge of the powers contained in any of
these grants , there is no other check than that which is to be found
in the great principles of our system , — th
e
responsibility o
f
th
e
representative to his constituents . If war , for example , is neces
sary , and Congress declare it for good cause , their constituents
will support them in it . A like support will be given them for the
faithful discharge o
f
their duties under any and every other power
vested in the United States . It affords to the friends of our free
governments the most heartfelt consolation to know , and from th
e
best evidence , - our own experience , – that , in great emergencies ,
the boldest measures , such as form the strongest appeals to the
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virtue and patriotism o
f
the people , are sure to obtain their most
decided approbation . But should the representative ac
t
corruptly
and betray his trust , or otherwise prove that he was unworthy of
the confidence o
f
h
is constituents ,he would be equally sure to lose
it , and to be removed , and otherwise censured according to his
deserts . The power to raise money by taxes , duties , imposts ,and
excises is alike unqualified ; nor do I see any check on the exercise
o
f
it , other than that which applies to the other powers above
recited , — the responsibility of the representative to his constitu
ents . Congress know the extent of the public engagements , and
the sums necessary to meet them ; they know how much may be
derived from each branch o
f
revenue , without pressing it too far ;
and , paying due regard to the interests of the people , they likewise
know which branch ought to be resorted to in the first instance .
From the commencement o
f
the government , two branches of this
power (duties and imposts ) have been in constant operation ,
the revenue from which has supported the government in it
s vari
ous branches , and met its other ordinary engagements . In great
emergencies the other two (taxes and excises ) have likewise
been resorted to ; and neither was the right nor the policy ever
called in question .
§ 987 . “ If we look to the second branch of this power , that
which authorizes the appropriation o
f
the money thus raised ,we
find that it is not less general and unqualified than the power to
raise it . More comprehensive terms than to pay the debts and
provide for the common defence and general welfare ' could not
have been used . So intimately connected with ,and dependent on ,
each other are these two branches o
f
power , that , had either been
limited , th
e
limitation would have had a like effect on th
e
other .
Had the power to raise money been conditional , or restricted to
special purposes , the appropriation must have corresponded with
it ; for none but the money raised could be appropriated ,nor could
it be appropriated to other purposes than those which were per
mitted . On the other hand , if the right of appropriation had
been restricted to certain purposes , it would be useless and im
proper to raise more than would b
e
adequate to those purposes .
Itmay fairly be inferred that these restraints or checks have been
carefully and intentionally avoided . The power in each branch is
alike broad and unqualified , and each is drawn with peculiar fit
ness to the other ; 'the latter requiring terms of great extent and
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force to accommodate the former , which have been adopted , and
both placed in the same clause and sentence. Can it be presumed
that a
ll
these circumstances were so nicely adjusted b
y
mere acci
dent ? Is it not more just to conclude that they were the result
o
f
due deliberation and design ? Had it been intended that Con
gress should b
e
restricted in the appropriation o
f
the public money ,
to such expenditures as were authorized b
y
a rigid construction of
the other specific grants , how easy would it have been to have
provided fo
r
it b
y
a declaration to that effect . The omission of
such declaration is , therefore , an additional proof that it was not
intended that the grant should b
e
so construed .
$ 988 . “ It was evidently impossible to have subjected this
grant , in either branch , to such restriction , without exposing the
government to very serious embarrassment . How carry it into
effect ? If the grant had been made in any degree dependent upon
the States , the government would have experienced the fate of the
confederation . Like it , it would have withered and soon perished .
Had the Supreme Court been authorized , or should any other tri
bunal , distinct from the government , be authorized to interpose its
veto , and to say that more money had been raised under either
branch of this power ( that is , b
y
taxes ,duties , imposts , or excises )
than was necessary ; that such a tax or duty was useless ; that the
appropriation to this o
r
that purpose was unconstitutional ; the
movement might have been suspended , and the whole system dis
organized . It was impossible to have created a power within the
government , or any other power , distinct from Congress and the
executive , which should control themovement of the government in
this respect , and not destroy it . Had it been declared b
y
a clause
in the Constitution that the expenditures under this grant should
b
e restricted to the construction which might be given of the
other grants , such restraint , though the most innocent , could not
have failed to have had a
n injurious effect on the vital principles
o
f
the government , and often on its most important measures .
Those who might wish to defeat ameasure proposed might co
n
strue the power relied on in support of it in a narrow and con
tracted manner , and in that way fix a precedent inconsistent with
th
e
true import o
f
the grant . A
t
other times , those who favored
a measure might give to the power relied on a forced o
r
strained
construction , and , succeeding in the object , fix a precedent in the
opposite extreme . Thus it is manifest that , if the right of appro
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priation b
e
confined to that limit ,measures may oftentimes be
carried o
r
defeated b
y
considerations and motives altogether inde
pendent o
f , and unconnected with , their merits , and the several
powers o
f Congress receive constructions equally inconsistent with
their true import . No such declaration , however , has been made ;
and , from the fair import of the grant , and , indeed , its positive
terms , the inference that such was intended seems to be precluded .
$ 989 . “ Many considerations of great weight operate in favor
o
f
this construetion , while I do not perceive any serious objection
to it . If it be established , it follows that the words to provide
fo
r
the common defence and general welfare ' have a definite ,safe ,
and useful meaning . The idea of their forming an original grant
with unlimited power , superseding every other grant , is abandoned .
They will be considered simply as conveying a right of appro
priation , - a right indispensable to that of raising a revenue , and
necessary to expenditures under every grant . B
y
it , as already
observed , no new power will be taken from the States , the money
to b
e appropriated being raised under a power already granted to
Congress . B
y
it , too , the motive fo
r
giving a forced o
r
strained
construction to any o
f
the other specific grants will , in most in
stances , be diminished , and in many utterly destroyed . The
importance o
f
this consideration cannot be too highly estimated ,
since , in addition to the examples already given , it ought particu
larly to be recollected that , to whatever extent any specific power
may be carried , the right of jurisdiction goes with it , pursuing it
through all its incidents . The very important agency which this
grant has in carrying into effect every other grant is a strong ar
gument in favor o
f
the construction contended fo
r . All the other
grants are limited b
y
the nature o
f
th
e
offices which they have
severally to perform , each conveying a power to do a certain thing ,
and that only ; whereas this is coextensive with the great scheme
o
f
the government itself . It is th
e
lever which raises and puts the
whole machinery in motion ,and continues themovement . Should
either o
f
the other grants fail in consequence o
f any condition or
limitation attached to it , or misconstruction of its powers , much
injury might follow ; but still it would be the failure of one branch
o
f power , of one item in th
e
system only . All the others might
move on . But should the right to raise and appropriate the pub
lic money be improperly restricted , the whole system might be
sensibly affected , if not disorganized . Each of the other grants
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is limited by the nature of the grant itself . This, by the nature
of the government only . Hence it became necessary that, like
the power to declare war , this power should be commensurate
with the great scheme of the government , and with all its purposes .
§ 990 . “ If , then , the right to raise and appropriate the public
money is not restricted to the expenditures under the other spe
cific grants , according to a strict construction of their powers
respectively , is there no limitation to it ? Have Congress a right
to raise and appropriate the public money to any and to every
purpose according to their will and pleasure ? They certainly
have not . The government of th
e
United States is a limited
government , instituted fo
r
great national purposes ,and for those
only . Other interests are committed to the States , whose duty
it is to provide fo
r
them . Each government should look to the
great and essential purposes for which it was instituted , and con
fine itself to those purposes . A State government will rarely , if
ever , apply money to national purposes ,without making it a charge
to the nation . The people o
f
the State would not permit it .
Nor will Congress be apt to apply money in ai
d
o
f
the State
administrations , fo
r
purposes strictly local , in which the nation
a
t large has no interest , although the State should desire it .
· The people of the other States would condemn it . They would
declare that Congress had no right to tax them for such a pur
pose , and dismiss a
t
the next election such of their representa
tives a
s
had voted for the measure , especially if it should be
severely felt . I do not think that in offices of this kind there
is much danger of the two governments mistaking their interests
o
r
their duties . I rather suspect that they would soon have a clear
and distinct understanding o
f
them ,and move on in great harmony . "
$ 991 . In regard to the practice of the government , it has been
entirely in conformity to the principles here laid down . Appro
priations have never been limited b
y
Congress to cases falling
within the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution ,
whether those powers b
e
construed in their broad o
r
their nar
row sense . And in an especial manner appropriations have
been made to aid internal improvements of various sorts , in our
roads , our navigation , our streams , and other objects of a na
tional character and importance . In some cases , not silently ,
1 It would be impracticable to enumerate all these various objects of appropriation
in detail . Many of them will be found enumerated in President Monroe ' s Exposition ,
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but upon discussion , Congress has gone the length of making
appropriations to a
id
destitute foreigners and cities laboring
under severe calamities ; as in the relief of the St . Domingo ref
ugees , in 1794 , and the citizens o
f
Venezuela , who suffered from
a
n earthquake in 1812 . 1 An illustration equally forcible of a
domestic character , is in the bounty given in the codfisheries ,
which was strenuously resisted on constitutional grounds in 1792 ,
but which still maintains its place in the statute -book of the
United States . ?
$ 992 . No more need be said upon this subject in this place .
It will be necessarily resumed again in the discussion of other
clauses of the Constitution , and especially of the powers to regu
late commerce , to establish post -offices and post -roads , and to
make internal improvements .
$ 993 . In order to prevent the necessity of recurring again to
the subject o
f
taxation , it seems desirable to bring together , in
this connection , al
l
the remaining provisions o
f
the Constitution
o
n this subject , though they are differently arranged in that in
strument . The first one is , “ no capitation or other direct tax
shall be laid , unless in proportion to the census , or enumeration ,
o
f
4th o
f May , 1822 , p . 41 to 45 . The annual appropriation acts speak a very strong
language o
n
this subject . Every President of the United States , except President
Madison , seems to have acted upon the same doctrine . President Jefferson ca
n
hardly
b
e
deemed a
n exception . In his early opinion , already quoted , ( 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp .
524 , ) he manifestly maintained it . In hi
s
Message to Congress , ( 2 Dec . 1806 ,Wait ' s
State Papers , 457 , 458 , ) he seems to have denied it . In signing the bill fo
r
the Cum
berland Road , on 29th March , 1806 , Act of 1806 , ch . 19 , he certainly gave it a partial
sanction , as well as upon other occasions . SeeMr . Monroe ' s Exposition , on 4th May ,
1822 , p . 41 . But see 4 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 457 , where Mr . Jefferson adopts an opposite
reasoning . President Jackson has adopted it with manifest reluctance ; but he consid
ers it as firmly established b
y
the practice o
f
the government . See his Veto Message
o
n
theMaysville Road Bill , 27th May , 1830 , 4 Elliot ' s Deb . 333 to 335 . The opinions
maintained in Congress , for and against the same doctrine , will be found in 4 Elliot ' s
Deb . 236 , 240 , 265 , 278 , 280 , 284 , 291 , 292 , 332 , 334 . Report on Internal Improve
ments , b
yMr . Hemphill , in the House of Representatives , 10th Feb . 1831 . See I Kent ,
Comm . Lect . 12 , p . 250 , 251 ; Sergeant ' s Const . Law , ch . 28 , p . 311 to 314 ; Rawle on
the Const . ch . 9 , p . 104 ; 2 United States Law Jour . April , 1826 , p . 251 , 264 to 282 .
1 See Act o
f
12th Feb . 1794 , ch . 2 ; Act of 8th May , 1812 , ch . 79 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates ,
240 .
2 See Act o
f
Congress , of 16th Feb , 1792 , ch . 6 ; 4 Elliot ' s Debates , 234 to 238 ;
Act o
f
1813 , ch . 34 . See also Hamilton ' s Report on Manufactures , 1791 , article , Boun
ties . The speech of the Hon .Mr . Grimké , in the senate of South Carolina , in Dec .
1828 , and of the Hon .Mr . Huger , in the house of representatives of the same State , in
Dec . 1830 , contain very elaborate and able expositions of the whole subject , and will
reward a diligent perusal .
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hereinbefore directed to be taken .” This includes poll -taxes and
land -taxes , as has been already remarked .
$ 994 . The object of this clause doubtless is , to secure the
Southern States against any undue proportion of taxation ; and ,
as nearly as practicable , to overcome the necessary inequalities of
direct tax . The South has a very large slave population ; and
consequently a poll -tax , which should be laid by the rule of uni
formity , would operate with peculiar severity on them . It would
tax their property beyond it
s supposed relative value and pro
ductiveness to white labor . Hence a rule is adopted , which in
effect , in relation to poll -taxes , exempts two fifths of all slaves
from taxation , and thus is supposed to equalize the burden with
the white population . "
$ 995 . In respect to direct taxes on land , the difficulties of
making a due apportionment , so as to equalize the burdens and
expenses o
f the Union according to the relative wealth and ability
o
f
the States , was felt as a most serious evil under the confedera
tion . By that instrument , ( it will be recollected , ) the apportion
ment was to b
e among the States according to the value of all
land within each State , granted or surveyed fo
r
any person , and
the buildings and improvements thereon , to be estimated in such
mode a
s Congress should prescribe . The whole proceedings to
accomplish such an estimate were so operose and inconvenient ,
that Congress , in April , 1783 , recommended as a substitute for
the article an apportionment , founded on the basis of population ,
adding to the whole number o
f
white and other free citizens and
inhabitants , including those bound to service for a term of years ,
three fifths of a
ll
other persons , etc . , in each State ; which is pre
cisely the rule adopted in the Constitution .
$ 996 . Those who are accustomed to contemplate the circum
stances which produce and constitute national wealth , must be
satisfied that there is n
o
common standard b
y
which the degrees
o
f it ca
n
b
e ascertained . Neither the value of lands , nor the
numbers o
f
the people , which have been successively proposed
a
s
the rule of State contributions , has any pretension to being
deemed a just representative o
f
that wealth . If we compare the
1 The Federalist , Nos . 21 , 36 , 54 ; 3 Dall . R . 171 , 178 ; 1 Tucker ' s Black . Comm .
App . 236 , 287 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 208 to 210 ; 3 Elliot ' s Debates , 290 ; 3 Amer .
Museum , 424 ; 2 Elliot ' s Debates , 338 .
2 8 Journal o
f
Continental Congress , 184 , 188 , 198 .
VOL . I . 45
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wealth of the Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany , or
even of France , and at the same time compare the total value of
the lands , and the aggregate population of the contracted terri
tory of the former , with the total value of the lands , and the ag
gregate population of the immense regions of either of the latter
kingdoms, it will be at once discovered that there is no com
parison between the proportions of these two subjects and that of
the relative wealth of those nations . If a like parallel be run
between the American States , it will furnish a similar result .1
Let Virginia be contrasted with Massachusetts , Pennsylvania with
Connecticut , Maryland with Virginia , Rhode Island with Ohio ,
and the disproportion will be at once perceived . The wealth of
neither will be found to be in proportion to numbers or the value
of lands.
$ 997 . The truth is that the wealth of nations depends upon
an infinite variety of causes. Situation , soil , climate ; the nature
of the productions ; the nature of the government ; the genius of
the citizens ; the degree of information they possess ; the state of
commerce , of arts , and industry ; themanners and habits of the
people , - these , and many other circumstances , too complex,mi
nute , and adventitious to admit of a particular enumeration ,occasion
differences hardly conceivable in the relative opulence and riches
of different countries . The consequence is, that there can be no
common measure of national wealth ; and , of course , no general
rule by which the ability of a State to pay taxes ca
n
b
e deter
mined . The estimate , however fairly or deliberately made , is
open to many errors and inequalities ,which become the fruitful
source of discontents , controversies , and heartburnings . These
are sufficient in themselves to shake the foundations o
f any na
tional government ,when no common artificial rule is adopted to
settle permanently the apportionment ; and everything is left open
fo
r
debate a
s
often a
s
a direct tax is to be imposed . Even in
those States where direct taxes are constantly resorted to , every
new valuation o
r apportionment is found , practically , to be a
t
tended with great inconvenience and excitements . To avoid these
difficulties , the land -tax in England is annually laid according to a
valuation made in the reign of William the Third , (1692 , ) and
apportioned among the counties according to that valuation . 3
1 The Federalist , No . 21 . ? Id .
8 i Black . Comm . 312 , 313 . .
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The gross inequality of this proceeding cannot be disguised ; for
many of the counties , then comparatively poor , are now enormous
ly increased in wealth . What is Yorkshire or Lancashire now ,
with it
s
dense manufacturing population , compared with what it
then was ? Even when the population o
f
each State is ascertained ,
th
e
mode b
y
which the assessment shall be laid on th
e
lands in
the State is a subject o
f
n
o
small embarrassment . It would be
gross injustice to tax each house o
r
acre to the same amount ,how
ever different may be its value , or however different its quality ,
situation , or productiveness . And in estimating the absolute
value , so much is necessarily matter of opinion , that different
judgments may and will arrive a
t
different results . And in ad
justing the comparative values in different counties o
r
towns , new
elements o
f
discord are unavoidably introduced . In short , it may
b
e
affirmed , without fear of contradiction , that some artificial rule
o
f apportionment o
f
a fixed nature is indispensable to the public
repose ; and , considering the peculiar situation of the American
States , and especially of the slave and agricultural States , it is
difficult to find any rule o
f greater equality or justice than that
which the Constitution has adopted . And itmay be added , (what
was indeed foreseen , ) that direct taxes on land will not , from
causes sufficiently apparent , be resorted to , except upon extraor
dinary occasions , to supply a pressing want . The history of the
government has abundantly established the correctness o
f
the re
mark ; fo
r
in a period o
f forty years three direct taxes only have
been laid ; and those only with reference to the state and opera
tions o
f
war .
§ 998 . The Constitution having in another clause declared that
“ representatives and direct taxes shall b
e apportioned among the
several States within this Union according to their respective num
bers , " and Congress having , in 1815 , 4 laid a direct tax on the
District of Columbia , (according to the rule of apportionment , ) a
question was made ,whether Congress had constitutionally a right
to lay such a tax , the District not being one of the States ; and it
was unanimously decided b
y
th
e
Supreme Court , that Congress
1 S
e
e
the remarks o
f Mr . Justice Patterson , in Hylton v . United States , 3 Dall . 171 ,
178 , 179 .
? 1 Tack . Black . Comm . App . 234 , 235 , and note ; Id . 23
6
, 23
7
; 3 Dall . R . 178 ,
179 ; Federalist , Nos . 21 , 36 ; 2 Elliot ' s Deb . 208 10 210 .
8 (Another was la
id
o
n
the breaking out o
f
th
e
civil war in 1861 . )
. • Act of 27th Feb . 1815 , ch . 213 .
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had such a right . It was further held that Congress , in laying a
direct tax upon th
e
States ,was not constitutionally bound to ex
tend such ta
x
to the District o
r
the Territories o
f
the United
States ; but that it was amatter fo
r
their discretion . When , how
ever , a direct ta
x
is to be laid on th
e
District o
r
th
e
Territories , it
can be laid only b
y
the rule o
f apportionment . The reasoning b
y
which this doctrine is maintained will be most satisfactorily seen
b
y
giving it in the very words used b
y
the court on that occasion .
$ 999 . “ The eighth section of the first article gives to Congress
* power to lay and collect taxes , duties , imposts , and excises , for
the purposes thereinafter mentioned . This grant is general , with
out limitation as to place . It consequently extends to all places
over which the government extends . If this could be doubted ,
the doubt is removed b
y
the subsequent wordswhich modify the
grant . These words are , 'but all duties , imposts , and excises shall
b
e
uniform throughout the United States . ' It will not be con
tended that the modification of the power extends to places to
which the power itself does not extend . The power , then , to la
y
and collect duties , imposts , and excises may be exercised and must
be exercised throughout the United States . Does this term designate
the whole , or any particular portion , of the American empire ? Cer
tainly this question can admit o
f
but one answer . It is the name
given to our great Republic ,which is composed of States and Terri
tories . The District of Columbia , or the territory west of theMis
souri , is not less within the United States than Maryland or Penn
sylvania ; and it is not less necessary , on the principles of our
Constitution , that uniformity in the imposition of imposts , duties ,
and excises should b
e
observed in the one than in the other .
Since , then , the power to lay and collect taxes , which includes
direct taxes , is obviously coextensive with the power to lay and
collect duties , imposts , and excises , and since th
e
latter extends
throughout the United States , it follows that the power to impose
direct taxes also extends throughout the United States .
$ 1000 . “ The extent of the grant being ascertained , how fa
r
is it abridged b
y
any part of the Constitution ? The twentieth
section o
f
the first article declares that representatives and d
i
rect taxes shall b
e apportioned among the several States which
may be included within this Union , according to their respective
numbers .
1 Loughborough v . Blake , 5 Wheaton ' s R . 317 ; Sergeant on Const . Law , ch . 28 , p .
290 ; 1 Kent , Comm . Lect . 12 , p . 241 .
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§ 1001 . “ The object of this regulation is , we think , to furnish
a standard b
y
which taxes are to be apportioned ,not to exempt
from their operation any part of our country . Had the intention
been to exempt from taxation those who are not represented in
Congress , that intention would have been expressed in direct
terms . The power having been expressly granted , the exception
would have been expressly made . But a limitation can scarcely
b
e said to b
e insinuated . The words used do not mean that
direct taxes shall be imposed on States only which are represented ,
o
r
shall b
e apportioned to representatives , but that direct taxation ,
in it
s application to States , shall be apportioned to numbers . Rep
resentation is not made the foundation of taxation . If , under the
enumeration o
f
a representative for every 30 ,000 souls , one State
has been found to contain 59 ,000 and another 60 ,000 , the first
would have been entitled to only one representative , and the last
to two . Their taxes , however , would not have been as one to two ,
but a
s fifty -nine to sixty . This clause was obviously not intended
to create any exemption from taxation , or to make taxation de
pendent on representation , but to furnish a standard for the ap
portionment o
f
each on the States .
$ 1002 . - The fourth paragraph of the ninth section of the
same article will next be considered . It is in these words : No
capitation , or other direct tax , shall be laid , unless in propor
tion to th
e
census o
r
enumeration hereinbefore directed to be
taken . '
$ 1003 . “ The census referred to is in that clause of the Con
stitution which has just been considered , which makes numbers
the standard b
y
which both representatives and direct taxes shall
b
e apportioned among the States . The actual enumeration is to
b
e made within three years after the first meeting of the Con
gress o
f
the United States , and within every subsequent term of
te
n
years , in such manner as they shall b
y
la
w
direct . '
$ 1004 . “ As the direct and declared object o
f
this census is to
furnish a standard b
y
which representatives and direct taxes
may be apportioned among the several States ,which may be in
cluded within this Union , ' it will be admitted that the omission to
extend it to the District or the Territories would not render it
defective . The census referred to is admitted to be a census ex
hibiting the numbers o
f
the respective States . It cannot , however ,
b
e admitted that the argument which limits the application o
f
the
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power of direct taxation to the population contained in this cen
sus is a just one. The language of the clause does not imply this
restriction . It is not , that no capitation or other direct tax shall
be laid , unless on those comprehended within the census herein
before directed to be taken ,' but " unless in proportion to that
census . Now , this proportion may be applied to the District or th
e
Territories . If the enumeration be taken of the population in the
District and the Territories on the same principles on which the
enumeration o
f
the respective States ismade , then the information
is acquired b
y
which a direct tax may be imposed on the District
and Territories , “ in proportion to the census o
r
enumeration ' which
the Constitution directs to be taken .
§ 1005 . “ The standard , then , by which direct taxes must be
laid is applicable to this District , and will enable Congress to ap
portion o
n it
s just and equal share of the burden with the same
accuracy as on the respective States . If the tax be laid in this
proportion , it is within the very words of the restriction . It is a
tax in proportion to th
e
census o
r
enumeration referred to
$ 1006 . “ But the argument is presented in another form , in
which it
s
refutation is more difficult . It is urged against this con
struction , that it would produce the necessity of extending direct
taxation ' to the District and Territories , which would not only be
inconvenient , but contrary to the understanding and practice o
f
the whole government . If the power of imposing direct taxes be
coextensive with th
e
United States , then it is contended that the
restrictive clause , if applicable to the District and Territories , re
quires that the tax should be extended to them ,since to omit them
would be to violate the rule o
f proportion .
$ 1007 . “ We think a satisfactory answer to this argument may
b
e
drawn from a fair comparative view o
f
the different clauses o
f
the Constitution which have been recited .
$ 1008 . “ That the general grant of power to lay and collect
taxes ismade in terms which comprehend the District and the Ter
ritories , as well as the States , is , we think , incontrovertible . The
subsequent clauses are intended to regulate the exercise o
f
this
power , not to withdraw from it any portion of the community .
The words in which those clauses are expressed import this inten
tion . In thus regulating its exercise , a rule is given in the second
section of the first article fo
r
it
s application to th
e
respective
States . That rule declares how direct taxes upon the States shall
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b
e imposed . They shall be apportioned upon the several States
according to their numbers . If , then , a direct tax be laid at al
l
,
itmust be laid on every State , conformably to the rule provided in
the Constitution . Congress has clearly no power to exempt any
State from it
s
due share o
f
the burden . But this regulation is
expressly confined to the States , and creates no necessity fo
r
ex
tending the tax to the District or the Territories . The words of
the ninth section do not in terms require that the system o
f
direct
taxation , when resorted to , shall be extended to the Territories , as
the words o
f
the second section require that it shall be extended
to a
ll
th
e
States . They therefore may , without violence , be un
derstood to give a rule when the Territories shall be taxed ,without
imposing the necessity o
f taxing them . It could scarcely escape
the members of th
e
convention that the expense o
f executing the
la
w
in a Territory might exceed the amount o
f
the tax . But ,
be this as it may , the doubt created b
y
the words of the ninth
section relates to the obligation to apportion a direct tax on
the Territories , as well as the States , rather than to the power to
d
o
so .
$ 1009 . “ If , then , the language of the Constitution be con
strued to comprehend the Territories and District of Columbia as
well as the States , that language confers on Congress the power of
taxing the District and Territories aswell as the States . If the
general language o
f
the Constitution should be confined to the
States , still , the sixteenth paragraph of the eighth section gives to
Congress the power o
f exercising exclusive legislation in a
ll
cases
whatsoever within this District . '
§ 1010 . “ On the extent of these terms , according to the com
mon understanding o
f
mankind , there can be no difference of
opinion ; but it is contended that they must be limited b
y
that
great principle which was asserted in our revolution , that repre
sentation is inseparable from taxation . The difference between
requiring a continent , with an immense population , to submit to
b
e
taxed b
y
a government having n
o
common interest with it , sep
arated from it b
y
a vast ocean , restrained b
y
n
o principle o
f ap
portionment , and associated with it b
y
n
o
common feelings , and
permitting the representatives o
f
the American people , under the
restrictions o
f
our Constitution , to tax a part of the society which
is either in a state of infancy advancing to manhood , looking for
ward to complete equality a
s
soon a
s that state o
f
manhood shall
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be attained , as is the case with th
e
Territories , or which has volun
tarily relinquished the right o
f representation , and has adopted
the whole body o
f Congress for it
s legitimate government , as is
the case with the District , is to
o
obvious not to present itself to
the minds o
f all . Although in theory it might be more congenial
to the spirit of our institutions to admit a representative from the
District , itmay be doubted whether , in fact , its interests would be
rendered thereby the more secure ; and certainly the Constitution
does not consider its want o
f
a representative in Congress a
s ex
empting it from equal taxation .
§ 1011 . “ If it were true that , according to the spirit of our
Constitution , the power of taxation must be limited by the right
o
f representation , whence is derived the right to la
y
and collect
duties , imposts , and excises within this District ? If the princi
ples o
f liberty and o
f
our Constitution forbid the raising o
f
rev
enue from those who are not represented , do not these principles
forbid the raising it b
y
daties , imposts , and excises , as well as by
a direct tax ? If th
e
principles of our revolution give a rule
applicable to this case , we cannot have forgotten that neither
the stamp act nor the duty on tea were direct taxes . Yet it
is admitted that the Constitution not only allows , but enjoins ,
the government to extend the ordinary revenue system to this
District .
$ 1012 . “ If it be said that the principle of uniformity estab
lished in the Constitution secures the District from oppression in
the imposition of indirect taxes , it is not less true that the princi
ple of apportionment , also established in the Constitution , secures
the District from any oppressive exercise o
f
the power to lay and
collect direct taxes . "
$ 1013 . The next clause in the Constitution is : “ No tax or
duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State . No prefer
ence shall b
e given b
y
any regulation o
f
commerce o
r
revenue to
the ports o
f
one State over those o
f
another ; nor shall vessels
bound to o
r
from one State be obliged to enter , clear , or pay duties
in another . ”
§ 1014 . The obvious object of these provisions is to prevent
any possibility of applying the power to lay taxes , or regulate
commerce , injuriously to the interests of any one State , so as to
favor o
r
aid another . If Congress were allowed to lay a duty on
exports from any one State , it might unreasonably injure , or even
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destroy , the staple productions or common articles of that State .1
The inequality of such a tax would be extreme . In some of the
States the whole of their means result from agricultural exports .
In others , a great portion is derived from other sources ; from ex
ternal fisheries, from freights , and from the profits of commerce
in it
s largest extent . The burden o
f
such a tax would , of course ,
b
e very unequally distributed . The power is , therefore , wholly
taken away to intermeddle with the subject o
f exports . On the
other hand , preferences might be given to the ports of one State ,
by regulations either of commerce o
r
revenue , which might confer
o
n
them local facilities o
r privileges in regard to commerce or
revenue . And such preferences might be equally fatal , if indi
rectly given under the milder form o
f requiring an entry , clear
ance , or payment of duties , in the ports of any State other than
the ports o
f
the State to o
r
from which the vessel was bound .
The last clause , therefore ,does not prohibit Congress from requir
ing an entry o
r
clearance or payment o
f
duties , at the custom
house , on importations in any port of a State to or from which the
vessel is bound ; but cuts of
f
the right to require such acts to be
done in other States to which the vessel is not bound . 2 In other
words , it cuts of
f
the power to require that circuity of voyage
which , under the British colonial system , was employed to inter
rupt the American commerce before the Revolution . No Ameri
can vessel could then trade with Europe unless through a circuitous
voyage to and from a British port .
§ 1015 . The first part of the clause was reported in the first
draft o
f
the Constitution . But it di
d
not pass without opposition ,
and several attempts were made to amend it , as b
y
inserting
after the word “ duty " the words “ fo
r
the purpose o
f
revenue , "
and b
y inserting a
t
the end o
f it " unless b
y
consent o
f
two thirds
o
f
the legislature , ” both of which propositions were negatived . 4
It then passed b
y
a vote of seven States against four . 5 Subse
quently the remaining parts o
f
the clause were proposed b
y
re
1 Rawle o
n
the Constitution , ch . 10 , p . 115 , 116 . (See Aguirre v .Maxwell , 3 Blatch .
140 . ]
2 Journ . o
f
Convention , 293 , 294 ; Sergeant o
n
Const . Law , ch . 2
8 , p . 346 ; United
States v . Brig William , 2 Hall ' s Law Journ . 255 , 259 , 260 ; Rawle on the Const . ch .
1
0 , p . 116 ; 1 Jefferson ' s Corresp . 104 to 106 , 112 .
8 Reeves o
n Shipping , p . 28 , 36 , 47 , 49 , 52 to 105 ; . Id . 191 , 492 , 493 ; Burke ' s
Speech o
n
American Taxation , in 1774 ; 1 Pitk . Hist . ch . 3 , p . 91 to 106 .
4 Journ . o
f
Convention , 222 , 275 . 6 Id . 275 , 276 .
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port o
f
a committee , and they appear to have been adopted with
out objection . Upon the whole , the wisdom and sound policy of
this restriction cannot admit o
f
reasonable doubt ; not so much
that the powers o
f
the general government were likely to b
e
abused , as that the constitutional prohibition would allay jealousies
and confirm confidence . The prohibition extends not only to ex
ports , but to the exporter . Congress can no more rightfully tax
the one than the other . 3
§ 1016 . The next clause contains a prohibition on the States
for the like objects and purposes . “ No State shall , without the
consent o
f
Congress , la
y
any imposts or duties on imports or ex
ports , except what may be absolutely necessary fo
r
executing it
s
inspection laws ; and the net produce of al
l
duties and imposts
laid b
y any State on imports and exports shall be for the use o
f
the treasury of th
e
United States ; and al
l
such laws shall be
subject to the revision and control o
f Congress . No State shall ,
without the consent of Congress , lay any tonnage duty . ” In th
e
first draft o
f
the Constitution th
e
clause stood , “ N
o
State , with
out th
e
consent , ” etc . , “ shall la
y
imposts o
r
duties on imports . "
The clause was then amended by adding “ o
r exports , ” not , how
ever , without opposition , - six States voting in the affirmative ,
and five in the negative ; 4 and again , by adding “ nor with
such consent , but . fo
r
the use of the treasury o
f
the United
States , " by a vote of nine States against two . In the revised
draft the clause was reported as thus amended . The clause was
then altered to it
s present shape by a vote o
f
ten States against
one ; and the clause which respects the duty on tonnage was
then added b
y
a vote o
f
si
x
States against four , one being d
i
vided . So that it seems that a struggle fo
r
State powers was
constantly maintained , with zeal and pertinacity , throughout the
whole discussion . If there is wisdom and sound policy in re
straining the United States from exercising the power of taxa
tion unequally in the States , there is , at least , equal wisdom and
policy in restraining the States themselves from the exercise o
f
the same power injuriously to the interests o
f
each other . A
1 Journ . of Convention , 301 , 318 ; Id . 377 , 378 .
2 i Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 252 , 253 ; Id . 294 .
8 Brown v . Maryland , 12 Wheat . R . 449 .
4 Journ . of Convention , 227 , 303 .
6 Id . 303 , 304 .
• Journ . of Convention , 35
9
, 380 , 381 . Se
o
2 American Museum , 53
4
; Id . 540 .
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petty warfare o
f regulation is thus prevented , which would rouse
resentments and create dissensions , to the ruin of the harmony
and amity o
f
the States . The power to enforce their inspection
laws is still retained , subject to the revision and control o
f
Con
gress ; so that sufficient provision is made for the convenient ar
rangement o
f
their domestic and internal trade , whenever it is
not injurious to the general interests .
$ 1017 . Inspection laws are not , strictly speaking , regulations
o
f
commerce , though they may have a remote and considerable
influence on commerce . The object of inspection laws is to im
prove the quality o
f
articles produced b
y
the labor o
f
a country ,
to fi
t
them for exportation or fo
r
domestic use . These laws act
upon the subject before it becomes an article of commerce , foreign
o
r
domestic , and prepare it for the purpose . They form a portion
o
f
that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything
in the territory o
f
a State not surrendered to the general govern
ment . Inspection laws , quarantine laws , and health laws , as well
a
s
laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State , and others
which respect roads , fences , etc . , are component parts o
f
State
legislation , resulting from the residuary powers of State sover
eignty . No direct power over these is given to Congress , and
consequently they remain subject to State legislation , though they
may be controlled b
y Congress when they interfere with their
acknowledged powers . Under the confederation there was a pro
vision that “ no State shall lay any imposts or duties which may
interfere with any stipulations o
f
treaties entered into b
y
the
United States , ” et
c
. , etc . This prohibition was notoriously ( as has
been already stated ) disregarded b
y
the States ; and , in the exer
cise b
y
the States o
f
their general authority to la
y
imposts and
duties , it is equally notorious that themostmischievous restraints ,
preferences , and inequalities existed ; so that very serious irrita
tions and feuds were constantly generated , which threatened the
peace o
f
th
e
Union , and , indeed , must have inevitably led to a
dissolution o
f it . 3 The power to lay duties and imposts on imports
and exports , and to lay a tonnage duty , is doubtless properly con
1 The Federalist , No . 44 ; 1 Tuck . Black . Comm . App . 252 , 313 . See also 2 Elliot ' s
Debates , 354 to 356 ; Journ . of Convention , 294 , 295 .
2 Gibbons v . Ogden , 9Wheat . R . 1 , 20
3
to 2
0
6 , 21
0 , 23
5 , 23
6 , 31
1 ; Brown v .Mary
land , 12 Wheat . R .419 , 438 , 439 , 440 .
8 The Federalist ,Nos . 7 , 22 .
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sidered a part of the taxing power, but itmay also be applied as a
regulation of commerce .
§ 1018 . Until a recent period no difficulty occurred in regard
to the prohibitions of this clause . Congress , with a just liber
ality , gave full effect to the inspection laws of the States , and
required them to be observed by the revenue officers of the United
States .2 In the year 1821 , the State of Maryland passed an act
requiring that all importers of foreign articles or commodities , et
c
. ,
b
y
bale o
r package , o
r
o
f wine , rum , et
c
. , etc . , and other persons
selling the same b
y
wholesale , bale , or package , hogshead , barrel ,
o
r
tierce , should , before they were authorized to sell , take out a
license , fo
r
which they were to pay fifty dollars , under certain
penalties . Upon this act a question arose whether it was or not
a violation o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United States , and especially
o
f
the prohibitory clause now under consideration . Upon solemn
argument , th
e
Supreme Court decided that it was . 3 The judg
ment of the Supreme Court , delivered on that occasion , contains
a very full exposition o
f
the whole subject ; and although it is
long , it seems difficult to abridge it without marring the reasoning ,
o
r
in somemeasure leaving imperfect a most important constitu
tional inquiry . It is , therefore , inserted at large .
$ 1019 . “ The cause depends entirely on the question whether
the legislature o
f
a State can constitutionally require the importer
o
f foreign articles to take out a license from the State before h
e
shall be permitted to sell a bale or package so imported . It has
been truly said that the presumption is in favor o
f every legislative
act , and that the whole burden of proof lies on those who deny its
constitutionality . The plaintiffs in error take th
e
burden on them
selves , and insist that the act under consideration is repugnant to
two provisions in the Constitution o
f
the United States . ( 1 . ) To
that which declares that no State shall ,without the consent of
Congress , lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports , except
whatmay be absolutely necessary fo
r
executing it
s inspection laws . '
( 2 . ) To that which declares that Congress shall have power ' to
regulate commerce with foreign nations , and among the several
States , and with the Indian tribes . '
1 Gibbons v . Ogden , 9 Wheat . R . 1 , 199 , 20
0
, 201 ; Brown v .Maryland , 12 Wheat . R .
446 , 447 .
2 Act o
f
2
0 April , 1790 , ch . 5 ; Act of 23 March , 1799 , ch . 128 , § 93 .
8 Brown v . Maryland , 12 Wheat . R . 419 ; The Federalist , No . 278 .
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§ 1020 . “ 1 . The first inquiry is into the extent of the prohibi
tion upon States ' to lay any imposts or duties on imports or ex
ports . The counsel fo
r
the State o
f Maryland would confine this
prohibition to laws imposing duties on the act of importation or
exportation . The counsel for the plaintiffs in error give them a
much wider scope . In performing the delicate and important duty
o
f construing clauses in the Constitution of our country which in
volve conflicting powers o
f
th
e
government of the Union and of th
e
respective States , it is proper to take a view of the literal meaning
o
f
the words to b
e expounded , of their connection with other words ,
and o
f
the general objects to be accomplished b
y
the prohibitory
clause or b
y
the grant o
f power . What , then , is themeaning o
f
the
words “ imposts or duties on imports o
r exports ' ? An impost or
duty on imports is a custom o
r
a tax levied on articles brought into
a country , and is most usually secured before the importer is a
l
lowed to exercise his rights of ownership over them , because eva
sions of the law can be prevented more certainly b
y
executing it
while the articles are in its custody . It would not , however , be
less a
n impost or duty on the articles if it were to be levied on
them after they were landed . The policy and consequent practice
o
f levying or securing the duty before or on entering the port does
not limit the power to that state o
f things , nor , consequently , the
prohibition , unless the true meaning of the clause so confines it .
What , then , are imports ' ? The lexicons inform us that they
are things imported . ' If we appeal to usage fo
r
the meaning o
f
the word , we shall receive the same answer . They are the articles
themselves which are brought into the country . “ A duty on im
ports , ' then , is notmerely a duty on the act of importation , but is
a duty on the thing imported . It is not , taken in its literal sense ,
confined to a duty levied while the article is entering the country ,
but extends to a duty levied after it has entered the country . The
succeeding words o
f
the sentence which limit the prohibition show
the extent in which it was understood . The limitation is , ' except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing it
s inspection laws . '
Now the inspection laws , so far as they act upon articles for expor
tation , are generally executed on land before the article is put on
board the vessel ; so fa
r
a
s they act on importations , they are gen
erally executed upon articles which are landed . The tax or duty
o
f
inspection , then , is a tax which is frequently , if not always , paid
for service performed on land while the article is in the bosom o
f
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the country . Yet this tax is an exception to the prohibition on
the States to lay duties on imports o
r exports . The exception was
made because the ta
x
would otherwise have been within the pro
hibition . If it be a rule of interpretation to which al
l
assent , that
the exception o
f
a particular thing from general words proves that ,
in the opinion o
f
the lawgiver , the thing excepted would be within
the general clause had the exception not been made , we know no
reason why this general rule should not be a
s applicable to th
e
Constitution as to other instruments . If it be applicable , then this
exception in favor o
f
duties for the support o
f inspection laws goes
far in proving that the framers of the Constitution classed taxes of
a similar character with those imposed fo
r
the purposes o
f inspec
tion with duties on imports and exports , and supposed them to be
prohibited .
§ 1021 . “ Ifwe quit this narrow view of th
e
subject and , passing
from the literal interpretation o
f
the words , look to the objects of
the prohibition , we find no reason for withdrawing the act under
consideration from it
s operation . From the vast inequality be
tween the different States o
f
the confederacy as to commercial ad
vantages , few subjects were viewed with deeper interest or excited
more irritation than themanner in which the several States ex
ercised , or seemed disposed to exercise , the power of laying duties
o
n imports . From motives which were deemed sufficient b
y
the
statesmen o
f
that day , the general power of taxation , indispensably
necessary as it was ,and jealous as the States were of any encroach
ment on it , was so far abridged as to forbid them to touch imports
o
r exports , with the single exception which has been noticed .
Why are they restrained from imposing these duties ? Plainly
because in the general opinion the interest o
f all would be best
promoted b
y
placing that whole subject under the control o
f
Con
gress . Whether the prohibition to “ lay imposts or duties on im
ports o
r exports ' proceeded from an apprehension that the power
might be so exercised as to disturb that equality among th
e
States
which was generally advantageous , or that harmony between them
which it was desirable to preserve ; or to maintain unimpaired our
commercial connections with foreign nations ; or to confer this
source of revenue on the government o
f
the Union ; or whatever
other motive might have induced the prohibition , it is plain that
the object would b
e
a
s completely defeated b
y
a power to tax the
article in the hands o
f
the importer , the instant it was landed , as
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b
y
a power to tax it while entering th
e
port . There is no differ
ence , in effect , between a power to prohibit the sale of an article
and a power to prohibit it
s
introduction into the country . The
one would be a necessary consequence o
f
the other . No goods
would b
e imported if none could be sold . No object of any de
scription can b
e accomplished by laying a duty on importation
which may not be accomplished with equal certainty by laying a
duty on the thing imported in the hands o
f
the importer . It is
obvious that the same power which imposes a light duty can im
pose a very heavy one , one which amounts to a prohibition . Ques
tions o
f power do not depend on the degree to which itmay be
exercised . If itmay be exercised at all , it must be exercised at
the will of those in whose hands it is placed . If the tax may be
levied in this form b
y
a State , it may be levied to an extent which
will defeat the revenue b
y
impost , so far as it is drawn from im .
portations into the particular State .
: $ 1022 . “ We are told that such a wild and irrational abuse of
power is not to be apprehended , and is not to be taken into view
when discussing it
s
existence . All powermay be abused ; and if
the fear o
f
it
s
abuse is to constitute an argument against it
s exist
ence , it might be urged against the existence of that which is uni
versally acknowledged , and which is indispensable to th
e
general
safety . The States will never be so mad as to destroy their own
commerce o
r
even to lessen it . We do not dissent from these gen
eral propositions . We do not suppose any State would act so
unwisely . Butwe do not place the question on that ground . These
arguments apply with precisely the same force against the whole
prohibition . It might , with the same reason , be said that no
State would be so blind to it
s
own interests a
s
to la
y
duties on
importation which would either prohibit or diminish it
s
trade .
Yet the framers o
f
our Constitution have thought this a power
which no State ought to exercise . Conceding , to the full extent
which is required , that every State would , in its legislation on this
subject , provide judiciously for its own interests , it cannot be con
ceded that each would respect the interests o
f
others . A duty on
imports is a tax on the article , which is paid b
y
the consumer .
The great importing States would thus levy a tax on the non
importing States , which would not be less a tax because their
interest would afford ample security against it
s
ever being so
heavy as to expel commerce from their ports . This would neces ·
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sarily produce countervailing measures on the part of those States
whose situation was less favorable to importation . For this , among
other reasons , the whole power of laying duties on imports was,
with a single and slight exception , taken from the States . When
we are inquiring whether a particular act is within this prohibi
tion , the question is not whether the State may so legislate as to
hurt itself , but whether the ac
t
is within the words and mischief
o
f
the prohibitory clause . It has already been shown that a tax
o
n
the article in the hands of the importer iswithin it
s
words , and
w
e
think it to
o
clear fo
r
controversy that the same ta
x
is within
it
s
mischief . We think it unquestionable that such a tax has pre
cisely the same tendency to enhance the price of the article as if
imposed upon it while entering the port .
$ 1023 . “ The counsel fo
r
the State o
f Maryland insist with
great reason that , if the words of th
e
prohibition be taken in their
utmost latitude , they will abridge the power of taxation ,which all
admit to b
e
essential to the States , to an extent which has never
yet been suspected , and will deprive them of resources which are
necessary to supply revenue , and which they have heretofore been
admitted to possess . These words must , therefore , be construed
with some limitation ; and , if this be admitted , they insist that
entering the country is the point o
f
time when the prohibition
ceases and the power o
f
the State to tax commences . It may be
conceded that the words o
f
the prohibition ought not to b
e pressed
to their utmost extent ; that in our complex system the object of
the powers conferred on the government o
f
the Union , and the
nature o
f
the often conflicting powers which remain in the States ,
must always be taken into view , and may aid in expounding th
e
words o
f any particular clause . But while we admit that sound
principles of construction ought to restrain a
ll
courts from carry
ing the words o
f
the prohibition beyond the object which the Con
stitution is intended to secure , that there must be a point o
f
time
when the prohibition ceases and the power of the State to tax
commences , w
e
cannot admit that this point o
f
time is the instant
that the articles enter the country . It is , we think , obvious that
this construction would defeat the prohibition .
§ 1024 . “ The constitutional prohibition on the States to la
y
a
duty on imports , a prohibition which a vast majority of them must
feel an interest in preserving , may certainly come in conflict with
their acknowledged power to ta
x
persons and property within
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their territory . The power and the restriction on it, though quite
distinguishable when they do not approach each other, may yet ,
like the intervening colors between white and black , approach so
nearly as to perplex the understanding ,as colors perplex the vision
in marking the distinction between them . Yet the distinction ex
ists , and must bemarked as the cases arise. Till they do arise ,
itmight be premature to state any rule as being universal in its
application . It is sufficient fo
r
the present to say , generally , that
when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it
has become incorporated and mixed u
p
with the mass o
f property
in the country , it has , perhaps , lost its distinctive character as an
import , and has become subject to the taxing power of th
e
State .
But while remaining the property o
f
the importer in his warehouse ,
in the original form or package in which it was imported , a tax
upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition
in the Constitution .
§ 1025 . “ The counsel for the plaintiffs in error contend that
the importer purchases , b
y
payment o
f
the duty to the United
States , a right to dispose of hi
s
merchandise , as well as to bring it
into the country ; and certainly the argument is supported b
y
strong reason , aswell as b
y
the practice o
f
nations , including our
own . The object of importation is sale ; it constitutes the motive
for paying the duties ; and if the United States possess the power
o
f conferring th
e
right to sell as the consideration fo
r
which the
duty is paid , every principle of fair dealing requires that they
should be understood to confer it . The practice of the most com
mercial nations conforms to this idea . Duties , according to that
practice , are charged on those articles only which are intended fo
r
sale o
r consumption in the country . Thus sea stores , goods im
ported and re -exported in the same vessel , goods landed and car
ried overland fo
r
the purpose o
f being re -exported from some other
port , goods forced in by stress of weather and landed , but not fo
r
sale , are exempted from the payment of duties . The whole course
o
f legislation on the subject shows that , in the opinion of the legis
lature , the right to sell is connected with the payment of duties .
§ 1026 . “ The counsel fo
r
the defendant in error have endeav
ored to illustrate their proposition that the constitutional prohibi
tion ceases the instant the goods enter the country , b
y
a
n array o
f
the consequences which they suppose must follow the denial of it .
If the importer acquires th
e
right to sell b
y
the payment of duties ,
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h
e may , they say , exert that right when , where , and as he pleases ,
and the State cannot regulate it . He may sell by retail , at auction ,
o
r
a
s
a
n itinerant pedler . Hemay introduce articles , as gunpow
der , which endanger a city , into the midst of its population ; he
may introduce articles which endanger the public health , and th
e
power o
f
self -preservation is denied . An importer may bring in
goods , as plate , fo
r
his own use , and thus retain much valuable
property exempt from taxation .
§ 1027 . 6 . These objections to the principle , if well founded ,
would certainly b
e
entitled to serious consideration . But we think
they will be found on examination not to belong necessarily to th
e
principle , and consequently not to prove that it may not be resort
e
d
to with safety as a criterion b
y
which to measure the extent of
the prohibition . This indictment is against the importer fo
r
sell
ing a package o
f dry goods in the form in which it was imported
without a license . This state of things is changed if he sells them
o
r otherwise mixes them with the general property o
f
the State b
y
breaking up his packages and travelling with them a
s
a
n
itinerant
pedler . In the first case , the tax intercepts the import as an im
port in it
s way to become incorporated with the general mass of
property , and denies it the privilege of becoming so incorporated
until it shall have contributed to the revenue of the State . It de
nies to the importer the right of using the privilege which he has
purchased from the United States until he shall have also pur
chased it from the State . In the last case the tax finds the article
already incorporated with the mass o
f property by the act of th
e
importer . He has used the privilege he had purchased , and ha
s
himself mixed them u
p
with the common mass , and the law may
treat them as it finds them . The same observations apply to plate
o
r
other furniture used b
y
the importer . So , if he sells b
y
auction .
Auctioneers are persons licensed b
y
the State , and if the importer
chooses to employ them h
e
can a
s little object to paying for this
service a
s
fo
r
any other fo
r
which h
emay apply to an officer of th
e
State . The right of sale may very well be annexed to importation
without annexing to it also the privilege of using the officers li
censed b
y
the State tomake sales in a peculiar way . The power
to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch o
f
the police power ,
which unquestionably remains and ought to remain with th
e
States . If th
e
possessor stores it himself out o
f
town , the removal
cannot be a duty on imports , because it contributes nothing to the
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revenue . If he prefers placing it in a public magazine , it is be
cause h
e
stores it there in his own opinion more advantageously
than elsewhere . We are not sure that this may not be classed
among inspection laws . The removal or destruction of infectious
o
r unsound articles is undoubtedly an exercise of that power , and
forms an express exception to the prohibition we are considering .
Indeed , the laws of the United States expressly sanction the health
laws o
f
a State .
$ 1028 . “ The principle , then , for which the plaintiffs in error
contend , that the importer acquires a right ,not only to bring the
articles into the country , but to mix them with the common mass
o
f
property , does not interfere with the necessary power of taxa
tion ,which is acknowledged to reside in th
e
States , to that dan
gerous extent which the counsel for the defendants in error seem
to apprehend . It carries the prohibition in the Constitution no
further than to prevent the States from doing that which it was
th
e
great object of the Constitution to prevent .
$ 1029 . “ But if it should be proved that a duty on the article
itself would be repugnant to the Constitution , it is still argued that
this is not a tax upon the article , but on the person . The State ,
it is said ,may tax occupations , and this is nothing more . It is
impossible to conceal from ourselves that this is varying the form
without varying the substance . It is treating a prohibition which
is general as if it were confined to a particular mode of doing the
forbidden thing . All must perceive that a tax on the sale of an
article imported only for sale is a tax on the article itself . It is
true , the State may tax occupations generally ; but this tax must
be paid b
y
those who employ the individual , or is a tax on his
business . The lawyer , the physician , or the mechanic must
either charge more on the article in which h
e
deals , or the thing
itself is taxed through his person . This the State has a right to
d
o , because no constitutional prohibition extends to it . So a tax
o
n the occupation o
f
a
n importer is , in like manner , a tax on im
portation . Itmust add to the price of the article , and be paid by
the consumer , or b
y
the importer himself , in like manner as a
direct duty on the article itself would be made . This th
e
State
has not a right to do , because it is prohibited b
y
the Constitution .
§ 1030 . “ In support of the argument that the prohibition ceases
the instant the goods are brought into the country , a comparison
has been drawn between the opposite words , export and import .
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As to export , it is said , means only to carry goods out of the
country ; so , to import means only to bring them into it . But ,
suppose we extend this comparison to the two prohibitions . The
States are forbidden to lay a duty on exports , and the United
States are forbidden to lay a tax o
r duty on articles exported from
any State . There is some diversity in language , but none is per
ceivable in the act which is prohibited . The United States have
the same right to tax occupations which is possessed b
y
the States .
Now , suppose the United States should require every exporter to
take out a license , fo
r
which he should pay such tax as Congress
might think proper to impose ; would the government be permitted
to shield itself from the just censure to which this attempt to evade
the prohibitions o
f
th
e
Constitution would expose it , b
y
saying
that this was a tax on the person , not on the article , and that the
legislature had a right to tax occupations ? O
r , suppose revenue
cutters were to be stationed o
ff
the coast fo
r
the purpose of levying
a duty o
n allmerchandise found in vessels which were leaving the
United States for foreign countries ; would it be received as an
excuse for this outrage , were the government to say that exporta
tion meant n
o
more than carrying goods out o
f
the country , and
a
s
the prohibition to lay a tax on imports , or things imported ,
ceased the instant they were brought into the country , so the pro
hibition to tax articles exported ceased when they were carried out
o
f
the country ?
§ 1031 . “ We think , then , that the act under which the plain
tiffs in error were indicted is repugnant to that article of the Con
stitution which declares that “ n
o
State shall lay any impost or
duties on imports o
r exports . ' ”
§ 1032 . As the power of taxation exists in the States concur
rently with the United States , subject only to the restrictions im
posed b
y
the Constitution , several questions have from time to
time arisen in regard to the nature and extent o
f
the State power
o
f
taxation .
$ 1033 . In the year 1818 , th
e
State o
fMaryland passed an act , la
y
.
1 That the term import , as employed in the clause o
f
the Constitution under exami
nation , does not refer to articles imported from one State into another , but only to arti
cles imported from foreign countries into the United States , see Woodruff v . Parham ,
8 Wall . 123 ; Hinson v . Lott , Id . 148 .
That goods imported from foreign countries , after having been sold b
y
th
e
importer ,
are subject to State taxation , even though still in the original packages , see Pervear y .
Commonwealth, 5 Wall . 479 ; Waring v . The Mayor , 8 Wall . 110 . )
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ing a tax on all banks and branches thereof not chartered by the
legislature of that State ; and a question was made whether the
State had a right, under that act, to lay a tax on the Branch Bank
of the United States in that State . This gave rise to a most ani
mated discussion in the Supreme Court of the United States,where
it was finally decided that the tax was, as to the Bank of the
United States , unconstitutional . The reasoning of the Supreme
Court on this subject was as follows :
$ 1034 . “ Whether the State of Maryland may , without violat
ing the Constitution , tax that branch ? That the power of taxa
tion is one of vital importance ; that it is retained by the States ;
that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the gov
ernment of the Union ; that it is to be concurrently exercised by
the two governments , — are truths which have never been denied .
But such is the paramount character of the Constitution , that its
capacity to withdraw any subject from the action o
f
even this
power is admitted . The States are expressly forbidden to la
y
any duties on imports or exports , except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing their inspection laws . If the obligation of
this prohibition must be conceded ; if itmay restrain a State from
the exercise o
f
it
s taxing power on imports and exports ; the same
paramount character would seem to restrain , as it certainly may
restrain , a State from such other exercise of this power as is in its
nature incompatible with and repugnant to the constitutional laws
o
f
the Union . A law absolutely repugnant to another as entirely
repeals that other as if express terms o
f repeal were used .
§ 1035 . “ On this ground the counsel for the bank place its
claim to b
e exempted from the power of a State to tax its opera
tions . There is no express provision for the case ; but the claim
has been sustained on a principle which so entirely pervades the
Constitution , is so intermixed with the materials which compose
it , so interwoven with its web , so blended with its texture , as to
b
e incapable of being separated from it without rending it into
shreds . This great principle is that the Constitution and the laws
made in pursuance thereof are supreme ; that they control the
constitution and laws of the respective States , and cannot be con
trolled b
y
them . From this , which may be almost termed an
axiom , other propositions are deduced as corollaries , on the truth
1 M Culloch v . State of Maryland , 4 Wheat . R . 316 ; 1 Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 19 , p .
398 ; Id . 401 .
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o
r error of which , and on their application to this case , the cause
has been supposed to depend . These are , 1st . That a power to
create implies a power to preserve . 2d . That a power to destroy ,
if wielded b
y
a different hand , is hostile to and incompatible with
the powers to create and to preserve . 3d . Thatwhere this repug
nancy exists , that authority which is supreme must control , not
yield to that over which it is supreme . These propositions , as
abstract truths , would perhaps never be controverted . Their a
p
plication to this case , however , has been denied ; and , both in
maintaining the affirmative and the negative , a splendor of elo
quence and strength of argument , seldom if ever surpassed , have
been displayed .
$ 1036 . “ The power o
f Congress to create , and of course to con
tinue , the bank ,was the subject of the preceding part of this opin
io
n , and is no longer to be considered as questionable . That the
power o
f taxing it b
y
the States may be exercised so a
s
to destroy
it , is too obvious to be denied . But taxation is said to be an
absolute power , which acknowledges no other limits than those
expressly prescribed in the Constitution , and , like sovereign power
o
f
every other description , is trusted to the discretion of thosewho
use it . But the very terms of this argument admit that the sov
ereignty o
f
the State , in the article of taxation itself , is subordinate
to and may be controlled b
y
the Constitution of the United States .
How far it has been controlled b
y
that instrument must be a ques
tion o
f
construction . In making this construction , no principle ,not
declared , can be admissible which would defeat the legitimate
operations o
f
a supreme government . It is of the very essence of
supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action within its own
sphere , and so to modify every power vested in subordinate gov
ernments as to exempt it
s
own operations from their own influence .
This effect need not be stated in terms . It is so involved in the
declaration o
f supremacy , so necessarily implied in it , that the ex
pression o
f it could not make it more certain . Wemust , there
fore , keep it in view while construing the Constitution .
§ 1037 . “ The argument , on the part o
f
the State o
f Maryland ,
is , not that the States may directly resist a law of Congress , but
that they may exercise their acknowledged powers upon it , and
that the Constitution leaves them this right in the confidence
that they will not abuse it . Before we proceed to examine this
argument , and to subject it to the test of the Constitution , we
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must be permitted to bestow a few considerations on the nature
and extent of this original right of taxation , which is acknowl
edged to remain with the States . It is admitted that the power
of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very
existence of government , and may be legitimately exercised on
the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to
which the government may choose to carry it . The only security
against the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the
government itself. In imposing a tax , the legislature acts upon
its constituents . This is in general a sufficient security against
erroneous and oppressive taxation . The people of a State , there
fore, give to their government a right of taxing themselves and
their property ; and as the exigencies of government cannot be
limited , they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting
confidently on the interest of the legislator , and on the influence
of the constituents over their representative , to guard them
against it
s
abuse . But themeans employed by the government of
the Union have no such security ; nor is the right of a State to
tax them sustained b
y
the same theory . Those means are not
given b
y
the people o
f
a particular State ; not given b
y
the constit
uents o
f
the legislature , which claim the right to tax them ; but
b
y
the people o
f all the States . They are given b
y
a
ll , fo
r
the
benefit o
f a
ll ; and upon theory should be subjected to that gov
ernment only which belongs to al
l
.
§ 1038 . “ It may be objected to this definition , that the power
o
f
taxation is not confined to the people and property of a State .
Itmay be exercised upon every object brought within its jurisdic
tion . This is true . But to what source do we trace this right ?
It is obvious that it is an incident of sovereignty , and is coexten
sive with that to which it is an incident . All subjects over which
the sovereign power o
f
a State extends are objects o
f
taxation ;
but those over which it does not extend are , upon the soundest
principles , exempt from taxation . This proposition may almost
be pronounced self -evident . The sovereignty of a State extends to
everything which exists b
y
it
s
own authority or is introduced b
y
its permission ; but does it extend to those means which are em
ployed b
y Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on
that body b
y
the people o
f
the United States ? We think it de
monstrable that it does not . Those powers are not given b
y
the
people o
f
a single State . They are given by the people of the
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United States to a government whose laws ,made in pursuance of
the Constitution , are declared to be supreme . Consequently , the
people o
f
a single State cannot confer a sovereignty which will
extend over them .
§ 1039 . “ If we measure the power of taxation residing in a
State b
y
the extent o
f sovereignty which the people o
f
a single State
possess and can confer on its government , we have an intelligible
standard ,applicable to every case to which the power may be ap
plied . We have a principle which leaves the power o
f taxing the
people and property o
f
a State unimpaired ; which leaves to a State
the command o
f all its resources ; and which places beyond its
reach a
ll
those powers which are conferred b
y
the people o
f
the
United States on the government of the Union , and al
l
those
means which are given for the purpose o
f carrying those powers
into execution . Wehave a principle which is safe fo
r
the States
and safe for the Union . We are relieved , as we ought to be , from
clashing sovereignty , from interfering powers , from a repug
nancy between a right in one government to pull down what there
is a
n acknowledged right in another to build up , from the incom
patibility o
f
a right in one goverňment to destroy what there is a
right in another to preserve . We are not driven to the perplex
ing inquiry , so unfit for the judicial department , what degree o
f
taxation is the legitimate use , and what degree may amount to the
abuse o
f
the power . The attempt to use it on the means employed
b
y
the government of the Union , in pursuance of the Constitu
tion , is itself an abuse , because it is the usurpation of a power
which the people o
f
a single State cannot give .
§ 1040 . “ We find , then , on just theory , a total failure of this
original right to tax the means employed by the government of
the Union fo
r
the execution o
f
it
s powers . The right never
existed ; and the question whether it has been surrendered cannot
arise .
$ 1041 . “ But ,waiving this theory fo
r
the present , le
t
u
s resume
the inquiry , whether this power can be exercised b
y
the respective
States consistently with a fair construction o
f
the Constitution .
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy ; that the
power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to cre
ate ; 1 that there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one gov
1 ( A very striking illustration o
f
this truth is afforded b
y
the case o
f
Veazie Bank v .
Fenno , 8 Wall . 533 , in which taxation imposed upon State banks and their circulation
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ernment a power to control the constitutional measures of another ,
which other, with respect to those very measures , is declared to
be supreme over that which exerts the control , are propositions
not to be denied . But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by
the magic of the word confidence. Taxation , it is said , does not
necessarily and unavoidably destroy . To carry it to the excess of
destruction would be an abuse , to presume which would banish
that confidence which is essential to a
ll government . But is this
a case o
f
confidence ? Would the people of any one State trust
those o
f
another with a power to control th
e
most insignificant
operations of their State government ? We know they would not .
Why , then , should we suppose that the people of any one State
would be willing to trust those o
f
another with a power to control
the operations o
f
a government to which they have confided their
most important and most valuable interests ? In the legislature
o
f the Union alone ar
e
a
ll
represented . The legislature of the
Union alone , therefore , can be trusted b
y
the people with the power
o
f controlling measures which concern all , in the confidence that
it will not be abused . This , then , is not a case of confidence , and
w
e
must consider it a
s it really is .
$ 1042 . “ Ifwe apply the principle for which the State of Mary
land contends to the Constitution generally , we shall find it capa
ble o
f changing totally the character o
f that instrument . We
shall find it capable of arresting a
ll
the measures o
f
the govern
ment ,and o
f prostrating it at the foot of the States . The Ameri
can people have declared their Constitution , and the laws made in
pursuance thereof , to be supreme ; but this principle would trans
fe
r
the supremacy , in fact , to the States . If the States may tax
one instrument employed b
y
the government in the execution o
f
it
s powers , they may tax any and every other instrument . They
may tax the mail , they may tax the mint , they may tax patent
rights , they may tax th
e
papers o
f
the custom -house , they may
tax judicial process , they may tax all themeans employed b
y
the
government , to an excess which would defeat all the ends of gov
ernment . This was not intended b
y
the American people . They
did not design to make their government dependent on the States .
Gentlemen say they d
o not claim the right to extend State taxa
fo
r
the very purpose o
f
destruction was held not unconstitutional . The case o
f imposts
levied not primarily for the purposes o
f
revenue , but in order to ai
d
home industry b
y
checking importations ,may also be referred to . ]
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tion to these objects . They limit their pretensions to property .
But on what principle is this distinction made ? Those who make
it have furnished no reason fo
r
it , and the principle fo
r
which they
contend denies it . They contend that the power of taxation has
n
o
other limit than is found in the tenth section of the first article
o
f
the Constitution ; that , with respect to everything else , the
power o
f
the States is supreme , and admits of no control . If this
be true , the distinction between property and other subjects , to
which the power o
f
taxation is applicable , ismerely arbitrary , and
can never be sustained . This is not al
l
. If the controlling power
o
f
the States b
e
established , if their supremacy , as to taxation , be
acknowledged , what is to restrain their exercising this control in
any shape they may please to give it ? Their sovereignty is not
confined to taxation . This is not the only mode in which itmight
b
e displayed . The question is , in truth , a question of supremacy ;
and if the right of the States to tax the means employed by the
general government be conceded , the declaration that the Consti
tution , and the laws made in pursuance thereof , shall be the su
preme law o
f
the land is empty and unmeaning declamation . ”
$ 1043 . “ It has also been insisted that , as the power of taxa
tion in the general and State governments is acknowledged to be
concurrent , every argument which would sustain the right of the
general government to tax banks chartered b
y
the States will
equally sustain the right o
f
the States to ta
x
banks chartered b
y
the general government . But the two cases are not on the same
reason . The people of al
l
the States have created th
e
general
government , and have conferred upon it the general power of
taxation . The people of all the States , and the States themselves ,
are represented in Congress ,and , b
y
their representatives ,exercise
this power . When they tax the chartered institutions of th
e
States , they tax their constituents ; and these taxes must be uni
form . But when a State taxes the operations of the government
o
f
the United States , it acts upon institutions created , not b
y
their own constituents , but b
y
people over whom they claim n
o
control . It acts upon the measures of a government created b
y
others a
s
well as themselves , fo
r
the benefit of others in common
with themselves . The difference is that which always exists and
always must exist between the action o
f
the whole on a part and
the action o
f
a part on the whole ; between the laws of a govern
ment declared to be supreme and those of a government which ,
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when in opposition to those laws , is not supreme. But if the full
application of this argument could be admitted , it might bring into
question the right of Congress to tax the State banks , and could
not prove the right of the States to tax the Bank of the United
States .
§ 1044 . “ The Court has bestowed on this subject its most de
liberate consideration . The result is a conviction that the States
have no power , b
y
taxation o
r
otherwise , to retard , impede , burden ,
o
r
in any manner control , the operations o
f
the constitutional laws
enacted b
y Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
the general government . This is , we think , the unavoidable con
sequence o
f
that supremacy which the Constitution has declared .
We are unanimously o
f opinion that the law passed b
y
the legis
lature of Maryland , imposing a tax on the Bank of the United
States , is unconstitutional and void . ” 1
$ 1045 . In another case the question was raised whether a State
had a constitutional authority to tax stock issued for loans to the
United States ; and it was held b
y
the Supreme Court that a State
had not . The reasoning of the Court was as follows : “ Is the
1 The doctrine was again re -examined b
y
the Supreme Court in a later case , and de
liberately reaffirmed . Osborn v . Bank of th
e
United States , 9 Wheat . R . 738 , 859 to 868 ;
i Kent ' s Comm . Lect . 12 , p . 235 to 239 .
2 Weston v . The City Council of Charleston , 2 Peters ' s R . 449 , per Mr . Chief Justice
Marshall . [See also Bank of Commerce v . New York , 2 Black , 620 ; Bank Tax Case ,
2 Wall . 200 ; The Bank v . The Mayor , 7 Wall . 16 ; Bank v . The Supervisors , 7 Wall . 26 .
The general principles declared in M Culloch v . Maryland were again applied in Dob
bins v . Commissioners o
f
Erie Co . , 1
6
Pet . 448 . It was there held that a State could not
levy a tax upon the compensation allowed by the United States to one o
f
it
s
officers ,
which compensation , it is to b
e
assumed , was n
o
more than the services were worth , and
no more than would b
e
sufficient to secure a diligent performance o
f
the official duties .
And it has also been held competent for Congress to provide that banks organized
under it
s
enactments may b
e
taxed b
y
the States to a certain extent and in a particular
way , and nototherwise . Van Allen v . Assessor' s , 3 Wall . 573 ; People v . Commissioners ,
4 Wall . 244 ; Bradley v . People , 4 Wall . 459 .
But State taxation of a Federal instrumentality , as , for instance , o
f
a railroad which
is employed b
y
the government for it
s purposes , is not impliedly prohibited where it
does not impair the usefulness o
r capability of such instruments to serve the government .
Thomson v . Pacific Railroad , 9 Wall . 579 . See National Bank v . Commonwealth, 9 Wall .
353 .
On the other hand , and for the same reasons , the Supreme Court has declared it incom .
petent for the United States to impose a ta
x
upon the salary o
f
a State officer . “ If the
means and instrumentalities employed b
y
the Federal ] government to carry into opera .
tion the powers granted to it are necessarily , and fo
r
the sake o
f
self -preservation , ex
empt from taxation b
y
the States ,why are not those of the States depending upon their
reserved powers for like reasons equally exempt from Federal taxation ? Their u
n
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stock , issued fo
r
loans made to the government o
f
the United
States , liable to be taxed b
y
States and corporations ? Congress has
power to borrow money on the credit of the United States . ' The
stock it issues is the evidence of a debt created b
y
the exercise o
f
this power . The tax in question is a tax upon the contract sub
sisting between the government and the individual . It bears
directly upon that contractwhile subsisting and in full force . The
power operates upon the contract the instant it is framed , and
must imply a right to affect that contract . If the States and cor
porations throughout the Union possess th
e
power to ta
x
a contract
fo
r
the loan o
f money , what shall arrest this principle in its appli
cation to every other contract ? What measure can government
adopt which will not be exposed to it
s
influence ?
§ 1046 . “ But it is unnecessary to pursue this principle through
it
s
diversified application to a
ll
the contracts and to th
e
various
operations o
f government . No one can be selected which is of
more vital interest to the community than this o
f borrowing money
o
n the credit o
f
the United States . No power has been conferred
b
y
the American people on their government , the free and unbur
dened exercise o
f
which more deeply affects every member o
f
our
republic . In war , when the honor , the safety , the independence ,
o
f
the nation are to be defended ,when al
l
it
s
resources are to b
e
strained to the utmost , credit must be brought in aid of taxation ,
and the abundant revenue o
f peace and prosperity must be antici
impaired existence is a
s
essential in the one case a
s
in the other . ” The Collector v . Day ,
1
1 Wall . 127 .
And the State courts , upon th
e
reasoning in M ' Culloch v . Maryland , have held that
stamp duties could not be imposed upon State process . Warren v . Paul , 22 Ind . 279 ;
Jones v . Estate of Keep , 19 Wis . 369 ; Fifield v . Close , 15 Mich . 505 ; Union Bank v .
Hill , 3 Cold . 325 ; Smith v . Short , 40 Ala . 796 .
Nor upon the tax deeds of a State . Sayles v . Davis , 22 Wis . 225 .
Nor upon the official bonds o
f
a State officer . State v . Gaston , 3
2
Ind . I .
Some o
f
these cases are referred to with approbation b
y Mr . Justice Clifford , in de
ciding th
e
case o
f Day v Buffington . See American Law Review for Oct . 1871 , p .
176 .
In Veazie Bank v . Fenno , 8 Wall . 533 , it was held that Congressional taxation of
State banks o
f
issue to a
n
extent that would put a
n
end to their existence was consti
tutional , notwithstanding it was imposed fo
r
that express purpose and not for revenue .
And in Crandall v . Nevada , 6 Wall . 35 , a State tax upon carriers of passengers , of so
much for each passenger carried out o
f
the State , was held void , because if the power
existed to impose it , itmight be exercised to an extent that would preclude the govern
ment from transporting it
s troops through the State b
y
the usualmodes , or its citizens
from visiting the Capitol or the Federal offices ,where the State line must be crossed for
the purpose . And See Minot v . Philadelphia , & c . , R . R . Co . , 2 Abb . U . S . 323 . )
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pated to supply the exigencies , the urgent demands of themoment.
The people , fo
r
objects the most important which can occur in the
progress o
f
nations , have empowered their government to make
these anticipations , ' to borrow money on the credit of the United
States . ' Can anything be more dangerous or more injurious than
th
e
admission o
f
a principle which authorizes every State and
every corporation in the Union ,which possesses the right of taxa
tion , to burden the exercise of this power at their discretion ?
§ 1047 . “ If the right to impose the tax exists , it is a rightwhich
in it
s
nature acknowledges no limits . It may be carried to any
extent , within the jurisdiction of the State or corporation which
imposes it , which the will of each State and corporation may pre
scribe . A power which is given b
y
the whole American people
for their common good ,which is to be exercised at themost crit
ical periods fo
r
the most important purposes , on the free exercise
o
f
which the interests , certainly , perhaps the liberty of the whole
may depend , - may be burdened , impeded , if not arrested , b
y
any
o
f
th
e
organized parts o
f
the confederacy .
$ 1048 . “ In a society formed like ours , with one supreme gov
ernment fo
r
national purposes , and numerous State governments
fo
r
other purposes , in many respects independent , and in the un
controlled exercise o
f many important powers , occasional interfer
ences ought not to surprise us . The power of taxation is one of
the most essential to a State , and one of the most extensive in its
operation . The attempt to maintain a rule which shall limit its
exercise is undoubtedy among the most delicate and difficult du
ties which can devolve on those whose province it is to expound
the supreme law o
f
the land in it
s application to the cases o
f indi
viduals . This duty has more than once devolved on this court .
In the performance o
f
it we have considered it a
s
a necessary
consequence from the supremacy o
f
the government o
f
the whole ,
that it
s
action in the exercise o
f
it
s legitimate powers should be
free and unembarrassed b
y
any conflicting powers in the posses
sion o
f
it
s parts ; that the powers o
f
a State cannot rightfully b
e
so exercised as to impede and obstruct the free course of those
measures which the government o
f
the United States may right
fully adopt .
§ 1049 . “ This subject was brought before the court in the case
o
f
M 'Culloch v . The State of Maryland , when it was thoroughly
14 Wheaton , 316 .
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argued and deliberately considered . The question decided in that
case bears a near resemblance to that which is involved in this .
It was discussed at the bar in all its relations , and examined by
the court with it
s
utinost attention . We will not repeat the rea
soning which conducted u
s
to the conclusion thus formed ; but
that conclusion was , that al
l
subjects , over which the sovereign
power o
f
a State extends , are objects of taxation ; but those over
which it does not extend are , upon the soundest principles , ex
empt from taxation . The sovereignty of a State extends to
everything which exists b
y
it
s
own authority , or is introduced by
it
s permission ’ ; but not “ to those means which are employed by
Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body b
y
the people of the United States . ' " The attempt to use ’ the power
o
f
taxation on the means employed b
y
the government o
f
the
Union in pursuance o
f
the Constitution is itself an abuse ; because
it is th
e
usurpation o
f
a power which the people of a single State
cannot give . ' " The States have no power , by taxation or other
wise , to retard , impede , burden , or in any manner control the op
eration of the constitutional laws enacted b
y Congress to carry
into execution the powers vested in the general government . We
retain the opinions which were then expressed . A contract made
by the government in the exercise of its power , to borrow money
o
n the credit o
f
the United States , is undoubtedly independent of
the will of any State in which the individual who lends may
reside ; and is undoubtedly an operation essential to the important
objects fo
r
which the government was created . It ought , there
fore , on the principles settled in the case of M ' Culloch v . The
State of Maryland , to be exempt from State taxation , and conse
quently from being taxed b
y
corporations deriving their power
from States .
§ 1050 . “ It is admitted that the power of the government to
borrow money cannot be directly opposed ; and that any law d
i
rectly obstructing its operations would be void . But a distinc
tion is taken between direct opposition and those measures which
may consequentially affect it ; that is , a law prohibiting loans to
the United States would b
e
void ; but a tax on them to any
amount is allowable . It is , we think , impossible not to perceive
th
e
intimate connection which exists between these two modes o
f
acting on the subject . It is not the want of original power in an
independent sovereign State to prohibit loans to a foreign govern
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ment, which restrains the legislature from direct opposition to
those made by the United States . The restraint is imposed by
our Constitution . The American people have conferred th
e
power
o
f borrowing money on their government ; and b
y making that
government supreme have shielded it
s
action , in the exercise of
this power , from the action of the local governments . The grant of
the power is incompatible with a restraining or controlling power ;
and the declaration o
f supremacy is a declaration that no such re
straining or controlling power shall be exercised . The right to tax
the contract to any extent ,when made ,must operate upon the power
to borrow , before it is exercised , and have a sensible influence on
the contract . The extent of this influence depends on the will of
a distinct government . To any extent , however inconsiderable , it
is a burden o
n the operations o
f government . It may be carried
to a
n extent which will arrest them entirely .
$ 1051 . “ It is admitted b
y
the counsel for the defendants , that
the power to ta
x
stock must affect the terms on which loanswill
b
e made . But this objection , it is said , has nomore weight ,when
urged against the application o
f
a
n acknowledged power to govern
ment stock , than if -urged against its application to lands sold b
y
the United States . The distinction is ,we think , apparent . When
lands are sold , no connection remains between the purchaser and
the government . The lands purchased become a part of the
mass o
f property in the country , with no implied exemption from
common burdens . All lands are derived from the general or par
ticular government , and all lands are subject to taxation . Lands
sold are in the condition of money borrowed and repaid . Its lia
bility to taxation , in any form it may then assume , is not ques
tioned . The connection between the borrower and the lender is
dissolved . It is no burden on loans ; it is no impediment to th
e
power o
fborrowing , that the money , when repaid , loses its exemp
tion from taxation . But a ta
x
upon debts due from the govern
ment stands , w
e
think , on very different principles from a ta
x
o
n
lands which the government has sold . The Federalist has been
quoted in the argument , and an eloquent and well -merited eulogy
has been bestowed on the great statesman who is supposed to b
e
the author o
f
th
e
number from which the quotation was made .
This high authority was also relied upon in the case o
f
M ' Culloch
· v . The State of Maryland , and was considered by the court .
Without repeating what was then said , w
e
refer to it as exhibit
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ing our view o
f
the sentiments expressed on this subject b
y
the
authors o
f that work .
§ 1052 . “ It has been supposed that a ta
x
o
n stock comes with
in the exceptions stated in the case o
f
M ' Culloch v . The State of
Maryland . We do not think so . The bank of the United States
is an instrument essential to the fiscal operations of the govern
ment ; and the power which might be exercised to its destruction
was denied . But property , acquired b
y
that corporation in a
State ,was supposed to be placed in the same condition with property
acquired b
y
a
n individual . The tax on government stock is ·
thought b
y
this court to be a tax on the contract , a tax on the
power to borrow money on the credit o
f
the United States , and
consequently to b
e repugnant to the Constitution . "
$ 1053 . It is observable that these decisions turn upon the
point that n
o
State can have authority to tax an instrument o
f
th
e
United States , or thereby to diminish the means of the United
States , used in the exercise of powers confided to it . But there is
no prohibition upon any State to tax any bank or other corporation
created b
y
it
s
own authority , unless it has restrained itself , b
y
th
e
charter o
f incorporation , from the power of taxation . This sub
ject , however , will more properly fall under notice in some future
discussions . It may be added that Congress may ,without doubt ,
tax State banks ; fo
r
it is clearly within the taxing power confided
to the general government . When Congress tax the chartered in
stitutions of the States , they tax their own constituents ; and such
taxes must be uniform . But when a State taxes an institution
created b
y
Congress , it taxes an instrument of a superior and inde
pendent sovereignty not represented in the State legislature . 3
1 Providence Bank v . Billings , 4 Peters ' s R .514 .
2 M Culloch v . Maryland , 1 Wheat . R . 316 , 435 .
8 [ Sc
e , however , Thompson v . Pacific Railroad , 9 Wall . 579 ; National Bank v . Com
monwealth , 9 Wall . 353 . ]
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APPENDIX .
WHILE this work was passing through the press, President Jackson 's Proclamation
of the 10th of December , 1832, concerning the (then ) recent ordinance of South Caro
lina on th
e
subject o
f
the tariff , appeared . That document contains a most elaborato
view o
f
several questions which have been discussed in this and the preceding volume ,
especially respecting the supremacy o
f
the laws o
f
the Union , the right of the
judiciary to decide upon the constitutionality o
f
those laws , and the total repugnancy
to the Constitution o
f
the modern doctrine o
f
nullification asserted in that ordinance .
As a state paper it is entitled to very high praise for the clearness , force , and eloquence
with which it has defended the rights and powers o
f
the national government . I gladly
copy into these pages some o
f
it
s
most important passages , as among the ablest com
mentaries ever offered upon the Constitution .
“ Whereas , a convention assembled in th
e
State o
f
South Carolina have passed a
n
ordinance b
y
which they declare that the several acts and parts o
f
acts o
f
the Con
gress o
f
the United States , purporting to b
e
laws for the imposing o
f
duties and imposts
o
n
the importation o
f foreign commodities , and now having actual operation and effect
within the United States , and more especially ' two acts for the same purpose passed on
the 29th o
f May , 1828 , and on the 14th o
f July , 1832 , ' are unauthorized b
y
the Consti
tution o
f
the United States , and violate the true meaning and intent thereof , and are
null and void , and no law , ' nor binding on the citizens o
f
that State o
r
it
s
officers ; and
by the said ordinance it is further declared to be unlawful for any of the constituted
authorities o
f
th
e
State , or of th
e
United States , to enforce the payment of the duties
imposed b
y
the said acts within th
e
same State , and that it is the duty o
f
the legislature
to pass such laws a
smay b
e necessary to give full effect to the said ordinance :
“ And whereas , b
y
the said ordinance , it is further ordained , that in no case of law or
equity , decided in the courts o
f
said State , wherein shall b
e
drawn in question the valid
ity o
f
the said ordinance , o
r o
f
the acts o
f
the legislature , that may b
e passed to give it
effect , o
r
o
f
the said laws o
f
the United States , n
o appeal shall b
e
allowed to the Su
preme Court o
f
the United States , nor shall any copy o
f
the record b
e permitted o
r
allowed fo
r
that purpose , and that any person attempting to take such appeal shall be
punished a
s
for a contempt o
f
court :
“ And , finally , the said ordinance declares , that the people of South Carolina will
maintain the said ordinance a
t every hazard ; and that they will consider the passage
o
f
any act b
y
Congress , abolishing or closing the ports of the said State , or otherwise
obstructing the free ingress o
r egress o
f
vessels to and from the said ports , or any
other act o
f
th
e
Federal government to coerce the State , shut u
p
her ports destroy o
r
harass her commerce , or to enforce the said acts , otherwise than through the civil tri
bunals o
f
the country , as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in
the Union ; and that the people of the said State will thenceforth hold themselves ab
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solved from a
ll
further obligation to maintain o
r preserve their political connection with
the people o
f
the other States , and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate gore
ernment , and do a
ll
other acts and things which sovereign and independent states may
o
f right do :
“ And whereas , the said ordinance prescribes to the people o
f
South Carolina a course
o
f
conduct , in direct violation of their duty as citizens of the United States , contrary
to the laws o
f
their country , subversive o
f
it
s
Constitution , and having for it
s object the
destruction o
f
the Union , - that Union which , coeval with our political existence , le
d
our fathers , without any other ties to unite them , than those o
f
patriotism and a com
mon cause , through a sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence , - that sacred
Union , hitherto inviolate , which , perfected b
y
our happy Constitution , has brought us ,
b
y
the favor o
f
Heaven , to a state of prosperity at home and high consideration abroad
rarely , if ever , equalled in the history o
f
nations . To preserve this bond of our politi
cal existence from destruction , to maintain inviolate this state of national honor and
prosperity , and to justify the confidence my fellow -citizens have reposed in me , I ,
ANDREW JACKSON , President of th
e
United States , have thought proper to issue this my
PROCLAMATION , stating my views of the Constitution and laws applicable to themeas
ures adopted by the convention o
f
South Carolina , and to the reasons they have put
forth to sustain them , declaring the coursewhich duty will require me to pursue , and ,
appealing to the understanding and patriotism o
f
the people , warn them o
f
the conse
quences thatmust inevitably result from an observance of the dictates of the convention .
“ Strict duty would require o
f me nothing more than the exercise of those powers
with which I am now , or may hereafter be , invested , fo
r
preserving the peace o
f
the
Union , and fo
r
the execution o
f
the laws . But the imposing aspect which opposition
has assumed in this case , b
y
clothing itself with State authority , and the deep interest
which the people o
f
the United States must a
ll
feel in preventing a resort to stronger
measures , while there is a hope that anything will be yielded to reasoning and remon
strance , perhaps demand , and will certainly justify , a full exposition to South Carolina
and the nation o
f
the views I entertain of this important question , as well as a distinct
enunciation o
f
the course which my sense o
f duty will require me to pursue .
“ The ordinance is founded , not on the indefeasible right o
f
resisting acts which are
plainly unconstitutional and too oppressive to b
e
endured , but on the strange position
that any one State may not only declare a
n
act o
f Congress void , but prohibit it
s
exe
cution , - that they may d
o
this consistently with the Constitution , that the true con
struction o
f
that instrument permits a State to retain it
s place in the Union , and yet be
bound b
y
n
o
other o
f
it
s
laws than those it may choose to consider as constitutional .
It is true , they add , that to justify this abrogation of a law it must be palpably contrary
to the Constitution ; but it is evident that to give the right o
f
resisting laws o
f
that
description , coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that char
acter , is to give the power of resisting al
l
laws . For , as b
y
the theory there is n
o a
p
peal , the reasons alleged b
y
the State , good or bad ,must prevail . If it should be said
that public opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse o
f
this power , itmay be
asked ,why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against th
e
passage o
f
a
n
unconstitutional
act b
y
Congress . There is , however , a restraint in this last casewhich makes the as
sumed power o
f
a State more indefensible , and which does not exist in the other .
There are two appeals from a
n
unconstitutional act passed b
y
Congress , - one to the
judiciary , the other to the people and the States . There is no appeal from the State de
cision in theory , and the practical illustration shows that the courts are closed against
a
n application to review it , both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor .
But reasoning on this subject is superfluous ,when our social compact in express terms
declares that the laws o
f
the United States , the Constitution , and treaties made under
it , are the supreme law of the land ; and for greater caution adds , ' that the judges in
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every State shall be bound thereby,anything in the constitution or laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding . And it may be asserted,without fear of refutation , that
no federative government could exist without a similar provision . Look for amoment
to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws unconstitutional ,
and has a right to prevent their execution in the port of Charleston , there would be a
clear constitutional objection to their coellction in every other port , and no revenuo
could be collected anywhere ; for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat
that an unconstitutional law is no law , so long as the question of its legality is to be
decided b
y
the State itself ; fo
r
every law , operating injuriously upon any local interest ,
will be perhaps thought , and certainly represented , as unconstitutional , and , as has been
shown , there is no appeal .
" If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day , the Union would have been
dissolved in it
s infancy . The excise law in Pennsylvania , th
e
embargo and non -inter
course la
w
in the Eastern States , the carriage tax in Virginia , were all deemed uncon
stitutional , and were more unequal in their operation than any o
f
the laws now com
plained o
f ; but fortunately none o
f
those States discovered that they had the rightnow
claimed b
y
South Carolina . The war into which we were forced to support the
dignity o
f
the nation and the rights o
f
our citizensmight have ended in defeat and
disgrace , instead o
f victory and honor , if the States who supposed it a ruinous and
unconstitutional measure had thought they possessed the right of nullifying the act b
y
which it was declared , and denying supplies for its prosecution . Hardly and unequally
a
s
those measures bore upon several members o
f
the Union , to the legislatures of none
did this efficient and peaceable remedy , as it is called , suggest itself . The discovery of
this important feature in our Constitution was reserved to the present day . To the
statesmen o
f
South Carolina belongs the invention ; and upon the citizens o
f that State
willunfortunately fall the evils of reducing it to practice .
" If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it internal
evidence o
f
its impracticable absurdity , our constitutional history will also afford abun
dant proof that it would have been repudiated with indignation , had it been proposed
to form a feature in our government .
“ In our colonial state , although dependent on another power , we very early con .
sidered ourselves a
s
connected b
y
common interest with each other . Leagues were
formed fo
r
common defence , and before the Declaration o
f
Independence we were known
in our aggregate character a
s THE UNITED COLONIES O
F
AMERICA . That decisive
and important stepwas taken jointly . We declared ourselves a nation b
y
a joint , not
b
y
several acts ; and when the terms of our confederation were reduced to form , it was
in that of a solemn league of several States , b
y
which they agreed that they would col .
lectively form one nation , fo
r
the purpose o
f conducting some certain domestic concerns
and all foreign relations . In the instrument forming that Union is found an article
which declares , that every State shall abide by the determinations of Congress on al
l
questions which b
y
that confederation should b
e
submitted to them . '
“ Under the confederation , then , no State could legally annul a decision of the Con
gress , o
r
refuse to submit to it
s
execution ; but no provision was made to enforce these
decisions . Congress made requisitions , but they were not complied with . The gov .
ernment could not operate o
n
individuals . They had no judiciary , no means of col
lecting revenue .
“ But the defects of the confederation need not be detailed . Under its operation we
could scarcely b
e
called a nation . We had neither prosperity at home nor considera
tion abroad . This state of things could not be endured ; and our present happy Con
stitution was formed , but formed in vain , if this fatal doctrine prevails . It was formed
for important objects , that are announced in the preamble ,made in the name and b
y
the authority o
f
the people o
f
the United States , whose delegates framed , and whose
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conventions approved it. The most important among these objects, that which is
placed first in rank , on which all the others rest , is, ' to form a more perfectunion . Now ,
is it possible , that even if there were no express provision giving supremacy to the
Constitution and laws of the United States over those of the States , it can be con
ceived that an instrument made for the purpose of forming a more perfectunion ' than
that of the confederation could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom of our
country as to substitute for that confederation a form of government dependent for its
existence on the local interest , the party spirit , of a State , or of a prevailing faction
in a State ? Every man of plain , unsophisticated understanding , who hears the ques
tion ,will give such an answer aswill preserve the Union . Metaphysical subtlety , in
pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated to
destroy it.
“ I consider, then, th
e
power to annul a la
w
o
f
the United States , assumed b
y
one
State , incompatible with theexistence o
f
th
e
Union , contradicted expressly b
y
th
e
letter o
f
the
Constitution , unauthorized b
y
it
s spirit , inconsistent with every principle on which it was
founded , and destructive of th
e
great object fo
r
which itwas formed .
“ After this general view o
f
the leading principle , wemust examine the particular
application o
f
it which is made in the ordinance .
“ The preamble rests it
s justification o
n
these grounds : It assumes , as a fact , that
the obnoxious laws , although they purport to be laws for raising revenue , were , in
reality , intended fo
r
the protection o
f
manufactures , which purpose it asserts to be un
constitutional ; that the operation of these laws is unequal ; that the amount raised b
y
them is greater than is required b
y
the wants o
f
the government ; and , finally , that the
proceeds are to b
e applied to objects unauthorized b
y
the Constitution . These are the
only causes alleged to justify a
n open opposition to the laws o
f
the country , and a
threat o
f seceding from the Union if any attempt should b
e
made to enforce them . The
first virtually acknowledges that the la
w
in question was passed under a power ex
pressly given b
y
the Constitution to lay and collect imposts ; but its constitutionality
is drawn in question from the motives o
f
those who passed it . However apparent this
purpose may b
e
in the present case , nothing can b
e
more dangerous than to admit the
position , that an unconstitutional purpose , entertained b
y
the members who assent to a
law enacted under a constitutional power , shall make that law void ; for how is that
purpose to b
e
ascertained ? Who is to make the scrutiny ? How often may bad pur
poses b
e falsely imputed ? In how many cases are they concealed b
y
false professious ?
In how many is n
o
declaration o
f
motive made ? Admit this doctrine , and you give to
the States a
n
uncontrolled right to decide ; and every law may be annulled under this
pretext . If , therefore , the absurd and dangerous doctrine should be admitted , that a
State may annul a
n
unconstitutional law , or one that it deems such , it will not apply
to the present case .
" The next objection is , that the laws in question operate unequally . This objection
may b
e
made with truth to every law that has been o
r
can b
e passed . The wisdom of
man never yet contrived a system o
f
taxation that would operate with perfect equality .
If the unequal operation of a law makes it unconstitutional , and if all laws of that
description may b
e abrogated b
y
any State for that cause , then , indeed , is the Federal
Constitution unworthy o
f
the slightest effort for it
s preservation . We have hitherto
relied o
n it a
s
the perpetual bond o
f
our Union . We have received it as th
e
work o
f
the assembled wisdom o
f
the nation . We have trusted to it as the sheet -anchor of our
safety in the stormy times o
f
conflict with a foreign o
r
domestic fo
e
. We have looked
to it with sacred awe as the palladium of our liberties ; and , with all the solemnities of
religion , have pledged to each other our lives and fortunes here and our hopes of hap
piness hereafter , in its defence and support . Were we mistaken ,my countrymen , in
attaching this importance to the Constitution o
f
our country ? Was our devotion paid
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e
wretched , inefficient , clumsy contrivance which this new doctrine would make
it ? Did we pledge ourselves to the support o
f
a
n airy nothing , a bubble that must be
blown away b
y
the first breath o
f
disaffection ? Was this self -destroying , visionary
theory the work o
f
the profound statesmen , the exalted patriots , to whom the task of
constitutional reform was intrusted ?
" Did the name o
f Washington sanction , di
d
the States deliberately ratify , sach an
anomaly in th
e
history o
f
fundamental legislation ? N
o . We were not mistaken .
The letter o
f
this great instrument is free from this radical fault ; its language directly
contradicts the imputation ; its spirit , its evident intent , contradicts it . No , we did not
err ! Our Constitution does not contain the absurdity o
f giving power to make laws
and another power to resist them . The sages ,whose memory will always be rever
enced , have given us a practical , and , as they hoped , a permanent constitutional com .
pact . The father of his country did not affix his revered name to 8
0 palpable a
n
a
b
surdity . Nor did the States , when they severally ratified it , do so under the impression
that a veto o
n
the laws o
f
the United States was reserved to them , o
r
that they could
exercise it b
y
implication . Search the debates in all their conventions , examine the
speeches o
f the most zealous opposers o
f
Federal authority , look at the amendments
that were proposed , - they are all silent ; not a syllable uttered , not a vote given , not a
motion made to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws o
f
the Union over
those o
f
the States , or to show that implication , as is now contended , could defeat it .
No , we have not erred ! The Constitution is still the object of our reverence , the bond
o
f
our union , our defence in danger , and the source o
f our prosperity in peace . It shall
descend , as we have received it , uncorrupted b
y
sophistical construction , to our poster
it
y ; and the sacrifices of local interest , of State prejudices , of personal animosities ,
that were made to bring it into existence , will again be patriotically offered for its
support .
“ The two remaining objections made b
y
the ordinance to these laws are , that the
sums intended to b
e
raised b
y
them are greater than are required , and that the proceeds
will be unconstitutionally employed .
“ The Constitution has given expressly to Congress the right of raising revenue , and
o
f determining th
e
sum th
e
public exigencies will require . The States have no control
over the exercise o
f
this right , other than that which results from the power of changing
the representatives who abuse it , and thus procure redress . Congress may undoubtedly
abuse this discretionary power , but the same may b
e
said o
f
others with which they are
vested . Yet the discretion must exist somewhere . The Constitution bas given it to the
representatives o
fall the people , checked b
y
the representatives o
f
the States and b
y
the
executive power . The South Carolina construction gives it to the legislature , or the
convention o
f
a single State , where neither the people of the different States , nor the
States in their separate capacity , nor the chief magistrate elected b
y
the people , have
any representation . Which is the most discreet disposition o
f
the power ? I do not
ask you , fellow -citizens ,which is the constitutional disposition ; that instrument speaks
a language not to be misunderstood . But if you were assembled in general convention ,
which would you think the safest depository o
f
this discretionary power in the last
resort ? Would you add a clause , giving it to each of the States , or would you sanction
the wise provisions already made b
y
your Constitution ? If this should be the result of
your deliberations , when providing for the future , are you , can you be ready to risk all
that we hold dear , to establish , for a temporary and a local purpose , that which you must
acknowledge to b
e
destructive and evenabsurd , as a general provision ? Carry out the
consequences o
f
this right vested in the different States , and you must perceive that the
crisis your conduct presents a
t
this day would recur whenever any la
w
o
f
the United
States displeased any o
f
the States , and that we should soon cease to be a nation .
“ The ordinance , with the same knowledge o
f
the future that characterizes a former
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objection , tells you that the proceeds of the ta
x
will be unconstitutionally applied . If
this could b
e
ascertained with certainty , the objection would , with more propriety , be
reserved fo
r
the law so applying the proceeds , but surely cannot be urged against the
laws levying the duty .
“ These are the allegations contained in the ordinance . Examine them seriously ,my
fellow -citizens ; judge fo
r
yourselves . I appeal to you to determine whether they are so
clear , so convincing , a
s
to leave n
o
doubt o
f
their correctness ; and even if you should
come to this conclusion , how far they justify the reckless , destructive course which you
are directed to pursue . Review these objections , and the conclusions drawn from them ,
oncemore . What are they ? Every law , then , fo
r
raising revenue , according to the
South Carolina ordinance , may be rightfully annulled , unless it be so framed as no law
ever will or cau be framed . Congress have a right to pass laws for raising a revenue ,
and each State has a right to oppose their execution , - - two rights directly opposed to
each other ; and yet is this absurdity supposed to b
e
contained in a
n
instrument drawn
for the express purpose o
f avoiding collisions between the States and the general gove
ernment , by an assembly o
f
the most enlightened statesmen and purest patriots ever
embodied for a similar purpose .
" In vain have these sages declared that Congress shall have power to la
y
and collect
taxes , duties , imposts , and excises ; in vain have they provided that they shall have
power to pass laws , which shall be necessary and proper to carry those powers into execu
tion ; that those laws and that Constitution shall be the supreme law o
f
the land , and
that the judges in every State shall b
e
bound thereby , anything in the constitution and
laws o
f any State to the contrary notwithstanding . In vain have the people of the
several States solemnly sanctioned these provisions ,made them their paramount law ,
and individually sworn to support themwhenever they were called o
n
to execute any
office . Vain provisions ! ineffectual restrictions ! vile profanations of oaths ! miserable
mockery o
f legislation ! if the bare majority o
f
the voters in any one State may , o
n
a
real o
r supposed knowledge of the intent with which a law has been passed , declare
themselves free from it
s operation , - say here it gives too little , there too much , and
operates unequally , - here it suffers articles to be free that ought to be taxed , - there it
taxes those that ought to be free , - in this case the proceeds are intended to be applied
to purposes which we d
o
not approve , - in that the amount raised is more than is
wanted . Congress , it is true ,are invested by th
e
Constitution with the right of deciding
these questions according to their sound discretion ; Congress is composed of the repre
sentatives o
f
a
ll
the States ,and of al
l
the people o
f
a
ll
the States ; but we ,part of the
people o
f
one State , to whom the Constitution has given n
o power o
n
the subject , from
whom it has expressly taken it away , - we ,who have solemnly agreed that this Consti
tution shall b
e our law , — we ,most o
f
whom have sworn to support it , - we now abro
gate this law , and swear , and force others to swear , that it shall not be obeyed ; andwe
d
o
this , not because Congress have no right to pass such laws , – this we do not allege ,
but because they have passed them with improper views . They are unconstitutional
from the motives o
f
those who passed them , which we can never with certainty know ;
from their unequal operation , although it is impossible , from the nature o
f things , that
they should b
e equal ; and from the disposition which we presume may be made of their
proceeds , although that disposition has not been declared . This is the plain meaning
o
f
the ordinance , in relation to laws which it abrogates for alleged unconstitutionality .
But it does not stop there . It repeals , in express terms , an important part of the Con
stitution itself , and of laws passed to give it effect ,which have never been alleged to be
unconstitutional . The Constitution declares that the judicial powers of the United
States extend to casesarising under the laws o
f
the United States ; and that such laws ,
the Constitution , and treaties , shall be paramount to the State constitutions and laws .
The judiciary act prescribes the mode b
y
which the casemay b
e brought before a court
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of the United States by appeal,when a State tribunal shall decide against this provision
of the Constitution . The ordinance declares that there shall be no appeal ,makes the
State law paramount to the Constitution and laws of the United States , forces judges
and jurors to swear that they will disregard their provisions , and even makes it penal
in a suitor to attempt relief by appeal. It further declares , that it shall not be lawful
fo
r
the authorities o
f
the United States , or of that State , to enforce th
e
payment o
f
duties
imposed by the revenue laws within it
s
limits .
“ Here is a la
w
o
f
the United States , not even pretended to be unconstitutional , re
pealed b
y
the authority o
f
a small majority o
f
the voters o
f
a single State . Here is a
provision o
f
the Constitution which is solemnly abrogated b
y
the same authority .
“ On such expositions and reasonings , the ordinance grounds not only a
n
assertion
o
f
the right to annul the laws of which it complains , but to enforce it b
y
a threat o
f
seceding from the Union if any attempt is made to execute them .
“ This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the Constitution , which they say
is a compact between sovereign States ,who have preserved their whole sovereignty , and
therefore are subject to n
o superior ; that because they made th
e
compact , they can
break it ,when , in their opinion , it has been departed from b
y
the other States . Falla
cious a
s
this course o
f reasoning is , it enlists State pride , and finds advocates in the
honest prejudices o
f
those who have not studied the nature of our government suffi
ciently to see the radical error o
n
which it rests .
“ The people o
f
the United States formed the Constitution , acting through th
e
State
legislatures in making th
e
compact , to meot and discuss its provisions , and acting in
separate conventions when they ratified those provisions ; but the terms used in its
construction show it to be a government in which the people of all the States collec
tively are represented . We are ONE PEOPLE in the choice of President and Vice -Presi
dent . Here the States have no other agency than to direct the mode in which the
votes shall b
e given . The candidates having the majority o
f
a
ll
the votes are chosen .
The electors o
f
amajority of States may have given their votes for one candidate , and
yet another may b
e
chosen . The people , then , and not the States , are represented in
the executive branch .
" In the House o
f Representatives there is this difference , that the people o
f
one State
d
o
not , as in the case of President and Vice -President , all vote fo
r
the same officers .
The people o
f
a
ll
the States d
o not vote fo
r
all the members , each State electing its own
representatives . But this creates no material distinction . When chosen , they are all
representatives o
f
the United States , not representatives of the particular State from
whence they come . They are paid b
y
the United States , not b
y
the State ; nor are they
accountable to it for any act done in the performance o
f
their legislative functions ; and
however they may in practice , as it is their duty to do , consult and prefer the interests
o
f
their particular constituents when they come in conflict with any other partial o
r
local interest , yet it is their first and highest duty , as representatives of the United
States , to promote the general good .
“ The Constitution o
f
the United States , then , forms a government, and not a league ;
and whether it b
e
formed b
y
compact between the States , o
r
in any other manner , it
s
character is the same . It is a government in which al
l
the people are represented ,
which operates directly o
n
the people individually , not upon the States ; they retained
a
ll
the power they did not grant . But each State , having expressly parted with somany
powers a
s
to constitute jointly with the other States a single nation , cannot from that
period possess any right to secede , because such secession does not break a league , but
destroys the unity o
f
a nation ; and any injury to that unity is not only a breach which
would result from the contravention o
f
a compact , but it is an offence against the
whole Union . To say that any State may a
t pleasure secede from the Union is to say
that the United States are not a nation ; because it would be a solecism to contend
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that any part of a nation might dissolve its connection with the other parts , to their
injury o
r ruin , without committing any offence . Secession , like any other revolutionary
act , may be morally justified b
y
the extremity o
f oppression ; but to call it a constitu
tional right is confounding the meaning o
f
terms ; and can only be done through gross
error , or to deceive those who are willing to assert a right , but would pause before they
made a revolution , o
r
incur the penalities consequent o
n a failure .
“ Because the Union was formed b
y
compact , it is said the parties to that compact
may , when they feel themselves aggrieved , depart from it ; but it is precisely because it
is a compact that they cannot . A compact is a
n agreement o
r binding obligation . It
may , by its terms , have a sanction o
r penalty for it
s
breach , or it may not . If it con
tains no sanction , it may be broken with n
o
other consequence than moral guilt ; if it
have a sanction , then the breach incurs the designated o
r implied penalty . A league
between independent nations generally has n
o
sanction other than a moral one ; o
r , if
it should contain a penalty , a
s
there is n
o
common superior , it cannot b
e
enforced . A
government , on the contrary , always has a sanction , express or implied ; and in our
case it is both necessarily implied and expressly given . An attempt b
y
force o
f
arins
to destroy a government is a
n
offence , b
y
whatever means the constitutional compact
may have been formed ; and such government has the right , b
y
the law o
f
self -defence ,
to pass acts for punishing the offender , unless that right is modified , restrained , o
r
re
sumed b
y
the constitutional act . In our system , although it is modified in the case of
treason , yet authority is expressly given to pass a
ll
laws necessary to carry it
s powers
into effect , and under this grant provision has been made for punishing acts which
obstruct the due administration o
f
the laws .
“ It would seemsuperfluous to add anything to show the nature of that union which
connects u
s ; but as erroneous opinions on this subject are the foundation of doctrines
themost destructive to our peace , Imust give some further development to my views
o
n
this subject . No one , fellow -citizens , has a higher reverence for the reserved rights
o
f
the States than the magistrate who now addresses you . No one would make greater
personal sacrifices o
r
official exertions to defend them from violation ; but equal care
must be taken to prevent , on their part , an improper interference with , or resumption of ,
the rights they have vested in the nation . The line has not been so distinctly drawn
a
s
to avoid doubts in some cases o
f
the exercise o
f power . Men of the best intentions
and soundest views may differ in their construction o
f
some parts o
f
the Constitution ;
but there are others o
n
which dispassionate reflection ca
n
leave n
o
doubt . Of this na
ture appears to b
e
the assumed right o
f
secession . It rests , a
s
we have seen , o
n
the
alleged undivided sovereignty o
f
the States , and on their having formed , in this sovereign
capacity , a compact which is called the Constitution , from which , because they made it ,
they have the right to secede . Both of these positions are erroneous , and some o
f
the - F *
arguments to prove them so have been anticipated .
“ The States severally have not retained their entire sovereignty . It has been shown ,
that , in becoming parts of a nation , not members of a league , they surrendered many o
f
their essential parts o
f sovereignty . The right to make treaties , declare war , levy taxes ,
exercise exclusive judicial and legislative powers ,were all of them functions of sovereign
power . The States , then , for all these important purposes , were no longer sovereign .
The allegiance o
f
their citizens was transferred , in the first instance , to the government
o
f
the United States ; they became American citizens , and owed obedience to the Con
stitution o
f
the United States and to laws made in conformity with the powers vested
in Congress . This last position has not been and cannot be denied . How , then , ca
n
that State b
e
said to b
e sovereign and independent ,whose citizens owe obedience to laws
not made b
y
it , and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws when they
come in conflict with those passed b
y
another ? What shows conclusively that the States
cannot b
e
said to have reserved a
n
undivided sovereignty is , that they expressly ceded
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the right to punish treason ; not treason against their separate power , but treason
against the United States . Treason is an offence against sovereignty, and sovereignty
must reside with the power to punish it. But the reserved rights of the States are not
less sacred because they have , for their common interest,made the general government
the depositary of these powers.
“ The unity of our political character (as has here been shown fo
r
another purpose )
commenced with it
s very existence . Under the royal government we had no separate
character ; our opposition to it
s oppressions began a
s UNITED COLONIES . Wewere
the UNITED STATEs under the confederation , and the name was perpetuated , and the
union rendered more perfect b
y
the Federal Constitution . In none of these stages did
we consider ourselves in any other light than a
s forming one nation . Treaties and alli
ances were made in the name o
f all . Troops were raised for the joint defence . How ,
then , with a
ll
these proofs , that under all changes of our position we had , for designated
purposes , and with defined powers , created national governments , - how is it , that the
most perfect of those several modes o
f
union should now b
e
considered a
s
a mere
league that may b
e
dissolved a
t pleasure ? It is from an abuse of terms . " Compact '
is used a
s synonymous with ‘ league , 'although the true term is not employed , because
it would at once show the fallacy of the reasoning . It would not do to say that our
Constitution was only a league , but it is labored to prove it a compact , (which in one
sense it is , ) and then to argue that , as a league is a compact , every compact between
nations must o
f
course b
e
a league ; and that from such an 'engagement every sovereign
power has a right to recede . But it has been shown that in this sensethe States are not
sovereign , and that , even if they were , and the national Constitution had been formed b
y
compact , there would be no right in any one State to exonerate itself from its obli
gations .
“ S
o
obvious are the reasons which forbid this secession , that it is necessary only to
allude to them . The Union was formed fo
r
the benefit o
f
a
ll . Itwas produced b
y
mu
tual sacrifices o
f
interests and opinions . Can those sacrifices be recalled ? Can the
States , who magnanimously surrendered their title to the Territories o
f
theWest , recall
the grant ? Will the inhabitants of the inland States agree to pay the duties that may
b
e imposed ,without their assent , b
y
those o
n
the Atlantic o
r
the Gulf , fo
r
their own
benefit ? Shall there be a free port in one State and onerous duties in another ? No
one believes that any right exists in a single State to involve the others in these and
countless other evils , contrary to the engagements solemnly made . Every one must se
e
that the other States , in self -defence ,must oppose a
t
all hazards .
“ These are the alternatives that are presented b
y
the convention : A repeal of al
l
the
acts for raising revenue , leaving the government without the means of support ; or an
acquiescence in the dissolution o
f
our Union b
y
the secession o
f
one o
f
it
s
members .
When th
e
first was proposed , it was known that it could not be listened to fo
r
a mo .
ment . It was known , if forcewas applied to oppose the execution of the laws , that it
must b
e repelled by force ; that Congress could not ,without involving itself in disgrace
and th
e
country in ruin , accede to the proposition ; and yet , if this is not done on a
given day , or if any attempt ismade to execute the laws , the State is , b
y
the ordinance ,
declared to b
e
out o
f
the Union . The majority of a convention assembled for the pur
pose have dictated these terms , or rather this rejection of al
l
terms , in the name of the
people o
f
South Carolina . It is true that the governor of the State speaks of the sub
mission o
f
their grievances to a convention o
f a
ll
the States , which , he says , they ' si
n
cerely and anxiously seek and desire . ' Yet this obvious and constitutional mode of ob
taining the sense o
f
the other States o
n
the construction o
f
the Federal compact , and
amending it if necessary , has never been attempted b
y
those who have urged the State
o
n
to this destructive measure . The State might have proposed to call for a general
convention to the other States ; and Congress , if a sufficient number o
f
them concurred ,
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must have called it. But the first niagistrate of South Carolina ,when he expressed a
hope that , ' on a review by Congress and the functionaries of the general government
of the merits of the controversy ,' such a convention will be accorded to them ,must
have known, that neither Congress nor any functionary of th
e
general government has
authority to call such a convention , unless it be demanded b
y
two thirds o
f
the States .
This suggestion , then , is another instance of the reckless inattention to the provisions
o
f
the Constitution ,with which this crisis ha
s
been madly hurried o
n ; or of the attempt
to persuade the people that a constitutional remedy had been sought and refused . If
the legislature o
f
South Carolina ' anxiously desire ' a general convention to consider
their complaints , why have they notmade application fo
r
it in the way the Constitution
points out ? The assertion that they earnestly seek ' it is completely negatived b
y
the
omission . ”
[ This document is understood to have been prepared b
y
that eminent jurist , Edward
Livingston . Hunt ' s Life of Livingston , 371 ; Parton ' s Life of Jackson , III . 406 . It
will not be inappropriate to place beside it extracts from the Inaugural Address of
President Lincoln , covering the same ground :
“ It is seventy -two years since the first inauguration of a President under our national
Constitution . During that time fifteen different and greatly distinguished citizens have ,
in succession , administered the executive branch of the government . They have con
ducted it through many perils , and generally with great success . Yet , with al
l
this
scope for precedent , I now enter upon the same task , for the brief constitutional term of
four years , under great and peculiar difficulty . A disruption o
f
the Federal Union ,
heretofore only menaced , is now formidably attempted .
" I hold that , in contemplation o
f
universal law and o
f
the Constitution , the anion
o
f
these States is perpetual . Perpetuity is implied , if not expressed , in th
e
fundamental
law o
f
a
ll
national governments . It is safe to assert that no government proper ever
had a provision in it
s organic law fo
r
it
s
own termination . Continue to execute al
l
the
express provisions o
f
our national Constitution , and the Union will endure forever , it
being impossible to destroy it , except b
y
some action not provided for in the instrument
itself .
“ Again , if the United States be not a government proper ,but an association of States
in the nature o
f
the contract merely , can it , a
s
a contract , be peaceably unmade b
y
less
than all the parties who made it ? One party to a contract may violate it , break it , so
to speak , but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it ?
" Descending from these general principles , we find the proposition that , in legal con
templation , the Union is perpetual , confirmed b
y
the history o
f
the Union itself . The
Union is much older than the Constitution . It was formed , in fact , b
y
the Articles o
f
Association , in 1774 . It was matured and continued b
y
the Declaration o
f Indepen
dence , in 1776 . It was further matured , and the faith of all the then thirteen States
expressly plighted and engaged that it should b
e perpetual , by the Articles of Confed
eration , in 1778 . And finally , in 1787 , one o
f
the declared objects for ordaining and
establishing the Constitution was ' to form a more perfect union . '
“ But if destruction of the Union b
y
one , o
r by a part only , of the States , be lawfully
possible , the Union is less perfect than before , the Constitution having lost the vital ele
ment o
f perpetuity .
“ It follows , from these views , that no State , upon its own mere motion , can lawfully
get out o
f
the Union ; that resolvesand ordinances to that effect are legally void ; and that
acts o
f
violence ,within any State or States ,against th
e
authority o
f
th
e
United States ,
are insurrectionary o
r revolutionary , according to circumstances .
“ I therefore consider that , in view of the Constitution and the laws , the Union is
unbroken , and , to the extent ofmy ability , I shall take care , a
s
the Constitution itself
expressly enjoins upon me , that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in al
l
the
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States. Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part , and I shall perform
it, as fa
r
a
s practicable , unlessmy rightful masters , the American people , shall withhold
the requisite means , or , in some authoritative manner , direct the contrary . I trust this
will not be regarded as a menace , but only as a declared purpose of the Union that it
will constitutionally defend and maintain itself .
“ In doing this there need b
e
n
o
bloodshed o
r
violence ; and there shall be none , unless
it be forced upon the national authority . The power confided to mewill be used to
hold , occupy , and possess the property and places belonging to the government , and to
collect the duties and imposts ; but , beyond what may be necessary for these objects ,
there will be no invasion , no using of force against or among the people anywhere .
Where hostility against the United States , in any interior locality , shall be so great and
universal a
s
to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal offices ,
there will be no attempt to forceobnoxious strangers among the people for that object .
While the strict legal right may exist in the government to enforce the exercise of these
offices , the attempt to do so would be so irritating , and so nearly impracticable with all ,
I deem it better , for the time , to forego the uses of such offices .
“ The mails , unless repelled , will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union .
S
o
far a
s possible the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security which
is most favorable to calm thought and reflection . The course here indicated will be
followed , unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to
b
e proper , and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised , accord
ing to circumstances actually existing , and with a view and a hope o
f
a peaceful solu
tion o
f
the national troubles and the restoration o
f
fraternal sympathies and affections .
“ That there are persons in one section o
r
another who seek to destroy the Union a
t
all events , and ar
e
glad o
f any pretext to d
o it , I will neither affirm or deny ; but if
there b
e
such , I need address no word to them . To those , however , who love the Union
may I not speak ?
“ Before entering upon so grave a matter a
s
the destruction o
f our national fabric ,
with all its benefits , its memories , and its hopes , would it not be wise to ascertain pre
cisely why we d
o it ? Will you hazard so desperate a step while there is any possibility
that any o
f
the ills you fl
y
from have n
o real existence ? Will you , while the certain
ills you fl
y
to are greater than all the real ones you fl
y
from , - will you risk the com
mission o
f
so fearful a mistake ?
" All profess to be content in the Union if all constitutional rights can be maintained .
Is it true , then , that any right , plainly written in the Constitution , has been denied ? I
think not . Happily , the human mind is so constituted that no party can reach to the
audacity o
f doing this ? Think , if you can , of a single instance in which a plainly
written provision o
f
the Constitution has ever been denied . If , by the mere force o
f
numbers , a majority should deprive a minority o
f
any clearly written constitutional
right , it might , in a moral point o
f
view , justify revolution , - certainly would if such
right were a vital one . But such is not our case . All the vital rights ofminorities and
o
f
individuals are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and negations , guaranties
and prohibitions , in the Constitution , that controversies never arise concerning them .
But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every
question which may occur in practical administration . No foresight can anticipate , nor
any document o
f
reasonable length contain , express provisions for all possible questions .
Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered b
y
national o
r b
y
State authority ? The
Constitution does notexpressly say . May Congress prohibit slavery in the Territories ?
The Constitution does not expressly say . Must Congress protect slavery in the Terri .
tories ? The Constitution does not expressly say .
“ From questions o
f
this class spring all our constitutional controversies , and we
divide upon them into majorities and minorities . If the minority will not acquiesce , the
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majority must , or the government must cease. There is no alternative ; fo
r
continuing
the government is acquiescence o
n
one side o
r
the other . If a minority in such case
will secede rather than acquiesce they make a precedent which , in turn , will divide and
ruin them ; fo
r
a minority o
f
their own will secede from them whenever a majority
refuses to b
e
controlled b
y
such minority . For instance , why may not any portion of a
new confederacy , a year or two hence , arbitrarily secede again , precisely as portions of
the present Union now claim to secedefrom it ? All who cherish disunion sentiments
are now being educated to the exact temper o
f doing this .
“ Is there such perfect identity o
f
interests among the States to composé a new union ,
a
s
to produce harmony only , and prevent renewed secession ?
“ Plainly the central idea o
f
secession is the essence o
f anarchy . A majority held in
restraint b
y
constitutional checks and limitations , and always changing easily with de
liberate changes o
f popular opinions and sentiments , is the only true sovereign of a free
people . Whoever rejects it does , o
f necessity , fl
y
to anarchy o
r
to despotism . Una
nimity is impossible ; the rule of a minority , as a permanent arrangement , is wholly
inadmissible ; so that , rejecting the majority principle , anarchy or despotism in some
form is all that is left .
" I do not forget the position assumed b
y
some , that constitutional questions are to
b
e
decided b
y
the Supreme Court , nor do I deny that such decision must be binding , in
any case , upon the parties to a suit , as to the object of that suit , while they are also
entitled to very high respect and consideration in a
ll parallel cases b
y
all other depart
ments o
f
the government . And while it is obviously possible that such decision may
b
e
erroneous in any given case , still the evil effect following it , being limited to that par
ticular case , with the chance that itmay be overruled , and never become a precedent for
other cases , can better be borne than could the evils o
f
a different practice . At the same
time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy o
f
the government upon vital
questions , affecting the whole people , is to b
e irrevocably fixed b
y
decisions o
f
the Su
preme Court , the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in per
sonal actions , the people will have ceased to be their own rulers , having to that extent
practically resigned their government into the hands o
f
that eminent tribunal .
“ Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the judges . It is a duty
from which they may not shrink to decide cases properly brought before them ,and it is
n
o
fault o
f
theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes . One se
c
tion o
f
our country believes slavery is right , and ought to be extended , while the other
believes it is wrong , and ought not to be extended . This is the only substantial dispute .
The fugitive slave clause o
f
the Constitution and the law for the suppression o
f
the
foreign slave -trade are each a
s
well enforced , perhaps , as any la
w
ever can b
e
in a com
munity where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself . The
great body o
f
the peopleabide b
y
the dry legal obligation in both cases , and a fe
w
break
over in each . This , I think , cannot be perfectly cared ; and it would be worse in both
cases after the separation o
f
the sections than before . The foreign slave -trade , now im
perfectly suppressed , would b
e ultimately . revived without restriction in one section ;
while fugitive slaves , now only partially surrendered ,would not b
e
surrendered a
t
a
ll b
y
the other .
“ Physically speaking , we cannot separate . We cannot remove our respective se
c
.
tions from each other , nor build an impassable wall between them . A husband and
wife may b
e
divorced , and g
o
out o
f
the presence and beyond the reach o
f
each other ,
but the different parts o
f
our country cannot d
o
this . They cannot but remain face to
face , and intercourse , either amicable o
r
hostile , must continue between them . Is it
possible , then , to make that intercourse more advantageous after separation than before ?
Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws ? Can treaties b
e
more
faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends ? Suppose you g
o
to
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war , you cannot fight always ; and when , after much loss on both sides, and no gain on
either , you cease fighting , th
e
identical old questions , as to terms of intercourse , are
again upon you .
“ This country , with it
s
institutions , belongs to the people who inhabit it . Whenever
they shall grow weary o
f
the existing government they can exercise their constitutional
right o
f amending it , or their revolutionary right to dismember o
r
overthrow it . I can
not b
e ignorant o
f
the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous o
f
hav .
ing the national Constitution amended . While Imake no recommendation o
f
amend
ments , I fully recognize the rightful authority of the peopleover the whole subject , to be
exercised in either o
f
the modes prescribed in the instrument itself ; and I should , under
existing circumstances , favor rather than oppose a fair opportunity being afforded the
people to act upon it . I will venture to add , that to me the convention mode seemspref
erable , in that it allows amendments to originate with the people themselves , instead of
only allowing them to take o
r reject propositions originated by others , not especially
chosen for the purpose , and which might not b
e precisely such a
s they would wish to
either accept o
r
refuse . I understand & proposed amendment to the Constitution -
which amendment , however , I have not seen — has passed Congress , to the effect that
the Federal government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions o
f
the States ,
including that o
f persons held to service . To avoid misconstruction o
f
what I have
said , I depart from my purpose not to speak o
f
particular amendments so far a
s
to say
that , holding such a provision now to b
e implied constitutional law , I have no objection
to it
s being made express and irrevocable .
" The Chief Magistrate derives all bis authority from the people , and they have con
ferred none upon hi
m
to fi
x 'terms for th
e
separation o
f
the States . The people them
selves ca
n
d
o
this also , if they choose ; but th
e
executive , as such , has nothing to do
with it . His duty is to administer th
e
present government , as it came to his hands , and
to transmit it , unimpaired b
y
him , to his successor .
“ Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice o
f
the people .
Is there any better or equal hope in the world ? In our present differences is either
party without faith o
f being in the right ? If the Almighty Ruler o
f
Nations ,with his
eternal truth and justice , be on your side of the North , or on yours of the South , that
truth and that justice will truly prevail , b
y
the judgment o
f
this great tribunal o
f
the
American people .
“ By the frame of the government under which we live , this same people have wisely
given their public servants but little power for mischief ; and have , with equal wisdom ,
provided fo
r
the return o
f
that little to their own hands a
t very short intervals . While
the people retain their virtue and vigilance , no administration , b
y
any extreme o
f
weak
Dess o
r folly , can very seriously injure the government in the short space o
f
four years .
" My countrymen , one and al
l , think calmly and well upon this whole subject . Noth
ing valuable can b
e
lost b
y
taking time . If there be an object to hurry any of you , in
hot haste , to a step which you will never take deliberately , that object will b
e
frustrated
b
y
taking time . Such o
f
you a
s
are now dissatisfied still have the ol
d
Constitution
unimpaired , and , on the sensitive point , the laws o
f
your own framing under it ; while
the new administration will have no immediate power , if it would , to change either . If
it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute , there
still is n
o single good reason fo
r
precipitate action . Intelligence , patriotism , Christian
it
y , and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land , are still
competent to adjust , in the bestway , al
l
our present difficulty .
" In your hands , my dissatisfied fellow -countrymen , and not in mine , is themomen
tous issue o
f
civil war . The government will not assail you . You can have no con
flict without being yourselves the aggressors . You have no oath registered in heaven
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to destroy the government ,while I shall have the most solemn one to preserve, pro
tect, and defend it.'
" I am loath to close. We are not enemies , but friends . We must not be enemies .
Though passion may have strained , it must not break , our bonds of affection. The
mystic chords of memory , stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every
living heart and hearthstone , al
l
over this broad land ,will yet swell the chorus of the
Union ,when again touched , as surely they will be , b
y
the better angels o
f
ur nature . " ]
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